ML20054H858

Staff Requirements Memo Re 820611 Affirmation Session on SECY-82-185 Containing Final Amend to 10CFR50 & App E. Commission Approved Final Amend to regulations.Marked-up Version of Final Rule Encl

ML20054H858
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/17/1982
From:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To:	Bickwit L, Dircks W, Fouchard J NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA), NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO), NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
References
REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8206250088
Download: ML20054H858 (26)

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$fb s9 Kloriq'o UNITED STATES g

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i'

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June 17, 1982 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MEMORANDUM FOR:

William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations Leonard Bickwit, Jr., General Counsel Joseph Fouchard, Director, Office of Public Affairs Carlton Kammerer, Director, Office of Congressional Affairs i

FROM:

Samuel J.

Chilk, Secreta I}

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - AFqI TION SESSION, 2:15 P.M., FRIDAY, JUNE 41', 1982, COMMISSIONERS '

CONFERENCE ROOM, (PUBLIC MEETING)

I.

SECY 82-185 - Final Amendment to 10 CFR Part 30 and to Appendix E:

Modification to Emergency Preparedness Regulations Relating to Low Power Operation The Commission, by a vote of 4-1, (Chairman Palladino, Commissioners Ahearne, Roberts and Asselstine approving and Commissioner Gilinsky disapproving) approved a final amendment to its regulations.

The Commission agreed to modify the rule as noted in the attached version.

This version consolidates changes proposed by OGC in a June 1 memorandum, by Chairman Palladino and by Commissioner Ahearne in their respective vote sheets, and by Chairman Palladino (additional language to the Commission response to Issue 3 and agreed to just prior to :he meeting).

Commissioner Roberts nonconcurred with the changes proposed by Chairman Falladino.

Staff should also make any changes necessary for conformance to the Commission change on page 3.

Commissioners Gilinsky and Ahearne have provided separate views to be attached to the rule (attachments 2 and 3).

The Commission requested that:

1.

The rule, as modified, be published in the Federal Register: (EDO) (SECY Suspense:

7/6/82) 2.

The appropriate Congressional Committees be notified (EDO/OCA) (SECY Suspense:

7/6/82) 820625008B B20617 '

PDR 10CFR PT9.7 PDR

3.

The ACRS be notified (EDO) (SECY Suspense:

7/6/82) 4.

The Federal Register notice be sent 20 affected applicants, licensees, and persons that commented on the proposed rule.

(EDO)

(SECY Suspense:

7/G/82) 5.

A public announcement be made (EDO/OPA)

(SECY Suspense:

7/6/82)

II.

SECY 82-228 - South Texas Recusal Proceeding The Commission, by a vote of 3-2, (Chairman Palladino, Commissioners Ahearne and Roberts approving, Commissioners Gilinsky and Asselstine disapproving) approved a Memorandum and Order that regarding the Commission's review of an Appeal Board Decision (ALAB-672) that had disqualified Judge Hill from the South Texas proceeding.

The Commission's Memorandum and Order reinstated Judge Hill to the proceeding.

(Subsequently, the Memorandum and Order with separate views of Commissioners Gilinsky, Ahearne, Roberts and Asselstine attached was signed by the Secretary.)

cc:

Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Ahearne Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commission Staff Offices PDR-Advance DCS-016 Phillips

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Prepa. redness

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AGENCY:

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

h ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to clarify:

(1) that emergency preparedness exercises are part of the preoperational inspection and thus required prior to aperation above 5%

of rated power, but not for a Licensing Board, Appeal Board, or Commis-sion licensing decision; and (2) that for issuance of operating licenses authorizing only fuel loading and low power operation (up to 5% of rated power), no NRC or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) review, findings and determinations concerning the state or adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness shall be necessary.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

[ Insert date of publication in the Federal Register.]

l FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael T. Jamgochian, Human Factors Branch, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 (telephone (301)443-5942).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

On Degember 15, 1981, the Commission published in the Federal Register two proposed rule changes (45 FR 61132 and ATTACHMENT 1 m

a 46 FR 61134).

The proposed rule change in 46 FR 61134 was conHdered by the Commission as clarifying in nature.

It proposed that 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) be modified to clarify that the findings on emergency planning required prior _ to license issuance are predictive in nature and need not reflect s

the aItual si. ate of preparedn'ess at the time the finding is made.

The amendment to 10 CFR 50.47(a)(2) was proposed to emphasize the predictive

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nature of the review and to provide that licensing decisions need not include the results of an exercise.

The Commission noted that prepared-ness connotes the actual state of implementation, is.important during the life of the plant and should be treated as an operational inspection matter.

The proposed rule change would require that a full-scale exer-cise be conducted before operation above 5% of rated power and periodi- ',,

cally thereafter.

The proposed rule change in 45 FR 51132 provided that in order to grant a low power license, only a finding as to the adequacy of onsite emergency planning and preparedness is required.

That is, neither FEMA nor NRC must have evaluated the adequacy and capability of offrite pre-paredness organizations and plans prior to issuance of a' low power license.

While the proposed rule would eliminate the need to have any NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations on the adequacy of off-site agencies' emergency planning and preparedness, the NRC review of the licensees' onsite response mechanism would necessarily include aspects of some offsite elements:

communications, notification, assist-l ance agreements with local law enforcement, fire protection, and medical organi::ations, and the like.

Some examples, but not an exclusive list, where review of an applicant's emergency plan would involve aspects of e

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.y 50.47(b)(3), (5), (6),* (9) c. and (.U)i '-

/,'..i Ex. tensive. comments were 'r.eceiv'edi.' all of which were evaluated an'd.~

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..,. Sum =ary.ofePublic Co=ments:

The Commission rec.eived 40, letters cooment-3 l

ing on the 46 FR 6"M proposed rule ' change and 65 letters commenting on.the 45 FR 61132 proposed rule change Many letters commented on.both issues within the same letter.

For 46 FR 6"M, 27 letters opposed

.the rule change shile 11 letters favored the rule change.

In 46 FR 51132,

... 43 letters opposed the rule change, while 18 letter f avored.the' rule change.

For both rul'e changes, commenters favoring the rule changes,

' were typically utilities, legal firms and consulting firms representing utilities, and one' State health department.

Commenters opposing the rule local electec officials from New Hammshire_

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q-- A changes included w private cituens3 and Suf folk Countv. New York, an Assistant

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. i. :. A At*. 6 General of Ma,ssachessetts, a n,_

II Assistant t : " -

' " ' - -, t '.M Atto rney -

.:.. La '>--- ' ' r ": _ ;; dtatM If various oubli c eroups". '

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ha reerese

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_. ' All of the significant comments favoring the rule changes basically

. reiterated the Commission's rationale for promulgation of the proposed rule changes that was put forth in the Federal Register Notices,

. 45 FR 61134 and 45 FR 61132, The foficwing major issues against changing the regulations were,

raised in specific comments received.' These major issues reflect the, areas of concern of many commenters..

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.'.s The NRC's credibility was so undermined by the handyng of the ISSUE 1:

THI accident that the Commission should take pains to avoid even the

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acoea' ance of relaxing safety standards.

By relaxing the current r

emergency preparedness regulations, far more than the prestige of the a'g'en or the Commissioners is at stake; indeed, it is believed that'the credibility of NRC is a vital component of emergency preparedness.

When l

the next serious accident occurs, many lives may be saved if people have enough faith in the dedication and truthfulness of the NRC.

As things stand, substantia'l segments of the population are still alienated and I

' cynical in their feelings about the agency to interfere seriously with the workability of any plans for managing an emergency.

s COMMISSION RESPONSE:

When the Commission published the upgraded emergency preparedness regulations in August of 1980, the subject of low power operating licens s was not addressed.

At that time the Commission did not differentiate as to what emergency planning requirements would be applicable to the period of fuel loading and low power testing.

The Commission has now focused on the risks associated with this level of operation and has chosen a level of emergency ' preparedness appropriate

.to assure the health and safety of the public at that stage.

In doing so, the Commission does not alter the high standards applicable to the review of emergency preparedness et full power.

ISSUE 2:

During low power testing there are higher risks due to unfamil-iarity of the plant operators with their particular plant and due to undiscovered ciesign and construction defects.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

The Commission agrecs that there may be I sligptly -

hi,gher risks due to the plant operators having less experience with the plan't at this stage and with a potential for undiscovered design and con-struction defects.

However, in the Commission's view this risk is signif'-

icandy, outweighed by sev,eral other factors.

First, 'the fission product inventory during low power testing is much less t an during higher power operation due to the low level of reactor power and short period of hpera-tion.

Second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to the required capacities under full power operation.

Third, the time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power.

This means the operators should have sufficient time to prevent a radio-active releas'e from occurring.

In the worst case, the additional time available (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) even for a postulated low likelihood sequence, which could eventually result in release of the fission products accumulated at low power into the containment, would allow adequate precautionary actions to be taken to protect the public near the site.

Weighing all risks involved, the Commission has determined that the degree of emergency preparedness necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety is significantly less than that required for full power operation."

RThe level of risk associated with low power operation has been estimated by the staff in several recent operating license cases:

Diablo Canyon, Docket Nos. 275-OL, 323-OL, San Onofre, Docket Nos. 351-OL, 352-OL, and LaSalle, Docket Nos. 373-OL, 274-OL.

In each case the Safety Evaluation Report concluded that low power'ris'k is several orders of magnitude less than full power risk.

These findines support the general conclusion in the text that a number of factors associated with low power operation imply greatly reduced risk compared with full power.

u.wi

. ine -ruse enanges would elimina.e public participay.ieh in the c

. review and assessment of exercises before a licensing board.

,COMMjSSION RESPONSE:

e Whl_ legit is, true that the rule changes will have the likely ef.fecsh of limiting litigation of the success of ext:cises in licensing hearings, it is the ce==ission's view that such assessments are not necessary to make the kind of predictive findini on emergency planning called for by the regulations prior to license issuance.

The substantive emergency clanning issues now being. litigated in license nearings are

'largely focused on the 16 pl=nning standards found in 10 CFR 50.47 (b).

These planning standards are unchanged by the; rule changes and do not, in themselves, require a successful exercise.

Thus the Commi.ssion does not regard the exclusion

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of the exercise generally from the Licensing Board process J [,f as affecting in any fundamental way the manner of public

' participation on prelicensing emergency planning issues.

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'inally the rule changes do not preclude public observation g

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of and barticipati' on in the exercises themselves (to the d

exuenu 'consissent, witn hthe objectives of the exercise) and

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in the review and assessment critique meetings held. after the exercise.

The rule changes clarify.that jhe

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d,,a }L. [#'4f emergency preparedness exercise Appeal Board or. Commission licensing decision.

Exercises will s~till be

- c(g},Wrequired before actual power above 5% and f

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conduct of full scale exercises early enough in the licensing process

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to permit the outc. ome of the exercises to be fully litigated at the

,V hearing is premature.

Such exercises are best held at a later time, "when the operating and management staff of the plant--who are central l

figures in an exercise-are in place and trained in emergency functions.

The Commission believes that, while the actual exercise is not an issue in a hearing under these rules (except to the extent that an outline for the exercise may be involved), the exercise will be held before full r

power and all significant deficiencies will be properly addressed.

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':. t ISSUE 4:

These rule changes would undermine public confidence in the adequacy of emergency planning, safe operation of the plant and the licensing process.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

As the Commission noted in the Federal Register notice which announced the upgraded emergency planning regulations on August 19,1980 (45 FR'55403) "The ITMI] accident also showed clearly that onsite conditions and actions, even if they do not cause significant 6 ct

and iocal entities react to protect the public from any dangers associated with the accident.

In order to discharge effectively its stadItory re,sponsibilities, the Commission must know that proper means'..and pro'-

cedures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its 1

potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the p,ubig will.be notified promptly, and that adequate p'rotective actions

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in response to actual or ~ anticipated conditions can.and will be taken."

Given that no change is envisioned in the caliber of reviews for full power licenses, and indeed, more resources in theory would be avail-able.

The Commission believes that the final rule changes announced herein do not change this rejponsibi.lity or diminish in any respect the '_

protection of the public health and safety.

While the Commission understands the feel.ings expressed by these commenters, the Commission

.wants to state its continued commitment to the adequacy of emergency planning, safe operation of the plant and in the licensing process.

These rule changes should not be cause for concern about this ' commitment.

ISSUE 5:

Unlike some of the more technical issues, emergency planning

,is a subject upon which the average citizen is knowledgeable and can make a valuable contribution to the licensing proceedings.

This is an important opportunity for public participation.

Eliminating this consideration from licensing decisions in effect removes this vital experimental evidence from public scrutiny.

~ COMMISSION RESPONSE: l The proposed rule dies not elNate any imoortant su'Estantive aspect. of 'eme::jency pla'ning from t' e opefating h

license hearings.

Whether an applicant satisfies the recuirements of 50. 4 7 (a) and 5 0.47 (b) is still.an issue that l

may be raised and litigated in those hearings.

In cases where such issues are raised applicant's and State and local jurisdiction's emergency plans should be available for examination in the hearing process prior to the issuance of an operating license.

In addition, an outline of an exercise should also be available to the extent a question

'is raised whether the requirement for the conduct of exercises (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I,Section IV) can or will be met.

Moreover, if the actual conduct of an exercise 1

she'uld' identify fundamental defect.s in the way that $a enargency plan is conceived such tha: it calls into q:estion whether the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 ca.n or will be met, a party to a license proceeding may seek to reopen a 10 CFR 2.206 as appropriate. concluded hearing or file a petition This is, distinct from deficiencies identified by an exercise which only reflect the actual state of emergency prepa.radness on a particular day in. question but which do not represent some basic flaw in?.erGirt gency planning.

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' ; ": g Finally, it should be recalled that the full-scale-b a ex'ercises themselves involve participation by local and State govern-ments.

Both the NRC and FEMA attempt' to make sure that all local and regional concerns expressed by representatives of these governments are fully addressed, and that any deficiencies brought to light are remedied before a full power license is issued.

The underlyiag feelings expressed by these comments, however, are addressed in the Com-ission Responses to Issues 3 and 4.

ISSUE 6:

The public knowledge that no off site protection exis s could cause chaos in the event of an incident during fuel loading or low power testi ng.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

Prior to issuing an operating license authorizing low power testing and fuel loading, the NRC will review the following offsite elements of the applicant's emergency plan:

(a)

S 50.47(b)(3)

Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near site Emergency Operations Facility 8

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hcve baen m de, and other organizations capable of aupenting %he plannad response have been identified.

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'(b)

S 50.47(b)(5)

Procedures have been established for notifica-tion, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for

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not,i.f:igtion of emergency personnel by all organizaticas; the content of initial and followup messages to response organiza'tior.s end the pub ic ha.s been established; and means to prov.ide early notification and ci: ear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency

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Planning Zone have been established.

(c)

S 50.47(b)(6)

Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

(d)

S 50.47(b)(8)

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to -

support the emergency response are provided and maintained.*

(e)

S 50.47(b)(9)

Adequate methods, systems, ar.d equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequeni:es of a radiological emergency condition are in' use.

(f)

S 50.47(b)(12) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.

(g)

S 50.47(b)(15)

Radiological emergency respcase training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.*

Knowing that the above elements of the applicants emergency plan have been reviewed by NRC should assure the public that, for low power testing and fuel loading, adequate protective measures could and would be taken in the event of an accident.

"Added in response to public comment.

9 Enciosure.1

s ISSUE 7:

The proposed rule changes are fundamentally not in t3e best

.t interest of the public health and safety but obviously in the interest of the utilities.

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COMM5k3 ION RESPONSE; As explained in previous Responses, the Commission is convinced that the ru3e changes will not compro' mise the health and safety of the public.

The Coanission considers that the rule changss provide flexibility in its licensing procedures, thereby meeting its obligation to the public to conduct its business in a timely and efficient This obligation inckudes the establishment of an efficient manner.

licensing process, while not adversely effecting the public health and safety.

4' ISSUE 8:

The proposed rule changes contradict previous TMI policy statements.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

In developing the upgraded emergency preparedness regulations (45 FR 55402 dated August 19, 1983) one of the policy state-ments that the Commission made was "that onsite.and offsite emergency preparedness as well as proper siting and engineered design features are needed to protect the health and safety of the public [and] as the Commission reacted to the accident at Three P.ile Island,. it became clear

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that the protection provided by siting and engineered design features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident."

L ID Falcerect3L

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This rulemaking will in no way deviate from previous poli $y state-f-

ments but' in fact will add flexibility and efficiency to the licensing process.

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(, Qh sw ISSUE:R:

Wstr 550.47(b)8 and 550.47(b)15 in evaluating the coordination of offsite and onsite emergency preparedness. 'These st u_.

uire eD~

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3g that:

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(a)

(8)

Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are prov,ided and maintained; and (b)

(15)

Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

The Commission agrees with this comme $t.

See Commission Response to Issue #5.

ISSUE 10:

The rule changes effectively exclude the public from the decisionmaking process on a matter of' primary public concern, and create apprehension in the public mind as to whether " preparedness" vill be a reality even after a full-scale exercise before operation above 5% of rated power.

The public.is unlikely to be granted a special hearing, before full power operation is granted a utility, in order to assess the actual state of preparedness.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

It is true that special hearings will not, in a typical case, be held following the full-scale exercise. lt L M_:;n we - e : - gJ 7 ty_w"

._e,,cd

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,1 eaehegasen.3

The public should recognizo that the Co-4 ssion do2s n'ot intend to authorize the issua.nca or a full-power opera" g=

license if there has been a full-scale exercise whicH' raises

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serious and significant deficiencies which have not baen comnensated for and which go to the fundamental nature of the' emergency plan itself.

Such a deficiency calls into cuestion whether reasonable assurance may be found that

-3ublic health and safety will be adecuately protected in a

' radiological emergency.

However, some deficiencies may be fourid t' hat only reflect the actual s-ate of. preparedness which may be easily remedied; such deficiencies as are identified should not delay licensing action.

See 10 Cn 50.47 (c).

. - ----. ISSUE 11:

No rationale sustains the requirement of o'ffsite emergency preparedness for small research reactors possessing a fission product inventory equivalent to that generated up to 5% by a large reactor while eliminating offsite emergency preparedness for the large reactor.

COMMISSION RESPONSE:

Although research reactors present an inherently smaller risk than power reactors, they do not possess the accident mitigation features (e.g., large containments) required for power t

l reactors.

In addition, research reactors are often located in high l

population density areas.

It is therefore prudent to have an offsite emergency plan for these reactors.

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SUMMARY

As-- noted by the ebcva ccrer.t-i, s ignif^ cent segm:nt of-Um e

public per-aivac that the rvile changoc being mede not, h thi pubiic a re i+terect and-thet the4' promulg-tic o4

-d cr3aly af f=tme pM k i

hosit,' en.! ;,;. Ly.

The Commission has evaluated all public comments, and has also fully considered the ri.sks of operating a nuclear power reactor at icw power.

The risks of operating a power reactor at low power are significantly lower than the risks of operating at full power

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because:

first, the fission product inventory during low power testing

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is much less than during higher power operation due to the low level of reactor power and short period of operation.

Second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of. systems designed to, myigate-the consequences of accidents compared to the required capacities under full power operation.

Third, th time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident con'se-quences is much longer than at full power.

This means the operators should have sufficient time to prevent a radioactive. release from

. occurring.

In the worst case, the additional time available (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) even for a postulated low likelihood sequence, which eventually results in release 'of the fission products accumulated at low power into the containment, would allow adequate precautionary actions ~ to be taken to protect the public near the site.

On balance, the Commission has concluded that the rule changes are technically justifiable and will

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enhance the efficiency of the licensing process, without adversely affecting the public health and safety and therefore should be promulgated.

National Environment Policy Act Consideration Pursuant to 10 CFR S 51.5(d)(3) of the Commission's regulations, an environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the subject final amendment because there is no substantive or significant environmental impact.

Reculatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

S 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not, if 9

'a promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantfal num,ber

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o'f. small entities.

The proposed rule changes concern a clarification of thev elements and findings necessary for the issuance of an operating license for nuclear power plants licensed pursuant to. Section 103 and 104p!af the -Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,' 42 U.S.C. 2133, 77t4b. -

The electric utility companies owning and operating these nuclear power j

pl. ants are dominant in their service areas, and do not fall within the.

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definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Sizi Standards set forth

.in 13 CFR Part 121.

Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statament Pursuant to the' provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act' of 1980 (Pub.L 96-511), the NRC has made a preliminary determination that these ru.le changes do not impose new recordkeeping, information collection, or reporting requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and section 552 and 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is published as a document subject to codification.

ihese rules are made immediately effective because restrictions on applicants are being relieved.

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PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION s

AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES The authority citation for Part 50 reads as follows: -

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AUTHbkiTY: Sections 103,104,161,182,183,189,- 68 Stat. 936, 937.,

948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2239); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.1243,1244,1246 (42 U.S.t.

5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section.50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).

Sections 50.80-50.81 -

alos issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234).

Sections 50 100-50.102 issued under sec.186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C..

2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended 42 U.S.C. "

2273), f 50.54(i) issued under sec.161i, 68 Stat. 949 (42 U.S.C. 2201(i));

sf 50.70, 50.71, and 50.78 issued under sec.161, 68 Stat. 950, as amended; (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)), and the laws referred to in Appendices.

1.

In 6 50.47, paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are revised, the intro-ductory text to paragraph (b) is revised, paragraph (c)(1) is revised, and a new paragraph (d) is added.

All revisions to read as follows:

5 50.47 Emergency plans.

l (a)(1) Exceot as orovided in caracraoh (d) below,* no operating l

license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that [the state of ensite and offsite preparedness provides) there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and wi1T be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

"These rule changes have been typed in comparative text, compairing the changes with the final regulations that were published in August 1980.

These rule changes have not been changed from the published proposed rule changes (December 1981).

15 Enslosurell

..v (2)

The HRC will base its finding on a review of the Federal E.5ergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determination's as to wh' ether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they [capabie of-being) can be implemented, and,gthe NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency.

plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable' assurance that they

[capabie of-being) can be implemented.

A FEMA findino wil'l crimariIy be I

based on a review of the o'lans.

Any other information already available to FEMA may be considered in assessino whether there -is reasonable assurance that the olans can be imolemented.

In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and imolementation cacability.

Emeroency preoaredness exercises (recuired by caracraoh (b)(14) of this section and Accendix E, Section F of this cart) are cart of the ocerational inspection crocess and are not recuired for any initial licensino decision.

(b)

The onsite and, exceot as orovided in caraoraoh (d) below, offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet I

the following standards:

(

n x

n n

n (c)(1)

Failure to meet the acolicable standards set forth in para-graph (b) of this section may result in the Commission declining to issue an Operating License, however, the applicant wili have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisifaction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate 16 Enclosure.1

^

interim compansating actions have been or will be taken prompt'ty, or trjat there are other compelling reasons to permit plant opera [ ion.

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(d)

Notwithstanding the recuirements of caragraph (a) and (b) above, no NREsor FEMA review, findinos, or determinations concerning the' state of offsite emergencv orecaredness or the adecuacy 'of and cacability to imolement State and local offsite emergency olans are recuired oriorI to issuance of an operatino license authorizino only fuel loading and/or low power operations (up to 5% of the rated oower).

Insofar as emergency planning and orecaredness reouirements are concerned. a license authorizing fuel loadina and/or low oower ooeration may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that. the state of onsite emeroency creoaredness orovides' reasonable assurance that adeouate orotective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergencv.

The NRC will base this l

findino on its assessemnt of the aoolicant's emeroency olans aoainst the certinent standards in caragraoh (b) above and Accendix E of this Part.

2.

S 50.54(q) is revised to read as follows:

,5 50.54 Conditions of licenses.

x x

x x

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l (q)

A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power l

l reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the aoolicable standards in 5 50.47(b) and the acolicable requirements in Appendix E to this part.

A licensee authorized to possess.and/or operate a research reactor or a fuel facility shall folicw and maintain

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in effect emergency plans which meet the requirements in Appendix E to l

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this part.

The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changh'd to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the aoolicable standards of 5 50.47(b) and the acclicable require-ments lif Appendix E to this part.

The research reactor licensee and/or

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the fuel facility licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effec - '

tiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the.

requirements of Appendix E to this part.

Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans shall not be imple-mented without application to and approval by the Commission.

The licensee shall furnish 3 copies of each proposed change for approval; and/or if a change is made without prior approval, 3 copies shall be submitted within 30 days after the change is made or proposed to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office specified in Appendix D,10 CFR Part 20, with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or, if appropriate, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Washi ngton, D. C.

20555.

x x

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Appendix E [ Amended) 3.

Section I of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 is revised to read as follows (footnotes unchanged):

I.

Introduction Each applicant for a construction permit is rec = ired by 5 50.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies.

Each applicant for an ope affhg license is required by 5 50.34(b) to include in the final

• safety analysis report plans for coping with emergencies.

This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency plins for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness.

These plans shall be described generally in the preliminary safety analysis report and submitted'as part of the final safety analysis report.

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The potential radiological hazards to the public associated with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities licensed under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 involve considerations different than those associated with nuclear power reactors.

Consequently, the size of

--e 2

Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for f acilities other than power reactors and the degree to which compliance with the requirements of this section and sections II, III, IV, and V as necessary will be detercined on a case-by-case basis.s Notwithstandino the above caracraohs in the case of an ooeratino t

l license authorizino only fuel icadino and/or low cover coerations uo to l

5% of rated oower no NRC or FEMA review, findinos, or determinations f

concernino the state of offsite emeroency creoaredness or the adecuacy of and the cacability to implement State and local effsite emeroency olans. as defined in this Accendix, are recuired orior to the issuance of such a license.

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4.

Section F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, item (b) 5s revised

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to read as follows:

F.

Training

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x x

b.

For each site at which a power reactor is located for which

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the first operating license for that site is issued after 'he effective t

date of this amendment, within one year before issuance of the first operating license for full power, and orior to coer'ation above 5% of rated oower of the first reactor, which will enable each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the ingestion pathway EPI to participate.

x x

x x

x Dated at this day of 1982 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission 0

Rp Enclosure.1

l 6/11/82 _

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY'S" SEPARATE OPINION REGARDING

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r' SECY-82-185

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..q. / _. I disapprove both par _ts:.of-the preposed amendment.

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whatsoever concerning the" state or_" adequacy of offsite:

~~.7.9 One part of the rule'pr6vides that ho NRC or FEMA findi_,ngs emerge'cy preparedness shall be necessary prior to issuance n

, of a low power license.'.-' As I stated in my disapproval:.of

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.- the proposed rule, thereshould be some offsite

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preparedness, especially if there is to be an extended period of low power operation.

Moreover, emergency.

preparedness for full power should not be a hurried, last-minute affair.. Some of the steps required for full-power should already be in place at the low power-stage.

The other part of the rule excludes consideration of emergency exercises in an operating license proceeding, thereby eliminating an opportunity for public participation in this phase of decisionmaking.

The exercises never completely follow the plan.

And this area happens to be one in which the nuclear plant's neighbors have special competence, greater in some respects than that of NRC or FEMA.

Their comments can be particularly useful.

These need not be presented in formal hearings but we should have some means to receive and consider them.

I would have modified the final rule to provide for such a brief comment period before NRC issuance of an operating license.

I would also note that the Simpson Report shows that FEMA findings will cause delays in only 2 plants:

Shoreham and Byron 1.

These delays are based on the applicants' construction dates.

If NRC estimates are used, this' amendment would have no effect on the dates for issuing operating licenses.

d.h

o/11/82 O

C'OMMISSIONER GILINSKY'S SEPARATE OPINION REGARDING SECY-82-185 I disapprove both parts of the proposed amendment.

One part of the rule provides that no NRC or FEMA findings whatsoever concerning the state or adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness shall be necessary prior to issuance of a low power license.

As I stated in my disapproval of the proposed rule, there should be some offsite preparedness, especially if there is to be an extended period of low power operation.

Moreover, emergency preparedness for full power should not be a hurried,

.last-minute affuir.

Some of the steps required for

' full-power should already be in place at the low power stage.

The other part of the rule excludes consideration of emergency exercises in an operating license proceeding, thereby eliminating an opportunity for public participation in this phase of decisionmaking.

The exercises never completely follow the plan.

And this area happens to be one in which the nuclear plant's neighbors have special competence, greater in some respects than that of NRC or FEMA.

Their comments can be particularly useful.

These need not be presented in formal hearings but we should have some means to receive and consider them.

I would have modified the final rule to provide for such a brief comment period before NRC issuance of an operating licence.

I would also note that the Simpson Report shows that FEMA findings will cause delays in only 2 plants:

Shoreham and Byron 1.

These delays are based on the applicants' construction dates.

If NRC estimates are used, this

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amendment would have no effect on the dates for issuing operating licenses.

ATTACHMENT 2

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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE'S ADDITIONAL VIEWS In response to Commissioner Gilinsky's comment that "the rule provides that no NRC or FEMA findings whatsoever concerning the state or adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness shall be necessary prior to issuance of a low power license','"

I would note "the NRC review of the licensees' onsite response mechanism would necessarily include aspects of some offsite elements:

communications, notification, assistance agreements with local law enforcement, fire protection, and medical organizations, and the like" (Statement of Considerations for this rule at 2).

With respect to his other point concerning consideration in the operating license proceeding, (1) it is important to hold the exercise close to completion of the plant since the operating personnel will then be on site and be able to learn from the experience,and the exercise will be more realistic since hardware and procedures will be closer to completions and (2) there are public meetings after each drill and the state, local government and other emergency people do participate in these meetings and do provide comments and criticism.

ATTACHMENT 3

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