ML20054B962
| ML20054B962 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/18/1981 |
| From: | Driskill D, Gagliardo J, Hunter V, Potapovs U, Potapovs V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054B943 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900030 NUDOCS 8204190333 | |
| Download: ML20054B962 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Investigation Report No. 99900030/81-02 Company:
Byron Jackson Pump Company Facility:
Plant 5 Investigation at:
Los Angeles, California Investigation Conducted:
January 12-16, 1981 Investigator:
I dO F t 7-%l D. D. DrisTill, Inveh'igator Date Investigation and Enforcement Staff Inspector:
3-/J'#/
V. H. Hunter, Contractor Inspector Date Components Section 1 Vcndor Inspection Branch Reviewed by:
J.(E. Gagli)rdo, Director Date\\
Investigati6n and Enforcement Staff be 3 //3/&l Approved by:
u Uldis Potapovs, Chief Date Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Investigation was conducted at Byron Jackson Pump Company, Los Angeles, Cali-fornia, on January 12-16, 1981, Report No. 99900030/81-02.
Area Investigated:
Allegations were submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) indicating that required Non-Destructive Examinations (NDE) were not being properly accomplished and that welders were being required to certify welding done by personnel whose qualifications were in question. This investigation involved 58 investigator / inspector manhours by one investigator and one inspector.
8204190333 810319 PDR GA999 EMVENPG PDR 99900030
2 Results Investigation of the allegation that NDE procedures at Byron Jackson Plant 5 are not being properly complied with, was not substantiated.
The allegation that welders at Plant 5 were being required to certify welding done by other persons was substantiated.
However, the investigation disclosed that all nuclear components fabricated by Byron Jackson Plant 5 during the time frame in question were destined for non-domestic nuclear power plants (~ foreign power plants) and not subject to NRC rules and regulations.
This allegation was not substantiated for welding operations at Plant 3 which manufactures components for domestic nuclear applications.
3 INTRODUCTION Byron Jackson Pump Company, Vernon, California, is the Engineered Products Division (EPD) of Borg Warner, Inc.
The facility employs 809 hourly and 475 administrative personnel in a facility which is self-contained in that most all ASME required services, i.e., design, welding, machining, NDE, and hydrostatic /
performance testing are provided.
EPD holds ASME certifications for both the "N" and "NPT" stamps that expire in 1981.
REASON FOR INVESTIGATION On July 14, 1980, Individual A telephonically notified NRC, Region V, of alleged improprieties concerning NDE procedures and falsified welding certifications during production of safety-related pump components for nuclear applications being fabricated at Byron Jackson Plant 5, Vernon, California.
SUMMARY
OF FACTS On July 14, 1980, Individual A telephonically contacted NRC, Region V, regarding safety-related concerns involving nuclear class pumps and pump components being fabricated at the Byron Jackson Pump Company Plant 5, located in Vernon, Cali-fornia.
Individual A stated that prior to about April 1980, strict rules for conformity with nuclear manufacturing standards were maintained at Plant 5.
Individual A stated a change in some supervisory personnel during the late spring and early summer of 1980 had resulted in an intentional departure from these policies in order to increase production.
Individual A related the following specific allegations:
1.
Components were released and shipped, at times, without acceptance of qualified NDE personnel and/or proper NDE techniques being performed.
2.
Byron Jackson Pump Company Plant 5 welders were being instructed to apply their assigned welder's stamp to documentation which represented welds they had not performed.
NRC Region V, recontacted Individual A on OcLober 27, 1980, to advise that the allegations would be investigated by the NRC, Region IV, Vendor Inspection Branch.
4 DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Persons Contacted
- H. T. Thompson, Executive Vice President
- A. W. Snodgrass, Vice President
- R. A. Romero, Director, Quality Assurance
- E. W. Ybarra, Quality Assurance Manager
- J. E. King, Manager, Manufacturing Operations
- R. W. Supernaugh, Manager, Employee Relations
- D. C. Tabb, Legal Counsel Other Persons Contacted Individuals A through I.
- Denotes those attending exit meeting.
2.
Investigation of Allegations Allegation No. 1 Components were released and shipped, at times, without acceptance of qualified NDE personnel and/or proper NDE techniques being performed.
Investigative Findings On January 13, 1981, Individual A was interviewed and stated that, during the summer of 1980, nuclear components were fabricated, inspected, and shipped from the Byron Jackson Plant 5 without proper NDE require:nents being accomplished.
Individual A stated that often welders conducted their own in process Liquid Penetrant (LP) and that same work was occasionally " bought-off" by the QC inspector in lieu of the required acceptance LP.
Individual A also stated that on several occasions welding personnel were instructed to use the developer only (without application of penetrant) as an acceptance criteria for components.
Individual A could not specifically relate this allegation to any identifiable component, date, or record.
Interviews of Former Byron Jackson Plant 5 Personnel On January 13 and 14, 1981, Individuals B, C, D, and E, all Byron Jackson employees formerly associated with the manufacturer of nuclear class components at Plant 5, were independently interviewed concerning allegations of improper NDE procedures being used.
Individual B stated that he had, on occasions, performed the required LP subsequent to which the inspector would view the results and accept or reject the welding accordingly.
Individual B stated that this procedure involved only repair work he had done, which had previously been identified as deficient.
During further
5 l
questioning, Individual B stated that the above penetrant tests were performed only on mild steel components ('which were determined to be non-nuclear products).
Individuals C, D, and E could recall no occasions l
when a QC inspector utilized their in process penetrant test for acceptance purposes. When questioned concerning the use of developer only on fabricated components, Individuals B, C, D and E denied any knowledge l
regarding this being done.
a Interview of Quality Control Inspector On January 14, Individual F, a Byron Jackson quality control inspector formerly employed at Plant 5, was interviewed.
Individual F stated that final penetrant tests were performed by welders on commercial non-nuclear products only.
Individual F stated that acceptance penetrant testing for nuclear components was always performed by the qualified NDE inspector.
Interviews of Former Plant 5 Supervisors On January 14 and 15, Individuals G, H, and I, all former supervisors at Plant 5, were independently interviewed regarding NDE procedures utilized at Plant 5.
Individuals G, H, and I disclaimed any knowledge concerning any improper use or acceptance of penetrant tests at Plant 5.
These individuals additionally stated they had never instructed nor encouraged any Plant 5 personnel to circumvent the required NDE policy.
Allegation No. 2 i
Byron Jackson Pump Company Plant 5 welders were being instructed to apply their assigned welder's stamp to documentation which represented welds they had not performed.
Investigative Findings On January 13, 1981, Individual A was interviewed and recalled during j
the summer of 1980 being instructed, by supervisors (Individuals H and I) i to apply his assigned welder's stamp to documentation (Shop Travelers) to certify welds not personally performed.
Individual A further stated that when requested to do this, the supervisor would say "I will take care of this later," implying that it was a correct procedure to do this.
He stated that on several occasions he had objected to stamping documenta-tion he thought was not his work; however, when pressured, he had stamped the traveler.
Individual A stated that the misuse of welding stamps was primarily attributable to the presence of non-English speaking welders being employed on the night shift who were unable to read the Byron Jackson documentation; therefore, someone else was completing their paperwork.
i
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l 6
Interviews of Byron Jackson Former Plant 5 Employees On January 13 and 14,1981, Individuals B, C, 0, and E were interviewed.
All stated they had knowlege of welders' stamps being utilized to certify welds, performed by other welders.
Each maintained they were instructed to personally apply their stamp to documentation of welds they believed they had not performed.
Each admitted to placing their welding stamps on welds they had not done.
Each also related having, on some occasions, resisted pressures to do this, but were repeatedly told by their respective supervisors (Individuals G, H, and I) that it was "okay" to do it, and that the supervisor "would take care of it".
Each stated they had not feared losing their jobs, as a result of refusing to comply with these requests, because of union protection.
4 i
Interview of Byron Jackson Former Plant 5 QC Inspector On January 14, 1981, Individual F was interviewed.
Individual F related 4
having no knowledge of any welders being asked to stamp welds they had J
not performed.
Individual F recalled an occasion, during the summer of 1980, when two welders had welded a component and subsequently discovered that their names were not listed on his approved matrix (qualified welder's l
list).
Individual F stated that an investigation of the welder's qualifica-l tion records disclosed they were, in fact, qualified, but had inadvertently not been listed on the matrix.
Individual F stated problems with the matrix were chronic during the operation of Plant 5.
Individual F addition-ally stated Plant 5 had employed some non-English speaking qualified welders who were unable to complete the welder's qualification forms and read the instructions for weld requirements listed on Shop Travelers.
Individual F related having assisted these persons in the translation and completion of their required welder's documentation (Shop Travelers) during this period; however, each of these individuals stamped documentation relating to welds they personally performed.
Interview of Byron Jackson Former Plant 5 Supervisors On January 14 and 15, 1981, Individuals G, H, and I were questioned concerning the allegations relating to misuse of welders' stamps.
Individual G stated a chronic problem experienced with welders was their failure to complete documentation of their welds in a timely manner.
Individual G recalled instances wherein paperwork was found to be incomplete and a record check would be made in an effort to identify the person responsible for the weld.
This effort would include a review of weld rod issuance records, visual observation of the weld, and communication with other supervisory personnel.
Individual G stated that upon the identification of the responsible welder, that person would be ordered to complete the paperwork, which included a fixation of the welder's stamp, i
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Individual G related that many times the welders would deny responsibility for the weld and not want to stamp the documentation, at which time he would order the welder to do so.
Individual G conceded that, on occasion, this identification process may possibly have not identified the correct welder.
Individuals H and I also related the problems involving incomplete paperwork which resulted in the welders being instructed to stamp the weld documentation several days subsequent to the weld being performed.
Indivi-duals G, H, and I also related that problems were experienced with the welders' matrix not listing all qualified welders.
Individual I admitted to instances wherein (1) he authorized the use of a welder's stamp on documentation of an individual's welds who had previously terminated his employment and (2) on documentation for a welder's work who had been on medical leave for about two weeks.
Individual I further stated that in both instances the welder he used to stamp the paperwork was qualified for the welding process involved.
Individual I also related that the nuclear components fabricated in Plant 5 were destined for use in Korean nuclear power plant projects only and that all other components fabricated there were for commercial non-nuclear use.
Contact with Byron Jackson Corporate Management l
On January 15, 1981, a meeting was held with members of Byron Jackson corporate management personnel.
The following information was learned:
1.
Plant 5 (as referenced herein) was closed in August 1980 and is no longer a functional operating facility.
2.
The only components fabricated at Plant 5 in 1980 were nuclear components manufactured for foreign projects and commercial l
non-nuclear items.
3.
Byron Jackson corporate management stated that although Plant 5 produced components for commercial non-nuclear and foreign nuclear use only, it is not their policy to condone practices described in this report.
l 4.
Corporate management members assured that, while these problems may have existed in Plant 5, they do not exist in the Byron Jackson Plant 3, where Class 1, 2, and 3 components are manufactured for domestic nuclear operations.
5.
Corporate management stated they had notified the purchaser of the involved components (Westinghouse Corporation) of the facts relating to this investigation and plans were being made to meet with representatives of Westinghouse concerning this matter.
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8 (Inspector's note:
Report No. 9990030/81-01 verified paragraph 4. above.)
(Investigators Note:
During the course of interviews conducted throughout this investigation Byron Jackson employees were indirectly queried concerning intimidation and their fear of losing their job as it related to their respective compliance / noncompliance with supervisors requests to certify work they had not personally performed.
None would state they feared adverse personnel action as a result of noncompliance.)