ML20052C824
| ML20052C824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1982 |
| From: | Kastenberg W Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Carbon M Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1414, NUDOCS 8205050583 | |
| Download: ML20052C824 (1) | |
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To:
Dr. Max. Carbon j
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From:
W.E. Kastenberg
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Subject:
Principle Design Criteria for CRBR J
N. N_ s I have reviewed the Design Criteria proposal by the StaffJfor!CRB and compared them with the General Design Criteria contained in 10'CFR 50 Appendix A.
Many of the Criteria from CRBR are taken verbatu= fro =
l Appendix A or slightly modified to exclude such words as " pressure boundary",
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" loss of coolant" and " emergency core cooling system." Although this group of criteria logically appear to be applicable to an IRFBR, some statement by the Staff elaborating on this vould set a prope.r framework for their use.
For example Criterion 1h-Containment Design (Criterion 16 in Appendix A of 10 CFR 50) does not address the implication of filtering. Criterion 17-Contorl Roo= mentions " accident conditions". Does this include the HCDA?
Several criteria are omitted vir.h obvious reason, e.g. those pertaining to the e ergency core cooling system. Other criteria are omitted, but the reasons are not so obvious.
It vould be helpful if the Staff addressed the o=ission of Criteria pertaining to: Reactivity Limits, Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences, Reactor Coolant Make Up and Containment Heat Re= oval.
It is not clear whether or not the new Criterion #38--Addi-tional Cooling Systems substitutes for Containment Heat Removal and Cooling Water Systems, and if so, why?
Other new criteria deal with protection against sodiu= reactions, sodium heating systems, the intemediate loop and the reactor residual heat extraction system.
Puel design limits are not mentioned with respect to the latter.
Is this a new approach by the staff? In the past, LWR reactor residual heat extraction was as tied to fuel design limits. The fuel and core design for CRBR are uniquely different than for an LWR.
I would think that the general design criteria for CRBR vould reflect this more than they l
de.
Criterion II Instrumentation and Control provides for monitoring variables and systems for postulated accident conditions as appropriate, etc.
The (preposed?) Reg Guide on instrumentation to follow the course of an I
accident may also influence this. Does the Staff believe that an IRFBR poses no unusual problem here? For example sodium aerosols, different source tems, potential pressure pulses, etc., =ay place different demands on the instru-mentation.
The staff employs the terms " accident conditions" and " postulated accidents" in several places.
Do these include " design basis accidents" and/or " core disruptive accidents" (HCDAs)? Lastly, it is difficult to tell whether or not proper emphasis is placed on sodium fires, aerosols and reactions from the description of the criteria. For exa=ple, Criterion L9-Centainment Atmosphere Cleanup mentions sodium leakage and its potential for hydrogen generation when in contact with concrete. Proper e=phasis should be placed on aerosol generation, as well as sodium fires should air be present.
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