ML20052A670
| ML20052A670 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1982 |
| From: | Mark Miller Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204280573 | |
| Download: ML20052A670 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- 32 P' 23 E"197 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.-
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In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-537
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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April 22, 1982 (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant)
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ORDER FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WITH PARTIES A conference with counsel was held pursuant to notice in this proceeding on April 20, 1982 at Bethesda, Maryland. Counsel representing the United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corporation and Tennessee Valley Authority (Applicants), the Staff, Natural Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club (Joint Intervenors),
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and the State of Tennessee participated in the conference.
The Board considered and heard arguments on the statements of position, filed by Applicants, Staff and Intervenors, that addressed the question of which issues within Contentions 1, 2 and 3 should be 95pf 60 t 8204280S73
e deferred for purposes of discovery and litigation until after the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision.
In addition, the Board ruled upon the Staff Motion for a Protective Order Relative to Discovery and addressed all matters of controversy among the parties regarding interrogatories and responses to interrogatories.
Contentions 1, 2 and 3 Contention 1(al The Board ruled that Subpart (a) of Contention 1, which challenges
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the ability of Applicants' reliability program to eliminate CDAs as DBAs, is litigable at the LWA-1 stage. However, the inquiry at this stage is limited to consideration of whether it is feasible to design CRBR to make HCDAs sufficiently improbable that'they can be excluded from the envelope of design basis accidents for a reactor of the general size and type proposed. Specifically, discovery at the LWA-1 stage is limited to the following areas of concern:
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The major classes of accident initiators potentially leading to HCDAs; 2.
The relevant criteria to be impor.ed for the CRBRP; 3.
The state of technology as it relates to applicable
'desi'gn characteristics or criteria; and e
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The general characteristics of the CRBRP design (e.g.,
redundant, diverse shutdown systems)
(Tr.548).
A full-scale inquiry into the specific design of the CRBR is inappropriate at the LWA-1 stage.
10 CFR 50.10(e) establishes that an LWA-1 may be issued only after the Board has conducted a full NEPA review and has determined that " based upon the available informatio'n and review to date, there is reasonable assurance that the proposed site is a suitable location for a reactor of the general size and type proposed from the standpoint of radiological health and safety considerations...."
In order to make the full NEPA findings, the Board must have before it " sufficient information regarding the proposed plant...in the applicant's environmental report and the record of the NEPA hearing in order to conduct a reasonable cost-benefit analysis as required by NEPA" (Statements of Consideration to 10 CFR 50.10(e) at 39 FR 14506).
The applicants' environmental report must assess the " probable impact I
of the proposed action on the environment" (10 CFR s51.20(a)). This assessment involves analyses of the probable environmental impacts of postulated accidents and must be based on realistic assumptions and methods of analysis. However, the conservative methods of analysis employed in the NRC safety evaluation, process are not necessary for the NEPA review (Gulf States Utilities (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2),
LBP-75-50,"2'NRC 419, 447-448 (1975)).
In order to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR s50.10(e)(2)(ii),
the Board must make a preliminary safety determination "that base'd on the available information and review to date there is reasonable assurance that the site is a suitable location for a reactor of the general size aiid type proposed from the standpoint of radiological health and safety considerations."
-On its face, it is evident that 10 CFR 50.10(e)(2)(ii) does not require a complete safety review based on the completed, detailed design of the specific reactor proposed.
Instead, a preliminary safety finding is contemplated " based on the available information and review to date" and based on "a reactor of the general size and type proposed." With respect to Contention 1(a) specifically, there must be a showing of reasonable assurance that the state-of-the-art technology permits the implementation of a design which would reduce the likelihood of CDAs so that they can be excluded or that the finding.is to include CDAs.
In contrast to 10 CFR 50.10(e)2, 10 CFR s50.35(a) contemplates a specific analysis of the facility at the CP stage. Thus, although a full NEPA review is mandated for the LWA-1 hearing phase, the finality of this review must of necessity await the completion of tne CP evidentiary hearing where full design details and supportive analyses of the facility will be critiqued.
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Contention 1(b)
The Board ruled that Subpart (b) of Contention 1, which questions Applicants' design, reliability program, methodology, and data base, is deferred for purpost.s of discovery and litigation until af ter the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision.
Subpart(b) involves matters of detailed design review and safety evaluation which, in accordance with the discussion in Contention 1(a) above, is more 7
appropriately considered at the CP stage (Tr. 550-551). Applicants clarified that, in light of the Board's order, they would not rely on the information in this subpart for purposes of the LWA-1 hearing (Tr.
(Tr. 576).
Contentions 2(a)-2(c)
The Board ruled that Subparts (a)-(c) of Contention 2, which l
broadly question the validity of the NRC Staff's postulated radiological source term for s*ite suitability analysis, are litigable at the LWA-1 stage, subject to the same limitations set forth in the ruling on Contention 1(a).
The evidentiary record and its precedent discovery will be confined to considering whether the Staff's source term is likely to envelope the design basis accident envelope astdefined under 1(a) for a reactor of the general size and type proposed (Tr. 607).
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Contention 2(d)
TheBoardruledthatSubpart(d)ofContention2,which[ broadly questions the adequacy of the containment design, is litigable at the l
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LWA-1 stage subject to the same limitations set forth in the ruling on Contention 1(a) (Tr. 607-608).
Contention 2(e)
No controversy existed among the parties with respect to Subpart (e) of Contention 2, which alleges that neither Applicants.nor Staff has adequately calculated the guideline values for radiation doses from postulated CRBRP releases. Contention 2(e) is litigable and subject to discovery at the LWA-1 stage as admitted (Tr. 608).
Contentions 2(f)-2(h)
The Board ruled that Subparts (f)-(h) of Contention 2, which question the validity of the codes used by Applicants and Staff to date, are the basis for discovery at the LWA-1 stage as to the codes used, including their validity, foundation proof and the like Tr. (614).
Contention 3(a)
The Board ruled that Subpart (a) of Contention 3, which broadly l
questions the need for and adequacy of a probabilistic risk assessment l
of the CRBRP comparable to the Reactor Safety Study ("Rasmussen Report"), is deferred until after the LWA-1 evidentiary hearing and partial initial decision. Applicants will not rely on any analyses comparable to the Reactor Safety Study.for purposes of the LWA-1 hearing (Tr. 625-626).
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l Contention 3(b)
Subpart (b) of Contention 3 alleges that neither Applicants' nor Staff's analyses of potential accidents, initiator sequet:es and events i
are sufficiently comprehensive to assure that analysis of the DBAs will envelope the entire spectrum of credible accidents. The Board ruled that Contention 3(b) is litigable at the LWA-1 stage, subject to the same limitations set forth in our ruling on Contention 1(a) (Tr.
618-619).
Contention 3(c)
The Board ruled that Subpart (c) of Contention 3, which alleges j
that accidents associated with core melt-through following loss of core i
geometry and sodium-concrete interactions have not been adequately analyzed, is litigable at the LWA-l stage subject to the limitations set forth in our ruling on Contentions 2(f)-(h) and on Contention 1(a)
(Tr. 619-620).
l Contention 3(d) l The Board ruled that Subpart (d) of Contention 3, which alleges that neither Applicants nor Staff has adequately identified and analyzed the ways in which human error can initiate, exacerbate or interfere with the mitigation of CRBRP accidents, is litigable at the LWA-1 stage' subject to the same limitations set forth in our ruling on Contention 1(a) (Tr. 622-625).
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Matters Regarding Interrogatories The Board denied the Staff's request (in its motion for a' protective order, filed April 16,1982) to set a numerical limit on the number of interrogatories filed by each party. An arbitrar'y limitation on the number of interrogatories is inappropriate at this time and in this kind of case (Tr. 643). The Board recognizes that there is a problem of too many interrogatories but does not believe that limiting the number on a mechanical basis would be fair to the parties nor would it be in the public interest (Tr. 660-661).
In order for the parties to control this problem, the Board granted protective orders and struck the following pending interrogat'ories and requests to produce:
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(1) Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club Twenty-Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request to Produce to Staff; (2) Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club Eighteenth Set of Interrogatories and Request to Produce to Applicants; (3) NRC Staff First Round of Discovery to NRDC, et al.; and (4) Applicants' Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club (Tr. 668).
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The Board directed the parties through counsel to follow the procedures outlined in Comanche Peak 1!andtonegotiateallsuch discovery with reasonable dispatch.
If parties are unable to resolve disputes, they shall file appropriate motions for a protective order which set forth verbatim the interrogatories or requests, the matters in controversy, and the differences between them that were discussed and negotiated. Such motions should be accompanied by points and authorities containing the authorities relied upon. Parties will have a total of eleven (11) days to reply to a motion (ten (10) days plus one (1) day delivery), and the Board will rule thereon promptly (Tr.
668-672).
If any discrepancies exist between statements or rulings made at the conference and this Order, this Order shall be controlling.
It is so ORDERED.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Marshall E. Miller, Chairman ADL11NISTRATIVE JUDGE l
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland i
this 22nd day of April, 1982.
1I Texas Utilities Generating Company, et al. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-22, 14 NRC 150, 155-157 (1981).
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