ML20056C518
| ML20056C518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/10/1992 |
| From: | Davis P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-2043, NUDOCS 9306240370 | |
| Download: ML20056C518 (1) | |
Text
CT-5189'3 fpc bPllC September 10, 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR:
David A.
Ward
'I NM FROM:
Peter R.
Davis, ACRS Consul ant I wasn't entirely satisfied with Murley's answer to your question regarding use of the ASP to evaluate potential containment integrity failures.
His answer seemed to be that since containments haven't been challenged we have no data for input to the precursor study.
I think that we can, and should, look at the conditional probability of containment failure given the sequence initiated by the precursor.
Of concern here would be:
1.
Did the precursor event itself compromise the reliability of systems needed to preserve containment integrity?
2.
Did failures assumed in the accident sequence subsequent'to the precursor event also compromise the availability /
reliability of containment safety systems?
3.
At the time of the precursor event, what was the status of the containment systems?
(i.e., one train out for maintenance, in a failed state, under test, etc.)
4.
At the time of the event, how likely would containment bypass.
be (either due to the sequence itself or to a pre-existing containment condition).
PWR Cont. Systems BWR Cont. Systems Sprays, fan coolers, heat Drywell sprays, ignitors, 2
removal, ignitors (support recombiners, suppression i
systems:
CCW, SWS, power pool cooling (support 1 l
etc.)
systems:
cc:
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