ML20053E593
| ML20053E593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1982 |
| From: | Rothschild M NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053E594 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8206090053 | |
| Download: ML20053E593 (43) | |
Text
- ,
06/02/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, )
)
50-446
)
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric
)
Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
NRC STAFF'S ANSWER SUPPORTING APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF CONTENTION 5 I.
INTRODUCTION On May 10, 1982 Applicants filed, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749,
" Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of CASE's Contention 5
(" Applicants' Motion").
In support of the Motion, Applicants attach a
" Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard" (hereafter " Applicants' Statement of Material Facts") and affi-davits. As stated below, the Staff submits that the attached Staff affidavit and Applicants' Motion and supporting documents demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that dismissal of Contention 5 is warranted as a matter of law.
Section II of this pleading discusses generally the law applicable to motions for sununary disposition.Section III of this pleading sets forth the Staff's reasons for concluding that there is no genuine issue a
of material fact raised by Contention 5.
py,sIG5ATED ORIGINAU (
e-ggE8SN Q $
8206090053 820602 PDR ADOCK 05000445 p[df O
r O
o 2-II. GENERAL POINTS OF LAW Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749 of the Comission's Rules of Practice, sumary disposition is available to a party in NRC proceedings as to all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding, as follows:
(d) The presiding officer shall render the decision sought if the filings in the proceeding, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law....
The Comission's sumary disposition rule is analogous to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing motions for sumary judgment, and Federal court decisions interpreting Rule 56 may be relied upon in NRC proceedings for the interpretation of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749.
See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 217 (1974).
Under both Rule 56 and-10 C.F.R. 5 2.749, the party seeking sumary judgment has been held to have the burden of proof, viz., the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753 (1977), citing Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The proponent of the motion for sumary disposition must meet its burden of proof even if the party opposing the motion fails to present evidentiary material to the contrary.
- Perry, supra, 6 NRC at 754. On the other hand, where a properly supported motion for sumary disposition has been made, a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations of its contention or m
e
- 1 9
0 0 answer.
10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(b); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584,11 NRC 451, 453 (1980).
Rather, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(b), the party opposing summary disposition must present specific material facts showing there is no genuine issue to be heard:
(b)... When a motion for summary decision is made and supported..., a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer; his answer... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact.
If no such answer is filed, the decision sought, if appropriate, shall be rendered.
Finally, in this regard, all material facts set forth in the statement filed by the moving party in support of its motion for summary disposition "will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party." 10 C.F.R. 52.749(a).1/
In a recent Statement of Policy, the Commission emphasized the availability of summary disposition in appropriate cases, as a means of expediting the hearing process.
In Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,533 (May 27, 1981), the Commission stated as follows:
In exercising its authority to regulate the course of a hearing, the boards should encourage 1/
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(a), answers to motions for summary disposition are to be filed within 20 days after service of the motion; and responses to "new facts and arguments presented in any statement filed in support of the motion" are to be filed within ten days after service thereof.
In deciding a motion for summary disposition, "the record is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC 246, 248 (1975);
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabroock Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877, 879 (1974).
_OS "8%g T*
W**
- h*
-***-N P NM T M 9' *"
- @*P'
'T
'".'Me*Seem.
4-the parties to invoke the summary disposition pro-cedure on issues where there is no genuine issue of material fact so that evidentiary hearing time is not unnecessarily devoted to such issues.
46 Fed. Rg. at 28,535. Similarly, the Appeal Board has stated that the sumary disposition rule provides "an efficacious means of avoiding unnecessary and possibly time consuming hearings on demonstrably insubstantial issues." Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek NuclearGeneratingStation, Unit 1),ALAB-590,11NRC542,550(1980).
As the Appeal Board noted recently, a hearing on each issue raised "is not inevitable," but " wholly depends upon the ability of the intervenors to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact...."
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-654, 14 NRC 632, 634 (1981). A party cannot avoid sumary disposition "'on the mere hope that at trial he will be able to discredit movant's evidence,'" nor may a party "'go to trial on the vague supposi-tion that something may turn up.'"
Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10,1 NRC 246, 248 (1975), quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice 9 56.15[3] and[4].
III. ARGUMENT Contention 5, as admitted by the Licensing Board in its " Order Subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980," dated June 16, 1980, alleges that:
Contention 5.
The Applicants' failure to adhere to the quality assurance / quality control provisions required by the constructions permits for Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2, and the requirements of Appen-dix B of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, and the construction practices employed, specifically in regard to concrete work, mortar blocks, steel, fracture toughness testing, expansion joints, placement of e m.,.,
p gee w e a w,+ +
- e- +==*wwe*--
e
+-e=w e
. the reactor vessel for Unit 2, welding, inspection and testing, materials used, craft labor qualifi-cations and working conditions (as they may affect QA/QC) and training and organization of QA/QC personnel, have raised substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility.
As a result, the Comission cannot make the find-ings required by 10 C.F.R. 9 50.57(a) necessary for issuance of an operating license for Comanche Peak.
(CFUR 4A-ACORN 14 CASE 19 Joint Contention).
The Staff believes that Contention 5 raises no genuine issue of material fact. After reviewing Applicants' Motion for Sumary Disposition and the accompanying Affidavits of David N. Chapman, Antonio Vega, Susan L. Spencer, R. J. Vurpillat and Roger F. Reedy, the Staff believes that the Applicants' Statement of Material Facts is correct.
(Staff Affidavit, at 4).2/ The Staff accordingly supports Applicants' position that summary disposition of Contention 5 in its entirety should be granted.3/
In support of this contention, CASE cites numerous NRC Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E") reports and the various filings submitted in support of this contention. CASE states that:
We believe that the Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) Reports (which we do not believe even the NRC Staff would allege have 2/
With respect to paragraph 10 of the Applicants' Statement of i
Material Facts, the Staff does explain that while structural integrity tests will be performed on the primary reactor con-tainments of Units 1 and 2, the unresolved matter concerning Unit I will be resolved by tests on Unit 1 only.
-3/
If the Board concludes that summary disposition of Contention 5 in its entirety is not warranted, the Board should grant sumary disposition of any portions of Contention 5 as to which the Board finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. Such action would be permitted by 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(a), which authorizes a
" decision by the presiding officer in that party's favor as to all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding." See Public Service Company of Oklahoma, et al. (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-46, 6 NRC 167 (1977T; Toledo Edison Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), LBP-73-30, 6 AEC 691, 699 (1973).
I I
- M
- e--*,
e,we
-e.me==
m
. mm, e
..**ww,= pay _
b-
1 caught each and every deficiency or violation which may have been comitted at the plant) if analyzed, indicate a clear pattern and trend proving that the plant has not been constructed properly and that there has been a continuing breakdown of quality assurance / quality control throughout the construction of the plant. CASE's concerns in this regard include, but are not now and never have been limited by, the specific items listed in the present wording of Contention 5.
In addition to the specific problem areas identified in the wording of the contention, we are further concerned about what we believe is the overall failure of the QA/QC program at CPSES. See Answer to the NRC Staff's Interrogatory C5-9 in
" CASE's Answers to NRC Staff's Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Intervenor CASE" (hereafter " CASE's Answers to NRC Staff"),
March 15, 1982, at 14.
According to CASE there is:
...a lack of a QA/QC program which has set forth specific methods and procedures to comply with NRC regulations (specifically 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) and carrying out such a program on a continuing basis..."
See Answer to Applicants' Interrogatory 5-5.b. in " CASE's Answers to Appli-cants' Fifth Set of Interrogatories to CASE and Requests to Produce," (hereafter " CASE's Answers to Applicants' Fifth Set") April 20, 1982, at 2.
With respect to the findings in I&E reports CASE cites, CASE does not know:
...whether all outstanding issues presented in each I&E report has [ sic] been resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC Staff or not... This is not one of the criteria we are using." See Answer to the Applicants' Interrogatory 20-5.a.
in CASE's Answers to Applicants' Fifth Set, supra, at 2.
CASE has questioned not only:
"The Applicants' response to their QA/QC requirements, but l
...the response of the NRC as well. We have grave questions and reservations about the NRC regulation of applicants at CPSES. This has been heightened recently by the cavalier attitude of the NRC to the ASME's allowing the certification i
and stamps to expire at CPSES." See Answer to the NRC Staff's
(
Interrogatory CS-31 in CASE's Answers To NRC Staff, suora, at 52.
l Section III.a. discusses the role of NRC Region IV during the construction phase of a nuclear power plant. As indicated in Sec-tion III.a., the role of the NRC Region IV is not, as CASE implies, to
. catch "...each and every deficiency or violation which may have been committed at the plant..."
(See Answer to Staff's Interrogatory C5-9 in CASE's Answers to NRC Staff, supra, at 14). Since the thrust of CASE C tention 5 relates to the adequacy of the quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) pro 3 rams during construction of Comanche Peak, Sec-tion III.b. contains a general summary of the role that the NRC plays in reviewing the development and implementation of the QA/QC programs during construction, and the specific results of that inspection effort at Comanche Peak. As stated in Section III.b., contrary to CASE's allega-tion, the Applicants have adequately developed and implemented a QA/QC program meeting NRC regulatory requirements. As demonstrated in Sec-tion III.c., the specific concerns in CASE Contention 5 do not raise substantial questions as to the adequacy of construction at Comanche Peak.Section III.d. contains the Staff's conclusions regarding CASE Contention 5.
III.a. The Role of NRC During Construction Each NRC applicant is responsible for assuring that its nuclear power plants are built and operated safely and in confonnance with the NRC regulations. An applicant also is required to assure that its i
i suppliers meet the applicable NRC criteria.
In this respect an applicant is responsible for functions such as product inspection and nondestruc-tive testing of reactor components, structures, and systems even though it may, on occasion, delegate the actual performance of the activity to another organization.
(Staff Affidavit, at 5).
-..., -, r,.
. NRC looks to the power plant owners, the utilities themselves, to take the leadership role i, assuring the quality of their plants and operations. This requires careful attention to the selection of engineering specifications and Quality Assurance (QA) procedures and practices for each task and their implementation by the workers on the jcb. And, most importantly, there must be adequate resources of quali-fied personnel at management, operating, and staff levels. The NRC places the highest emphasis on the active involvement of top management in QA programs. The NRC evaluates these programs, an applicant executes them, and the NRC assesses performance.
(Staff Affidavit, at 6).
To meet the NRC's regulatory requirements, an applicant must develop and implement a pyramid control system which, at the bottom, assures, through detailed inspection and test programs, that all safety signifi-cant actions are properly done. These detailed verification programs require up to 100% inspection by an applicant's quality control personnel of a multitude of individual actions. These programs also provide the basis for accept / reject decisions on specific equipment, instrumentation, technician or operator actions, and procedures.
(Staff Affidavit, at 6).
Moving up the pyramid, an applicant must have a quality assurance program which includes audits to oversee and test the adequacy of the performance of the detailed quality control tests and inspections. These I
programs provide feedback to the lower level of this system in the form of specifying changes in training, modification of procedures, upgrading or improving testing methods or equipment, requalification methods, if required, and other programmatic improvements. This feedback assures and enhances the reliability of the program as a whole which, in turn,
_.m.
. assures and verifies that all actions which are of safety. significance have been, and will be properly carried out.
(Staff Affidavit, at 6-7).
At the top of the pyramid, an applicant's management must provide adequate organizational independence and manpower for its quality assur-ance and quality control programs and provide policy guidance to all elements of an applicant's organization in order to assure quality performance in all safety aspects of the construction and operation of its nuclear facility.
(Staff Affidavit, at 7).
Another basic element of the NRC program is the defense-in-depth concept which requires multiple barriers and redundancy in equipment and operating options. This approach assures that, even if an item of equipment malfunctions or an incident of human error occurs, there will nevertheless be adequate protection of the public.
(Staff Affidavit, at7).
~
Region IV's mission is to conduct inspections to assure that an applicant meets license and regulatory requirements as well as comit-ments in Safety Analysis Reports. Region IV takes enforcement action, where necessary, to obtain corrective action for specific or programatic deficiencies. These Region IV activities interface with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) whose mission is to evaluate the adequacy of an applicant's proposals and, upon approval, promulgate licenses and, where necessary, specify license conditions, amendments, and technical specifications. Simply stated, NRR evaluates what an applicant proposes, comits to, or is required to do, whereas the NRC regional offices inspect to determine that an applicant does what it is required or comitted to do and takes enforcement action, if needed.
(StaffAffidavit,at7-8).
_._.___..,_. _.. ~. _ _. _
. The NRC regional offices are charged with providing assurance, through direct inspection, that an applicant's performance meets NRC's regulatory requirements and other commitments. Considering the extensive applicant control programs referred to above, the regional office inspec-tion program may be viewed as the apex of the pyramid which provides overall assurances of adequate quality in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities. The object of the regional program is to assure that an applicant's program meets NRC regulatory requirements. The regional office inspection program is one of selective auditing and not 100% verification of all phases of an applicant's program. This inspec-tion of hardware, observation of testing, review of procedures, and all other inspection activities are not aimed at approval of individual components, actions, or procedures, but rather, at evaluating whether or not an applicant's management control systems are working.
(Staff Affidavit,at8-9).
Whenever deficiencies. are identified, the NRC requires an applicant to take action to prevent recurrence as well as to correct the specific l
b deficiencies.
If the results of a single inspection, or a sequence of 1
I inspections, indicate a deterioration in the performance of an appli-cant's program in several areas, the NRC requires the applicant to lx L
examine its program in depth and upgrade the degree of control exercised
' at the highest level of the control system pyramid to assure that such deterioration'is checked and the program as a whole returned to a satisfactory level of quality.
(Staff Affidavit, at 9).
H l
/
k E*N
" 8 h_.
.-m h
$W
.'-68
- N'O*
_6 D-9NMW G5MNNW M
. III.b. NRC Inspection of QA/QC Program The NRC conducts periodic scheduled and unannounced field inspections of an applicant's QA program implementation as well as those of its contractors and suppliers. These inspections start prior to docketing of the application and continue throughout the construction phase, the preoperational test program, and the operating lifetime of the facility. The NRC inspection program is carried out by region based specialists and resident based inspectors. The NRC, inspection program is not designed to duplicate an applicant's QA program, or to perfom a redundant, independent review of every accept / reject determination.
Rather, it is a regulatory program aimed at determining, by spot checking and sampling, whether or not an applicant is in fact providing adequate assurance of quality in the construction.nd operation of its facility.
The NRC audit or sampling program is not a statistical random sample.
The specific areas reviewed in detail are selected from those considered to be the most important from a nuclear safety standpoint. By a specific spot checking and sampling review of QC actions the Staff can, therefore, test whether an applicant's QA program is really working. The Staff's review of the overall program gives considerable confidence that its spot checking and sampling review provides an accurate assessment of an appli-I cant's performance in meeting regulatory requirements.
(Staff Affidavit, at9-10).
The NRC enforcement program complements the sampling or auditing l
inspection philosophy.
By assuring that upgrading of an applicant's program results from specific noncompliance identified by the inspector, continued reliance can be placed on the validity of NRC's inspections
. which place heavy emphasis on an evaluation of an applicant's quality assurance program.
(Staff Affidavit, at 10).
Inspections conducted during the construction phase include:
(1) reviewing an applicant's QA performance, including audits of an applicant's QA records and documentation; (2) witnessing the construction practices and an inspection of the facility at various stages of construction; and (3) reviewing the qualifications and training of the construction personnel (where requirements exist) as well as those of the quality assurance ar.d quality control (QA/QC) personnel.
Inspection reports, resulting from the above inspections, document inspection findings (items of noncompliance and deviations), as well as unresolved items. These items are entered in the tracking system and remain open until appropriately resolved.
(StaffAffidavit,at11).
Inspection of the implementation of an applicant's quality assurance program is a key element in the determination of its adequacy. This inspection activity, still a nonrandom sample, involves checking whether actual work activities are in accordance with procedures, license requirements, technical specifications, plans, and code requirements.
NRC inspectors question craftsmen and operators to determine if they understand, and are adhering to, applicable limits and requirements.
The NRC inspectors observe operating instruments and recorder charts i
to determine that operations are being conducted within regulatory requirements. They observe instruments being calibrated. Observations are made as equipment is started up, shutdown, or otherwise changed in the operating mode. These observations and individual discussions with, and questions of, people actually doing the work provide a basis for
Y
. determining how well an applicant is actually implementing its quality assurance program.
(Staff Affidavit, at 11-12).
The NRC's quality assurance requirements are contained in Appendix B to Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants." These criteria provide a basis upon which the NRC assesses the acceptability of QA programs. The criteria of Appendix B apply to all activities affecting safety-related functions of nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components.
(Staff Affidavit, at 12).
Issuance of construction permits to the Applicants (Texas Utilities Generating Company or "TUGC0") for the construction of CPSES was contingent on the development of a satisfactory QA program.
(Staff Affidavit, at 16). The TUGC0 QA program is interpreted to include their prime contractors, subcontractors, and vendors.O (Staff Affidavit, at 17). Subsequent to issuance of the permits and during construction, implementation of the program has been monitored by the NRC by review of further procedure development and observation of work activities.
(Staff Affidavit, at 16).
Based on experience gained in the implementation of this QA program, during the first 6 months of 1978, TUGC0 made a series of organizational changes which were considered to have a positive impact on the CPSES QA
-4/
Brown and Root ("B&R") has constructor responsibilities and American Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") certification.
The architect-engineer ("AE") with responsibility for design and engineering of the facility is Gibbs and Hill, Inc. Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("W") is the Nuclear Steam Supply System
("NSSS") supplier for tFe two four-loop pressurized water reactors rated at 1150 MWe each.
(StaffAffidavit,at15-16).
7.......
program.
(Staff Affidavit, at 17). At the same time, Texas Utilities Services, Inc. ("TUSI") implemented comparable changes to exercise greater control over engineering and construction. The active management of the B&R QA/QC staff was assumed by TUGC0 except for that work accomplished under the ASME code certification program. This reduced B&R headquarters QA involvement in on-site activitites. Also, at that time, TUGC0 assumed management of the on-site soils and concrete testing laboratory, formerly under a subcontract. A revised program description for QA during design and construction of CPSES was submitted to the NRC on September 22, 1978, and accepted by NRR on November 3,1978.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified as a result of the Region IV's audit of the CPSES QA program which was completed in December 1978 and documented in NRC Inspection Report 78-23.
(Staff Affidavit, at 14-16).
Work accomplished prior to the 1978 revision of certain aspects of the Applicants' QA program included only early civil construction activities and was concluded to have been performed satisfactorily.
Subsequently, the major construction phases, such as piping, electrical, etc., have been performed utilizing the improved organization. Since 1978, the Applicants have initiated minor program revisions which have strengthened quality control.
(Staff Affidavit, at 17).
The TUGC0 QA program has, to date, been determined to comply with NRC QA criteria established in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."
In most cases, the Applicants' own QA program has identified and corrected significent construction deficiencies within the context of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
(Staff Affidavit, at 17).
.____m
. However, NRC inspections haya identified items of noncompliance, deviations from conunitments,E and weaknesses in the QA/QC program of the Applicants, but in each instance the Applicants have responded properly and taken adequate corrective action.
(StaffAffidavit,at14).
Assessments of the Applicants' performance on an annual basis have also determined that the Applicants have adequately developed and imple-mented a QA/QC program. The last Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance ("SALP") for TUGCO, wh'.ch is documented in NRC Inspection Raport 81-20, reflected an overall Category I performance (the highest rating).
(Staff Affidavit, at 14).
Additional inspections of the Applicants' QA/QC program by the NRC are planned. The NRC will ensure that safety matters identified during the past and subsequent inspections will be adequately resolved prior to authorization for the Applicants to load fuel or operate CPSES.
(Staff Affidavit, at 17-18).
~~5/
An item of noncompliance refers to an applicant's failure to comply with the various regulatory requirements of the NRC cr the appli-cant's specificiations. Durinc the time covered by the Staff's affidavit, such items were categorized into three levels of severity:
violations, infractions and deficiencies. Wherj any level of severity was found a Notice of Violation was attached to the Inspection Report wherein the item was reported and the level of severity was set forth.
(Staff Affidavit, at 12-13). When an applicant did not conform to its commitments to the NRC, eyes, though such commitments were not I
regulatory requirements, such failure was cited and referred to as a deviation.
(Staff Affidavit, at 13). The above classification system was revised in October 1980 to provide for six severity levels of violation. 45 Fed. Reo. 66754 (October 7,1980). On March 9, 1982 the enforcement poTTEy was revised to reduce the number of severity levels from six to five. 47 Fed. Reg. 9987 (March 9, 1982).
(Staff Affidavit, at 13-14).
1 1
x
. III.c. Specific Concerns Raised in CASE Contention 5 The NRC inspection and investigation findings concerning the adequacy of the Applicants' Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) program with respect to the construction activities specified in Contention 5 do not demonstrate, as alleged in Contention 5, that there 3
are " substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility."
(Staff Affidavit, at 107). Each of these activities is addressed below.
Concrete 1
The NRC Staff has conducted inspections of Comanche Peak construction to determine the adequacy of Applicants' QA/QC program with respect to concrete. The inspections of concrete construction activities involve both the direct work and the Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) tests and inspections, including the installation of the reinforcing steel; the mechanical splicing of the reinforcing steel into continuous lengths (usually by the proprietary process called "Cadweld"); testing of aggregates and cement; operation of the concrete batch plant and transportation of the fresh concrete; the testing of the fresh concrete; the formwork before and during placement; the actual placement and con-solidation of the concrete; and finally, the curing of the newly placed concrete.
(Staff Affidavit, at 18-19). Such. inspections also included materials that are embedded in the concrete such as steel structures for subsequent attachments and electrical conduits.
(Id., at 19).
m
a.
.u~...
. From early 1975 to date, there have been in excess of 45 inspections of these activities covering both Units 1 and 2.
There was no set frequency for the inspections, but every effort was made to arrange the inspections to occur at the times when major activities were in progress.
(StaffAffidavit,at19).
Approximately 75% of the routine inspections resulted in findings that the Applicants and their contractors had complied with their commit-ments to fulfill the requirements of the Safety Analysis Report and Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50. The other 25% of the routine inspections revealed either items of noncompliance or deviations. As might be expected, five instances occurred in 1975 when the concrete work was just getting underway. During 1976, only two such instances were identified and, in 1977, none. With the advent uf the resident inspector at CpSES, the instances of noncompliance or deviation rose to three, which probably reflects the increased time that was devoted to direct observation of the work.
In 1979 and 1980, there was one instance of noncompliance or deviation each year. These inspection findings and the corrective actions taken by the Applicants as a result of these findings are sunnarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit, at 19-29).
The NRC staff conducted follow-up inspections to determine whether the Applicants in fact implemented the corrective actions they repre-sented they would undertake as a result of the Staff's inspection findings.
(Staff Affidavit, at 29). The results of these follow-up inspections are summarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit, at29-33).
7 d
In view of the corrective actions taken by the Aplicants as a result of these findings, a
- .afied by the NRC Staff, these inspection findings do not raise substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility.
(StaffAffidavit,at34).
In addition to the routine inspections described above, the NRC Staff conducted a number of investigations of alleged improprieties in construction activities involving concrete.
(Staff Affidavit, at 34).
The Staff's Affidavit sets forth the n ture of the allegations investi-gated and the investigation findings.
(StaffAffidavit,at34-41). The NRC Staff conducted follow-up inspections to determine whether the Applicants, in fact, implemented the corrective actions they represented they would undertake as a result of any adverse investigative findings.
(StaffAffidavit,at41). The results of these follow-up inspections are summarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(StaffAffidavit,at41-43).
In view of the corrective actions taken by the Applicants as a result of any adverse investigative findings, as verified by the NRC Staff, such investigative findings do not raise substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility.
(StaffAffidavit,at43).
Mortar Blocks The NRC inspection program for construction does not include inspection of mortar blocks except as they relate to testing methods for cement and the water used in concrete. The Staff is not completely familiar with the term " mortar block construction" but has assumed that it might refer to the use of precast concrete block construction some-
~ ~... - -.
.....n--
. times referred to as " cinder block" construction. Such construction is frequently used in some parts of the country in home construction and is used in nuclear plants, on occasion, to build walls of a somewhat temporary nature such as personnel shields covering entrances into potential radiation areas and as divider walls. Generally, they are not designed or used as structural members and carry little or no safety loads.
(Staff Affidavit, at 43-44).
CASE has stated that it believes that the " mortar blocks" referred to in Contention 5 are in the walls of the control room. See Answer to Staff Interrogatory C5-11 in CASE's Answers to NRC Staff, supra, at 25.
The Staff has reviewed the construction drawings for the control room area to determine if there were any precast concrete blocks used and if so, the quality requirements imposed by the designer. The Staff found that for several walls, the engineer had specified block walls as divider walls that in effect make small rooms out of a large room. The large room is adjacent to the main control room and its walls are of reinforced concrete construction of seismic Category 1 standards.
Failure of the block walls within the large room would not jeopardize any of the equip-ment or personnel within the control room. The walls were not considered by the engineer to have any effect on safety and therefore, no quality assurance requirements were imposed on their construction. Based on examination of the drawings and the rooms involved in the matter, the Staff believes the engineer's action complied with NRC requirements.
(Staff Affidavit, at 44).
20 -
Steel n
The NRC Staff has conducted inspections of Comanche Peak construc-tion to determine the adequacy of the Applicants' QA/QC program in regard to steel.
(Staff Affidavit, at 45).
Steel, along with concrete, is the most commonly used material of construction in a nuclear power plant. The reinforcing steel used in concrete construction is considered Juring the inspection of concrete work.
Steel is used in piping systems and the support thereof and is considered during inspection of these elements. Likewise, a vast majority of the mechanical components are made of steel and that is considered during the inspection of the component and the related documentation.
In each case, the material quality is just one relatively small phase of an overall inspection effort for a given category.
It is thus nearly impossible to estimate the number of inspections that have involved steel.
(Staff Affidavit,at45).
The instances cited in CASE's Answers to the NRC Staff, supra, that were categorized as dealing with steel as a material actually deal with the installation of components made of steel. Three of the instances which relate to the installation of concrete embedments are discussed in the answers to questions 22, 23, and 24 in the Staff's Affidavit.
Another instance, i.e., the difference between the actual method used to install supports for the reactor coolant pumps and the steam generators and the method depicted in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
("PSAR"), is a fairly common occurrence since the PSAR usually is con-ceptual in nature (this is one of the reasons why there is also a Final DW VWIS-%"
?[g*2 P VQ' e C -,
.yas.s w-Te?*.,* V* ^
. [..? T "% I*"* *
~ ~ * *
~~*
1M p
[
21 -
Safety Analysis Report or "FSAR"). The remaining specific instance cited in support of the contention dealt with a finding in 1975 that B&R had not fulfilled a procedural comitment to independently test reinforcing steel but rather accepted the supplier's test results. The B&R procedural comitment was in excess of that required by the NRC or by the engineer-ing specifications for the project and was subsequently deleted from the procedure. The item was resolved to the Staff's satisfaction as indicated by NRC Inspection Report 50-445/76-03.
In conclusion, the Staff is not aware of any inspection findings dealing with steel.that would indicate a failure by the Applicants to adhere to their comitments to the NRC.
(StaffAffidavit,at45-46).
Fracture Toughness Testing The NRC Staff has conducted inspections of Comanche Peak construction to determine the adequacy of the Applicants' QA/QC program with respect to fracture toughness testing.
(StaffAffidavit,at46).
Fracture toughness is a characteristic of steel materials and generally relates to a determination as to the temperature at which the mode of failure of the steel to withstand an impact changes from brittle to ductile and the impact energy required to cause failure. Determining which steel materials used in nuclear plants require such testing is based on an engineering evaluation of those materials that have a likeli-hood of having to withstand impact loadings. The Staff inspects for compliance with this requirement as an element of the Staff's evaluation of the steel which in turn is inspected as discussed in regard to " steel."
(Staff Affidavit, at 46-47).
m =.w
. In support of the allegation that there are deficiencies in Applicants' QA/QC activities with respect to " fracture toughness test-ing," CASE has adopted the position that an equipment supplier should not perform the tests for fracture toughness of the matericls in the reactor vessels, steam generators or the pressurizer. See Answer to Staff Interrogatory C5-13 in CASE's Answers to NRC Staf f, supra, at 27.
As a general rule, these tests are actually performed initially by the steel mill supplying the steel to the component fabricator since this steel characteristic is affected by the composition of the steel, the melting practices involved, and by the heat treatments given the steel during and after processing into its final form, in this case, plate steel. The steel mill is by far the most qualified party to perform the tests. The test is again repeated when the weld procedure for joining the plates is qualified. Generally, this test would be performed on materials that are comparable but not identical to the materials used in fabrication. NRC inspections have not identified any specific deficiencies in the Appli-cants' QA/QC program for fracture toughness testing.
(StaffAffidavit, at47).
l Placement of Reactor Vessel for Unit 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-446/79-03 discussed the initial discovery by the Applicants that the supports and the periphery structura around j
the Unit 2 reactor vessel were rotated approximately 45 from a usable position. The Unit 2 structure was mirror imaged from Unit 1.
Mirror imaging is a comon engineering method of developing a second design from l
DGF MW*P T
. an original design provided that everything is completely symmetrical.
(If one component is not syninetrical, mirror imaging will not work).
In this case, the Unit 1 and 2 reactor vessels are identical units but need to be placed in position 180* in rotation.
Following the detennination that the pnysical structure (the supports and the periphery structure around the Unit 2 reactor vessel) could be rebuilt in a relatively short time, the Applicants' engineer devised the method which was coordinated with the design review personnel of the NRC.
A comprehensive inspection of the rework effort was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-446/79-07.
There were several short follow-up inspections by the NRC Staff resident inspector, culminating in NRC Inspection Report 50-446/79-13. The entire reconstruction effort, including the engineering aspects, took approxi-mately three (3) months, ending with the placement of the vessel on its supports in June 1979.
(Stay Affidavit, at 48-49).
It was not shown that any specific failure by design QA or with construction QA/QC had occurred. The error in design had been through the entire design review process including review bS the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor. The facility area had been constructed in l
accordance with the original design even though that design was incorrect.
It appeared that a very basic drafting concept error had been made early in the design effort for Unit 2 and was not detected in subsequent reviews, perhaps because of its very simplicity.
(Staff Affidavit, at 49).
The matter was reported to the NRC resident inspector and through him to other components of the NRC, but was not the subject of a 10 CFR l
.. ~ _. -
-m-
. 5 50.55(e) report by the Applicants. That provision of the regulations requires notification of deficiencies in design and construction, which if uncorrected, could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant.
In this case there could not have been a safety problem with the reactor because, with the vessel rotated from its correct position, the reactor could not have been assembled into a system.
(StaffAffidavit,at49).
Based upon the actions taken by the Applicants in this matter, as reviewed for design by personnel of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and verified by the personnel of Region IV, there is nothing that would indicate that the as constructed placement of the reactor vessel in Unit 2 is less than satisfactory or unsafe.
(Staff Affidavit, at 50).
Welding The NRC reactor construction inspection program included inspections of all safety-related welding. Such welding included welding of rein-forcing steel used in concrete work; the welding of the seams in the l
containment building liners; the welding of piping system components; and the welding of structural steel into component supports and restraints.
l The inspections included all aspects of the welding, from the materials l
involvad to the finished weld; the qualification testing of welders; the qualification of nondestructive testing personnel and the application l
and results of nondestructive testing activities. The inspections vary somewhat in depth, mostly depending on the importance of the welding l
{
..o amm w... c -
- m. ~ ~.:
< ~ _
m-7;
. activity. There is no set frequency for the inspections but every effort was and is made to arrange to have the inspections conducted to coincide with the early phase of a new welding activity and to have additional inspections of each activity as the work progresses. During the construction of Comanche Peak, the Staff has conducted some sixty-five (65) inspections dealing with various aspects of the Applicants' program for quality assurance / quality control of weldin;.
(StaffAffidavit, at50-51).
Approximately 83% of the routine inspections resulted in findings that the Applicants and their contractor had complied with their commit-ments to fulfill the requirements of the Safety Analysis Report and
~
Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50. Approximately 17% of the routine inspec-tions revealed either items of noncompliance or deviations.
It should be noted that while Brown and Root (B&R) as the principal contractor at Comanche Peak is directly responsible for the vast bulk of the welding activities, other contractors have also been involved in welding, both on-site and off-site. Such contractors include Chicago Bridge & Iron Company for the containment liners and for certain off-site fabricated l
welded steel components and ITT-Grinnell for performing off-site fabri-cation of pipe assemblies.
(Staff Affidavit, at 51-52).
The Brown and Root (B&R) scope of work is such that several different craft groups were involved in welding such as ironworkers, millwrights, and pipefitters. The QA/QC scheme within B&R for control of welding is essentially the same regardless of the craft type, but the specific application has varied depending on the welding processes involved and also on the construction activity at that time. The present
. system of controls has evolved from a relatively complex method of documentation to a less complex but more effective system.
(Staff Affidavit,at52).
There are two primary code systems dealing with welding. The Amerhan Welding Society (AWS) is a code widely used throughout industry and in the nuclear field for structural welding. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) also has a code system for welding that is widely applied in the manufacture and erection of pressure retaining systems such as boilers for heating and power generation. The parts of the ASME Code most used in the nuclear power industry are Sections III, V, and IX. The differences between the two codes in regard to control of welding processes and the qualification standards for welders are relatively insignificant. There is, however, considerable difference in the two codes with respect to the criteria for acceptance of a given weld, particularly since the ASME Section III Code has several subdivi-sions, each with its own inspection and acceptance requirements. Thus, a QA/QC program for control of welding is necessarily complex because of such a variables.
(Staff Affidavit, at 52-53).
The Staff has summarized the negative findings obtained during routine inspections of we'>ing.
(Staff Affidavit, at 53-55). The Applicants made commitments to take corrective actions for each finding.
These comitments were reviewed by Region IV management and by the inspector involved to assure that the corrective action as stated would be effective and of a nature that could be verified.
(Staff Affidavit, at 55-56). The corrective actions taken by the Applicants as a result
- -. ~ ~
a
. of the Staff's inspection findings are summarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(StaffAffidavit,at56-60).
The NRC Staff also conducted follow-up inspections to determine whether the Applicants in fact implemented the corrective actions they represented they would undertake. These follow-up inspections are summarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(StaffAffidavit,at62-63).
In view of the corrective actions taken by the Applicants as a result of the NRC Staff findings, which have been verified by the Staff, these findings do not raise substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility.
(Staff Affidavit, at 6a).
In addition to the routine inspections of welding activities discussed above, the NRC Staff has also conducted investigations of alleged improprieties that involved welding activities. The nature of these allegations and the investigative findings were documented in the inspection reports discussed in the Staff's Affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit, l
at 67-68).
The only negative inspection finding resulting from the investigations (Notice of Violation that was part of NRC Inspection Report 80-20) has been resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC staff.
(StaffAffidavit,at68).
In particular, the Applicants responded to 1
the Notice of Violation by their letter dated October 20, 1980, in which I
they committed to reinspecting all of the involved components and to l
reworking them as necessary to assure satisfactory weld surfaces. The Applicants further committed to performing fully documented inspections i
of all shipments from the involved vendor until completion of the sub-l l
contracted work. Region IV acknowledged the Applicants' letter by a
. letter dated November 5,1980. A follow-up inspection was made and documented in NRC Inspection Report 80-23.
(Staff Affidavit, at 68).
Expansion Joints Inspection of expansion joints is included as a part of the normal inspection of concrete placement. There have been no negative inspection findings with respect to expansion joints.
(StaffAffidavit,at69).
An investigation was conducted of an alleged impropriety in construction activities involving an expansion joint. As stated in NRC Inspection Report 77-13, the Applicants informed the NRC Region IV office on November 23, 1977, by telephone, of a call on November 22, 1977, from an unidentified woman. She was apparently concerned about the workmanship at the site regarding the use of rotofoam as a temporary spacer in construction to maintain the required air space between Category 1 seismic structures. During that inspection, the NRC inspector found that contrary to the woman's belief, all temporary rotofoam blocks had been removed from the subject areas. The B&R QA/QC inspection staff had initiated an inspection and documentation program to assure that the required 1" gap between Category 1 seismic structures was being main-tained in the as-built ccndition. This matter was treated as an open item pending NRC review of the B&R QA/QC inspection results.
(Staff Affidavit, at 70).
The NRC Staff conducted a follow-up inspection to determine whether the Applicants, in fact, implemented the corrective actions they repre-sented they would undertake.
NRC Inspection Report 78-01 documented the
. follow-up on the findings contained in the NRC Inspection Report 77-13.
The NRC inspector reviewed the B&R inspection and documentation program which was initiated to ensure that all temporarily installed rotofoam blocks had been removed from between Category I seismic structures after concrete placement. The NRC inspector found that the procedural require-ments were being implemented and considered this item closed.
(Staff Affidavit,at71).
Inspection and Testing The essential element of any quality control program is the performance of inspection or testing, or both, for the purposes of determining whether a function or a product satisfies the requirements established for the function or product. Nearly all of the criteria of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50 relate in some way to a function or product inspection to verify performance. Therefore, nearly any NRC inspection relates in some way to inspection and testing. NRC inspections, during the construction phase, do not specifically reference one or more inspections related to inspection and testing. The NRC inspections are directed to general activity areas such as civil or structural (concrete) construction activities and are carried out to determine confomance with the requirements in the regulations and coninitments in the Safety Analysis Reports. The same is true for the broad activity areas generally designated as mechanical and electrical.
For example, an observation that a test of fresh concrete was not properly performed could readily be assigned to the category of " inspection and testing"
. whereas the Staff has assigned that type of finding to " concrete" because that was the activity area inspected.
(StaffAffidavit,at72).
The Staff has assigned seven of its inspection findings to this aspect of Contention 5.
These findings do not relate to more specific categories such as concrete or welding, but relate to the mechanical and electrical areas of the Staff's inspection program. These findings are sumarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit, at 72-74).
With respect to each of these findings, the Applicants made written comitments to take corrective action regarding the specific finding and have made comitments to prevent similar situations from recurring. The written comitments were reviewed by Region IV management and the NRC inspector for probable effectiveness, and if acceptable, were acknowledged by letter. The nature of the corrective actions for each of these findings are samarized in the Staff's affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit,at74-77).
The NRC staff conducted follow-up inspections to detennine whether the Applicants in fact implemented the corrective actions they represented they would undertake with one exception (in regard to NRC Inspection Report 81-15, which will be discussed later). These follow-up inspections are sumarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(StaffAffidavit, at77-80).
Considering the nature of the findings and the Applicants' corrective actions as verified by the NRC Staff, these findings do not raise substantial qu stions as to the adequacy of construction.
(Staff e
Affidavit,at80).
I
. In addition to the routine inspections described above, the NRC Staff also conducted an investigation of allegations of improprieties in construction activities involving inspection and testing. The inves-tigation was documented in NRC Inspection Report 81-04 and involved allegations that electrical inspectors were directed by their supervision not to follow procedures; that electrical inspectors had not performed required inspections; that certain electrical inspectors were not qualified to do the inspections to which they were assigned; and that electrical drawings utilized for inspections were, in some cases, obsolete.
(Staff Affidavit, at 80).
None of these allegations was substantiated. The investigation did reveal that one of the QC senior supervisors for electrical inspections had required that all nonconformance reports be approved by him prior to being logged in.
It was not shown, however, that he refused to approve any nonconformance reports even though he had technically violated the procedures for reporting non:onformance. Under these circumstances, no NRC enforcement action was taken since there was no demonstrated program breakdown.
(Staff Affidavit, at 80-81).
Materials Used l
l The materials used in any phase of ccnstruction which become part of the permanent installation are inspected as an element of the overall specific area inspected. As an example, when an inspection of concrete activities is made, the constituent materials of concrete such as cement, coarse and fine aggregates, and the water will be inspected by review of I
. test records generated in accordance with the specifications. Whenever possible the inspectors will observe this type of testing to establish the credibility of the testing organization.
(StaffAffidavit,at81).
Although CASE has alleged that there are specific instances where questions have been raised about " materials used," it has not "identi-fied these reports in this context." See CASE's Answers to Staff Interrogatory C5-18 in CASE's Answers to NRC Staff, suora, at 48.
Review of the Staff's adverse tindings in regard to construction at Comanche Peak indicate no instance where materials as such were unsatisfactory.
(Staff Affidavit, at 81).
Craft Labor Qualifications and Working Conditions in general, there are no NRC regulatory requirements or policy concerning the qualifications of the craft labor force or the conditions which may be imposed on the labor forse during construction. The NRC has, however, established or adopted qualification standards for welders and for persons performing reinforcing steel splicing, usually referred to as Cadwelding. The NRC requires that the Apolicants comit to con-structing pressure retaining components under one of the appropriate parts of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code for Boilars and Pres,sure Vessels. The NRC also requires that the Applicants commit to use the American Institute for Steel Construction (AISC) Code j
for most other steel construction where the ASME code is not applicable.
Both codes contain direct or referenced requirements for the testing of welders prior to pro. duction work. The ASME code for concrete reactor
. containment buildings contains a requirement for the qualification test-ing of Cadweld splicers. NRC Staff inspections covered implementation by Applicants of these requirements concerning the qualification of welders and Cadwelders.
(Staff Affidavit, at 82).
There have been no inspection findings that would indicate that welders have not been qualified as required by the applicable code. One instance was identified where Cadweld splicer helpers were not fully tested and qualified. That matter is discussed in the Staff's Affidavit in regard to the finding contained in NRC Inspection Report 78-16 (See answer to questions 22, 23 and 24).
(StaffAffidavit,at83).
The NRC Staff also has conducted investigations of allegations that welders were unqualified. NRC Inspection Reports 79-15 and 79-22 dis-cussed, among other charges, an allegation that welders were unqualified.
In each instance the investigation revealed that the particular welders had been qualified in accordance with the applicable requirements. As stated above, the Staff's inspections and investigations have revealed no instance where a welder performing production welding had not been quali-l fied by the testing methods stipulated by the codes.
(StaffAffidavit, at 83).
Training and Organization of QA/0C Personnel The training of the Applicants' QA/QC personnel is examined during i
most of the routine inspections since training is one factor in the determination of the qualifications of a given person to perform an inspection and in the detennination of the acceptability of what is
, inspected. The inspection of the organization is performed much less frequentiy since it is generally reasonably static. Emphasis is placed on the organizational aspect of QA/QC in the period prior to issuance of a construction permit and again, at about the mid-point in the construction period.
Changes in QA/QC organization, such as the changes which occurred at Comanche Peak during 1978 (as discussed previously),
are examined in greater detail by the regional inspectors and by the NRC headquarters personnel who are responsible for assuring that an adequate organization is presented by the Applicants in the Safety Analysis Report.
In the Staff's opinion, the ability and the integrity of the persons in an organization is generally far more important than the exact structure of the organization and generally can only be determined by continued, long-term observation rather than by specific inspections.
(StaffAffidavit,at84-85).
There are certain adverse inspection findings that appear to fit this aspect of Contention 5 rather than any other aspect, which are summarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(StaffAffidavit,at85-87). The corrective actions which the Applicants comitted to take as a result of these findings are also summarized in the Staff's Affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit,at88-93). The NRC Staff conducted follow-up inspections to determine whether the Applicants in fact, implemented the actions they represented they would undertake.
(Staff Affidavit, at 93-94). The Staff has summarized the follow-up inspections in its affidavit.
(Staff Affidavit,at93-98).
In view of the corrective actions that have been taken by the Applicants, as verified by NRC Staff inspections, these findings do not raise substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of Comanche Peak.
(StaffAffidavit,at98).
n.
. In addition to the routine inspections described above, the NRC Staff also conducted an investigation as documented in NRC Inspection Report 81-12 of allegations that 1) QC personnel were not performing their prescribed inspection of fastening devices referred to as "Hilti" bolts in a correct manner; 2) QC personnel were careless or had lost control of an inspection marking media called " Torque Seal," and 3) a repair was made to concrete without the knowledge of QC personnel after a "Hilti" bolt was removed. The investigation did not substantiate any of these allegations.
(StaffAffidavit,at99).
Hayward-Tyler Pumps In addition to the above inspection and investigative findings concerning the Applicants, the NRC Staff has recently conducted an investigation of allegations of improprieties by one of Applicants' vendors, the Hayward-Tyler Pump Company. This investigation has not yet been completed.
(Staff Affidavit, at 99).
Hayward-Tyler delivered four pumps used in the safety-related service water system at Comanche Peak. Review of vendor data packages in the possession of the Applicants indicates that Hayward-Tyler apparently only tested for final performance the two pumps associated with Unit 1.
These records indicate that nearly all of the manufacturing, assembly and non-destructive testing activity on these pumps was accomplished by AMPC0 Metals Division of the AMPC0-Pittsburgh Corporation under the auspices of Babcock & Wilcox Canada Limited, with whom the Applicants had placed the original contract for the pumps. Most of the pressure boundary parts for
-a eme e u m--
'M
. the Unit 2 pumps appear to have been manufactured under the same circum-stances, but the records indicate that Hayward-Tyler may have fabricated some of the non-pressure boundary parts. Hayward-Tyler appears to have assembled as well as tested the Unit 2 pumps.
(Staff Affidavit, at 99-100).
There is no indication in the vendor data records reviewed by the NRC resident inspector that the pumps are defective. However, Hayward-Tyler has reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 that a spare part (pump shaft) may be defective.
(Staff Affidavit, at 100).
The two pumps for Unit I have been operated intermittently since March 1980 to supply service water in performance of certain tests and to supply cooling water to assist in the cooling of the Unit 1 containment building during times of peak heat to provide a more agreeable working
~
environment for the construction labor force. One of the pumps for Unit 2 was temporarily substituted for-one of the Unit 1 pumps when the Unit 1 pump had to be taken out of service for examination following a maintenance' error. To date, the pumps have performed satisfactorily, but a substantial'. amount of testing for all of the pumps remains to be done prior to issuance of operating licenses for Comanche Peak. Any findings concerning the Comanche Peak pumps resulting from the investi-
~
gation of Hayward-Tyler will be followed-up as necessary. '(Staff Affidavit, at 100-101).
Exoiration of Brown and Root's ASME Certificates of Authorizati_on According to CASE, the expiration of the Brown and Root ASME
~
Certificates of Authorization on January 8,1982 and the Staff's position
~
w
. about the expiration raise grave questions about the Applicants' QA/QC-program and the NRC Staff's regulation of the Applicants. See Answer to the NRC Staff's Interrogatory C5-31 in CASE's Answers to NRC Staff, supra, at 52.
The NRC requires the application of all aspects of Section III of the Code to that part of a nucit :r power plant which is defined by regulation as being within the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The particular version of the Code which applies is specified by 10 CFR 50.55a, " Codes and Standards".
In addition, the NRC has promulgated s
Regulatory Guide 1.26, which specifies the use of portions of Section III that should be considered by an applicant for systems other than the reactor coolent pressure boundary and to which the NRC staff expects an applicant to comit in its Safety Analysis Report. Although the NRC has i
adopted Section III of the ASME Code for reactor coolant pressure boundary work, the NRC specifically deleted the requirement that the "N" stamps be applied.
(The "N" symbol stamps indicate that construction has been built strictly in accordance with the provisions of the AS'ME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.) Thus, there is no NRC requirement j
that an applicant have an ASME certificate of authorization to possess i
or use "N" stamps. Also, the NRC will consider means other than the ASME Code of assuring quality work.
(StaffAffidavit,at 101-102).
The primary basis for ASME enforcement is the adoption of the. Code by a legal jurisdiction, such as the state in which a nuclear power' plant is being built. The State of Texas, in which Comanche Peaktis j
located, has adopted the entire ASME Code (including Section III of the s
s Code).
(Staff Affidavit, at 102).
s 3
b l
.._w.
s E
38 -
The ASME requires that an organization called an Authorized Nuclear Inspection Agency be involved in all work performed under the Code. The inspectors for the Agency are referred to as Authorized Inspectors, or in the case of the nuclear industry, Authorized Nuclear Inspectors or
("ANI"). The ANI'are perscns who are trained and qualified by the National Board o,f Pressure Vessel Inspectors and derive their authority through certification by the local jurisdiction.
(StaffAffidavit,at102).
~
,.An applicant for' an ASME Certificate of Authorization enters into
(;
an ' agreement with an' Authorized Inspection Agency and makes application sto the ASME for a certificate of authorization before actually starting work. The.ASijE generally will conduct a survey shortly after the sub-mittal' of the application to review the applicant's ASME Quality 1
~
. Assurance'(QA) manual for the work. 'If that manual is found to be
\\ acceptable,, the ASME conducts a ' survey of the implementation of the
-s
~
approved manual ar.d may require changes, as necessary, to assure its s-
,s.
effectivbness. Th'e work accomplished-in the interim period between the
\\'
time an hpp'icant files for a certificate.of authorization and receipt 1,
ctlsuch d certificate 'is entirely at the risk of the applicant if the j
y s
[ir,kistechnicallyunacceptableundertheASMEcode. The certification u.
^
procsss is' repeated 'gyery three (3) years.
(StaffAffidavit,at 102-103).
i s
1 The Solder af a ASME certificate of authorization has the authority
\\
tokrformworkptdsuanttotheASMECodeandtocertifysuchworkas
-l
- a complying'with. all the applicable requirements of the Code. ASME s
g certificates df authorization pennit the stamoing of an item with an
,ASME Code Symbol Stamp ("M htamp) folicwing completion. These stamps 4
Q, are issued only upon 'a demonstration to the ASME that an acceptable QA
(
l
=
i*
v
+
.y.
\\
9 M
~
. prograin exists for the work to be perfomed pursuant to the requested authority.
(StaffAffidavit,at103).
The ASME Certificates of Authorization that Brown & Root had been issued in 1978 by the ASME were allowed to expire on January 8, 1982 and new certificates were issued on March 15, 1982.
(StaffAffidavit,at 103-104). The NRC resident inspector at Comanche Peak was aware of this situation, as was the management and supervisory staff of Region IV. He is aware of the findings reported by the ASME Survey Team at the October 12-14, 1981 Survey based on his attendance at the October 14, 1981 exit meeting, at which time the ASME reported that they found the Brown & Root QA manual vague. The ASME Survey Team also provided a limited number of examples of inadequate implementation of the QA program and of the detailed requirements of the Code.
(Staff Affidavit, at 104).
The ASME Manual is one of the basic enforcement tools available to the ASME and to the Authorized Nuclear Inspectors. Once approved, the manual can only be changed with the approval of the Authorized Nuclear Inspection Agency. Thus, the manual is the main basis for auditing by t
the ANI. Procedures implementing the manual can be changed by the certificate holders provided that the requirements of the manual or the Code are not specifically violated.
It is thus important to the ASME that the manual contain considerable detail. Since the NRC Staff had found that the procedures and instructions implementing the manual were generally effective, it was not important to the NRC Staff that such j
procedures and instructions were not in the manual itself. The Brown and l
Root ASME QA Manual was revised, in accordance with the findings of the ASME survey, by incorporating many of the detailed instructions already l
l
\\
. contained in the implementing procedures and by editorial re-arrangements to achieve greater clarity.
(Staff Affidavit, at 104-105).
Based on the resident inspector's attendance at the October 14, 1981 meeting, he determined that although the examples of inadequate implementation of the QA program indicated technical violations of the provisions of one subsection of the Code, such examples did not indicate poor quality construction.
(Staff Affidavit, at 105).
The NRC Staff was also aware of the ASME findings reported by the ASMF Survey Team at the January 18-20, 1982, resurvey of the Brown and Root ASME QA program. According to the inspector who attended the January 20 meeting, the ASME Survey Team stated that they would recom-mend that new certificates of authorization be issued by the ASME pro-vided that certain corrective actions were taken and verified by the ANI.
(Staff Affidavit, at 105).
Based on the findings reported by the ASME survey team at both the October 14, 1981 meeting and the January 20, 1982, meeting, the Staff determined that these findings did not warrant any enforcement action in accordance with the NRC enforcement policy in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.
It should be noted that, as previously stated, there is no NRC require-ment that "N" stamps be applied, and thus no NRC requirement for certifi-cates of authorization to possess or use such stamps.
In addition, although the ASME had the authority to immediately withdraw the certifi-cates and stamps following the October survey, the ASME did not do so.
It merely allowed the certificates to expire on January 8, 1982. Also, on January 20, 1982, just eight (8) days after expiration of the certifi-cates, the ASME survey team indicated that they would recommend issuance
. of new certificates.
Finally, the ANI personnel continued to perform their functions through the entire period from October 1981 until the certificates were re-issued in March 1982. The only site activity that was precluded was final ASME certification of completed components or systems and application of the "N" stamps, neither of which was essential during this period. The net effect of the ASME action was that Brown and Root reverted to the status of an interim certificate holder until the certificates were re-issued on March 15, 1982.
(StaffAffidavit,at 106).
III.d. Staff's Conclusions Regarding Contention 5 In sum, the Staff's inspection and investigation findings at Comanche Peak to date do not substantiate the allegation in Contention 5 that there are substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construc-tion of the facility.
(StaffAffidavit,at107).
In particular:
l The Staff's inspections and investigations, as well as assessments of the Applicants' performance on an annual basis, have determined that the Applicants have adequately developed and implemented a QA/QC program meeting NRC requirements.
(Staff Affidavit, at 107).
The inspection and investigation findings that were indicative of actual defects in construction were resolved by correction of the defective construction, as necessary, along with correction of the underlying QA/QC program deficiency. All but two of the matters raised
. in the Inspection Reports cited in support of Contention 5 as negative findings have been resolved and that resolution verified by the NRC Staff. These two matters relate to 1) a small amount of concrete of indeterminate quality in the Unit 1 containment which will be finally resolved by the containment structural integrity test and 2) coatings in both containments that have been and are being reinspected and repaired, as necessary, by the Applicants.
(Staff Affidavit, at 107-108).
The negative findings in the Staff's inspection reports that were essentially programatic in nature (i.e., no actual construction deficiency was identified) occurred early in each given phase of construction and were corrected in a timely manner such that there is little likelihood that any significantly defective construction has not been detected.
(StaffAffidavit,at108).
Although the construction of Unit 1 of the Comanche Peak Station is essentially complete, additional final construction testing remains to be l
done, along with system tests that are prerequisites to the issuance of operating licenses. These tests are designed to reveal any deficiencies in either the design or construction of the facility that could adversely affect the safe operation of the facility at a future time. Additional inspections of both Units 1 and 2, including monitoring of these tests, will be conducted by the NRC Staff to insure that safety-related construction matters identified will be adequately resolved prior to recommending authori::ation for the loading of fuel and the operation of Comanche Peak.
(Staff Affidavit, at 108).
l 1
y e
. The Staff believes that the Applicants' Motion and documents filed in support thereof, along with the Affidavit submitted by +.he Staff, establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Conten-tion 5.
The Staff believes that the Applicants have met the burden of obtaining summary disposition on Contention 5 as a matter of law, and accordingly, the Staff believes that summary disposition of Contention 5 i
is appropriate.
IV.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Staff supports Applicants' conclusion that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved with respect to Contention 5.
Therefore, Applicants' motion for summary disposition of Contention 5 should be granted and that contention should be dismissed as a matter in controversy in this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted, WW IWe/MicI Marjorie Ulman Rothschild Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 2nd day of June, 1982.
-. -