ML20054L299
| ML20054L299 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1982 |
| From: | Jackie Cook CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 17529, 82-07, 82-7, NUDOCS 8207070361 | |
| Download: ML20054L299 (7) | |
Text
i Gr Consumers Power James W Cook C0mpany vic, ~,u,., - ~gc,,. e.g.,
y and Construction ceneral Offices: 1945 West Parnali Road, Jackson, MI 49201 (517) 78& O453 82-07 //1 June 25,1962 Mr J G Keppler, Regional Administrator US Huclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 MIDLAND PROJECT -
DOCKET NOS 50-329 AND 50-330 Q-RELATED EQUIPfEiT COOLED BY NON-Q HVAC SYSTEM FILE:
0.h.9.63 SERIAL:
17529 On May 26, 1982, W R Bird and D T Perry notified Mr R C Knop of your staff of the potentially reportable 10CFR50 55(e) condition concerning safety-related equipment in the auxiliary building which are cooled by non-Q HVAC systens. This letter is an interin 50.55(e) report on this subj ect.
The attachments to this letter provide a description of the concern and a summary of the investigation and corrective actions being taken in regard to this problem.
Another report, either interim or final, vill be sent on or before August 17, 1982.
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WRB/1r CC: RJCook, NRC Resident Inspector Midland Nuclear Plant Document Control Desk, NRC Washington, DC Att achments :
- 1) MCAR-1, Report No 59, dated May 28, 1982
- 2) MCAR-59, Interim Report 1, dated June 10, 1982 8207070361 82062S gu 3 0 BB?,
PDR ADOCK 05000329 S
PDR 15 7
2 Serial 17529 82-07 #1 CC: CBechhoefer, ASLB Pane?
RSDecker, ASLB Panel FPCowan, ASLB Panel JHarbour, ASLB Panel AS&L Appeal Panel MMCherry, Esq MSinclair BStamiris CRStephens, USNRC WDPaton, Esq, USNRC FJKelley, Esq, Attorney General SRFreeman, Esq, Asst Attorney General WHMarshall GJMerritt, Esq, TNK&J Great Lakes QA Managers
OUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT serial 17529 I
OOO71964 uCAR1 82-07 n 59 REPORT NO.:
JOB NO.:
0 N O.:
DATE:
May 28, 1982 7220 1 DESCRIPTION * (including References):
During engineering review of section 3.2 of the FSAR, it was discovered that some Q-related equipment / components are located in the auxiliary building (AB), cooled by a non-safety grade HVAC system. Following a LOCA concurrent with either a loss of of fsite power or failure of the non-Q HVAC system, the cooling to the majority of the AB will be lost. This will result in a significant temperature rise in most of the AB.
Two of several significant areas are rooms 506 and 507 at elevation 645'-0" which RECOMMENDED ACTION * (Optional):
(continued) 1.
Identify all affected equipment and areas.
2.
Evaluate the need for and take appropriate corrective actions to ensure that the environmental temperature does not exceed the capability of the equipment operating temperature, following LOCA.
3.
Determine the root cause and take appropriate action to preclude recurrence.
4.
Issue an interim report by June 16, 1982.
REFERRED TO:
$ Engineering O Construction O OA Management O
O Procurement O
ISSUED BY:
Note: This condition was reported to the NRC by the client on May 26, 1982, as "potentially reportab b l
11 REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY:
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'Desende en space previoed and attach reference document.
Pro ect oA E*gew De'e AAP0 0009 Section Number Page of
"[f 000719614 I.
Description (continued) contain all four of the safeguard HVAC system water chillers for the A and B trains of both reactor units' engineered safety features ventilation systems. The maximum calculated environmental temperature in these two rooms could reach 160F under which the safeguard chillers may not operate.
Because all four safeguard chillers would be simultaneously affected by the excessive environmental temperature resulting from loss of the non-Q HVAC system, the entire chilled water system serving all ESF pump and equipment rooms could conceivably be lost.
The applicable requirements are described in general in FSAR Sections 9.4.5.1.1, Rev 41, and Response to Criterion 4, Rev 33, as follows:
9.4.5.1.1 - Safety Design Basis One - The engineered safety feature venti-lation system (ESFVS) controls the air temperature within the auxiliary and radwaste area safety-related equipment areas to permit adequate air cooling for ESF pump installations including associated motor control centers and load centers.
Response to Criterion 4 - Environmental and Missile Design Bases -
Structures, systems, and components important to safety are designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents, assuming that non-related cataclysmic events do not occur simultaneously.
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Serial 17529 82-07 #1 074698 074470
SUBJECT:
MCAR 59 Issued May 28, 1982 INTERIM REPORT NO. 1 DATE:
June 10, 1982 PROJECT:
Consumers Power Company Midland Plant Units 1 and 2 Bechtel Job 7220 Description of Deficiency Safety-related devices are located in portions of the auxiliary building (AB) which are cooled by non-Q HVAC systems. Loss of these non-Q HVAC systems (following various design basis accidents) concurrent with loss of offsite power could result in room environmental temperatures which could exceed the specified design temperature of 104F since the rooms are served by non-Q HVAC systems.
Summary of Investigation and Historical Background A thorough review of the AB was conducted utilizing the project design drawings to identify and locate Class lE electrical equipment, devices and instruments in the AB.
The list of 60 affected areas is preliminary and is currently being verified by project engineering. This will provide assurance that the problem areas are identified and included in the scope of the corrective action.
Analysis of Safety Implication Following an assumed design basis accident such as a LOCA or a safe shut-down earthquake simultaneous with a loss of offsite power, the cooling to the majority of the AB would be lost. This could result in a rise in the room tempercture above the design temperature of 104F. The preliminary predicted maximum environmental room temperatures in the non-Q cooled por-tions of the AB, assuming a design basis accident simultaneous with a loss of offsite power, ranges from 120 to 200F. Under these conditions, the safety-related equipment in these rooms may not be reliable. In many instances both trains of redundant Q equipment are affected by the loss of the non-Q HVAC system. Consequently, the capability of the safety-related equipment to mitigate the consequences of the design basis accident and/or achieve and maintain a safe shutdow. or the plant is indeterminate.
074698
~
MCAR 59 Interim Report No. 1 074470 Date:
Page 2 Probable Cause The root cause of these discrepancies is still under investigation and will be addressed in the next report.
Corrective Action 1)
Project engineering is reviewing the safety function of the Q devices in the areas already identified to evaluate the safety-related impli-cations of the equipments' failure following the design basis accidents.
Should the evaluation indicate that failure of the equipment could adversely affect the capability of the plant systems to migitage the consequences of the accident or achieve and maintain a safe shutdown, corrective action would be implemented on a case-by-case basis. These actions could include the following:
a)
Upgrade selected AB HVAC systems to Q status to limit the effect of the peak room temperature within the current environmental qualification envelope of the equipment.
b)
Relocate the Class IE device to another area where the predicted peak environmental temperature is within the environmental quali-fication envelope of the equipment.
c)
Replace the Class 1E device, which does not qualify for the pre-dicted peak room temperature, with one that qualifies.
d)
Qualify the existing Class 1E device for temperatures greater than or equal to the calculated peak room environmental tempera-ture.
2)
Project drawings identifying the areas of the AB which are ESF cooled have been prepared, are being coordinated, and will be issued for use indicating that Q devices shall be located only in areas which are cooled by Q HVAC systems, unless qualification data indicates that the component has the ability to operate in elevated temperature environ-ments.
MCAR 59 Interim Report No.0'7 4 4 7 0 074698 Date:
Page 3 Reportability This deficiency was reported to the NRC on May 26, 1982, as potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) by W.R. Bird of Consumers Power Company.
Submitted by
((cigM T.CI. Ballwe$
Mechanical Group Supervisor Approved b E.M. Hughes \\
Project Engineer Af/
Concurrence by/'M.T. Fravel Chief Mechanical Engineer Concurrence by:
i p
E.H. Smith Engineering Manager Concurrence by:
g M.A. Dietrich s
Project Quality Assurance Engineer TGB/PL/am(M)
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