ML20055F526

Informs Commission of Working Group Activities Under US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety

ML20055F526
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/13/1990
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
TASK-PII, TASK-SE JCCCNRS-WG-7, SECY-90-246, NUDOCS 9007170411
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{{#Wiki_filter:* g a peeosoeeeeeeeeeeeeee.... I l RELEASED TO THE PDR ono /s ug$, e e v/27/eo a ^, taa < inug 2 e e e e e e e e s e e s e o s e t ...e* (Information) July 13, 1990 SECY-90-246 fati The Commissioners f.rmi James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations Subiect: REPORT COVERING DISCUSSIONS Of JCCCNRS WORKING GROUPS 1 AND 8 IN THE USSR, APRll 21 - MAY 2, 1990 Puroose: To inform the Comission of working group activities under the U.S.- USSR Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS). Discussion: Attached for your information is a copy of a cover memorandum and its enclosures, which constitute a multi-part report of the visit of an NRC delegation th.t travelled to the USSR April 21 - May 2, 1990. The discussions involved Working Groups 1 Safety Approaches and Re of(Operational Experience),gulatory Practices) and 8 (Exchange d We a es 1. Tay r ecutive D rector for Operations Re isit to the USSR NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE Aphortoil 21 - May 2, 1990 IN 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS PAPER

Contact:

Gordon Fowler, GPA/IP 49-20329 DISTRIBUTION: Commissioners OGC .I b ci OIG GPA EDO k ] ACRS }& fo?170y I I QSgp) )(4 1

June 18, 1990 MEMORANDUM FOR: James M. Taylor, Chairman, JCCCNRS Harold R. Denton, Director, GPA FROM: Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs, AEOD

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF Visli TO THE USSR APRIL 21 - MAY 2, 1990

===1. Background=== This is one of a series of reports on working group meetings under the auspices of the Joint Coordinating Committee for Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS). These meetings are part of a series of meetings approved in protocols uetween the US and the USSR in August 1988 and October 1989. An NRC delegation arrived in the USSR on April 21,1990 for a week of meetings. The meetings covered: WG 1 - Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices (led by L. Joseph Callan, Region IV) WG 8 - Exchange of Operational Experience (led by Thomas M. Novak, Headquarters) The head of the delegation was Thomas M. Novak,

11. Summary The meetings of the two working groups were held oc the All Union Institute for fiuclear Power Plant Operations (VNilAES) in suburban Moscow. VN!!AES is part of the Ministry of Nuclear Power and Industry (under Vitaly Konovalov).

.ne antantive usuualuns were neio Aprii 15-27. l'r l'atsov, Deputy Directer of VNilAES for Nuclear Science, opened the meeting by noting that it marked the 10th anniversary of the Institute. Vladimir Sukoruchkin of the Kurchatov Institute represented N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS. He noted that the renewal of the Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, under whose authority the JCCCNRS operates, was to be signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Bush at the Summit in June. (The Agreement wes signed by the two Presidents on Jdne 1, 1990). I 4 6

James M. Taylor 2 Harold R. Denton Following these introductory remarks, the two working groups retired to separate rooms for the week. The results of the meetings are in the

• Memorandum of Hecting of Working Groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nucleer Reactor Safety, April 23 27,1990" (MOM.5) (Enclosure 1). For each working group, MOM.5 summarizes the subjects discussed and the conclusions and recommendations reached in the discussions. Additionally, each of the working group leaders and the International Programs officer prepared trip reports of the meetings and the visit (Enclosures 2 3). A separate trip report (Enclosure 4) was provided by the representative from International programs.

Over the weekend, the delegation visited the Zaporothe nuclear power plant at Energodar in the southern Ukraine, where five VVER.1000s are operating and one nearing completion of construction. This was the site of the 1989 inspector exchange in which L. Joseph Callen participated, i Following the weekend, a final meeting was held to finalize and sign the HOM.5. Ciriginal clgned by: Thomas M. Novak I Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs, AEOD

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/cnclures: J. Snierek, DEDO F. Miraglia, NRR R. Speis, RES E. Jordan, AEOD S. Rosen, DOE M. Schulman, DOE T. ;6 '.c.,, :;RC l E. Beckjord, RES R. Brady, SEC/ADM R. Hauber, IP/GPA V. Benaroya, IP/GPA J. Clifford, OE00 Distribution 05P P/F-G. Fowler T. Novak L. Whitney M. Williams J. Callan H. Ornstein-T ore ..... ; m.am?.. ;............;............;............;............;.............;......... NAME - DATE :,,s,e OFFICIAL RECORD COPY P

A 4 i t a r w e 4 9i i t i e t 1 8 a y ' O t. .I k h t r ? e 4

n e _? MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF WORKJNG GROUPS M-5 = OF THE US-USSR JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE 2 ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY April 23-27, 1990 1 The fifth eeeting of working groups of the US-USSR Joint f', Coordinating Committee on Civilian

• Nuclear Reactor Safety

( J CCCNRS ) was held in Moscow at the All Union Research Institute r for Nuclear Power Plants Opi:ation (VNIIAES) on April 23-27. g 1990. In addition the working groups had a very useful visit to t: the Zaporothe Atomic Power Station. Two of the ten working groups }_ had discussions. The working groups were as follows: WORKING GROUP 1: SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGUL/ TORY PRACTICES ] WORV'"4 1ROUP 8: EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE f. int US side of the working groups was headed by Thomas M. Nova. Director. Division of Safety Programs. U,,. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The USSR side was headed by Armen A. ADagyan. General Director of All Union Research Inst'itute for NPP Orrration (VNIIAES). The reports of the two working groups are ') provided in Appendix I. A list of participants in the working group sessions, as well as observers. is provided'in Appendix II. The lista of documents exchanted for each session are provided in Appendix III. This Memorandum of Meeting reports the recommendations and proposed future actions. WORKING GROUP 1: SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES Both sides agreed to proposed topics for the next Working Group i Information Exenange meeting and. areas of emphasis for the next inspector exchange.The information exchange meeting is 1

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re;csed for fallewinter 1990/91 but both sides reccanice that this proposal for the timing of the next meeting may te affected by the timing of the currently postponed inspector exchanges.

The US will consider specific Soviet p ro t. c s a l s. Both sides agree that the following topics should be included during the upcoming information exchange moiting and inspector exchange: 1. Allocation of inspection resources to reflect the differing safety performance of NPPs.

2. Inspection of licensee training programs and activities of operatcr licensing examiners.

3.The role of the headquarters organization and regional officea in assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of the reactor inspectlon program. 4

e_ I i 4 Programs for developmwns of emergency preparednaog with emphasis' o c. the participation of local gover sents tnd <a tlls public relations groups. Both sides agree that 59Pricitat.$on during an emergency preparedness drill as part of tier 01Xt inspector exchange would be beneficial. j $. Regulatory requirements for reviewing the adequacy of ) l reactor core thermal and physics characteristics of newly installed cores. including comparison of associated US and USSR regulatory documents.

6. How and when changes are made to the inspection program.to t

in';crporate lessons learned or information gathered from analysis of operational events. 7. Accident management for be.'<ond design basis. accidents. B. Early in the inspector exchange. exchangees will be briefed on the host country's stra t em-for. nuclear power procuction, focusing on the current roles of Soviet ministers or US sovernment agencies and industry organizations in d e s i gn', ~ 1 construction, operations and regulation (including the relationships and responsibilities of GPAN and the NRC relative the other government ministries / agencies). Information will be exchanged about the philosophy and practices-of' supervision / regulation of the nuclear industry in the USSR /US. 9. US-and USSR practices regarding the-supervision or regulation of design processes and methods for assuring USSR design standards that US and are met. In addition. both nuclear facilities sides will consider appropriate tours of for memoers of the working group. WORKING GROUP 8: EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL' EXPERIENCE April 27. 1990 Topic it Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicators RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES: Performance Indicators should be - further discussed in the I 1990 fall meeting. Specific sub3ecta would include further development and benefits resulting from the use of the indicators. The U.S. should coordinate a discussion of plant maintenance management systems-Rand possibl/ a presentation by-a U.S. utility. Topic 2: Human Factors Affects on NPP Safety RECOMENDATIONS FOR-FUTURE ACTIVITIES: It was agreed that future work was warranted to examine the human factors of recent operational events and share results from that work. Actual examples of operator performance during abnormal operational events should be further discussed in the next meeting.

- ~. Topic 2: Techniques to Identify Severe Accident Precursors RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES: The delegations agreed that further results should be exchanged at the next meeting. In the interia. additional information on the ASP code may be provided to the U.S.S.R. i delegation. Topic 4: Assessment of Feedback Effectiveness RICOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES i Future meetings of the working group should include reports on feedback projects. new case studies, and the analysis of new-recent safety significant events, specific topics being: 1. US: Studies addressing common-cause failure potential. 2. US: Programs and events occuring during plant shutdowns. studies associated with conditions and

3. USSR and US: Interplant feedback of operating experience to stimulate improved plant performance.

Topic '5: Discussion of selected safety. events root cause RECOMENDATION FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES USSR and US: Discussion of recent including root operational experience. cause analysis. lessons learned operating experience. and feedback of 1 FOR THE USSR STATE COKMITTEE FOR THE UTILI"ATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR THE.US NUCLEAR THE REGULATORY COMMISSION /]- m / ^ Armen A. Abagyan &N i Thomas M. Novak ') } 1 May, 1990-f ,1 May. 1990 s l in i._

l e-i APPENDIX I MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS OF THE TWO WORKING GROUPS i Attached are the smoranda-of the two working group meetittas held in Moscow. April 23-27, 1990. 4 i O-j \\ a r r. l

.. - - ~. - -. -. 5 MEMORANDUM OF MEETING FOR WORKING GROUP 1: r SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY-PRACTICES 4

l. WORKING CROUP SCOPE AND CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS.

The main topics discussed by the USSR and the US participants were as follows: 1. The US and USSR representatives made presentations' on their experiences and observations during 'the 1989. inspector l exchange program. with emphasis.on differences in US and USSR: approaches in the following areas of-intereett The. roles and. relationships among the various governmental organizations involved with nuclear power generatient The relationship between inspectors and the plant stafft ) The allocation of inspection resources and inspection planninst The enforcement authority-of inspectors and personal vs i organization respons1b111ty for violationst The reactive vs-proscrive role of-inspectores The roles of resident va region-based inspectors-and offsite support provided to the resident inspectorat Design pr.11osophy as evidenc'ed by' design and safety features-currently in place'in each country's reactor plants't The scope-and depth of operating and emergency procedurest l The scope.and depth of inspection procedurest The degree of plant management oversight of safety-related. l activities: The characteristics of maintenLice. surveillance, and design j change programs: The training and qualification of-operators and !1nspectors and the depth of inspector. plant-spweific knowledge and engineering expertiset Regulatory = body systems for providing feedback on operating experience, operating ' events. and design problems for use in modification of the inspection program.

2. The sides also. discussed' resident inspector evaluation of overall plant safety on

a. day-to-day

basis, including-the parame ters. and indicators review 6d by.the inspectors to determine the plant enfaty etetuc. 7; pica includect The philosophy l underlying'the resident inspector's approach to monitoring the activities of the operating organization:

A typical weekly divided between'scheduledschedule.of resident, inspector activities as and non-scheduled.activitiest- -A detailed breakdown of regularly scheduled-daily, weekly. biweekly, etc. inspector tours. observations.and verificatioitat. Non-routine. -unscheduled (reactive) resident inspector-i ' activities such as event or generic safety issue followup. ( M. w ,--w s.- .me.-we. -.. - .- - + - w - m --..--s m

v. n t l 3 Planning was pursued-for the next inspector exchange and regulatory body oversight of design processes was discussed. A. The USSR side-described the organisation and nuclear regulatory activities-of GOSPROMATOMNADEOR (GPAN). Committee a new State having responsibility for the safety of all industries. including the civilian .n u,cle ar power industry.-The Soviets also outlined the nuclear safety policy of this-new organisation, the-role of GPAN. the USSR and-of Nuclear Power safety.. which is now a subsetState' Committee for Supervision of this larger-organisation. The ~ extent 't o which GPAN's. authority in I directing and implementing nuclear safety policy has, been enhanc63 by this restructuring was also covered. Finally, the USSR side' described the Scientific Technical Safety-Center. functions and specific activities of the l Which. is, affiliated with-GPAN. The following-aspects'were discussedt The current and projected activities of the Centert The organisational structure of the Center The decision process for selecting research activitiest How the scientific and engineering expertise of.the+ Center staff is adduated to satisfy' diverse research needst; The process by which research results are folded back into -the regulatory program for 1mplementation: The circumstances leading to the undertaking of research-activities (e.g. whether promptedwhether a proactive or reactive undertakinal i by operating experience. design / analysis practices. construction practices. ' performance-capability considerations): Accomplishments of the Centert Relationship of Concer efforts 'to GPAN: regulatory program activitiest impact cf Center. activities on the design / construction / operation of nuclear power plants. manufacturing facilities, and regulatory activities. AGREEMENTS A'lD CONCLUSIONS 1. Both sidos reviewed and discussed in detail the results of the very valuac.e 1989 inspector exchange USSF program. The-US.and reprocentativas mace presentations on their experiences'and ooservations dLring this exchange. With emphasis ' on differences in the two sides' ' approaches.in a-number of' areas such scope and desth of as the inspection procedurest the relatio9 ship betweon inspectors and the plant staffl the enforcement' authority of inspectores the roles of resident vs region-based inspectorst and'the craining and qualification of operators 'and inspectors. The following signd.ficant similarities approaches of _the two sides were notedt 'and differences.in'the The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission a. (NRC) and the USSR' Gospec=atomnac:or have common obdectives to regulating the safe utill:ation of nuclear energy.. but differ in organizational. ~ structure and regulatory procedures / approaches. b. Both sides consider-it important to analyze the.ceuses of operational occurrences at nuclear power plante, imgl of regulatory approaches that encourage: an and,to undertake att1,ementation Yude of-concern and 'self-criticism-on the part of plant managers anc cperating personnel toward their work, almec at safe (o

y r-operation of reactors. t i It is noted that periodic comprehensive team inspections of. i all aspects of safety.. conducted by specialists in the regionsa } and from the headquarters, provide an important supplement to the. s NPP inspection program. t Both. sides attach great importance to developing-operating Orocedures..and ~believe that an optimal relationship should be ( va*.ntained between procedural detail and operator flexibility respene to unfors'een situations (taking into account to. the level of I operatsc training and proficiency). i

2. The two sides also discussed resident inspector evaluation-I of everall plant safety on a daily basis. includins parameters-a.n d indicators reviewed to-determine -plant safety status..

Conclusions reached were as follows:- a. Both sides believe that by regions to evaluate NPP safety.the inspection program 9Cnducted in addition to work done by; the site inspectors. is an important factor that contributes to. the ability to effectively allocate regulatory resources.

b. Both~ sides are committed _-to

'a 'high guality. of, plant maintenance, particularly at units operating for a long period of time. Both sides agree that there is a need to enhance our

• regulatory: approaches to maintenance.

1 3. The US side discussed -the NRC oversight of.. design I activities from pre-licensing to license renewal / life extension. The Soviet side discussed their regulatory-approach-to design review including the use of. operational experience as design and an input to i mocification-activities. A. The USSR side described 'the = organization and. nuclear regulatory activities of GOSPROMATOMNADZOR (GPAN).- a 'new State Committee having responsibility for'the safety of'all including the ' industries. civilian nuclear power industry. The ' Soviets also outlined the nuclear' safety policy of this new organization. 'and-the role of GPAN, the USSR State Committee fer Oupervision of l auceear Power Safety.'which is now a subset of this larger L organization. The extent to.- which GPAN's a'thority in directing and implementing-nuclear' safety policy has been u enhanced by this restructuring was-also covered.' Finally, side described the USSR the functions and specific activities of the Scientific Technical Safety ~ Center. which is affiliated with GPAN. At the meeting the Soviet, side reported:a change in the structure and functions of the USSR GOSPROMATOMNADZOR. Regulatory 1 and cversight functions.in the general field of safe utilization of nuclear energy are -now _-being carried out'by,a commission heade: ty Chairman A.Belyaev. He is the first deputy Chairman of GCSPRCMATOMNADOOR. .This. commission is charged.with additional regulatory responsibilities in the area of radiation ' safety. safety in radioactive waste -handling. fuel technology. and othere. j 5.The US side discussed the-coordinating ' role of the US l Nuclear Regulatory Commission in safe 9y research and cevelopment 7 1.i _ - -,,.. - ~

o programs. including the process for selection and prioritization of research activities, and how reguistory needs influencethe implementation of research results.- I safety research. U.O.S wo g c3,g,, U.S. wG 1 Co-Leader. M&:alov, Anatolvs T.. c.11&n'. penard a. j 1 i i i e O i i a- ) (7

4

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s - MEMORANDUM OF MEETING FOR WORKING GROUP 8: ~ { EXCHANGE OF. OPERATIONAL EXPEP.IENCE i WOPKING GROUP 8: EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE ECOPE AND CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS: i The various topics of discussion focussed'on the evaluation of operating experience. primarily power reactor events. { methods employed in and the -the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to determine the 'I relative significance of. events and emerging safety-issues. .It i was noted that the U.S.S.R. had initiated.new work based upon the 1989 Working Group 8 meetingc and they discussed the results of this work. During this meeting. it waa'also noted that the; scope N of vne interchange was becomming' better. defined and of more interest to both participants. = Topic 1: NuclearLPower Plant Performance-Indicators The participants presented i papers. discussing' methods to' trend and further analyze the events at issueo arising from eculpment power reactors.to detect safety or. program deficienci,es. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. presented their respective programs of' plant perfermance indicators. These indicators included safety system tsilure. reactor trips.' significant-events, unplanned'or-forced power plant outages, and other accepted indicators of. overall plant performance.'Each country presented-its-approach develcp maintenance indicators. The U.S presented ita' equipment-to'further failure based indicator and the U.S.S.R. ~ presented its development resseding maintenance indicators based on the reliability of plant equipment. AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:. It was agreed that the I discuasions potential =' benefits for further warrant that a meeting be heldLin the U.S. in the fall of 1990. Both delegations agreed that the subgeet of monitoring nuclear plant develcred. performance was a priority issue and'must be further Both delegations agreed that indicators-provide valuable information anc. if possible. should plant performance. The U.S.S.R. noted that cover all major areas of used by IAEA or WANO. such as the Safety, System Performance -certain' indicators. Indicator (SSPI), may warrant further discussion. The: U.S. agreed with the technical basis for this proposal. B0th delegations recognized. based-upon their analysis of operating experience, to ensure safe operations;that. plant maintenance was a primary' issue. It was observed that! the.U.S. and the U.S.C. nac. a common understanding of the definition of~ " maintenance". This perspective defined s i functions needed to maintain the reliability. of the plant main t s n an c e '- as al l' equi;nent and the function of.each train as well as the balante-of-plant system. One etJective of the U.S.S.R. program is tased in optimising the frequency of preventive maintenance of equipnent te avoid unnecessary maintenance activities. The.U.S. noted inat this activity was cimilar to reliability-centered W 11

-) s,- maintenance activities in the U.S. The U.S.S.R. expressed an i. interest in discussing ~ plant maintenance management systems. The U.S.S.R. discussed-the potential for. developins an overall safety indicator ~ based upon the individual indicators. The U.S. explained their experience on that t subject.,The U.S. emphasized its position that guidance is ne ces s ary to ensure that performance indicators are not misused. The delegations agreed .that deterministic indicators. and reliability-based (ptobabilistic)-indicators-desirable. Deterministic indicators are: are: characterized' by simplicity. and

accuracy, but. reliability (probabilistic) indicators have the potential to provide additional quantitative Perspective on equipment performance and would represent in the development of risk based indicators. The-delegations a-step believed that the probabilistic approach can supplement.

deterministic assessments. 1 RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES: Performance Indicators should be further fall meetina. Specific subsects would diseu,ssed in the 1990 include further development and~ benefits resulting from the use of the indicators. The .U.S. should coordinate maintenance management a discussion of plant systems U. S. utility. and possibly a presentation by a Topic 2 Human Factors Affects on NPP Safety U.S.S.R. and U. S. 1 presentations focussed on their analyses of the -human factors invcived in the causes'and response to operating reactor events. In addition to' systematic analyses the patterns of personnel related of Insights were provided causes for these events. on 'ha operator behavior during. such events. The USSR presentes f.n analysis of operator actions during' abnormal events involvins. equipment failure. The U.'S. presented ~ information regarding steam generator tube. rupture (SGTR) events where the operators responded differently in' performing recovery. actions. AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONSI The delegations agreed that the performance. of. operatorm-during operational events should be further studied. I Understanding the influences on the operators. Was - L of-first importance. The U. S. delegation agreed to provide lessons' learned from their program The U.S. i U.S.S.R.. for their potential . agreed' to forward to the i use.c a protocol for operator 3 interviews following such events and a specific l evaluation-of one event. The U.S.S.R. delesation noted that future discussions might approach the. topic of causes for human errors. RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE' ACTIVITIES: It was agreed that future work was' warranted to examine the human factors of recent operational events and share resulta' from that work. Actual examples.of operator performance during 1 acnormal operational events. should be further discussed in the /0 ..~.

next meeting. Topic 3: Techniques to Identify Severe. Accident Precursors j This topic focussed on'the actual review'of operating events to detect those that could be precursors of more serious events. The U.S.S.R. presented potential modeling techniques to utilize operational-data to evaluate and trend the overall safety level I of a plant. These involved the-use of Markovian processes to formulate methods to predict-the possibility of the failures of -equipment and systems with the consequences of a more severe 3 accident. The U.S. discussed mheir Accident Sequence -Precursor (ASP) program. using' event; tree methods, to screen operstional i events and select precursors,for further analysis and evaluation. The mador assumptions. included in the models were discussed. The Markovian method may address the concern of analysis uncertainty l and may lend itself to provide a probability-value for event reoccurrence, while the: ASP involved a best estimate ] analysis that_could.be used for~ feedback to plant management. Additionally, a paper was=also presented involving analyses of ) noble sas release which could be needed to saggest a casis for restricting plant ~ a operations to Within acceptable safety limits. J AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS: 1 The delegations -agreed fthat quantitative tools-for events analysis had been shown-to provide safety -benefit. Specific benefits from past analyses were presented as examples of how the technique could be used to. enhance sa*ety. One such.was the quantification of sequential events at one plant with the resultant effect of increasingLthat plant's vulnerability'to a serious accident. Recognition of-this condition and 4 communication with~ the plant operators -can improve; their awareness of potentially unsafe plant conditions. The. delegations agreed that development activities should_ continue to obtain quantitative ~{ methods to evaluate actual operational. events. Strategies should { be developed to assess the uncertainty in an analysis. ASP and 1 Markovian models are two initial approaches to this area. The delegations agreed that there was a potential for a;41aterpretas.on-or Ino resulta'from such. quantitative tools and-that the development activities-should ' address the proper and j improper use of such tools based-upon their limitations and potential effects. 'l AECCMENDATIONS FORLFUTURE ACTIVITIES: The delegations agreed.that.further results should be 1 exchanged at the next-meeting. In the interim. additional i information on the. ASP code m ay ' - b e provided to the U.S.S.R. delegation. j Topic ut Assessment of-Feedback. Effectiveness Both sides-presented examples which illustrated-the effectiveness of their processestfor the feedback of operating experience. it is recogniced that there are many organizational ~ differences between each country's programs. however, the systems of both countries do have some similarities. Each country provided examples to include that each is working f$

successfully. The countries have some had similar, operating experience, with similar' corrective actions. by way of their in plan feedback processes. The U.S.S.R. delegation presented information on nuclear power plant equipment reliability data. The US delegation expressed interest in this activity and provided insights gained from similar US activities. AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS We agree that continued evaluation and feedback of reerational data ic an important tool to inha nee reactor saf ety. Each country's program is ef fective at.d appears to be achieving successful results. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES Future meetings of the working group should include reports on new feedback projects, new case studies, and the analysis of .recent cafety significant events. specific topics beings-

1. US: Studies addressing. common-cause f ailure. potential..-

2. US: Programs and studies; associated with conditions and' events occuring during plant shutdowns..

3. U3CR and.US: Interplant feedback of operating experience to stimulate improved plant performance.

' Topic 5: Discussion of selected safety events. at cause analysis. lessons learned Both sides presented information about recent events. The presentations included discussions of .)e analysis techniques and each country's event classification guidelines. AGREEMENTS AND CCNCLUSIONS We agree that the discussions of recent operational events are important to our feedback programs to enhance reactor safet&. We agree that futare meetinas should include. similar discuzcions of recent events. l RECOMENDATION FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES USSR and US: Discussion of recent operational ex' 'perience. including root-cause analysis. lessons. learned and feedback of operating experience. U.C.C.R. WG S Co 'ascer U.S. WG 8 Co-Leader. Vi tMov. Vladidir M. Novak. Thomas. M. e /2 i i

e o A9PENDIX II: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS-US PARTICIPANTS IN WORKING' GROUP-1: SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES: Co-Leaders l Callan. Leonard J.. Director. Division'of' Reactor Safety. Region IV. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Other

Participants:

Whitney. Leon E..-Inspection and Licensing Program Branch-Office.of Nuclear Reactor Regulation US' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Observer: I Fowler. Gordon. International Programs. Office of Governmental and.Public Affaire-us Nuclear Regulatory Commission USSR Participants. in Working Group 1: Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices Co-Leader i _ l! Mazalov. Anatoly1 T., Head-of GPAN Main. Department = Other Participantes. l Kordduk. Alexander G...Yuzhoukrainsky region GPAN Deputy Head' Stovoun, Viktor V.. Yuzhonoukrainsky region-GPAN In pector Koltunov. Viktor P.. Zaporothye NPP GPAN Inspector Head' Serebryakov. Alexander V., Yuzhnoukrainsk'aya NPP GPAN Inspector Head Miroshnichenko. Michael I.. Head of GPAN ' Nuclear safety See* ion Sleonev. Lev H., Deputy Head of GPAN Second Department Bukrinsky1. Anatolyi M..,Depar,tment Head Scientific Research l Centre Gortunov, Viktor P.. Scientific Secretary-Scientific Research Centre o Sit:sker. Valervi P. Senior Scientist Scientific Research Centre Khazanov. Adolf L.. Laboratory-Head. Scientific Research Centre- %2 /3 ) l

1 I .s US Participants in Working Group 88 Exchange of Operational Experiences Co-Leadert Novak. Thomas M., Director. Division of Safety Programs US Nuclear Regulatory Commission other

Participants:

Williams. Mark H.. Chief. Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch US Nuclear Regulatory Oommission Ornstein.-Harold L.. Reactor Systems Section for Westinghouse and. Babcock and Wilcox Reactors US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Observer: Fowler, Gordon. International Programs Office of Governmental and Public Affairs US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Interpreters Kelly. Kevin. US Department of State USSR Participants in Working Group 8: } Exchange of Operational Experience: Co-Leader:

Vitkov, V., Division Head. All-Union.Research ' Institute 'for Nuclear Power Plant Operations (VNIIAES).

Other

Participants:

ALL UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR NPP OPERATION: Taratunin. Valery1 M. Ohuk. Yuryi K. Altshooler. Michael A. Mikhailov. Valentin D. Gonchukov. Viktor V. Podkolzina. Larisa V. Doroshenko, Georsyi G. Gurinovich. Valeryl D. 'Plyusin. Boris S. Borovkov. Anatolyi I. Ananyev. Grisoryi A. Chukavina. Svetlana M. Belo ertsev. Michael A. Popov. Aleksei M. Lennoi. Stanislav A. Ph111montsev. Yury1 N. Sorokin. Vyatcheslav V. j i-a /6/

1 GOSPROMATOMHADSOR ) Macalov. Anatoly1 7. Kame n e v. Yupiter A. ) V.ha t a n ov, Adolf L. Bukrinsky1. Anton M. Gromovsky1 Gennady1 I. Biryukova. Nataly F. Gorbanko. Andrew L. GYDROPRESS Melchanov, Vladimir L. D:hangobegov. Viktor V. [ I.V.Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute Osmachkin. Vladimir S. USSR MINISTRY OF HVC 1AA POWER & INDUSTRY Artyushin. V1kvc;> P. i OakharenkOV. Sergate fl. i l I % 4 1 /3 i 6

=- - ... - - ~ _ 'o s' APPENDIX III Documents Exchanged by Working Group it by US: Inspection Procedure 71707. December 18. 1989 " Operational Safety Verification." Memorandum from L.J. Callan. Director. Division of Reactor Safety. Region IV and P.G. Brachman.' Senior Resident Inspector. Region III. to James M. Taylor. Acting Executive Director for Operations. " Trip Report on Inspector Exchange with July 8 - August the USSR. 27, 1989." dated November 14, 1989. NUREG/BR-OO53 (rev. 2). "U.S. Regulations Handbook." December 1989 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NUREG-1319. "A Prioritizat' ion of Research Activities.'" December 1988 Memorat.dum from Eric S. Beckdord to multiple; addressees. transmit *ing-RES Office Letter No. Identifica*1on.

1. Revision 1. " Procedure for Generic Issues." MarchPrioritization and Tracking of the Resolution of.

22. for Control of Rulemaking."1989. "Research Procedures Handbook prepared by the-Regulation Development Branch. of Nuclear Regulatory Research. Division of Regulatory Applications. Office May 1988. Memorandum from Victor Stallo. Jr.. to multiple-addressees.. transmitting the revised charter for the Committee to Review Generic Requirements.' April 23, 1987. by USSR to be provided t Documente Exchanced tv Woraing Group d-1 by US: Performance. Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors - Data through December 1989 (2 volumes) l ^ l, NUREG-1272. Vol. 3.-June 1989. "AEOD-Annual Report L for 1988" Accident Sequence Precursor Program Event-Analysis NUREG-1275. Vol. 5. dated. " Operating Experience ' Feedback-Report-Progress in Scram Reduction." l I NUREG/CR-4991, dated " Evaluation and. Proposed Effectiveness of U.S. Nuclear / Regulatory Commission Generic Improvements to-Communications." by USSR Altshooler. M. NPP Performance Indicators. /6 l

J 4 Ananyev. G. of WANO PIs. NPP Operational' Safety Performance Indicators. Use Taratunin. V. Maintenance Optimization Based on Reliability ) i Indicatore Using Probabilistic Techniques, t i. Gurinovich. V. NPP Equipment Maintenance And Repair l Indicators. J Borovkov. A. Operating. Personnel Effect On NPP Safety in 1989-Compared to 1988. Nad An Efferet On MPP Safety. Examples Of Events Where Personnel Actions Artemchuk. /.'. Gonchukov..V.. Podkolmina. L. Analysis Of Serial VVER-1000 Plant Causes. Operating Personnel Errors And Their

Panov, A.. Taratunin.

V. Accident Probabilistic Prediction.Use of Markovian Processes Foi' Kamenev. Yu. Basic Guidel.enes , ' ~ System.For Severe Accident For The Development Of An Expert ' 'Curren t NPP-Safe ty.. Level. prevention. A Way-To Identify The l Doroshenko. Noble Gas Discharges To:Desermine Permissible-Dev Prohibit NPP-Operation With Regard To Plant Peculiarities. Khatanov. A. Operational SafetyAnalysis of NPP Event Data A'nd Evaluation Of Plant Level. Vitkov. V. Operational Experience Dissomination And Examples l Of Feedback From Plant Events. Mikhailov, V. Use Of NPP Equipment Reliability-Data In' Industry (Factories. Research Institutes ~.. Designers).

Mazalov, A.

Experience With ISI-NADZOR Information System Feedbackt Co n t a c i c Wi t.'.

• idustry.

Zhukavina. S.. Pryaklin. 33.04.89 V..Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 1 Scram On Spurious Actuation Of~ Automatic Protections.After TG Load R Molchanov. V., Novak. V.. et ~l The Number Events At all.' Preliminary Assessment Of VVER-1000 Plants Throughout i Lifetime. J Belozartsev. M. Independent failures of Two Trains Of Emergency Discharge From-SG ThroughPower Supply System of Safety System And W ADV During Kalinin NPP Unit 1 Cooldown on 06.01 90. Plyugin. B. Failure Subsystem of Sat'ety System. Train 3 on 27. 08. 89 Atof Control. V NPP Unit 8 Zaporotnye Zhuk. Yu.. Borovkor. A. Pressurization-Of Refueling Machine Tunnel At Chernocyl NPP Unit 2 on 22.06.69. /7 ~_

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TRIP REPORT FOR WORKING GROUP 1 Official Travelers: L. J. Callan Travel to: Moscow, USSR L. E. Whitney j Office: NRR Beginning on: April 20, 1990 Ending on: - May 2, 1990 Meeting

Title:

Working Group Safety Approaches o'nd Regulatory Practices Organized by: Joint Civilian Coordinating Committee for Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)

1. Introduction The Working Group 1 discussions'the week of 23-27 April,1990 addfessed the following topics:

1. Experiences and observations-during the 1989 US/ USSR Inspector Exchange Program (Working Group 1.2).

Emphasis was on the differences,in,U.S. l and U.S.S.R. practices including the relationship between inspectors and' plant staff.

2. Methods used by resident inspectors to evaluate overall plant safety

~ on a daily basis. '3. US and USSR desires for FY 1990 inspector exchanges.

4. Regulatory oversight of the design process.

5. The research function and activities of the USSR Scientific Technical Safety Center and its impact on GPAN's regulatory activities and on nuclear power production facilities.

6. The USNRC Office of Research mission, interaction with industry, issue gru.ritization, ono :,uppvrt for regulatory utivity.

,, aS$h cooes ano regulations for NPP safety: nuclear safety p*inciples,. technical regulations, safety rules, requirements from other 'nini-steries, and -industrial safety guides. The conclusions and recommenoations for future action resulting from these dis-cussions are contained in " Memorandum of Meeting of Working Groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, April 23-27,1990"(M0M-5). The Soviet Co-Leader for the week of discussions was Anatolyi T. Mazalov, the Head of the GpAN Main Department. Other Soviet participants are listed in Appenoix II :f M0M-5. 1 3

11. Information Obtained from GPAN GPAN REORGAHlZATION GPAll (formally GAEN) has undergone an extensive reorganization (see new GPAN organization chart attached) putting day-to-day -operations of GPAN under the control of N. A. Steinberg. Overall control of GPAN is by A. I. Belyaev.- Of-l most significance in'the reorganization-is the inclusion of fuel cycle facili-ties, radiation safety, industrial and medical use of sources, transportation of nuclear material (sources, waste, spent fuel), and space applications of nuclear energy under GPAN.

The increased scope of GPAN responsibility will not be accompanir.d by any ap. preciable staff increases. As a consequence, GPAN believes that it will have to reduce some of its inspection requirements at nuclear power This mayhavehadsomebearingonrecentdecisions(discussedbelow) plants. to shift to, i ward more safety responsibility by the operating organizations and to _ reduce-the number of site inspectors, i LEGAL-BASIS FOR GPAN GPAN anticipates that late this year or in early 1991 the USSR will enact laws-concerning utilization of nuclear power (similar to the US Energy Reorganiza-tion Act of 1974), with new implementing regulations to follow. STANDARDS GPAN expects that in the summer of 1990 new standards will be issued which will address:

1. Beyond design basis accidents

]

2. The distinction between safety and non-safety, as it applies to systems and components

a. Numericai (PRA-basea) safety goals -

3

4. Changes in line operating organization safety accountablility and GPAN safety oversight GPAN expects that about six RMBK and four VVER reactors will not be able to.

meet the new standards and will have_to be decommissioned over the next few t years. REGULATORY BODY RESOURCES GPAN noted significant differences in NRC and GPAN resources. The US has.108 reactors in coeration-while the USSR has 45. but the NRC has about four times the technicai staff of GPAN. A-comparison of the NRC's Region 11 with GPAN's Kiev (Scuthwest) Region shows the following:

.= e 4

• The Kiev Region has'22 operating units compared to 33.in Region II, while there are 50 resident inspectors in the Kiev Region and 40

~ resident inspectors in Region 11 (2,2. residents per reactor in the Kiev Region and 1.2 residents per reactor in Region 11'. i

• There are 3.4 region-based inspectors.per reactar in the Kiev Region while there are 6 region-based inspectors per 7eactor in Region II.

GPAN noted that the NRC makes about 4000 inspections per year at the 108 oper-ating units compared to only about 440 at the USSP s 45 units.: The disparity arises in part from the logistical difficulties faced by region-based inspec-tors in the USSR. l INSPECTOR LOCATIONS GPAN intends to reduce the number of resident inspectors and locate more in-spectors-in the regional offices. It was explained that one of.the primary ~ motives for this was the fact that the reorganization of GPAN, with the at-tendant increase in its organizational responsibility, is to be implemented with no-increase in staffing levels. As a consequence, more efficient use must be made of existing staff. HEA000ARTERS TEAM INSPECTIONS Every three years each reactor site in the USSR receives a comprehensive team j inspection mounted by GPAN Headquarters. These inspections require about 17 GPAN specialists for 2 weeks. i j SAFETY ASSESMENT i c GPAN intends to emulate the SALP concept of ass'igning-inspection resources in accordance with formal safety assessments. No time frame was stated for impl-mentation. ) EVENT FOLLOWUP GPAN has recently modified its practices for event followup. GPAN has elimi-catcc ir.chsion of the site inspectors on the site investigation-commission (headed by the Chief Engineer). 'Instead, the-site inspectors'will now investi-gate independently. The inspectors will review the Chief Engineer's report, but make their own assessment of the root cause of the event (not just'identi-fy the guilty party). _...__..m_...

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UNITED STATES _yx. ~' _ j i T_ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION waswiwovow. o. c. 20sss i f v \\ MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan, Director; Office for Analysis-and Evaluation of Operational Data FROM: Thomas M, Novak Director Division of Safety Programs-Mark H. Williams, Chief Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch. Harold L. Ornstein Senior Reactor Systems Engineer-Reactor Operations and Analysis Branch

SUBJECT:

TRIP REPORT WORKING GROUP 8 MEETING ON " EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE"- Enclosed is the trip report of the-Working Group 8 meeting on the " Exchange of Operational Experience" held in Moscow from April 20 - May 2, 1990. 2} Thomas M. Novak, Director Division of Safety Programs 7d M rk H. Williams, Chief T ends and Patterns-Analysis Branch M- -Harold L. Ornstein Senior Reactor Systems Engineer-Reactor Operations and Analysis Branch

Enclosure:

As stated i

' =, 4 4 TRIP REPORT FOR WORKING GROUP 8 Official Travelers: T, M. Novak Travel to: Moscow, USSR l M. H. Williams H. L. Ornstein Office AEOD Beginning on April 20, 1990 Ending on May 2, 1990 l Meeting

Title:

Working Group 8 Meeting on t " Exchange of Operational Experience" Organized By: Joint Civilian Coordinating Committee for Nuclear Reactor. Safety (JCCCNRS) .l ABSTRACT: The April 1990 meeting of Working Group 8 was the second meeting of this working group.- Additional details are available in th6 memorandum of the meeting which was signed by the US.and the USSR delegation heads on May'1, 1990. The meeting was held at the All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations (VNIIAES). The discussions at the' sessions of the-meeting were attended by 31 personnel representing Soviet programs, and 3 personnel representing US programs. :The Soviet participants.in.the working group came from the following organizations: (1) The Ail-Union Researen Institute (VNIIAES) (18)- (2) Gospromatomnadzor (GAEN) (7) 1 (3) Gydropress (Hydropress) (4) (4) USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power and Industry (2)- The meeting at the VNIIAES focused primarily upon the evaluation of operating experience, and the methods that both countries use to determine the relative significance of events and safety-issues, a The-main topics discussed at the meeting were: (1) nuclear power, plant performance indicators; (2) human factors affects on nuclear power plant.. safety; (3) techniques to identify severe accident' precursors; (4) assessment of feedback activities; and, (5) root cause analyses -of safety significant' events. Subsequent to five days of meetings at VNIIAES, the US delegation proceeded to visit the Zaporozhe Nuclear Power Plant. Zaporozhe is a 6-Unit, 1000 MWe VVER, station located on the Dnieper River near Energedad. At Zaporozne, the delegation to ired Unit 6, which is currently nearing completion, and the control roon. of Unit 4, which was operating.at near 100 percent power. In addition, the delegation had a 90-minute meeting with.the~ j Zaporozhe station management and the station's senior (GAEN) resident-inspector.

V. 'l n.,. t . L Highlights / Observations 1. Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicators Both delegations agreed that the subject of monitoring nuclear plant performance was a priority issue. Both at VNIIAES and Zaporozhe, the... Soviets expressed an keen, interest in our programs. The Soviets discussed their performance indicator program and their implementation of the international WANO indicators. The. indicators in both programs were very similar to those in the US. ( 2. Human Factors Presentations made by both sides noted the important lessons ~ learned from studying human factors aspects of operating reactor events. Discussions at VNIIAES focused upon specific lessons learned from recent events, and each country's methodology for gathering accurate descriptions of human performance during operational, events. Therewasagreatinterestin'theNRC'srecentlydevelohedprotocolfor operator interviews following operational events. 3. Techniques'to Identify Severe Accident Precursors This topic appears to have a high priority in bcth countries. The need for obtaining a ranking of events and pinpointing the individual plant's vulneraoility is well understoca. The b iets are developing a Marnovian mooel to analyze operating experience. We.are presently having a. Soviet paper on this subject translated. Similarly, the Soviets requested assistance (for which we will provide i publicly available reports) on our Accident Sequence Precursor Program. This subject,.and the adaptability of.each country's program to significantly different ohysical plants is expected to be an item of great Sterest at i future meetings. 4. Assessment of Feedback Effectiveness Both countries provided examples of how the feedback loop is being closed. Important to.our understanding of the Soviets program is the fact that their " incident reports" (LER equivalents), are in the form of i Commission reports which appear to have a very limited distribution. -l Conversely,'the concept of multiple sources of unregulated suppliers of major reactor safety equipment is a situation that the Soviets look-upon as an obstacle to closing the feedback loops. j i

i 3-5. Zaporozhe Nuclear Station A. Control Room The tour of the Unit 4 control room highlighted the operators' heavy reliance'upon CRT displays. There were over a dozen screens being ( observed by several operators. B. Plant Management - AIT/ITT Program The station manager was very interested in' knowing how the US1 regulators determine that'a particular plant must be shut down for-safety reasons. He appeared to be looking for a discreet numerical technique. The discussion proceeded to focus upon NRC responses (special inspections, AITs, IITs) to safety significant events. C. Miscellany C-1 Damage from Armenian earthquake In our discussion on regulatory shutdowns, we were briefly informed of significant structural damage at two Armenian rectors due to last-year's earthquake. C-2 Zaporozhe 1 - Remote shutdown capability We were made aware of the fact that Unit l's remote shutdown capability can be compromised by a service water system break. It was not clear from the discussion if this is a newly discovered problem or an old problem still to be resolved.. How the operating 1 experience feedback process works (or is working). on this problem l may be a good agenda item at a-future meeting. I l L I-l 8

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4 1 l TRIP REPORT BY GORDON F0WLER Official Trave 11ert G. Fowler Travel to: Moscow, USSR I Offical _GPA/IP Beginning on April 20. 1990 Ending on May 2,-1990-e Observations on' the technical' aspects of the working. group l -meetings are oevarsd in the MOH-5 or in other reports.1 The-purpose of this report-is to note conditions in the USSR which affected the trip and-to desoribe events outside the meeting. context. A. Conditions in the USSRt q 1. Preparation for the Trip As in the rast, the delegation-was given a three-hour briefing on what to take and how to act in the Soviet Union. For first-time travellers,'the briefing has prov0d to be essential. 2.- Word Processing for Preparing MOM-6: The lessons learned from T.revious trips to the Soviet Union helped in preparing the HoH-6. However, we were at-an'instituteothat had - E not had a JCCONRS meeting before, and our hosts were'not prepared to provide administrative support. Anticipating this, we had arranged for compatible software and a. typist from the Kurchatov~ Institute, but did not have a dedicated printer for our laptop p . :.mpute r. We had te uso printer balenging te the-Verld l Association of Reactor operators six floors sway, and rarely could we use the same printer for each draf t of portions of the document. A technical problem with printing'the final version made it impossible to meet the already-compressed schedule for signing the MOM. It continues'to be essential to bring a computer and to arrange 'apecifically for: dedicated typing and printing support. 3. Hotel Bills: As was the case in the December. 1989 trip, the host institute had paid'for the hotel room. The reason f or this appears to be that,. when hotel availability is tight,- which is the case most of the. time the institute cannot.make reservations directly with the hotel. Instead the institute must-deal with an intermediary (in this case connected.with' Intourist), and pay in full when the reservations are mado.- Therefore, the delegation must reimburse the institute in oash (including travellers'~ checks). Credit cards are. useless since-the-hetel is no lenger part of the transactien. i

l. 2 8. Fourth Anniversary of Chernobyl Acnident l The fourth anniversary of the Chernobyl sooident was April 29, l during the working group meetings. From midnight to midnight. Soviet television carried a non-stop program on the heelth and ~ enviromental impact of the accident. The purpose was to raise funds to assist the victime. The format wat very Westera in nature, incorporating interviews, original en',ortainment, j dooumontary reports and ovitural presentatioria, and periodio reports of the amount of money rsised throupa telephone pledges. At one point, it was reported that some tens of millions in hard currency and some hundreds of millione in rubles had been raised. C. Side Trip to Zaporoshe NPP: ) 3 Following the substantive discussions, the delegation boarded an I overnight train for the industrial city of Zaporoshe in the southern Ukraine. There a bus took the delegation for two and I one half hours to 2nergodar, a town of 86,000 which was constructed specifically to support the construction and operation of the six PWR reactors. The plant was originally to i contain eight units, but two were cancelled before while still in the planning stage. Five units are operating, and a sixth is nearing completion of construction (with testing in 1990 and j_ operation beginning in 1991) Joe Callan, co-leader of Working Group 1 for this meeting, had been one of the two US inspectors who spent neven weeks in Energedar in ?'.ti:*-a guet. 1980 lit a aiefgnment uma part of the i u first inspector exchange agreed to under the 1986 Protocol. Mr. Callan therefore was able to give the delegation information on all aspects of the plant bafore arriving. This made the discussion with the Chief Er.gineer (Terms Flo).y) and the plant i tour with the Deputy Chief Engineer (Vicheslov Tishenko) more revealing snat they otnerwise would have been. Mr. Flohy described the characteristics of the steam generator, core, containment, boration rates, 16nsth of the fuel cycle and the location of the spent fuel pool (inside containment.) His-impression was that Soviet inspectors have more-direct observation of operations (" touch the iron") than do US L inspectors. This impression extended to plant managementi Soviet i management is more involved in daily, low-level action that is l the case in the US. He thought.it indeed possible that the Soviets were too involved. He noted that two of the simulators beir.g built by Link-Miles (and which his people helped to design) I were to be located at the Zaporothe plant. i l His organization uses world-wide incident information collected by the World Association of Nuclear Operatore (WANO) for anticipating safety problems. He found that by and large problems arise because vf lack of thought and care. There was g discussion of ways to use operating data to monitor operations snd identifr problems, !n rempense to a comment. Mr. Novak +,t

e s s, I. described the NRC policy on requiring corrective actions following violations of license conditions. This policy has led to improved safety since 1986, as measured by the declining incidence of reactor trips. l t t t 1 5 ) l r a f j l l l l

Appendia SOVIET ATTENDEES AT NEITING AT ZAPOROINE.NPP Plohr, Teras, Chiaf Engineer for all six units Tiahenko, Vicheslov, Deputy Chief Engineer for Units 4, 6, 8 Virpieta, Vladimir, Deputy Chief Engineer, Technical Services Konoplin, Vladimir, Deputy Chief Egineer, Radiation Protection Serviset Koltunov, Victor, Chief. State Satety Inspoetion !}}