ML20053A258

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Interim Significant Deficiency 52 Re Omission of Stress relief/post-weld Heat Treatment for Welds on Reactor Containment Penetration Assemblies.Welds Will Be post-weld Heat Treated Using Qualified Procedure.Final Rept by 820831
ML20053A258
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/13/1982
From: Mclendon G, Milhiser R, Wills J
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins, Jay Collins, Gutierrez J
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3K-82-0275, W3K-82-275, W3K-8200275, NUDOCS 8205250147
Download: ML20053A258 (4)


Text

f LOUISIANA / 142 ORARONDE STHU T POWE R & LiG H T/ P O BOX 0000

  • NEW ORLEANS LOUIS!ANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345 ihUl$U$iUA May 13, 1982 i

G D McLENDON Senior Voce President W3K-8 2- 0275 Q-3-A35 E 5 L _

[b~~ $[${]\\Yl[f!IlS Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV f

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8' S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

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611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012 l 1; -

jh 4-Subj ec t : Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Doc ke t No. 50-382 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 52 "Bi-Metallic Penetration Welds, No Stress Relief"

Reference:

Telecon - L. L. Bass (LP&L) to L. Martin (NRC) on 4/13/82

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 52, "BL-Metallic Penetration Welds, No Stress Relief."

I f you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, GDMcL/LLB/grf Attachment cc:

1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 (with 15 copies of report)

2) Director Of fice of Management s

Information and Program Control

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Washington, D. C.

20555 (with I copy of report) i 8205250147 820513 gDRADOCK 05000382 PDR

LOUISIANA POWER & LIG'dT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 52 BI-METALLIC PENETRATION WELDS, NO STRESS RELIEF Reviewed by XI,#

6 3/D R. J. Milfiise/ '

te Manager Date Reviewed by 3

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. 41 1s - Project Superintendent

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My J.pftrt-Project Licensing Engineer

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Reviewed by J.

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L J. Gt lerrez - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date April 30, 1982 e

INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 52 "BI-METALLIC PENETRATION WELDS, NO STRESS RELIEF" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(c).

It describes a defect with Reactor Containment Penetration Assemblies 40 and 41.

The problem includes omission of stress relief /postweld heat treatment for Shop Weld 2 on each assembly and use of an unqualified welding procedure. This prob-lem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Shop Weld No. 2 was performed by Associated Piping & Engineering Corporation personnel using their Welding Procedure SUP-836, Rev. 6, to join a 24-inch diameter schedule 120 ASME SA106 Crade B Cuard Pipe to an ASME SA182 Grade F304 Flued Head Forging on Reactor Containment Penetration Numbers 40 and 41.

The nominal wall thickness of this weld joint is 1.812 inches.

Based upon the requirements of ASME Section III Subsection NE 1971 Edition includ-ing Addenda through Winter 1973 Subsubparagraph ND-4623.1(d), the SA106 Grade B Cuard pipe requires postweld heat treatment since it exceeds 1 inches in thickness. The subject joints were welded by buttering the SA106 Grade B material with a high nickel alloy filler metal. Postweld heat treatment of this pipe prior to welding to the stainless steel flued head forging was not accomplished. The welding procedure utilized by Associated Piping & Engineer-ing Corporation was qualified for use with the high nickel alloy buttering but not for subassembly postweld heat treatment.

_ SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Failure of Shop Weld No. 2 on Containment Penetration Numbers 40 and 41 could lead to degradation of containment integrity.

This condition does not ensure that radiological exposure to the public resulting from a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is below 10CFR100 guidelines.

Therefore, the present welds, if lef t uncorrected, are a safety hazard.

CORRECTIVE ACTION In order to correct the nonconforming condition, the No. 2 welds must be post-weld heat treated by Associated Piping & Engineering using a welding procedure qualified in accordance with ASME Code Sections III and IX requirements and incorporating postweld heat treatment of the subassembly in accordance with the requirements of NE-4620.

To avoid an embrittlement problem due to sigma phase formation in the austenitic stainless steel weld filler metal (Type 309) and to cinimize the amount of sensitization developed in the stainless steel filler metal and base metal, the postweld heat treatment will not use a holding tempera-ture in the range of 1100 to 1250"F.

A lower temperature in the range of 900 to

. 1000 F will be utilized in accordance with ASME Code Section III Subsection NE allowable alternative requirements. This shall be verified by metallo-graphic examination of individual specimens prior to final heat treatment temperature and hold time selection.

Site Nonconformance Report W3-3647 was issued on April 7,1982, to track this discrepancy.

Completion of the corrective action will be accomplished and a Final Report submitted to the USNRC no later than August 31, 1982.

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LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 52 BI-METALLIC PENETRATION WELDS, NO STRESS RELIEF Reviewed by M#

6 3/D R. J. Milfilse/ -

te Manager Date 3

Reviewed by

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tit - Project Licensing Engineer

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J. Gdierrez - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date April 30, 1982 l

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INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 52 "BI-METALLIC PENETRATION WELDS, NO STRESS RELIEF" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(c).

It describes a defect with Reactor Containment Penetration Assemblies 40 and 41.

The problem includes omission of stress relief /postweld heat treatment for Shop Weld 2 on each assembly and use of an unqualified welding procedure. This prob-lem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION Shop Weld No. 2 was performed by Associated Piping & Engineering Corporation personnel using their Welding Procedure SWP-836, Rev. 6, to join a 24-inch diameter schedule 120 ASME SA106 Grade B Guard Pipe to an ASME SA182 Grade F304 Flued Head Forging on Reactor Containment Penetration Numbers 40 and 41.

The nominal wall thickness of this weld joint is 1.812 inches.

Based upon the requirements of ASME Section III Subsection NE 1971 Edition includ-ing Addenda through Winter 1973 Subsubparagraph ND-4623.l(d), the SA106 Grade B Guard pipe requires postweld heat treatment since it exceeds 1 inches in thickness. The subject joints were welded by buttering the SA106 Grade B material with a high nickel alloy filler metal. Postweld heat treatment of this pipe prior to welding to the stainless steel flued head forging was not accomplished.

The welding procedure utilized by Associated Piping & Engineer-ing Corporation was qualified for use with the high nickel alloy buttering but not for subassembly postweld heat treatment.

_ SAFETY IMPLICATIONS l

Failure of Shop Weld No. 2 on Containment Penetration Numbers 40 and 41 could lead to degradation of containment integrity.

This condition does not ensure that radiological exposure to the public resulting from a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is below 10CFR100 guidelines.

Therefore, the present welds, if Icf t uncorrected, are a safety hazard.

1 I

CORRECTIVE ACTION In order to correct the nonconforming condition, the No. 2 welds must be post-weld heat treated by Associated Piping & Engineering using a welding procedure qualified in accordance with ASME Code Sections III and IX requirements and incorporating postweld heat treatment of the subassembly in accordance with the requirements of NE-4620.

To avoid an embrittlement problem due to sigma phase l

formation in the austenitic stainless steel weld filler metal (Type 309) and l

to minimize the amount of sensitization developed in the stainless steel filler metal and base metal, the postweld heat treatment will not use a holding tempera-in the range of 1100 to 1250"F.

A lower temperature in the range of 900 to ture l

1 I

l

. 1000 F will be utilized in accordance with ASME Code Section III Subsection NE allowabic alternative requirements.

This shall be verified by metallo-graphic examination of individual specimens prior to final heat treatment temperature and hold time selection.

Site Nonconformance Report W3-3647 was issued on April 7, 1982, to track this discrepancy.

Completion of the corrective action will be accomplished and a Final Report submitted to the USNRC no later than August 31, 1982.