ML20054C651
| ML20054C651 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1982 |
| From: | Bloch P, Paris O, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | BIER, MILLS, CHRISTA-MARIA, ET AL |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204210465 | |
| Download: ML20054C651 (14) | |
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j ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARO g5 Before Administrative Judges:
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Peter B. Bloch, Chairman iT J \\
Dr. Oscar H. Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon
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In the Matter of Docket No. 50-155 (Spent Fuel Pool Amendment)
CONSUMERS POWER C6MPANY (Big Rock Point Plant)
April 20, 1982 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Motion to Strike Emergency Planning Contention)
This decision addresses a dispute among the parties concerriing the proper status of the Christa-Maria, Joanne Bier, and Jim Mills (Christa-Maria) Contention 9, dealing with emergency planning (contention).
This contention was admitted to discovery, subject to the requirement that the intervenor "should have to specify before the hearing the specific changes required in the emergency pl an because of the increased fuel storage."
LBP-80-4, 11 NRC 117 (1980) at 126.
At the outset, we confront a dispute concerning the meaning of the Board's requirement that specificity be provided before the hearing.
Inter-i venor relies on the Board's language that "the Board accepts the contention" Id., and construes this requirement to mean that its contentiun was admitted to the hearing but that prior to the hearing it needs to "specify" the chan-ges in planning which the pool expansion are alleged to require, thus put-ing Consumers Power Company (applicant) on greater notice of what it would need to refute.
Applicant opposes this interpretation of the Board's ruling by reference to 10 CFR %2.714(b), which requires that "the bases for each contention [be] set forth with reasonable specificity."
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's staff (staff) first states that it interprets the Board's order as requiring that intervenors " provide the 5C)}
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Emergency Planning:
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specificity necessary to put the parties on notice as to what they must k
oppose or defend against."
NRC Staff Response to Licensee's Motion to, k
s Strike (Staff Response) 'at 4.
Staff then states that:
The whole thrust of the Board's order with respect to Conten' ion 9 t
was to allow discovery in the area of emergency planning in order that the contention could be made more specific.
This would mean that Intervenors should refer to particular provisions of the Big Rock emergency plan, or to particular assumptions used in the formu-lation of the Big Rock plan and demonstrate that a change is neces-sary in these provisions or assumptions to account for the increassed fuel to be stored on site.
Id. at 4-5.
We appreciate the difficulty the parties have had in interpreting the Board's order.
Although the Board made no finding concerning the basis for Contention 9, its words indicated that it considered the contention admitted into the proceeding, and neither applicant nor staff sought to clarify the meaning of the order through a motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, the Board required that " specificity" be supplied before the hearing.
One meaning of " specificity" is the meaning found in 10 CFR 2.714(b),which requires that "the bases for each contention [be] set forth with reasonable s peci fic i ty." This is the the most reasonable interpretation and is the meaning the Board intended.
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The intervenors have attempted 'to provide the specificity required by the Board.
In their first filing they attempted to list " arguments for the Board required nexus" and " discussion."
Testimony of Christa-Maria, Joanne Bier, Jim Mills, Shirley John, and John O'Neill, January 25, 1982 (testi-mony), passim.
Our reading of these sections persuades us that intervenors understood that they were being required to do two things: (1) clarify in what way the expansion of the spent fuel pool would require modification of the emergency plans for Big Rock, and (2) provide some basis for believing that there is a nexus between the expansion of the pool and the allegedly required modifications.
In addition, we believe that intervenors reflected a sound interpretation of the Board's meaning.
The requirement of "specifi-J
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city" should b'e interpreted both in light of. 2.714 and in light of the. pro-cedural context.
In this case, the procedural context was the completion of discovery.
At that stage of. the proceeding, intervenors already have had' an opportunity to assemble evidence.
With evidence in their possession, they shoulc. be able to specify changes in the emergency plan together with their i
informed basis for believing that the changes are necessary.
We believe -
that this interpretation of the Board's requirement is the correct one, and j
we shall apply that interpretation in this memorandum.
I SPECIFIED CHANGES IN THE EMERGENCY PLAN First, we have examined Christa-Maria's filings to determine which changes in the emergency plan have been specified to be in contest.
Those changes follow:
(1)
The increased inventory of the fuel pool requires that the emergency pl an be based on an inhalation pathway of 10 miles rather than 5 miles and on a 50 mile rather than a 30 mile ingestion path-way.
Testimony at 4-5.
(2)
The Public Information pamphlet, which does not adequately in-form people about radiation hazards, especially to children and preg-nant women, should be improved. Testimony at 6, citing Brian Grimes,
" director of the division of Emergency Preparadness.' It also f ails to educate the public properly about gamma ray radiation.
Interve-nors Specification of Changes, March 9,1982 (Specification) at,3. In addition, the public, local officials and school officials should be more completely educated in problems of radiation exposure.
Id. at 5.
(3)
The Public Information pamphlet has not been properly distri-buted and should therefore be redistributed.
Testimony at 8.
(4)
Applicant shoul.d be required to assist pe'rsons without vehic-les to leave the area.
Testimony at 9.
( 5-)
A current list of invalids should be kept so that they can be assisted in time of emergency. M.
(6)
Radiation monitoring is not sufficiently accurate.
Specifica-tion at 3.
(7)
Some of the people relied on in the emergency plan do not ex-ist and there is poor coordination anong those who do exist.
Id.
Emergency Planning: 4 (8)
The public should be notified at the beginning of radiation releases rather than waiting for the situation to become critical; and evacuation should begin at an earlier time and at lower radiation doses.
Id,. at 4; Intervenor's Specification at 4.
(9)
There should be separate pl ans for winter and summer.
Testimony at 4.
(10)
Communications deficiencies should be cured.
Ij!. at 5.
(11)
Children and pregnant women should be evacuated at much lower levels of radiation than in the current planning for the general public.
For the sake of convenience, we will refer to these items as subcontentions.
11 BASIS FOR SUBCONTENTIONS Having decided which subcontentions were filed by Christa-Maria, we must now review each to see whether its basis has been set forth with reas-onable specificity.
We will discuss each subcontention in the order in which we have just listed them.
A. Subcontention (1): Size of Emergency Planning Zones
- 1. Christa-Maria's Allegations Christa-Maria alleges that tnere are methods by which the entire contents of the enlarged fuel pool can be dispersed and that, consequently, it is not appropriate to apply planning zone areas for nuclear power facili-ties with less than 250 MWt capacity.
Testimony at 4.
They argue, first, that the number of fuel elements in the pool is being increased from 193 to 441.
Id. at 2.
Second, that this fuel is being added to a pool in which a substantial quantity of the stored fuel is plutonium enriched and therefore of increased toxicity.
Ij[. at 1,4.
Third, that:
Breach of containment is a possiblity that cannot be ruled out forever just because all rules, regulations and safety measures are designed to prevent this occurrance.
Murphy's Law does exist, as do natural occurances and the real possibility at Big Rock of the impact of an aircraft.
None of the above can be fully regulated.... At least not to the 100% effect that is deemed necessary to protect the public....
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Emergency Planning: 5
[ Style changed for clarity.] g. at 4-5.
Christa-Maria also contends that the contents of the pool could be released from a hydrogen-steam explosion, such as might accompany a supercriticality incident.
Specification at 2.
For its basis for this subcontention, Christa-Maria citas the follow-ing passage from page 4 of a December 6,1972 Memo of James Shea, U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission Docket No. 50-155:
The increased quantity of plutonium. in the Big Rock Point core introduces the possibility that core neutronics are affected unfavor-ably or that the increased toxicity of plutonium results in an unac-ceptable increase in radiation doses to the public during normal or post accident conditions.
Cited on Specification at 2.
( Although this passage deals with plutonium in the core, Christa-Maria offers it for its implications concerning plutonium in the fuel pool.)
Christa-Maria also states that the plant is not properly shielded for gamma radiation, which creates a problem with respect to the use of the standard evacuation zones.
Id. at 2-3.
- 2. Arguments Opposing Basis Applicant and Staff concur in the opinion that Christa-Maria has merely made a general attack on the overall adequacy of the emergency plan and has not shown that there is any assumption used in determining the Big Rock emergency planning zone which is rendered inaccurate because of the ex-pansion.
Applicant's Reply at 6; Staff's Response at 5.
Applicant adds that the Big Rock emergency plan is based on Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 which applicant describes as assuming " accident conditions involving reactor core melt consequences." ' Applicant's Reply at 6. More particularly, appli-cant asserts that it informed Christa-Maria, in response to its Interroga-tory 9-2, that the maximum release of radioactivity assumed for emergency planning purposes is a full core meltdown. M.at6. Applicant also stated that its response to Interrogatory 9-6 stated that "the emergency planning i
Emergency Planning: 6 assumption of a complete meltdown and loss of containment integrity over-whelms any contribution made_by the spent fuel."
_Id. at 7.
Applicant also argues that the fuel pool enlargement will not add any additional plutonium enriched fuel to the pool.
It states that no addition-1 al M0X fuels will be discharged to the spent fuel pool after February 1982.
1 Q.at8.
To determine the credibility of applicant's assertion that the re-lease from "a complete meltdown and loss of containment integrity overwhelms any contribution made by spent fuel", we examined applicant's answer to Cnrista-Maria Interrogatory 9-6.
Answers of Consumer's Power Company, May i
21,1980 at 8.
The authority for that statement is cited by applicant but is not discussed.
We examined the two memoranda cited, RAE 83-79 and JLB 6-80.
These memoranda appear to analyze the comparative radiation coming from an expanded fuel pool during a complete loss of water from the pool.
RAE 83-79 at 1.
They do not purport to analyze possible releases resulting from the crash of an airplane, from a supercriticality incident which might be accompanied by a zirconium cladding fire or from a cask drop incident re-sulting in a zirconium cladding fire.
Nor do they purport to analyze pos-sible accidents involving a combination of fuel pool and core releases.
See Intervenor's Supplemental Response, April 13, 1982 at 3.
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- 3. Conclusion Our starting point for reviewing the competing factual and legal claims is 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).
Although only Christa-Maria mentioned the applicability of this re911ation to the question before us, we think it important to cite the sectern in its entirety:
Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plar.ts shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a nuclear power reactor sh all be determined in relation to local emergency needs and capabilities as they are affected by such condi-tions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, 1
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and jurisdictional boundaries.
The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis... for reactors with an author-ized power level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for the inges-tion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to pro-tect the food ingestion pathway.
This section makes it possible to treat a plant such as Big Rock, generating less than 250 MW thermal, on a " case-by-case" basis.
- However, our i ecord does not show that the staff has ever made a case-by-case deter-mination concerning the effect of the fuel pool expansion on the size of the emergency planning zones.
See Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Relating to the Modification of the Spent Fuel Storage Pool, May 15, 1982 (which does not discuss emergency planning at all ).
( Applicant cites a finding in the Environmental Impact Assessment that off-site radiological impacts would be environmentally insignificant, but we do not interpret that finding to extend to emergency events.
Motion of Consu-mers Power Company to Strike, February 19,1982 (Motion to Strike) at 9.) We find that a case-by-case evaluation of this spent fuel pool expansion is particularly necessary because of the use of restricted planning zones.
Compare Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-7, j
11 NRC 245 (1980) at 285.
Furthermore, we find that Christa-Maria has made plausible arguments concerning both the presence of an increased inventory of radioactive prod-ucts and the mechanisms for dispersal.
Applic ant has not answered those arguments.
Consequently, we conclude that Christa-Maria's arguments neea to t
j be evaluated and considered in making the required case-by-case determina-tion. We therefore conclude that this subcontention has a basis and must be l
considered at the hearing.
We understand that our ruling will not please either applicant or staff.
Both are likely to feel that the methods by which the fuel pool might be dispersed are too unlikely to deserve serious treatment.
- However, i
we consider the possibility of occurrence of improbable incidents such as these to be the reason the Commission has promulgated the emergency plan-
Emergency Planning: 8 ning requirements, and it is not our role to question the wisdom of that policy choice.
The need for emergency plans arises in an Alice-in-Wonder-land World, where events occur which probabilistic risk assessment tells us to be highly unlikely.
But what is unlikely?
A piece of boilerplate in a steam generator at the Ginna plant caused a steam generator rupture.
Sul-phuric acid appears to have found its way into the primary coolant system at TMI-1.
A dropped light bulb caused a transient at Rancho Seco.
TMI-2 occurred as a result of a sequence of improbable events.
Indeed, Murphy's Law is alive and well in reactors, justifying the Commission's continuing implementation of defense-in-depth concepts.
Since no one can estimate the combined occurrence of highly improbable events, the Commission may be cor-rect in promulgating a rule requiring emergency planning for such events.
B. Subcontention (2): Radiation Hazards Information and Training
- 1. Christa-Maria's Allegations This contention rests on two legs.
First, the argument, which we have just accepted as litigable, that the spent fuel pool expansion causes a greater risk in times of emergency.
Second, the argument that Brian Grimes, apparently the county (see Testimony at 9) director of the division of Emer-gency Preparadness, has found that the public information pamphlet distrib-uted by Big Rock is weak in providing useful information about radiation hazards. Testimony at 6; Specification at 3.
- 2. Opposing Arguments Applicant and staff contend that Christa-Maria has f ailed to show a connection between alleged deficiencies in its information pamphlet or in the training of its emergency personnel and the expansion of the fuel pool.
Applicant's Reply at 9; Staff's Response at 5.
- 3. Conclusions 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.D.2. requires yearly dissemination to
Emergency Planning: 9 the public of " general information as to the nature and effects of radia-tion..
10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) requires radiological emergency response training for those who may be called to assist in an emergency.
We find that Christa-Maria has argued that the expansion of the fuel pool. increases the risks which might lead to activation of emergency plans.
Under that circumstance, we reject the argument that it does not matter whether the plans are adequate now because there is no special feature of the pool enlargement that calls for an improved pl an.
It is enough for Christa-Maria to show that the expansion contributes to a risk and that the reactor with its expanded pool has not been adequately protected against that increased risk.
That the reactor may heretofore have been inadequately protected is not a sufficient defense against the allegation that it is not now adequately protected. (This conclusion has a widespread effect on other subcontentions and shall be called the " increased risk conclusion".)
We differentiate two branches of this subcontention.
The first branch, concerning dissemination of information, has a basis in the state-ment of Brian Grimes.
However, no basis is provided for the more specific charge that gamma ray exposure will be exacerbated by the expansion of the fuel pool and that there is a need to improve education about gamma rays.
Nevertheless, the general contention concerning inadequate education is sup-ported by a basis and gamma ray education arguments are admissable if they are shown to be linked to the overall contention about inadequate education.
The second branch of this subcontention, relating to inadequate training, has a basis in the affidavit of the intervenors.
See Testimony at 9.
Consequently, ws accept this entire subcontention, modified to delete any explicit mention of gamma radiation.
C. Subcontention (3): Distribution of Public Information Pamphlet Intervenors have alleged, without any citation to the record or to other authority, that applicant's public information pamphlet has not been distributed pursuant to regulations but has been "just laid out at several
Emergency Planning:
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key places for people to take."
Testimony at 8.
However, this allegation is contained in an affidavit and applicant apparently has not contradicted this assertion of fact.
Since Appendix E requires distribution of the pam-phlet, as we have already discussed, it should be properly distributed and this unrebutted testimony of Christa-Maria establishes a basis for this sub-contention.
Furthermore, our acceptance of the increased risk conclusion requires us to find that this subcontention has a nexus to the pending application for amendment and that it should be admitted.
D. Subcontention (4): Assistance for People Without Vehicles Intervenors state that applicant has refused to assist people with-out vehicles to leave the area in times of emergency.
Testimony at 9.
We do not find applicant contradicting this assertion.
Furthermore, we find that there is a question under the regulations as to whether the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) for " adequate emergency f acilities" can be met without providing transportation of some type for those without it.
Having already accepted the increased risk conclusion, we must therefore also admit this subcontention.
E. Subcontention (5): Current List of Invalids Intervenors state that the Sherriff keeps a list of invalids who l
would need assistance in an emergency but that the list is inadequate be-cause it depends on voluntary action of the invalids to be on the list.
Testimony at 9.
For reasons parallcl to those applying to contention (4),
this subcontention also must be accepted.
F. Subcontention (6): Inadequate Radiation Monitoring l
Intervenors have stated in their affidavit that compliance with tech-nical requirements, such as installation of monitoring equipment, etc., has been continually deferred by the utility or is being reduced.
Testimony at 8.
They expanded on this in the subsequent Christa-Maria Specification at
Emergency Planning: 11 3, by stating that monitoring depends on extrapolation with insufficient accur acy.
These factual allegations have not been contradicted.
See Appli-cant's Reply at 8-9.
Furthermore,10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) requires adequate monitoring.
Having accepted the increased risk conclusion, we must there-fore.edmit this subcontention.
G. Subcontention (7): Personnel Specification and Coordination i
Intervenors' affid avit stated that there are insufficient personnel to insure proper control in case of an accident.
Testimony at 8; Specifica-tion at 3.
There is no specific contradiction of this subcontention, which apparently f alls within 10 CFR &50.47(b)(3),(5) ~and (6) and may f all within other subsections as well.
Consequently, we must also accept this subcon-tention.
H. Subcontention (8): Earlier Public Notification Intervenors allege that expansion of the fuel pool would release higher amounts of radiation and at a f aster rate.
Testimony at 5.
They assert that this requires that the public be notified earlier about the need to leave.
Specification at 4.
However, intervenors do not even state the current criteria for notification of the public and do not indicate why i
those specific criteria are deficient.
Hence, they have not established a sufficient basis for this subcontention and it shall not be admitted.
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- 1. Subcontention (9): Separate Plans for Winter and ' Summer Intervenors have specified that there should be separate emergency plans for winter and summer, accomodating the difficulties of winter weather and the complications caused by large numbers of s'ummer visitors. Spgcifica-
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tion at 4.
Applicant recognizes that this assertion has been made but do'es
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not provide any specific f actual reason for rejecting it.
Applicant's Reply at 9.
Hence, based on our acceptance of the increased risk conclusion, we.
must admit this subcontention.
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Emergency Planning: 12 J. Subcontention (10): Communications deficiencies Intervenors have generally "specified" communications deficiencies.
Specification at 5.
This will not do.
It provides inadequate notice of what is contended and appears to be without basis. (We carefully reread the Testimony w!thout finding a basis.)
Consequently, this subcontention must not be admitted.
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K. Subcontention (11): Children and Pregnant Women Intervenors allege that children and pregnant women are more suscep-tible to radiation and that provision should be made for them to leave early during an emergency.
Specification at 3.
Applicant does not assert that its plan makes such provision or that such' a provision would not be helpful.
Applicant's Reply at 9.
It does assert that the Appendix E does not require such a provision and that the subcontention therefore is in controvention of the regulations.
Id.
We disagree with Applicant's interpretation of Appendix E, particu-larly with respect to section II.C.
That section requires a description of
" protective measures to be taken... within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an accident."
We interpret intervenors to be alleg-j ing that a specific protective measure must be included in the plan because j
it is required for the reasonable protection of the public.
This particular suggestion also derives practical support from the TMI-2 experience, in which women and children were evacuated. Consequently, we find that this j
subcontention f alls within the scope of the regulations and that pursuant to I
our incremental risk conclusian, this subcontention must be accepted.
0RDER For all the foregoing reasons and based on consideration of the en-tire record in this matter, it is this 20th day of April, 1982,
ii Emergency Planning:
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l ORDERED l
Christa Maria's Contention 9, previously admitted to. discovery,.is limited to the following subcontentions:
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(1) The increased inventory of the fuel. pool requires that the emer-gency plan be based on an inhalation pathway of 10 miles rather than 5 miles and on a 50 mile rather than a 30 mile ingestion pathway.
(2) Consumer Power Company (applicant) should improve its public in-formation pamphlet to more adequately inform people about radiation hazards, particularly to children and pregnant women. In addition, the public, local officials and school officials should be more com-pletely educated in problems of radiation exposure.
J (3)
Applicant's public information pamphlet has not been properly distributed and should therefore be redistributed.
(4)
Applicant should be required to assist persons without vehicles to leave the area during an emergency evacuation.
(5)
A current list of invalids should be kept so that they can be assisted in time of emergency.
(6)
Applicant should comply with regulations requiring adequate radiation monitoring.
(7)
Applicant's emergency plan should be revised so that it relies only on people who exist and have been properly identified and so that there will be adequate coordination among responsible person-nel.
(8)
Applicant should have separate emergency plans appropriate for j
summer and winter.
I (9)
Appropriate emergency plans should be made for children a$d pregnant women to evacuate at appropriate levels of radiation, consi-dering their special susceptibility.
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Emergency P1anning: 14 FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD De j
Peter B. Bloch, Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE (Y
Oscar H. Paris, ADMIN TIVE JUDG
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Fr'ederick J. (5ho ADMINIS DGE Bethesda, Maryland i
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