ML20053A409
| ML20053A409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1982 |
| From: | Willmore R CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205260066 | |
| Download: ML20053A409 (23) | |
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i May 20, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
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Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al.
)
50-441
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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Units 1 and 2)
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APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO SUNFLOWER ALLIANCE, INC. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS Intervenor Sunflower Alliance, Inc., et al. (" Sunflower")
l has moved for leave to amend its Petition for Leave to l
Intervene to add two new contentions which it would have the Licensing Board admit as issues in this proceeding.
The Licensing Board should not admit either of the proffered i
contentions; Sunflower has demonstrated neither the requisite l
basis and specificity for the contentions nor any " good cause" for its late filing.
Pf8se (
l t
l 82052600666
I.
Psychological Stress Sunflower asks the Licensing Board to order the NRC Staff to prepare an evaluation of the psychological impact on neighboring residents of operating the Perry Nuclear Power Plant ("PNPP").
It bases the contention on the January 7, 1982, Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in People Against Nuclear Energy (" PANE")
- v. NRC, No. 81-1131, requiring the Commission to prepare an environmental assessment of the psychological impact on neighboring residents of restarting Three Mile Island, Unit 1 ("TMI-1").1!
Sunflower concludes that this Judgment necessarily requires the NRC Staff to assess the psychological impact of PNPP's operation.
Since Sunflower's Motion the Court of Appeals has issued its opinions explaining its Amended Judgment.
PANE v. NRC, No.
81-1131 (May 14, 1982).
A majority of the court (Judges Wright and McGowan) holds that psychological health effects fall within the ambit of the National Environmental Policy Act 1/
The court entered an Amended Judgment on April 2, 1982.
The Amended Judgment remands the case to the Commission "for a determination whether, since the preparation of the original environmental impact statement for (TMI-1), significant new circumstances or information have arisen with respect to the potential psychological health effects of operating the TMI-l facility."
If such circumstances or information is determined to exist, the NRC must prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement.
l !
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("NEPA").
A majority (Judges Wilkey and McGowan) also holds that consideration of psychological stress is not required by the Atomic Energy Act.
Sunflower believes that the court's Judgment in PANE v.
NRC, supra, automatically requires consideration of psychologi-cal stress in this and all other license proceedings.2/
That is, Sunflower contends that the mere operation of a nuclear power plant is a sufficient ground to require the NRC to assess the psychological impact of the plant's operation.
Sunflower apparently believes that no basis need be demonstrated as to the existence or magnitude of psychological stress for the particular reactor at issue--Sunflower has clearly presented no such basis for PNPP.
Such a reading of the Judgment is inconsistent, however, with Judge Wright's opinion explaining the court's reasoning.
The Commission's rules require intervenors to demonstrate a basis for issues they wish to litigate.
See 10 C.F.R.
1/
To the extent that Sunflower's Motion is predicated on the Atomic Energy Act, the holding of the Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Act from being used as a basis for considering psychological stress.
See PANE v.
NRC, supra, Judge Wilkey's opinion, slip op, at 29-37.
3/
Sunflower states, "Although the TMI-l restart case involved the special circumstances of cestarting the undamaged reactor on the same site as the worst commercial nuclear accident in history, this decision is presumably applicable to all nuclear plant sites, since the same potential for catastrophic accidents exists at all nuclear facilities."
Motion at 1-2 (emphasis added).
S 2.714(b).
Nothing in Judge Wright's opinion for the court in any way modifies this rule.
Indeed, Judge Wright is careful to note the bases advanced by PANE in support of its psychological stress contention.
For example, Judge Wright observes that the
" President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island reported that the ' major effect of the accident appears to have been on the mental health of the people living in the region of Three Mile Island and of the workers at TMI.'"
PANE v.
- NRC, supra, slip op, at 11.
Judge Wright further notes that the NRC Staff has acknowledged that the psychological effects of the TMI accident have received considerable attention, and cites a number of studies conducted by independent organizations on the psychological impact of the accident.
Id.
He also details PANE's specific allegations of the types of " severe psychologi-cal distress" already created for those living nect TMI.
Id.,
slip op. at 10.
Judge Wright's opinion not only confirms that a basis must be demonstrated, it defines the threshold showing which must be met before a ps;rchological effects issue can be raised.1/
It is not enough marely to allege--as Sunflower here does--generalized community anxieties regarding nuclear power l
4/
The requirement for a threshold showing for admitting a j
contention was approved by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee l
Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 l
U.S. 519 (1978).
- t
generation.
As Judge Wright categorically states, "not all psychological effects rise to the level of psychological health effects."
Id.,
slip op. at 16.
Rather, intervenors must show that the psychological impact at issue is of such a magnitude as to constitute a " medically recognized impairment of the psychological health of neighboring residents."
Id.
" Mere anxieties" are not enough; instead the Court points to PANE's threshold showing of " intense anxiety, tension, and fear accompanied by physical disorders."
Id.,
slip op. at 14.
Judge Wright expressly recognizes that "the severity of a psychological effect is not only relevant to whether an EIS is required under NEPA, but also to the cognizability of the impact under the statute."
I d,., slip op. at 17 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals found that PANE had met that minimum threshold of psychological severity by its allegation (based on the report of the President's Commission and the psychological impact studies conducted by independent organiza-tions) that the residents had been so traumatized by the TMI accident that fears of a recurring catastrophe would cause severe post-traumatic anxieties accompanied by physical effects.
See id., slip op. at 16-17.5/
5/
It is worthwhile noting the court's characterization of PANE's psychological stress allegation:
PANE alleges that renewed operation of the nuclear reactor would cause " severe psychological distress" to persons living (Continued Next Page) -_
Sunflower has not, of course, demonstrated any basis for a psychological impact assessment in this proceeding.
It has cited no studies or actual manifestations of psychological stress to persons living near PNPP, nor any basis for expecting such effects to occur after PNPP begins operation.
Sunflower has not even attempted to show if and how the findings of the prior studies of the TMI community have any applicability to l
PNPP.
There is nothing before the Licensing Board that would even suggest that the generalized community anxieties alleged without basis or support in Sunflower's Motion in any way approach the " medically recognized impairment of mental health" at issue in PANE v. NRC, supra.
Sunflower does no more than blithely assume that any anxiety about nuclear power generation necessitates a psychological impact assessment--an assumption (Continued) in the vicinity of the reactor, including PANE's members.
According to PANE, the accident at TMI-2 created intense anxiety, tension and fear, accompanied by physical disorders including skin rashes, aggravated ulcers, and skeletal and muscular problems.
Post-traumatic neurosis, PANE asserts, can be diagnosed with reasonable medical certainty on the basis of standardized quantitative tests Moreover, PANE argues, reopening TMI-l would severely aggravate existing problems and would prevent Three Mile Island's neighbors from resolving and recovering from the trauma they have suffered.
Id.,
slip op. at 10 (citations to the record onitted). -..
plainly conflicting with the statements of Judge Wright emphasizing the severity of the psychological ef fects at TMI-1.
See supra.
Sunflower having failed to even try to demonstrate a basis for its psychological stress contention, the contention cannot be admitted.
Sunflower also has failed to show " good cause" for its untimely filing.
See 10 C.F.R. S 2.714(a).5[
Sunflower cites the recently issued Draft Environmental Statement (" DES-OL")2!
for PNPP and the January 7, 1982, Judgment in PANE v. NRC, supra, as " good cause" for its tardiness.
Neither can justify its year long delay in raising this issue.
Few issues before the Commission have achieved as much notoriety in recent years as whether the NRC must assess t'.ie psychological impact of restarting TMI-1.
The question has been the subject of at least three Commission orders--CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C.
141 (August 9, 1979); CLI-80-39, 12 N.R.C.
607 (December 5, 1980); CLI-81-20, 14 N.R.C.
593 (September 17, 1981)--as well as the licensing board's certification of the issue to the Commission, LBP-80-8, 11 N.R.C.
297 (February 22, I
6/
The standards for determining " good cause" have been described in prior filings and need not be repeated here.
- See, e.g.,
" Applicants' Answer to Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy Motion for Leave to File Its Contention 16," dated December 17, 1981.
7/
Draft Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, NUREG-0884 (March 1982).,
1980).
The question sharply divided the Commission, resulting in four separate opinions.
Metropolitan _ Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-39, supra.
It is inconceivable that Sunflower was unaware of this issue until the issuance of the DES-OL for PNPP.
Nor can much credence be given to Sunflower's suggestion that it had only recently learned that psychological stress was not being considered with regard to PNPP. !
The recent issuance of the DES-OL thus cannot serve as " good cause" for Sunflower's delay in seeking to have this contention admitted.
Sunflower may be trying to argue that until the January 7, 1982, Judgment in PANE v. NRC, it believed itself precluded by the Commission's earlier rulings from raising the psychological stress issue.
That argument, of course, in no way justifies Sunflower's four month delay since January 7, 1982, in raising this issue (discussed infra).
The argument, however, also misconstrues the legal significance of the Commission's
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December 5, 1980, Order as well as Sunflower's obligation to preserve the contention.
On December 5, 1980, the Commission announced that "the Commissioners are evenly divided on the question whether the 8/
For one thing, Applicants' Environmental Report-Operating License Stage ("ER-OLS") did not include a psychological impact assessment, thereby putting Sunflower on notice that no such study had been conducted. !
Board should consider psychological stress."
CLI-80-39, 12 NRC at 608.
Because the Commission had directed that affirmative Commission action was required before psychological stress issues could be litigated in the TMI restart proceeding, CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C.
at 148, the two-to-two vote was only "an effective denial of requests to admit contentions based on psychological stress."
CLI-80-39, 12 N.R.C.
at 608 (emphasis added).
The vote did not, however, constitute an affirmative determination of the issue, as indicated by the Commission's determination to reconsider the issue after the fifth Commissioner was confirmed.
Id.
See S 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
5841 (" Action of the Commission shall be determined by a majority vote of the members present.")
Had the two-to-two vote occurred on a petition to overturn a licensing board order admitting a psychological stress contention, the contention would have remained in the proceeding.
Not until September of 1981, did the Commissioners af firmatively determine that psychological stress would not be considered.
CLI-81-20, supra.
At the time it filed its original contentions in May of 1981, Sunflower thus was not barred from raising psychological impact issues.
Had it raised the issue, the litigability of the contention would most likely have been adjudicated by the Licensing Board.
Had the Licensing Board believed itself precluded from admitting the contention, Sunflower would at least have preserved the contention pending reconsideration of the Commission's Order and disposition of PANE's appeal to the Court of Appeals.1!
Had the Licensing Board held that it was not precluded from considering the issue, it could have reached the merits of whether Sunflower had demonstrated sufficient basis for the contention to be admitted.
But Sunflower chose to do nothing--not even to attempt to preserve the issue 1
pending reconsideration and appeal.
Now, over one year after its Petition for Leave to Intervene, Sunflower asks leave to add the contention.
Sunflower had its opportunity to raise the contention in a timely manner.
For whatever reason, it chose not to do so.
The motion for leave to submit this contention r
one year late must be denied as untimely.
Even if the Licensing Board believes that the January 7, 1982, Judgment in PANE v. NRC, supra, can serve as " good cause" for a delay in raising this issue until early January of this year, Sunflower has failed to demonstrate any " good cause" for its unexplained tardiness in failing to file the motion for four months.
The Judgment received extensive media coverage.1S!
Sunflower almost assuredly was aware of the 9/
PANE's appeal was filed on February 3, 1981.
10/
See New York Times, Jan.
8, 1982, p. A10; Jan.
9,
- 1982, pT 9; Wall Street Journal, Jan. 11, 1982, p.
23, Jan. 12, p.
32 (editorial); Washington Post, Jan.
8, 1982, p. A8, Jan. 11, 1982, p. A12 (editorial).
l,
+
Judgment soon after its issuance.
Yet Sunflower offers no explanation for its inaction.
There is no justification for simply doing nothing for four months.11/
In addition, Sunflower has failed to show how its partici-pation as to this contention will assist in developing a sound record.
See 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714(a)(1)(iii).
Indeed, in light of Sunflower's dilatoriness in raising this issue and its failure to even attempt to demonstrate a basis, see supra, there is every reason to conclude that Sunflower's participation will be of little practical value in this proceeding.
- Moreover, admission of this contention certainly will broaden the issues, and has a very real potential of delaying this proceeding.
See 10 C.F.R. S~
'a)(1)(v).
The time and effort which a psychologicaA stress contention would impose can best be appreciated from the TMI experience, where the NRC already has spent more than $400,000 to study the psychological well-being in the vicinity of the plant,12/ and has not even begun to l
examine the psychological impacts of restarting TMI-1.
For the foregoing reasons, Sunflower's motion must be denied as untimely.
11/
In this regard, it is worth noting that intervenors in other proceedings raised psychological stress contentions both before and soon af ter the Court of Appeals issued its January 7, 1982, Judgment.
See PANE v. NRC, supra, Judge Wilkey's opinion, slip op. at 27-29, 35.
12/
Request of the Respondent Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Expeditious Issuance of the Court's Opinions, dated May 13, 1982, PANE v. NRC.
M.
II.
Local Economic Effects in the Cost-Benefit Analysis Sunflower's second untimely contention asserts that the cost-benefit balance in the DES-OL is skewed to favor operation of Perry "due to the improper inclusion of increased employment and tax revenues to the local community as benefits."
Motion at 3.
The contention is based on an incorrect interpretation of Appeal Board precedent and must therefore be rejected.
It must also be rejected for being unjustifiably late.
Sunflower's contention is a legal attack on the DES-OL for including tax revenues and increased employment as benefits in the cost-benefit analysis.11/
The legal basis for Sunflower's attack is a footnote in the Appeal Board's discussion of the alternate site evaluation for the Seabrook facility.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-471, 7 N.R.C.
477, 509 (1978).
The footnote appears in the context of the Appeal Board's criticism of the licensing board for failing to analyze the significance of socioeconomic factors in the alternate site evaluation.
To be sure, a large influx of workers and their families might impose a greater burden upon some small communities.
But other such towns might consider themselves advantaged by such an influx.
- Although, for example, their governmental ser-vices--fire, police, education--might be strained at first, there could also be a 13/
Sunflower does not attack the factual accuracy of the values used by the Staff in the DES-OL.
boost to a sagging local economy and additional tax revenues which might constitute a more than offsetting advan-tage. 58/
Of course, we do not know that this would be the case.
We cannot be certain that such advantages would follow--and that is precisely the point.
For without examining into the particular facts of each community's situation, no one can be any more certain that disadvantages will accrue.
In short, some study is necessary before it can be said that a particular sparsely populated area will necessarily suffer adverse socioeconomic impact sufficient of itself to justify rejecting it as an alternative site.
58/
Increased employment and tax revenues cannot be included on the benefit side in striking the ultimate NEPA cost-benefit balance for a particulat plant.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Station), ALAB-179, 7 AEC 159, 177 (1974).
But the presence of such factors can certainly be taken into account in weighing the potential extent of the socioeconomic impact which the plant might have upon local conaunities.
Indeed, the l
Board below recognized this in discounting the socioeconomic impact of plant construc-t tion upon the town of Seabrook.
LBP-76-26 (initial decision), 3 NRC at 913.
ALAB-471, 7 N.R.C.
at 509 (original emphasis deleted, emphasis added).
The Seabrook decision relied on by Sunflower thus is based on the cited Vermont Yankee decision.
In that case, the Appeal l
Board briefly discussed intervenor's objections to the i
treatment of certain secondary benefits in the cost-benefit l
analysis.
I l l l
A third group of exceptions (numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18) reflects NRDC's view that confusion existed with respect to the
" issues concerning secondary benefits" (Brief, p.16).
The short answer to these exceptions is that, as a staff witness pointed out, the secondary benefits listed in the FES (e.g.,
local taxes and local employment) were mentioned only for informational purposes and did not play a part in the decision to proceed with the proposed project (FES, p. XI-14, par. B.8.;
Tr. 6175, 6198-99, 6290-91).
Because many of the " secondary benefits" consist of transfer payments resulting in offsetting costs and benefits, we agree with the staff and NRDC that they have no place in the overall evaluation of the appropriateness of the project.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-179, 7 A.E.C. 159, 177 (1974) (emphasis added).
Since this paragraph lacks both elaboration and citations for its conclusion, its meaning is not without question.1A/
However, the best translation would seem to be that those " secondary benefits" which have an offsetting cost which is not included on the cost side of the cost-benefit balance should be excluded from the balance.15/
f 14/
For instance, neither local taxes nor local employment are technically " transfer payments".
That term is defined as
" payments made by the government to individuals for which no services are rendered in return.
A transfer payment might be a Social Security check or an unemployment check."
Black's Law Dictionary 1342 (5th ed. 1979).
Nor is it clear that the l
Appeal Board meant to include local taxes and local employment I
within the scope of " transfer payments resulting in offsetting costs and benefits."
13/
The Appeal Board could not have meant that every secondary benefit which has an offsetting cost should be excluded.
Such (Continued Next Page) l l
The key question thus becomes whether the secondary benefits of increased employment and tax revenues shown in the Perry DES-OL in fact have offsetting costs which are not included in the balance.
Sunflower has not presented such an analysis, although the information on which the analysis can be made is readily available.
The available information shows that increased employment and tax revenues are not, by them-selves, offsetting costs and benefits.
On the contrary, the costs associated with these benefits are already incorporated in other factors of the cost-benefit balance.
Excluding the benefits associated with increased employment and tax revenuc-s from the cost-benefit analysia will unfairly tilt the balance toward the cost side since the cost aspects of these items will remain in the cost-benefit balance.
Sunflower's contention would produce an unbalanced result.
Increased employment has both costs and benefits associa-ted with it.
The benefits are more jobs and the payroll associated with those jobs.
See DES-OL, Table 6.1.
These are the items which Sunflower would delete.
The costs of increased employment are the economic costs to Applicants of meeting the payroll and the socioeconomic costs of adding those employees I
(Continued) l an interpretation would be nonsensical since every benefit, both primary and secondary, has a cost associated with it--at a i
l minimum, the economic cost of obtaining the benefit. l
and their families (or, at least, those who would relocate) to the area around the plant.
These costs are already considered in the DES-OL.
See DES-OL SS 6.4.3 (economic costs of operat-ing include operating and maintenance costs); 5.8.1 and 6.4.4 (impact of operating work force on community services); ER-OLS SS 1.3.3.6 (employment costs included in operating and maintenance cost component); 8.2.1 (employment costs included in external costs); and 8.2.2 (impacts of operating work force on community).
These costs under Sunflower's proposed conten-tion would remain in the cost-benefit balance.
Deleting only the benefit Lide would be illogical and misleading.
Similarly, for tax revenues, Sunflower's proposed conten-tion would delete the benefit site of the balance without adjusting the cost side.
Tax revenues appear on the benefit side.
See DES-OL, Table 6.1 (local taxes as indirect benefit).
However, taxes are also included as part of the economic cost of operating the facility.
See ER-OLS S 1.3.3.4 (taxes included in annual fixed charges).
Sunflower cannot cavalierly unbalance one side of the equation.
Since increased employment and tax revenues are not in l
themselves offsetting costs and benefits (the cost aspects already exist in uncontroverted portions of the DES-OL's cost-benefit balance), the test established in Vermont Yankee and followed in Seabrook simply does not apply here.
The conten-tion, therefore, must fall because Sunflower has failed to establish that it meets the Appeal Board's test..
Even if the contention were otherwise admissible, Sunflower has failed to show " good cause" for its untimely submission.
Sunflower's argument is that the DES-OL was only recently issued and that this constitutes good cause.
Motion at 4.
The important point, however, is not that the challenged factors appear in the March, 1982, DES-OL, but that documents in this proceeding for at least.eight years have treated increased employment and tax revenues in the way Sunflower now finds objectionable.
As the Appeal Board held in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2),
ALAB-384, 5 N.R.C.
612 (1977), the time for determining lateness begins to run from the issuance of the first envi-ronmental impact statement which could have dealt with the issue.
The Coalition has favored us with no good reason why it could not have raised Contention No. 5, with its assertions respecting pro-motional rate structures, long before last August.
And none appears.
The record reflects l
that a Final Environmental Statement for both
(
units of the Three Mile Island facility issued in December 1972.
That document did not address the energy conservation alternative at all.
Surely, if the Coalition thought that energy conservation should have been considered as an alternative to Unit 2, it both could and should have raised the matter when given the opportu-nity to file an intervention petition in 1974.
5 N.R.C.
at 618.
1 In this case, all environmental documents since the filing l
l of the construction permit applications have dealt with
( l l
l
1 increased employment and tax revenues in the same fashion as the DES-OL.
The subjects were treated as indirect benefits in the Environmental Report-Construction Permit Stage, SS 8.3.1 (construction employment), 8.3.2 (operating employment), 8.4 (taxes), 11.5.2.1 (taxes), 11.5.2.2 (construction employment),
and 11.5.2.4 (operating employment).
They were treated as indirect benefits in the Draft Environmental Statement at the 4
construction permit stage issued in November 1973, SS 10.2.2 (taxes and increased employment as benefits) and 10.4 (cost-benefit summary listing additional taxes, local economic effects).
They were treated as indirect benefits in the Final Environmental Statement at the construction permit stage issued in April 1974,11/ SS 10.22 (taxes and increased employment as benefits), 10.4 (cost-benefit summary listing increased taxes, local economic effects) and 11.3.4 (taxes).
The ER-OLS, submitted in June 1980, also dealt with these topics, i
SS 8.1.2.1 (tax revenues as benefit), 8.1.2.2 (payrolls and employment as benefits) and 11.2.2 (taxes and increased i
employment as indirect benefits).
The issue of employment was even the subject of a contention at the construction permit hearing that was withdrawn pursuant to a stipulation (agreed to by the licensing board) that Applicants would submit additional 16/
It should be observed that the construction permit Final Environmental Statement was issued after the Vermont Yankee decision, ALAB-179.
1.- ---
information on local employment and other socioeconomic issues which would become part of the record.11!
Sunflower thus has had more than eight years of notice that increased employment and tax revenues were being treated as they are in the DES-OL.
With this much time, Sunflower would have a substantial burden to make any compensating showing on the remaining factors for considering late conten-tions.
But it makes no such showing.
As to the availability of other means to protect its interests, Sunflower has another--and rather obvious-- forum to make its concerns known.
By filing comments on the DES-OL, it can have its arguments considered and reflected in the Final Environmental Statement.18/
Sunflower also has failed to demonstrate any grounds for expecting that its participation will assist in developing a sound record.
Moreover, adding the issue will, to some extent, expand and delay the proceeding.
And although there may be no other parties that will represent Sunflower's 17/
See Partial Initial Decision, LBP-74-69, 8 A.E.C. 538, 541 T1974); Transcript 2124-32, 2257-58 (July 3, 1974); Stipulation between Applicants, Staff, and intervenor Ohio Power Siting Commission (Joint Exhibit 1, see 8 A.E.C. at 581); Applicant's Submittal Pursuant to Stipulation Between OPSC [intervenor Ohio Power Siting Commission], AEC Regulatory Staff, and Applicants, dated July 16, 1974.
13/
Given the Appeal Board rulings, perhaps the simplest answer to Sunflower's concerns would be an appropriate footnote to the Benefit-Cost Summary, Table 6.1, reflecting the argument that these items (both their costs and benefits) may be considered inappropriate and, even if considered, do not affect the ultimate cost-benefit balance reached. 1
interest in this matter, that alone cannot conceivably overcome Sunflower's failure to make a credible showing on the other factors of 10 C.F.R. S 2.714(a)(1).
For these reasons,' Sunflower's second late contention must be rejected.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE t
By
/
" Jay E.
Silberg, P.C.
Robert L. Willmore Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.
20 822 10 b
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Dated:
May 20, 1982 t
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing BoaNd'Iu '.,,;U,7.- '
- f.,, m In the Matter of
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al.
)
50-441
)
1 (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Answer To Sunflower Alliance, Inc. Motion For Leave To Submit
)
Additional Contentions", were served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, this 20th day of May, 1982, to all those on the attached Service List.
I V
f m
]
Robert L. Willmore Dated:
May 20, 1982 l
1 i
e UNITED STATES CF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-440
' ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et_ _a_l.
)
50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2
)
SERVICE LIST Pator B.
Bloch, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Jerry R.
Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Frederick J.
Shon James H.
Thessin, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive U.S.
Nuclear Regulatcry Commission Legal Director Washington, D.C.
2C555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Christine N.
Kohl, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing NI.' Sue Hiatt Appeal Board OCRE Interim Representative U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8275 Munson Avenue Washington, D.C.
20555 Mentor, Ohio 44060 Dr. John H.
Buck Daniel D. Wilt, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Wegman, Hessler & Vanderburg Appaal Board Suite 102 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7341 Chippewa Road Washington, D.C.
20555 Brecksville, Ohio 44141 Gary J.
Edles, Esquire Terry Lodge, Esquire Atcmic Safety and Licensing 915 Spitzer Building Appeal Board Toledo, Ohio 43604 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al.
Service List Page Two l
Donald T.
E: one, Esquire Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Lako County Administration Center 105 Center Street Painesville, Ohio 44077 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Achtabula. County Courthouse Jefferson, Ohio 44047 l
.l t
- _. -. _ _.... - -