ML20056C683
| ML20056C683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1993 |
| From: | Erin Kennedy, Kerry J, Studds G HOUSE OF REP., SENATE |
| To: | Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056C684 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-93-003, IEB-93-3, NUDOCS 9307200017 | |
| Download: ML20056C683 (2) | |
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60HFt#5 Of ffJt EHittD 6tatts Mastington. BC 20515 June 29, 1993 Mr. Ivan Selin, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Con:nission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Chairman Selin:
We are writing with regard to two separate problems existing at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant.
First, as you are well aware, there has been longstanding concern about problems with the reference leg of BWR water level instrumentation, including Pilgrin's, which can lead to false high level indications after a rapid depressurization event.
This is critical to safety because water level signals are used to actuate automatic safety systems and for guidance to operators during and after an event.
In NRC Bulletin 93-03, the NRC directed each affected licensee to take steps to enrure that potential level errors would not result in improper system response or improper operator actions during certain situations.
You further directed that hardware modifications be made at the next cold shutdown beginning after July 30, 1993.
While we are pleased that the NRC is directing licensees to address this problem, we are concerned that the repair will not be made for quite some time.
In the case of the Pilgrim plant, the licensee will not be required to nake the modification until the next planned cold shutdown, which isn't until April 1994.
If the problem is serious enough to require a plant that is shut down on August 1, 1993 to make modifications, why are other plants allowed almost a year before they are required to take the same action?
We are also interested in the issue of operability determinations, as discussed by Paul Blanch at the June 1 briefirg.
As you know, Mr.
Blanch argued that the NRC should require the utilities to carry out a plant-specific operability determination based on the latest results 1
of the testing program and to perform that operability determination immediately.
Is Mr. Blanch correct that the regulations and Generic Letter 91-18 require an operability determination in this case that would look at all functions and determine whether the system is capable of perfonning its function?
Please include with your response a copy of the relevant regulations and guidance.
Is Mr. Blanch correct that. the technical specifications for this particular device state that if level measurement is inoperable, it must be fixed immediately?
If Mr.
i Blanch's assertions are accurate, does NRC Bulletin 93-03 conflict with the requirements of the regulations and guidance?
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Chairman Ivan Selin June 29, 1993 Page Two Mr. Blanch also indicated his belief that the solution iglemented at the Millstone plant would be appropriate for Pilgrim. It is our understanding that applying this engineering fix would take only a matter of days.
In fact, Mr. Blanch indicated during questioning that Dr. Thadani and he agreed that some plants could implement the solution while the plant was on line.
As you know, Boston Edison is not convinced of the applicability of the Millstone solution to its plant and is evaluating other options.
Does the NRC have the authority to review this evaluation?
Can the NRC make an independent determination on the applicability of the Millstone solution to Pilgrim or must it accept the licensee's decision?
The second issue about which we are writing concerns cracks in rotors on two low pressure turbines.
We are troubled by the fact that vastly different assessments have been made about the risk of malfunction; given the potential for damage to the reactor containment if the turbine breaks down, it is important that these discrepancies be resolved.
You are probably aware that the turbine's manufacturer, General Electric, claims that the turbine could break apart within a year and a half.
-Since we must attribute a fair amount of credibility to the assessment cf the equipment's own manufacturer, we are at a loss to understand how the NRC can denigrate this analysis, labeling it overly pessimistic.
Could ycu'please provide the basis for this conclusion.
Adding to the uncertainty i' the assertion by the inspector of the turbine., Etructural Ireegrity Associates, that it would not fail in less than four and half years.
We understand that Boyton Edison intends to order two replacement turbines but does not expect to carry out the replacement until April 1995. This is beyond the one and a half year time frame cited by GE and Robert Pollard of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
Is it reasonable to expect that the turbines cannot be delivered until that date?
Given the more pessimistic scenarios, what assurance can you provide that the turbines can safely operate for nearly two more years?
These two issues raise significant safet cerns which zust be resolve Your timely response to thes tions is appreciated.
Si e
l Edward M. Kennedy er fE. Studds U.S.
Senate House of Representatives q
ohn F. Kerry U.S. Senate j
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