ML20050D419
| ML20050D419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1982 |
| From: | Halligan T CITIZENS AGAINST NUCLEAR DANGERS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204120192 | |
| Download: ML20050D419 (10) | |
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'I 6 April 2, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA., ... .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD g2 't r, -7 m1 :ra IN THE MATTER OF
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PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. BERWICK ATOMIC POWIR PLANT-AND 'SUSQUEHANNA UNITS 1 &
ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVF INC. DOCKET NOS. 50-387 5)
CITIZENS AGAINST NUCLEAR DANGERS-
. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 9 i'EC MEC g OF LAW, BASED ON IMPORTANT NEW INFORV.ATIO AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NRC COMMISSION ' SPP O 9 32" AND THE CONGRESS- c. .
The Citizens A6ainst Nuclear DanSers- (CAND) of Berw k Pa." e havin6 appeared as a party--to the intervention with le6al sta ding /
-4V before the Atomic' Safety, and Licensin6 Board ( ASLB), herein, summarize its participation- in this operating license application case, and also present findin6s of fact and conclusions of law. They are submitted ,
at this time, under terms of the special provisions of the NRC discretionary rules concernin6 the extraordinary nature of. relevant new and incriminatin6 information that mandates inclusion of this
> 1mportant public safety related information into the record, even if it necessitates an exception to the stated filin6 deadline.
CAND will not specifically refer to the transcripts of the hearin68~
to validate its observations and proposals ~. Rather, the basis some of CAND's findin6s and conclusions include the fo110 win 6:
- 1) The failure of the utilities' and their vendors quality assurance pro 6 rams, as described by Mr Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman of the Nuclear Re6ulatory Commission. (NRC);
- 2) The current invest 16ation of collusion related to the Diablo Canyon safety reviews;
- 3) The major violations and breakdown of quality control at the 3 Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, which is a lead reactor settin6 the standards for the Berwick Nuke.
8204120192 820402
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A separato careful scrutiny of the verbatim text of c11 witnesses will be undertaken, presently; to identify instances of probable perjury.
This information will, in due course, be incorporated into intervener appeals, and will also be presented to the Justice Department. .
After reviewing the public hearin6 record of this procecdin6, CAND concludes that the Applicants and the NRC have not . proven that the Berwick reactors (Susouchanna Unita 1 and 2) can be operated safely in accordance with NRC re6ulations and the Atomic Ener6y Act. Nor will the human environment be adequately protected in accordance with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), and in accordance with related Pennsylvania laws. T he re fo re , an operating license should not be issued under the ci rcum stan ce s.
CAND further concludes that because the NRC and the Applicants, in their testimony on most contentions, completely ignored their leSal ob116ation to comply with explicit directives of the National ,
Environmental Protection Act on specific major public health and safety issues, the ASLB must order full compliance with NEPA by the Applicants and the NRC staf f before an ASLB operatin6 license decision can be contemplated.
To place this proceedin6 in its proper perspective, we must go back and review the salient points. First of all, there was a major violation of the citizen interveners' le61timate r16ht to due process of law.
It occurred on January 29 and 30, 1979, at the first Pre-Hearin6 Con fe rence , held in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , whe reat, the counsel for the NRC, and the crunnel for the Applicants (PP&L), each presented the public interest interveners, who were not represented by counsel, with n lar6e stack of le6al documents citin6 literally hundreds of reasons why (in their view) the contentions submitted should be denied and the public hearings not even be held! (Incidentially, this hiSh-handed
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treatment towards the public interveners has been stendard oparstin6 procedure ever since, with the condescendin6 approval of a not too impartial ASLB--especially the " reconstituted" Board)
These ennormous amount of technical pap 6rs were handed to the interveners, CAND included, approximate.ly ten minutes before the start of the Pre-Hearin6 Conference convened to decide the merit of the contentions to be adjudicated! Normally, an interver should have received these documents at least several days in advance of a pre-hearin6 conference and allowed about ten days to study such NRC and Applicant position papers, and allowed to respond to their alle6ations.
But... ten minutes notice!!!
The importance of this cannot be understated. The administrative judge, had he acted fairly from the outset, would have postponed the conference several days to allow all parties time to respond in writin6 The record of the conference will show that CAND vi6orously objected to this hiSh-handed conduct of the ASLB and also protested 'the inherently unfair tactics of the NRC staff and the Applicants. These pleadings were noted and arbitrarily brushed aside by the ASLB. It was
_ clearly evident from the start, therefore, that the apparatus assembled to go through the motions of conducting the licensing review were not going to tolerate the rights of concerned American citizens, nor allow the U.S. Constitution to stand in the way of approving-the Berwick operating application. However,those well laid plans of mice and men would soon So swire as a result of the Three-Mile-Island disaster, which began three years ago.
CAND and the othe r interveners were at a decided disadvanta6e durin6 the two day Pre-Hearing Conference because we were confronted with the suprise imposition of the aforementioned NRC and Applicant legal proposals that were used extensively in their ar6uments a6sinst
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the intervenors. CAND had no time to resacrch the issues raised.
. Because of this lack of time to prepare a comprehensive and convincin6 rebuttal, the ASLB judged that CAND did not have suf ficient cause to merit the admission of several contentions that will, nevertheless, have a great impact on public health and safety and the human environment if the Be rwick nukes become operational. A notable case in point deals with the rejected contention on the environmental impacts of the low-flow augmentation reservoir. -
This unfair situation was formalized in the ASLB Order of March 6,1979 (issued just three weeks before the chaos at TMI began) wherein the ASLB promugated numerous scholarly, yet arbitrary decisions that established the explicit wording of the admitted contentions, which in one contention on radiation induced abortions--was admitted--
but never explicitedly identified as an actual issue. CAND was confus~ed by this ASLB trickery and opposed the wording of much of the Order of March 6,1979, because it disre6arded many of the important health and safety issues, presumably in the name of expediency.
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Another due process violation occurr.ed when CAND was not afforded en opportunity to properly contest. the ASLB- decisions at. that time j due to late mailin6s of the 86 page Order. CAND intends to appe,a1 this injustice, however, when the Initial Decision is rendered by the ASLB One of several crucial issu'e s swept under the bulging NRC rug was the refusal to admit the contention that the so-called low-flow augmentation reservoir, to be built by the Applicants, as an important environmental matter. This was a serious misjudgment by the ASLB.
Now, three years latter, the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC) is entertainin6 the execution of a proposed " interim a5reement"
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l l concerning the Cowansque Lake Reformulation Study, whereby, the i *
. 5 U. S. A rmy Corp's of Engincors would release from impounded storago one-hundred miles upstream, water for downstream users, principally 1 the Applicants for their Berwick Nukes.
Such a Sovernment ballout would seemin61y relieve PP&L from constructing a massive stora6e reservoir at the Pond Hill site.
Nevertheless, such a plan would drastically chan6e the environmental impacts caused by such a federal action, and require the complete changin6 of certaim sections of the Final Environmental Statement. -
It will require that the NRC and the U.S. A rmy Corps of Engineers'
' re-evaluate this complex issue of water storage because it will not only impact adversely on the flood control aspects of the Tioga and Cowansque Lake projects, but also impact adversely on the overall
, federal and state flood control systems for the entire North Branch of the Susquehanna River. .
The lakest
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devekopment occurred just a few weeks ago with the
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announcement by the U.S~. Army Corps of En61neers that they are recommendin6 in a report to the U.S. Congress, after years of
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on61neerin6 surveys, a ~ flood control project to raise Susquehanna River. flood levees in the Wyomin6 Valley, which is a short distance upstream from Berwick. T'his project would also include building ad it_ional structu'res downstream from Berwick as mitigating measures to protect the communities of Danville, 'Sunbury and Bloomsburg from possible floodin6 caused by the improvements upstream. This' master plan could be jeopardized by any unilateral water storage plan devised by PP&L and approved by the NRC and the Commonwealth.
Needless to say, the Corps of Engineers plans are at cross-currents with the Applicants water storaSe optional plan for Tioga and Cowansque
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reservoirs.
T he re fo re , the ASLB findin6s and conclusions certainly should
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- i require the full resolution of all environmental aspects of this ma tte r, including conductin6 public hearings, in conjunction with the !
Corps of En61neers and the SRBC, before issuance of an operating license.
Because some of the people in char 6e acted in bad faith, there can be little doubt that the above issue and some other rejected contentions plus the summary dismissal of the contention on the danger of radiation induced abortion, must simultaneously be investigated by the appropriate independent Sovernment aSencies (e.6. General Accountin6 Office), since '
the ASLB, in the past, ' shirked its duty to review these public health and' safety issues in a meaningful way, brou6h t to the attention of the Board by the public interest interveners.
From June, 1979 until October, 1981, these proceedin6s have been characterized by a protracted exchange of alle6ations and some unfair and unjust ASLB decisions concernin6 discovery interrogatories.
I During the conths immediately"preceedin6 the public ~hea~ rings, tbGre were numerous allegations and equally unfair ASLB decisions concerning summa ry disposition of many contentions. Several of these judgements rendered by the ASLB' will be appealed by CAND at the appropriate time, .
for reasons specified in previous CAND ~ communications ~and ~motionsi' These issues should also be thI tar 6et of the GAO' inquiry. -
NRC Chairman Palladino, on December 1,1981, at San Francisco, CA.
in a speech before the conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum, stated what the interveners in the Berwick case have tried to impress-upon the NRC staff and the comatose ASLB for the past three years...
to no avail, unfortunately. The Chairman told the nuclear industry executives that he found the failure of their quality assurance programs inexcusable. Referring to the construction of atomic power plants, Mr. Palladino said: "There have been lapses of many kinds---
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7 in'desi6n analyses resultin6 in built-in des 16n errors, in poor construction practices, in falsified documents, in harassment of quality control personnel and in inadequate trainin6 of reactor operators,". Perhaps Mr. Palladino has not yet studied the Berwick Docket, but, he nonetheless gave a near perfect discription of what has been going on at the 'PP&1 Nuke construction site since 1973, all the while ~the NRC has sat' on their hands!
CAND would, therefore, ask the NRC' Chairman to have his staf f
- conduct'.an independent in-depth review of the mismana6ement in the
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Berwick ca se, especially since the PP&L reactors are 6006raphically located a relatively short distance upstream from the TMI reactors,.
on the samo river system--the Susquehanna~. CAND can assure Chairman Palladino that the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation (whose
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members can ,.be expected to try and ball-out Met-Ed) are presently
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bein6 urged'to conduct a Congressional investigation of the Berwick-reactors. Such an inquiry should require the full cooperation of f
the NRC Inspection and Enforcement. Division--as a safeguard prerequisite to federal financial assistance in any salva6e attempts at TMI. The WRC cannot henceforth justify a double standard whereby high safety standards and strict enforcement of regulations are currently imposed at TMI while these same re6ulations and safeguards are compromised seventy miles northeast of TMI at the Berwick reactors.
On November 25, 1981, the NRC recommended a $200,000 fine for a breakdown of quality control at the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, in southwestern Ohio, tentatively scheduled for completion in July, 1982.
The proposed steep fine stemmed from falso quality assurance documeats and numerous deficient quality assurance programs. A s a result, the
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URC has ordered the Zimmer applicant (Cincinnati Gas & Electric)
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8 to review all safety-related systems in the plant.
The Zimmer reactor is one of the GE lead plants in the so-called c16ht-member " owners Group" of which PP&L is associated, formed for the purpose of resolving "6eneric" safety en61neerin6 problems. The various safety test plans and construction quality assurance pro 6 rams first approved for Zimmer, and the LaSalle plant in Illinois, set the .
standards for Berwick. The mistakes and fraud at Zimmer, therefore, may well have been repeated at Berwick. CAND proposes to the ASLB
-. that before a license be issued to the Applicants, the NRC ~ order a review of all satety-related systems at the Berwick atomic power plant, and all necessary technical modifications be fully implemented.
CAND also proposes to the ASLB that all of the approximately-forty unresolved safety and environmental issues identified in' the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and Supplements 'l and 2 (based in part -
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on outstandin6 FSAR ' questions) including those requiring " additional
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documentation" be completely resolved prior to issuance of an operating
}1icense for Berwick. There may, well be a connection between~ the se -
major _deficencies in the Berwick SER~ and the _ falsification of quality assurance documents uncovered at Zimmer by the NRC technical staff.
The Applicants, durin6 the course of the public hearings, alluded to numerous scientific studies conducted by reputed experts to bolster their ar6uments before the ASLB. CAND would like to point out that, in one instance at least, there is a najo'r discrepency concernin6 the contention on Ultra-High-Volta 6e (UHV) transmission lines. The.public hea rin6 transcript reveals that the Applicants tried to convince the ASLB that some obscure controlled experiments on animals done in the past at a New York State lab are suf ficient to prove that there can i never be any hazard caused by hi6h ener6y electrical fields to humans 4
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,' - 9 living and farmin6 near the Applicants 128 mile lon6 tranemiscin lino right-of-way spannin6 several counties in Northeastern Pennsylvania.
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A typical
- valid test cited by the Applicants as their evidence involved experiments on as few as eicht rats over a span of only a few hours! This testimony was delivered on October 7,1981.
On October 15, 1981, at a " Limited Appearance" session of the public hearin6s, a letter was read into the record by the ECNP intervener published by PP&L (one of hundreds circulated) that emphatically warns .
people livin6 near PP&L h16h volta 6e transmission lines to take certain
' precautions to prevent physical harm that can be caused by electrical shocks from the lines. This, in our jud6ement, at the very least, impeaches the credibility of the testimony of October 7th. It also ,
may involve the presentment of material false statements by the Applicants, and it certainly appears as if the Applicants have .
deceived th5 ASLB with their conflictin6 docu=ents. .,.___,,,
C AND compares this lack of candor with the recent misconduct of the officials of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), builders of the notorious Diablo Canyon reactors in California. The NRC reported that on November 12, 1981, PG&E submitted a deceptively favorable seiemic report to the NRC which conflicted with other versions submitted on previous and subsusquent dates. Conflict of interest.
char 6es are also alle6ed against the consultants.
CAND proposes that the NRC requisition the records of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and the Federal Ener67 Administration, pertaining to the Applicants UHV transmission lines, and compare them with the Applicants highly questionable public hearin6 testimony and summary disposition af fidavits in order to pin point the apparent misrepre sentation involving the electric field controversy.
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- 10 The same investi6ative comparison should be made in rel'etion to the CAND contention that future low-powered television transmission will be seriously disrupted by nearby UHV transmission from Berwick.
The l'RC and the Applicants denied in their affidavits that any problems would develop. However, this hypothesis piled on top of hypothesis is contrary to scientific reality. The Federal Communications Commission should be called upon by the GAO and the NRC to verify the existence of low-power TV franchises that will be intersecting PP&L ' s URV lines, and thus refute the patently false statements issues by the NRC'and the Applicants.
Re spectfully submitted Dated: April 2, 1982 9 wa l 9ddL-Correspondept ' / ,
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., i e CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE -
s I hereby certify that copies of Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, Based On Important
- New Information And Recommendations To The NRO Commissioners, And The Congre ss have been served on all parties to this proceedin6 by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, this 2nd day of April, 1982.
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