ML20050A428
| ML20050A428 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1982 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Glenn J SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050A429 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204010283 | |
| Download: ML20050A428 (11) | |
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The Honorable John Glenn
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Dear Senator Glenn:
This is in response to your January ll,1982 request that the Commission's staff provide its views on a fact sheet. " Notes on the Perry Nuclear Plant,"
and three media clippings from one of your constituents, Ms. Genevieve Cook.
During the licensing review of the Perry application, all of Ms. Cook's concerns that fall within the scope of our jurisdiction have been or are.
presently under review by the staff. Some of these concerns have been fully resolved to our satisfaction while others are awaiting further infomation or study. A.few of these concerns were fully litigated during the construction permit hearing held from 1974 to 1977. All of the remain-ing concerns that are appropriate to the Comission's scope of review will
' be addressed during the operating license review which is currently underway.
Some of these concerns have been admitted as contentions for an operating license hearing which is currently expected to begin in Painesville, Ohio, later this fall. Construction of the plant is not expected to be completed until late 1983.
Prior to the start of the operating license hearing, the staff will document, the results of its safety and environmental review. A Draft Environmental Statement (DES) is scheduled to be issued in the next few weeks and finalized in a Final Environmental Statement (FES) this sunmer. A Safety Evaluation Report (SER) covering the bulk of our review is currently expected to be issued in May 1982.
One or more supplements are likely to be required to resolve all issues. The first such supplement is targeted for issuance in July 1982. All of Ms. Cook's concerns that are within our scope of review o3 will be addressed in these documents.
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Notwithstanding the fact that our review is still in progress, we are en-closing responses to Ms. Cook's concerns consistent with this fact.
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I hope this infomation will be helpful for you to respond to your consti-
.tuent.
0204010283 820324 Sincerely, PDR ADOCK 05000440 H
PDR Mm:nT. A.Rshni ELD ED0 JThessin
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Willian J. Dircks WJDircks 3/ /82 fExecutive Director for Operations 3/
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.3 ENCLOSURE Commission's Staff Responses to Ms. Cook's Concerns about the Perry Nuclear Plant e
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Cobents on Perry Plant C"oncerns Concern No. 1 and 2 There are four schools within three miles of the Perry reactors, two of_them elementary.
The Perry Township High School by the old Atomic Energy Com-mission regulations would be in the exclusion zone. Within 10 miles are the Madison high school, middle school, and a couple elementary schools.
All roadways North of I-90 are two-lane, so that in case of accident and evacuation, long strings of school busses could be bogged down and stalled in traffic.
Children, who are more susceptible to radiation injury than adults, would inevitably be forced to breathe considerable radiation-con-taminated air.
(9 schools within 5 miles; 32 schools within 10 miles; insufficient buses)
Access to I-90, the nearest major throughway, is midway of Madison at Route 528.
Route 2 ends between Perry and Painesville and parallels the westerly exit or access to I-90.
East-West traffic on I-90 with a northerly wind would be traveling for miles in radiation-contaminated air. 'There is no adequate North-South route out of the area.
Lake County wants Cleveland Electric to cover the costs of disaster services.
Response
These concerns are associated with the Perry Plant Emergency Plan. The Plan in its current form, Appendix 13A to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), addresses the evacuation of school children and area evacuation routes. These matters were discussed at the prehearing conference in Painesville, Ohio on June 2,1981. The applicant is aware of these con-cerns and is assisting the local communities in the development of the local emergency plan to resolve them.
For evacuation routing, the appli-cant has indicated that the Ohio State Highway Patrol an~d local police forces will be mobilized to maintain traffic flow and exclusion from some roadways, if necessary.
The Emergency Plan must meet our requirements prior to issuance of an operating license for power levels above 5%.
The Energency Plan has been admitted as a contention to the operating license hearing (expected to begin in November 1982).
The Lake County Board of Commissioners have been granted status as a party to this pro-ceeding.
Their primary interest in the proceedings is in regard to the development and financing of the local off-site emergency plan.
Concern No. 3 Highways to and from the reactor site are inadequate for the 40,000 to 45,000 cu. ft. of low-level radioactive wastes which must be transported away each year.
On-site storage would be most unsuitable in the Perry area with its ground water problems.
Response
Based on experience to date at operating nuclear plants, the staff has no reason to expect that the hauling of Perry low level wastes will be a major safety or traffic problem.
Low level radioactive waste will be
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typically enclosed in 50 or 200 cu. ft. containers for shipment.
A normal truck could easily transport four-200 cu. ft. containers, each approxi-mately 5' x 5' x 8' in' size. At that rate, the annual low level waste could be removed in 50 to 57 separate truck trips.
This number of truck shipments should not significantly impact local traffic.
I The applicant has p'roposed only temporary on-site storage of low level waste d awaiting shipment to off-site repositories.
Thus, the leak-tight con.
l tainers should prevent any low level waste from entering the groundwater during this temporary storage period.
_ Concern No. 4 Construction of the reactors at Perry was halted several times because of seriously sub-standard workmanship in safety related areas.
Inspection of the work was found t: be inadequate and unreliable with forged inspector initials on work which had not been inspected.
There is no assurance that the Perry reactors could be operated safely without serious malfunction.
No quality assurance.*
Response '
The issue of quality assurance during the Perry plant construction has been admitted as a contention for the operating license hearing.
The contention has been restricted by the Hearing Board to the specific quality assurance implications arising from the February 1978 stop work order.
At that time with the plant in the initial stages of construction, the Com-mission found major deficiencies in several areas of construction activity which indicated a major breakdown. in the quality assurance program.. Con-struction at the.. Perry plant was halted until Cleveland Electric I,llumir.ating demonstrated that' thesd deficiencies 'had been overcome.
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We are' aware of the recent events in regard to quality assurance that~have led to press articles.
These two events concerned the welding of liner' plates in the suppression pool and the installation of electrical cable.
In these instances, either the contractor or CEI reported or detected the defects early and corrective action was token.
In both events, stop work orders were issued, one by Newport News (the containment steel erector) and the other by CEI' to L.K. Coms.tock (the electrical contractor). A number of allegations have been made regarding these events.
During the NRC investigation of the allegations, some QA problems in.the electrical area have been identified. An NRC enforcement action is. presently under consideration and a team inspection has been scheduled to provide further details.
In the meetings with the applicant on these matters, CEI has
'been cooperative and responsive in making corrections.
Concern No. 5 Because of the underground high, water table level (16 inches below the' surface), Perry is to use a porous cement blanket and pumping system instead of stronger foundation walls.
The complete system is untried--only parts of it--and there' is the unanswered questi.on as to whether the soft shale under the cement blanket could erode and block the pores.
Failure of the pumping system could threaten the stability of-the reactor building, according to NRC engineer, David Lynch.
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Res ponse This concern relates to the underdrain system, a system designed to draw down the groundwater level at the site.
The system was required after an analysis in 1974 of the dynamic stability of safety-related structures indicated that the safety factor against overturning during a seismic event was insufficient. This insufficiency was due to the buoyancy forces associated with the normal groundwater level.
The sta'ff requires a minimum safety factor of about 1.5 during the Operating Basis Earthquake (.0BE) and about 1.1 during the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The underdrain system was a fully litigated issue resolved at the Perry construction permit hearing.
The normal groundwater elevation at the Perry site is 618 feet, msl.
The underdrain system will maintain the groundwater at an elevation of 568 feet, msl, under normal conditions and will maintain the groundwater at an eleva-tion of about 594 feet, msl, under worst case assumptions. With a ground-water level of 594 feet, msl, the safety factor for the safety-related structures against overturning during the postulated Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) ranges. from 1.8 to 4.4 and from 1.1 to 2.5 during the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
All of these values are within the acceptable limits which were established by the staff.
The porous concrete blanket is not the load bearing member for the plant foundation.
The plant is supported by means of appropriately designed reinforced concrete members.
The porous concrete blanket was placed in and around these supporting members to offer a path for water flow.
An elaborate system involving Class A fill is placed around and beside the.
porous concrete to act as a filter blanket to protect the porous cont: rete from-infiltration of fine particles present in Class B fill and existing subsoils (includes the soft shale mentioned in the concern).
The Technical Specifications for operation of the plant will require that if the water level in the pressure relief, underdrain_ manholes exceeds elevation 570.0', the Commission shall be notified of the fact and remedial action taken.
If the water level exceeds elevation 580.0', the eactors will be required to' shut down 'and emergency actions taken to reduce the water level.
Note that these controls are initiated well below the 594.0'-
level that has been shown to be acceptable.
Concern No. 6 The Perry facility is in earthquake area, which runs diagonally through the Buffalo area, Lake Erie, northern Ohio, and angles down to Miss6uri.
Any quaks activity could disrupt the pumping system and building stability.
The Perry site has a rock fissure, which has been filled 30 feet across with cement, running diagonally across the entire site from southeast to northwest. The extent of the fissure was unknown at the time it was decla' red to be of glacial origin.
A second and different rock fissure is in the floor of the tunnel which runs out under Lake Erie.
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Response
The geological fault or anomaly at the Perry site (on land) was a fully litigated issue during the construction permit hearing.
Specifically, it was determined that the faults and other irregularities in the shale at the site (a).are nontectonic in origin, (b) are the result of glacial activity, and (c) cannot be expected to cause earthquakes.
Since the CP stage hearingo similar faults were discovered in the vicinity of the intake and discharge tunnels under t.ake Erie.
In a letter dated November 30, 1981, the. staff's consultant from the United States Geological Survey has concluded that these faults are also non-capable.
Therefore, based on the available information, the staff presently believes that the seismology of the Perry location has been appropriately considered in the plant's design.
Concern No. 7 j
The Perry utilities have petitioned the NRC for permission to triple the size of its spent-fuel storage facilities. With no federal program demon-i strated as feasible for long-term storage of spent reactor fuel, we have no assurance that the Perry spent-fuel assemblies will ever be moved from the site.
According to a German study this past year, a loss of coolant in a spent-fuel storage pool, either from disruption of supply or destruc-tion of storage pool walls from earthquake or settling, could result in a more widespread accident than a reactor meltdown.
The storage pools lack the built-in safety systems which would mitigate the effects of a serious reactor accident.
The inadequate roads combined with population evacua-tion efforts would greatly hamper emergency assistance in the area under such circumstances.
Response
This concern was iddressed at the prehearing conference for the opera-ting license hearing.
The spent fuel pool is a steel lined, conc' rete pool inside a thick reinforced concrete building. These structures are designed 9 withstand the worst postulated seismic event for the Perry site.
Since the intervenor did not icentify any fault with the pool design or mecha-
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nism for loss of coolant, the Board has rejected this issue from the hearing The staff's evaluatioh of the spent fuel pool, including its size and d'si.gn) e will ap~ ear in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which is expected to be p
issued in May 1982.
Concern No. 8 In case of accident utility insurance liability is limited under the Price-Anderson Act to the grossly inadequate $650 million [ sic] limit.
People in area are unable to get personal insurance which will cover either property damage or health damage from radiation exposurt It is very difficult to l
prove that cancers, leukemia, or birth defects years later have resulted from such radiation exposure.
The 20 year statute of limitations would further limit efforts to secure just restitution.
People living within a 50 mile radius of the Perry reactors would bear most of the costs of, an accident, both physically and financially.
Response
Under the Price-Anderson Act there is a system of private funds and Government indemnity totaling up to $560 million to pay public liability claims for personal injury and property damage resulting from a nuclear incident.
The Act requires licensees of commercial nuclear power plants having a rated capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more to.. provide proof to the NRC that they have financial protection in the form of private nuclear liability insurance, or in some other form approved by the Commissio:
in an amount equal to the maximum amount of liability insurance available aB reasonable cost and on reasonable terms from private sources.
That financia protection, presently $530'million, is composed of primary private nuclear liability insurance of $160 million available from two nuclear. liability insurance pools--American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters (MAELU), and a secondary retrospective premium insurance layer up to $5 million per power reactor licensed per incident but not in excess of $10 million for a single r,to operate eactor in any year.
With 74 commercial r.eactors operating under this system, the secondag insurance layer totals $370 million.
The difference of $30 million between the financial protection layer of $530 million and the $560 million liabili%
limit is the present Government indemnity level.
Under the present system, indemnity will be phased out as more commercial reactors are licensed and participate in the retrospective premium system.
At the time the primary and secondary financial protection layers by themselves Provide liability coverage of $560 million, Government indemnity will be eliminated.
Then the liability limit would increase, without any cap on the limit, in increments of $5 million for each new commercial reactor licensed. The.
present limitation of liability of $560 million was established by the-Congcess so that if an incident occurred requiring the Government to pay
$500 million in indemnity (above the $60 million in liability insurance available from the pools when 'the Act was enacted in 1957), the Federal budget would not be greatly disturbed yet there would be.a sure supply of funds _to pay public. liability claims resulting from the incident.
Because the limitation was not meant to reflect the worst possible accident that 1
could occur at a nuclear power plant, the fact that various technical reports issued over the years acknowledge that a nuclear accident could cause damages exceeding the liability limit has not led Congress to raise the limitation.,
The comment pertaining to the inability for members of the local population to buy radiation insurance relates to the fact that property insurance f
policies are written with a " nuclear exclusion" clause that does not providG coverage for damage resulting from a nuclear accident. The guestion of the " nuclear exclusion" in an individual's homeowner's policy has been raised numerous times over the last few years. While the Price-Anderson Act does not prohibit private insurers from offering this type of insurance the standard fire and property insurance policies have contained the nucleah exclusion since 1959.
Our understanding of this exclusion is that the insurers consider that property damage caused by a nuclear accident would be covered by nuclear liability insurance maintained by NRC facility licensees and that coverage 'for the same property damage should be ' excluded from the conventional. homeowner's policy to avoid duplication of insurance.
Thus, if a property owner suffered damage to his property because of a nuclear accident, the compensation would come through nuclear liability insurance or Government indemnity.as provided under the Price-Anderson Act.
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Finally, we agree that there may be tilfficulty in proving tha.t cancers have resulted from radiation exposure and that the cancer latency period in many case's exceeds 20 years.
It should be noted, however, that the 20 year statute is only a minimum and only' applies in the ev'.at of an
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extraordinary nuclear occurrence (ENO).
If a state has a longer statute of limitations for radiation-induced injury, as many states do, then the longer state statute takes precedence. While it may be correct to state that people living within a 50 mile radius of the Perry reactors would bear many of the health and property costs arising out of an accident, in the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess of the limitation of liability, "the Congress will thoroughly review the par-ticular incident and will take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude" 42 U.S. C. 2210(e).
Concern No. 9 l
If the Price-Anderson Act were rescinded, there is no assurance that the CAPC0 utilities could meet the costs of such an accident as that at Three Mile Island without being bankrupted.
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Response
Any answer to this concern would be speculative on the part of the Commission.
However, thc financial. capabilities of the Cleveland Electric Illumfoating Company and CAPC0 to cover the costs of operation, including the costs of reasonable foreseeable contingencies, for the Perry plants is an admitted contention in the operating license hearing that is scheduled to begin this fall.
Concern No.10 The operating record of American reactors has been poor, operating an average of about 51% of thu time. With Davis-Besse it has averaged about 32%.
These long shutdown periods have caused millions of dollars to be spent for replacement power, which in all instances the customers have had to pay.
In addition, maintenance and repair from malfunctions, defec-tive components and design, and defective workmanship have added to customer costs.
Mishaps of these types are amazingly common--tota.lling 2,800 and 2,900 in 1977 and 1978.
These.have resulted in long shutdown per.iods and heavy costs to consumers.
Response
The operating performance of nuclear power plants has been the subject of numerous discussions.
The Perry plar are boiling water reactors (BWRs)..
An article published in the September 1981 issue of Nuclear Engineering International indicated that the average annual load factor (worldwide) for BWRs was 59.2%.
Due to refueling outages, demand for power and other
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factors, individual load factors will vary from year to year.
In the noted reference, the annual load factor for BWRs varied from 27.1% to 88.8%.
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7-3, The operating record of Davis-Besse has no bearing on the future perfomance of the Perry plant.
Even there, the situation appears to be improving since on January 14, 1982, Davis-Besse officials reported that their reactor had.
generated power. 67 percent of the time during 1981.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating has a financial interest in the Davis-Besse plant through' CAPCO. but has no association with the management or operation of the plant.
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In summary, the operating performance of any nuclear plant can vary widely from year to year and the prediction of an annual load factor is difficult.
Concern No. 11 To date, nuclear utilities have no way of estimating the costs of transpor-tation and storage of radioactive wastes, long-term.
Nor do they have any way of estimating the eventual costs of moth-bolling, entombing, or dismantling reactors after their period of service, to say nothing of the costs of radiation monitoring in perpetuity.
Response
As stated in response to concern No. 9, the financial capabilities of the utility to operate the Perry plant is an admitted contention to the hearing.
All of the above items including decommissioning will be addressed at that hea ring.
Concern No.12 The recent malfunction of the hydraulic control-rod system at Browns Ferry focused attention on a GE boiling water reactor design fault.
Failure of h shut-down system is a critical safety defect. Both Perry reactors are GE boiling water type.
Res ponse The Browns Ferry event resulted in an extensive review of the BWR scram discharge system by the staff.
From that review, sev,eral actions have been recommended by the Commission to reduce the perceived risks associated with this system.
These actions will be implemented at Perry.
Furthermore, the safety issues involved with pipe breaks in this systed have been admitted as a contention for the Perry operating license he'aring.
Concern No.13 Letter by Ms. Cook published in the October 18, 1981 edition of The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) captioned " China Syndrome. Revisited."
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Response
Most of the concerns listed in the article were addressed at the prehearing conference in June 1981. A proposed contention on the issue of pressure vessel cracking was discussed at the prehearing conference and no basis was found to admit it.
An issue concerning the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) was admitted as a contention and the full scale 30 degree sector steam test that was performed to demonstrate the adequacy of the ECCS system will be addressed at the hearing.
The concern of water hammer in a PWR is no_t appropriate to the Perry BWR.
Concern No. 14 General. articles on Toxic Chemical Air Pollutants Res ponse Except for the area of radioactive releases, the control of air pollutants is under the jurisdiction of other Federal and/or State agencies.
There is little. reason to believe that coatings (plastics, epoxies or acrylic latex) if used in the construction of the Perry plant would differ sig-nificantly in composition or quantity from any other general non-nuclear facility under construction.
With respect te radioactive releases, nuclear power reactors in the United States must comply with certain NRC regulatory requirements in order to operate.
The permissible levels of radiation in unrestricted areas and the radioactivity in effluents to unrestricted areas are spelled out in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I, Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion "As low As Is Reasonably Achievable" 'for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents.
These regulations specify limits on levels of radiation in the Station's effluent releases to the air and-water (above natural background).
They also state that no member of the general public in unrestricted areas shall receive a radiation dose to the total body due to Station operation of more than 3 mrems from liquid effluents, 5 mrems from noble-gas effluents, and/or 15 mrems from radio-iodines and particulates.
These radiation dose limits are established to be consistent wi.th considerations of the. health and safety of the public.
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DISTRIBUTION:
MAR 2 4 1982
- Docket File 50-440/441
- TERA
- NRC PDR
- L PDR EDO Reading LBf2 File HDenton ECase TMurley FSchroeder DEisenhut RPurple RTedesco ASchwencer DHouston EHylton RVollmer OELD PBrandenburg (EDO# ll400FM LBerry OI&E(3)
PPAS Dross SCavanau h - AO SHanau%g(82-2%
SECY er RMattson HThompson PCheck BSnyder RDeYoung WKerr, SP GCunningham, ELD LUnderwood, MPA OCb
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