ML20052H860

Exemption from Fire Protection Rule Schedular Requirements of 10CFR50.48(c)

ML20052H860
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	05/10/1982
From:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML20052H861	List: ML20052H860
References
NUDOCS 8205240087
Download: ML20052H860 (29)

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NUCLEI.R REGULATORY CC CISS105

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ARKANSAS ~PCKER a L'.3HT CC?.JiY

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DESIGNATED ORIGINAL 77 hMN YE O

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Certtfied By I.

The Arkansas Power and Light Company (the licensee) is the holder of Facility Doerating License ilos. NPF-6 which authorizes operation of Arkansas

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'This'_.,l'icense provides, areng other tiiings, that i t' ild." 2.:

i they are subject to all rules, regulations and Orders of the Corxnission 1

1 new or hereaf ter in effect.

k The f acility uses a Corbustion Engineering, Inc. pressurized yater reactor

-l at the licensee's site located in Pcce County, Arkansas.

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%.'!r. ember 19, 1930, t';e Ccrriisica published e revised Section 10 CFR

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iD. -: and 3 nr. Er anc, I to 10-GF?. 50 reg rcing f;a erstection festures af 4

wcicar pe. ar pisr.ts (45 F.R. 76502-).

The reviseo Sraction 50.48 and Appendix R became ef fective en February if,1931.

Section 50.48(c) established the schedules for satisfyir.g the provisiens of Appendix R.

Section III of Appendix a

9 c'entains fif teen sattectians, lettared A :nrcugh 0, each of which specifies 5

I rectir a r.ts.for a urtic;lar aspect of the fire trotection feetures at a i

1 nuclear power plant. One of these fifteen subsections, III.G., is~the subject of this exemption request.

III.G. specifies detailed requirements for fire protection of the equipment used for safe shutdown by means of separation and i

b rriers (III'.G.2).

If the requirerents for separaticn Ind barriers cculd not be : et in an area, alternative safe shutdcun capabliity, independent of tnat

;l area 'and eauipment in that area,- was required.(III.G.3.).

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Section 50.'3',:) required conaletion of all rodificaticos to meet the prcs:sions af 'ppendix ~ *i:hin a s:ecified tine f rom the affective date cf this I

fi ra prct:c;ico ru'e, Febru ary 17, ISM, except f or modificaticas to provice

'4 al:ar ative safe sr.tc:in capability.

Thase lat:er codificaticas (III.S.3. )

require NRC revies and approval.

Hence, Section 50.42(c) requires their completico within a certain tite af ter NRC approval.

The date for submittal

...of d.esi.gn des cr.i p.t. ions of.any. pudi f icat.cas..t. o.p rc vide a.lternative cs afe shutdgwn..

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7 capability was spacified as ' March 19, 1981.

By letter dated March 19, 1931, Arkansas Power ard Light Ccocany requested exenptions f rom reeting the scnedule requirerents for those items as outlined in 10 CFR 50.4S(c). The staff discussed the March 19, 1931, request with Arkansas i

pcwer and Light CorDanv ard it was understood that Arkansas Power and Light I

i, Cc r'ny was re:uesting ere stien f rcr eating the schecule requirements for i

.bc;e 4:a s (Of A? e

x ; Cectico Ill.G and L) as cutlinec in 10 CF3 50.l'(c).

Iy le ::r a:ec : ;3ry 15, 1932, Ark ans as E;.,er and Li;ht Cr pa y i-dicatad

Mej -ere ana;'e to cor.it to any fira schedule fcr sub.ni: ting technical that i

exenstions and design details.

When this Fire Protection Rule was approved by the Cor. mission, it was i

undef st:2d th-it the t're recuired f or each licensee to re-examine those

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.:dy-i: prove d ccnfigariticns at its plant to determine wPether thej reet the requirements of Section III.G of Apoendix R to 10 CFR 50 was not well known

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and w:uld.'ary deoending upon the degree of conformance.

For each item of non-4 C

f confornance that was fcund, a fire hazards analysis had to be performed to f

da:er.;ine -ne:r.er the exi s:irg configuration providad suf ficient fii e protection.

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If it cid, a Dasis had :: be formulated for an exerptica request.

If it did not, i

modifications to either meet the requirements of Appendix R c,r to provide some other acceptable car figuratien, tna: cculd be justified for example, had to be I

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Where fire pr0tec'1cn idatures alone Could not ensure protectiCn Of I

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' as re 4u i re d b.v Sectica : :'.3.3. of Ap?endi x,. Cepending upon the f

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.a.r of a e *re s invaiv y, :ne i a req; ires for tnis s-I re-exaninaticn, reenalysis and rede. i.,n could vary f rom a few months to a year 2

c'r mare.

The Conmission decided, hcwever, to require one, short-term date for

..a,.11 l i ce n s e,e s i n t he, n. te re s t..of er.s u ci n t. a be s. t.-e,f.f o rt, e xp..e d.i t.e.d. c o.gp l et..i..cn.,.,....,

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cire Fratection Rule, recognizing that there wculd be of concliance with the rumber of licensees who could not eet these time restraints but who could 3

R then request 5ppropriate relief thrcuch the exemption process.

Licensees for

cf the 72 plants to which Apcendix R applies (plir.ts with an operating

'i; ens a ;ssued priar to Jaruary 1,1979) have requested such schedular relief.

The licensees f cr the ren3inir; 23 ? ants rade submittais to caet the l

s ch. w ! ir ce irerints of L2.K{:).

ill of t':es e w bitt al s, hat:ever, were a

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Therafore, additicnal ti:r.e is being used to cor.plete t'

those submittals also.

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7 rice ta the issuance cf Appendix 7, the Arkansas !Nclair One, Unit No. 2 5

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' ad t.een revie <2d against the criteria of Appendix A 'o the Branch Technical r

f' Cysiti:, 9.5-1 (5T? 9.5-1).

The 37P 9.5-1.2s cevelaeed to rescive the lesscos Ie--r.ad f ren the fire at Srcxns Ferry Nuclear Plar.t.

It is trJader in scope than Ap;endix R, for~ed the nucleus of the critaria ceveloped further in

-c ran di t 2 and in its presant, re.ised form constitutas the sectico of the l

Standard ~ eview Plan used fcr t e raview cf applications for c nstruction 3

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,j I the 'iRC sta f f 3-d i:s fira prctecticn censul'. ants and 3 Fire Protaction l

Safety Evaluatien (F?SER)1 -as 1ssued. Sone items renair.ed unresolved.

Fur:r.er discourse te:-een the licensee and the NRC staff resulted in resolu-

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tion of several of these items as documented in letters

'*to Arkansas Poser and Li cht Coccany.

The CPSER sup?crted the issuance of an ar.endmer.t to tne

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perat)?g;.l.iq,is,nsp...cf;cArkar,sas. Nuclear} 0n'e,. Unit.}%. 2..which required "9

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. a nadifications to be. ace to plant physical features, systems, and acministrative

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controls to meet the criteria of Appencix A to STP 9.5-1.

All of these modifica-ti:ns have been completed.

Therefore, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2 has had upgradinc to a high degrec of ' ire protection already and the extensive reasses!.ent i.,olved in this request for exemption f rcm the schedular dates i,

of 550.!?(c) ti e is to cua'tify. 4 ' det ail, the dif f ersr. css betwaen xnat was e c. c.e.,.. )., _=- r.=.

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n ite.e:_cr :ated Januarj 15, 1952, Arkansas Pc-er and Light Company i

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stated

• hat they we e unable to cer,it to any firr schedule for submitting exem; tion req;ests and design details.

I Ark ansas Nuclear One, Ur.it No. 2 - Operating License No. NPF-6 Amendment 1 dated September 1,1973 supported by FPSER (NUREG-0223) published in August 1973.

9' Letters date: January 17 and aoril 16, 1933 f ron 'tr. R. W. Reid, NRC, to i

r. ',illiar 'a.3 a;gn, ;II, A?&L Cc., a; proving F?iER Item 3.6 "Protectica l

cf Redundart Cables in the Cable Spreading P,com (207S-L)".

I Le:ter datec :;ril 25, li!O forn .r. R. W. Reid, NRC, to M.r. William Cavanaugh, I::, 2::.rcvi ; FFSER Iteo 3.15 "'<anual Hose Stations".

• Letter da:ed Novem er 5,1950 frca Mr. R. W. Rei d, NRC, to M.r. 'n'illi am Ca vanaugh,

III,' a; proving FPSER Iters 3.la "Secke Detectors" and 3.12 "RCP Cil' Collection f

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.a a substa'ti21 p.:-; of the fire ctactica features at Arkansas Nuclear Cne, Ur,1t No. 2 in ;cnf ormance witi the requirerents o' tr.e r ire vrotectica,.u,te r

and is applying significant effort to complete the reassessment of any remaining edifications whir.h might be necessary for strict conformance with PM Tv 1

.'Saction. l.II.G; ' 1/e,f.ind that ' because~ offthe airea dy-comp.lete'dco;igrad.i ng' o f' -

g tnis f acility',' :nere is' nc unc2e risk to tne health and safety of the public

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involved w'tn continued operation until the completion of this reassessment on July 1, 1932.

This date is based upcn the response of all the licensees t

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as is ccasistert with *he tire needed'by Other licer. sees f or similar ef forts.

Mcwe.'er, because we nave f 0and that r0st submittals of this reanalysis to I

date roi other licensees have r.ct been complete; that is, not all of the ir.fcr.kition re;Lested by Ge eric Letter 81-12 dated February 20,1951, was i

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ravicac, we are adding a ccrditicn to this E. rem;;icn tnat requires all such infcr

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1 l 1 53.12, an exempticn is authcriced by law and will r.ct e cancer life or I'

i property er ne cc-on defense and security and is otherwise in the public j

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- o-i ct rat ind sere?y grants the f alle.ing exenpticas witn respect to the rac : ire-ents ;f Sectica :::.G. of Aopendix R to 10 CFR 50:

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v".2va cc gilance a; rec ir5d by 350.42(c)(5' is exterced to t..mr,0 7.,

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(2) e :ste, " arch 19, 1951 ^;r filir.g exeoption requests pursuant to j50.43(c)(5),which includes a to'iling provision is extended to

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Tne cate, "arcn 19, 1931, for submittal of design descriptions of alternative or cedicated shutdown systems to comply with Section

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( 4 )~ ~,e a:e, Februcry 17, 'i381, fcc., s.hich the install ation schedules estaclished in 550.43(c)(2) and (3) are calculated, is extended to vu,.y,,.s.cc;

,- e Provided the followinc conditions are met:

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Requests for e;,er; tion pursuant to 550. '3(c)(6) =st include:

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in fire safetj sy full car? ianca ;itn l

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• .o plant safety incurred by full corpliance with III.G. A single statement that the feature for which the exemotion is recuested was previously arproved by j

the staff is not sufficient. A simple assertion that in the licensee's judgmunt the feature f cr which the exenpticn is r 7.ested is Odequate fire protectica is not sufficierit.

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The desi:n descriptions of alternative :r dedicated shutdewn syste s

'c ce f j,ith S c*.iri 111.3.3., as c o ired by 9:0,42(c)(5) shall include a -point-by-point response t.o each item in Section 8 of 1

Encicsure 1 to gereric letter 31-12 dated February 20, 1931, arid to each item in Encicsure 2 to Generic Letter 31-12, dated February 20, l e. c,I.

-Ey - :li ci'i ;n, this inc'..jes III.L wnich specifies the criteria f or meeting I.

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1 till ' e consicered uncer Section 234 af the

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' teni c Er ercy ? ct, 5s ar:er,de d.

Such a violation wilI ce.4 Ocntinuing one i

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.',e exemption f er s ;bMttal and ter.;;inating de n..g i l. R.aha g uac i e s, '.a r e i r c rh.2 c,t ed.I.~. ;..

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dela.v in the %terni.-ation of saa.:equacv b.v, '.5e 'staf f, causer y the

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..crilaad assccigd with reviewing all of thb suanittals alling due near the same time, will not relie;ee the licensee of the responsiliility for cocp'a+eness 4-

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Harold ?..

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,n, W e:ter Of fice of h'uclear '.eactor Regulation h,

Dated at Bethesca, .aryland this 10th day of May, 1922.

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t, ga-eric letter ci-12 was forwarded to all reaccer licensees 1

Ch F & uary 21 1931, s,n u # ca_-

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t to reassess areas of the plant vhere cables cr equipment including associated-I J]

ncn-safety circuits of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and

' reirdai n.:, hot', sttut#own..condit.i.ons,.ar.e.. lo. cat.ed. to..det.ergine whether t

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. ents of Sectica :II.G.2 'of A;pendix R to 10 CFR 50 were satisfied.

3 Eriicsure I and Enclosure 2 of the generic letter requesced a'ditior.a1 3.

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ing thcse areas of the plant requiring alternative shutdown i

. informat on concern L'

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Seccica S cf Enclosure i requested information for the systems, I

capability.

equi;:.unt and procedures of alternative shutdcwn capability and Enciosur 1

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a;purent that the request for inforT.ation shculd be clarified since a lack I

l of c arity could result in the submissica of either insufficient or e,cessive x

i Thas, the staff his rewritten Section 3 of Enclesure 1 and

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inform t-:cn.

Ecciosure 2 of the February 20, 1951 cer.eric letter. Addicicnally, further i

its has-been provided t.o clarificatien of the definition of associated c rcu f

aid in the reassessments to determine compliance with the requirements o In develepir.; this=rewrita we have 5

f Secticns III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Apper. dix R.

Fire Protectica Group.

The enclosed

c ris i der e d t he Mme,nt o,f th, e Nucl e, ar.U ti.l. i tys l

rewrite of the Er.cicsures ( Attachmancs 1 & 2) centains no new require.ents

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but -erely sttempts to clarify the request for additional informtion.

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.f.p:enre.es w.mo,';2ve not r:s;c. dei to 'he February 20, 1931 gencric letter, e

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=ccired repost for informatica is not new, but merely clarification of cur previcus letter, responding to it should not delay any submittals. in i

progress' that are based upon February-20, 1.081 letter.

Licensees whose r_esponse..to.the Eepruary..20,.1,981, letter, pas been. found..ingomplete. resylting jq t

o steff identifications of a major unresolved item (ise., associated circuits),

may chocse to respcnd to pertiner.t sections of the enclosed request for infor-nation in order to close open items (i.e., open item for. associated circuits, f

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If additional clarification is needed, please contact the staff Project I

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2.-

,... -..s...

-r..e....a e..:.,....c..-

, a.

s.

a

..,.....e.,.g

2.,.. : -

u ~ r_ 5 _,.. ~, c.:i,,. =..., ~. e. g c. :

1..

r., : c..,.

r.,

n.,... ;.. >.,.. :,. - c_.,-..,a _c c

.v_.,..a,x ~.

~

= '. u _' ".,, 9_ 0, I c..1 r =_,n.-i. u-i t '.*. a r.

3 cc5e, a

n. f r..... a u r a_ 1 o#.

_'.<s_.

l

'. c a_ s o. t '.. = r l = r.+

'. '.. 2 '. wi l l.. + r.. =_ =_ '. '. '.. a_

.- >. ~,; i r a_. c. i e s o '.

Y.

r 3.

d e.

'.'. #.,- ' '.. a c =.

~

s ideds i.

9

s..,,

c.ectio.n.III.G.2.of A,ppe.ndix R and, th.us a.lte.rnati.ve s.hutdown. w~ll be prov S

- n.

.....,. 1

_,...a d

.uil

's_

o.,, e.v.., -. :. ". n

1. .. -... "...a.

. n _ a i r n... =..^.e. r f S ev-'ei e,. t 'i I. G. 2 o f c'., 0. e.." 3 -

.uis..

s.,

m n.

'. ' = +. a l l o '.n' s r a -o =.- u' '

t..'. s, '. _ =. '.

1, 3

....1cm_

.sa:

n_

m re s.: a. 2

. i m., t,,,,

r.

m

b iv_a.

..mm.

are or will be in compliance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

h x_

a' For each of t'.cs e fire areas of the plant requiring an alternative shutdown F

-3

.9 t_ip3n.3_

,2_. n.

. c_ s e, ns e_ e,

'. '. h.. a.

1. o l i c,"i. i g r n 3'. c..e 'w s

1. . ^ r

3 c

e n

.ys...r-;

---.2.2,

-s s

. v w

i ivv

sj 7 1

s,.

e _,. s..

=.. -.

...,,,.. c\\., n.,

z., =_ L:.. c., 3.,..

.u._ e;..

,.?c.s) s.

.,,....... -..a

.s.

s._

t r..

4:

n. e..

.,, ~,. e r.

w _.. 3 4.

y.,.. ns m..u. m_

-,,w:

i.e-aa u.

b.

Fcr those systems identified in "la" for which alternative or dedicated u

,t....r-.,, r.e_-,t l../.

..,.,. t o., r. m : s., a, le.r. v.._, c y-, ;. r...... 3.2 cm_.__.,.,...,

4 a.

s.

c s..

_.n 4

n.. 'L. r. s rj d

t e, s. 3..,. e.r

>a

1. . # ra. ' -. =.

7... w

'a d.... 4. '. j- '.'i.s

.., i.......,,1

.e.-,. s.,,.

r.

w n e.

a n.'s

--s

.s of -he circuits of the normal shutdown system in the fire area (pcwer to'what Pr.

equipment, control of what components and instrumentation).

Describa the system (s) or pcrtions thereof used to provide the alternative shutd:na s

e u :i r.,.

-u,.-'-* 3:8 3 's - a v-

-..a

-- yis

.>u a

--c c

...-.. u. n.

.= :i. =_

_7..,

a,

d*

-r'-

. r

.y v

. ' a.

r. z_

mr.,

n

.y,

, 'I.. e.

,.. I.. a.

e L. i. J ~.a n s.,r

'L....

a

. Jt

.n i.

e-

..e..ao.n---- n.e w

.. v s

s yvn_

va

.s L...

4,6

~

Fcr each alternative system identify the function of the new l

circuits t.2ing provided.

Identify the lccatica (fire Icne) of the i

.,,._,.4...,........._a._..a-...

,,,,.u.

_...,.a..p -

c..r..i.'

'.'.. '_ u"..- ' ' >

1. . i - a.

i m.

trea and verify that the alternative shutdcwn equipment and/or circuits are separated frem the fire area in accordance with Secticn III.G.2.

l, f

Provide drawings of the alternative shutdown system (s) which highlight any I

c.

.. connections.to the.no.r.7.al shutdown systems,(Pil,Ds for. piping.anc,ccmgonents,;.

.,7.. ' q

.*.9 *

• .. q. t.., 4.

.r

.,,.,.r..

f,

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p,'.,,y

-vj,

. p, elementary wiring d.iagram's of electrical cabling)'. Show the ele'ctrical t

1ccation of all breakers for power cables, and isolation devices for control and instrumentation circuits for the alternative shutdown systems l

fcr that fire area.

e

~

l d.

Verify that chan;es to safcty systte.s will r.ot degrade safety systems,

(?.7., '.0w i"Cl2ti0n switches and control switches should meet design 1

u. :. s. _. :, e.e..4

e. s. a. a.. a_3 1.,.

s. y a

..e.:.,. r.cr electricml ecua.; ment in the system

.m t

' hat t: e s.-< itch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches are to be m:unted in should also meet.the same criteria (F5/.?.) as other safet.v related cabinets and panels; to avoid inadvertent isolation from the cer.trpi rocm, the isolation switches should be keylocked or alarmed i

j in the control reca if in the " local" or " isolated" p.csition; periodic

,1

^

l checks should be made to verify that the switch is in the proper position,for 4

nor.al cperatica; ar.d a single transfer switch or.other new device shculd 3

not be a source of a failure which causes toss of recur.cano scfeb *.

s

..,...-.).

a a a..>

l

e..'

"erify that licensee procedures have been or will, he develc' ed which describe the p

j tasks to be perfor.ned to effect the shutdown. method.

Provide a summary 4'

of these proced; ras outlinin; c;erator acticas.

t

~

t

f.. Verify that the ranpcwer required to perform the shutdcwn functions using i,

.=i.

,.yo.-, n.., u :, s,

w- :.-. <

~

-:. u s

.,-~. t.,,.

-......3

..a s s.; * -

a s u.

s;r -

v

.a

~

y-s s

s.

a the fire is avail:ble as required by the fire bricade technical speci-ficati:ns.

4 9-Provide a ccm.mitment to perform adequate acceptance tests of the alter-

~

native shutdo.,n capability.

These tests should verify that:

equipment

~..'

' s' -

. :ia t w.t i o n.....;

w

.t.

t h...e traris.fer or 'i:clation

' ' ' c p e ra't es f ro. f..t h e' 1 o ca l,'.. con tr6T 's:...

~

whfi1 switch is placed in the "lecal" position and that the equipment cannot be operated frca the control roc =; and that equipment operates from the l

l control recm but cannot be cperated at the local centrol station when the trar.sfer isolation switch is in the "reccte" position.

i h.

Fr: vide Te:Pnicai.cpecifica:icns of the surveillance requirements and 13-i:i.; c:rditi:ns for peratirn for that equipment not already covered by exi: ting Technicai Specifications.

For example, if new isolation and centrol switches are added to a shutdcwn system, t.ne existing technical.q.pect rica. ion surveillance requirements should te suppicented ta verify syste:/ equipment functiors frca the alternate s,c.:td:wn station at tes. ting intervals censistent with the guidelines of

'1 Regulator.v Guide 1.22 and IEEE 338.

Credit ca.v" be taken for other existirIa. -

l 1

i tests using group cverlap test concepts.

e l

l j

l k

i

~

t 1

1 1

i.

For new equipment ccrprisir.; the alterr.ativa ;hutdcwn cap Sili:y, verify 3

thn the ;yner; : ailable are adequata to perf:rm the neces:2ry rhut-s,.,.

e... _. : r..

e...__._,, _ n.. : a..,. :,.;, a %_ _ t,,. s,,.,.. :..,

analyses, if possible (e.g., in the FSAR), such as a icss of ncroal ac power or shutdown on Group 1 isola, tion (3WR).

The equip ent required for the alterna.t.ive capability should be. the sa.me.or equivalent to that.

.. y.

,w..;

_;;.: :.,..:..,.. s..

)

... ~.....:

1.,.

.-.r.. :,..

relied on in the above ar.alysis, j,

Verify that repair prccedures for cold shutdom systes are developed I

and. material for repairs is maintained on site.

Provide a summary of these proccdures and 1 li_st of the material needed for repairs.

i 4

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Enc'.a s.:re.::

9 n...._.,......c..

e t

SAFE ShuTC04N CAPASILITY_

The folicsing discusses the requirer.ents for. protecting redundant and/cr The alterr.ati. e equiprent r.eed2d for cafe shutdcwn in the event of a fire.

'.-t shu:c:an quipment uich must ce

.....v.....

.s... v R. - ' r u.. s

. _.s..

' 3 f a' l :.ti n g. r..e c.u i r c e e n t ai:o ar. p1.v to c ld s.hutdown

,, e,

,-:..->. n.. c. _,.

'a

.s c y j., e..r. n.

.w

. %.._ l i -... - ".. e l a_ c ' s '. o... m. ' r = '. a.'e 'u- =. '. ' ' a r u *. n-.. e n '.. i s*.a d

r c g Appendix P, does allowrepairabie dam 3ge to ccid shutdcwn free of fir.e.darage.

ecu i cment'.

.,y.,

.r;... : -,. ;....,,...,, g::2,,

.s 4

L' sing the recuirements of Sections III.G and III.L of Appendix P., the capa-bility to achieve hot shutdown must exist given a fire in any area of the Section III.G plant in conjunction with a icss of offsite power for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

i cf Appendix ? provides fcur methods for ensuring that the het shutdown capa-bility is protected frcm fires.

The first three cptions as def'r.ed in Section c.. g,. i c n. _. rca n r es c. equi:.ent needed ter

r..,s... t-.

17.c;.9,.. \\, :. v _, 2 s -

vas

_.. a l

a._ _. m.

a.

I e

5.c q u :..,, c.= u.q a_ c, c g.1,.... a. n +u,.-.a. ae-,cic.s.d c1., 1,

a l

3.

u.. n.

... ~.. c.

s r._

ray be separated by a three-hour fire rated barrier; or, t

I

^edu'ndant syctrs including ca51es, squip. ment and associa:cd circuits may 2.

b2 separated by a horizontal dis ance of more than 20 feet with no inter-vening combustibles.

In addition, fire dete: tion and an automatic fire suppressicn syste: are rea.uired; cr, I,

4.. m:. ).. s e..,, _ m.n.,

._s n.u.,.._

s..; ace _-ri,'ed circuits ".v

~. -

a.

r 2.._.

y s. _..,

1 c....,

In additicn, fire detactors by er.clcsed by a one-hour fire rated tarrier.

, l l

and an automat.ic fire suppression system are required.

il i

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2-jl The last cption as defined by Section III.G.3 provides an a'.ternative shutdonn

..s. ms,,.......,4...-

s,-er,d "f '.

f'..a.

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s.. :..:,.,

i

t.,. i...n.,... ~e, ' c.

t. '.. >. c = b l. a..s,.',- ".1' 1. -

^

,...,.....:..,....s...

_-...r...

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rent and associated circuits of the redundant systems damaged by the fire.

Associated Circuits of Ccncern_

_th5'Ed11Mi~ns fiscuss'ib'n p'roVidesM.s dsfihiti'ox.of te.ssociat'ed ; circuits. for..

.. ' ::.41, A;;endix R consideration, 3) the guidelines for protecting the safe'shutdcwn capability from the fire-induced failures of associated circuits and C) the in-i The definition 4

for.T.ation recuired by the staff to review associated circuits.

1

't of asscciated circuits has not ch'anged from the Febreiry 20, 1931 generic letter; 4

I but is merely clarified.

It is important to r.ote that our interest is eniy i

..i '. ".. e c.' " '. ' u. #. c.c.. e.H...".....

s. :...a...,

.1

.- " i 'v c.= ' 'i a. s s t.

. n c;.>

1. . i c -i. n '. ".

a. '.

e. r..

. r, a

• 3.

. j r a. a. a.

e s. a.

,- L,.,

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1. . i ' ^ **, 0.d ' '. a. #a s

~ :, r

4.,.,.,.

v=

y.

..e c,,. : 3 1. :.. n. e e.,.,.s n:, e e,. :..

a..an;...:..c

. - n.

r e.

,. :. w..,... c;.

r..=..,

+

.. ~.

.u..

+

w.

e., ;.,..., -

..a s,

be used only as. guidance when needed. These guidelines do r.ot li.mit the alter-e f

natives available to the licensee for protecting the shutdcwn capability.

i A 1 pre;cshd methc.!s for pr:tscticn of' the shutdewn capability frca fire-induced failures will be evaluated by the' staff for acceptability..

t Our cencern is that circuits within the fire area.will..eceive fir _e damage A.

i

}

':hich can affect shutd wn ca: ability and thereby prever.t post-f re sa e 1

j Asscciated Circuits

• of Ccncern are defined as those cables l

shutdown.

(safetj Ielated, non-safety related,Ciass 1E, and non-Class TE) that:

- *The definition for associated circuits is not exactly the same in.;;;-:,-1c.,e,/.

1.__

s es the de..initica presentee i

t

.b 1

v v

- i.

H1ve a physical separaticn less than that rec.uired by Secticn III.G.2 f

I i

1.

. i O

-...a.,

.,.--....,s

a.,

u

-..w 2.

i3ve cne c f t. e fo'.i:mir.;:

5 a ccmmon power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or a.

i alternative) and the p:wer scurce is not electrically protected i

i from the _ circuit.of. cencern by. coordinated breakers, fuses,.or i

y..

_ u.

l

..... g.

..= u, e,. :. :.

. :9 :,

similar devices'isse diagram 2a), or 1

a f,

a connection to circuits or equipment w. nose spurious operat..cn b.

4 would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS l

isolation valves, ACS valves, POR"s, steam ger.erator atmospheric du. p valves, instrcmentaticn, steam bypass, etc.) (see diagram 2b), or f

.4..

r )..j w x..,

e. u., wa -.n

.. -. -.. a....

e

..,..., n 2... 3.-.... 3_

(,_. 3.,. s. c. s.. m ;.., r _.. s_

c.

c

- i. -, n. _. i._, ) - a>.

~

.a r.....

c a. u...-3 tr-....nr..

.a (1) are not eiactrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or simi-lar devices, or I

.. ~

(2) will alica prcpagation of the fire into the common encicsure, (see diagram Ec).

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The folicwing guidelir.es are for prctecting the shutdown capsbility from 3.

t r _, 8_,, e ) 5,.. u.,. ::-,

.a-z_m,

u.., ~., ;, s_, o-n.,

.._....._,.,:.. c....u..c.

..i

,c_

...:,_....t i -

provided beicw fcr interruptir.g devices applies only to new devices installad j

o provide electrical isciaticn cf associated circuits of ccncern, or as The shutdown capability part of the alternative er dedicated shutdcnn system.

may be protected from the adverse effect of damage to associated circuits e, '.,3 t m o f 't.......,.....e-fo1Towihs '.tetModh ~

W... ' e :V s.

- vh

(

encern. 6f'th.

7 Frevide protection between the associated circuits of concern and i

1.

the shutdown circuits as per Section III.G.2 of Appendix P., or i

For a common pcwer scurce case of associated circuit:

e 2.

a.

I Provide 1 cad fuse / breaker (interrupting Gavices) to fe 'er fuse /cr a'.er cc:rdination to prevent less of the redundant or 5

i.......,...,

yf.... u.,.. ".,,,.

c',,-,*

i3

,~J'**,,

._,...u, g I I g ". 9 4

4.....

.s ven r-cc:rcincti:n criceria are me che fci10wina. shcuid appi.v:

(T) The associated circuit of concern interrupting devices (breakers or fuses) tic 2-overcurrent trip characteristic

cr ati circuits tauncs shou,

d c?use the interrupting device to i.nterrupt the fault current prior to initiation of a trip of any upstream interrupting device which will' cause a less of the cenmcn pcwer source,

.( - ) The power sc;rce sbail supply the necessary fault current 2

}.

fcr sufficient tine to er.sure the proper ccordination i

without loss of functicn of the shutdcwn icads.

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~ he acceptability of a particular interrupting device is ccnsidered T

b dem r.strated if the folicwing critaria are metr

+

l (i) The interrupting device design shall be fac cry tested to

j verify overcurrent protection as designed in accordance with I

l-the applicable UL, ANSI, or NEliA standards.

i 1..gc;.qc: ;.# 6.,.(N) JO[jl0W apd:9,e(ig, yo1}aggswi.tc,hggat,:(,@0,.y l.anii,above)."1.i.a. fun Ng f,:

i l circuit breaker / protective r'elay periodic testing shall 4;

i 1 demonstrate that the overall coordination scheme remains within the limits specified in the design criteria. This testing may be performed as a series of overlapping tests.

t (iii) Molded case circuit breakers shall peridically be c.anually

}

exercised and inspected to insure case cf Operatien. On i '!

4 i

e rotating refueling cutage basis a'sampia of these breakcrs I

i shall be tested to determine that breaker drift is within i

i, that allowed by the desigr. criteria.

Breakers should be I

I i

tested in accordance with an accepted QC testing nethodology-such as : IL STD 10 5 D.

I 7

(iv)

Fuses when used as interrupting devices do not require f

I I

periodic testing, due to their stability, lack of drift,

)

4 i

and high reliability. Administrative centrols must insure 1j that replacement fuses with ratings other than those selected for proper coordinating are not accidentally used.

I b.' For circuits of equipment and/or compenents whose spuricus cperatica

[

j-wcuid affect the capability to safely s.httdown:

l i-1 t t 1

t s-i

' o

1. . s ^. l = ' a_

.. s_ =_-"4..=.*.

... A / o r c...

m-. _= n +. s '.. e..,

l (1) rvvida..=.. =_ :_.2 s

. r e

e,,,,

,-r,

- -;. r

.u,

1-,.

(,i.,..,

=_-.,, -

m,.

s._

s_..

. =..,. _ c v,.

r c.

u,....s.r.).,

r 2..:.

..c.~

a v

s

-.u I

(2) provide electrical isciation that prevents spurious cperation.

Fotential isolation devices include breakers, fuses, ampli-i

'.s.

U :.,

..s...s. f. i.g r sa,.c. o.rt.t.1rol.. F..xi. tc,.h..es..,. c.u r;ren.t. "F..R. S.,..fibe r cp.t. i

. e relay's and trarsducers; or (3) provide a means to detect souricus operations and then proce-dures to defeat the maleperatica of equipment (i.e., closure of the bicek vaive if FORY spuriously cperates, opening Of uricus cperation cf safet.v in.iectica);

the breakers to remove s~e A

m

--n:,-..a

,e mome...

. -,.- -. n.. c u,,. t. a_

_ _ e_ a_ -

c 2

em n:

(,)

. o,. : ; a_

m e r. - r. i _,. a.

=_,-.,n.e,-

.....-..+-.,....,, :. ;

a.

+.,_

s~

c...

u.

e:

r._

c i

i fire; and

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i (2) provide electrical protection (i.e., breakers, fuses or sla11ar devices) i

'n'e recognize that there are different approaches which may be used to C.

reach the sane objective of determining the interaction of associated I

circuits with shutdown systems. One =pprcach is to start with the fire

.. u

,a

.. c....:

_, a u..,_ 1 s:rc.c.:,o-m o

..v

+u...,. ::re, c c.,,

.a.-::,..w i v o..

.o c. c.,,

.. n :. e. a r,.

_.n. az. u..,. s....2..

c... e.._.... c n

+ > n.

t.=__,

a.u n..

s.a...,.=_=_,. a.,.

i.

n~_

.o i

l l outside the fire area. We have entitled this approach, "Jhe Fire Area 4

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.-e.

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e G

=

.e

(.

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9 e...E.

.=%

,E_.*,."~.3_.". 3...*A..9 e

r.

. ; a _..

s...

g

?

g I

- /

. i those circuits that are lccated in the fire area that are associated i

e. n.,.

.r.,,,.-v...2

- -..=. r 3 a.. - - -

., s

,a....

u.,

.n.L,_.....in s j s...

u.. mu..,., 2 w

u

..e..

s.,

u un s s

-a information, one for each approach.

The licensee may chocse to respond to either sit of requests deper.dir.g on the apprcach selected by the licensee.

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i i

FIP.E AREA APPROACH p

th d e.

ve r.

d., h.

.F.o..r..ea,ch..f_,i.,zg. a.r.ea wh. y.r.e a.n.al te, r. at..i.y.. o.ms.d.ed.i c a.te. s.. u..t own.

,,,.,. 3..

q

... 1., s..

in acccr ance with Section III.G.3 cf Appendix P. is provided, the d

folic.,. 'g inforr.ation is required to de cnstrate that associated circuits will not prevent operation or cause caleperation of the i

alternative or dedicated shutdown cethod:

~

1 Provide a table that lists all the p;wer cc51es in the fire area i

a.

t that conr.ect to the ;are p:wer supply cf the alter.ative or dedicited shutd -n ethod and the functica cf each peuer cable listed (i.e., pr.er for F.Hy pump).

b.

Provide a table that lists all the cables in the fire area that i

were considered for possible spurious operation which would adversely affect shutdown and the. function of each cable listed.

~

Provide a table that lists all the cables in the fire area that c.

share a common enclosure with circuits of the alternative or dedicated shutdown systems and the function of each cable listed.

i Show that fire-induced failures (hot shorts, open circuits or I

d.

i shcrts to ground) cf each of the cables lis:cd in a; 5, and c wili i

.:t prevent cperation er cause calc;eration of the alterr.ative 1 I

^ "

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P. b., tJ v s. '..'.. *3thnN.

M 4 -

f o

i.sw s

t c

j m

6$

e n

e ti.

i

[.

For each cable listed in a, b and c where new electrical isolatien has j

e.

been prcvided or m0dificacion to existir.g electrical isolation has H

~

been rade, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that

.,i,

'i ll shcw hcw each cable is isolated from the fire area.

f SYSTEMS APPROACH tive or., de,dic.a.ed shutdown. nethod.,1,.,i n..og.;. :. jg....}

at

...-u

-..u..; n :q: -

l t.; w h

s.1.

For.ea.ch aret w ere an.a,.erna..n.

o,,,

j.

.e.v...

.,...... v.

u,...

.,.n.<.

accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R is provided, the t

following informaticn is required to demonstrate that associated i

circuits will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of the f

alternative or dedicated shutdown nethod:

Describe the cathodology used to assess the potential of associated 4

J a.

fj circuit adversly affecting the alternative or dedicated shutdown.

i-The de:cription of the methcdology shculd include thi nethods s

used to identify the circuits which share a cc nion power supply or a commen enclosure with the alternative or dedicated shutdown

4 14,

systea and the circuits whose spurious cperation would affect 3

t chutdown. Additionally, the description shculd include the 4

i i'

cetheds used to identify if these circuits are associated circuits 1

l of concern due to their location in the fire area.

s b.

Prcvide a table that lists all associated circuits of concern

+

iccated in the fire area.

j l

Shew that fire-induced failures (hot shcrts, open circuits or j

c.

shorts to grcund) of each of.the cables listed in,b will not i

prevent operation or cause caloperation of the alternatiie or s

i i i

• dedicited shu:d:wn method.

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t ;

i t

2 i

A

b e'

i

_ o. -

i For each cable listed in b where new electrical isolation has been d.

pr:vided, prcvide detailed electrical schemati drawings th:t f

shew hcw each cable is isolated.frca the fire area.

Provide a location at the site or other office,s where all the e.

i tables and drawings generated by this methodology approac,h 9.d.. ' *i,;

,r;.;..i,7f.for.:,tlieq,agspci ayd.,pjrcui.ts;.,9e.v1,gwj.ay,be :agi.te(,g.verigy

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infcrmation provided above.

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i, FIGH-l.0',' PRESSURE INTERFACE For either approach chosen the follcwing concein dealing with high-low.

4 f

pressura interface shculd be addressed.

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2.

The residual heat removal systa?. is genera!1y a low pressure system i

that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system. To i.

preclude a LOCA througn this interface, we require ccmpliance with 1

the recommendations of Branch

• Technical Positica R53 E-1.

Thus, the 4r interface most likely censists of two redundant and independent motor 5

J cperated valves. These two motor operated valves and their associdted 1

cables may be subject to a single f. ire hazard.

It' is our concern that-J this single fire could cause the two valves to cpen resultina in

. i ;.

a fire initiated LOCA through the high-lcw pressure system i

.i nterf ace. To assura that this interface and other high-lcw 4

pres ure interfaces are adequately prctected from the effects cf a l

' single fire, we require the following information:

i

.i.

Identify each high-1cw pressure interface that uses redundant a.

electrically controlled devices'(such as two series c:otor operated' i

vaIVes) to isolate Gr preclude rupture ef.E.#y primary c00 lint i

i L.

.. 7' p,7

1 i

I

• b.

For each set.of redundant valves i'dentified in a.,

verify the redur. dant cablir.g (pcwer and control) have adequate physical c.3., + 4.n - 7 7..,^J. 2 o #.

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W......= 'd.="," ". a rcr n__>.5 cssa_

. v c.

fire induced failures (hot short, open circuits or short to ground) of the cables will net cause maloperation and result in a LOCA.

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M EXEM?TICNS TO SECTION III G CF AP?Ef; DIX R 1

t CF 10 CFR PART 50 Paragraph 50.43 Fire Prctection of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that all i

to Janeiry 1,1979 catisfy the 4 nuclear pcwer piants licen:ed pr or r:7:irecents cf 32ction III.G cf Appandix R to 10 CFR Fart.50.

It.isc requires that alternative fira prctection ccafiguraticas, r/ c; sly ap;rcycd by an SER be reexamined for compliar.ce with s

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prctection features for ensuring that systems and associated circuits l-used to achieve ar.d maintain safe shutdown are free cf fire camage.

Fire pr.otection conficuraticns must either meet the specific require-i

-l ments of section III.G or an alternative fire protection configuration must be justified by a fire hazard analysis.

.. ;.x,.., g.,..,... u., _ g.. x y ;y,..,,y;..... ;,.

4.% J >. s The general criteria for accepting an alternative" fire prctection conficur-t J

ations are the following:

The alternative assures that one train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the centrol roca or emercene1 cont stations is free Of fire damac.e.

The alternative assures that fire damage to at least one train of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown is limited such that i

it car, be repaired within a reasonable time (m:nor repairs with i

cc:penants stcred on-site).

Fire retardant c 2 tin;c are not u:ed as fire barriers.

Modification 3 required to meet Section III.G would r.ct enh2n;e s

4 fire protection safety abcVe that proYided by either existing or j

proposed alternatives.

Modifications required to mest Section III.G would be detrimental' to 'cve'rall fccili ty safety.

1 1

'9 h

ca-ause of the broad spectrum of potential confiourations for whic exemptions may be requested, specific criteria tha l

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safety requirements of ali plant-unique ccafigurations have

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ments in cur previcus reviews and in the requests fo developed.

f specific criteria have been develeccd.

I 1

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h A passive Section III.G.2 cccepts three methods of fire protection.

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bility is required and a fixed suppression system installed in the fire 2

a

..,n 1

f cables.

It is area of concern, if it contains a large concentration o deemed essential to remember that these alternative requirements are to..be ecuivalent.

'conUsera.tionsein' whi.ch..they.aregepepted ;.,

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'n' hen' the fire protection features of each fire area are evaluated, t e tive. The defense-whole system of such features cust be kept in perspecin Strengthening any one adequate balance between the different features.can cc pe in others.

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= y,'. wi u1 = r p12 *. s = s - s s

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=.

ng.

3 I

paranaters:

}

A.

Area Description and celiina. constructica

- - wailsf f,i c e r 9 ceiling height recm volume

/

ventilation congestion 1

Safe Shutdown Capability 2

B.

.,u....w,. o. r e d u r. ' '. m'. e.v e ' a. m.s '. n m'.. is. rec,uired for hot shutdcwn a'

r

. s a

4 3

- 3;'.eth;r or not syst-:n or equiment s

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n.,,., : - c.. / t, s.. =. c 1

i.

a. - u ' -... w". ". o. n '. i s =. = =

i

...c, a. c:i

-.r-i u,

4. - o. e. g r c. e d s h "'. ',. e,.- r. - o a- =..,'. s = a.d #..- s i ' u s

c-

~ -

J.

m, _,,. 5 a _,.,,,,.., '. r. ~^ n.. c.. - r r

w concentration of cci:ustibles

r

.~ -

alternative shutdown capability 1

l 1

i a

a

+

t l-3-

I C.

Fire Hazard Analysis type and ccnfigura:icn of ccabustibles in area -

quantity of combustibles cf ignitica and pr:;2;2tica~

aa;2 heat ralease rate pccantial transient and installed ccabustibles suppression damage to equipment

- whether the area is continueusly manned traffic through the area

..... accessi. bili.ty of. the. are.a

.*....><..,4

.,,4..,

j z.

2... -.

D.

Fire Protection Existing or Committed fire detection systems fire extinguishing systems ho,se station / extinguisher

~

radiant heat shiel ds.

A specific description of the fire protection features of the configuration i

Los

[

ic recuired to ;ustify the cor;ensating features cf the alternative.

fire 10 ding is no: a sufficient basis for granting an exemption in areas 2

v. hare t'-=re tre cables.

i If iececsary, a taim Of. experts, including a fire prctectica engineer, This visual j

will nsit the site co deterr.ine the existing circumstances.

j inspecticn is also ccasidered in the review process.

The majority of the III.G exemption requests received to date are being Licensees have not identified denied because they lack specificity.

the extent of the exemption requested, have not provided a technical basis For the Fequest a.nd/or have not previded a specific description of the We expect to receive requests for ex2 ption of the following alternative.

nature:

)

?

1.

Fixed fire barriers less than 3-hour rating.

Fire barrier without an automatic fire suppression system.

2.

Less than 20 feet separation of cables with fire propagation 3.

retardants (e.g., coatings, blankets, covered trays) and an automat.ir suppression :ystem.

For large cpen areas with few components to be prctected and few ir.-situ a.

cc:bustibles, no rutcr.atic suppressica system with separatica as in Itt:

i 3 above.

1, j

5.

No fixed suppression in the contr'o1 r'cca.

)i I

i 1

~s.

t 6.

No fixed suppression in areas without a large concentration of cables for which alternative shutdown capability has been provided.

j

• Cur fire research test program is co.nducting tests to provide information

~

~

chat will b2 utsful.ta det2rnine the tcundary of :ccept:51e c:nditions for fire protecticn configurations which do net include a fire rated barrier.

Based on dehiatiens recently approhed, specific criteria for certain recurring configurations are as follows:

i ftr..:.c.'.*..s.;$.irb.4irciee. Eess. tbsn'.ThreE4 fours :j M:..3 l

9.l.o.C li, L

.r. *y.k e:i. ';a..'i p :: ':.Q.d...\\.

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r This barrier is a wall, ficor, ceiling or an enclosure which separates one fire area frca another.

Exemptions may be granted for a lower rating (e.g., one hour or two hou's) r The fire where the fire loading is no more than 1/2 of the barrier rating.

rating of the barrier shall be no less than one hour.

Exed;tions nay be granted for a fixed barrier with a icwer fix rating supplemented by a water curtain.

l-An Autcratic Su;pression Systen 'n'ith Either One Mcur Fire Barrier or i

La-r:;c decarat on i

This barrier is an enc 1csure,hich separates those portions of one division which are within 20 feat cf the redundant division.

The suppre: Sant may ba water or cas.

3 Exemptions may be granted for configurations of redundant systems which

'hav.e ccmpensating features.

For example:

.$eparatica distances less than 20 feet ray be deamed acceptable where:

A.

1.

Fire prcpagation retardants (i.e., cable coatings, covered trays.

conduits, er mineral wool blankets) assure that fire propagation,,

'through in-situ ccabustibles will not occur or will be delayed sufficiently to ensure adequate time for detection and suppression.

2.

Distance abcVe a floor level exposure fire and below ceiling assures c

that redundant systems 'will not be simultanecusly subject to an una;ceptable temperature or heat flux.

3.

The omission-of an automatic suppression system ray be deemed acceptable l

where?

1.

Distance above a flocr level exposure fire and bJica ceiling assures that redundant systems wi,11 not be simultar.ecusly subject to an unacceptable to:;erature or heat flux.

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3.

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_._,y f

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The fire area is required to be minned continuously by the provisions

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