ML20054H332
| ML20054H332 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, San Onofre |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1981 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049A511 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-176 NUDOCS 8206230259 | |
| Download: ML20054H332 (5) | |
Text
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h g/4 ak idlCLOSURE EVALUATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N COMPANY'S SElSMIC SYSTEMS INTERACTION PROGRAM FOR THE SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 fu {gir 1.0 Introduction o
Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," of g 6 I.1.9 M
Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their intended safety _ functions.
Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 also requires that certain systems be able to accommodate single failures without loss of capability to perform their intended safety functions.
- CsotAc Southern California Edison Company (SCE.) has undertaken af, systems interaction i
program for its San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 to ensure that (1) the safety-related plant structures, systems and components will not lose their capability to perform their intended safety functions as a result G
of seismicallyinduced physical interactions with non-seismic Category 1 -
equipment, and (2) the redundant safety-related plant systems will not lose their capability to accommodate single failures as a result of such interactions.
2.0 Description of SCE's Program SCE's program was based on the assumption that any non-seismic Cateogry I equipment having significant mass and located in the vicinity of safety-related structures, systems or components would fail structurally as a result of a seismic event of severity up to and including the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), and such failure would non-mechanistically prevent the safety-related iso Si2 ilNU U 8206230259 820429 PDR FOIA
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structures, systems and components from performing their intended safety functions.
All non-seismic Category I equipment having significant mass and located in the vicinity of safety-related structures, systems or components
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were shown by analysis &o be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of t
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wd to be able to accommodate the SSE k)
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a SCE's program was accomplished in three phases - the generic upgrading phase',.
the plant area upgrading phase and the plant area walkthrough phase. The generic upgrading and plant area upgrading phases of SCE's program were carried out during the design stage of the plant.
The plant area walkthrough phase of SCE's program was carried out following the c'onstruction stage of the plant.
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Duringthegenericup$gradingphaseofSCE'sprogram,thedesignofn'on-ssfety-QAP'7 T S"(
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releted equipment A ocated in seismic Category I buildings, ua4 analyzed or l
upgraded as follows:
1.
All non-safety-related conduit and cable trays located in all seismic Category I buildings were designed with upgraded supports; 2.
All fire protection system sprinkler system piping located in all seismic N
to.u Category I buildings wjW'e designed with upgraded supports; 2.
All permanent and maintenance cranes located in safety-related areas of all seisinic Cateogry I buildings 'were shown by analysis or designed to dr, X
l able to accomnodate the SSE vithout loss of structural integrity; r
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All non-safety-related heating, ventilating and air conditioning equipment I
and ductwork located inside the containment was designed with upgraded supports; 5.
All non-safety-related control room panels were designed with upgraded supports and, if located adjacent to safety-related panels, appropriate gaps; 6.
The control room lighting system was designed to both maintain its structural integrity and function during the SSE; and All non-safety' related instrumentation located in all seismic Cateogry 7.
I buildings was designed'with upgraded supports.
In addition, the non-safety-related turbine building, the turbine gantry, crane and the secondary system reheaters located on the turbine building deck were shown by analysis to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of struct' ural integrity.
During the plant area upgrading phase of SCE's program, a design review of all plant areas containing safety-related equipment was conducted to identify any remaining non-seismic Category I equipment that could interact with hefety-related structures, systems or components as a result of a seismic event.
This review resulted in the following actions:
1.
Large-mass non-safety-related equipment located in all seismic Category I buildings was shown by analysis or designed with upgraded supports to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrjty; 2.
All non-safety-related large-and small-bore piping located in safety-related areas in which adverse interactions might occur were designed with upgraded supports; 3-
f 3.
All non-safety-related heating, ventilating and air conditioning ductwork located in all seismic Category I buildings was designed with upgraded supports; and 4.
All lighting fixtures located in all seismic Category I buildings were designed with upgraded supports or were shown by analysis to have insufficient mass to result in unacceptable damage.
'During the plant area walkthrough phase of SCE's program, a field walkthrough of all plant areas containing safety-related equipmer$t was conducted to verify
'that all non-seismic Cateogry I equipment having significant mass and located in the vicinity of safety-related structures, systems or components had been shown by analysis to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural
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integrity,/ ad beenpupgradedyto be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of h
s"fports structural integrity. or._tla4-t een-p-ided with -upgraded support.s -Lv eniuce T
that thc cqvip;:.ca;,iculd be cLle ic eccc=cdeta tha 99F withnot !c;; cf k
nru ct.u ro i n.ttgrity.
This walkthrough resulted in the identification,of the following non-seismic Cateogry I equipment which 'could potentially interact hew roukd ce L'A :
adversely with safety-related str"rt" rat. system er cc poner.ts-:
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4 h,non-safety-related screen wash pump suction pipe located in the salt 5
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water intake structure, and w-cpb 74 peedk. W)
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- 2. Q-Certain4non-safety-related electrical..peac4s. W 01
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The generic' upgrading and plant area upgrading phases of SCE's program were implemented by an interdiciplinary task force composed of representatives of Bechtel Power Corporation's (Bechtel's) Nuclear, Control System, Mechanical, I
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Electrical, Plant Design, Civil / Structural and Architectural Engineering Groups.
The task force was directed by the Bechtel Project Engineer. The plant area walkthroughs were conducted by a team of Bechtel office engineers.
The team's findings were reported to the Bechtel Project Engineer and the interdiciplinary task force.
SCE's program was reviewed by an independent consultant, Robert L.
Cloud Associates, Inc., which reported directly to SCE management.
4 The analysis methods used to show that the non-seismic Category 1 equipment and/or equipment supports could accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity were the same as those used for their seismic Category I counterparts.
In addition, the upgraded non-seismic Category I equipment and,&quipment supports e
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were designed to the same criteria (except for material documentatioj) as their seismic Category I counterparts. These criteria were incorporated into the applicable design drawings and specifications.
SCE's program was subject to normal project practices as documented.in the Project Internal Procedures Manual and the Project Quality Procedures Manual.
Design and design control, including desig'n reviews, were carried out in the, same manner as for safety-related equipment.
Field work was performed under the direction of the field construction super-intendents and was inspected by the onsite field engineers.
The field engineers were responsible for verifying that the construction was performed in accordance with the design drawings and specifications and with applicable codes and
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f:r g y a pav ENCLOSURE EVALUATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY'S SEISMIC SYSTEMS INTERACTION PROGRAM FOR THE SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 1.0 Introduction Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their intended safety functions. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 also requires that certain systems be able to accommodate single failures without loss of capability to perform their intended safety functions.
Southern California Edison Company (SCE) has undertaken a systems interaction program for its San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 to ensure that (1) the safety-reiated-plant structures, systems and components will not lose their capability to perform their intended safety functions as a result of seismically-induced physical interactions with non-seisinic Category I equipment, and (2) the redundant safety-related plant systems will not lose their capability'to accommodate single failures as a result of such interactions.
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2.0 Description of SCE's Program, <
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br,'wyg presu e1 SCE's program was based on the assump lon that any non-seismic Cateogry I equipment having significant mass and located in the vicinity of-safety-related structures, systems or compon'ents would fail structurally as a result of a seismic event of severity up to and including the Safe Shutdown Earthquake kib<f (SSE), and,such failure would non-mechanistically prevent the safety-related e
nd components fr m-structures, systems G 14 ij k m",p% performing their intended safe *J t
functions.
All non-seismic Category I. equipment having significant cass and l
located in the vicinity of safety-related structures, systems or cocponents y w
-L' f, c;7he>O) w4re-shown by analysis to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of r (O wa s estructural integrity or, were provided with upgraded supports to ensure that u[laa{$dwes equipment would be able to accommodate the SSE withoutqn er
/, la s h th adversely with the safety-related structures, systems or components.
g SCE's program was accomplished in three phases - the generic upgrading phase, the plant area upgrading phase'j'and the plant area walkthrough phase. The generic upgradir.g and plant area upgrading phases of SCE's program were carried out during the design stage of the plant.
The plant area walkthrough phase of SCE's program was carried out following the construction stage of the pl ant.
During the generic upgiading phase of SCE's program, the design of non-safety-related equipment located in seismic Category I. buildings was analy:ed or upgraded as follows:
1.
A'.1 non-safety-related conduit and cable trays located in all seis=ic Category I buildings were designed with upgraded supports; 2.
All fire protection system sprinkler system piping located in all seis=ic Category I buildings were designed with upgraded supports; T, -
2; 3.
All permanent and maintenance cranes located in safety-related areas of all seismic Cateogry I buildings were shown by analysis or designed to able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity; 4
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4.
All non-safety-related heating, ventilating and air conditioning equipment and ductwork located inside the containment was designed with upgraded supports; 5.
All non-safety-related control room panels were designed with upgraded supports and, if located adjacent to safety-related panels, appropriate gaps; 6.
The control room lighting system was designed to both maintain its structural integrity and function during the SSE; and 7.
All non-safety-related instrumentation located in all seismic Cateogry
~
I buildings was designed with upgraded supports.
In addition, the non-safety-related turbine building, the turbine gantry crane and the secondary system' reheaters located on the turbine building deck were shown by analysis to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity.
During the plant area upgrading phase of SCE's program, a design review of all plant areas containing safety-related equipment was conducted to identify any remaining non-seismic Category I equipment that could interact with safety-related structures, systems or components as a result of a seismic event. This review resulted in the following actions:
1.
(arge-mass non-safety-related equipment located in all seismic Category I buildings was shown by analysis or designed with upgraded supports to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrtty; 2.
All non-safety-related large-and small-bore piping located in safety-related areas in which adverse interactions might occur were designed with upgraded supports; i l
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3.
All non-safety-related heating, ventilating and air conditioning ductwork located in all seismic Category I buildings was designed with upgraded supports; and 4.
All lighting fixtures located in all seismic Category I buildings were dash designed with upgraded supports or were shown by analysis to have insufficient
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tb unacceptable damage.1" N mass to
- During the plant area walkthrough phase of SCE's program, a field walkthrough of all plant areas containing safety-related equipnient was conducted to verify that all non-seismic Cateogri I equipment having significant mass and located in the vicinity of safety-related structures, systems or components had been shown by analysis to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity or had been pr'ovided with upgraded supports to ensure that the equipment would be able to accommodate the SSE without interacting adversely with the safety-related structures, systems or components.
This walkthrough resulted in the identification of the following non-seismic Cateogry, I equipment which could potentially interact adversely with field-routed safety-related conduit:
1.
One non-safety-related screen wash pump suction pipe located in the salt water intake structure, and 2.
Five non-safety-rel.ated electrical panels located in the penetration and control buildings.
The generic upgrading and plant area upgrading phases of SCE's program were V a{.u.y l.nsvy implemented by an interdiciplinery task force composed of representatives of Bechtel Power Corporation's (Bechtel's) Nuclear, Control System, Mechanical, G
e
Electrical, Plant Design, Civil / Structural and Architec-gineering Groups.
The task force was directed by the Bechtel Project Engineer.
The plant area walkthroughs were conducted by a team of Bechtel office engineers. The team's vd.d I no y findings were reported to the Bechtel Project Engineer and the inters?c?p ;inany vl task force.
SCE's program was reviewed by an independent consultant, Robert L.
Cloud Associates, Inc., which reported directly to SCE management..
N/
Y The analysis methods used to show that the non-seismic Category I equipmaet suppor.ts could accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity were the same as those used for their seismic Category I counterparts.
In addition, the upgraded non-seismic Category I equipment supports were designed to the same criteria (except for certain quality assurance requirements)'as their seismic Category counterparts.
These criteria were incorporated into the applicable design drawings and ' specifications.
Field work was performed under the direction of the field construction super-intendents and was inspected by the onsite field engineers.
The field engineers were responsible for verifying that the construction was performed in accordance with the design drawings and specifications and with applicable codes and standards.
SCE's program was subject to normal project practices as documented in the' Project Internal Procedures Manual and the Project Quality Procedures Manual. Design
~
and design control, including design reviews, were carried out ia the same manner as for safety-related equipment.
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3.0
!!RC Staff Review of 'SCE's Program Our review of SCE's program consisted of a review of the infonnt: ion provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report and the amendments thereto, and an onsite audit of SCE's program.
Dur'ng the course af our review, we participated l
in a number of meetings and discusssions with SCE representatives concerning their program.
At our request, SCE provided additional information as needed for our review. This additional information was provided mainly in the form of amendments to the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Our inhouse review of SCE's program emphasized the objectives of the program, the scope of the program, the organization. established to implement the program, the methoddo'gy used to implement the program and the c-iteria used Our acc'eptance criterila for SCE's program we" as follows:
in the program.
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1.
All non-seismic Category I equipment located in the vicir of safety-related structures, systems and components should be cons
. red as potential sources of interactions with the safety-related structure sys,tems and components; p
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'All non-seismic.Categcry I equipment deemed to be potential sources of interactions with the safety-related structrures, systems and components (a) y p dys,\\
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should be shown,to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity, (b) should be upgraded to be able to accommodate SSE without loss of structrural integrity or (c) should be provided with upgraded supports to
&,/ f ea h vs? > 4 m - w i - 4 G f T ssc ensure that the eqtlipment would be able to accommodate the SSE without inter-acting adversely with the safety-related structures, systems or components; d
3.
The methods used to analyze the non-seismic Category I equipment af to LH/f*75 upgra'de the non-seismic Category I equip::/t hd/or-equip; ant-should be i
consistent with those used for seismic Category I equipment..
With regard to the first acceptance criterion, SCE's program considered all non-seismic Category I egetpment having significant mass and located in the same room as safety-related structures, systems or components.
Small-mass non-seismic Category I equipment was determined to be able to accommodate and SSE without loss of structural integirty based on its anchor bolt speci-fications.
All other non-seismic Category I equip ;rit was deemed to have significant mass and was considered as potential sburces of adverse inter-actions with safety-related structures, systems and components.
With regard to the second acceptance criterion, all non-seismic Category I equipment having significant mass and located in the same room as safety-related structur.es, systems or components was shown by analysis to be able to accommodate the SSE without loss of structural integrity or was provided paafEr k t O l
with upgraded supports to ensure that the equipment would be able to accommo-date the SSE without interacting adversely with the safety-related structures, systems or c'omponents.
With regard to the third acceptance criterion, the analysis methods'.used to show that the non-seismic Category I eget[ ment could accommodate the SSE without loss ~ of structural integrity were the same as those used for their seismic Category I counterparts.
In addition, the upgraded non-seismic Category I Aquipment and/or eqM supports were designed to the same criteria (except for certain quality assurance requiremen.ts) as their seismic Category I counterparts.
On the basis of our review of the information provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report and the amendments thereto, we conclude that SCE's program e
has met our acceptance criteria. Our onsite audit was conducted to obtain reasonable assurance that.SCE's program has been implemented in a manner 5
consistent with these acceptance criteria.
The objectives of our onsite audit of SCE's program were to (a) review the status of SCE's program and any outstanding matters associated therewith; (b) review representative examples of design drawings and specifications; (c) observe representative examples of upgraded nt and/or nt supports; and (d) conduct our own independent walkthrougg
'of selected
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At the time of our onsite audit, March,3-5,1981, SCE had completed essentially Vo r (y all of their program for Unit 2.
The ey outstanding matters for Unit 2 were (a) final disposition of the potential interactic,(s identified during the plant v
area walkthrough phase and (b) p.. application of the program to any remaining construction and/or modification activities.
SCE had not yet begun the plant area walkthrough phase for Unit 3.
The representative examples of design drawings and specifications that we reviewed during our onsite audit were implemented in a manner consistent with our acceptance criteria.
Likewise, the representative examples of upgraded equipment supports that we observed during our onsite audit were constructed in a manner consistent with our acceptance criteria.
Our review and obser-vation of these aspects of SCE's program provided us with reasonable assurance y
that SCE's program has been implemented in a manner consisten$ with our acceptance criteria. '
4 9
During our independent walkthrough/walkdown, we walked through/ walked down representative areas / equipment in each building containing safety-related equipment.
We also looked for types of interactions postulated during systems I
interactions programs of other applicants. We found only one type of' potentially-adverse interaction that we felt warranted further consideration.
That potentially-adverse interaction involved the plant lighting fixtures.
The plant lighting fixtures were in general designed with upgraded supports.
However, it was not clear that the lighting fixtures themselves could accom-modate the SSE without becoming detached from their supports and interacting
~
advers~ely with safety-related structures, systems and components. At our request, SCE committed to reevaluate this aspect of the design of the lighting fixtures and to make any modifications necessary to ensure that the lighting fixtures will not become detached from their supports during an SSE and interact adversely with safety-related structures, systems or components. We find this commitment acceptable.
4.0 Conclusion and Followup Our review of SCE's program has provided us with reasonable assurance that (a) the safety-related plant structures, systems and components will not lose their capability to perform their intended safety functions as a result of seismically-induced physical interactions with non-seismic Category I equipment, and (b) the redundant safety-related plant systems will not lose their capability to accommodate single failures as a result of such interactions.
On these bases, we conclude that SCE's programs is acceptabie.
The implementation of the remainder of SCE's program including any analyses, tests and plant modifications will be followed by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement during the normal course of their inspection activities.
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7g6 OBJECTIVES OF SCE'S PROGRAM wit 2E 7D.'
ENSURE THAT THE, SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES,
SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTIONS AS A RESULT OF SE_ISMICALLY-INDUCED PHYSICAL INTERACTIONS WITHt.NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY,I EQUIPMENT, ENSURE THAT THE REDUNDANT SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR CAPABILITY TO t
ACCOMMODATE SII4GLE FAILURES AS A RESULT OF SUCH INTERACTIONS.
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APPROACH USED Q SCE W P-R00 RAH-W M N
ASSUME \\THATNON-SEISMICCATE0GRYI. EQUIPMENT WOULD FAIL STRUCTURALLY AS A RESULT OF A SEISMIC ro essum E TH A Y EVENT AND,SUCH FAILURE WOULD NON-MECHANISTICALLY
_ PREVENT THE; SAFETY-RELATED SIRUCT.URES, SYSTEMS
'AND COMPONENTS FROM PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTIONS.
Ti4E0 Tf.jer.;NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT (1) WAS SHOWN n
TO BE A_BLE TO ACCDMMODATE THE SSE,WITHOUT LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OR (2) WAS PROVIDED WITH UPGRADED SUPPORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE SSE WITHOUT LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.
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$NPCEMbNtATiON -0F SCE'S PR0 GRAM wn s 1/>?P.cEn1ENTED "rb)
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GENERIC UPGRADING PHASE - GENERIC NON-SEISMIC
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CATEGORY I EQUIPMENT ^ fog 4 wu2,e n t-a (~ sch ut.+w ea I ie, J c.) t ' H SFr3-We P't "O ACCOMMODATE THE SSE OR WAS PROVIDED WITH UPGRADED
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, [, _,, g. f REVIEW TO IDENTIFY THE REMAINDER OF. THE NON-
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S E I S M I C C AT E G O R Y I E Q U I P M E N T ( D U R.I N G D E S I G N ). TJ, /s sp/rm8*18 Pi&c was sk,an n ee. a y u. +o s u _,a,,;c m c s a,; ; u,,;.
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TO IDENTIFY ANY NON-SEISMIC CATE0GRY I EQUIPMENT NOT PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED (FOLLOWING CONSTRUCTION) r k J-1f%d
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r, NRC STAFF REVIEW 0F SCE'S PROGRAM l'
CONDUCTED BY' REVIEW TEAM CONSISTING 0F TWO l
SIB MEMBERS AND ONE MEB MEMBER.
TWO-PART REVIEW:
(1) INHOUSE REVIEW OF SCE'S PROGRAM AS DESCRIBED INTHE'FSkRANDAMEN0MENTSTHERET0.
(2) ONSITE AUDIT OF SCE'S PROGRAM.
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&cn'CC.v,-2A 7t.p ou,o OBJECTIVES OF PROGRAM
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e SCOPE OF PROGRAM
. Scope. of equ/pmen:b Ao l<4 proICC4d
' Sw of inkreeNm.:, e.g. pkycle.e?, fue k's.,-7 ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAM
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METHODOLOGY USED TO IMPLr. MENT PROGRAM
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CRITERIA USED IN PROGRAM Co 1/c, /A uue1 4 S*ot*/M l? h k } eve &h'on C a
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ONSITE AUDIT OF SCE'S PROGRAM w
. THREF-DAY ONSITE AUDIT CONDUCTED BY NRC REVIEW TEAM IN E ARLY-MARCH 1981 i
.'0BJECTIVFS:
(1) REVIEW STATUS OF SCE'S PROGRAM AND ANY _0VTSTANDItG MATTERS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH O **' 4 U" M # #**
auy adJlHenot crues eucha,,,
t e.e. 7enz. z, (7xe.c.
(2) REVIEW REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF FIELD DOCUMENTATION oceign cl awim s, spec.:r'.ca yous 6.i - t~ ~ ~
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(3) OESERVE REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF UPGRADED EOUIDMENT
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SUPPORTS l'9 $6 V/x h e.e s, c +c..*
(4) CONDUCT INDEPENDEb'T WALKTHROUGHS /WALKDOWNS OF SELECTED-PLANT AREAS / EQUIPMENT INDEPENDENT WALKTHROUGHS/WALKDOWNS (1) REPRESENTATIVE AREAS / EQUIPMENT IN EACH BUILDING CONTAINING 2*"#'d #bM##" F***l/
SAFETY-RELATED EOUIPMENT VIfer/ o'-6 baHe<y room
$tsf*e/y - ec lam dow.luil-(2) CATEGORIES OF INTERACTIONS POSTULATED DURING DIABLO CANYON SEISMIC SYSTEMS INTERACTION. PROGRAM, Sfrveh.< val gra}c 5, flping y }ltyk H"o) $Ixiurcs t;'C cut.v' fe w, o a wa-s w. i9 p sc.y w p:ct.) w g f g i. T VME'ig.or.e D Fu m nif g o v S r p a 2.i g f r e u ;
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e FINDINGS AND REMAINING ACTIONS REVIEW HAS PROVIDED REASONABLE ASSURANC_E THAT:
(1) SAFETY-RELATED PLANT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTIONS AS A RESULT OF SEISMICALLY-INDUCED PHYSICAL INTERACTIONS WITH NON-SEIS.$IC CATEGORY I. EQUIPMENT (2) REDUNDANT SAFETY-RELATED PLANT SYSTEMS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR CAPABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE SINGLE FAILURES AS A RESULT OF SUCH INTERACTIONS 4 7p)SEG&rcE)
CONCLUDE THAT SCE'S PROGRAM IS ACCEPTABLE REMAINING ACTIONS:4 2It
/+3 fb t 2 v # s i (1) SCE TO AMEND FSAR TO DOCUMENT INFORMATION AND COMMITMENTS REQUESTED.DURING AUDIT (2) NRR TO PREPARE AND ISSUE SER SUPPLEMENT SUMMARIZING RESULTS OF EVALUATION OF SCE'S PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION OF REMAINDER OF SCE'S PROGRAM, INCLUDING ANY ANALYSES, TESTS AND PLANT MODIFICATIONS, WILL BE F0ll0WED BY IE DURING NORMAL COURSE OF THEIR INSPECTION ACTIVITIES G
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UNITED STATES p
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ei
- f WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e
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s%,.....f On g 1981 fiOTE T0:
NRR Assistant Directors and Branch Chiefs B. Grimes FROM:
R. L. Tedesco
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMIfiG ACRS MEETIfiGS ON SAfi ONOFRE, MARCH 11 & 12, 1981 The San Onofre 2 and 3 SER was issued on February 6, 1981 and Supplement No. I to the SER was issued on February 25, 1981. The ACRS Subcommittee on San Onofre 2 and 3 will meet on March 11, 1981, and the full Committee will. consider San Onofre 2 and 3 on March 12, 1981.
In order to get a favorable letter from the full.comittee on March 12, and thereby avoid delays in the project schedule, substantive staff support at both meetings is necessary.
Keep in mind that all cur efforts to issue a timely Safety Evaluation will be for naught if the ACRS concludes that the staff effort is not sufficiently complete, and requires that the project be addressed again at a later meeting.
The agendas for the two meetings are attached.
At th'e subcommittee meeting on March 11, 1981, staff presentations by R. Benedict, P. Collins, J. Knight, and C. Thomas are requested. Attendance by other staff members is requested, as indicated on the agendas, to answer ACRS Questions in areas where the applicant or the staff Project Manager will be making the presentation. -Your cooperation in helping to advance this project will be appreciated.
Y
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Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing L
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Tentative Presentation Schedule
.U ACRS Subcommittee on San Onofre 2&3 Washington, D.C.
March 11,1981 i
Organizational Presentation Approximate-Speaker Time (min.)
Time
- 1. Opening Remarks by the 5
1:30 p.m.
Subcomnittee Chairman
- 2. NRC Staff Presentation 2.1 Introduction -
%ok 5
1:35'p.m.
Plant schedule /s'taffing o
requirements 2.2 Standards for Operator f,Colhg 10 Training, including Simulators 1:40 p.m.
2.3 Management Evaluation k, 6ene.dg'eh 10 1:55 p.m.
Assessment of the Independent o
Review Groups, their charter,
,g and how they interrelate 2.4 Structural Evaluation I, knic
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10 2:10 p.m.
l o Structural audit, comparison with Diablo Canyon review o Safety factors for containment stress levels 2.5 Systems Interactions Evaluation ~ C.,bena,3 10 -. - -
~ - 2:25 p.in. -
o Comparison with Zion, Indian v Point and Diablo Canyon o Review group conclusions Break 10 2:40 p.m.
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- 3. Applicant Presentation 3.1 Introduction SCE/W. Moody 5
' 2:50 p.m.
3.2 Training Program and Facilities SCE/J. Willis 10 b8-1(E) 2:55 p.m.,
3.3 Simulator SCE'B.K}tz 10 Codif 10 p.m.
(Ja k, 3.4 Systems Interaction B/J Hosme r.~
10 M S, 3:25 p.m.
3 3.5 ALARA B/J. Purucker 10NM5oh 3:40 p.m.
3.6 Emergency Planning SCE/D. Pilmer 5 k NIel 3:55 p.m.
3.7 TM1-related Issues 3.7.1 Hydrogen Control
'i Provisions B/R. Tosetti 10 Feo rn 4:05 p.m.
3.7.2 Inadequate Core Cooling CE/W. Burchill 15 Ng 4:20 p.m.
Instrumentation 3.7.3 Miscellaneous Items SCE/R. Phelps 20 4:40 p.m.
o Reg. Guide 1.97 yk
,,,Q Implementation o EPRI Relief Valve Tests (ATWS) o Loss of CCW to RCP ^
l-t Seals Break 10 5:05 p.m.
3.7.4 Critical Function CE/W. Gill 10 5:15 p.m.
Monitor 3.7.5 SCE Grid Reliability SCE/W. Schmus 15 @
Q5:30p.m.
DC Power Reliability B/E. Richardson A
3 3.7.6 NUREG-0660, Oper-SCE/W. Strom 5 Q 5:55 p.m.
ations Feedback to Design & Procedures
& Safety Review Groups
[
3.7.7 Post Accident Plant CE/R. Turk 5 ((
6:05 p.m.
Depressurization 3.7.8 Water Hammer CE/R. Turk 5Me 6:15 p.m.
Prevention in CE Plants 0
f s
3.7.9 Operations Related Items SCE/ Fisher 15 6:25 p.m.
o Symptomatic Analysis of Accidents o Control Panel Tag i
Out Procedures o RV Vent Controls L '-]
Sh3 hJEg 6:45 p.m.
3.7.10 Air Cleaning System B/
Capabilities including Control Room Intake 3.7.11 Application of NUREG-0660 10 y '
6:55 p.m.
Transients and Accidents 3.8 Industrial Security SCE/X. Hadley 15 Q k 7:10 p.m.
(Closed) 3.9 Summary and Conclusions SCE/W. Moody 5
7:30 p.m.
- 4. Closing Remarks by the'
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Subcommittee Chairman 5
7:3b p.m.
Adjournment
. s.L 7:40'p.m.
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Tentative Presentation Schedule ACRS Meeting on San Onofre 2&3 V
Washington, D.C.
March 12, 1981 Organizational Presentation Approximate Speaker
-Time (min.)
Time
- 1. Report by the San Onofre 15 1:00 p.m.
Subcommittee Chairman o Report by the Electrical Phlkig3 Systems Subcommittee Chairman on the Computerized Protection System
,p
- 2. Staff Presentation A&eum
{&fE 2.1 Summary and Schedule
\\ 'D,Pe g 10 Kood 1:15 p.m.
2.2 Open items - plans and 15 3.cd
',1:25 p.m.
schedule for resolution 7
- d. 6Aff4A o Comparison of AM0-2 I* M0 Design with San Onofre 2&J S' N b.8 eft 8.HAAJ Q,
- 3. Applicant Presentation 3.1 Introduction SCE/W. Moody 5
2:00 p.m.
I o Response to NRC' Staff Position on Open items 3.2. Applicant Organization SCE/D. Fogarty, 15 he_fA 2:05 p.m.
R. Dietch and K. Baskin 3.2.1 Organizational Structure 3.2.2 Personnel / Qualifications 3.2.3 INP0 3.3 Training Program i-and Facilities SCE/J. Willis 10 5
2:35 p.m.
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3.4 Station Blackout B/E. Richardson 107Y
- 50 p.m.
3.5 Hydrogen Control Provisions B/S. Freid 10 h en 3:05 p.m.
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l 3.6 Natural Circulation CE/H. Windsor 10 f.en 3:20 p.m.
Break 10 3:35 p.m.
w I
7 2
V 3.7 Human Factors Engineering 3.7.1 Control Room B/J. Singer 10 Seded:
3:45 p.m.
3.7.2 Critical Function CE/W. Gill 10 Monitor 3.7.3 Outside Control Room B/E. Richardson 5
3.8 Secondary System Chemistry 10Ning 4:20 p.m.
and Materials 3.9 Seismic /Non-Seismic Systems B/J. Hosmer 10 M 4:35 p.m.
Interaccion 3.10 Emergency Planning SCE/ D. Pilmer 7 hNte 4:50 p.m.,
3.11 Carry-over items 7
5:00 p.m.
3.12 Industrial Security (Closed) SCE/K. Hadley 7 6s.skig 5:10 p.m.
3.13 Concluding Remarks SCE/W. Moody 5
5:20 p.m.
- 4. Executive Session 5
5:25 p.m.
Adjourment of San Onofre Discussions 5:30 p.m.
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