ML20050C199
| ML20050C199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1982 |
| From: | Greenberg E National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, TUTTLE & TAYLOR |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204080266 | |
| Download: ML20050C199 (50) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- 7- _ 1 3 RELATED CORRE}PONDENCE Before the UNITED STATES O C '. 6 7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Washington, D.C. 20555 , g _) g 73 In the Mattir~of - ) bCM it% L U UR/ tKli
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ) a) PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) Docket No. 50-5 %, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )
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) R7 sl ANSWERS AND OBJECTIONS OF INTERVENORS, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB, 4 TO TO NRC STAPP'S PIPTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO NRDC
- 1. Does NRDC presently maintain that the Applicant's ER and/or NRC's EIS inadequately assesses the consequences of programs and measures to prevent acts of " sabotage, terrorism, or theft"?
Yes. a.) If answer is yes, state each and every consequence of the programs and measures to prevent acts of sabotage, terrorism and theft, which NRDC maintains is not adequately considered. b.) With respect to each consequence identified in 1 a.) above, give the basis (identifying both individual experts and documentation relied upon) for NRDC's position that the consequence is not adequately considered in either the NRC's BIS or Applicant's ER. (a) & (b). The ER does not assess the consequences of " programs and measures to prevent acts of sabotage, terrorism, and thef t." See ER, Section 5.7.1.3. With so , 8204080266 820329 PDR ADOCK 05000537
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respect to safeguards and security systems at the CRBR plant site, it refers the reader to the PSAR, Section 13.7. With respect to safeguards and security systems throughout the CRBR fuel cycle, it states, without analysis, that they are
" expected to be effective in accounting for and protecting the SNM,". Id.
The PSAR, Section 13.7, is basically an outline of measures. To the extent there is any assessment of effectiveness of the system, it is purely conclusory. Thus, while the PSAR states that the physical security design will have certain effects, e.g., detection of unauthorized penetrations or apprehension in a timely manner of unauthorized persons , see PSAR, Section 13.7.2, the foundation for these conclusions is not presented, and no confidence levels are attached. In the FES , the following " consequences" are inadequately considered: Section 7.3 - This section does not discuss the nature of the threat; does not explain how the threat levels are established which are used to judge the adequacy of physical security; does not set forth any basis for determining residual environmental risk; and ignores evidence of prior sabotage and theft. These inadequacies are reflected in the f ailure to consider and evaluate t- 1
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theft at the NUMEC plant, see Office of the Inspector General, NRC, Inquiry Into the Testimony _ of the_ Executive Director for Operations (Feb., 1978); Fialka, "The American Connection: H,w Israel Got the Bomb," The Washington Monthy, Jan., 1979, at 50; Burnham, "The Case of the Missing Uranium," The Atlantic, Apr., 1979, at 78; 125 Cong. Rec. S.5736-51 (May 14, 1979); theft of uranium at Wilmington, N.C. in January, 1979, see 125 Cong. Rec. II . 9 219 (Oct. 16, 1979); sabotage of VEPCO Surry reactors, see Commonwealth of Virginia
- v. William E. Kurkendall and James A. Merrill, Jr.,
Circuit Court, County of Surry (circa 1980); sabotage of components for the Iraqi reactor while under fabrication in France, see Newsweek, 6/28/81, at 25; actions of Basque terrorists directed against Spanish nuclear facilities, see Energy Daily, 4/10/78; Nucleonics Week, 3/22/78; and the attack on the Gupeg Phenix facility in France , see The Washington Post, 1/20/82, at A16. See generally, letter dated April 13, 1978, from Dr. Thomas Cochran to ~ Senator John Glenn, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Nuclear Proliferation and Federal. Services,. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, with enclosures (copy attached at Tab A). w~am ,
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o ' Purther review and analysis of the following may result in the identification of additional incidents supporting Intervenors' conclusion: NRC, Preliminary Notification of__Safecuards Events (through 1981); NRC, Summary Listings of Threats to Licensed Nuclear Pacilities and Transport and Other Nuclear Threats (through 1981); DOE, Threats of Violence and Acts of Violence to Unlicensed Nuclear Facilities (through 1981). The statement in the first paragraph on page 7-13 that "the NRC has no indiention of any threat to domestic nuclear facilities that would endanger the public and safety", is inconsistent with the incident" cited, supra, pages 2-4, and our own analysis. See Tab A. The statement in the first paragraph on page 7-14 that " historical evidence and current
' intelligence' fail to reveal any substantive threat" is factually incorrect. See incidents cited supra, pages 2-4.
The second paragraph on page 7-14 is no longer
-accurate because new t1RC regulations have been issued. See 10 CPR pt. 73, as amended.
The third paragraph on page 7-14 is
- conclusory. It does not indicate what an adequate threat level would be, nor does it state what b
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., t additional requirements might be appropriate if threat levels changed. Finally, it does not mention that fuel cycle facilities may not be subject to NRC regulations.
- 7.3.1 - There is no explanation of the basis for the view that various functional elements will assure " effective implementation" of a safeguards
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program. Further, the discussion makes no reference to the fact that fuel facilities, at least initially, will not be subject to NRC regulatory requirements. Finally, this section does not describe residual risks, nor does it provide support for the proposition that residual risks would be minimal. 7.3.1.1 - Requirements sunnarized in Appendix E have been revised since release of the FES and consequently Appendix E must be updated. 7.3.2 - The statement that " compliance provides reasonable assurance that there will be no significant increase in the overall risk to the public from acts of sabotage, theft or diversion at a reactcr site" is both vague and conclusory. No evidence is provided to support this statement. No effort is made to define what constitutes
" reasonable assurance". Further, it is not clear k.
a e e whether the phrase "reas$nable assurance" reflects the' current requirements of law. Lastly, the Staff does not indicate what a "significant" increase in risk would be. 7.3.2.1 - The conclusion in the first full paragraph on page 7-13 that acts of sabotage causing " substantial core damage and release of radioactive materials . . . while possible, are highly improbable" is vague. The basis for the judgment is not given, nor are any confidence levels attached to the judgment. The statement in the carryover paragraph on page 7-16 that multiple barriers and backup safety systems "when combined with an appropriate safeguards program, provide adequate protection L. against the occurrence or effects of sabotage" is conclusory and unsupported. No definition is provided of an " appropriate" safeguards program.
.No. effort is made -to define what " adequate protection" is, or why, if it is the standard ,
- chosen by the staf f ~ it was so chosen and how it relates to other standards referred to in the.FES, e.g.,'" reasonable assurance", "high level of protection".
-4J L 21 _ . _ _
7 -- i e e _7_ The discussion of regulatory requirements in the second and third paragraphs on page 7-16 does not reflect changes in regulations. Threat levels referred to are no longer valid and have been upgraded. See 10 CFR SS 73.1, 73.55, as amended. The statement in the last paragraph on page 7-16 that technology and systems developed for current reactors can "in large part, he translated to the CRBRP" needs explanation. Are there elements that cannot be transferred? Does the possibility of initiating an explosion make the CRBR a more attractive target? Does the quantity of plutonium present at the CRBR make it a more attractive target? The summary paragraph on page 7-17 is unjustified. .No effort has been made to define what " minimal" means. Further, a determination cannot -tx3 made that a threat is " minimal" solely based upon absence of evidence "at this time".- It is~ equally, if not more, important to determine what threat is likely to materialize in the future, see Mitre Corp.,-.The Threat to Licensed' Nuclear Facilities 91-97 (MTh-7022) (Sept. 1975), yet there is no ' discussion whatsoever of this issue.
7.3.2.2 - The discussion in this sectior. sows confusion with respect to the kind of safeguards system the NRC Staf f feels must be applied and the kid of assurance that system must provide. References in this section are to a "high degree" of protection, where as, elsewhere, as noted above , there are references to " reasonable protection" or
" adequate protection".
The conclusion in the summary paragraph that "the potential environmental impacts due to theft or diversion of SNM from the CRBR site are minimal" is conclusory. The process by which the judgment is reached is not explained.
- 7.3.3 - Since release of the PES, a considerably clearer picture has developed with respect to both the supply-of fuel for the CRBR and the processing and disposition of spent fuel: DOE will likely See
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provide both fuel'and processing services. Answer-to Interrogatory No. 6, infra. Consequently, there are a limited number of f acilities which need to be analyzed in order to determine fuel cycle safeguards impacts. The Staff should' discuss, as it has not done, those specific facilities'and determine the. adequacy of safeguards-at ~ them.
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- 7.3.3.1 - The discussion,of fuel cycle activities f ails to set out current views of the GAO and others regarding the safeguardability of bulk handling facilities. See General Accounting Office, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (EMD-80-38) (March 18, 1980); IAEA, Special Safeguards Implementation Report (1977). Further, the discussion of fuel loads is based on the homogeneous, rather than a heterogeneous reactor core. Finally, the Staff has not distinguished among fuel grade and reactor grade materials which may be obtained from DOE, as well as materials which might be obtained, at some point, from commercial sources.
7.3.3.2 - Determinations made in connection with safeguardability in GESMO proceeding in 1975 must be updated to reflect new developments. See General Accounting Office, Nuclear Puel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (EMD-80-38) (March 18, 1980).
'7.3.3.3 - In the discussion of these programs, the Staff has not j udged the adequacy of . DOE safeguards l
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I 10 - (both materials accounting and physical security) . It has not identified inventory differences at a f acilities likely to be utilized and the ef fect of such differences on assurances that safeguards are effective. And, it has failed to discuss current criticisms of DOE safeguards by other organizations, such as the GAO. See GAO, Nuclear Puel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (EMD-80-38) (March 18, 1980). 7.3.4.1.1 - This section neither reflects the fact that NRC requirements have been upgraded since 1977, nor the fact that NRC requirements are different from DOE requirements. 7.3.4.2.1 - The conclusion that there are "no known technical, logistic or societal impediments to producing a transit protection system that would be essentially undefeatable" is unsupported. There is no discussion of what the technical,-logistic or societal impediments might be. Nor is there any discussion of who might operate such a transit protection system. 7.3.4.1.3 - The Staff cannot dismiss without discussion irradiated fuel as an attractive target
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11 - for theft. See answer tb Interrogatory No. 4, , 1 infra. 7.3.4.2.4 - There is no basis shown for the conclusion on page 7-22, third paragraph from the bottom, that it is " highly unlikely" that i individuals with the right combination of motivation and skills would attempt to steal nuclear material, fabricate an explosive: device, and use or threaten to use it.
'7.3.6 - The conclusions reflect a combination of all the inadequacies discussed above - failure to explain the basis for judgments; f ailure to use consistent terminology with respect to needed level of assurance; failure to analyze safeguards at-likely DOE facilities; failure to acknowledge criticism of safeguards by the General Accounting Office and others; and failure to present an analysis applicable to projected future situations.
R2. Does NRDC presently believe that a " design _ basis threat" must include a specific number of attackers' as part of that threat? No. A range, rather than a single number, may makg more sense. a.) If answer is 'yes , - does NRDC agree that this number must be kept classified in order to assure the maximum
-security for the CRBR facility?
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h Intervenors' position is that there must be enough 5 information available to the public with respect to possible s threat levels so that the public may be able to make an independent judgment as to the adequacy of facilities sa f eg ua rd s . b.) Does NRDC agree that the appropriate design basis threat for acts of sabotage is the ability to defend against several persons with the attributes described in 10 CPR 7 3.1( a) ( 1)? c.) Does NRDC agree that the appropriate design basis threat for acts of theft against strategic nuclear material is a small group of persons with the attributes described in 10 CPR 73.1(a)(2)? d.) If the answer to 2b or 2c above is no, explain fully the bases for NRDC's disagreement with the statement. Identify any documents or individuals relied on as establishing the identified bases. (b) & (d). No. The use of the term "several" is vague. The possibility of an internal conspiracy of more i' than one insider is not included. See' Commonwealth of 9 Virginia v. William E. Kurkendall and James A. Merrill, Jr., Circuit Court, County of Surry (circa 1980). (c) & (d). No. The use of the term "small group" is vague. The definition should include collusion of more than one' insider. See documentation.re NUMEC incident,:page 3, supra. -The definition should include the'use of suitable weapons larger than handheld weapons, e.g., rocket launchers, and. groups larger than "small", e.g. , ten-twelve. We believe
'DOD takes 'such threats into account when establishing threat.
.lehels.SeeLetter,datedFebruary. 19,.1980, from the General 1 Accounting Of fice to Senator John Glenn (B-197548), entitled l a
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" Assessment of Various Aspects of this Nation's Nuclear y
Safeguards Programs" (EMD-80-48). (d). The basis for Intervenors' views is set forth more fully in Enclosure 2 to the letter of April 13, 1978, from Dr. Thomas Cochran to Senator John Glenn, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services, Senate Conmittee on Governmental Aff airs (Tab A).
- 3. In view of the fact that the NRC has designated a design basis threat, does NRDC agree that compliance with the Commission's present regulations on safeguards, using the design basis threat, adequately protects against the environmental effects of sabotage, terrorism and theft directed against the CRBR site?
No. i a.) If the answer is no, explain fully the basis for NRDC disagreement including the actions NRDC believes must be taken to adequately address the effects of sabotage, terrorism, and theft directed against the CRBR. Identify any documentation of individuals relied upon for the identified basis. The basis for Interr' tors' position is found in (i) their answers to Interrocal ty 90. 1, where they explain why the Staff's analysis of ..e .. as and consequences of sabotage, terrorism and theft is inadequate, and (ii) their
- answers to Interrogatory No. 2, where they explain why the current. design basis threat for acts of sabanage an~ theft is not-appropriate. Intervenors object to that part of this question which asks'what action Intervenors believe needs to be taken. _See Objection, infra.
- 4. Does NRDC agree _that after irradiation the fuel for CRBR, due to 'its radioactivity, will be "self protecting" against theft,-although measures must still be taken to prevent sabotage of the irradiated material?
- , No.
a.) If the answer is no explain fully NRDC's basis for disagreeing with the statement. Identify any documents or individuals relied upon for the identified basis. The hypothetical possibility of theft or irradiated fuel cannot be dismissed as incredible. To the extent there is water transport of irradiated f uel over the open ocean, highjacking, and subsequent diversion to a national government for reprocessing, cannot be ruled out. See Letter dated February 21, 1979, from DOE to Thomas Cochran, with enclosures (attached at Tab B).
- 5. Does NRDC maintain that the effects of sabotage, terrorism,_and theft for CRBR and the fuel cycle for CRBR cannot be adequately protected against under any circumstances involving operations of CRBR?
a.) If answer is yes, explain fully NRDC's basis for believing. adequate protective measures are not available or cannot be developed. Identify both documentation and individuals relied upon for the identified basis. It is Intervenors' position that there is no reasonable likelihood that in the foreseeable future adequate protective measures:will be available or developed. The-basis for this position is set forth in: GAO, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the-Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (EMD-80-38) (March 18, 1980).
- 6. Contention 9, subsection (a) states that the
' analyses of the environmental impacts of the model LMFBR and
fuel cycle in the Programmatic Sta,tement and Supplement a s. ? based on a series of faulty assumptions. a.) Identify each and every "f aulty assumption" which Contention 9, subsection (a) is referring to. b.) For each assumption identified give NRDC's view as to why the assumption is faulty. c.) If NRDC has a position as to what they believe the correct assumptions should be for the alleged faulty assumptions, state those correct assumptions. j Reactor The CRBR heterogeneous core fuel requirements are substantially different from the requirements of the AI follow-on design used as the model for the 1000 MWe reactor in the LMFBR EIS. Fuel Fabrication As indicated in the DEIS LMPBR Program Supplement (DOE /EIS-0085-D p. 75): The assumptions concerning model LMPBR fuel cycle f acilities in WASH-1535 were based on commercial-sale fuel cycle capabilities sufficient to sustain about 80 large LMPBR plants. Present LMPBR ' program plans for developmental fuel cycle facilities are modest relative to these assumptions. Therefore, the environmental effects should be no greater than those projected ' in the PFES, WASH-1535.
-The last statement is not supported by analysis. Moreover, it does not follow that the ef fluents/MT CRBR fuel would be less.than previously projected. Assuming the DEIS'LMFBR Program Supplement correctly identifies the CRBR fuel i
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fabrication facilities, effluents,from and radiation exposures from CRBR fuel fabrication identified in the CRBR FES should correspond to these f acilities. Fuel _ Reprocessing As indicated in the DEIS Supplement (DOE /EIS-0085D, pp. 75-81), the PPES'(WASil-1535) described a model plant with a capacity of 5 MT/ day (i.e., Barnwell) whereas under current plans the CRBR spent fuel will be reprocessed in the Development Reprocessing Plant (DRP) having a capacity of only 0.5 MT/ day. Assuming the DEIS Supplement correctly identifies the CRBR spent fuel reprocessing facility, effluents and radiation exposures from this portion of the CRBR fuel cycle identified in the CRBR PES should correspond to the DRP. The DEIS Supplement (p. 78) suggests that adequate supplies of plutonium are available, e.g. from DOE stocks, should commerical reprocessing falter. Intervenor's Contention 17 is a challenge to this assertion. Intervenor's position is based on testimony of Mr. Ronald Cochran , DOE, in unclassified portions of transcripts of a closed Briefing of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, December 8, 1981, and unpublished NRDC . analyses of the supply and demand of . DOE fuel-grade plutonium. g-
The most likely alternatives for supplying plutonium fuel for the CRBR are 1) the Barnwell plant, 2) existing stocks of DOE fuel- and reactor-grade Pu; 3) add ing a shear / leach head-end to one of the existing DOE reprocessing plants, most likely at SRP, and 4) obtaining Pu from the UK. Neither the DEIS Supplement, WASH-1535, nor the CRBR PES discuss the environmental (including safeguards) aspects of these alternative fuel sources. Waste Disposal The DEIS Supplement (pp. 173-185) discusses the DOS high level radioactive waste program for management and disposal of commercial wastes. It appears likely that the wastes from processing commercial spent fuel (for purposes of supplying fresh fuel for the CRBR) and wastes from processing CRBR spent fuel in DOE processing facilities (e.g. at one of the SRP chemical processing canyons following the addition of a shear / leach head-end facility) will be classified as defense wastes. The CRBR FES fails to discuss the DOE defense waste management program and any significant dif ferences between the manner in which defense and commercial wastes may be managed. Additional specific criticisms by Intervenors of the di'scussion of the LMPBR fuel cycle in the DEIS Supplement are' identified in NRDC's " Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Liquid Metal Past Breeder Reactor Program", w _-
letter to Wallace R. Kornack from Barbara A. Finamore, S. Jacob Scherr and Thomas B. Cochran, February 8, 1982. Additional specific criticisms by Intervenors of the discussion of the LMFBR fuel cycle in WASH-1535 are identified in NRDC's Comments on the WASH-1535 Draft EIS (see, particularly, WASH-1535 PFES, Vol. 6, pp. VI.38-53 to 38-85 regarding Transportation and pp. VI.38-308 to 315). With regard to management of commercial nuclear waste, see NRDC's filing in the Waste Confidence Proceeding , particularly NRDC's Statement of Position and Cross Statement.
- 7. Contention.9, subsection (b) states that . the impacts of the CRBR fuel cycle will differ from those analyzed in the Programmatic Statement. That subsection then identifies 4 areas where NRDC believes the CRBR analyses are deficient. For_each of those 4 identified areas give the following information:
a.) Identify each and every fact concerning the identified area on which NRDC bases its statement that the Programmatic Statement does not adequately cover the facilities planned to be used for the CRBR fuel cycle. There are several items that are generic to subparts (1)-(4) of' Contention 9(b); i) The CRBR now utilizes a different core and fuel management scheme, i.e., the heterogeneous core. ii) The CRBR may operate in the once-through fuel cycle mode for much if not all of its operation life, u
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iii) There may not be sufficient plutonium stocks a',ailable to operate on a plutonium cycle (See Contention 17). iv) The CRBR annual fuel requirements are different from those of the AI follow-on design (See WASH-1535 Vol. 6, p. VI.4.5-2). v) Intervenors believe the source term analysis in WASH-1535 at Vol. 2, Appendix II.G is nonconservative. See 1) NRDC comments on WASH-1535 (Draft) Re: Plutonium Toxicity reproduced in WASH-1535 (PPES) at pp. VI.38-2 to 19
-in Vol . 6 of WASH-1535 ; 2) NRDC Comments on the DRAFT EIS Supplement (Supplement to WASH-1535) submitted in a letter from Barbara A. Finamore, et al. to Wallace R. Kornack, DOE, Fe b . 8 , 1982, pp. 60-68.
Additional specific dif ferences between the Programmatic Statement and the CRBR fuel cycle .as planned are
. identified in the response to Interrogatory 6 above under Fuel' Fabrication, Fuel Reprocessing'and Waste Disposal.
b.) If the basis for your answer in Part (a) 'is that-there are differences between the discussion in the Programmatic Statement and the planned CRBR fuel-cycle, explain specifically_ why those dif ferences lead to environmental impacts beyond those already considered in the Programmatic Statement. Intervenors:do not claim at this time that dif ferences between the planned CRBR f uel cycle 'and the f I-
. discussion in the Programmatic Statement lead to
. environmental impacts beyond those already considered in the Programmatic Statement.
There is insufficient information in Appendix D of the CRBR PES to determine how the Staff derived the estimates in Tables 24 (p. D-4 to 8) from data in WASH-1535 and other references (2-7) in the CRBR FES (at p. D-14). Furthermore, the CRBR PES must be updated to account for deficiencies identified in response to 7a. above. Consequently at this time we have no way of determining from the FES whether the environmental impacts from the CRBR fuel cycle are larger, smaller, or comparable to those of a model i000 MWe LMPBR fuel-cycle as described in WASH-1535. c.) For each area identified as being inadequately assessed state specifically what environmental impacts NRDC believes must be considered to make the analysis adequate. The impacts that must be considered to make the analysis adequate are reasonably scoped in the Table of Contents of WASH-1535. (In responding to this Interrogatory, we are'not making a judgment regarding the adequacy of - the discussion under these sections of WASH-1535; rather we are identifying areas that should be addressed. by an adequate analysis.) u
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Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc. 917 15TII STR E ET, N.W. WAS!!!NGToN, D.C. co oo5 20: 737-500'o w<nem ogu April 13, 1978 ""# # 'A #" 2345 Y^tz sTarar its EAsr 4:s0 starrr PALO AI.TO, CAUF. gjjo6 NEW YORK, N.Y. 2 0017 485 327-io8o 2:2 949-o049 Senator John Glenn, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services Committee on Governmental Affairs Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Glenn,
This is in response to your letter of April 6, 1978 requesting comments on your two proposed amendments to S.2236, the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act of 1977 and the subjects covered in your hearings of March 22 and 23 dealing with the adequacy of safeguards measures imposed by DOE, DOD and NRC. I will s begin by commenting briefly on the subjects covered in the hearings. With regard to Mr. Rotow's efforts, the useful unclassi-fied literature readily available to preform these kinds of exercises is far more extensive than indicated by the few docu-ments utilized by Mr. Rotow. Certainly, the subset of NTIS documents identified by Mr. Urbach represent only the tip of the iceberg. I say this only because I believe your efforts to control the situation by withdrawing a few documents is likely to be counterproductive. At a minimum, it will place a premium on selected documents already widely circulated, and it will flag these particular documents as useful. I would not dismiss on the basis of Rotow's testimony any concern regarding the extent to which the thermonuclear knowhow is scoping into the unclassified literature. The situation is far worse than you might believe. My immediate concern here is with nations that do not presently have thermonuclear devices, rather than the terrorists threat. I will be pleased to discuss this issue with you further privately if you desire. Regarding the testimony of Drs. J. Carson Mark and Theodore B. Taylor, as you are probably aware these two gentlemen have some disagreements over just how easy it is to fabricate a nuclear device. In Enclosure 1, taken from my testimony before the Windscale Inquiry last September, I cite several references that address this issue. Enclosure 1 includes a quote from a chapter in an OTA report that was written by five nuclear weapons g g experts including Drs. Mark and Taylor. Also, I particularly call your attention to the last quotation in Enclosure 1, a view that I share.
@ 73 stu!*.RecycInt Paper N
*-* S:ntaor John Glenn April 13, 1978 page two The bottom line to all this is that I agree with your conclusion that the only real control left is control over the SNM itself. Consequently I strongly support your efforts to strengthen the physical security at NRC facilities.
Turning now to the second day of he: rings, while I do not have a copy of the transcripts of the hearings, I recall that Mr. Donald M. Kerr stated to the effect that physical security at all DOE facilities handling strategic quantities of SNM was comparable to the DOD physical security requirements for safe-guarding weapons. Mr. Kerr's testimony conflicts with the testimony of Mr. Gossick of the NRC, when he appeared before the House Interior Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on July 29, 1977. On page 31 of the Subcommittee's Hearing Record, the following exchange appears: Mr. Gossick: ... The level of protection that we are requiring nou for licensed fuel cycle facilities - the 13 or so that you mentioned - is comparable to the protection provided by ERDA for its facilities handling the same materials. If I missed the point - Mr. Tsongas: What you arc saying is that the safeguards at the 15 facilities are equivalent to the gl safeguards that ERDA has on its weapons facilities. Mr. Gossick: With the exception of those facilities handling completed devices or where they are being assembled, ERDA has different levels of security for those plants. In other words, Mr. Gossick is saying NRC's safeguards are equivalent to DOE's and Mr. Kerr is saying DOE's are equivalent to DOD's. However, everyone recognizes that NRC's safeguards don't come close to DOD's. I believe Mr. Kerr has erred in ' stating that DOE facilities in all cases, particularly facil-ities that do not handle completed nuclear weapons, have the same level of protection as DOD facilities handling weapons. This discrepancy in the public record should be corrected. */ I will turn now to the two proposed amendments, taking them in reverse order. The Comparability Amendment NRDC he rtily endorses this proposed amendment. As you may know, in February 1.76, NRDC petitioned the NRC to strengthen its safeguards so they would be adequate against design threat 4
*/ While the reports required under your proposed " Comparability" amendment to S.2236, if adopted, should clarify the situation, these reports may be classified, u
Sanctor John Glenn April 13, 1978 page three levels that are considered credible'. Our petition was denied by the NRC. To place our concern in perspective, I refer you to Enclosure 2, a discussion of the credible threat drawn largely from my Windscale evidence. From this discussion it can be seen that the majority of safeguards experts including consultants to the NRC and DOD agree that a credible external threat for safeguards purposes consists of "... a group of 10-12 dedicated, well trained and well equipped fanatics with light weapons and explosives," 1/ and a credible internal threat consists of 2-3 persons in collusion. Enclosure 3, also taken from my Windscale evidence, is a discussion of the physical protection presently afforded NRC licensed facilities. It is clear from the chronology developed in Enclosures 2 and 3 that there is no rational basis for the current design basis threat levels adopted by the NRC, e.g., the 3 man external threat as opposed to the 10-12 man threat adopted by NRC consultants and other safeguards experts (and presumably DOD), other than it at best represented NRC's view of the nuclear industry's current capability to provide physi-cal protection. It is important to note that the greater level of physical protection required of NRC licensed facilities under your amend-ment could be achieved much sooner than the 15 month period you J allow. In denying NRDC's petition for implementation of emer-gency safeguards measures adequate against the larger threat levels, the commission in January 1977 did not argue that a much higher level of physical security was not desirable or could not reasonably be implemented, rather the Commission argued that the emergency relief we requested was " drastic" and that NRC's
" current available information ... falls short of establishing a basis for emergency action" 2/, and what is called for is an
" orderly strengthening of safeguards..." 3/ because the " licensees have safeguards programs which are adequate for the immediate term..." 4/.
In summary, we are pleased that you agree with us that the
-physical security at the NRC licensed facilities is not adequate ncu, much less "for the immediate term", and we believe your approach to strengthening the physical security at these facil-ities by beefing them up to the DOD level over a 15 month period is quite reasonable, except that we believe this could be accom-plished much sooner.
1/ " Consideration of the Threat and Potential Threat to the U.S.
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Nuclear Power Industry", Willard'Shankle, 1975, 2/ Petition of Natural Resources Defense Council for Adoption of
-A Emergency Safeguard Measures or, Alternatively, for Revocation 4 of Licenses, NRC Docket Nos. 70-8, ~et al., Memorandum and Order, ~ - -
January 21, 1977, p. 10. 3/ Ibid., p. 16.. {/ Ibid.,p. 17. u, --
m Sinator John Glenn April 13, 1978 page four Confidentiality of Safeguards Informatien Amendment I have serious misgivings concerning this amendment. First, if it were fully implemented, it would have signifi-cant civil liberties implications. Second, even if it were implemented, it would not make a large impact on the threat. Third, it would tend to authorize the NRC to further abuse its privilege of withholding information from the public. There are numerous good reviews of the civil liberties implications of safeguards. (See, for example, Enclosure 4.) The cla.ssifications of information and the security clearance of personnel would involve a broad spectrum of firms and individuals. In addition to the employees of the facility itself, such a classification and security system would have to involve: .
- 1. Contractor personnel involved in the maintenance and repair of the facility.
- 2. The architect / engineer firm involved in the design of the facility.
- 3. The various contracting firms involved in the con-l struction or in bidding on the construction contracts.
- 4. The off-site response forces.
Securing the information within all of these various sources would be next to impossible. But even if this could be done for future facilities, there are some 130 reactors either operating or rnder construction. For these, the cat is out of the bag. Findlly, classification and security clearances with all their civil liberties implications can not clininate the internal threat wherein 1 or more employees, acting alone or cooperating with an external group could per-petrate a successful theft or act of sabotage. In the past, the NRC has used its ability to withhold information as a critical mechanism for deluding the public and the Congress with respect to the adequacy of safeguards. Given a broader mandate, they could and probably would use this privilege to withhold information related to reactor safety since flaws in reactor design could be a point for r sabotage. Implementing the ccmpatability amendment would signi-ficantly improve present safeguards. Implementing the confi-dentiality amendment would add little to safeguards but would ( i 1 L
** S:natorDJohn Glenn April 13, 1978
-page five I have significant civil liberties drawbacks.
In closing I might add that my experience in this area over the past two years leads me to conclude that it is far easier to design and fabricate a nuclear device than it is to get the NRC and the Congress to provide adequate physical security at facilities handling SNM. Sincerely, J
~
Thomas B. Cochran Enclosures 4 w-
Enclosure 1 The Relative Ease and the Likelihood of Success in Design and Fabrication o f 'a Clandes' tine Tission Explosive There is considerable confusion on this subject, in part because of the general limitation, and even supression of factual information. According to a recent US NRC report: An inherent technical problem associated with dissemination of CFE [ Clandestine Fission Explosive) information is the difficulty in developing a definitive statement concerning' the case and likelihood of adversary success in constructing a CFE. Such an assessment involves judgment concerning the adversary's skills, resources and willingness to accept risk of failure, injury or death. There has been disagreement among experts, not only concerning their individual tech-nical assessments, but also concerning the best way of expressing their conclusions. Thus, any attempt to express the " averaged opinion" of the experts is susceptible to challenge. A recent example of such an effort is contained in reference 69. 1/ Reference 69 refers to " Chapter VI, Nuclear We.apons" in the OTA report, Nuclear Proliferation and Safecuards. This chapter was written by the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons composed of five nuclear weapons experts who either are presently or used to be in the US nuclear weapons program.2_/ According to this OTA Task Force: At the low end of the ainimal range of effort, a small group of people, none. of v'm have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nucicar explosive device. They would not necessarily require a great deal of technological equipment or have to undertake any experiments. Only modest machine-shop facil-ities that could be contracted for without arousing suspi-cion would be required. The financial resources for acquis-ition on open markets need not exceed a fraction of a million dollars. The group would have to include a person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields, and a " jack-of-all-trades" technician. Again, it is assumed that sufficient quantities of fissile material have been provided. 1/ US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Report of Task Force on Allegations by James H. Conran, April 29, 1977, p. 4-2. 2_/ US Congress, Office of Technology. Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, July 1977, Chapter VI, "Nucicar Weapons", pp. 139-147. The experts, identified on page v of this report, are J. Carson Mark, Chairman, Los Alamos' Scientific Laboratory; Thomas B. Cook, Sandia Laboratories; George B. Kistinkowsky, Harvard University; Robert W. Selden, Lawrence Livermore University; and Theodore B. Taylor, Princeton University. w:
l . The actual construction of even a crude nuclear explosive k would be at least as difficult as the design itself. The small non-national group described above would probably not be able to develop an accurate prediction of the yield of their device. The device could be a total failure, because of either #aulty design or faulty construction. Here again, a great deal depends on the competence of the group; if it is deficient, not only is the chance of producing a total failure increased, but the chance that a member of the group might suffer serious or fatal injury would be quite real. However, there is a cicar possibility that a clever und competent group could design and construct a device which would produce a significant nuclear yield (i.e., a yield much greater than the yield of an equal mass of high explo-sive). 3/ It is important to note here that the person capable of searching and understanding the literature also could be the " jack-of-all-tradec" technician. Furthermore, literature searches of the type required are known to have beea performed already by several people in order to ascertain the extent of the information that is available. In addition, the " fraction of a million dollars" referred to above could imply a small fraction, e.g. in the neighborhood of one thousand dollars or less. Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, one of the weapons designers on OTA's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons, has publicly expressed the op'nion that " design and fabrication of a successful CFE could be done by perhaps one man, using modest facilities and unclassified information." 4/ This conclusion appears to have been shared by Mr. Carl H. Builder at the time he was Director of the Division of Safeguards, US NRC: Returning to the subiect of CFE's, it was Builder's position that he was convinced in the Fall of 1975 that it was " easy" to build a CFE and from that time on safeguards developments uere based on that assump-tion. He felt that some didn't really want to believe it but Builder personally reviewed public statements on the matter and believed they were consistent from then on. He also informed Safeguards management and staff of this position. Builder discussed this issue with Ted Taylor personally and suggested that the 3/ US OTA, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, Op. Cit. pp. 140-141. 4/ NRC, " Task Force on Allegations by James H. Conran", Op. Cit., pp.' 4-6. See, for example, Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards, (Ballinger, Canaridge, h ;.}, 1 7 4, pp. 22-21; John McPhee, " Profiles (Theodore B. Taylor)", New Yorker, Dec. 3, 10, and 17, 1973 (particularly Dec. 17, 1973, pp. 72-76 and 84-08 where simple crude weapons recipes are presented). 1-2 w
m -
" simple recipes" for CFE's be voluntarily withheld f from public dissemination until safeguards were improved. Taylor agreed with this position although both agreed that these recipes would eventually get out. Builder strongly disagreed with the suggestion that the safeguards staff made decision on any othar basis than that CFE's are relatively " easy". 5/
S/ US NRC Note for Task Force Files, from J. Mark Elliott, Member Task Force on Allegations of James H. Conran, re Telecon with Carl H. Builder on April 19, 1977, pp. 2-3, par. 5. Mr. Builder resigned from the NRC in .'.ugust 1976 to become the Director of Strategic Studies at the RAND Corporation. 1-3 w _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
4' Enclosure 2 Credible Threats "It is generally recognized that the character of potential adversaries, i.e., the threat, 15 a major consideration in arriving at a benchmark for design and evaluation of safe-guards systems." 1/ In April 1974 an independent review of the US AEC's safe-guards program for licensed facilities was carried out for the US AEC's Director of Licensing by a group of consultants headed by Dr. David Rosenbaum. The authors of this report stated:
"THE THREAT Our estimate of the maximum credible threat to any facility or element of transportation handling special nucicar materials is fifteen highly trained men, no more than three of which work within the facility or transportation company from which the material is to be taken..." 2/
Because of the importance of the subject matter, the US AEC's Director of Licensing requested that the Rosenbaum Report be reviewed promptly by the staffs of the three regulatory directorates to assess its findings and recommendations. A May 9, 1974 Memorandum to the Director of Licensing from the three directorates contains the staff's evaluation. This memorandum states in part:
" STAFF CO)24ENT:
We agree that the concept of design basis incidents can and should be applied to material protection. In anology with reactor safety, design basis incidents pose a range of threats such that a system designed to cope with design basis threats will by its nature protect against the lesser postulated threats." 3/ In early 1975, the NRC's Office of Special Studies commissioned the Mitre and BDM Corporations to do threat analysis studies. Shortly thereafter (in the summer of 1975) the Office of 1/ US Nucicar Regulatory Commission, Report of Task Force on Allegations by James H. Conran, April 29, 1977, p. 4-25. 2/ US Atomic Energy-Commission, Special Safeguards Study, by David M.. Rosenbaum, John N. Googin, Robert M. Jefferson, David J. Kleitman, William C. Sullivan, 1974. 3/ US Atomic Energy Commission, Revier of "Specini Safeguards Study',' by Donald F. Knuth, Director of Regulatory Operations; John F. O' Leary, Director of Licensing; and Lester Rogers, Director of Regulatory Standards,.sent to L. Manning Muntzing, May 9, 1974. u
e-~ s.- ..- 1
)
I Special Studies was merged into the Nuclear Material Safety l
- and Safeguards (NMSS). In the fall of 1975, NMSS contracted f with Colonel Willard Shankle 4_/ to review the special studies' threat analyses and other relevant information and to produce the design threat position for the Special Safeguards Study.
Shankle's Report, " Consideration of the Threat and Potential Threat to the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry" was also to provide input to the CESMO effort. While the design basis threat numbers in the Shankle report itself are still classified, they have been declassified in a recent US NRC Task Force established to review a number of allegstions made by James H. Conran, an employee of the Division of Safeguards in the US NRC. One of Mr. Conran's allegations was that the design basis threat used by the US NRC 5/ was not conservative. The Task Force after conducting its review concluded: Mr. Conran is concerned that threats of terrorist, criminal or foreign groups, of up to 12-15 people, as well as dis-gruntled employees acting alone or possibly in collusion with other insiders or external groups, must be considered credible threat possibilities. The Task Force finds, principally on the basis of reference 64, that external threats up to 12 persons are sufficiently credibic to warrant consideration in the developrtent of safeguards acceptance criteria. Review of past actions of the NRC staff reveals that such threats have i- fact been g- considered (34 and 64, for exampic), but the record is not 4 sufficiently complete to demonstrate how such threats factored
'into the staff's ultimate recommendations on group size (91, 105, 106), although it is generally acknowledged that the selection of an appropriately conservativo design basis threat is a highly judgmental process.
The Task Force finds that the preliminary paper (64) prepared by an NRC consultant summarizing several studies in the Special Safeguards Study is relevant to this concern. That paper states, in part, that:
"... a group of 10-12 dedicated, well trained
~
and well equipped fanatics with light weapons and explosives appears to be the level of terrorist capabilities which should be consid-cred when establishing day-to-day security requirements for the nuclear power in industry,.... [in addition, an internal threat] of disgruntled or defective employees [should be considered] .
'4_/ A noted authority with many years of experience in the Nuclear Weapon Protection Program and principal advisor to D0D on such matters.
5_/ Memorandum from Carl 11. Builder, Director, Division of Saf eguards to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director of Licensing, Division of Safeguards, Jan. 19, 1976. 2-2
m The NRC provided these conclusions for comment to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and Defense Intelligence Agency in October 1975. The response from those agencies lead the Task Force to conclude that these threat characteristics are sufficiently credible to warrant further consideration. Additionally the Task Force finds that there can be no assurance or detection of this level of threat prior to an attempted malevolent act on the basis of reference 64." 6/ The quotation from reference 64, "... a group of 10-12 dedicated, well trained and well equipped fanatics, etc." in the above quote is taken from the Shankle Report. The last p o i n't , "... that there can be no assurance of detection of this level of threat (by a group of 10-12 dedi-cated, well trained and well equipped fanatics) prior to an attempted malevolent act..." is based on the US intelligence community view, 'that the intelligence community can provide no assurance or prior detection of adversary groups, unless group sizes become very large, that is " army size".'" 7/ It is perhaps worth noting here that the adversaries, i.e. the external threat, are conceded to have any of the follow-ing equipment: hand guns, semi-automatic and automatic rifles, shotguns, sub-machine guns, machine guns up to 50 l caliber, hand grenades, dynamite, plastic explosives, shaped charges, light mortars, light anti-tank weapons, hand-held air-defense weapons, tear gas, mace, special purpose vehicles, fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, two-way radios (walkie-talkies) and citizens band radios. In the fall of 1975, the NRC sent the Shankle Report to the FBI, CIA, State and DIA for review. The DIA response was as follows: This Agency concurs with the conclusions and re.t.ommendations set forth in the Shankle Report -- specifically that:
- a. The capabilities of terrorist groups must be considered in establishing security systems for the nuclear power industry;
- b. A minimum security system which will provide adequate protection against an adversary group comprised of apprcx-imately 12 dedicated, well-trained, well-armed personnel
'is an appropriate standard; 6_/ US NRC Report of Task Force on Allegations by James H. Conran, Op. Cit.
pp. 4-25, 4-26. I 7/ Ibid.'pp. 4-18, 4-19. 2-3 e
m- -
- c. Close liaison must be continually maintained by installation security managars with law enforcement and intelligence agencies regarding terrorist matters.8/
None of the other agencies (CIA, FBI, State) indicated that the threat levels proposed by Shankle were too large as evidenced from Transcripts of a 1977 meeting of the Task Force on A112gations of James H. Conran.9/ Mark Elliott, of the NRC Staff and a Task Force member, stated, "Certainly none of those responses from the intelligence community [ CIA, FBI, DOS, DIA] said t. h e threat was too high." M/ The 12 man threat is apparently the design basis threat used-to judge the adequacy of safeguards at military facilities handling nuclear weapons. This can be seen from the follow-ing exchange between Roger Mattson, Chairman of the Task Force on Allegations of James H. Conran and James A. Powers of the NRC's Division of Safeguards. It would also be con-sistent with Shankle's experience as a principal advisor to D0D on matters related to nuclear weapons protection. Although the threat levels have been deleted from the unclassified, sanitized transcript (the deletions are indicated by the brackets [] ) it is evident from the Conran Task Force report and DIA letter which refer respectively to a 10-12 man and a 12 man threat icvel that Mr. Mattson in the following quota-tion is referring to this threat level. Mr. Powers: [ ] armed, dedicated violent commando-type could probably take over most ERDA or NRC facilities in the country. Mr. Mattson: Let me follow up on that. I am led to believe, in fact from these very same meros, the one from the Defense Intelligence Agency, that I would call a design threat at ERDA weapons facilities is [ ] well trained, dedicated lunatic types. I am also led to believe from that DIA classified memorandum that those characteristics and that level of threat were picked from a systematic approach to intelligence information and intelligence indicators of the type conducted by the Special Safeguard Study, namely BDM, MITRE, that kind of work. In fact, DIA goes on to encourage near the end of their letter, that this kind of work should be done. Accepting at face value that this is true -- I read it in the Washington Post and I read it in the DIA classified memorandum, 8_/ Dec. 1975 Memorandum to US NRC, Attn: Mr. Lee V. Gossick, re letter of 29 October 1975 from Richard L. Cary, Colonel, USA, Assistant Deputy Director for Counterintelligence and Security. 9_/ Transcript of Proceeding. Meeting of Task Force on Allegations of James H. Conran, April 13, 1977, 10f Ibid., p. 2S7. 2-4 6
~ and given those two sources I will accept for the moment that [] is the design threat for ERDA weapons facilities. That is to protect weapons, fabricated weapons. Did you just - I think you just said that [] dedicated, well-armed lunatic guys seven-feet call, could defeat the ERDA facil-ities. Did you mean against that [ ] even though [] design threat is in place? Mr. Powers: Yes, Mr. Elliott: Just because there is a design threat in there doesn't mean that the facilities are protected to that level. But, did you nean to imply -- did you mean weapons as well as fuel facilities when you made your statement? Mr. Powers: Licenses as well as ERDA facilities. 11/ Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which split the US AEC into the NRC and the ERDA, the US Congress requested that NRC prepare a study to determine the need for and feasi-bility of establishing a Security Agency for the protection of special nuclear materials. A 1975 draft of the Executive Summary of this Security Agency Study prepared by the US NRC stated: l Congressional concern for adequate safeguards was heightened as a result of a special safeguards study done for the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974. That study, by David Rosenbaum and others, ... described a variety of potential problems and short comings in the area of nuclear safeguards and made recommenda-tions for their solution... The Rosenbaum report expressed concern about the adequacy of protection afforded SNM by the private industrial security systems of licensees. One aspect of concern was the level of threat to facilities and SNM. The authors postulated a maximum credible threat consisting of 15 highly trained men, three of whom might be " insiders", employed by the licensee target firm. Threats to nuclear facilities and material can come from external or internal sources. External threats would include overt acts of theft and sabotage. They span a scale ranging from mischief and minor nuisance through coordinated attacks, which at some point would take on the character of a civil war. Internal threats are most often postulated as being covert and might involve diver-sion of material, the perpetration of hoaxes and, perhaps, sabo-1 / Transcript of Proceeding, Meeting of Task Force on Allegations of James H. Conran, April 13, 1977, p. 259. 2-5 w
tage. They span a scale from minor pilferage by individuals, through collusion, all the way through revolutionary conspir-actes, in which entire plants might be covertly controlled.
"To estimate the credible threat, the office of Nuclear Mater-ials Safety and Safeguards researched 19 relevant studies and conducted 9 interviews with individuals and groups of profes-sional analysts from the FBI, the intelligency community, the Department of Defense and State and local law enforcement agen-cies.
"What emerged from this was a consensus estimate that an exter-nal threat group will probably number about 6-8 persons and very likely not exceed 12 persons . . .
+
" Interviews and studies yielded less upon which te base estimates of threats internal to the industry. In general, the internal threat was characterized as follows:
o One person operating alone will probably renain undetected. o Instances of collusion involving 2-3 persons have been encountered in industry. l o Most hijackings involve internal collusion. o Key internal persons can be influenced by threats against their families or other forms of black.* ail. As a result, a credible internal threat, for safeguaris purposes, is estimated to consist of 2-3 persons in collusion." 12/ Similarly, a January 19, 1976 memorandum of Carl H. Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards, to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Safeguards, states:
"The design thrssts in the safeguards supplement to GESMO are divided into an nternal (diversion) and an external (assault) threat. Many parameters or considerations must be taken into account it; describing or specifying such threats. To simplify these descriptions, we have assumed that all of these parameters (e.g. motivation, training, arms, equipment, employment position, etc.) are fixed at worst-case values with respect to safeguards, and that the only remaining variable is the number of people involved in the threat. For a nominal or baselipa threat, as a point of departure, we have assumed that the internal cnd exter-nal threats are two and six persons, respectively. The range of 12/ Draft, Executive Summary of Security Agency Study, pp. 1, 2, 5, 6.
2-6 w
m numbers suggested by threat rescarchers, expert opinion, and partisan comments generally lie within a factor of two, g up and down, from this baseline specification. 13,/ The US OTA in Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards made the following assessment of the threat level in 1977: Current research at the RAND Corporation which involves a number of adversary events selected to be analogous to poten-tial nuclear theft or sabotage shows that groups of 3 to 6 are common, that larger groups do appear, that a group size of 12 does appear to be somewhat of an upper boundary although there are a few cases in modern industrialized societies in which larger groups have been involved. More importantly, the RAND researchers argue that one must be extremely cautious in interpreting historical data regarding the number of attackers since the figures represent for the most part what the perpe-trators, criminals ci terrorists, perceived to be necessary to accomplish their mission, and in most cases what turned out to be sufficient. In other words, they came with as many as they needed to do the job, and no more. The fact that most came with a handful of persons, 3 to 6, thus does not represent an upper limit on their capacity to mobilize people. The upper limit would appear to be higher. Although the historical data are useful as a guide, an estimate of the number of attackers is inescapably a matter of judgment. { Without speaking in terms of a " maximum" threat, the RAND studies suggest a range of anywhere from 7 or 8 to about 15 as a prudent estimate. Again although it is judgmental, military men and law enforce-ment officials would argue that more than this number might even by counter-productive. It is no mere coincidence that after 5,000 years of military history, the smallest operational unit of almost all armies is a squad composed of 9 to 13 men. Even 10 or 12 attackers would stretch to the limit the capacity of most known violent political extremist groups in this country. Moreover, although no one has attempted to determine precisely how many persons must be in a conspiracy rn commit a serious crime before it is no longer a secret, the probability of dis-covery must increase rapidly in the higher ranges. The fear of leaks appears to be a principal consideration and constraint in assembling the personnel for a task force crime.14/ This OTA assessment is based on the RAND Corporation report included as Appendix III-A in the OTA Report. 13/ Builder Memorandum, Op. Cit., p. 3.
~~~14/ US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, July 1977, Chapter VIII, " Control of Proliferation"
- p. 197.
2-7
~
. , Enclocure 3 Adequacy of Physical Security at NRC Licensed Facilities l During 1973 and 1974 a number of reports were published that were highly critical of the,cxisting US domestic safe-guards. Prominent among these were two GAO reports, 1/
the book by Willrich and Taylor, 2_/ and the AEC's Special Safeguards Study known as the Rosenbaum Report. Prodded by these reports the AEC modified its safeguard regulations in 1974 However, the Rosenbaum Report, published after the regulations were changed, concluded with the following: Even though safeguard regulations have just been revised and strengthened, we feel that [the] new regulations are inadequate and that in rediate steps should be taken to greatly strengthen the protection of special nuclear materials. We hope that this paper will contribute in a positive way to the speedy implementation of such steps. As noted in Enclosure 2, the Rosenbaum Report was reviewed by the AEC Staff. In an expression of its concern, the US Congress, in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, mandated that the newly created Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission undertake a one year study of safeguards, called the Security Agency Study. In g conjunction with this study and the ongoing revision of generic environmental impact statements on plutonium recycle in LWR's, the reports of numerous NRC safeguards consultants have been made public during the past two years. Many of these reports are highly critical of existing US physical security. It was la the last half of 1975 that the NRC contracted for and received the Shankle Report discussed in Enclosure 2. The Shankle Report was reviewed by the other Federal agencies in late-1975. Thus, in the following discussion one should keep in mind that this represented the current thinking as to what should be the design threats. In a January 19, 1976 Memorandum, Carl H. Builder, Director of the NRC's Division of Safeguards, conceded that he was 1/ U.S. Cencral Accounting Office, " Improvements Needed in the Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material," (November 7, 1973) and U.S. Cencral Accounting Office, " Protecting Special Nuclear Material in Transit: Improvements Made and Existing Problems," (April 12, 1974). 2_/ Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safe-guards, (Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass.),1974.
"not in a position to judge current safeguards [against nuclear theft) as adequate or inadequate." 3/ The Builder memorandum went much further, however. It states, I am concerned that some or even many of our currently licensed facilities may not have safeguards which are adequate against the lowest levels of design threat we are considering in GESMO (which are, for an internal
[employeel threat, one person and, for an external threat, three persons). 4/ In short, the then head of the NRC's safeguards program was stating that he doubted that the safeguards employed at some or even many licensed facilities were adequate to prevent plutonium or similar materials from being stolen even when only small efforts are involved, such as a theft attempt by one employee or three armed intruders. This small threat of 1 to 3 individuals must be compared with the credible threat levels discussed in Enclosure 2. By January 28, 1976, the NRC had completed a paper review of the adequacy of the physical security at 15 licensed facilities, 5/ to determine whether the physical security was sufficient to prevent, with a high degree of assurance, the theft of more than five formula kilograms of SNM by a) an internal threat consisting of a single employee in { any position, in any singic theft or in any continuing series of thefts over a period of up to one year and b) an external threat consisting of a well planned and coordinated assault by three persons, one of whom nay be an er.ployee in collusion, having the equivalent of military training and equipment. As seen from the January 28, 1976 NRC memorandum,6/ 9 out of the 15 licensees were inadequate against the internal threat, and all but one had inadequate protection against the external threat. The NRC immediately began site reviews of all these facilities. In March of 1976 ERDA j oined in the safeguards review that NRC had begun in January. A joint ERDA-NRC Task Force was formed and charged with developing an action plan to assure confident control and protection of significant amounts of strategic special nuclear materials (SSNM) under government regulations and controls. The joint task force was directed 3/ Memorandum from Carl H. Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards to Ronald A. Brightsen, Assistant Director for Liceinsing, Division of Safeguards, January 19, 1976,
Subject:
Adequacy of Safeguards. 4/ Ibid. p. 2. E 5/ Memorandum from George W. McCorkic, Chief, Physical Security Licensing i Branch, to Carl H. Builder, Director, Division of Safeguards, Jan. 28, 1976,
Subject:
Adequacy of Current Safeguards, and enclosure. 6/ Ibid, 3-2
- m. ]
~- ( by Mr. Builder. The ongoing NRC review was expanded to include three representative ERDA facilities to assure the parity of safeguards between NRCalicensed and ERDA-licensed exempt facilities. The Joint Task Force completed its facility reviews in May 1976. 7/ According to its Final Report, with respect to the NRC licensees The results of the reviews indicated that improvements in physical protection a1d material control (containment measures and access controls as opposed to r.aterial accountability) would be needed at each facility in order to counter the threat level use defined for the evaluation.8/ The threat levels used here were an internal threat of one employee or an external threat comprised of three well-armed (with legally obtainable ucapons 9_/), well-trained individ-uals, including the possibilities of inside knowledge or assistance of one insider. Similarly, according to the Joint Task Force the three ERDA facilities could not counter with a high degree of assurance the external threat if inside knowledge of assistance was assumed, and one of the three could not prevent with a high degree of assurance the diversion by one insider. In summary, although the fixed-facility licensees were found to have safe-guards programs which were generally in compliance with exist-ing regulations, nearly all the facilities were unable to defeat this minimum level of design threat. After further upgrading the safeguards at these facilities, a second round of onsite reviews were conducted in September and October of last year. This time the review teams concluded that
...all facilities visited have the capability of meeting the postulated threat. However, as to several facilities, the site reviews have suggested that the level of assurance underlying that judgment was not as great as for the remaining facilities.10/
~7/ An unclassified version " Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safeguards (U)"
Final Report, NUREC-0095/ERDA 77-34, July 1976. 8/' Ibid. pp. 9-10. 9_/ In other words, hand guns, shot guns and rifles only. 10] Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, in the matter of LICENSEES AUTHORIZED TO POSSESS OR TRANSPORT STRATEGIC QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS, Memorandum and Order, January 21, 1977, p. 9.
The current NRC position with respect to the external threat as expressed in testimony before the US Congress on July 29, 1977 g/, is that .
... safeguards at all fuel facilities are adequate to protect against a postulated threat comprised of, at minimum, a determined violent assault by several persons, perhaps having inside knowledge or assistance.
It was brought out in these same Congressional hearings that "several persons" means "3 peopic". As seen from NRC's proposed safeguards rules M /, the NRC is proposing to further upgrade the external threat level from "several" to "a small group", where the latter is meant to imply 6 people. Thus, it is evident that present, and even proposed, physical security measures at US licensed facilities that handle strategic quantities of SNM are inadequate when judged against } credible threat levels considered by safeguards experts, i.e. those reviewed in Enclosure 2. q 1 H/ US Congress. IIouse, Testimony of Lee V, Gossick, m cutive Director for Operations, US NRC before Subcommittee on Erwre and the Environ-ment, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, July 29, 1977. 8 M/ NRC Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, Performance Oriented ' Safeguards Requirements, Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 128, July 5, 1977, pp. 34310-34321. , I a . . . . . _ _ . _ i
m l Enclosure 4 Civil Liberties Implications of Safeguards
- 1. Ayres, Russell W., " Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout," Harvard Civil Rights _ Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring, 1975.
- 2. Bartkus, Robert and Block, Gail, Rapporteurs' Report: Con-ference on the Impact of Intensified Nuclear Safeguards on Civil Liberties, Stanford Law Schcol, October 17-18, 1975.
- 3. Barton, John H., Intensified Nuclear Safeguards and Civil Liberties, Paper prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, October 31, 1975.
- 4. Westin, Alan F., Congress of the U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safecuards, Appendix Vol. II, Part One, (1977), " Civil Liberties Implications of U.S. Domestic Safeguards", pp. III-128-133.
- 5. American Civil Liberties Union, Memorandum of Special Committee on Nuclear and Other Energy Programs Affecting Civil Liberties, March 29, 1976.
- 6. Center for Science in the Public Interest, " Nuclear Power and Civil Liberties -- Countdown for 1984?," People and Energy, September, 1976.
g 7. The Plutonium Economy: A Statement of Concern, Governing Board, National Council of Churches, September, 1975.
- 8. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 6th Report, Nuclear Power and the Environment, Chap. VII, " Security and the Safeguarding of Plutonium", Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1976, pp. 128-129.
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Department of Energy 773 g ; 1979 Washington, D.C. 20545 Mr. Thonca B. Cochran
- atural Resources Council, Inc.
917 15th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005
Dear !r. Cochran:
This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Departnent of State (DOS #310679), your reference NRDC/T3C/78-19 dated :ttrch 6,1978. A total of nine (9) Department of Energy (DOE) originated documents were referred to us by tha DOS for direct response to you. Theec documenta are numbered 8, 9, 10 and 11 and include enclosures. Uc have reviewed the documents and determined that the followin;; letters and/or memorandums are unclassified. Enclosure #3 - C. J. Zoblocki f rom L. R. Kojoin, 2/6/76 C. J. Zoblochi from A. D. Starbird, 1/13/76 Enclosure (19 - J. Poor f rom R. ::arble, 12/23/75 Enclosurc //10 - Chairman Seaborg etc. from :1. B. Kratzer, 1/27/70 To Files from :1. B. Krat:er, 1/27/70 Enclosure #11 - Chairman Scaborg etc. from M. B. Krat:cr, 12/23/69 It. B. Krat:cr from R. G. Bradley, 12/19/69 Chairman Seaborg etc. from D. L. Crouson, 12/11/69 The questions and answcra enclosed uith the letter listed below contain a DOE deletion on page 3. Enclosure !i9 - Ray :Iarbic from James C. Poor, 2/5/75 The information la being withheld pursuant to Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552(b)(3)) and DOE Regulations 10 CFR Part 1004.10 (b) (3) and 1004.6. The legal basia for this exception is the Atomic Energy Act { j
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1 of 1954, as acended. I an the denying official. - If you disagree with the action that has been taken, you may file an FOIA appeal. You should appeal by sub:.itting a uritten notice to the Of fice
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j of Hearings and Appeals, DOE Headquarters, ','ashington, DC 20461, within
- > 30 calendar days af ter receipt of this letter. The appeal should contain a concise statencnt of the grounds upon which it is brought and a
.; ti description of the relief sought. A copy of the DOE letter that is the y subject of the appeal should also be submitted with the appeal. Both the
> #q envelope and your letter cust clearly identify that a Freedom of Information SE Appeal is being nade (see 10 CFR 100!..S, appeals frca Initial Denials for
~T DOE FOL\ negulations),
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( V John A. Griffin, Director Office of Classification hk Enclosureu:
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- Deccaber 23', 1975 *
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n 3' .JO: Jcre. t Poor, Director i -
- M Divisica of International Sec*rity Affairs C
Ray !arbic, D2puty Direc cr
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SUBJICT: 1*cctin': with Ccncultants of Sti ~=--ittee en Internaticnal Security and Scientific AffM ~., - M. s 1 bp Reg.:est for infor:nntica, frc a Chair: 2.n, Sh:c :tittca en International
.sfe,. .4 Sec.urity and scientific Affcirs, liou 2 Intemacie:r.1 Reintiens ccentit- -%. tee, on alleged Icss of 200 tons of uranit n o>:ide in 1960, uan ;ade.
W -gj A necting was held rc catly b2.:2en :*r. C-acrge R., Serdes, I ajority - Wa
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Staff Ccasulunt, tir. Ecnald I'crcicr, ?:incritv Staff Censultant, - T (liouse Sti cc niitten cn Intern .ticnal Sccurity :nd Scicntific Affairs), W,-r; ! and I*r. I/:n R. Hoj:n, CCn, at which all- g:.1 1003 cf Urani :: 0: cide *
![ during trans;c:: frc .; 521ginn to Italy '.tas dicercred. F.c.-:cver, ths ~ ,
Ae s rol .ox.me of the : :: tin ~:s tas to c'.'. rit the follc/. inc c.uesticas to
,y ?.' ~._. DCI, for answers: .
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- 1. II/.e cnd when did the Icss take place?
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' 2. Unan and heu did tne United Staten Ica:n ahc.ut it? - .t: n .
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- 3. Wnat did the United States da about it?
- 4. Glat could the United Sectes have done ci: cut it?
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- 5. h'nat did Italy and/or Belgit:n do chcut it?
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- 6. Miat uns the ' significance of the 1o:3 ci such a large quantity of
- i. A u uranit::t o::ide at that tinn? .
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YM4$ The Cc..r.tittee still is aware of the classification a: d annaitivity of 1 W' , the nubject.
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9 UNITED STATES f-1,I -
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I ((/ Y.'ASHINcTON. D.C. 20545 ' FEB 5 13/G .
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Ray !!arble; Deputy Director l 11 Office of Congressional Relations
.SPECIAL REQUEST, SUSCO:'f!ITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC A I. i
.? ~. The answers to your questions submitted or! December 23, 1975, are provided
; in the attachT.ent. -
~.1' Ue had delayed our answer in anticipation of some additional information concerning involved. final actica on the part of either or all of the foreign countries ,.
/ -
A response to our inquiry may still be forthecming; however, M wb -1 rather than delay further, we indicated in the attached that we will Provide anything significant that we might obtain as a result of our inquiry. Y I hope that George Berdes will understand that our delay i.Os in his in 1 f.d in the hope that more cc plete information could have been provided. ,
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. James G. Poor, Director idj '. ' Division of International
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Enclosure:
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I Questions con erning the disappearance of Scurce Material from the EURATCll safeguards control system.in late 1958
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I . . J l'. llow and when did the loss take place?' [. 7 ' , ,
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y, '. ..._ EURATOM officials indicated that in November 1958, 200 tons of natural uranium were shipped by a German firm from Antwerp by ship consigned f
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to Genoa for ultimate non-nuclear use as a chemical-catalyst in the
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.cf petro-chemical industry. The natural uranium involved was frca the K' , Belgian Congo and had been bought frca a firm in Belgium prior to the E . shipment. EURATOM security centrol was duly notified of the shipment .
$ '- in December 1963. Uhen, after five months (as required by regulations .
ff; y at the time), no notification of receipt was received, an investigation was Degun. The circumstances apparently involved a transfer of the ff'
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material to another consignee by the ship's captain pursuant to
- i. instructions received while at sea. The ship did not call at Genoa and y? _
there were sev e al changes in crew, ship's officers, and even ship ,, 1p registration around this time. When the ship next arrived at a European M Community port, that portion of the ship's log covering the period in jyj , s question was missing. It was concluded by EUpaTOM security ccatrol that the material probably had been transshipped to Israel. - g&p ~ W .
- 2. Uhen and how did the United States learn abouti t?
Y I?cpresentatives of the PEC, ERDA's predecessor, were orally informed of
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the matter on December 9,1959, by the EURATOM representative in hj .! Mashington, requesting that we treat the informatien as ccnfidential 4 and Sensitive. It should be noted that since the material was not of
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US origin, EURATCM authorities really hed no obligation to inform us 'of
- 7. the matter, but did so in the spirit of cooperation which exists between -
Ild M EURATOM arid the US. Ue had already been alerted to the incident and M provided some of the details by way of an intelligence report received S
- about the middle of liovomber 1950 -
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The U.S. action was limited to expressing to EURATOM strong concern
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and to urging that corrective measures be taken to apply appropriate penalties against the violators. h J' i b .' Additionally, eithough the safeguards system had, in fact, performed L its function of detecting a 2isappearance, the U.S. urged EURATOM to [7 , review its procedures, p3. Licularly uith respect to improving the
.', time schedule on.uhich its safeguards function.
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r IlhatcouldtheU:..tedStateshavedoneaboutjt? . Since it was an internal EURATO:4 ma'tter, did Eot ' involve material of US yV .
-8 origin, significance and involved only source material of relatively low strategic
( appear approp,riate.any positive action in response to the incident did not
- 1
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'.' on safeguards cffective. policy and procedures with the goal of making them more ei -
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- 5. Uhat did Italy and/or Belgium do about it?
8 F He have no informaticn other than the statement that investications were being conducted to establish a basis for possible criminal
% b proceedings by the member states.
w - EURATC1 acticas included: M . a. The Cc:;aission sent letters to each of the member States propcsing J , Sh - the development and harmonizatien of adequate national legislatica y.i p to provide appropriate legal sanctica against offenses of this sort.
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The Co:maission's Legal Services examined the possibilities of legal h[M reccurse under the Treaty in this case. They concluded that such rec'ourse was not available to the Cccmission. Merecver, there was
% a serious question bassa on the results of the investigation that a FJ:.1 persuasive case could be developed against the principals identified % ._, cven if legal recourse had been available under the Treaty. . $3 c. EURATO:
1 reviewed its regulations to determine what modifications A i[$ would 6e appropriate.to safeguard more effectively nuclear material in transit. In a related action, EURATC:4 requested a meeting of
;4{,5 w.j j the US-EURATO'i Joint Technical !!arking Group on Safeguards specifi-cally to discuss trcnsportation prchiems.
M.'S
- m. Ue are seeking additional information as to the final outcome and will y . . .
provide anything significant to you.
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y'i c.u 6. 4 Uhat was the significance of the loss of such a large quantity of uranium .. oxide at that tica? -
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J This was the first known disappearance of tonnace quantities of safe-
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5, guarded source material. but it was detected through standard follow-up pr .cedures for such material transf ers within EURATO:4. The material in , 4TL 7 ,'i . r.cestion about 163was tons.uranica cxide with an elemental uranium metal potential of J .*- .- If the material did go to Israel as suspected, it was
.= .;<
. probably obtained for use in the nominal 26 IP.it reactor at Dimona, which i.,
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ample natural uranium frca dcmestic or other sources for the operation -
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'.' : 2 umTco STATES SE[iiET. ;k.yW'p S-( : J ' N *.4h*
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W ASHINGTCN. D.C. 20543
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+ i January 27, 1970 I
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' Chaircan Scaborg 5 '
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,Co nissioner Ra:ney -.
'f Cor.nissioner Tho=pson ^
'y . Co:cissioner Johnson e
' . Cocnissioner Larson '
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, ,.I IRREGUU.RITII.S Ili TFJd:SFER OF IIATU?.AL UnidiIUP. {' -
e? -\ Attached is a ev2=orandum to the files reporting on conversations
&!d in Brussels with individuals who provided additional inforration
'MI! on the disappearance of natural uranium of Belgian origin. This
;g[g c.atter vas reported to you originally by cy me. orandum of Decem-ber 23,1969. .
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or :A liyron Kratzer pv . Aspiotant General l'.anager for
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- . International Activitics .
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3 h !!coorandum to the files,1/27/70 -
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,g s, s p jf.f8 ,h January 27, 1970 '[ l ' $rfi 1
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On January 15th, I had discussions with $r. Willi Schlied'er' concern- Thesc ;
-'s ing the disappearance of 200 tons of Eurata= natural uranium. .j g
discussions vcre undcreaken at the direct authorization of,Coc=ris- - sioner Haferka=p, who inforced cc carlier in the day, im=ediately .i'
- Y@k .before leavi ng the city, that he had asked Schliede to provide h me with all possible information on this subject.- . :
yp iN On January 16th further discussion, including both Schlieder and Mr. Jacchia, Director of Safeguards for Eurato=, was held on~this YN cubj ect. M - i Most of the inforration obtained during these discussions wasfollow-by
. However, the
- 2. A vay of confirmation of that already received.
ing additional details cace up:
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- 1. Schlieder. offered to supply the names of all fir =s involved in the arrangccents. The names which he provided confir=ed the identi-jfj
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fications previously obtained through intelligence sources. g(
- 2. The shipment wh'ich led to the disappearance of the catcrial took
&@ place in 1968. Before this tice, however, the Belgian shipper had .* '
license
.f' .:i consulted with Euratom's Supply Agency concerning an export . .t y to a Moroccan firm and had been discouraged na to the possibility ' ,
y[$
- of obtaining auch a license on the ground that the export of material'
?93 to Mor'cco would not be in the best interect of Euratom and its Mem-E.
ber States. Thercaf ter, the firm developed the arrangement for proc-l[M escing of the cutcrial in Italy, which, since it did not my Schlieder didinvolve not clarify an export from the Coc= unity, van approved. 2(pp - whether, in connection with their application for this 'ransfer, the
N Belgian firm had identified that the material, af ter tren.Jacnc, vould be reexported to Morocco.
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..-6; 3. The Italian firm which was to have converted the material to a " catalyst form has close business connections with the Belgian firm. -
~~
i$ Schlieder ata! .:d that while nothing could be proved, it is his
$ opinion th:A the Bc1gian firm might not have been entirely innocent : ;h % . ' of the ultimate destination of the material. Ec also noted that the Italian firm concerned had, in fact, never produced ca:alyst of tha -
type,uhich was cupposed to be produced in this i.nstance. .
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4. On the question of the actur.1 destination of the material,
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Schlieder or.id that while they had no documentary evidence, ,K1 th 3?
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, had essentially no doubt thatIsrael, although he was still unable to dis '
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'"~t'$717 basis for reaching this conclusion. . @M several interesting observations which at least partially f a more answere '
this question, although there is apparently evidence o j-)i f specific nature that he was not f ce to disclose:
;p j i The Cernan fire which purchased the material for transfer .I -
- a. 1
.$' to Italy and subsequent sale to a Moroccan company was ;g owned by a Jcvish family. Schlieder cald that the owners ~,
j
$fA were ciderly peopic who quite possibly genuinely did not -
p understand the significance of what they had done.
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- b. Schlieder said Coc=issioner Haferkamp had recently been ,d jg '
informed by a high official in the Cabinet of Chancellor b Willy Brandt that an E= bassy representative in Bonn had
/M.@ called upon this of ficial and asked whether it would bc .
p possibic for Euratom to be called off frcu its continuing investigation of this mat'ter. Schlieder said that while
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g he was not so informed by Haferkamp, he had good reason to
.2j.a know that the A=bassador in question uns the Israeli ,
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c. Some time af ter the disappearance, and after Euratom investi- !! g gations had begun, Commissioner Haferkano received a call U uhich he referred to Schlieder, f rom a Cerr.au attorney in .: M;g:.y Wiesbaden whose name was Von Preusschen, who stated that F M while he vould like to provide information on the whereaboutt do M of the material, his principals felt that it was unwise to r so because of the possibility of a leak of the inforcation. ld
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Nevertheless, he did want to provide assurances (a) that being it was ! ma'tcrial was not in Eastern Europe, and (b) thatSchlieder said '.'
;Ik used only for peaceful uses of atomic energy. his [,
that he attc=pted to persuade this attorcey to go beyond ~; ij statements and disclose the whereabouts of the miterini by i G 7, aosuring him that Euratom had tight security control of sens - tive inf orration. (In the course of describing this, '-
,W time that Euratom has '
(. T Schlieder explained to me for the first a classification and occurity system for sensitive information .; ', i ,, to which only a few personnel, thisincluding security Euratom inspectors , and classification ;
.) e have access). He said that
*l; system is norm.sily ecployed only for cinctified patent appli-cations di::clesed to Eurctom and for infe:nstion frca France .
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f if s regarding the amount of material withdrawn from Euratom d
,q . safeguards control for the French military progra=. He daid that for this reason, Euratom safeguards records -
at Luxembourg were under a tight security control under i h y a the supervision not only of Euratom itself but of the French Deuxice.c Bureau. However, although the attorney
..f .M stated that he would consider this catter and return in a ucek to provide the additional inforeation on the where-
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- abouts of the material, he has never done so. Schlieder caid that he had the iapression, but was net certain that g
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the attorney might also be Jewish. - S. .Schlieder, said that a further atte=pt to divert material was ff c.ade in July 1969. This invcived 232 kilograms of natural uranium 5W . bought by the same Cerr.an firm fro = huken. The transfer was quickly identified by the Euratom safeguards staf f and an investigation of
~
k it was immediately undertaken. According to Jacchia, in tbr course of this investigation which he participated in personally, " pres- , gf sure" - including threats of ieprisonment - which was not strictly g legal, was brought on the owner of the firm. The owner became Og extremely emotional and concerned, and promiced to return the ljg
,8 caterial within three days and did so. Eu'ratom belicves that this ,
material had actually Icf t the country and had been returned. We rpe
/'If -
discussed the obvious. point that, after the successful diversion M4 of 200 tons of material, the diversion of an additional 232 kilo-h grams made no sense. While agreeing that this was so, Euratom had ,
;4yi no explanation for the mat cr. .
Ay -
;' 3 6 The Belgia'n owners of the 200 tons of uranium have a total quan- '
d..'Dm tity of approximately 4,000 tons on hand, representing the final N production of their mine in the Belgian Congo, which was not pur-p fl chased by the United States. This figure is ccm:.cretally secret information which the firm involved considers extreccly sensitive,
}tg
- since they believe knowledge of it might.have an effect on the market price of uranium in Europe.
ji h 7. Schlieder said that Euratom has been searching assiduously for a .
~
means to apply sanctions , i.e. , penaltics to those responsible for o f*.f f} the diversion but that they.so far had been unabic to do co. He l ."
- explained that, in general, while Eurato a '.iad the responsibility cf '
for the operation of a safeguards system for the detection of diver-4, ston, the responsibility for criminal penaltics against violators ' . rested with the national governments. He nada.a point of noting - S' .. , q that 'a sinilar cituation applies as well to the T*.%. '_Morcover, f. 1 :. -
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z he said that the disappearance had been extremely cleverly p annc's for a period of more than a year before it actually was execute of the parties 4(, , . L i.'q l that they f aced the problem of lack of proof that anyhe ultimate diversion under Euratom jurisdiction were implicated in tHe also rdedpointed out t of the catcrial. 3 diversion of the caterial were Cercan nationals and that he regasince x . this as a deliberate ciccent of the plant, i l action against . d . would Israel. be very difficult for Cercany to h take offic aHe rade ld protest whether the German Covern=ent should not consid
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l to the Israeli Covern=ent an obvious attempt to c y 4 of Cercan and Euratom laws and policies,
^
finding,y,' k$ 8. Notwithstanding the difficulties they are encountering is still anxious on , a b~. sis for the application of penalties , Haferkarp his case. (Vaile Hafer- - ,j, ..J
- that there be soce official action I got the taken on t impression that it was distinct
.] ka=p might hold this view, In the ccanti=e, Euratos, iw not shared by the German Covernment.) hing.the initiative in -
j .l even though it has no charter to do so, ,is ca l statutes and 2 ~ vorking with the Mccher States to develop new criminaThis is in addition
; t' tightening regula- ;y penalties for handling instances of this type.to steps they
( ; tion for the transportation of caterial.
'E 9.
Schlieder and Jacchia also stressed, as they have in other con-investigative
's safe- -
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versations, that knovicdge of this diversion and the u steps that followed came about only as a result of Euratom i ary func-
%,g guards systems, which had therefore accomplished its pr =Jacchia ';sai -
}
-{ ., t: tion of detecting diversions. intc?ligence service :
gfy . carried out by Euraton, which of course has no d in many g . as such, were extre=cly exhaustive and went well beyon , .fd respects, Euraton' a strictly legal poders.
- M M -
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v M ! h.'$ liyron[.Krat:cr . 3 WC . Assictant Cencral Manager for . . T' International Activitics
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- December 23, 1969 .
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'e M.w. , 3 InnSG"LARITI"S IM TRA'GrEn OF HATUP.AL UP.ANI'JM h '
M AttacheC is a raport frca our Brussels office providing
% further details on the disappearance of natural urani =.
of Belgian origin which uns reported to the Cc=lssion
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for International Activitics 2.n w.s i - gg .' Attachr.' ant: . Q .- -- Bradley ltr to Krat:cr . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . _ . . . g dtd Dqember 13, 1969 , WwY. . cc: Mr. Uollingsworth, GM .
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U. S. Atc.aic Encrgy Co :ission
. 1.'ashington, D. C. 20545 . [% -
Dear Fyron:
, . . , .*j . c.g ; On Decc.-bcr 18 Robert Kaufme.n and I rnet with U. Schlieder, Co.:,issioner :-
, lh:ferh:rg's Chef da Ocbinet, in rccponse to his, enpre:::cd willingness to *[f3 claborate on the detcilr. o ~ the illegal disposition of naturci uraniu ,
M - T uhich una of Del;iu:a cri;in. Mr. S:hlieder indicated that, the meterici b ei n a, of noa-U.S. ori';in, Eurctoa te under no oblisction to take dis-T{4 clo:.ures of this car.c. hv.rever, in c rpirit of coop:rction for thich there N' M.-
- c::iste.1 a Icn, hicrory of vorhing clonely to;cther on t,attere pertainin; to the d scic~r. cat c,d inplement: tion of ef20ti"c control: for nucicar
,:c. r 4/R enteri:1c, the Eurapcan Cor.ticcion vsnted its U.S. counterpcrt to have *
$.'; tF: b:m fit ef itr ::" :rd.("u in t'H s e-r.e, rccogni:. irs that the incident 4M could have o: curred any picce, including the U.S. Eurcte= is tching steps .
k y.9 -~ promptly whi:h it hopes till r.initier; the pro';cbility of a recurrence of this sort. In this connecti'on, Euraton hopes it een ceunt on cooperation 5 uith tha U.S. in es:: ssin; the probicas secociated with safeguarding nuclec
^h .S m:::risis in tin. cit. The obj::tive would be to modify entsting Co:::. unity .
re;; ult.tions on there untters, p::ticulcrly cc they pertcin to corr: n teric1. N7 Mr. Schlieder stresced 'that chile in this frcec of reference Corfaiccicner
'h U2ferhaap uns prep red to discusr thic pcrticulcr ent:c vith the U.S. Covern- .$k ment, he r.:ust in::i::t thet it pro:ced under a closh of ctrictest secrc:y due h
di to the hi ;hly scacitive probleas in the case. Ehl
. /.s to the det ils of 'the cc o uhich 1:r. Schlieder revected: .
N.1 1. The natural urantua cama from the stockpile of Societc Cener:1c Miniere h s (50;:), a Eci;, ion firm which has been a urcniur supplier for _ cany years. in accor:'enee uith the Cor . unity regulation,SGM filed an cppropricte
'%y Nf rep;rt of the shipment eith Eurato a. This resul tion 1:o stipulctes Dk that the courii ; ace vill file'a report on receip. of the r*sterict within
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g nt . five conths of the d::: of its t.hipment. The abres:e of thi: repv..
/$ en the required tirc.: schedule 1: uh:t tri;Screi en inquiry by Eura:ce's ,
W.f : fe;uerd!. gro.:p cud its subscr:ucat inve::i';ction upon Icarnin; that " " the c.tcriel h d not arrived : its intended destination. :I 3 i
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a 2. The cia:cri:1 uas ordered by a Cerncn firm (Seblied: did not identify) g J Rt uho u s a :in.j as an c ,en: for eno:hcr party, reportedly a petroleuzt j]: .- pro:::sor in 1;orocco. The latter is of such r.ie:3:r holdin; th t *t : ' The Gcrcen p. scre: u .likely it was b::ing purch: sed for i ts oun ucc.
$ :.H fir:r had beca vicued as a repu::.ble one, at le::: up to about o.c yccr
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sto then it uns dropped as lL*.TO contr:ctor. The n:terial uas :on-l-
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T-i, S';i hed rc:ci ted an enport license from the Sc1rian Government and f. g} .
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h:d evidence that Italy had ic::ued en import li: O r.s c . I'oreover, SSM o g:/ received pay = nt fer the natcriel froa S. iss bank prior to cetu:1 , i S shipn:nt of the materi:1. The transport of the netcriel to Antuer? p)g;3 was erren;;ef by 502: uith, ac rding to Schlieder,. a very reputchic firm. [ x4 I. . Th: conti::ncr, the Gert an fir:n orderini, the c:teri:1, reportedly re-i f ceived specific shippin; instructions includit:; the nc ce,cery paper vork fron th: p rty en uhose behalf they ucre cting. These instructions
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ctipult.ted thct th: meterit.1 could be tahcn ::,o:rd a Cermen ship ct :-
"$$ Antuerp which v : cr. route to that port fro:n th-hu:3 Eeratom Icarned .
that otnerr. hip of this vessel cheap.cd hands while ir ucs en'rcute fror g kaburg to k.tuerp n:' thet uithin one hour citer it.. crrival in Antuerp y, . 1p j;
-its resistry was cher.;nd and it uent under a Liberian fle;. ::orco ter ,
$g$p there ua: : completc cht ; of creu sher:1y upon itr arrint in .'.ntuerp. ...
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The n:u c ptcin requerted 1:5:13 on th: shippin; dre :: uhich sicply n s indi :ted th:.t the contained :..:terie.1 uns seid to be chemic:1s. ,
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'i 5 Uhen this thip cen: sde cril at c Cent:: unity port it une returnin- fren F
!!ce.:uia and had still : different crcu. Th 2t portien of the ship':. los .-
%yd coverin; its carlier trip froa Antuerp uns ::issins.
[bs 6. E:rly in 1:- investi;stion Eurato: cr.11cd in the k.btssadors fro: Eel;ica, Italy end ". Corceny and solicited their help in u teevering Qi % the f ::s of this c Oc. S:hlieder et one poir.t indic ted the Duta
? Cyrer..::nt v ;w te :enecrned abcut 1cch ia this case uhl=h u::
. . . s, "the only indi:: lon th:: One:hcr :::c.5:r St c:e h:2 bec.) breu3h : in on
." the ::.=:. This :pp rently resul:cd !rea the f..et th:: the : hip med: 'i e c:11 rt a Putch por: after laevir; !.n:ucrp.
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- 7. In an c~for: to : veld a re:urrence of c si:uction of this type Eureto;
; j . is taking the follo::i .3 cetica:
i c. The Co-missien he.c cpproecd sendin , letters to ecch of the Menber , ( . States proposin ; :he development and harmonicc ion of cde ;ucte l M(.O national icgiciccio.. to provide cppropricte le;cl sanctions cGainst
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.nv fjp . b. The Co. .nir.sion's 1.c ;sl Servi:e hct. been c:.:c=ining the pc:::ibilitics of le;al rc:<.,urse under the Tre:ty for the current case and its .
. . - , ,- de:icion is c::pe::cd soon. Horever, the results to date cre not
. en:ouregin, thct such recource is avcilcble to the Cc= mission. e
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to date the.t : persuctive ccse could be dcveloped c;cinst the principcis identified thu: fcr even if legcl roccurse verc availc-g
. ble u6 der the Treaty.
!.!.d, c. Eurctor her its re;;eletions under revieu to deter =ine chct ecdifi-
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-% cations ecy be cypropricte'to nore effectively safeguard nu:len-natcrici in transit. In a relcted a:tica, Eurcton hcs requusted
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. Scf guards to discuss tran portation pro', lens. Eurcto repre-
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sentc :ives vould hope to be prepcred for such a meeting by mid-
.) January. * ,;d$'..
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- d. S:hlieder promised to hecp us advised of any further develcpment::
in thit. cr.se includin ; cny lencl cetions thich the Cc: =ission or M.dd~.
. any I'.rber State r ncy undertche. At the accent it vould c,' ',ccr tha: the grestes possibility fer such cc ion rests vith the FRG,
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f] p 6 but it vill be ver; difficult for the Ger:ca Government to decide on specific c: tion, if cny, to tche in vicu of the apparca:1y deficica: juridi:cl bc::is cad fcetuc1 cvidcnce en which to instituie . Q . crimin:.1 1c3:1 pror.ccdings. impliertion: which could crise vis-c-Vis the Soviets cad Arch s:ctc:: Morcover, there cre scrious politicci
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J y In response to his request for an opportunity to brief the writers gf regarding' a Euratem safeguards mat:cr, Mr. Curt Heidenreich, p Washington representative of Eurato=, met with Myren trat:cr and Leonard
;g g Erenner (representing Delmar Crowson) at H Street on Decc=ber 9.
Mr. Heiden:cich, Director, Co=ission of European Cc=unitics Washington y Liaison Office, was accompanied by Mr. Felin Oboussier, Chief, Division TAjy of Cencral Af fairs and Internal Ad: inistration, Supply Agency, Ce=is-
.$ 2 sion of the European Cc=unitics, who was in Washington on other business.
N Mr. Heidenrcich stated that he was under instru:: ions to report to us on this mat:c from Cc=issioner Haforkamp, who is responsibic for safeguards
. g.; in the European Co= unity Cc=ission.
Mr. eidenreich reported-that 200 tens of sourec,Ioflatcrial (naturnl h,' uranium) were shipped by boat from Antwerp to GeEon or ulti=ste non-iA nucicar use (chemical catalyst in the petro chc=ical industry) in Italy'. i The contrac: involved source material frc= the Belgian Congo, then h IM located in Eclgium. U.S. material was not involved. He added that Euratom safcguards personnel, in the normal course of their function, 5:tc=pted to verify receipt of the ship =ent by :he consigace in I:aly . [%j% and found it had not arrived. Euratom thus fccis thc: the de:cc ica of
.U the loss and possible diversion has been a significant de=onstration of lh the effcetiveness of their safeguard system, whose objective is to detect
[k
- diversion since the loss might not otherwise-have beca discovered.
.%ptf). An investigation was initiate f and is still 'in process by Euratom a: i its k Member States. Heidenref'.n stated tha: Eurate... usuld have preferred to
.hk ' advisc us of the loss c:.rlier, but was requested to v::hhold notification l}
by its Mc=bcr States pending completion of investig. : on. They have now
., decided to inform us, but requested that we treat tne entire entrer as sensitive a..d confidential. He also stated that if the loss had involved wi U.S. caterial, the U.S. would have been no:ified at once. Heidenreich _ i
.$,4}. indica:cd tha: we were under no restriction as to'wh:m this information could be nade available on a confidential basis, including the JCAE.
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Before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LIQENSING BOARD Washington, D.C. 20555
.Iri the Matter of )
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ) PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) Docket No. 50-537 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTilORITY )
)
(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )
- -)
OBJECTION TO INTERROGATORY 3(a) Intervenors object to that part of Interrogatory 3(a) which asks that they " explain . . . the actions NRDC believes must be taken to adequately address the effects of sabotage, terrorism and theft directed against the CRBR." This question is irrelevant, and, further, seeks to elicit an opinion, rather than factual information. Respectfully submitted, Eldon V. C.. Greenber TUTTLE & TAYLOR 1901 L Street,- . . Washington, D.C. -20035
-(202) 861-0666 Dated: LMarch 29; 1982 washington,.D.C.
L
, , - . . Ix'a
e e 5 Before the-UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Washington, D.C. 20555 In the Matter of )
)
UNITED. STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ) PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION ) TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ) Docket No. 50-537
)
-(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant )
)
AFFID AVIT OF DR. THOMAS B. COCHRAN I, Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am employed as a Senior Staff Scientist by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and, as such, I am duly authorized to execute the foregoing answers to interrogatories.
- 2. The foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, b -
Dr. Thomas B. Cochran SUBSCRIBED-and SWORN to before me this.le '^5 day of /tA,/ , 1982. V ,
)
.-n*
- n,gf/ / !,{ e c Notary ,Public Kr cese- ret .,1st 11 im l
. 1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ANSWERS AND OBJECTIONS OF INTERVENORS, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB, TO NRC STAPP'S PIPTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO'NRDC was delivered by hand this 29th day of March 1982 to: Daniel Swanson, Esquire Stuart Treby, Esquire Bradley W. Jones, Esquire Of fice of Executive Legal Direct. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Maryland National Bank Building 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20814 R. Tenney Johnson, Esquire Leon Silverstrom, Esquire Warran E. Bergoholz, Jr., Esquire Michael D. Oldak, Esquire L. Dow Davis, Esquire Office of General Counsel U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20585 George L. Ed g a r , Esquire Irvin N. Shapell, Esquire Thomas A. Schmutz, Esquire Gregg A. Day, Esquire Frank K. Peterson, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 And by mail, postage prepaid, to the following: Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Boar'd U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-4350 East West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 b- .s m. m
s, Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr. Director Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California P.O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (3 copies) Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., Esquire Lewis E. Wallace, Esquire James F. Burger, Esquire W. Walker LaRoche, Esquire Edward J . Vigluicci Office of the General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority 400 Commerce Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 William B. Hubbard, Esquire Assistant Attorney General State of Tennessee OfYice of the Attorney General 422: Supreme Court Building Nashville, Tennessee- 37219 1 I l pBPitz s-Lu .. _ 1
c: e Lawson McGhee Public Library 500 West Church Street Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 William E. Lantrip, Esquire City Attorney Municipal Building P.O. Box 1 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Oak Ridge Public Library Civic Center Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37820 Mr. Joe li. Walker 401 Roane Street liarriman, Tennessee 37748 Commissioner James Cotham Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development Andrew Jackson Building, Sutie 1007 Nashville, Tennessee 32219 Eldon V. C. Gre I_ t
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