ML20049J185
| ML20049J185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1982 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-02-04.F, TASK-03-03.A, TASK-2-4.F, TASK-3-3.A, TASK-RR LAC-8146, NUDOCS 8203120235 | |
| Download: ML20049J185 (11) | |
Text
-
O D DA/RYLAND h
k COOPERAT/VE
- PO BOX 817
- 2615 EAST AV SOUTH
- LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN 54601 (608) 788 4 000 1
March 9, 1982 In reply, please refer to LAC-8146 DOCKET NO. 50-409 U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ATTN:
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director 83 Division of Licensing 4
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RFCgg,j0 s
Division of Operating Reactors IUIRJ 7 7g Washington, D.
C.
20555 J
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE g
h* gyp LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTC R (LACBWR)
.at g
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 y
SEP TOPIC II-4.F - SETTLEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS AND BURIED EQUIPMENT, AND SEP TOPIC III-3.A -
EFFECTS OF HIGH WATER LEVEL ON STRUCTURES
Reference:
(1)
DPC Letter, LAC-7387, Linder to Eisenhut, dated February 27, 1981.
Gentlemen:
Enclosed find the Safety Evaluation Reports of Settlement of Foundations and Buried Equipment (SEP Topic II-4.F) and Effects of High Water Level on Structures (SEP Topic III-3.A).
Our letter, Reference 1, identified topics for DPC to submit for NRC evaluation.
The subject topics were listed in the schedule submitted with Reference 1.
If there are any questions regarding this report, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE Frank Linder, General Manager FL:JDP:af cc:
J.
G.
Keppler, Reg. Dir., NRC-DRO III g6 NRC Resident Inspectors f
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8203120235 820309 PDR ADOCK 05000409 P
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s LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
SEP Safety Assessment Report Topic II-4.F - Settlement of Foundations and Buried Equipment
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This assessment revi :ws the protection of safety-related structures, systems, and components against excessive settlement.
2.0 CRITERIA Information must be presented concerning the properties and stability of the soils and rock related to total or differential static and seismically induced settlement which may affect safety-related nuclear power plant facilities or pose a hazard to the public under both static and dynamic conditions. Completeness of information is determined by the ability to make an independent evaluation on the basis of information provided.
3.0 DISCUSSION The site is located in a river valley adjacent to the Mississippi River at an average elevation of 639 feet mean sea level (MSL). Exploratory borings were drilled at the site in four programs over an 18-year period.
The alluvial fill extends from approximately elevation 620 feet to a 5
depth of between 85 and 155 feet The underlying bedrock is the Eau Claire sandstone extending approximately 300 feet. The Mount Simon sandstone is located below this formation.
i The alluvial fill consists generally of a fine to coarse sand and contains a 5 to 10 foot thick, silty sand layer 20 to 25 feet below plant grade.
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The upper 10 to 20 feet of the site is a medium grained hydraulic fill
- The sand density ranges from loose to very dense.
The major structures at the LACBWR site are pile supported. The reactor containment is supported by a reinforced concrete mat. which is pile supported. The piles were 7F tapered monotube piles driven to refusal The in medium dense sand, 80 to 100 blows for the last foot turbine, office, and machine shop buildings are founded just below plant grade and are also pile supported. The piles are 50-ton, step-tapered, cast-in-place concrete. Because of the nature of the cohesion -
less materials, the settlement of LACBWR structures should have occured Post-during construction essentially at the same rate of loading.
construction settlement would only occur due to live loads. After 12 years of commercial operation there has been no significant observed
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settlement of plant structures.
The design basis for the SSE value of 0.11g. This acceleration level is comparable to the value presented in the FSAR for the NSP Prairie Island Nuclear Plant which is in the same seismic area.
In 1973, 1979 and 1980 extensive studies of the geology, seismology, and liquefaction potential at the LACBWR site were performed.
Each of these studies yielded essentially consistent conclusions that the site was safe against liquefaction under the designated SSE.
Sur.:maries of the conclusions of each study are given below.
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i license, a In 1973, as part of LACBWR application for an operat ng logy, investigated i
study was conducted of geology and engineering se smo d liquefaction potential.
static and dynamic soil properties and evaluate ity Vi shock with The study concluded that the SSE should be a MM Intens gg d maximum horizontal its epicenter near the site and that the associate An anslysis of 0.12g.
ground surface acceleration would be less that than about liquefaction potential indicated a factor of safety greater les.
1.47 for an induced ground motion of ten significant stress cyc to NRC's
(
In 1971 a review of the liquefaction potential in response It was concluded Systematic Evaluation Program was undertaken.
ith state-of-the-art that although the 1973 report was consistent w k some modifications.
of the time, it was appropriate at this time to ma e factor of safety The reevaluation of the 1973 data resulted in a minimum to that calculated l
l against liquefaction of 1.45, which compared c ose y this time that a limited program It was also recommended at in 1973.
i be undertaken to of undisturbed sampling and cyclic triaxial test ng 1
substantiate earlier conclusions.
Using three Such a sampling and testing program was implenented d testing and analysis, approaches to liquefaction--one of sophisticatether sites, and a oneef empirical correlation to past performance at o i
all yielded factors semi-empirical one based on Japanese case histor es--
tion of up to 0.12g.
l of safety greater than 1.0 for a surface acce era 3
An independent review of the ' analyses was performed in. December, 1979, by Dr. H. R. Seed of the University of California at Berkeley His conclusion was that the site was safe against liquefaction during a local earthquake producing peak horizontal surface acceleration of up to Q,12g with five equivalent uniform cycles of shaking.
On February 25, 1980, NRC issued to DPC an " Order to Show Cause" why a dewatering system should not Se implemented to preclude liquefaction 10 at the site The reponse to the order, dated March 21, 1980 quantified for the first time the increase in densities due to the presence of piles under the reactor containment. The response concluded that the conditions under the containment were much better than those under the free-field conditions previously analyzed and therefore had higher margins of safety against liquefaction under the SSE.
NRC raised several review questions, to which DPC responded in a report 15 dated July 11, 1980 In it the contention that soil conditions under the structures on piles were improved with increased densities and in-creased lateral earth pressure coefficients was reiterated, and proposed to provide site substantiation of the increased values.
I Borings were subsequently drilled in and around plant structures.
The values obtained from these borings and consideration of earlier data lead to the following conclusions:
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e Soil conditions beneath the pile-supported structures are better than those in the free-field away from the structures.
'o Testing of the actual soil conditions under existing structures has substantiated the improvement anticipated and predicted in h
previous reports,
/
e Good soil conditions exist at both ends of the chimney / reactor in turbine building complex and are expected to be consistent
- between, i
o By any. currently-accepted methods of analysis, the soils support ng the LACBWR reactor and turbine generator will not liquefy under a peak horizontal ground surface accelaration of up to 0.12g induced by a local earthquake.
4,0 CONCLUSIONS l-DPC has indicated that the appropriate acceleration level is 0.11g l
DPC has performed a site-dependent for the safe shutdown earthquake.
The results analysis of liquefaction potential at the LACBWR site.
of the analyses indicate that the foundations in and around seismic cateogry I structures are safe against liquefaction during a local earthquake producing a peak horizontal surface acceleration of up to
(
)
Oil 2g (which exceeds the 0.11g design basis).
Based on the nature of the cohesionless soils which support the LACBWR problems have been plant and the fact that no observable settlement noted to date, DPC concludes that safety-related structures, systems, excessive settlement.
and components are adequately protected against 5
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5.0 REFERENCES
1.
_the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor, Report to t Regulatory Commission (1974) 2.
Northern States Power, Environmental Report for Typone Energy
_ Cent e r.
3.
Northern States Power, Final Safety Analysis Report for Prari
_ Island Nuclear Plant.
e 4.
_ Operations 60 MW Steam Turbo-generator, G 1963.
5.
Raymond, Inc., 1962, Drawing, Boring Profiles, LACBWR 6.
Black & Veatch, Telephone Memorandum to Union Metal Company January 17, 1982.
7.
Black & Veatch, Telephone Memorandum to Atlas Pile Driving Com January 17, 1982.
- pany, 8.
Black & Veatch, Telephone Memorandum - Carbolander & Sons 1982.
, January 17, 9.
Dames & Moore,_Geotechnical Investigation of Geology, Near Genoa, Vernon County, Wisconsin (October 197 Seismologv,.
10.
Water Reactor (LACBWR) Near Genoa, Vernon County g
to the Dairyland Power Cooperative (March 1979), Wisconsin, Report 11.
Dames & Moore, Liquefaction Potential at Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) to the Dairyland Power Cooperative (September 28 Site Near Geno
, 1979).
12.
Seed, H.B., letter of December 27, 1979, to Dames & Moore 13.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, _ Order to Show Cause 50-409), February 25, 1980.
(Docket No.
14.
Dames & Moore Response to NRC Concerns on Liquefaction Potential at Lacrosse Boiling Water Rsactor (LACBWR) Site Near Genoa County Wisconsin, Report to Dairyland Power Cooperative (March 21
, Vernon 1980).
15.
Dames & Moore, Response to NRC Concerns on Liquefaction Potential County Wisconsin, Report to Dairyland Power Cooperativ (July ll,1980).
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.g LA CROSSE BO1 LING WATER REACTOR SEP Safety Assessment Repor t Topic ~'III-3.A' Effects'of'High Water Level on Structures
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1.0 ' INTRODUCTION The objective of this topic is to assure that, if the high water level for the plant is reevaluated and found to be above the original design basis, the plant structures can withstand this water level.
2.0 CRITERIA Criterion 2 of the General Design Criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A covers flood protection of nuclear power plants. A restatement of Criterion 2 follows.
Criterion 2 - Design Bases for protection Against Natural Phenomena-Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natur:1 phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
The design bases for these structures, systems, and components shall reflect:
(1) appropriate consideration of the most severe l
of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the 1
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