ML20052G944
| ML20052G944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000025 |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1982 |
| From: | Book H, Brock B, Thomas R, Zurakowski P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052G937 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0025-82-03, 70-25-82-3, NUDOCS 8205190175 | |
| Download: ML20052G944 (6) | |
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U.S. iiUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO'l Report flo.
70-25/82-03 70-25 Sil'4-21 I
Docket No.
Licensee flo.
Safeguards Group ne m ys ems Group Licensee:
Rockwell International Corporation Canoga Park, California 91304 Headquarters Site and Santa Susanna Field Laboratory Facility flare:
Headquarters W.e and Santa Susanna FieM Laboratory inspection at:
f4 rch 29 - April 1,1932 Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
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B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date Signed f tf. fy.Ac &Mah" yjlg)l@2-.-
P.R.Zurfkowski,RadiationSpecialist Date 6i ned Ib Approved by: R. D. Thomas, Chief, Materials Radiation Protection bettion 1) ate ' Signed Approved by:
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' 4. E. Rook, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch
[ fate signed Sunma ry:
Inspection on 'iarch 29 - April 1, 1982 (Report 'lo. 70-25/82-03)
Areas Inspected:
Incident in the vault; facility changes and modifications; internal review and audit; safety committee activities; training; criticality safety; transportation activities; and radiation protection.
T he inspection involved 49 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No itens of noncompliance were identified within the areas inspected.
8205190175 820422
{DR ADOCK 07000 $
RV Form 219 (2)
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. G. Jones, Vice President and Controller, Finance and Administration
- M. E. Remley, Manager, Health, Safety and Radiation Services Department R. J. Tuttle, Manager, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Unit J. D. Moore, Health and Safety Engineer
-V. J. Schaubert, Manager, Nuclear Materials Management Unit R. M. Micklich, Training Specialist R. McCurnin, Manager, Nuclear Operations E. Babcock, Manager, Rockwell International Hot Laboratory (RIHL)
D. Campbell, Member RIHL Technical Staff R. R. Garcia, Het?th Physics Representative and Criticality Coordinator J. F. Lang, Engineer In-Charge, Building 055
- Denotes persons attending the exit interview.
2.
Incident in'the' Vault During the taking of the physical inventory of the ATR vault at about 6:15 a.m. on March 2, 1982 a container of UA1 briquettes that had been stored under vacuum collapsed and lost ils integrity. The container spewed sparks when exposed to the atmosphere. The container was replaced in the dessicator and the inventory team (2 members) stoppec' inventorying.
'The_ team member handling-the container washed up.
Surveys of the team member's skin and clothing were clear. Nasal wipes from both team members were 'also clear (< 5 dpm).
Bioassay specimens taken 1
< day after'the incident and 7 days after the incident were negative.
The two team members will'be included in the next group of employees scheduled to' receive' lung counts (the licensee normally arranges for
= one, fourth of those working with radioactive material to be lung counted quarterly, this ~ schedule. assures that all such persons are lung counted annually)<
Of'the40smearstakenin}heareaoftheincident17indicatedcontamination greategthan50dpm/100cmalpha. Thehiggestvaluewas1700dpm/
100 cm and the average was 437 dpm/100 cm alpha. These areas were
' decontaminated as required.
The material, originally in the form of UAlg briquettes, has been melted into UAl buttons (with much less surface araa) and are now stored in a seaYed can that is not under vacuum.
3.
Facility Changes and Modifications a.
Building 001 Decontamination and remodeling efforts in Room 118-11 of Building 001 are nearing completion.
Several rooms of the 118 and llD series are being considered-for.the same procedure with a possibility of conversion to a " cold" machine shop.
Should the decision be made to proceed with this work, a detailed survey will be conducted to scope the decontamination effort. The inspectors were assured that the NRC criteria for unrestricted use will be followed in all such work.
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.. Plans are proceeding to move the Q.A. and Metallurgy Laboratories from Building 001 tc Building 004 The transfer should be completed within the next few months.
b.
Building 020 Decontamination work in the Service Gallery and Decontamination Room #4 is nearing completion.
The levels are now at street cloths access levels with plastic sheeting covering the floor area. New floor tiling is planned for the floors. The special alpha radiation glove box, described more fully in Report 81-10, is nearing completion in Decontamination Room #4 Provided that the external radiation levels are not too high, SEFOR decladding work will commence in Decontamination Room #4 near the end of May of this year.
If the external radiation levels r, rove to be too high, this glove box can be placed inside of a " hot cell" and operated remotely.
SAXTON, EBWR, FERMI and EBR-2 decladding
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jobs are scheduled through 1957.
c.
Building 055 There have been no changes in Building 055. As described in Report 81-10, the only on going job in a converted plutonium glove
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box is the oxidation of depleted uranium carbide (on a batch basis)-which~has'been obtained from the surrounding blanket assembly i
w of the FFTF. At this time decommissioning of the facility is still planned in the lattes part of 1983.
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-Interrial Audit and Review c
When' conducting its annual audit, the Fuels Committee of the Nuclear Safeguards ReviewcPanel identified an item of noncompliance. The nonreportable titem was immediately corrected, its cause identified, and' appropriate ~ steps taken to prevent its recurrence. The problem arose from'the stoiage of five bottles of solidified laboratory waste in a tray.. approved for' the storage of only four bottles (the bottles contained less than 50 grams U-235 each). The Fuels Committee suggested a.. reevaluation of the tray storage of these bottles to see if the tray should be modified to" physically permit storage of no more than four bottles 'of ~ solidified waste or whether the storage of five such bottles is in fact permissible. The reevaluation resulted in a finding that the storage of up to five h gallon bottles of solidified waste was permissible, as well as the storage of up to four 1 gallon bottles of solidified waste (five 1 gallon' bottles will r.ot fit in the tray).
The work station control limit sign was appropriately modified (including restriction to one type of bottle per tray) to reflect this change and the tray dimensions were left unchanged. Adherence to Work Station Criticality Control limit postings was reemphasized to the vault custodians.
This item is considered to be of minor significance and no NRC action is planned.
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The radiation and nuclear safety staff continues to monitor tiie production
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' operations practices relative to approved: radiation and nuclear safety aspects of approved procedures..These inspections reported weekly-a (however conducted more frequently) facilitate identifying problems g
early in their development.
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Safety Comittee Activities v
'The Fuels Committee of the Nuclear Safety Review Panel had reviewed 1
and approved in early March-1982 the completed Nuclear Safety' Analysis for-Phase II of the decladding of the Fermi fuel pins. Second' party review of the Phase II aspects of the Criticality Safety Study was completed during the Fuels Committee review meeting on March 1, 1982.
i' The draft Nuclear Safety Analysis and Criticality Safety Study for SEFOR.
Phase I were being copied for provision to reviewers several days before the meeting at which they would be discussed prior to decisions being made on them.
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6.
Employee Training i
Training generally is via tapes made on-site. The licensee has-the facilities for preparation of tapes Ly appropriate instructors. Additionally, handouts related to the training tape subject matter are provided r
to the trainees. Examinations are given and graded. A passing grade
-of.70 is required before the trainee is permitted to work in the subject area. The records reflected that an individual had not passed.the licensee's required radiation safety test to qualify to work in.an area where radioactive material-is used. That individual was temporarily assigned alternate responsibilities outside of the restricted area until-further. study and training resulted in a passing test score.
r' It was noted that special training is given to selected people on each shif t to assure that someone is available to properly reenter an area after an alarm has caused an evacuation. This training is provided on demand, as when personnel changes occur, as well as on an annual basis to assure continuity. This training includes personal fitted masks and suiting up including taping of appendage orifices.
A test of the records'of six selected new and experienced production employees reflected that appropriate training had been given and passing grades had been received by all members of the sample. The individual who had not passed the test was not in the sample selected (the sample was restricted to those working with radioactive meterial) but was
' discussed by the licensee as an example of how their system works to the benefit of the employee, his co-workers and the company.
7.
Criticality Safety The technical expertise used by the licensee in establishing nuclear criticality safety' limits remains unchanged from the last inspection.
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4-The licensee's established positive management controls for ensuring.
that f acility operations are conducted within Nuclear Criticality
. Safety limits are maintained and observations made during the inspection indicate that the licensee's activities are conducted safely.
Observations in various process areas indicated that instruments and alarms were operational and reflected appropriate calibration, areas were appropriately posted, containers were properly stored and approved procedures were available at work stations.
No violations of good criticality safety practices were noted during j
the facility tour.
8.
Transportation Activities The only aspect of transportation that the inspectors concerned themselves with during this inspection was the shipment of appproximately 200 4
drums and four boxes of low level waste to DOE's Hanford Disposal Site.
It was found that most of the waste had been shipped to the Hanford~ site with the exception of those noted in Report 81-10 showing i
significant corrosion.
It was stated that the corroded drums were i
not sent because DOE had asked the licensee to construct special sealed plywood boxes lined with plastic foam to contain.these drums.
It was stated that upon completion of the boxes, DOE will accept the
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drums'in the special overpacks for disposal. This shipment is anticipated within the next few months.
In the light of the current political situation in the States of Washington and Nevada and civil penalties imposed;on another similar licensee, the importance of safe transportation was discusse'd. The inspectors were assured that all applicable NRC
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and 00T' regulations will be observed.
9.
'RAdiationProtection j
,This inspection' included visits to both Building 020'and 055 at the
' Santa Susanna Field Laboratory)and the following parts of Building i
001: -(1) Powder Prep Room; (2 Vault Area; (3) Sampling Room; (4) i ATR Assembly Area; (5) Hot Roll Area; (6) Room 119-33C Assembly Area-Where applicable, criticality alarms, fixed and portable air sampling equipment, portable monitoring equipment, and stack-monitors were l
found to be operable and currently calibrated.
In addition, appropriate j
radiation warning signs were noted where such signs are required.
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Part 19 posting requirements were noted to be posted both at Building j
001 and the Santa Susanna Field Laboratory. No violation of good health physics practices were noted during the tour.
(a) Bioassay The licensee's bioassay program includes in-vivo lung counts by an independent laboratory. On February 9, 1982, 21 people were counted. Three of the results were positive. The maximum reading was 64 + 36 micrograms U-235. The MPLB is presently i
246 micrograms U-235 (based on the isotopic composition of the l
current U metal feed).
The maximum deposition therefore-represents approximately 25% of MPLB.
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(b) Urinalysis Two high urinalyses results since the last inspection were noted for hot cell workers. They were 297 and 248 dpm/1500.ml. These results indicated gross fission product (including Sr-90) intake.
Further analysis indicated that approximately 30% of.the exposure was due.to Sr-90.
Both intakes were.under 18% of a body burden when averaged over a period of one year.
(c) Film Badge Results An examination of 1981 film badge results indicated a yearly high whole body beta-gamma exposure of 1140 mrem. -At the present time all licensee personnel needing a film badge are on a routine quarterly )
program. Pocket dosimeters and TLD badges -(made up by the licensee are available for special jobs.
In addition unused visitor film badges can be assigned to workers in the event they are involved in a particularly " hot" job requiring more frequent analysis.
Hot ~ Cell workers who will'be involved with the SEFOR project may be placed on a monthly film badge program should~the radiation levels prove to be higher than anticipated in Decon Room #4.
- 10. Management Interview The scope and the results of.the inspection were discussed with licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 1,1982.
Those representatives were informed that no items of noncompliance were identified within the scope of the inspection.
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