ML20052F136
| ML20052F136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1982 |
| From: | Gerner L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052F128 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8205120150 | |
| Download: ML20052F136 (70) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-254-SP l
l COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
)
50-265-SP (Quad Cities Station,
)
(Spent Fuel Pool Modification)
Units 1 and 2)
)
TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE F. GERNER ON CONTENTION NUMBER EIGHT A.
Introduction 1
My name is Lawrence F. Gerner and I am currently employed at Commonwealth Edison Company's Quad l
Cities Nuclear Power Station as the Assistant Superintendent l
i for Administration and Support Services.
I graduated from the University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island in 1969 with a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering and from the University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois in 1971 with a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering.
I have been employed by Commonwealth Edison Company (" Commonwealth Edison") since July 1971.
I have held the position of Assistant Superintendent for Administra-tion and Support Services since June 1980.
My responsibilities in this position include supervising the activities performed by the Technical Staff, Quality control, Radiation / Chemistry, Security, and Administration Departments.
I am the Quad
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Cities Nuclear Station's primary contact with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and have taken on the added respon-sibilities for Emergency Planning and In-Service Piping, Valve, and Pump Testing.
I hold a Senior Reactor Operator's License which was issued to me by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in November 1975.
In addition to my current position, I have held the following jobs while employed at the Quad Cities Nuclear Station (" Station") :
Technical Staff Supervisor (January 1977-June 1980)
Supervised on-site engineering staff, in charge of mechanical, electrical, nuclear, and projects activi-ties.
My responsibilitie's included supervising the On-Site Review and Investigative Function at the Station.
I also performed reviews and approvals of numerous Quality Assurance documentation, such as deviation reports, discrepancy records, procurement documentation, surveillance test records, and modification documents.
Special Projects Engineer (November 1974-January 1977)
Administered Corrective Action and Licensee Event Reporting Systems for the Technical Staff Supervisor.
(September 1972-November 1974) - My Thermal Engineer responsibilities included supervision of the Mechanical and Electrical Engineering activities at the Station, preparation of equipment failure reports to the NRC, and coordination of surveillance programs for technical plant support.
Technical Staff Engineer (July 1971-September 1972)
Assisted in the performance of pre-operational and startup tests during initial plant startup.
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As a result of my education, training, experience, and personal familiarity with the quality assurance programs and inspection procedures to be utilized during the removal of the existing spent fuel racks and installation of the proposed high density spent fuel racks, I believe I am qualified to address Contention No.
8.
B.
Contention No. 8 Contention No. 8 asserts:
Quad Cities Nuclear Station's quality assurance programs and inspection procedures which will be utilized during the installation of the proposed racks and removal of the existing racks are not set forth with sufficient specificity to provide reasonable assurance of public health and safety during the reracking operations.
My testimony will show that the Quad Cities Nuclear Station's Quality Assurance Programs and inspection proce-dures will provide reasonable assurance of the public health and safety during the removal of existing racks and instal-lation of the proposed racks.
I C.
Commonwealth Edison Company's Quality Assurance Program
" Quality Assurance" comprises all planned and l
systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that an item or facility will perform satisfactorily in i
service.
Commonwealth Edison has a formal Quality Assurance i
Program which functions through a comprehensive system of I.
procedures and activity checks.
Commonwealth Edison also has a quality assurance organization which implements and enforces the Quality Assurance Program through extensive documentation reviews, maintenance, surveillance, and audit activities.
Commonwealth Edison is responsible for the assurance of quality in all phases of the design, procurement, construc-tion, modification, testing and operation of its nuclear generating facilities.
Accordingly, all safety-related material, that is, components, systems, equipment and structures that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents at Commonwealth Edison's nuclear generating facilities that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public, are subject to Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program.
Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program meets the requirements of each of the 18 criteria of Appen-l dix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Plants"; American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(" AS ME" )
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III; ANSI Standard N45.2, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants"; ANSI Standard N18.7, " Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants," applicable regulatory 4
guides and ANSI standards as committed to by Commonwealth Edison Company; and 10 C.F.R. Part 21, " Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliances."
The Quality Assurance Program is implemented through Quality Assurance Procedures and other the procedures covering NRC Criteria and Regulatory Guides, ASME Code, and other applicable codes and standards.
An excerpt from Commonwealth Edison Company's Quality Assurance Manual describing the Quality Assurance Program in detail is
+'.Y-attached to this testimony as Attachment No.
1.
Commonwealth Edison's operating nuclear stations have been audited many times by personnel from the NRC Region III, and Commonwealth Edison is not aware of any deficiencies in its Quality Assurance Program.
Furth2rmore, the Quality Assurance Program has been satisfactorily reviewed by the Illinois office of the State Fire Marshall, Division of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety, and the NRC Headquarters Staff.
The Quality Assurance Department is a distinct corporate organization within the Commonwealth Edison Company. The Manager of Quality AssuJance directs the quality assurance activities related to the design, pro-construction and operation of Commonwealth Edison's curement, - - - -
i nuclear generating stations.
Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Department is completely independent of the engineering, construction and operating organizations.
The Quality Assurance Department reports directly to senior corporate management.
The purpose of this separation of authority is to ensure, in compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, q
Appendix B, I, that quality assurance personnel will not be influenced by concerns, including cost and scheduling matters, which might compromise their quality assurance responsibilities.
This separation of authority is maintained at the Quad Cities Nuclear Station, for the quality assurance staff of five inspectors at the Station is separate and distinct from the Station's organization and reports directly to the corporate Quality Assurance Department.
The people that comprise Commonwealtn Edison's Quality Assurance Department consist of graduate engineers l
of essentially all engineering disciplines related to nuclear and non-graduates with years of maintenance, con-struction, engineering and operating experience.
The ASME
(
Code requires all Commonwealth Edison personnel who conduct non-destructive testing of material and equipment to be certified by other Commonwealth Edison personn$el as qualified to conduct such inspections.
Accordingly, Commonwealth vr-,,-
,--v-e
Edison quality assurance inspectors must be certified by a Commonwealth Edison Level III Examiner from the Operational Analysis Department, who is himself certified according to 1/
the ASME Code requirements.-
Commonwealth Edison's quality assurance personnel are required to be recertified every three years, and receive annual retraining pursuant to Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program.
Quality assurance is distinct from " quality control," which involves examinations and procedures designed to measure and control the characteristics of an item, process, or facility, and to establish conformance with acceptance standards and requirements.
At the Quad Cities Nuclear Station, there is a quality control staff, entirely distinct from the Station quality assurance staff, comprised of eight inspectors, whose supervisor reports directly to I
me.
Similarly to the quality assurance inspectors, the l
l l
quality centrol inspectors must also be certified by a Level III Examiner to be qualified to conduct non-destructive testing of equipment and material, and must receive annual 1/
There are three levels of certification for inspectors who conduct non-destructive testing, pursuant to the American Society for Non-Destructive Tesoing (ASNT).
Level I inspectors are only certified to do examinations I
and report the results.
Level II inspectors are certified to conduct examinations and interpret the results.
Level III inspectors are certified to conduct tests, interpret results and certify Level I and II inspectors.
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retraining pursuant to Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program.
The distinction between quality assurance and quality control can be illustrated using the example of welding two pieces of pipe together in a safety-related plant system.
Quality control personnel would be present at the job site performing visual inspections of weld job preparation and conducting a non-destructive examination of the welds once completed.
Quality assurance personnel would perform documentation reviews of the weld procedures, the qualifications of the welders, and the specifications for the weld material.
D.
Description of the Quality Assurance Program Applicable to the Reracking Operation Increasing the storage capacity of the Quad Cities spent fuel pools through the utilization of high density storage racks constitutes a safety-related plant modification.
Accordingly, the design, procurement, manufacture, and shipment of the proposed high density racks, as well as the removal of the currently utilized racks and installation of the proposed racks, are subject to Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program, its implementing procedures, and quality assurance audits.
Contention Eight, however, deals only with the quality assurance programs and procedures applicable to the proposed racks once they reach the Quad Cities Station.
.g_
A brief review and description of the quality assurance program and procedures applicable to the reracking operation follows.
Written approved procedures for the following activities must be implemented:
Receiving inspection of the new high density a.
storage racks; b.
Radiation protection requirements for old rack removal and new high density rack installation; c.
Removal of existing spent fuel racks; d.
Installation of the new high density racks; e.
Neutron attenuation test; and f.
The long-term in service surveillance program.
The written procedures governing the above noted reracking-related activities must be approved by Station personnel in accordance with Commonwealth Edison's Quality Assurance Program.
This requires the written procedures to be approved by Station Department Heads, the Technical Staff Supervisor, and the Station Superintendent.
The Department Head whose approval is required for a given procedure depends on the department assigned responsibility for the procedure's implementation.
For example, the Radiation Pro-tection Procedure would be approved by:
Mr. Tom Kovach, the Supervisor of the Station Radiation / Chemistry Department; l
Mr. Gerald Tietz, the Technical Staff Supervisor; myself, the Assistant Superintendent for Administration and Support
_9_
Services; and Mr. Nick Kalivianakis, the Station Superin-tendent.
Each of the written approved procedures to be dis-cussed below might need to be modified and amended during the course of the reracking operations.
If the amendments involve a change in the intent of the procedure, the pro-cedural changes would have to meet the requirements of the Quality Assurance Program, including being reviewed and approved by the appropriate Department Head, Technical Staff Supervisor and Station Superintendent.
However, a change in procedure not involving a change of intent needs only to be approved by two Senior NRC Licensed Reactor Operators.
Minor changes to procedures are expected to be made during the reracking operation.
The intent of a procedure is changed if steps are made less conservative than the original l
procedure, if the order or content of the major steps in the procedure are changed, or if the procedure is a new procedure I
document, that is, a temporary procedure which governs an activity for which there was no established procedure.
The Licensing Board and NRC Staff will be noti-fied should the Station e ride during the course of this licensing proceeding to change the intent of any of the l
l i l I
i
procedures which will govern the reracking operation.
Should the decision to change the intent of any of the procedures be made after licensing authority to install the new high density racks has been received, the Station will notify the Station NRC Resident Inspector.
An important part of the quality assurance program for the reracking operation is the receiving inspection and acceptance of the new racks after they have arrived at the Station site.
When the new racks arrive at the Station, storeroom personnel will conduct a preliminary visual inspection of the new racks before they are unloaded from the delivery truck.
This preliminary visual inspection will verify that the new racks did not incur handling or shipping damage during their transport from the factory.
Storeroom personnel will look for damage which would result from such sources as fire, rough handling, tie-down failure, and hostile weather conditions.
Any rack modules exhibiting damage will be evaluated to determine whether they should be repaired or returned to the factory.
After verifying that the racks were not damaged during shipment, the racks will be unloaded from the delivery truck and moved to a controlled
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location which the Quality Assurance Program requires to be segregated from non-safety related material and equipment.
Storeroom personnel document their findings in a Receiving Inspection Notice, which is forwarded to the Station Quality Control Department.
After the racks have been unloaded from the delivery truck and moved to the controlled location, Quality i
Control inspectors will in turn perform a Quality Receipt Inspection of the new racks in accordance with the written approved procedures attached to this testimony as Attachment l
No.
2.
Quality control personnel will review the docu-mentation from the manufacturer which will accompany the new racks to verify that the new racks conform to the specifications set forth in the racks' purchase order.
This documentation will include, among other things, Visual and Non-Destructive Examination Reports ("NDE Reports"), Certified Material Test Reports, Certificates of Compliance, Deviation Disposition Requests and the Dummy Fuel Mandrel Test Reports.
The l
documentation will also show that all required weld examina-
, - ~ _ _ _ _ -, _._,... _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - - - _ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ -. _.
tions and chemical and physical tests have been completed.
The Quality Receipt Inspection will also include a visual inspection of the racks' accessible welds by a certified Level II Inspector.
Certification indicates that the inspector has good eyesight and has received training in making visual inspections in accordance with the require-ments of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
Both the Receiving Inspection Notice and the Quality Receipt Inspection will then be forwarded to the Quality Assurance Department for review and approval.
The 4#
Quality Assurance Department reviewAof this d>>cumentation provides an independent verification of acceptability of the new racks based on the racks' physical characteristics and their documentation.
Quality assurance has the discretion to perform an independent receipt inspection of the new racks, in addition to that performed by the Quality Control Department.
Upon approval by the Quality Assurance Depart-ment the Stores Superviser attaches stock tags to the new racks to indicate their approval, stores the new racks in a controlled storage area where they will be protected from damage, and at the appropriate time can release the new high density racks from the controlled storage area for instal-lation in the spent fuel pools. '
The Quality Control Department prepares a final documentation check list prior to commencing the reracking operation.
This checklist is that part of the proposed high density rack project's work package
(" work package") that lists and indexes the documentation to be made part of the work package.
The purpose of the work package is to compile in one packet all rack-related documentation.
For the re-racking modification, this documentation will consist of, but not be limited to, the following:
Modification Approval Sheet, Safety Evaluation, Station Nuclear Engineering Department Approval Letter, Modification Test, Rack Removal and Installation Procedures, Work Request, Drawings, Weld Inspection Records & Procedures, and Stock Tags.
Any additional requirements which might arise from the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's decision in this proceeding would be included as part of this work package.
Upon completion of the job, the Quality Control and Quality Assurance Depart-ments w. V review the completed modification work package and verify that the required documentation is, in fact, in the package.
In addition, the Quality Assurance and Quality l
Control Departments will monitor the entire reracking operation.
Both departments are authorized to perform periodic surveillance of the reracking work activities.
l,
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However, the Quality Control Department wi]1 focus more on the actual work process and the mechanics of the job.
The Quality Assurance Department will survey the paperwork and documentation associated with the reracking operation to assure compliance with the Quality Assurance Program and procedures.
Hold points may be inserted by either the quality assurance or quality control staffs into the reracking procedures to facilitate their review of the reracking operation.
Hold points are checkpoints which will suspend the reracking operation until certain data have been taken, inspections made, and/or approvals received.
The reracking operation will not resume until either quality assurance and/or quality control has either signed off on the hold point or waived the hold point requirement.
The first step in the reracking operation will be the removal of a certain number of the existing racks from the spent fuel pool for Unit 1. !
The removal cf the existing racks will be governed by the written approved 2/
This testimony assumes that the reracking operation will commence prior to the refueling outage for Unit 1 scheduled for September 1982.
If the reracking.. operation is delayed until sometime after this refueling ~ operation, the reracking operation will start with the removal of existing racks from the spent fuel pool for Unit 2.
The method for reracking the spent fuel pools will not be significantly altered by changing the spent fuel pool in which the operation will commence. - -.
procedures attached to this testimony as Attachment No.
3.
The removal of the existing racks will be per-formed only after verification that the racks are empty.
A radiation / chemistry technician will be in attendance as deemed necessary by the Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor during the reracking operation.
The rack hold-down bolts will be loosened and the swing bolts will be moved clear of the rack to be removed.
This operation will be done from the refuel floor area using a remote-operated tool.
The rack, which weighs only about 1,850 lbs., will be attached to the 9-ton auxiliary hook of the reactor building overhead crane, using appropriate cables and hooks.
The rack will be lifted slowly out of the water, while it is being rinsed with water.
Radiation protection personnel will carefully monitor the dose rate as the rack emerges from the pool.
The rack will not be allowed to pass over racks containing fuel as it is being removed.
Once removed from the spent fuel pool, the racks will be washed off with pressurized demineralized water, surveyed for radiation, and moved to a dryer-separator pit on the refuel floor for temporary storage.
The dryer-separator pit is a segregated space on the refuel floor, and will be appropriately posted and controlled for access in accordance - _.
with the Quad Cities Nuclear Station's RaSiation Procedures ORP 100-1, which is attached to Mr. Kovach's testimony as Attachment No.
, and 10 CFR Part 20.
Existing racks will be removed, and new racks installed in batches, as they are received from the manu-facturer, depending on the activities at the Station.
Once a certain number of the existing racks are removed from the spent fuel pool for Unit 1, the vacated area of the pool floor will be vacuumed and the attachments which fasten the existing racks to the fuel pool liner will be removed.
Removal of the fuel pool liner attachments will be accom-plished according to the written approved procedures [ attached to this testimony as Attachment No. 4].
A diver will assist in the removal of the pool liner attachments.
Plate material such as swing bolt mounts and pipe saddle supports will be removed by cutting with an arc-air torch.
A power grinder is then used to grind smooth the pool liner surface.
All parts and fragments left by cutting and grinding will be removed from the fuel pool, and small fragments will be removed using underwater vacuuming apparatus.
The dose rate to the diver will be monitored according to procedures and equipment explained in the testimony of Mr. Kovach.
l New high density storage racks will then be l
installed into the portion of the Unit I spent fuel pool l
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left vacant by the removal of the existing racks.
The installation of the new high density storage racks will be governed by written procedures attached to this testimony as Attachment No. 5.
In accordance with the written procedures governing installation, the new high density racks will be installed as follows.
After the new fuel storage rack is rigged with the lifting frame shown in Chapter 3 of the Licensing Report and attached to this testimony as Attachment No. 6, the reactor building crane main hook is used to lift the new storage rack.
The rack is moved over the refueling floor using a selected pathway to the spent fuel pool.
At no time will the rack be transported over spent fuel in either spent fuel pool.
The new rack is slowly lowered into the water, until its base supports are firmly contacting the bottom of the spent fuel pool.
The rack is then leveled.
If necessary, a diver will assist in leveling the new racks.
Prescribed rack-to-rack and rack-to-wall clearances will be provided, as shown in the " Licensing Report on High Density Spent Fuel Racks for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2"
(" Licensing Report"),
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which are attached to my testimony as Attachment Nos. 7 and 8.
After rack placement is deemed satisfactory, the crane hook is lowered and the lifting rig assemblj is removed.
The crane hook and lifting rig are raised out of the water.
This process will be repeated for the remaining racks.
Following completion of the rack modules' inser-tion into the spent fuel pool for Unit 1, the Quality Control Department will review the installation of the rack modules.
The purpose of this review is to evaluate the installation operation, verify that the rack modules were installed in compliance with procedures and establish that the rack modules are ready for neutron attenuation testing.
A Quality Control Inspector will visually verify proper rack installation, and will examine the appropriate work package documentation.
T!.As documentation will include sign-offs on all procedures that have been used in the reracking operation thus far.
The newly inserted high density rack modules will not be released for neutron t.ttenuation testing until this review is completed.
After the new high density racks are installed, but prior to the transfer of spent fuel assemblies into the new racks from existing racks, neutron attenuation tests will be performed in accordance with approved written proce-dures and under the direction of the Station Staff to confirm that the required neutron absorbing material is present in each storage location.
The procedures governing this test are currently being written by the NUS Corporation and will be finally reviewed and approved by the Station Staff prior to the commencement of the reracking operation.
The neutron attenuation test procedure will involve the placement of a neutron source into a given storage cell, and the use of a detector to verify that the storage location contains boraflex which will absorb the neutrons emitted by the neutron source.
A test fixture is utilized to provide for these measurements, and the results are recorded on a chart recorder.
The neutron attenuation test will check storage locations in each batch of new rack modules to confirm to 95% confidence level that each rack module contains a sufficient number of boraflex sheets to ensure K
will n t exceed 0.95 when the spent fuel is stored in eff the new racks.
If one boraflex sheet is detected missing, the sampling program will be terminated, and 100% of the racks' storage locations will be tested.
If any boraflex sheets are detected missing, a sufficient number of associated storage locations will be blocked to ensure that each spent fuel assembly will be surrounded by boraflex material.
Because the proposed racks are being fabricated in accord-ance with Commonwealth Edison's and Joseph Oat Corporation's quality assurance programs, it is not anticipated that_any boraflex sheets will be detected missing.
The results of the attenuation tests will be reviewed and approved by the Station's Technical Staff Supervisor, the Operating Engineer and Station Superin-tendent.
After verifying the results of the attenuation test, the Operating Engineer will authorize the new racks for service.
Spent fuel assemblies will then be transferred to the new racks from the existing racks.
The entire reracking operation from removal of the empty old racks, vacuuming, removal of the pool liner attachments, the installation and testing of the new racks will then be repeated until the reracking operation is com-pleted and all of the existing racks have been replaced with the new high density storage racks.
The order in which existing racks are removed and replaced with the new high density storage racks will be in accordance with the written approved procedures which have been attached to this testi-mony as Attachment No. 5.
l Assuming it starts this summer, before the Unit 1 refueling outage, the reracking operation will begin with the east side of the spent fuel pool for Unit 1.
Figure 1 in Attachment No.
5, shows the configuration of existing racks which will be present in the spent fuel pool for i
Unit 1 just prior to removal of the first batch of existing l
l 1 l
racks.
Rack designations "A" through "F" represent existing rows of racks in the Unit 1 spent fuel pool.
In addition, the Unit 1 spent fuel pool has four extra racks, in Figure 1.
which are designated X, Y, Zy, and Z2 Racks and blade guide tubes on the east side of the spent fuel pool will be emptied by transferring fuel to existing r< ks on the west side of the spent fuel pool.
The existing racks to be initially emptied of spent fuel are shown in locations X, Y, Zy, and Z2, D20-D32, E20-E28, and F20-F28 in Figure 1.
All but two of the emptied racks and three of the emptied blade guide tubes will then be removed from the spent fuel pool and three new high density racks will be installed in their place.
The initial three new racks to be installed in the spent fuel pool, racks F,Ey, and Gy, are shown in Figure 2 of Attachment No. 5.
Spent fuel will then be transferred from existing racks on the west side of the spent fuel pool, locations C20-C25 in Figure 2 of Attachment No.
5.
Three additional in Figures 3, 4 high density racks, racks By,B2, and B3 I
and 5 of Attachment No. 5, will then be installed and additional spent fuel will be transferred from the existing racks, locations A20-A31, B20-B32, and C26-C28 in Figures 5 and 6, to the newly installed racks.
The spent fuel being transferred from the existing racks to the newly installed.-.
racks will be loaded into the new racks in a configuration which will maximize the distance between spent fuel and any diver which might be required to assist the reracking operation.
Existing racks in locations C20-C29, Figure 5 of Attachment No. 5, on the western side of the pool will and then be removed to allow installation of new racks Cy C
Figure 6 of Attachment No. 5.
The spent fuel remaining 2,
in existing racks will then be transferred to the newly installed racks, and the remainder of the existing racks will be removed from the spent fuel pool for Unit 1.
The remaining new racks to be added to the spent fuel pool for Unit 1 will then be installed, in accordance with Attach-ment 5, and Figures 7 and 8.
The reracking operation for the spent fuel pool for Unit 2 will be much simpler, since spent fuel assemblies from existing racks in the spent fuel pool for Unit 2 can be transferred to the spent fuel pool for Unit 1.
This will minimize the need to jockey spent fuel assemblies within the Unit 2 spent fuel pool to accomodate the reracking operation.
The details are set forth in Attachment 5, and Figures 9 through 13.
Except for refueling outages, during which the reracking operation will not be taking place, there will be l
few workers, if any, other than those workers involved in the reracking operation on the refuel floor.
Written approved procedures shall implement the radiation protection requirements for the reracking operation are attached to Mr.
Kovach's testimony as Attachment No. _.
The specifics of the written approved procedures implementing the radiation protection requirements are covered in Mr. Thomas Kovach's testimony on Contention No.
5.
The radiation protection re-quirement procedures have been reviewed and approved by the Technical Staff Supervisor, the Radiation / Chemistry Super-visor, the Assistant Superintendent for Administration and Support Services, and the Station Superintendent.
Following completion of the reracking operation, a review of the entire rack-related work package will be performed by the Quality Assurance Department.
This will include review of all rack-related documentation, the final documentation check list, the sign-offs on all approved procedures, and the resolution of all exceptions and amend-ments to approved procedures.
Procedural changes, drawing changes, operator training and NRC reporting will be finalized.
Final Quality Control and Quality Assurance Reviews are performed to assure the proper completion of the reracking project.
The final review serves to document approval of the actions necessary to effect procedural changes, drawing changes, training and reporting.
All documents will be filed as a permanent Station Record.
Follow-up testing will be performed in the future in accordance with approved written procedures to confirm that the new high density storage racks will retain their neutron absorbing capabilities.
This In-Service Surveillance Program is fully described in Section 10 of the Licensing Report and is attached to this testimony as Attachment No. 10.
The Lead Nuclear Engineer at the Station, who is a member of the Station's Technical Staff, will have responsibility for performing this surveillance testing.
The test results will be evaluated by Joseph Oat Corporation for the benefit of the industry.
E.
Conclusion Based on the foregoing information, I conclude that the Quad Cities Nuclear Station's quality assurance programs and inspection procedures which will be utilized during the removal of the existing racks and installation of the proposed racks will provide reasonable assurance of the public health and safety during and after the reracking l
operation, and that only new racks meeting design requirements will be installed in the spent fuel pools.
. l l
e rai c-7 "'e~ r Connmonwealth Ho. !
QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL INTRODUCTION The Corporate Quality Assurance Manual contains the Common-wealth Edison Company (CECO) Quality Assurance Program Manual as covered by the Quality Requirements, ASME Code Interface and Station Quality Assurance Manual and the implementing Quality Assurance Procedures Manual relative to its nuclear power generating facilities.
The purpose of this Quality Ass,urance Manual is to standardize quality requirements and procedures and otherwise identify methods of quality control.
The design, organization and contents of this manual are intended to comply with the fol-lowing documents to which Commonwealth Edison commits to comply:
a.
Appendix B to 10CFR50, " Quality Asurance Criteria for Nuclear Plants" (NRC regulation covering licensing cf production and utilization facilities).
b.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Divi-sion.1 and Division 2 for concrete containment as stated in the SAR applicable to a specific nuclear unit at the time of engineering, construction and modifications.
/
c.
ANSI N45 2 - Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants as stated as applicable in the SAR 12 or Technical Specifications to a specific nuc'aar unit.
d.
ANSI N18.7 - Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants as stated as applicable in the SAR or Technical 12 Specifications to a specific nuclear unit.
e.
Applicablo Regulatory Guides affecting design, procure-12 l
ment, construction and operations as listed in the specific plant SAR's or Technical Specifications to a specific nuclear unit.
f.
" Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliances".
12 In reference to "c" and "d" above, the compliance commitment is to the mandatory requirements of the Standards or as other-wise committed in the Technical Specifications.
The procedureu in this Quality Assurance Manual will be supple-mented by additional instructions which will be developed and documented by individual departments, each Generatin6 Station and Constniction Site as the need arises.
These procedures will be audited by Quality Assurance personnel to assure adher-ence to the Quality Assurance Program.
DATE 3-04-81 (Rev. 12) PAGE i OF 2
CommonwecIth Edimn C mpany QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL For each Station, these will be developed in specific areas such as operation, maintenance and repair which are peculiar to that Station.
The individual Station Maintenance and Operations Procedures Manuals will be developed for this pur-pose.
The application of the 18 Criteria of Appendix B to 10CFR50 and the requirements of ASME Code Section III, Division 1 and Division 2 for concrete containment, as outlined in this manual, is in accordance with the. interpretation by Commonwealth Edison Company.
Changes or modifications to these interpretations will be reflected in revisions to the manuals Quality Require-ments and, in turn, the Quality Procedures as applicable.
Revisions to this manual will be made as necessary to reflect changes in applicable NRC Regulations and ASIG Boiler and Pres-sure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1 and Division 2 for concrete containment.
Such revisions shall not conflict with the requirements of the ASME Code and NRC Regulations.
No part of this program will negate the requirements of ASME Section III, Division 1 and Division 2 for concrete containment and NRC Regulations.
The contents of the Quality Assurance Manual apply to safety-related material, components, equipment, systems and structures (i.e., those that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public) as defined in each Station's SAR(s).
They also apply to those systems, components, parts, materials and appurtenances in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1 and Division 2 for concrete containments.
The issue of the Quality Assurance Program in effect for the 1980 Survey was that covered by the Quality Assurance Program 12 l
Manual Index in effect on December 3, 1980.
[
Approved: b 3-f f /
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1 OATE _ 3-04-81 (Rev. 12) PAGE 2 OF ' 2
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QFPel100-3 On-Site Recoiving Inspection Revision %
%, A Procedure for High Density Racks February 1982 g
-t0,,/a M M.db A.
PURPOSE g. g -- 4 x L a @ u, dp,povide on-site requirements and guidelines for inspecting, receiv-ing, accepting, handling and storing the new high density fuel racks (HDTR).
B.
REFERENC5S Co.
1.
Joseph Cat, Drawings and Procedures, a.
D-7070 Fuel Cell Details for HDFR.
b.
D-7085 Module Assembly for HDFR, c.
JP-2443-2 Packaging and Shipping Procedure for HDFR, d.
D-7072 General Arrangement Spent Fuel Stei age Racks.
2.
NUS Drawings, a.
5430-M-2200 " Lifting Ycke" b.
5430-M-2201 " Upending Cradle" c.
5430-M-2202 " Upending Base" d.
5430-M-2203 " Rack Lifting Equipment and Rigging" M.
0;.T J::"ir;
.:.--ic;; :c.,
.sd.......J..Jf.el.
3.
T ;;;i'irrtica: Qu,4-M M [ h,
a.
QFPol100-4 HDFR Installation Procedure b.
QFPal100-5 HDFR free path gauge test procedure c.
QFP4150-3 Operation of the Reactor Building 125/9 ton Crane System 4.
ANSI Specifications, a.
ANSI N45.2.1-1973, " Cleaning of Fluid Systerrs and Associated Components During Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants."
b.
ANSI N45.2.2-1978, " Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants."
C.
PREREQUISITES 1.
.. ';;; n;; ; ;:...... :: = i :.
M, no O b151g.
2 Availability of the 125 ton, crane.
2.
Nonhalogen plastic wrap and tape materials if racks are unpacked and need rewrapping for further storage.
- f..... e L.,.
-4.
et~?-
- -- ? i :ir p; ; : r e '_
"..~.
2.'.
_p
QFPel100-3 Rr. vision 4 o
n...,. - -. -
3 2 - 4' x 8' x 3/4" plywood sheets.
D.
PRECAUTIONS Me*4d J. Handling and unpacking racks.oheti, be done with extreme care Reference B.2.d drawing. racks fran truck should be done using the I,1fting fi;ni n should be followed when operating the 125 ton craAll safet the 2.2.; C.;i 6
t t MTAT\\c OS AVO ACT1003 ne.
r PROCEDURE t. Met.
- 1. g p,w.4.aUnd.0-9 en#amep.oo a q
, Visually inspect packaged rack while on truck at the area for, 3
d'- tifi J... h._;.. M.
C W All findings should be recorded.
2.
If the rack appears damaged, notify the Station Nuclear Engin Department eering c ;
^; li t, C... 1
..;i n : ::. and manufacturer for authoriz aticn to remove racks for inspection or f acturer for repair.
return to manu-3.
If there is no. visible damage, rack should be removed from truck f placement in temporary storage or preparation for installation into or the spent fuel pool.
4.
If racks are to be placed into temporary storage stored as packaged on skid.
they should be 3:
Racks cilitate removal from theshould also be stored g mger which will
- ...~m, when needed for in-sta11ation; check -N f n..
2.2., for or der of installa-tion.
GN 11004 5.
If racks are to be installed into the pool th should be followed
& FM KC 2 bj he follcwing steps Using C.m
..f.
- nr: ' ' ' ' '~ in; rigging eculpment and '
crane, rack and skid should be lif ted to the f 1 y..u ten
& pus AN&p S 430- %and placed in the upending cradle
- Ref er
- 2. ^
w,f oor
.s ew-.
cot oaL S4'50.w. 7200 Y.
Strap rack while still on skid to the upending cradle 4
Assure that plywood sheets are properly placed en floor in a tion which will result in the support posi-af ter the rack is raised to its vertical position. legs resting on the sheets d..
Using the 125 ton hook, raise rack to vertical pesitien 9
Remove straps and unpackage rack for +Murir inspection using the b n 11:: ; i. a...
Oc....u
~
before it becomes contaminated...+
Discard skid and plastic wrapping a_
QFPal100 -3 Rovssior 1
. i...., 1 4%-
If there is no visible damage, randcmly test 5% of cells with the 8.0' (half length) free path gage in accordance with m..
L;m m.a 12 '. 5.
p:r
>r:-
G T' f 000 - 5, NOTE:
At least three cells on the rack side which were in con-tact with the shipping skid should be tested. If there is a question of potential damage, rack should be placed in.
decontamination pit for further inspection using the full length free path gauge.
h.
Af ter inspecting, if rack needs to be relocated prict to instal-lation, the following guidelines should be used.
a.
Assemble lifting yoke and rods per R.I.i.44w, 2.2.:. M M F 5410 ww - 2 000.
b.
Attach slings to crane hook and position lif ting yoke assembly over rack.
c.
Screw threaded ends of rods into support legs and assure a minimum thread engagement of 1.0 inch.
l d.
Adjust Belleville washer spring packages and sling lengths per l
2:f em. L. l.m MJ $ 6 9 % 54%- IM,- 2200, e.
Gradually load the rods until the Belleville washer spring assemblies deflect 3/8 inch.
f.
During lif ting, care must initially be taken that lif ting reds are equally loaded.
Difference in deflection of the Belle-ville washer spring assemblies should be within 3/8 inch total.
If this deflection is exceeded, readjust leng th of turnbuckles until tne lifting yoke is level.
NOTE:
The above step is performed to initially level the lifting yoke.
Additional adjustments are performed by adjusting the Pelleville washer spring assembly nuts.
l g.
Gradually increase leading on the crane and check that the Belleville washer spring assemblies deflect to within 3/8 inch of each other until rack is free of floor and supported by the l
Belleville washers in a noncompressed condition.
l l
h.
Relocate rack to desired location.
i.
Unthread lif ting rods and disassemble lif ting ycke.
l l
G. C.gECILtST9
(. M Gt4 t\\00-Sl, H. TEc.micat SPEu etanou EEFeie.E6J CE S
- i. %.
- s-cpo 1
h g ST o -11
-3 R v4 ion A Feb ry 982 r.
w a.- '., m -
f, l Q..
A preliminary visual inspection and examination shall be performed prior to unloading racks from the truck in order to determine if any damage occurred during shipping.
The follering areas should be covered.
(4)
A shipping release tag must be attached to each rack.
The shipping release tag can be used to assure that dimensional checks and all testing inspection and examination requirements were performed before the rack lef t the fabricator.
('2)
Verify that racks are identified bv rack numbers given en the
":f::r
- :.1. 2 f:r ir.;- p'af.DetO#2> ] Q '70'?Q.
('t)
Visually inspect protective covers and seals to assure they meet their intended function.
Record any torn areas or en-vironmental damage such w soiled areas, salt film or oil marks.
(4)
Assure that there are no tie down failures, shif ting of loads, i:nproper blocking or tie down during shipping.
g On 0%W
( E, S.
.Y fi.._1 inspection should be conducted,before t'3cks are installed in the spent fuel pool.
This inspection should include the fol-lowing items.
g y QF9 noo-St (4)
A review of the T_t '. 1 docu=entation,should be performed to verify that all requirements were met before shipping.
Ap-preval for many of these documents may have occurred at the fabricator's facility before rack shipment.
Random visual inspection to assure that important dimensicns conform with drawings.
As examples, overall external size, support leg plate thickness and preper size of thread lif ting holes could be checked.
Vka_e "I ' I t
Als4AA p p 199-LIST OF TECHNICAL DOCDENTATIONS Document Received Aperoved 1.
Index to Records Package 2.
As-Built Drawings 3.
Material Record Form 4.
Certified Material Test Reports (A)
Materials (B)
Weld Wire 5.
Non-Destructive Examina-tion Reports (A)
Liquid Penetrant (B) visual Examination 6.
Weld Repair Records 7.
Ceritification of Welder Personnel Qualifications 8.
Certification of NDE Per-sonnel Qualifications 9.
Deviations 10.
Non-Conformance Reports 11.
Free Path Test Reports l
12.
Final InspectionReports l
13.
Certified copies of Pro-cess Inspection Reports
__ l
s QFP 1100-1 Revision 1 REMOVAL OF EXISTING January 1982 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS ID/3H A.
PURPOSE The purpose of thir procedure is to provide instructions for the removal a
of existing spent fuel racks from the Quad-Cities spent fuel pools.
B.
REFERENCES t
1.
Dresden procedure for Removing Present Spent Fuel Racks, DFP 800-28.
C.
PREREQUISITES 1.
Radiation protection coverage is available.
I 2.
Clean demineralized water and hose are available.
1 D.
PRECAUTIONS I
1.
Ensure spent fuel racks to be removed are empty.
2.
Due to possible high dose rates, the number of personnel present r
during rack removal should bc restricted at the Fuel Handling Foreman's e
discretion.
3.
In no event shall the rack being removed pass over other racks containing fuel.
The Fuel Handling Foreman will directly supervise the operation to ensure this requirement is set.
E.
LIMITATIONS AND ACTIONS 1.
If the dose rate becomes excessive as the spent fuel rack is removed, the operation should be stopped. Wash down racks to bring dose rates 8
to an acceptable level.
l I
F.
PROCEDURE l
1.
Loosen the hold down nuts and move the swing bolts clear of the spent fuel rack to be removed.
i t
J l
2.
Using appropriate cables and books, attach the rack to the nine ton f
auxiliary hook of the overhead crane.
l 3.
Lift the rack slowly, being careful to assure that the rack does not become hung up on other racks or parts of the pool wall.
I APPROVE P 1
JAN 211982
,Q. C. O. E n i
_i.
I
QFP 1100-1 R;visien 1 4.
Lift the rack out of the water, rinsing with-condensate transfer water if desirsd.
NOTE-Have Radiation Protection carefully MONITOR "a
the dose rate as the rack emerges from the pool.
5.
Move the rack to its designated location for storage and decontamination.
G.
CHECKLISTS 1.
None.
H.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REFERENCES 1.
None.
l l
l l
l i
APPROVED JAN 211982 Q.c. o. s. a.
l f (final)
I
M' QFPol100-2
[ Md-Guidelines for Pemoval of Liner Attachments Revision 4 and Installation of Cooling Water Pipes February 1982 A.
SE j, ;,
Mi provide guidelines for; removine all required swing bolt brackets which would interfere with the new spent fuel racks Iggs ands removing the six inch cooling water pipes, check valves, and pipesupportingbracketsj 4 (Se.provides the installation guidelines for the new coolin'g water T M N Lao pipe segments.
B.
REFERENCES 1.
NUS Drawing 5430-M-2003, " Pool Liner and New Storage Racks Inter-forence Arrangement Unit 1."
2.
NUS Drawing 5430-M-2103, " Pool Liner and New Storage Racks Inter-forence Arrangement Unit 2."
3.
QFPp1100-4 HDFR Installation Specification.
4.
NUS Drawing 5430-M-2204, " Spent Fuel Storage Circulation Piping and Swing Bolt Modifications.
5.
QFiel100-6 Liner Repair Procedure.
6.
Sargent and Lundy Specification, " Quad Cities Piping Design Table "B" 304 Stainless Steel, Class 150" dated December 7,1973.
7.
On_if' mir QFPfl50-3 "Operatien of the heactor Building 125/9 Ton Crane System".
s w-u (m-so), u m a % f e.
9.
euos C.
PREREQUISI'"IES 1.
All equipment (instruments, tools, liner protective padding, and others) are available, tested, checked, and ready to operate.
2.
Availability of necessary radiation :ronitoring and protective shield equipment for operators and divers.
3.
Assure that comunication system is operable between diver and-ed-c i _. 2 personnel in pool area and also between the pool area and control room.
I 4.
Divers shoulci be trained or have experience in the techniques, tools, etc., which will be used in cutting operatiens in order to prevent damage to the pool liner.
l
-\\-
QFP-1100-2 Revision )
T..,...., '???
I 7M) 5.
O,.::-*
,wate r level limits s! :....... T.1-and obtain au thor i-zation for lowering pool water level before performing flame cut-ting operations of the six inch cooling water pipes.
6.
1 :::: 0t t.'. : ::::i:----*-
< ?:: tic. 7.1....
,,s..
f,
11
- - p5
' fi;;i..; ::t-th: 2; f...uw S., J......g Build proper rigging which will be used when working on the removal of six inch cooling water pipes and check valves.
Gef stoo-F 7.
..,- hrocedure and necessary equipment for repairing
, u.
o.....um liner should be available. g 8.
Cleaning and vacuum equipment to remove residues from pool walls and floor should be available.
9.
Determine if the cooling pipes are welded to the pool floor brackets.
D.
PRECAUTIONS p
1.
Proper protective clothing and radiological 4 ^......., equipment shall be used as deemed necessary by the radiation protection de-j par tment.
2.
All rit: Safety rules ;f E !..~~ ;.
with regard to lif ting and rigging should be followed.
3.
Individuals should be aware of their responsibilities cencerning radiation exposure.:.'.l... r.;;. _ c.
E. L t ut iMtops Ab4 A,c.Tio us
,t..u t
4.
Access to the fuel pool area Msbe limited to individuals identi-fied on the various job work permits.
A -.n If grinding of the brackets is required, protective plates d'be' 3.
used around brackets to ensure that grinding of pool liner does not occur.
ab%
l 3
Protective burn pads, such as transite, e% be used for all flame cutting operations to ensure that the liner is not damaged.
4 Unless otherwise specified, removal of the swing bolt brackets and support bracket will be within 1/2" form the pool liner surface.
new rack legs will be lAll protrusions which interfere with the l
covered with 1/2" thick plates to ensure proper support of the rack.)
l l
2-
QFPC1100-2 Revision &
";t:::r, I?"2 K.
Check that 6" pipe is not welded to brackets at the bottom of the G.
.ht. N M 14 4a6.1I11 Mb m= y. +-g e.w g %.
f.
,,oom 1.
Cooling pipe and check valve removal. h a.
If the cooling pipes are welded to the pipe support brackets, the following three steps should be performed.
())
Fuel from racks F20 through F25 should be relocated before working on the east pool side cooling pipes or fuel from racks A20 through A27 should be relocated before working on the west pool side cooling pipes.liee E f;;... : 2.2 r 9 --M -- f:: GF# LM p Unit 1 and 2 rack identification).
NOTE:
Removal of cooling pipe and floor brackets may also be performed during new rack installation in order to minimize additional relocation of spent fuel as-semblies.
(2)
Check that necessary prerequisites have been performed before diver enters pool for pipe to support bracket cutting opera-tions.
h.)
Perform necessary cutting opera.tions and assure cooling pip.e is free from floor brackets, b.
Determine necessary rigging attachment points which will be required to lif t the cooling peos seg=ent from the pool and secure pipe.
C.
If securing rigging devices to the pipe at a lower location is found to be necessary, fuel from racks F20 through F23 or A20 to A23 may need to be relocated if radiation levels are too high.
NOTE:
Step C would only apply if cooling pipe was not
~
welded to the supports brackets.
h Sec)re flow of wate Q rg y eg fuel pool cooling water pumps anti close b4eek valves to prevent back siphoning of water.
- 4. g {T-M TN~ fr.
1.
.._ M N GC
,Eoger pool wate: 1evel,a:: :ing h::
J::'.1i-i:: ;
l90Q,1, 3_
- - ^ ' ' ' - * '
,g,
'y l'v,
Y *,~
9}6,.,, _
f l' ra s to f.-
i r
9 1
e C
D
_3-
.e
QFPO1100-2 Revision &
F-' r, im
[.
Attach platform and rigging under the cooling pipe cutting area.
g.
Secure tools and instruments to prevent them from falling into pool.
k.
Flame cut pipe, allow for stem preparation and welding of prefabricated new cooling pipe segments shown on th; ?:f------ V\\)$
ere drawing 6 4 30- k 330 6, d.
Remove and decontaminate pipes and any unnecesary parts and equipment from pool.
Prepare stem for welding.
k.
Weld prefabricated new pipe to stem.
pr.
Perform ctive testing ir :::^-dr.;;
2.'.h ;h; :quir,0,
e....
- --... 1 2.
f.
t.
g-Remove platform, riggin and pment Yrom pool.
m
...... _.. - _~
y b' -
.al..
gp n;f111 pa l., c, Q in:1"-*-'-~%
identified on th; 2:'.....;; 2. t. drawing
- Ire,t, pg 'ined a Flame cut the support bracket y ssuring ga clearances f.
mainta the cutting operation.
2.
Removal of swing bolt brackets, a.
Removal of the swing bolt brackets will follow the sequence of existing rack removal and new rack installation, jfefer to -he,
" 'r - -- 2.0 ;
- -'- g equence).
P.;
2.l......
2.1 uId bIuse as a guide in identifying
- ?.S rawing s
brackers to be flame cut.
b.
Check that necessary prerequisites have been performed before diver enters pool for actual flame cutting operations.
Remove swing bolts g flame cut brackets, as shown on detail C c.
of S.; 3 !u m.me
- 2., drawings 4 Jo - n4.- 3.3 04.,
A G, C HECIDSTS
- 1. W R, QFPF1100-2 Revision &
2 1.., 1;;;
f,
/2UALITY ASSUf02:CE r
,?
i.
i
/
'1.
4111 Certifications sh'ou1( be peovidgd with,'a new pipe, ittings and weld af tal defined on the Reference B.4 drawings bill o l-
/-
natarialk.
/
/
T ting o
all to ded join should b in ac or ance wi the iremen s of th Referen B.6 Pipi Desig
- 1e.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REFERENCES 1.
Section 3.10.C for, water level lower limits.
D 0
s 5-(f
htG.C.h%V Y
~
Q. v e QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A RackF 'nd Installation of the New Racks April 1982 A.
PURPO3E 1.
To provide guidelines for removing the existing racks and instal-ling the new racks at the Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel storage pools.
2.
To provide a baseline approach for performing all related work for the Rack installation project.
B.
REFERENCES 1.
Josepn Oat Drawings and Procedures a.
D-7070 Fuel cell details for High Density Fuel Racks b.
D-7085 Module assembly for High Density Fuel Racks c.
D-7072 General arrangement for High Density Fuel Racks d.
E-7281
" Lifting Yoke" e.
5430-M-2201
" Upending Crandle" f.
5430-M-2202
" Upending Base" To be replaced by Joseph Oat Drawing Numbers.
2.
NUS Drawings a.
5430-M-2001
" Unit 1 Existing Spent Fuel Storage Racks Fuel Pool Arrangement" b.
5430-M-2002
" Unit 1 Existing & New Spent Fuel Storage Racks Overlay Arrangment" c.
5430-M-2003
" Pool Liner and New Storage Racks Interfer-ence Arrangement Unit 1" d.
5430-M-2004
" Unit 1 Installation Arrangement" e.
5430-M-2101
" Unit 2 Existing Spent Fuel Storage Racks Fuel Pool Arrangement" f.
5430-M-2102
" Unit 2 Existing and New Spent Fuel Storage Racks Ovs;1ay Arrangement" g.
5430-M-2103
" Pool Liner and New Storage Racks Interfer-ence Arrangement Unit 2" __
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 h.
5430-M-2104
" Unit 1 Installation Arrangment" i.
5430-M-2204
" Spent Fuel Storage Circulation Piping and Swing Bolt Modification" j.
5430-M-2205
" Rack Pad" k.
5430-M-2206
" Pad Locating Tool" 1.
5430-M-2207
" Leg Shims" m.
5430-M-2208
" Shim Placing Tool" n.
5430-M-2209
" Shim Box" o.
5430-M-2210
" Rack Rod Holder" p.
5430-M-2211
" Measuring Gauge" q.
5430-M-2212
" Existing Spent Fuel Storage Rack Lifting Device" r.
5430-M-2213
" Rack Lifting Equipment and Rigging" 3.
CECO Specifications a.
QFP 1100-1 "Bereflex Off-Gassing Apparatus Installation and Test Procedure" b.
QFP 1100-2
" Guidelines for Removal of Attachments 'and Installation of Cooling Water Pipe" i
c.
QFP 1100-3 "On Site Receiving and Inspections Procedure for High Density Rack" d.
QFP 1100-5 "High Density Fuel Racks Free Gauge Test Procedure" e.
QFP 1100-6
" Spent Fuel Pool Liner Repair Procedure" f.
QFP 150-3
" Operation of the Reactor Building 125/9 Ton Crane System" g.
QFP
" Neutron Attenuation Test Procedure" SNM between or within h.
QFP 100-2
" Transfer of Fuel spent fuel pools or vaults".. -
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 C.
PREREQUISITES 1.
All Reference B documentation and drawing are available.
2.
Availability of 125/9 ton crane system 3.
Availability of necessary radiation monitoring and protective shield equipnent for operators and divers.
4.
All liner repair equipment, cutting tools, lif ting devices, shims plates, and handling tools identified on the applicable Reference B drawings are available.
5.
Cleaning and vacuum equipment to remove residues from pool floor j
and walls should be available.
6.
Assure that communication systems are operable between diver and
- advirory personnel in pool area and also between the pool area and control room.
7.
A radiation work permit (RWP) shall be obtained for working over and in the spent fuel pool.
8.
Assure that all receiving and inspection requirement of QFP 1100-3 Section F and the free path gauge test also defined in Section F of the same procedure have been met or performed before l
preparing a new rack for installation.
l 9.
Sequence of Installation defined in Section E.
should be made known to individuals responsible for temperatory storage of new racks in order to avoid time delays in obtaining the required rack for installation.
New rack to be installed should be already located on the fuel pool operating floor level following the process defined in the Reference B.3.c procedure.
10.
Assure that the stored spent fuel arrangement in Unit 1 agrees with that shown on Figure 1 prior to performing any removal or installation operations.
Relocate stored fuel if necessary to achieve the Figure 1 arrangement.
D.
PRECAUTIONS 1.
Proper protective clothing and radiological detection equipment shall be used as deemed necessary by the Radiation Protective Department.
2.
All site safety rules of the QFP 150-3 procedure with regard to Jifting and rigging should be followed. l l
~
1 QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 3.
Individuals should be aware of their responsibilities concerning radiation exposure (Alara Program).
4.
Check to assure that all swing bolts are detached from an existing spent fuel storage rack before lifting rack with the 9 ton crane.
5.
Assure that the low level pool water limits of Section H.1 are known and authorisation is obtained prior to lowering pool water level for any flaming cutting operation defined in the QFP 1100-2 procedure if the cool.ing water pipe modifications are performed during rack installation.
E.
LIMITATIONS AND ACTIONS 1.
Access to the fuel pool area shall be limited to individuals on the various job work permits.
2.
If grinding of the floor brackets is required protective plates shall be used around brackets to ensure that grinding of the pool liner does not occur.
3.
Protective burn pads, such as transite, shall be used for all flame cutting operations to ensure that the liner is not damaged.
F.
PROCEDURE 1.
The initial existing racks which will be removed from the Unit 1 pool are X2, Y2, 21, 22, D20 through D27, E20 through E28, and F20 through F28 as indexed on Figure 1.
The sequence of new rack installation is Unit 1 followed by Unit 2 with the first nine racks as defined on the NUS 5430-M-2004 drawing and Figure 6 lat Rack F1 2nd Rack El 3rd Rack Gl 4th Rack B1 5th Rack B2 6th Rack B3 7th Rack C1 8th Rack C2 9th Rack C3 2.
Removal of existing racks should be performed in accordance with the following process:
a.
Using proper remote operating tools, back off swing bolt nuts sufficient to remove all swing bolts clear of the rack.
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 b.
A second check should be made to assure that all bolts have been detached before attempting to remove each rack from the pool.
c.
Assemble the lif ting equipment shown on the NUS 5430-M-2212 drawing and attach the 9 ton crane hook to the lifting lug.
d.
Lower the lif ting equipment over the proper rack and attach the lifting hook using the proper remote equipment.
e.
Femove the existing rack, hosing it as it is removed, and transport to a designated cleaning, decontamination or storage area.
f.
Repeat the required steps in this section as necessary.
NOTE:
A recomended removal sequence of existing racks is X2, Y2, 21, 22 followed by the racks in rows D, E, and F.
3.
Assure that all modifications have been performed to the Cooling Water Pipe at the northeast corner prior to installing the first new rack Fl.
NOTE:
The cooling pipe modification can be performed prior to the removal of existing racks or at this point in the installation process.
The procedure for performing the cooling water pipe modification is defined in QFP 1100-2 procedure.
4.
Establish a north south working line along the east edge of the pool and a east west work line along the north edge of the pool in order to establish measurements shown on NUS drawing 5430-M-2004 and 2104.
5.
Assure that all swing bolts and brackets which would interfere with the rack support legs have been flame cut to within h" of the liner surface.
NUS drawings 5430-M-2003 and 2103 should be used as a guide in identifying brackets to be flame cut.
The procedure for performing are all removal operations is contained in QFP 1100-2, 6.
After removal of all liner interferances locate the Rack Pads shown on NUS drawing 5430-M-2205 to the proper pool floor locations using the dimensions shown on NUS drawings 5430-M-2002 and 2102 as guidelines for initial locations.
NOTE:
The Rack Pads shown on NUS drawing 5430-M-2205 will require modification through frame cutting operations -
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 in order to properly fit around the interfering swing bolt brackets.
7.
Assure that all prerequisities identified in QFP 1100-3 have been performed before preparing a new rack for installation into the spent fuel pool.
8.
Prepare the F1 rack for ufting as follows:
a.
Assemble lifting yoke and rods shown on JOC drawing E-7281.
b.
Attach slings to crane hook and position lifting yoke assembly over rack.
c.
Screw threaded ends of rods into support legs and assure a minimum thread engagement of 1.0 inch.
d.
Adjust Belleville washer spring packages and sling lengths shown on JOC drawing E-7281.
e.
Gradually load the rods until the Belleville washer spring assemblies deflect 3/8 inch.
f.
During lifting, care must initially be taken that lifting rods are equally loaded.
Difference in deflection of the Bellefille washer spring assemblies should be within 3/8 inch of each other.
If this deflection is exceeded, readjust length of turnbuckles until the lifting yoke is level to within this limit.
l NOTE:
The above step is performed to initially level the lifting yoke.
Additional adjustments are performed by adjusting the Belleville washer spring assembly nuts.
g.
Gradually increase loading of the crane and check that the Belleville washer spring assemblies deflect to within 3/8 inch of each other until rack is free of floor and supported by the Belleville washers in a noncompressed condition.
9.
Bring rack into position and lower the rack to approximately a foot frcan the proper pool floor location defined on NUS drawing 5430-M-2004 or 2104.
10.
Using the Pad Locating Tool shown on the Reference B.2.i drawing make any necessary adjustments required to assure the rack legs will rest on the rack pads before the rack in lowered into l
position. --
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 NOTE:
A 1" minimum distance is required between the edges of the rack support leg plates and edges of the pad plates on all four sides.
11.
Lower the rack into position and assure the location agrees with th Reference B.l.c general arrange:sent drawing.
12.
Check the plumbness of the rack to the requirements on the Reference B.I.b drawing.
NOTE:
Shimming may be required in order to account for unlevel conditions of the pool floor and to achieve the necessary plumbness requirements.
Special equipment and shims defined on NUS 5430-M-2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, and 2211 drawings are provided to achieved the required plumbness, a.
If an out-of-plumb or gap condition exceeding 1/16" exists between the rack pad and leg determine the size of shim a
required using the mea'suring gauge shown on NUS drawing 5430-M-2211.
b.
Obtain proper size shims and build-up the spacing as required to obtain plumbness and flush conditions between rack pad and leg.
c.
Using the Reference B.2.1 pad locating tool assure that the 1" minimum distance between the edges of the rack support leg plates and edges of the rack pad plates are still maintained along all four sides.
13.
Repeat steps E.5 through E.12 for the installation of racks El and Gl.
NOTE:
The requirement for rack alignment and spacing identified on NUS drawings 5430-M-2004 and 210 4 must be maintained between adjacent racks and the pool walls.
l 14.
Peform the neutron attenuation test on racks F1, El, and G1 in l
accordance with the QFP procedure.
NOTE:
This testing may have been performed as the Joseph Oat Corporation in which cost documentation would be cl.ecked by QFP 1100-3 inspection proceedings.
l l
l i l
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 15.
Relocate 150 spent fuel assemblies from existing racks C20 through C25, D31 and D32 to new racks F1, El, and G1 and assure that the final straged arrangement conforms to that shown on Figure 2.
NOTE:
Assure that all prerequisities defined in the QFP 100-2 procedure have been met before relocate any spent fuel assemblies.
16.
Repeat steps F.5 through F.12 for the installation of the B1 rack.
17.
Relocate 52 additional spent fuel assemblies to the F1 rack from racks C25, C26, C27 and C28 in order to provide divers with addi-tional water shielding for the installation of the B2 rack.
The Unit 1 pool arrangement at this point should agreed with the configuration showed on Figure 3.
NOTE:
Assure alignment and spacing requirement of NUS drawing 5430-M-2004 and prerequisities of QFP 100-2 procedure are met during the step F.16 and F.17 operations.
18.
Repeat steps F.5 through F.12 for the installation of the B2 rack.
19.
Perform the Nuetron Attenuation test on racks B1 and B2 in accordance with the QFP if such testing was not performed at the Joseph Oat Corporation.
20.
Relocate 205 spent fuel assemblies from existing racks C28 through C32 and B27 through B32 and 24 spent fuel assemblies in l
the G1 rack to the new rack storage location shown on Figure 4.
l i
21.
Repeat step F.2 for the removal of existing racks D31, D32, C29, C30, C31, C32, B31 and B32.
22.
Relocate the control rod racks in locations D28, D29, and D30 to 1coations C30, C31, and C32.
23.
Repeat steps F.5 through F.12 for the installation of the B3 rack as shown of Figure 5.
24.
Relocate 265 spent fuel assemblies from racks B20 through B27 and l
A26 through A26 and 24 spent fuel assemblies in racks B1 and B2 I
to racks El and Gl.
NOTE:
At this point in the installation operations new racks l
F1, El and G1 will be full of spent fuel and the Unit 1 pool arrangement would be that shown on Figure 5..
r
.e-,,
e,
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 NOTE:
The arrangmeent shown on Figure 5 also represents the minimum installation operations which should be completed before the March 1983 refueling outage.
25.
Repeat steps F.5 through F.12 for the installation of the C1 and C2 racks.
26.
Relocate. the remaining 128 spent fuel assemblies from racks A20 through A26 to the B1 rack locations shown on Figure 6.
27.
Repeat step F.2 for the removal of existing racks A20 through A 1 and B20 through B31.
28.
Relocate the control rod racks in locations D30, D31, and D32 to locations A29, A30, and A31.
29.
Relocate the 192 fuel assemblies in the G1 rack to the B1 and B2 l
rack locations as shown on Figure 7 in order to provide divers l
with additional shielding for the installation of the B4 rack.
30.
Repeat steps F.5 through F.12 for the installation of the remain-ing new racks shown on Figures 7 and 8.
31.
Perform the neutron attenuation test on racks B3, Cl, C2, C3, C4 and K1 in accordance with QFP if such testing was not performed at the Joseph Oat Corporation.
32.
The Unit 2 pool contains a total of 1140 spent fuel assemblies arranged as shown on Figure 9.
The initial operation will be to relocate 642 fuel assemblies from racks A20 through A31, B20 through B32 and C20 through C29 into Unit I racks G1, B2, B3 and C4.
33.
Relocate 278 spent fuel assemblies from C29 through C32, D20 through D25, X1 t<d Y1 into Unit I racks C1 and C2.
The config-uration in the Units 1 and 2 pools after this operation are shown on Figures 10 and 11.
34.
Repeat step E.2 for the removal of racks A20 through A31, B29 through B32, C20 through C32 and XI.
l 35.
Assure that all modifications have been performed to the cooling water pipe prior to installing racks.
36.
Repeat steps E.5 through E.12 for the installation of racks H3, H4, A5, A6, A7, A8, D3 and D4 37.
Perform the neutron attenuation test on racks H3, H4, AS, A6, A7, A8, D3 and D4 in accordance with the GFP_.
. l l
QFP 1100-4 Guidelines for the Removal of Existing Revision A Racks and Installation of the New Racks April 1982 38.
Relocate the remaining 220 spent fuel assemblies in racks E20 through E24, Zl, Z2 and F20 through F23 racks H3 and A5.
G.
QUALITY ASSURANCE 1.
The installation operations should be controled by the require-ments of CECO's Quality Assurance Program.
Items which must be verified shall include but not be limited to the following a.
Check list requirements of the Reference B.3.c procedure.
b.
Orientation and location of all racks in the two spent fuel pools.
c.
Verification of gaps between racks and walls.
d.
Verification of rack plumbness and alignment.
H.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REFERENCES 1.
Section 3.10.c for water level lower limits.
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,, e 10.
INSERVICE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM FOR BORAFLEX NEUTRON ABSORBING MATERIAL 10.1 Program Intent sampling plan to verify the integrity of the neutron absorber A
material employed in the high-density fuel racks in the long-term environment is described in this section.
The program is intended to be conducted in a manner which allows dCce.3s to representative absorber material samples Without disrupting the integrity of the fuel storage system.
The program is tailored to evaluate the material in normal use mode, and to forecast future changes using the data base developed.
10.2 Description of Specimens The absorber material, henceforth referred to as " poison," used d
in the surveillance program must be representative of the material It must be of the same composition, used within the storage system.
produced by the same method, and certified to the same criteria as the production lot poison.
The sample coupon must be of similar thickness as the poison used within the storage system.
Figure 10.1 shows a 7
l typical coupon.
Each poison specimen must be encased in a stainless steel jacket of an identical alloy to that used in the storage system, formed so as to encase the poison material and fix it in a position and The with tolerances similar to that designed into the storage system.
jacket would be closed by tack welding in such a manner as to retain its form throughout the use period yet allow rapid and easy opening without contributing mechanical damage to the poison specimen contained within.
The jacket will permit wetting and venting of the specimen similar to the actual rack environment.
10.3 Test The test conditions represent the vented conditions of the cruci-The samples will be located adjacent to the fuel racks y
form elements.
10-1
and suspended from the spent fuel pool wall.
Eighteen test samples are to be fabricated in accordance with Figure 10.1 and installed in il the pool when the racks are installed.
The procedure for fabrication and testing of samples shall be as follows:
a.
Samples shall be cut to size and carefully weighed in milli-grams.
b.
Length, width, and average thickness of each specimen.to be measured and recorded.
c.
Samples shall be fabricated in accordance with Figure 10.1 11 and installed in the pool.
d.
Two samples shall be removed at each time interval per the schedule shown in Table 10.1.
Il 10.4 Specimen Evaluation l1 After removal of the jacketed poison specimen from the fuel pool at the designated time, a careful evaluation of that specimen will be made to determine its actual condition as well as its apparent durabil iy for continued function.
Separation of the poison from the stainless steel specimen jacket must be performed carefully to avoid mechanically damaging the poison specimen.
Immediately upon removal, the specimen and jacket section should be visually examined for any effects of environmental exposure.
Specific attention should be directed to the examination of the stainless steel jacket for evidence of physical degradation.
Functional evaluation of the poison material is accomplished by the following measurements:
A neutron radiograph of the poison specimen will allow for a a.
determination of the maintenance of uniformity of the boron distribution.
b.
Neutron attenuation measurements will allow evaluation of 1
the continuing nuclear ef fectiveness of the poison.
Con-sideration must be given in the analysis of the attenuation measurements for the level of accuracy of such measurements 10-2
as indicated by the degree of repeatability normally observed by the testing agency.
c.
A measurement of the hardness of the poison material will establish the continuance of physical and structural dura-bility.
The hardness acceptability criterion requires that the specimen hardness will not exceed the hardness listed in the qualifying test document for lab test specimen irradi-ated to 1011 rads.
The actual hardness measurement should be made after the specimen has been withdrawn from the pool and allowed to air dry for not less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to allow for a meaningful correlation with the preirradiated sample.
d.
Measurement of the length, width, and average thickness and comparison with the pre-exposure data will indicate dimen-sional stability within the variation range reported in the Boraflex laboratory test reports.
A detailed procedure paraphrasing the intent of this program will
\\
be prepared for step-by-step execution of the test procedure and interpretaticn of the test data.
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TABLE 10.1 Date Installed INITIAL FINAL WEIGHT PIT WEIGHT WEIGljT CHANGE PENETRATION SCHEDULE (mg/cm -Yr)
(mg/Cm -Yr) (mg/Cm -Yr) mil /Yr z
1 2
90 day 1r 3
4 180 day MP 5
6 1 year V
7
(
8 5 year V
9 10 10 year y
11 12 15 year 3r 13 14 20 year v
15 16 30 year 97 17 18 40 year v
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---e.---
--s y-
YY s
e April 6, 1982 5
a Note to: Harold Denton, Director s'
s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
,rg ep
^2 From:
Guy H. Cunningham, III m y, 3 7gg7,c_
Executive Legal Director n,,.,g.
-x m
m3 As Subj:
COMMISSION'S LEGAL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON COGNIZABIL TYNOF u
/
PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH UNDER THE AT0f1IC ENERGY ACT gf' In a Memorandum and Order (CLI-82-6) issued on flarch 30, 1982, the Commission set forth its views on the cognizability of psychological health under the Atomic Energy Act in response to the January 7,1982 judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in PANE v. NRC directing the Commission to provide its reasons for determining that psychological health need not be considered under the Act.
In CLI-82-6, the Commission reviews in some detail the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act as well as court cases defining the Commission's responsibility under the Act.
The Commission finds that the legislative history and cases make it clear that the Commission's primary responsibility is with protecting health and safety from the standpoint of the radiological effects of the activities it licenses and regulates and that psychological health effects were never contemplated as being within the scope of the Commission's responsibilities under the Act.
The Commission cites its long and consistent interpretation of the Act in this regard and the Congress' tacit approval of that interpretation as support for the Commission's position.
Finally, the Commission argues that, even if its authority were broad enough to permit it to consider psychological health under the Act, the Commission is not required te do so and strong policy and practical considerations argue against doing so.
A copy of CLI-8?-6 is attached for your information.
ff
/
/
Guy H. Cunnir[m, III Executive Leoal Director cc: William J. Dircks
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l
1 UNITED STATES OF' AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION sm
.a 1
COMMISSIONERS:
) g Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky John F. Ahearne Thomas M. Roberts i
)
307W In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMP 7NY
)
)
Docket No. 50-289-(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,)
Unit No. 1)
)
)
)
c
~
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-82-6)
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a Judgment issued January 7, 1982, in Peocle Against Nuclear Energv v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 81-1131,' directed the Commission,
~
inter alia, to " prepare a statement of the reasons for its determination that psychological health is not cognizable l
under the Atomic Energy Act." 1/
~
,s l
s i
1/
That Judgment came on' petitioner PANE's appeal from the Commission's Memorandum and Order of December 5,
- 1980, in which a 2-2 division of the Commissioners on the question of whether psychological stress contentions should be accepted in the TMI-1 restart proceeding had the effect of denying those contentions.
Subsequently, after the appointment and confirmation of a fifth Commissioner, a 3-2 majority stated its adherence to j
the position that psychological stress contentions i
should not be accepted in the restart proceeding.
That l
ruling, contained in an order dated September 17, 1981, l
was not accompanied by an opinion.
[2Y&G QO h iMb 03 h l
w
i The views of the Cc=missi5n with respect to the cogni: ability of psychological hea th under the Atomic Energy Act may be sd=marized as follows.
First, the Atomic Energy Act itsalf does not discuss psychological health, and the statute, its legislative history, and applicable caselaw all suggest strongly that Congress intended the Cc= mission to exercise its regulatory authority to protect only against the physical risks associated with radioactivity.
Even if it were found that Congress did not bar the Commission.from considering non-physical risks associated with NRC-licensed activities, the indicia of Congressional intent alluded to above make clear that
.=
Congress never required the Commission to consider psychological health effects under the Atemic Energy Act, and there are strong policy considerations which argue I
against the consideration of psychological health effects per s3 in NRC licensing and enforcement proceedings.
The Commission's reasoning is set forth in greater detail below.
I.
The Focus of the Atomic Energy Act is on the Ea:ards Which Civilian Nuclear Activities Pose to physical Health and Safety, Not to Psycholocical Well-beine.
A.
The statute, its legislative history, and applicable caselaw all indicate that Congress intended the Commission to protect public health and safety against the physical risks associated with radioactivity.
The Atomic Energy Act does not address directly the question of whether the Commission's regulatory
o responsibilities extend to psychological effects associated with the operation of nuclear reactors.
The relevant statutory provision states only that the Cc= mission has the duty of regulating the operation of nuclear reactors "in order to... protect the health and safety of the public."
42 U.S.C.
2021 (d).
The issue which faced the Co= mission was one of statutory construction:
what did Congress intend the words " health and safety" to mean when it enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954?
As explained by Commissioner Hendrie:
The Congress which passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the Atomic Energy C.ommission in order to bring a maximum of technical expertise to bear on complex and hazardous activities associated with a developing technology.
When the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorized the development of a civilian nuclear power industry, it was understood from the first that the public might well be apprehensive about a technology associated in the minds of most with the destructive power of atomic weapons.
One of the major reasons for providing for public hearings on nuclear power plants was to
~
provide a means,for educating the public Xbout nuclear energy and the measures taken to assure its safety.
The 1965 report to the AEC by its Regulatory Review Panel, for example, characterized the most significant functions of public hearings as including a demonstration thht "the AEC has been diligent in protecting the
.s public interest" and that the applicant's proposal had received a " thorough and c.ompetent review."
Congress implicitly acknowledged that public fears about nuclear reactors were a reality which had to be addressed; the means chosen by Congress was to have technical issues of nuclear safety addressed and resolved by technical experts in a public licensing review process administered by the Atomic Energy Commission'.
Thus, it is not only that there is no suggestion in the Act, its legislative history, or more than a quarter century of Congressional oversight that the Commission's decisions in licensing proceedings
were intended to encompas's psychological stress associated with particular licensing actions, it is also that Congress envisioned that the Commission's expert judgments, publicly arrived at, would help serve to prevent or allay public fears.
Petitioner PANE argues that the plain meaning of
" health," as defined in the dictionary, encompasses mental health, and that the Atomic Energy Act therefore obligates the Commission to evaluate the psychological effects of allowing the Three Mile Island Unit 1 reactor to resume operation. 2/
In support of this position, PANE cites judicial decisions in such areas as abortion, zoning, and tort liability.
The meaning of the term "public health and safety", as used in the Atomic Energy Act, was analyzed in detail by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in New f
Hampshire v. Atomic Enerev Commission, 406 F.2d 170, cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
In that case, the court rejected the contention of the 5 tate of New Hampshire that the Commission was required by the Atomic Energy Act to consider the effect on public health of discharges of hot
~,,
2/
At the same time, PANE asserts that it would be a
" reductio ad absurdum" to suggest'that psychological
~
effects must be evaluated before nuclear reactors can be licensed to operate for the first time, since
"[t] hat type of interpretation could conceivably prohibit reactors virtually anywhere, which is clearly not the intent of Cengress."
Petitioner's Brief in PANE v. NRC [ hereinafter " Petitioner's Brief"}., pp.
t l
25-26.
water into the Connecticut River.
The State had assorted that such discharges could be harmful to public health by reducing the capacity of the river to assimilate waste Though the subsecuent passage of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972 3/ assures that the effects of thermal and other discharges are now fully evaluated before a reactor operating license can be issued, the court's analysis of the statute and its legislative history is no less valid today as a gloss on the meaning of the statutory language.
As in the present case, the petitioners in the New Hampshire case argued that the analysis of the scope of the Commission's responsibilities need go no further than a:
judgment on the "present day plain meaning" of the terms
" health" and " safety".
The court rejected that proposed approach, stating: _"we do not feel dhat we fulfill our function responsibly by simply referring to the dictionary."
406 F.2d 170, 173.
The court explained:
s Here we feel a very palpable restriction in the history surrounding the problem addressed by the Congress, the subsequent Congressional confirmation of the limited approach taken by the Commission... and a recognition 3/
42 U.S.C. S 4321, et seq. (NERA) ; 33 U.S.C. S 1251, et
~
seq. (FWPCA).
of the complexity of administrative arrangements which would attend a literal definition of public health and safety as these terms are used in the Atemic Energy Act.
406 F.2d 170, 173-174.
The court then stated its conclusion that "[t]he history of the 1954 legislation reveals that the Congress, in thinking of the public's health and safety, had in mind only the special hazards of radioactivity."
406 F.2d 170, 174.
It backed up that conclusion with an exhaustive review of the applicable legislative history, and it also traced subsequent act. ions of Congress and the Commission which shed light on the original congressional purpose.
First, the court observed that the Senate and
=
House Reports on the 1954 legislation contrasted conditions in 1946, when the first Atomic Energy' Act was passed, with conditions'eight years later.
In 1946, the Reports said,.
"there was little experience concerning the health hazards t
involved in operating atomic plants," whereas by 1954 it had become " evident that greater private participation in power development need not bring with it attendant hazards to the health and safety of the American people."
406 F.2d 170.,
174, n.
4, quotine Senate Report No. 1699, Vol. I, Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
- p. 751; House Report No. 2181, id., p. 999, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, p. 3458.
The court found "(v]ery little else on the subject of health and safety... in the massive three volume Legislative History."
It concluded:
l 1
l I
l
a 3
l It seems obvious to us that these terms were beyond the purview of the 1954 deliberations and that their meaning had been deemed settled at the time of the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
406 F.2d 170, 174, n.
4.
The court then reviewed the legislative history of the 1946 Act.
It cited the Senata Report on the bill, which described one of the kinds of authority granted to the Commission by Section 12 of the Act in the following terms:
Establish safety and health ragulations to minimize the danger from explosion, radioactivity, and other harmful or toxic effects incident to the presence of such mater,ials.
Sen. Rep. No. 1211, U.S. Code Cong.
Service, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, p. 1335.
The court observed that Section 12 of the 1946 Atomic Energy.Act spoke more briefly of " danger from explosions and other hazards," and it found "no motive other than one of simplifying language" to explain the deletion of the words "from explosions and other hazards" in the 1954 legislation.
406 F.2d 170, 174 n. 4.
The. court observed that the 1954 Act had created a "very special relationship, crystallized in statutory form l
between the Commission and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- a relationship that is rarely embodied in positive s
i law."
406 F.2d 170, 174.
The court found that the Joint i
l l
Committee's interpretation of the Act's purposes supported the view'that Congress intended "public health and safety" to include only the "special hazards of radioactivity."
The court cited the Joint Committee's first study report on the Act, in which it said:
O The special p7roblem of safety ih the atomic field is
~
the consequences of the hazards, created by potentially harmful radiations attendant upon atomic energy operations.
Jo' int Co=mittee Print, A Study of Atomic Energy Commission Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor Facilities, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,
- p. 4 (1957), cuoted at 406 F.2d 170, 174.
The First Circuit co=mented that the Co= mission had been consistent in confining itself to the regulation of radiation hazards, and that the Joint Committee had apparently raised no objection to that approach.
The court cited the Supreme Court's affirmation of the special significance of.the Joint Committee's acquiescence in an action of the Commission:
It may often be shaky business to attribute significance to the inaction of Congress, but...
considering especially the peculiar responsibility and place of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the statutory scheme, we think it fair to read this history as a de facto acquiescence in and ratification of the Commission's licensing procedures by Congress.
Power Reactor Develocment Corp. v.
International Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S.
396, 409 (1961), cuoted at, 406 F.2d 170, 174 n. 5.
The court went on to " discuss subsequent cnendments to the Atomic Energy Act which illuminated the intent underlying the 1954 Act.
In 1959, Congress amended the Act to allow the Commission to relinquish control over seme nuclear materials and activities to the States.
The statutory language spoke in terms of " protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards."
42 U.S.C.
2021 (b).
In defining the authority which the States could Congress was necessarily aiso defining the authority
- assume, which the Commission was already exercising.
t
The court also cited Con'gress' action in 1965 to amend 42 U.S.C.
2018 of the Act to make clear that the Commission was not subject to control by other governmental agencies, state, local and federal.
In its report, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy described the Co= mission's regulatory control as " limited to considerations involving the common defense and security and the protection of the health and safety of the public with respect to the special hazards araciated with the operation of nuclear facilities."
S. Rep. No. 390, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4, 1965, cuoted at 406 F.2d 170, 175.
New Hampshire v. AEC, in finding that the commission's authority was limited to protecting against the "special hazards of radioactivity," plainly supports the Commission's action here, for psychological stress in our society is not peculiar to the generation of electricity through the splitting of atoms.
PANE's argument that the fear of radiation is so uniquely a hazard of radiation that it requires w
consideration by the Commission is unpersuasive.
Presumably, every ha:ardous technology gives rise to fears peculiarly associated with it:
fear of being inundated by failure of a newly constructed dam, for example, or of being hit by debris from a crashing airplane.
That is not a ground, however, for imposing a statutory duty on the Corps of Engineers, the Federal Aviation Administration, or the
/
4
NuclearRegulatoE' Commission,ro([iringthoseagenciesto y
develop expertise ih the categories and subcategories of psychological stress associated with the particular technology which each regulates.
The Commission's determination that the major contribution which it can make to the alleviation of psychological stress is to make sound technical decisions in its areas of expertise is a wholly reasonable reading of its obligations under the Atomic Energy Act.
-PANE' also contends that the New Hampshire cour-erred in its reading of the legislative history, and that it improperly narrowed the scope of the Commission's responsibility to protect " health" under the statute.. In particular, PANE asserts that the court failed to give proper weight to what it terms "the only relevant pre-enactment legislative history of any significance",
i.e., the description of the 1946 Senate Report; quoted above, of Section 12 of the Act.
Petitioner's Brief, p. 31.
According to PANE, the court failed to consider the significance of the Report's statement that the Ccmmissibn's duty was to " minimize the danger from explosion, radioactivity and other harmful or toxic effects."
PANE emphasizes the phrase "other harmful or toxic effects",
contending that it shows Congress' concern with "a full range of harmful effects."
PANE $sserts that even if the court was correct in holding that the Commission's authority
extendedonlytothe"specialhazarfsofradioactivity,"the
" threat of invisible and unknown radiation" unquestionably falls in that category.
Petitioner's Brief, pp. 21-22.
The language on which PANE relies does not support the broad reading of the statute which it urges, but rather the contrary, as the court correctly recognized.
Under the eiusdem generis principle of statutory construction, where a statute sets forth a list of specific items and then includes a reference to unspecified "other" items, the latter term wil'1 be construed as though it read, "other items of like kind." 4/
In the present case, the context
=
4/
The D.C.
Circuit's discussion of the eiusdem generis rule of statutory construction in Association of American Railroads v. United States, 195 U.S. App.D C.
371, 603 F.2d 953 (1979), is directly applicable to the present case:
"The rule of eiusdem generis is a common sense doctrine which teaches:
'Where general rules follow specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace on objects similar in nature to. those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.'
2A Sutherland Statutory Construction S 47.17, at 103 (4 th ed. 1973)
(footnotes omitted); see Weyerhauser Steamshio Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 600-01, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1 (1963); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14, 18, 67 S.Ct. 13, 15, 91 L.Ed. 12 (1946) ('Under the.eiusdem generis rule of construction the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it' (emphasis added) ; United States v.
Stever, 222.U.S. 167, 174, 32 S.Ct. 51, 53, 56 L.Ed.
145 (1911) (' [u]less there is a clear manifestation to the contrary, general words, not specific or limited, should be construed as applicable to cases or matters of like kind with those described by the particular words.'); United States v. Brown, 536 F.2d 117, 121 o
(6th Cir. 1976).
A statutory reference to 'other' objects of a general nature... most frequently calls for the application of the doctrine."
603 F.2d 953, 963-64.
In the present case, PANE is undeniably attempting to use the reference to "other harmful or toxic effects" to enlarge the class of effects reached by the statute to include matters which have never '
previously been suggested to fall within the scope of the Act.
makes it apparent that Congress had in mind the physical dangers associated kith nuclear materials, specifically the risks of explosion and of exposure to radiation, and the reference to "other harmful or toxic effects" can only be j
1 interpreted in that light.
Psychological distress is sufficiently dissimilar to the types of harm enumerated in the statute that it cannot be considered among the "other harmful or toxic effects" contemplated by Section 12.
This is all the more true in view of the total absence of any suggestion.in she legislative history or in 35 years of Commission practice and congressional oversight that the '
Commission was intended to take into account psychological distress alleged to result from its activities.
The fact that Congress did not specifically state whether psychological distress falls within the Commission's authority does not, centrary to PANE's contention, argue for l-an expansive reading of the s.tatute.
Where Congress has intended that an administrative agency should take psychological considerations into account, it has used precise language to express that intent.
In the Noise Control Act, for example, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to conduct or contract for research that includes " investigation of the psychological and physiological effects of noise on humans and the effects of noise on domestic animals, wildlife, and 1
I t
property, and determination of acdeptable levels of noiss on the basis of such effects."
42 U.S.C. 4913 (1) (A). El In the present case, it is reasonable to suppose that Congress never spoke to the issue of whether the Commission was required to consider psychological distress because the issue never came up.
To the best of our knowledge, this case is the first instance, in the years since the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was passed, in which the suggestion has been made that the Commission's 5/
Among other statutes in which Congress specifically authorized the agency to take psychological factors into account are the following:
the: Fire Research and Safety Act of 1968, providing inter alia for research into the " biological, physiological, and psychological factors affecting human victims of fire, psychological and motivational characteristics of; persons who engage in arson..., the conditions of stress encountered by firefighters, the effects of such stress, and the alleviation and reduction of such conditions," 15 U.S.C.
278 (f) (2), (f) (2) (E), and (f) (2) (G) ; the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, "provi_ ding for researgh in the field of occupational safety and health, including the psychological factors involved," 29 U.S.C.
651 (b) (5) ;
1972 mnendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, authorizing grants for projects designed to plan for, test, and demonstrate the effectiveness of programs for Indian children, including those to " meet the special health, social, and psychological problems of Indian children," 20 U.S.C.
887c. (b) (3) ; and the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of.1974, authorizing programs to " develop new and innovative methods of applying the most adva.4ced medical technology, scientific achievement, i
l and psychological and social knowledge to solve rehabilitation problems," 29 U.S.C. 701(5).
I L
i 1
obligation to protect health and safety included the prevention of psychological distress.
If, as PANE seems to argue, the silence of Congress on a particular issue were always to be construed as a mandate to the agency to consider that issue, the result would be to reward petitioners able to frame contentions so far-fetched that they either did not occur to the Congress or were considered too unlikely to warrant discussion.
B.
Even if the Commission's authority were broad enough to permit it to consider psychological health under the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission:
would not be required to do so, and strong policy considerations counsel against doing so.
We hav outlined in the preceding section of this Memorandum and Order our reasons for believing that Congress intended the-Commission to confine its regulatory activities under the Atomic Energy Act to the physical hazards of radioactivity, rather than to psychological concerns',.
At the same time, we are conscious that the Commission, even more than most administrative agencies, has wide discretion to interpret the scope of its mandate and the means of
's fulfilling its duties.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has commented, in North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, that the NRC's regulatory scheme is " virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the 4
administrative agency, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the
statutory objectives."
533 F.2d 655, 658-59 (1976) (quoting Siecel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
See also, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NEDC, 435 U.S.
519, 543 (1978).
Even if we believed ourselves to possess sufficient authority to permit us to consider psychological health under the Atomic Energy Act -- or were found by a reviewing court to have such authority -- the same indicia of Congress' overriding concern with the physical hazards of radioactivity which we have outlined above demonstrate a fortiori that the Commission is not recuired to consider psychological health under the Act.
There are, moreover, substantial policy. considerations which argue against considering psychological effects under the Atomic Energy Act.
The primary objective of the Atomic Energy Act was to protect the health and safety of the public from the dangers associate.d with a civilian ndelear power program by, establishing a technical agency with special expertise in radioactivity and its hazards.
Congress provided for an expert agency and a public process for resolving questions s
of nuclear safety so that safety decisions would be made Viewedinthatkight, the reduction competently and openly.
of psychological stress is a desirable byproduct of open and i
l competent decisions.
A technical agency, whether charged with assuring the safety of dams, airplanes, or nuclear power plants, i
1
,-----e-n
.-w---,,.-
i ought properly to7 apply itself prim.a ily to the areas in 7
which it is uniquely, expert, as Con *gress intended.
A i
technical agency canhot and should not be expected to devote its resources to developing expertise in the categories and subcategories of psychological stress alleged to be peculiar to the particular technology which that agency regulates.
Rather, the protection of the public fr.om psychological J
distress, including that resulting from fear of various technologies, ought properly be the responsibility of agencies with expertise in the area of mental health. 6/
6/
The Commission took action to bring the issue to the attention ofTrelevant groups.
In November 1979,
~
Mitchell Rogovin (Director of the special inquiry group
~
established by the NRC to study the Three Mile Island i
accident) suggested that some action, perhaps by the Nationa.1 Institute of Mental Health, might be appropriate.
The Commission forwarded this f
recommendation to the Governor of Pennsylvania with the explanation:
" Recognizing that the responsibility for the health and welfare of those citizens is shared by I
the State of Pennsylvania and the Federal Government, the Ccmmission believes that your views would be of the utmost value as we evaluate Mr. Rogovin's recommendation."
(Letter from Chairman Joseph M.
Hendrie, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Governor Richard Thornburgh, Pennsylvania, dated November 30, 1979.)
After receiving a generally favorable response from Pennsylvania, the Commission sent a letter to the s._
Department of Health and Human Services relating the background and concluding "the Nuclear Regulatory Commission believes that it would be desirable for your Department to evaluate these proposals and to consider what remedial programs may best address the problems that have been identified.
We will direct our staff to provide whatever assistance may be necessary in developing and instituting such programs."
(Letter from Chairman John F. Ahearne, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Secretary Patricia R. Harris, Department of Health and Human Services, dated April 17, 1980.)
l The Department of Health and Human Services r
acknowledged our request and identified some ongoing state and federal efforts which addressed the concerns.
i
se The major contribution which technical agencies can make to the prevention and alleviation of psychological stress is to make sound technical decisions and to make those decisions available to the public in understandable terms.
To require technic'al agencies with no psychological expertise to address themselves to mental health issues would be doubly undesirable:
it would impair the agencies' ability to fulfill their necessary technical responsibilities, while pro'viding no assurance that the public's psychological
^
well-being was entrusted to capable hands.
It may be countered.that a technical agency which lacks expertise.in a particular ' area is atiliberty to acquire that expertise, either by hiring knowledgeable staff I
or by retaining consultants.
This is undeniable.
What is equally undeniable, however, is that in a world of finite resources, the Commission cannot allocate funds and s
pe,rsonpel to the evaluation of psych.ological stress without diverting resources from its major responsibility -- that of protecting public health and safety from the radiological,.
4
.s hazards posed by nuclear power plants.
In our view, it makes far more sense for the Commission to address itself to the health and safety issues which are the source of public anxieties than to attempt to quantify, analyze, and palliate the anxieties themselves.
The Licensing Board, in its certification to the Commi,ssion, was only expressing sound common sense when it declared:
"Certainly it is true that O
~
s s
.~
the best way to minimi:o any psychological stress in tho communities around TMI-1 is to make* the plant safe or not allow it to operate."
11 NRC 297, 308.
There are, moreover, issue.1 which by their nature f
do not lend themselves to resolution in the adjudicatory process.
The same reasoning which has led courts to d sfavor the consideration of psychological effects under the National Environmental Policy Act is applicable to the adjudication of psychological health under the Atomic Energy Act.
Judge Leventhal, writing for the D.C. Circuit in Maryland-National Caeital Park and Plannine Commission v..
United States Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029 (1973),
2 observed:
~
Some questions of esthetics do not seem to lend themselves to the detailed analysis required under NEPA for a S102 (C) impact statement.
Like psychological factors the "are not readily translatable into concrete measuring rods."
487 F.2d 1029, 1038.
It may be argued in response to Judge Leventhal's comment that the Commission does in fact make judgments on esthetic matters as part of the NEPA process, and that a body capable of judging the esthetic effects of its decisions should also be capable of judging their psychological effects.
That argument would not be valid, however.
Although as Judge Leventhal suggested, esthetic factors may be difficult to quantify and describe with analytical precision, ultimately any layman is capable of forming an opinion on a matter of esthetics.
By contrast,
se
)
o sound judgments on the probable psychological effects of regulatory decisions would require far more than a layman's opinion.
Thus the need for expertise is added to the problems of quantification.
Finally, we believe that whatever, discretion the Commission may have in defining " health" under the Atomic Ene:rgy Act, the definition it adopts -- or which may be established by reviewing courts -- will be applicable to every_ nuclear power plant.
We cannot accept the proposition,' advanced by petitioner PANE, that the Atomic Energy Act requires the evaluation of psychological health 7
in the vicinity.of Three Mile Island, because of the accident there, but that it would be a " reductio ad absurdum" to suggest that the Act requires t,he Commission to examine psychological health whenever it licenses the construction or operation of a reactor.
PANE goes on to explain that "[t] hat type of interpretation could,
conceivably prohibit reactors virtually anywhere, which is clearly not the intent of Congress."
PANE Brief, pp. 25-26.
Whatever else Congress may have intended, we cannot believe that it meant that " health",.under the Atomic i
Energy.Act, should clearly encompass the psychological well-being of persons fearful of a second nuclear accident in their vicinity, while equally clearly excluding the mental health.of persons who fear that their locality may experience its first nuclear accident.
On the contrary, it
i is apparent to us'that if the definition of " health" undar the Act is held to i.nclude psychological health in any proceeding, the inevitable result will be the litigation of psychological health in virtually every licensing proceeding, with effects on the NRC's processes which could only be destructive.
It is not merely that the analysis and litigation of psychological stress issues would recuire the expenditure of resources and time; safety issues also require resources and time, but those expenditures on safety issues contribu'te to sounder decisions and the better
\\
protection of the public.
We do not believe that the public' well-being, including psychological well-being, would be benefited in any meaningful way if the Commission's Licensing Boards or the Conmission itself were to take on I
the task of weighing, in one licensing proceeding after another, the essentially unprovable claims and counter-claims of competing arrays of mental health experts.
We reiterate, therefore, our conviction that the most appropriate means of taking psychological stress into account in its decisionmaking process is to make sound safety decisiens and to publicize fully and accurately the basis for those decisions.
In that way, the resources of the Commission can be devoted to the agency's real task --
l that of pre.tecting the public's health and safety by l
assuring that licensed nuclear rea'ctors are built and
[
operated safety -- rather than diverted to assessing the t
22 degree to which :ne:abers of the public fear those judg:nents to be incorrect.
The separate views of Co=nissioner Gilinsky are attached.
Fo the Co=nirsion, f
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I D'N..m,/ [a S SAMUEL J. CHILK i
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Dated at Washington, DC this 30th day of March, 1982 et
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2 SEPARATE VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER GILIUSKY In my view, the Commission has discretion under the Atomic Energy Act to consider psychological health issues raised in connection with the licensing of nuclear power plants.
In the TMI-1 restart proceeding, the Commission should have exercised this discretion to admit the psychological stress contention to the hearing after the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania asked the Commission to consider this issue and the Licen' sing Board unanimously supported that request.
In any other field, such issues would normally be handled 5y the political pi~ocess at the State and local level. In light of the Atomic Energy Act's pervasive preemption of State authority regarding nuclear matters, only the Federal Government can deal with them. The Commission, as the l
representative of the Federal Government, should have made j
every effort to accommodate the concerns of,the.
1 Commonwealth.
. ~.
(
I do not think that taking up psychological issues after the most serious nuclear power reactor accident in history in l
any way implies taking them up in every reactor licensing l
case. In most cases, the public interest would not be served l
by airing these' issues in the Commission's proceedings.
These matters are intrins'ically difficult to adjudicate and, in any case, largely beyond the Commission's expertise.
It l
is by no means clear that the Co= mission would be able to
deal with them in a entisf actory smy.
Ncnethaless, in tha
+-
particular circumstances of this case, it would have been wiser for the Commission to have heeded the Commonwealth's concern. What the Cc= mission did, in effect, was to tell the neighbors of this plant that nowhere in the government--local, state, or federal--can the concerns at issue here be considered, short of an act of Congress.
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...# "G%,jo UNITED STATES C%tt g
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E WASHtNGTON. D. C. 20556
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@. c;~;J MAR 2 91982 gh
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t Cl FiECEiVED MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino 2
g-APR 021982* 5 THRU:
William J. Dircks, Executive Director mm arm m:m for Operations (Signe:D William J.De
"$f" 4
FROM:
Guy H. Cunningham, III e
N Executive Legal Director m
SUCJECT:
FR0PRIETY OF MY INVOLVEMENT IN MATTERS INVOLVING THECLINCHRIVERBREEDERREACTOR(CRBR)
On February 12, 1982, I sent you and each of the Comissioners a memorandum on the above subject.
In that memorandum I stated that based on discussions with the Office of the General Counsel (and, through them, the Office of Government Ethics), Howard Shapar and William Dircks and a review of the pertinent canons of ethics there appeared to be no impediment to my advising the Commission and the staff on CRBR except with respect to one NEPA issue.
Nevertheless, I have decided to re-examine the matter in light of the March 11, 1982 letter from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to you indicating its position that my participation in the CRBR proceeding would appear to create a conflict of interest situation. To that end, I directed my staff to make a thorough and detailed review of all laws, executive orders, regulations, canons of ethics and court decisions that could arguably apply to the issue raised by NRDC. That effort did not uncover any authority dealing directly with a conflict question involving a government attorney's represen-tation of two different federal agencies. However, it is clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility would require me to disqualify myself if this issue (so-called " side-switching") had been raised in a private employment context.
Moreover, federal employees are required by Executive Order 11222 to:
"... avoid any action... which might result in, or create the appearance of -
(2) giving preferential treatment to any organization or person; (4) losing complete independence or impartiality of action; (6) affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government."
[E.0.11222,Sec.201(c)]
j$
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8, x
. The same language is found in the Commission's regulations at 10 C.F.R. 0.735-49a. While I am convinced that no actual conflict exists under the present circumstances, failure to disqualify myself could arguably be said to create the appearances set forth above, particularly number six since the issue has been raised by NRDC.
Therefore, af ter considering all the circumstances and after discussions with the EDO, I have concluded that disqualification of myself from further participation in CRBR is the appropriate course of action.
For me to do otherwise could result in needless litigation over what is clearly a very collateral issue.
In order to isolate myself from CRBR matters I have taken the following actions:
(a) The Deputy Executive Legal Director will be responsible for the provision of all ELD advice on issues pertaining to CRBR; and (b) I will not participate in any way in the formulation of staff positions on any CRBR related matters, nor in advocacy of those positions before the Comission or its adjudicatory tribunals.
A copy of my letter informing NRDC and the other parties to the CRBR proceeding j
of this decision is attached.
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4 Guy H. Cunningham, III Executive Legal Director cc: Commissioner Gilinsky DISTRIBUTION:
Comissioner Ahearne GCunninnham, ELD Commissioner Roberts i
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MAR 2 91982 Thomas B. Cochran, Ph.D.
Barbara A. Finamore, Esq.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
1725 I Street, N. W.
Suite 600 Washington, D. C.
20006 RE: Participation of Guy H. Cunningham, III, in the CRBR Licensing Proceedings
Dear Mr. Cochran and Ms. Finamore:
By letter dated March 11, 1982, addressed to Chairman Palladino, you indicated your belief that my participation on behalf of the NRC staff in CRBR pro-ceedings appears to create a conflict of interest situation.
I have reviewed your position, and while I do not fully agree with it, I have decided to dis-qualify myself from further participation in this matter in order to remove any possible obstacle to full public confidence in the integrity and objectivity of the agency's activities relating to CRBR.
In order to assure my complete isolation from all CRBR matters, I have informed the Comission and the Executive Director for Operations that I will not participate in any way in the formulation of staff positions on any CRBR-related matters, nor in advocacy of those positions before the Comission or its adjudicatory tribunals.
Furthermore, I have designated the Deputy Executive Legal Director as the final staff legal authority on all issues pertaining to CRBR.
This procedure should assure that the objectivity and integrity of the Comission's processes is preserved.
Yours truly,
[
.Cunnidm,III uy Executive Legal Director cc:
Service List
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i UNITED STATES OF M4 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMit SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of f
a-UNITED STATES DEPARTHENT OF ENERGY '
Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGER CORPORATION TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant)
SERVICE LIST Marshall Hiller, Esq., Chairman William B. Hubbard, Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
State of Tennessee U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 450 James Robertson Parkway Washingtcn, D.C.
20555 Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Oak Ridge Public Library Administrative Judge Civic Center Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 William E. Lantrip, Esq.
City Attorney Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Municipal Building Administrative Judge P.O. Box 1 Bodega Marine Laboratory Oak Ridge, Tennessea 37830 University of California P.O. Box 247 Lawson McGhee Public Library Bodega Bay, California 94923 500 West Church Street
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Knoxville, Tennessee 37962 Alan Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Apoeal Warren E. Bergholz, Jr.
Board Panel Leon Silverstrom U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
20555 1000 Independence Ave., S.W.
Room 6-B-256 Dr. John H. Buck Washington, DC 20585 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 O
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. Service List Hr. Joe H. Walker George L. Edgar, Esq.
401 Roane Street Frank K. Peterson, Esq.
Harriman, Tennessee 37830 Gregg A. Day, Esq.
Thomas A. Schmutz, Esq.
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Irvin A. Shapell, Esq.
fiorgan, Lewis & Bockius
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1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 a
Project Management Corporation P.O. Box U Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Ellyn R. Weiss Dr. Thomas B. Cochran Barbara A. Finamore S. Jacob Scherr flatural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 Mr. Godwin Williams, Jr.
Manager of Power Tennessee Valley Authority 819 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Mr. Lochlin W. Coffey, Director Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant Project U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
20585 Eldon V.C. Greenberg Tuttle & Taylor 1901 L Street N.W., Suite 805 Washington, D.C.
20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
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