ML20052A815
| ML20052A815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109152 |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1982 |
| From: | CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052A812 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204290219 | |
| Download: ML20052A815 (17) | |
Text
Revisien 3 Aoril 1982 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR MODEL CNS 1-13C II PACKAGE TO 10 CFR 71 TYPE "B" PACKAGING REQUIREi1ENTS VOLUME I June 19, 1980 Rev. 2 -- December 1981 3
Rev. 3 -- April 1982 Submitted By:
CHEii-HUCLEAR SYSTE?iS, IllC.
P. O. Box 1866 Bellevue,;lA 98009 8 2 04 290 J1/ f
Revision 3 TABLE OF CONVENTS (Con't)
April 1982 Pace ko.
I' 3.4.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses 3-37 I
3.4.5 Evaluation of Package Performance for Normal Conditions of Transport 3-37 3.5 Hypothetical Thermal Accident Evaluation 3-38 3.5.1' Thermal Mod:1 3-38 s
3.5.2 Package Conditions and Environment 3-39 3.5.3 Package Temperatures 3-39 3.5.4 Maximum Internal Pressures 3-57 3.5.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses 3-57 3.5.6 Evaluation of Package Performance for Hypothetical accident Thermal Conditions 3-67 4-1 4.
Containment 4.1 Containment Boundary 4-1 4.1.1 Containment Vessel 4-1 4.1.2 Containment Penetration 4-1 4.1.3 Welds and Seals 4-2
(#
4.1.4 Closure 4-2 4.2 Requirements for Normal Condition of 4-3 Transport f
4.2.1 Release of Radioactive Materials 4-3 4.2.2 Pressurization of Containment Vessel 4-4 4.2.3 Coolant tontainment 4-4 4-4 4.2.4 Coolant Loss 4.3 Containment Requirements for the 4-6 Hypothetical Accident Conditions 4.3.1 Fission Eas Products 4 -6 4.3.2 Release of Radioactive Materials 4 -6 4.4 Verification of Package Leaktightness 4-8 l
4.5 Appendix - Normal and Accident Radioactive 2
Material Limits for the CNS 1-13C II Cask 4-15 l
4.5.1 Derivation of Limit Relations 4-15 4.5.2 Example Use of Activity Limits 4-22 4.5.3 Gasket Design and Bolt Torque Calculations 4-26 1
(
4.5.4 Parker Stat-0-Seal Information 4-30 4.5.5 Combustible Gas Generation Safety Assurance 4-37 3
iii e
I e ee ee
. er e
e e
O M e@me eo
- em e em e e.am o e yee ao e _
m me -
Revision 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Con't)
Page No.
5-1 5.
Shielding 5-1 5.1 Discussion and Results 5-1 5.2 Source Specification 5-3 5.3 Model Specification 5-4 5.3.1 Damage Prediction - Corner 5-8 5.3.2 Damage Prediction - Side 5-10 5.3.3 Damage Prediction - Ends 5-13 5.4 Shielding Evaluation 5-18 5.5 References 6-1 6.
Criticality Evaluation 7-1 7.
Operating Procedures 7-1 7.1 Procedures for Loading Packages 7-3 Procedures for Unloading the Package 7.2 7.3 Preparation of Empty Packages for 7-5 Transport 7-5 2
7.4 Leak Test Requirements 7.5 Procedures for Shipment of Packages which 7-6 Generate Combustible Gases
.3 7-6 7.5.1 Conbustible Gas Control by Inerting 7-6 7.5.2 Coi.tusti' ole Gas Suppression
!E 8-1 8.
Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program 8-1 8.1 Acceptance Tests 8-1 8.1.1 Visual Inspection 8-1 8.1.2 Leak Test Requirements 8-1 l2 8.1.3 Component Tests 8-2 8.1.4 Test for Shield Integrity 8-2 8.1.5 Thermal Acceptance Test 8-2 8.2 Maintenance Program 8-2 8.2.1 Pre-Usage Inspection and Maintenance 8-3 Appendix 8A 8-10 Appendix 8B 9.
Appendix A 9-2 9.1 Cover Letter for Rev. 1 Response 9-3 9.2 Rev. 1 Response Summary I
9-9 List of Affected Pages, Revision 1, August, 1981 9.3 9-14 Instructions for Incorporating Revisions to the SAR 9.4 iv
Revision 3 April 1982 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Con't)
Page No.
- 10. Appendix B 10.1 Cover Letter for Rev. 2 Response 10-2 10.2 Rev. 2 Response Sunnary 10-4 10.3 List of Affected Pages, Revision 2, 10-7 2
December, 1981 10.4 Instructions for Incorporating Revisions 10-8 to the SAR
- 11. Appendix C 11.1 Cover Letter for Revisfor. 3 Response 11-2 11.2 Revisions to SAR 11 4 11.3 List of Affected Pages 11-8 11.4 Instructions for Incorporating Revisions 11-9 i
f iv-a l
4.5.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS GENERATION SAFETY ASSURANCE Assurance of safe shipment of vessels which may generate combustible gas is based on meeting the following criteria over the shipment period.
(i) The quantity of hydrogen generated must be limited to a molar quantity that would be no more than 5% by volume at STP (or equivalent limits for other inflammable gases) of the secondary container gas void (i.e., no more than 0.053 g-moles /ft3); or (ii) The secondary container and the cask cavity (if required) must be inerted with a diluent to assure the oxygen, including that radiolytically generated, shall be limited to 5% by volume
'3 in those portions of the package which could have hydrogen greater than 5%.
The following discussion establishes the safety assurance of the above criteria ana describes how vessels will be prepared such that the above criteria will be met while the vessels are in shipment.
Criterion (i) essentially stipulates that the quantity of hydrogen shall be limited to 5% of the secondary container gas void at STP. This 5%
hydrogen gas volume at standard conditions is equivalent to a hydrogen partial pressure of 0.735 psi or 0.063 gram moles / cubic foot. By actual experiment *, the ignition of a 5% (H ) gas volume has been demonstrated 2
to produce an approximate 2.3 psi incremental pressure increase above an initial pressure of approximately atmosoheric. The reason this is so is that the 0.063 gram moles of hydrogen per cubic foot provides such a small 4-37
source that the peak pressure rise resulting from ignition of this source is slight.
It is felt the 1-13CII is able to sustain an incremental 3 psi internal pressure rise from atmospheric pressure without failure. This pressure increase is not considered in Section 2.6 and Chapter 3 and 4 calculations as it is considered to be insignificant.
Criteria (ii) is invoked to ensure that when a secondary container's l
hydrogen concentration potentially exceeds 5% volume, release of that hydrogen to the then existing total volume (secondary container void plus cask void) will not result in a total mixture of greater than 5% volume 3
hydrogen in a greater than 5% oxygen atmosphere. Maintaining the oxygen lower than five (5) volume % assures a non-flammable mixture.**
i I
l Carlson, L.11., et al., " Flame and Detonation Initiation area Propagation in Various Hydrogen - Air Mixtures With and Without Water Spray", Atomic International Division of Rockwell International, Canoga Park, California,
!!ay 11, 1973.
(The incremental pressure rise is basically independent of the total volume under test--i.e.,-- that the 0.063 gram moles per cubic foot relationship to 2.3 per rise is valid for one or many cubic foot of specimen volume.)
Lewis, B. and von Elbe, G., " Combustion, Flames and Explosions of Gases",
Academic Press, idew York,1961, Second Edition, Appendix B.
4-36
7.5 Procedures for shipment of packages which generate combustible gases.
i Procedures for preparing packages for shipment which radiolytically generate combustible gases are outlined below. These procedures are divided into I
two categories:
a.
combustible gas control by inerting, and b.
combustible gas suppression.
7.5.1 Combustible gas control by inerting.
3 f
a.
Dewater the secondary container. The bulk of the free water is removed from the secondary container by displacing the water with nitrogen gas.
b.
Inert the secondary container (and, if necessary, the cask). The inerting operation is done at the dewatering station just before the cask is loaded.
Inerting is performed if the hydrogen generated will be greater than 51; in any portion of the package.
Inerting is intenaed to limit the oxygen concentration to less than 5% including any oxygen that is j
radiolytically generated.
If a leak path can develop between the secondary container and the cask, the cask will also be inerted.
(The inerting of the cask shall be perfcmed according to a special procedure.)
Sample the gas in the secondary container (and cask, if inerted).
c.
d.
Load the secondary container.
7.5.2 Combustible gas suppression.
a.
Dewater the secondary container. See paragraph 7.5.1.a.
7-6
4 i
b.
Install the combustible gas suppression system (e.g., a vapor pressure catalytic recombiner).
i c.
Sample the gas in the secondary container and measure static pressure.
3-This will assure that the combustible gas control method is working
)
properly and that the combustible gas criteria specified in I
Section 4.5.5 will be met.
d.
Load the secondary container.
I i
4 1
4 1
I 1
i 7-7 i _.... _.. _ - -, - -
Revision 3 April 1982 11.0 APPENDIX C SUfftARY OF REVISION 3, SAR MODIFICATIONS l
l l
l l
11-1
Revision 3 11.1 COVER '.ETTER FOR REVISION 3 RESPONSE April 1982
- CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS INC.
P O Box 1866
- Bellevue. Washmgton 98009 * (206) 827-o711 April 1, 1982 Nr. Charles E. MacDonald, Chief Transportation Certification Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Haterial Safety U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555
Reference:
Docket No. 71-9152 Subjec t:
Proposed Shipping Criteria for CNS 1-13CII Certificate of Compliance /SAR
Dear Mr. MacDonald:
Based on discussions with members of your staff (Messrs. Odegaarden and Lake) at the TMI site on March 18, 1982, we would like to request an amendment to the SAR and C of C tor "se of the CNS 1-13CII shipping cask.
This amenchent addresses the pot-.ial generation of combustibie gases and specifies the shipping criteria which we believe is necessary and sufficient to assure safe waste shipments.
The proposed criteria is as follows:
"For all packages containing residual water or other substances which could radiolytically generate combustible gases, a determination must be made by tests and measurements of a representative package such that the following criteria are met over a period of time that is twice the expected shipment time:
(i) The hydrogen generated must be limited to a molar quantity that would be no more than 5% by volume at STP (or equiv-alent limits for other inflammable gases) of the secondary 3
container gas void (i.e., no more than 0.063 g-moles /ft ); or (ii) The secondary container and the cask cavity (if required) must be inerted with a diluent to assure that oxygen including that radiolytically generated, shall be limited to 5% by volume in those portions of the package which could have hydrogen greater than 5%
For packages to be delivered to a carrier for transport, the secondary container must be prepared for shipment in the same manner in which determination for gas generation is made.
Shipment period begins when the package is prepared (sealed) and must be completed within twice the expected shipment time."
11 2
Mr. Charles E. ItacDonald April 1, 1982 Page 2 The technical basis and amendment to the SAR for the above criteria is Additionally, we have included our current addressed in the enclosure.
technical approach and general " procedures" for preparing packages for These procedures address combustible gas control by both in-shipment.
erting and/or gas suppression systems.
Hopefully this information will provide your staff with the necessaryIf additional details to oerform their reviews.
please notify us as soon as possible.
Sincere)e, CHEli-NUCLEAR SYSTEltS, IRC.
Chryl A. itarsh Licensing Coordinator CAf t:slj Revisions (10) to SAR for 11odel C;iS 1-13CII
Enclosures:
Package to 10CFR71 Type "B" Packaging Requirements, Volume I dated 6/18/81 cc:
David G. Ebenback 11-3
11.2 REVISI0 tis TO SAR 4.5.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS GENERATI0ft SAFETY ASSURANCE Assurance of safe shipment of vessels which may generate combustible gas is based on meeting the following criteria over the shipment period.
(i) The cuantity of hydrogen generated must be limited to a molar quantity that would be no more than 5% by volume at STP (or equivalent limits for other inflammable gases) of the secondary container gas void (i.e., no more than 0.053 g-moles /ft3); or (ii) The secondary container and the cask cavity (if required) must be inerted with a diluent to assure the oxygen, including that radiolytically generated, shall be limited to 5% by volume
' 3 in those portions of the package which could have hydrogen greater than 5".
The following discussion establishes the safety assurance of the above criteria and describes how vessels will be prepared such that the above criteria will be met while the vessels are in shipment.
Criterion (i) essentially stipulates that the quantity of hydrogen shall be limited to 5% of the secondary container gas void at STP. This 5%
hydrogen gas volume at standard conditions is equivalent to a hydrogen partial pressure of 0.735 psi or 0.063 gram moles / cubic foot.
By actual experiment *, the ignition of a 5'4 (Hg) gas volume has been demonstrated to produce an approximate 2.3 psi incremental pressure increase above an initial pressure of approximately atmospheric. The reason this is 50 is that the 0.063 gram moles of hydrogen per cubic foot provides such a small 1
11-4
source that the peak pressure rise resulting from ignition of this source is slight.
It is felt the 1-13CII is able to sustain an incremental 3 psi internal pressure rise from atmospheric pressure without failure. This pressure increase is not considered in Section 2.6 and Chapter 3 and 4 calculations as it is considered to be insignificant.
Criteria (ii) is invoked to ensure that when a secondary container's hydrogen concentration potentially exceeds 5% volume, release of that hydrogen to the then existing total volume (secondary container void plus cask void) will not result in a total mixture of greater than 5% volume 3
hydrogen in a greater than 5% oxygen atmosphere. Maintaining the oxygen lower than five (5) volume % assures a non-flammable mixture.**
I Carlson, L. W., et al., " Flame and Detonation Initiation area Propagation in Various Hydrogen - Air Mixtures With and Without Water Spray", Atomic International Division of Rockwell International, Canoga Park, California, l'.ay 11, 1973.
(The incremental pressure rise is basically independent of the total volume under test--i.e.,-- that the 0.063 gram moles per cubic foot relationship to 2.3 per rise is valid for one or many cubic foot of srecimen volume.)
i l
Lewis, B. and von Elbe, G., " Combustion, Flames and Explosions of Gases",
Academic Press, idew York,1961, Second Edition, Appendix B.
11-5
Procedures for shipment of packages which generate combustible gases.
7.5 Procedures for preparing packages for shipment which radiolytically generate combustible gases are outlined below. These procedures are divided into two categories:
combustible gas control by inerting, and a.
b.
combustible gas suppression.
t 7.5.1 Combustible gas control by inerting.
3 Dewater the secondary container. The bulk of the free water is removed a.
l from the secondary container by displacing the water with nitrogen gas.
I I
i Inert the secondary container (and, if necessary, the cask). The inerting b.
operation is done at the dewatering station just before the cask is I
loaded.
Inerting is performed if the hydrogen generated will be greater than SS in any portion of the package.
Inerting is intenced to limit the oxygen concentration to less than 5% including any oxygen that is radiolytically generated.
If a leak path can develop between the secondary container and the cask, the cask will also be inerted.
(The inerting of the cask shall be perfomed according to a special procedure.)
Sample the gas in the package (and cask, if inerted).
c.
d.
Load the secondary container.
7.5.2 Combustible gas suppression.
Dewater the secondary container. See paragraph 7.5.1.a.
a.
11-6
b.
Install the combustible gas suppression system (e.g., a vapor pressure catalytic recombiner),
Sample the gas in the secondary container and measure static pressure.
3 c.
This will assure that the combustible gas control method is working properly and that the corabustible gas criteria specified in Section 4.5.5 will be met.
d.
Load the secondary container.
11-7
1 4
I t
Rsvision 3 April 1982.
1 1
i i
I 11.3 LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES (REVISION 3, APRIL 1982) t i
f.
+
v i
Title'Page j
iii iv j
iv-a 4-37 4-38 i
7-6 7-7 j
Appendix C h
i t
I r
P L
k t
t i
(
11-8 I
I i
i 1
I
..-4,_ _,.. _, -,, - -, - -..,.. - - -,.... - -,,.,,.,.... - _.. -... - - - -. -, - - - - -. - _ -.... _. - _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _. - - - _. - - - - -. - - - - - -- -
R: vision 3 April 1982 11 4 INSTRUCTI0ilS FOR INCORPORATING REVISIONS TO THE CNS 1-13C II SAR Remove Pages:
Add Pages:
Title Page Title Page iii iii iv iv iv-a iv-a 4-37 4-38 7-6 7-7 Appendix C 1
11-9
--