ML20056F854

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Confirms Info Provided by Util During 930726 Telcon W/Nrr & Region III Re Operator Training & Procedural Requirements for Timely Restoration of AFW to Unit Following Dual Unit Actuation.Eops Steps Adequate to Ensure Appropriate Action
ML20056F854
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1993
From: Link B
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-93-90 VPNPD-93-143, NUDOCS 9308310212
Download: ML20056F854 (2)


Text

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t kViscin1 sin Electnc POWER COMPANY 231 W Mcngan. PO fo 2M hwee # E32M MM) 221-23E VPNPD-93-143 NRC-93-90 August 24, 1993 Document Control Desk U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 f

4 The purpose of this letter is to confirm information provided by our staff during a telephone conference with NRC Nuclear Reactor l

Regulation and Region III staff on July 26, 1993.

The purpose of j

the conference was to discuss operator training and procedural requirements concerning the timely restoration of auxiliary feedwater to a unit following a dual unit actuation.

LER 91-001-00, " Minimum AFW Flow During Automatic Operation," for i

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, documents a potential condition in which following a dual unit actuation of auxiliary feedwater (AFW), automatic flow to one unit may not occur if there is a pressure differential between the steam generators of opposite units, and a turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump fails to i

start.

This may occur following a loss of off-site power to the l

units.

On July 26, 1993, we discussed with NRC staff the adequacy of procedural guidance and operator training for mitigating the consequences of the above scenario.

Calculations were previously performed which determined that plant operators had at least five minutes to take action to ensure auxiliary feedwater flow to a unit-following AFW actuation.

A copy of this calculation was provided to the NRC Resident Inspectors for review.

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. Document Control Desk August 24, 1993 Page 2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) direct the operators to verify AFW flow to an affected unit following a reactor trip.

Based on operator experience in responding to actual reactor trips and in the simulator, the operators would reach the procedural step to verify AFW flow and take the required actions to ensure adequate AFW flow to the affected unit within five minutes following the trip.

Although the procedures do not specifically differentiate between a dual unit and a single unit AFW actuation, the EOP steps are adequate to ensure the appropriate action is taken to ensure AFW flow to the affected unit (s).

An operations night order has been initiated to reinforce with operations personnel the implications of a dual unit AFW system actuation and the need to ensure adequate AFW flow to each affected unit.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely, hh W

A Bo y nk Vice President Nuclear Power TGM/jg cc:

NRC Resident Inspector NRC Regional Administrator, Region III e