ML20050D073
| ML20050D073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1982 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050D066 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204120038 | |
| Download: ML20050D073 (4) | |
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s SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING A'1ENDMENT N0. 76 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICEllSE N0. CPR-50 j
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY JERSEY CEf4 TRAL POWEP. AND LIGHT COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY GPU NUCLEAR COMPURATION i
I THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 Intmduction By letter dated February 25,1982 (TSCR 111,82-031), GPU Nuclear Corpora-tion (the licensee) requested an amendment to Appendix A of Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (TMI-1). This amendment would permit fuel movements at TMI-1 without requiring the tests to verify the efficiency of the air filter systems for the Reactor Building purge exhaust system, the Control Building emergency ventilation system and the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation system.
In addition, this amendment would permit a relaxation of ventilation system flow rate requirements for the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation system. This amendment is applicable only for the shutdown period prior to Cycle 5 criticality. The licensee has indicated that these changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) are needed to permit a timely investigation of possible degradation of materials within the reactor vessel.
On March 12, 1982, the licensee filed a motion before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the TMI-1 Restart proceeding seeking clarification of a Board ruling on the need for an engineered safety features filter system for the Fuel Handling Building.
Attached to this motion is an affidavit by Robert W. Keaten of GPU Nuclear Corporation, which provides the results of an analysis of a fuel handling accident in the Fuel Handling Building. We considered this affidavit in our evaluation of the requested amendment.
Discussion and Evaluation The purpose of the TSs which the licensee seeks to amend is to provide assurance that the air filter systems for the Reactor Building purge exhaust, Control Room emergency ventilation systen and the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation system are capable of performing their intended function. The function of these systems is to provide for the treatment and controlled release of radioactive materials in the event of an accident which has the potential to release radioactive material, When the reactor is shutdown, the accidents of concern involve movements of irradiated fuel.
TMI-l has been shutdown for more than three years.
8204120038 820402 PDR ADOCK 05000289 P
TMI-1 The air filter systems consist of High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters and other filters, charcoal adsorber beds and fans. The charcoal adsorbers function to remove airborne radioiodines.
The HEPA and other filters are provided to remove other airborne particulates which could impair the efficiency of the charcoal adsorbers. The fans serve to control the overall flow of air in the affected space and control the flow rate of air through the charcoal adsorbers so as not to impair their function. The licensee has proposed changes to the TSs which would allow fuel movements at Unit I without conducting tests to verify the efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber beds of the air filter systems in the Reactor Building purge exhaust system, the Control Room emergency ventilation system and the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation system.
In addition, the licensee seeks relaxation of flow rate require-ments for the fans in the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building. Relief from these TS requirements applies only to the shutdown period prior to the next (Cycle 5) criticality.
Current licensing guidelines for evaluating the system design features for mitigating the consequences of fuel handling accidents are set forth in Section 15.7.4 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
That section of the j
SRP indicates that systems for mitigating the radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident are acceptable if the calculated whole-body and thyroid dose at the exclusion area boundary and low population zone (LPZ) boundary are well within the exposure guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100, Section 100,11.
"Well within" means 25% or less of the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guideline values (75 rem for the thyroid and 6.25 rem for the whole-body doses are 25% of the 10 CFR Part 100 values).
In order to assess the potential hazard posed by a fuel handling accident at TMI-l prior to restart, the licensee has calculated the results of a postulated fuel handling accident without taking credit for any filtering l
of the discharge f rom the Fuel Handling Building (Robert W. Keaten affidavit).
For the purposes of the calculation, it was assumed that TMI-1 had been shutdown and that fuel activity has decayed for a period of two-and-a-half years. All other assumptions and methodology used in the analysis were in accordance with the guidelines of SRP 15.7.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.25.
Regulatory Guide 1.25 provides acceptable assumptions that may be used for evaluating the potential radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling and storage facility for boiling and pres-surized water reactors, i
The results of the licensee's dose calculation are as follows:
Exclusion 10 CFR 100 25% of Boundary LPZ Limit Limit Thyroid dose 8.7 x 10-5 1.7 x 10-5 300 75 (rem)
Whole-body 6.5 x 10-4 1.3 x 10-4 25 6.25 dose (rem)
TMI-1 The calculated doses are very low due mainly to the extensive time period since the TMI-1 fuel assemblies were last irradiated. Since the reactor is to remain shutdown, virtually no radiciodine exists which could poten-tially be released to the atmosphere in the event of a fuel handling accident, even in the absence of a filter system to control the release of radiciodines. Although we have not performed independent calculations to verify the above values, the licensee's values are considered reasonable for the condition of the Unit 1 fuel, and in any case, the actual doses at the exclusion boundary and LPZ would be orders of magnitude below the acceptable limits.
The above calculations demonstrate that in the event of a fuel handling accident with the Unit 1 fuel in its present condition, the offsite doses would be only a very small fraction of acceptable limits, even if there were no filter systems to treat the release.
If offsite doses are acceptable with no filter system in use, it follows that tests to demon-strate the effjciency of the filter systems are not important for this l
fuel movement In addition, since no additional radioiodines in Unit 1 fuel will be generated until criticality, we agree with the licensee that these tests are not needed until Cycle 5 criticality.
For the above reasons, we find the licensee's request to amend the TSs to defer until Cycle 5 criticality testing of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of the filter systems of the Reactor Building purge exhaust system, the Control Room emer0ency ven-tilation system and the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation system to be acceptable.
With respect to the licensee's request for relief from ventilation systen flow rate requirements for the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building, the licensee has indicated that the system was capable of developing approximately 103,000 cfm during tests instead of the T5 flow rate of 118,810 cfm + 10%.
As with the rest of this amendment, this request applies only to the shut-down period prior to Cycle 5 criticality. Since the intent of requiring specific flow rates relates to the efficiency of the charcoal adsorber to remove airborne radiciodines and since virtually no iodines will exist until plant operation, we conclude that requiring specific flow rate requirements is unnecessary for these fuel movements. We note, however, that additional justification will be necessary to show that the reduced flow rate is suf-ficient in the event of accidents following Cycle 5 criticality.
For the above reasons, we find the proposed amendment acceptable.
I We note that this analysis would not be applicable to the Control Room emergency-ventilation system, but since virtually no radiciodine exists, we similarly have no concern that the efficiency of this filter system requires verification prior to these fuel movements.
TMI-1 Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types'or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impagt. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or necative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
The following NRC staff personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:
C. Nichols, R. Jacobs.
Dated: April 2,1982 l
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O 7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-289 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OVETETING LICENSE The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 76 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-50, issued to Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, and GPU Nuclear Corporation (the licensees),
which revised the Technical Specifications (TSs) for operation of the Three Mile Island Nsclear Station, Unit No.1 (the facility) located in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
The amendment revises the TSs for the facility to d'efer until Cycle 5 criticality, tests to verify the efficiency of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers in the filter systems for the Reactor Building purge exhaust, the Control Room emergency ventilation system, and the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building ventilation sy' stem.
This amendment is applicable only during the shutdown period prior to Cycle 5 criticality.
These tests will be required prior to criticality following authorization to restart.
The application for the amendmer t complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Comission has made appro-priate findings as required by the Act and the Commiss. ion's rules and l
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. 7590-01 regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amend-Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amend-ment.
ment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
The Comission has detennined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 151.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need r.ot be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.
For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for anendnent dated February 25, 1982, (2) Amendment No.76 to
- License No. DPR-50, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Comission's Public Docunent Room,1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
20555, and at the Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
- 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 2nd day of April 1982, FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7
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Jofn F. Stolz, Chief f Op' rating Reactors B nch #4 vision of Licensing i