ML20049H284
| ML20049H284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000447 |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1982 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8202230060 | |
| Download: ML20049H284 (600) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- - _. - _ _ _ _ __.___. _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , _ . _ . _ _ . _ l GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 [ t !9! l f !
- L i !
l 1 l 4 l I i APPENDIX 9A FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS l j i i i 1 ! l l i O 8202230060 820212 PDR ADOCK 05000447 K PDR
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 APPENDIX 9A ( FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS CONTENTS Title Page Section INTRODUCTION 9A.1-1 9A.1 Appendix 9A.1-1 9A.l.1 ANALYSIS CRITERIA 9A.2-1 9A.2 Reference 9A.2-1 9A.2.1 Codes and Standards 9A.2-1 9A.2.1.1 Drawings 9A.2-4 9A.2.2 Fire Area Separation Drawings 9A.2-5 9A.2.2.1 9A.2.2.2 Fire Protection Equipment Drawings 9A.2-5 reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.2-5 9A.2.2.2.1 9A.2.2.2.2 Control Building 9A.2-6 9A.2.2.2.3 Diesel-Generator Buildings - Divisions 1, 2 and 3 9A.2-6 Raduaste Building 9A.2-6 O) ( 9A.2.2.2.4 Terminology 9A.2-6 9A.2.3 Acceptance Criteria 9A.2-8 9A.2.4 Muclear Island Core Cooling System 9A.2-14 9A.2.5 ANALYSIS APPROACH 9A.3-1 9A.3 Review Data 9A.3-1 9A.3.1 Steam Tunnel 9A.3-3 9A.3.2 Separation 9A.3-3 9A.3.3 Insulation Fire Hazard 9A.3-4 9A.3.4 Exceptions to Penetrations Requirements 9A.3-4 9A.3.5 9A.3-4 9A.3.6 Wall Deviations Locations of Deviations 9A.3-5 9A.3.6.1 Door Deviations 9A.3-6 9A.3.7 ANALYSIS 9A.4-1 9A.4 Auxiliary Building 9A.4-1 9A.4.1 9A.4.1.1 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 37 f t 0 in. 9A.4-1 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 37 ft 0 in. 9A.4-4 9A.4.1.2 I) 9A.4.1.3 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-8 G Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A. 4- 11 9A.4.1.4 3A.1-i l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 9A.4.1.5 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-15 9A.4.1.6 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. 9A.4-18 9A.4.1.7 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-21 9A.4.1.8 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-25 9A.4.1.9 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-27 9A.4.1.10 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-30 9A.4.1.ll Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-33 9A.4.1.12 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-35 9A.4.1.13 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-39 9A.4.1.14 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-42 9A.4.1.15 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. 9A.4-45 9A.4.1.16 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-48 9A.4.1.17 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-51 9A.4.1.18 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-54 9A.4.1.19 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-57 g 9A.4.1.20 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-61 9A.4.1.21 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-63 9A.4.1.22 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-66 9A.4.1.23 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-69 9A.4.1.24 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-73 9A.4.1.25 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-76 9A.4.1.26 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-82 9A.4.1.27 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-82 9A.4.1.28 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-86 9A.4.1.29 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-89 9A.4.1.30 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-92 9A.4.1.31 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. and 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-93 9A.4.2 Cor. trol Building 9A.4-97 9A.4.2.1 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-97 9A.4.2.2 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-100 9A.4.2.3 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-103 9A.4.2.4 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-106 9A.1-ii
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O COMTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 9A.4.2.5 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-109 9A.4.2.6 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-113 9A.4.2.7 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-ll6 9A.4.2.8 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-119 9A.4.2.9 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-121 .< 9A.4.2.10 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-124 9A.4.2.11 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-126 9A.4.2.12 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-130 9A.4.2.13 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-133 9A.4.2.14 Bui' ding - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-136 9A.4.2.15 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-139 9A.4.2.16 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-141 9A.4.2.17 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-144 9A.4.2.18 Building - Control: El 38 ft 6 in. 9A.4-146 9A.4.3 Fuel Building 9A.4-148 9A.4.3.1 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-148 9A.4.3.2 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-150 9A.4.3.3 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. 9A.4-152 9A.4.3.4 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-155 9A.4.3.5 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-157 9A.4.3.6 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-160 9A.4.3.7 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-164 9A.4.3.8 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-167 9A.4.3.9 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-170 9A.4.3.10 Building - Fuel: El (-) 3 2 ft 0 in. 9A.4-173 9A.4.3.ll Building - Fuel- El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-175 9A.4.3.12 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. 9A.4-178 9A.4.3.13 Building - Fuel: El (-) 18 ft 0 in. 9A.4-180 9A.4.3.14 Building - Fuel: El (-) 18 f t 0 in. 9A.4-183 9A.4.3.15 Building - Fuel: El (-) l7 f t 0 in. 9A.4-186 9A.4.3.16 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. 9A.4-189 (~} 9A.4.3.17 Building - Fuel: El (-) l7 f t 0 in. 9A.4-192
# 9A.4.3.18 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. 9A.4-195 9A.1-iii
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 9A.4.3.19 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. 9A.4-197 9A.4.3.20 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. 9A.4-200 9A.4.3.21 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-204 9A.4.3.22 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-207 9A.4.3.23 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. 9A.4-209 9A.4.3.24 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. 9A.4-213 9A.4.3.25 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. 9A.4-216 9A.4.3.26 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. 9A.4-219 9A.4.3.27 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. 9A.4-222 9A.4.3.28 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-225 9A.4.3.29 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-228 9A.4.3.30 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-232 9A.4.3.31 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-234 9A.4.3.32 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-237 9A.4.3.33 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-240 9A.4.3.34 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-242 9A.4.3.35 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-246 9A.4.3.36 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-248 9A.4.3.37 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7-1/2 in. 9A.4-251 9A.4.3.3S Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 in. 9A.4-254 9A.4.3.39 Building - Fuel: El 84 ft 7 in. 9A.4-256 9A.4.3.40 Building - Fuel: El 101 ft 5-1/2 in. 9A.4-259 9A.4.4 Reactor Building 9A.4-262 9A.4.4.1 Building - Reactor: El (-)28 ft 7 in. to (-) 12 f t 3 in. 9A.4-262 9A.4.4.2 Building - Reactor: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. 9A.4-266 9A.4.4.3 Building - Reactor: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-268 9A.4.4.4 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-272 9A.4.4.5 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4-274 9A.4.4.6 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. 9A.4-279 9A.4.4.7 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. 9A.4-281 9A.4.4.8 Building - Reactor: El 35 ft 0 in. 9A.4-284 9A.4.4.9 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. 9A.4-287 9A.1-iv
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Pev. 0 CONTFNTS (Continued) Section Title Page 9A.4.4.10 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. 9A.4-290 9A.4.4.ll Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. 9A.4-293 9A.4.4.12 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. 9A.4-296 9A.4.4.13 Building - Reactor: El 45 ft 1 in. 9A.4-299 9A.4.4.14 Building - Reactor: El 48 ft 7 in. 9A.4-302 9A.4.4.15 Building - Reactor: El 50 ft 7 in. 9A.4-304 9A.4.4.16 Building - Reactor: E.1 59 ft 7 in. 9A.4-307 9A.4.4.17 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. 9A.4-309 9A.4.4.18 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. 9A.4-312 9A.4.4.19 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. 9A.4-315 9A.4.4.20 Building - Reactor: El 64 ft 6 in. 9A.4-318 9A.4.4.21 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. 9A.4-320 9A.4.4.22 Building - Reactor: El 84 ft 7 in. 9A.4-323 9A.4.5 Radwaste Building 9A.4-326
/~' 9A.4.5.1 General 9A.4-32r O) 9A.4.5.2 Facility Features 9A.4.326 9A.4.5.3 Fire Detection 9A.4-327 9A.4.5.4 Fire Suppression Systems 9A.4-327 ,
9A.4.5.5 Penetrations 9A.4-327 9A.4.5.6 Consequences of Suppression 9A.4-328 9A.4.6 Diesel-Generator Building, Division 1 9A.4-328 9A.4.6.1 Building - DG 1: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-328 9A.4.6.2 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. 9A.4-332 9A.4.6.3 Building - DG 1: El 28 ft'6 in. 9A.4-335 9A.4.7 Diesel-Generator Building, Division 2 9A.4-338 9A.4.7.1 Building - DG 2: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. 9A.4-338 9A.4.7.2 Building - DG 2: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-342 9A.4.7.3 Building - DG 2: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-345 9A.4.8 Diesel-Generator Building, Division 3 9A.4.348 9A.4.8.1 Building - DG 3: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-348 9A.4.8.2 Building - DG 3: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-352 9A.4.8.3 Building - DG 3: El (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.4-355
}
9A.4.8.4 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. 9A.4-358 9A.1-v k
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 9A.4.8.5 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. 9A.4-361 9A.4.8.6 Building - DG 3: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.4-364 9A.5 SPECIAL CASES 9A.5-1 9A.S.1 Piping Penetrations, Reactor Building 9A.5-1 9A.5.2 Fire Door Deviations 9A.5-2 9A.5.3 Charcoal Filters for Process Tanks and Drain surps 9A.5-2 9A.5.4 Pipe Break Analyses 9A.5-5 9A.5.5 Fire Separation for Divisional Electrical Systers 9A.5-6 9A.S.5.1 Scran Solenoid Circuits 9A.5-6 9A.5.5.2 Turbine System Sensor Inputs to RPS Including the NSSSS 9A.5-6 9A.5.5.3 Main Steamline Radiation Monitor Detectors 9A.5-7 9A.5.5.4 Main Steanline ADS Relief Valves 9A.5-8 9A.5.5.5 "ain Steamline Isolation Valve Licit Switch Interlocks with RPS 9A.5-10 9A.5.5.6 Under the Reactor Pedestal 9A.5-13 9A.5.5.7 Local Instrumentation and Control Panels 9A.5-17 9A.5.5.8 Lcak Detection System 9A.5-19 9A.5.5.9 Standby Liquid Control 9A.5-20 . 9A.S.6 Carbon Dioxide Storage 9A.5-22 9A.5.7 HVAC Systems 9A.5-23 9A.5.7.1 Control Building 9A.5-23 9A.5.7.2 Division 2 Cable Tunnel - Auxiliary Building 9A.5-24 9A.5.7.3 SGTS Exhaust Stack - Fuel Building 9A.5-24 9A.5.7.4 Reactor Building HVAC Penetrations 9A.5-24 9A.5.7.5 Reactor Building 9A.5.7.6 Auxiliary Building: (-) 3 2 f t 0 in. , Zone 1, Col. E-ll 9A.5-25 9A.5.7.7 Auxiliary Building: (-) 32 f t 0 in. , Zone 1, Col. D-11 9A.5-25 9A.5.7.8 Auxiliary Building: (-) 6 f t 10 in. 9A.5-25 9A.1-vi
i l GESSAR II 22A7007 1 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O I CONTEMTS (Continued) f Section Title Page 1 i 9A.5.7.9 Auxiliary Building: (-)6 ft 10 in. 9A.5-26 4 j 9A.S.7.10 Auxiliary Building: 28 ft 6 in. HVAC j Eauipment Room, Zone 1 9A.5-26 l l 9A.S.7.ll Fuel Building: (-) l7 f t 0 in. 9A.5-26 l 1 9A.5.7.12 Fuel Building: (-)l7 ft 0 in. 9A.5-27 l t 9A.5.7.13 Fuel Building: (-) 5 f t 3 in. 9A.5-27 l 9A.5.7.14 Fuel Building: (-) 5 f t 3 in. 9A.5-28 9A.S.7.15 Fuel Building: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.5-28 1 9A.S.7.16 Control Building: El 28 ft 6 in. 9A.5-28 l 1 I I i i I f i i I O 9A.1-vil/9A.1-viii
-_--_ - _. - - _ - -_ -.- - - - -. - - - .-. _ _ - - - - - . . - - - - - --- -I
__ _ _m . _ _ _.._ . _ _ . _ _ . l GESSAR II 22A7007 l'
- 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 l !
t i J 1
! APPENDIX 9A 4
FIRE !!AZARD ANALYSIS j TABLES f i Table Title Page i i 9A.5-1 Penetration Design Temperatures 9A.5-29 l -l l 9A.5-2 Nonfire Rated Doors 9A.5-30 9A.5-3 RPS and NSSSS Sensors Located in Turbine 1 Building 9A.5-34 i i t O l i l i I l e i 9A.1-ix/9A.1-x ;
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O t0j APPENDIX 9A ( FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Title Page 9A-1 Title Sheet - All Buildings 9A.5-35 9A-2 Floor Plan at El (-)32'0" - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-37 9A-3 Ploor Plan at El (-) 5 ' 3" and (-) 6 '10" - Reactor , Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-39 9A-4 Floor Plan at El 11'0" - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-41 9A-5 P]oor Plan at El 28'6" - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.5 9A-6 Roof Plan at El 51'11" - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-45 9A-7 Partial Plans - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-47 Partial Plans - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel (} s-9A-8 Buildings 9A.5-49 9A-9 Floor Plans at El (-) 6 '10" and 11' 0" - Control Building 9A.5-51 9A-10 Floor Plans at El 28'6" and Roof - Control Building 9A.5-53 9A-ll Floor Plans at El (-) 4 3 ' 10" and (-) 2 7 ' 10"
- Radwaste Building 9A.5-55 9A-12 Floor Plans at El (-) 6 ' 10" and 9 ' 2" - Radwaste Building 9A.5-57 9A-13 Ploor Plan at El 32'2" and Roof Plan - Radwaste Building 9A.5-59 9A-14 Diesel-Generator Building Fire Area Separations
- Division 1 Floor and Roof Plans 9A.5-61 9A-15 Diesel-Generator Building Fire Area Separations
- Divisions 2 and 3 Floor and Roof Plans 9A.5-63 9A-16 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plan at El (-)32'0" 9A.5-65 9A-17 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protec-tion Equipment Floor Plan at El (-)5'3" and
(-) 6 ' 10" 9A.5-67
/O V
l 9A.1-xi , l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O APPENDIX 9A ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) Figur< Title Page 9A-18 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protec-tion Equipment Floor Plan at El 11'0" 9A.5-69 9A-19 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protec-tion Equipment Floor Plan at El 28'6" 9A.5-71 9A-20 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protec-tion Equipment Roof Plan at El 51'11" 9A.5-73 9A-21 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protec-tion Equipment Floor Plan at El 84'7" 9A.5-75 9A-22 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings Fire Protec-tion Equipment Partial Floor Plans 9A.5-77 9A-23 Radwaste Building Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plans at El (-) 4 3 ' 10" and (-) 27 ' 10" 9A.5-79 9A-24 Radwaste Building Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plan at El (-) 6 ' 10" and 9 ' 2 " 9A.5-81 9A-25 Radwaste Building Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plan at El 32'2" and 54'2" Roof Plan 9A.5-83 9A-26 Diesel-Generator Building Fire Protection Equipment Division 1 Floor and Roof Plans 9A.5-85 9A-27 Diesel-Generator Building Fire Protection Equipment Divisions 2 and 3 Floor and Roof Plans 9A.5-87 9A-28 Control Building Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plan at El (-) 6 ' 10" and 11 ' 0" 9A.5-89 9A-29 Control Building Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plan at El 28'6" and Roof Plan 9A.5-91 9A-30 Control Room Arrangement 9A.5-93 9A-31 Control Equipment Room Arrangement 9A.5-95 9A-32 Type 1 Penetration 9A.5-97 1
- 9A-33 Type 1A Penetration 9A.5-98 9A-34 Type 2 Penetration 9A.5-99 9A-35 Type 3 Penetraticn 9A.5-100 9A-36 Type 4 Penetration 9A.5-101 9A-37 Type 5 Penetration 9A.5-102 l
9A-38 Type 6 Penetration 9A.5-103 9A-39 Type 7 Penetration 9A.5-104 9A-40 Type 7A Penetration 9A.5-105 9A-41 Type 8 Penetration 9A.5-106 l 9A.1-xii
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
'() APPENDIX 9A ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued)
Figure Title Page 9A-42 Type 9 Penetration 9A.5-107 9A-43 Type 10 Penetration 9A.5-108 9A-44 Type 12 Penetration 9A.5-109 9A-45 Type 13 Penetration 9A.5-110 9A-46 Type 14 Penetration 9A.5-lll 9A-47 Type 15 Penetration 9A.5-ll2 9A-48 Sketch of Typical simplified connections - Turbine Stopvalve (etc.) Auxiliary Switch Contact - Nuclear Island 9A.5-113 I I i
\ f 9A.1-xiii/9A.1-xiv
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.1 INTRODUCTION This Appendix supplements Subsection'9.5.1.3 (Safety Evaluation). 9A.l.1 Appendix This appendix identifies distinct fire areas throughout the Nuclear Island facility through the use of plan and elevation views of the plant. It defines equipment, both safety-related and nonsafety-related, contained within each fire area. Further, it identifies and quantifies all materials capable of supporting combustion in each designated fire area. Primary requirements for'a nuclear facility are that the design provide a means for the safe shutdown of the facility, that it maintain the condition of safe shutdown, while not posing a hazard to personnel, and that it mitigate the consequences of accidents q which may occur. O The analysis addresses the hazard of fire relative to maintaining the safe shutdown capability of the plant. Each specific area has been reviewed to define the fire loads contained. Detection and suppression systems provided in the design to mitigate the hazard have also been reviewed. i i O 9A.1-1/9A.1-2
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2 ANALYSIS CRITERIA
)
9A.2.1 References 9A.2.1.1 Codes and Standards The following applicable codes and standards are incorporated in the design of the Nuclear Island facility, including the' fire detection and suppression systems designs: 29CFR1910 Occupational Safety and Health Standards 29CFR1926 Safety and Health Regulations for Construction 10CFR50 Licensing of Production / Utilization Facilities UL Underwriters Laboratories Approved Equipment Lists O FM Factory Mutual Approved Materials and Equipment Lists ANI " Basic Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants", March 1976 ASTM D992-56 " Classification of Flammability Standards" l NFPA 10-73 " Portable Fire Extinguishers - Installation" NFPA 10A-73 " Portable Fire Extinguishers - Maintenance and Use" NFPA 12-73 " Carbon Dioxide Systems" p NFPA 13-73 " Sprinkler Systems" V 9A.2-1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.1.1 Codes and Standards (Continued) NFPA 14-73 " Standpipe and Hose Systems" NFPA 24-73 "Outside Protection" NFPA 37-73 " Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines" NFPA 70-73 " National Electric Code" NFPA 72A-73 " Local Protective Signaling Systems" NFPA 72D-73 " Proprietary Signaling Systems" NFPA 78-73 Lightning Protection Code NFPA 80-73 " Fire Doors and Windows" NFPA 80A-73 " Protection from Exposure Fires" NFPA 90A-73 " Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems" NFPA 90B-73 " Warm Air Heating and Air Conditioning" NFPA 91-73 " Blower and Exhaust Systems" NFPA 101-73 " Life Safety Code" NFPA 194-73 " Fire Hose Coupling, Screw Threads" NFPA 196-73 " Fire Hose" NFPA 251-73 " Fire Test, Building Construction and Materials" O 9A.2-2
i GESSAR II 22A7007 i 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 4 ) 9A.2.1.1 Codes and Standards (Continued) i i i NFPA 252-73 " Building Materials, Tests of Surface Burning I Characteristics ; f I. i NFPA 255 " Method of Test of Surface Burning Character-l istics of Building Materials" } j NFPA 321-73 " Classification of Flammable Liquids" i ! l l NFPA 802-73 " Nuclear Reactors" t I ( L ASTM-E84 " Method of Test of Surface Burning Character-istics of Building Materials" r Regulatory " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled l ! Guide 1.39 Nuclear Power Plants" l Regulatory " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems" Guide 1.75 , I I APCSB 9.5-1 " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Appendix A Power Plants" IEEE-384 "IEEE Trial-Use Standard Criteria for i Separation of Class lE Equipment and Circuits" i ICB0 " International Conference of Building Officials" l i r 9A.2-3 ,
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.2 Drawings 9A.2.2.1 Fire Area Separation Drawings The following drawings are incorporated in the design of this facility: (Figure 9A-1) Title Sheet, All Buildings (Figure 9A-2) Floor Plan at El (-)32 ft 0 in., Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-3) Floor Plans at El (-)5 ft 3 in. and (-) 6 ft 10 in., Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-4) Floor Plan at El 11 ft 0 in., Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-5) Floor Plan at El 28 ft 6 in., Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-6) Roof Plan at El 51 ft 11 in., Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-7) Partial Plans, Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-8) Partial Plans, Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings (Figure 9A-9) Floor Plans at El (-)6 ft 10 in. and 11 ft 0 in., Control Building (Figure 9A-10) Floor Plans at El 28 ft 6 in. and Roof, Control Building 9A.2-4
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
/s 9A.2.2.1 Fire Area Separation Drawings (Continued) k- I (Figure 9A-ll) Floor Plans at El (-)43 ft 10 in. and (-)27 ft 10., Radwaste Building (Figure 9A-12) Floor Plans at El (-)6 ft 10 in. and 9 ft 2 in., Radwaste Building (Figure 9A-13) Floor Plans at El 32 ft 2 in, and Roof Plan, Radwaste Building (Figure 9A-14) Floor and Roof Plans, Division 1 Diesel-Generator Building (Figure 9A-15) Floor and Roof Plans, Divisions 2 and 3 Diesel-Generator Building 9A.2.2.2 Fire Protection Equipment Drawings 9A.2.2.2.1 Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Buildings The following drawings are incorporated in the design of the Nuclear Island facility:
(Figure 9A-16) Plan at El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Figure 9A-17) Plan at El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Figure 9A-18) Plan at El 11 ft 0 in. (Figure 9A-19) Plan at El 28 ft 6 in. (Figure 9A-20) Plan at El 50 ft 0 in. (Figure 9A-21) Plan at El 84 ft 7 in. (Figure 9A-22) Partial Plans n v 9A.2-5
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.2.2.2 Control Building h The following drawings are incorporated in the design of the Nuclear Island facility: (Figure 9A-28) Plan at El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Figure 9A-29) Plan at El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.2.2.2.3 Diesel-Generator Buildings - Divisions 1, 2 and 3 The followiny drawings are incorporated in the design of the Nuclear Islund facility: (Figure 9A-26) Plan at El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Figure 9A-27) Plan at El 10 ft 10 in. 9A.2.2.2.4 Radwaste Building O The following drawings are incorporated in the design of the Nuclear Island facility: (Figure 9A-23) Plan at El (-)43 ft 10 in. and (-)27 ft 10 in. (Figure 9A-24) Plan at El (-)6 ft 10 in, and 9 ft 2 in. (Figure 9A-25) Plan at El 32 ft 2 in, and 54 ft 2 in. 9A.2.3 Terminology (1) Fire Area - portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by fire barriers. (2) Fire Barrier - components of construction (i.e., walls floors and their supports, including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors and ll 9A.2-6
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.3 Terminology (Continued) (3 fire dampers) that are rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the spread of potential fire. (3) Fire Soppression - control and extinguishing of fires (Manual fire suppression includes the use of hoses, portable extinguishers or fixed systems by plant personnel. Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatically actuated, fixed systems such as water, halon or carbon dioxide systems.) (4) Noncombustible Material - materials having one of the characteristics listed below: (a) materials no part of which will ignite and burn /"% when subjected to a fire; (b) materials having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in (a), with a surfacing not over 1/8 in. thick which has a flame spread rating not higher than 50; or (c) materials, other than as described in (a) or (b), having a surface flame spread rating not higher than 25 without evidence of continued progressive combustion and of such composition that surfaces that would be exposed by cutting through the material in any way would not have a flame spread rating higher than 25 without evidence of continued progressive combustion. rO) v 9A.2-7
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.3 Terminology (Continued) g The flame spread ratings referred to in (b) and (c) are obtained according to NFPA 255, " Method of Test of Surface Burning Char-acteristics of Building Materials". (S) Nuclear Safety-Related Structures, Systems and Components - plant features necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and the capability either to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a cold safe shutdown condition or to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents. (6) Water Spray System - a special fixed pipe system con-nected to a reliable source of fire protection water supply and equipped with water spray nozzles for specific water discharge and distribution over the surface or area to be protected. (The piping system is connected to the water supply through an automatic or manually actuated valve which initiates the flow of wate .) (7) Wet Standpipe System - The Nuclear Island design utilizes a modified Class III wet standpipe system as defined by NFPA 14-73, " Standpipe and Hose Systems". 9A.2.4 Accepfance Criteria l The following basic guidelines have been used as criteria for the fire hazard analysis: l (1) The analysis is based on the design as it now exists and l on the equipment as currently specified, but not yet purchased. The equipment, when selected, shall be reviewed by the Purchaser for provision of adequate O 9A.2-8
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 Acceptance Criteria (Continued) 0 9A.2.4 fire protection against that already provided in the Nuclear Island design. (2) Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided in the Nuclear Island design for areas in which a transient fire loading is most likely to occur as a result of combustibles introduced by normal maintenance operations. The fire hazard analytis is based on the introduction of combustibles to any area of the plant, subject to the owners' administrative control. (3) With minor exceptions, the Nuclear Island structures are primarily Seismic Category I, reinforced concrete con-struction having either 2-hr or 3-hr fire-resistive rating for walls, floors and ceilings. Interior walls
} other than concrete are constructed of metal studs and gypsum wallboard. The fire-resistive rating for such walls is determined on a case-by-case basis for each fire area.
(4) Doors, in general, are either 3-hr A-label or 1 1/2-hr B-label, complying with NFPA ratings. Doors for stair-ways are B-label and have a maximum 250 F temperature rise requirement. There are also doors, not labeled, which provide building separation. Typical of these are the doors for the personnel air lock into the Reactor Building and the missile / tornado doors at the rail car entrance to the Fuel Building. The term " doors", where used in the analysis, shall mean doors, frames and hardware. 9A.2-9 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.4 Acceptance Criteria (Continued) O (5) The fireproofing of structural steel members is accom-plished by application of a UL-listed or FM-approved cementicious or ablative material, or by a UL- or FM-approved boxing design. The required fire rating, utilizing gypsum board, determines the fireproofing material thickness. (6) Surface finishes are specified to have a flame spread, fuel-contributed and smoke-evolved index of 25 or less (Class A), as determined by ASTM-E84 (NFPA 255). (7) The use of plastic materials, other than for electrical cable insulation, has been minimized in the Reactor Island design. A plastic forming material is used in seismic joints and may be exposed temporarily during construction. After construction is completed, the material is enclosed by concrete walls and the exposed end thickness is covered with self-extinguishing neoprene. The material does not represent a fire hazard to the completed facility. (8) Suspended ceilings are used in the control room and the control equipment room of the Control Building, and the radwaste control room. The ceilings, including the lighting fixtures, are of noncombustible construction. (9) Metal-deck roof construction is used only over the IIVAC equipment rooms located on top of the Radwaste Building and the Fuel Building. These roofs consist of materials approved and listed by Underwriters Labora-tories for UL Metal Deck Assembly Construction No. 1. O 9A.2-10
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~ 9A.2.4 Acceptance Criteria (Continued) N )I (10) The electrical cable fire-stops are tested to demonstrate a fire rating equal to the rating of the barrier they penetrate. As a minimum, the penetrations meet the requirements of ANI. The tests are performed or wit-nessed by a representative of a qualified, independent testing laboratory. The documented test results for the acceptable fire-stop are made a part of the plant design records. (11) Electrical cable insulation in either conduit or con-crete duct banks does not represent a combustible fire load and is excluded from the fire hazard analysis. i (12) Control, power or instrument cables of redundant systems that are used for bringing the reactor to safe, cold shutdown, or of any other divisional system, are not per-(~}'
~
mitted together in the same cable tray in the Reactor Island design (see Subsection 8.3.3). (13) The NOclear Island design specifies that solid-bottom, solid-cover metal trays be used. Certain areas of the plant have cable trays in stacked array. Where stacking of trays occurs, power cable, which is the most susceptible to internally generated fires, is routed in the uppermost tray to the greatest extent possible to provide maximum isolation from other trays in the stack. The fire loadings of electrical cable in trays is based on flame-retardant, cross-linked polyethylene insulation (XLPE-FR) having a calorific value of 14,000 Btu /lb. O
- V 9A.2-ll l
1 - .-.
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.4 Acceptance Criteria (Continued) The cable trays have been estimated at the maximum design fill to contain between 8 and 10.5 lb of insula-tion per running foot of tray. The analysis uses 9.25 lb of insulation per foot of tray. The combustible loading is based on maximum loading. The loading reduces as cables drop out of trays and the fire loading decreases. No attempt has been made to translate the fire loading to a Btu value per square foot for any of the fire areas as a result of cable insulation. Cable insulation in soli 1-bottom, solid-cover trays is not considered to be a contributcry, exposed combustible fire load to the area. (14) Certain compartments contain instruments in safety-related systems with only local indicating capability. They do not initiate any signal for remote indicators, recorders or alarms, nor actuate any devices for the safe, cold shutdown of the reactor. Therefore, local indicating instruments have not been considered in the fire hazard analysis. (15) Total reliance is not placed on a single fire supp;assion system. A mininum of tyc fire suppression means is available to each fire area. The Nuclear Island design provides the following types of suppression and utilizes them in suitable combination for the fire hazard considered: (a) automatic wet pipe sprinklers; (b; automatic Halon 1301 systems; (c) automatic carbon dioxide systems; 9A.2-12
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (' ( 9A.2.4 Acceptance Criteria (Continued) (d) modified Class III, Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reels; and (e) Class ABC and Halon 1211 hand extinguishers. (16) The Nuclear Island design includes requirements for delivering water to the standpipe and hose reel systems through any single failure mode, including the SSE. The standpipe system is Seismic Category I in all Nuclear Island buildings, except the Radwaste Building. The standpipes are contained within the buildings and thus are also protected from other phenomena of less severity and greater frequency. The effects of pipe breaks in fire suppression systems and protection methods for the effects of pipe breaks ('h' '; meet the criteria specified in Section 3.6 (Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping). (17) Piping penetrations are provided with fire-stops when penetrating fire-resistive walls. (18) HVAC penetrations are provided with fire dampers equal in rating to the fire barrier where required. (19) The Nuclear Island design provides ventilation systems which minimize the release of radioactive materials through the use of HEPA, high efficiency and charcoal filtration systems. I O V 9A.2-13
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.2.5 Nuclear Island Core Cooling System The Nuclear Island Core Cooling Systems are required when the NSSS is isolated from the main condenser, located in the balance of plant, during shutdown or accident conditions. The main steamlines and feedwater lines provide the core cooling path to and from the main condenser during normal cperation at power and during startup and shutdown transients when the reactor is not isolated. The Nuclear Island core cooling f'mction is accomplished through interaction of various systems. The Nuclear Island systems pro-vide one or more of the following functions: (1) maintaining reactor vessel water level; (2) depressurizing the reactor pressure vessel; (3) steam condensing; (4) heat removal; (5) heat sink; (6) electrical power; and (7) control. In addition, electrical power is required for pump motors and valve operation. Instrumentation automatically activates the core cooling system or provides signals to the control room operators to activate the appropriate system manually. O 9A.2-14
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.2.5 Nuclear Island Core Cooling System (Continued) Table 9A.2-1 shows the Nuclear Island systems that provide one or more of the core cooling functions. The table includes the opera-ting mode for multimode systems, the functions performed, reactor conditions that require system operation, the divisional assign-ment, the backup system and SAR reference for system description. O l t i r l O O 9A.2-15/9A.2-16
1 J I O 9 e i i Table 9A.2-1 I NUCLEAR ISLAND CORE COOLING l Backup (3) j System / Mode
- Function (1) Reactor Condition Division (2) System SAR Ref Remarks I RHR A/ Decay Heat Removal 4 Normal shutdown 1 RHR B 5.4.7 (4) , (5) , (6)
RiiR B/ Decay IIeat Removal 4 Normal shutdown 2 RHR A 5.4.7 (4) , (5) , (6) ; i RHR A/Supp Pool Cooling 4 Hot standby, LOCA 1 RHR B 6.2.2 (4) , (6) I RHR B/ Suppression Pool 4 flot standby, LOCA 2 RHR A 6.2.2 (4 ) , (6) Cooling w W RHR B 5.4.7
- RER A/ Steam Condensing 3,4 Hot standby, iso- 1 (4) , (6) , (7) i yg
. lation event y O tu i j
- RHR B/ Steam Condensing 3,4 Hot standby, iso- 2 RHR A 5.4.7 (4) , (6) , (7) i e lation event :D *O l
l r 4 RHR A,7ontainment Spray / 4/1 LOCA, SBE(8) 1 PHR B 6.2.2 & (4) , (6) , (9) (( LPCI 6.3.2 g , 2 RHR A 6.2.2 & U RHR B/ Containment Spray / 4/1 LOCA, SBE (8) 2 (4) , (6) , (9) LPCI 6.3.2 RER C/LPCI 1 LOCA 2 RIIR A and 6.3.2 (4) RHR B RCIC and Non-ADS Safety / 1 Isolation 1 HPCS 5.4.6 (4 ) , (10) l Relief Valve i HPCS 1,2 Isolation, LOCA 3 ADS 6.3.2 (4) l (LOCA) g
- c w
! ADS 2 LOCA 1,2 HPCS 6.3.2 (11) , (12 ) @>q
. o I
o C" i *See Table 9A.2-1 Notes for description of the numbers in parentheses. l l
Table 9A.2-1 NUCLEAR ISLAND CORE COOLING (Continued System / Mode
- Punction (1) Reactor Condition Division (2) System (3) SAR Ref Remarks LPCS 1 LOCA 1 HPCS and 6.3.2 (4)
LPCI ESW A 5 All 1 ESW B 9.2.1 (13) ESW B, normal and cross 1,5 All 2 ESW A 9.2.1 (13) , (16) , (18) tie to httR B Loop ESW C 5 Isolation, LOCA M 3 - 9.2.1 (13) as RWCU 4 Shutdown - - 5.4.8 (14 ) , (15 ) Z e CO
> O trj 'g CRD 1 Shutdown - -
4.6 (14 ) , (15) {y i
$ Div 1 electrical power 6 All 1 Div 2 8.3 %%
HH l Div 2 electrical power 6 All 2 Div 1 8.3
! 2 Div 3 electrical power 6 All 3 -
8.3 (17) O Control Room 7 All All Remote 7.4.1.4 shutdown power and , system ) Div 1 instrument power & 7 All 1 2, 3 and/ 7.2 signals or 4 Div 2 instrument power & 7 All 2 1, 3 and/ 7.2 signals or 4 M 3 c>
<4
. O O
O4 O O O
- @ @ g Table 9A.2-1 1
i NUCLEAR ISLAND CORE COOLING (Continued) l Backup i System
' SAR Ref Remarks i System / Mode
- Function Reactor Condition Division l
t J 7 All 3 1, 2 and/ 7.2 ' Div 3 instrument power & signals or 4 Div 4 instrument power & 7 All 4 1, 2 and/ 7.2 i or 3 signals w Z CO o OM 1 M U2 Mm N I W lC H HH U3 H Z -I O l i l l l l . i f WN (D >
<: a .
. o '
o e OQ l t
~ ___ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _
GESSAR II 22R7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O Notes for Table 9A.2-1: (1) Functions: 1 - maintain reactor water level; 2-depressurize the reactor vessel; 3 - steam condensing; 4 - heat removal; 5 - heat sink; 6 - electrical power; 7 - control (includes logic systems power for initiation of RPS an core cooling systems) (2) Division - electrical power divisional assignment (3) Backup System - see Subsection 6.3.2 for required number of ECCS systems (4) Room coolers needed for pump operation (5) Closed loop to and from reactor vessel (6) ESW provides coolant to heat exchangers (7) Only heat exchangers used, main steam to heat exchanger, condensate to RCIC pump suction when water quality is acceptable (8) SBE - small break event (9) Not a core cooling mode (10) Water supply for RCIC is condensate storage tank (BOP), suppression pool or RHR hx condensate (11) Pneumatic valves (12) Depressurizes the reactor to allow LP systems to function O 9A.2-20
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O g Notes for Table 9A.2-1 (Continued) (13) Only ESW piping and valves in RI, pumps in BOP, ultimate heat sink removes heat 114) Not a safety system (15) SAR does not describe this mode but system could be used to cool core (16) ESW B cross tie to RHR B loop for direct injection of ESW water into the reactor (17) Division 3 electrical power is for HPCS only (18) Crosstie is backup water source for emergency core cooling 1 I l l l 9A.2-21/9A.2-22
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O O 9A.3 ANALYSIS APPROACH U 9A.3.1 Review Data The analysis is based on a review of every room or area, on a floor-by-floor basis, for each building of the Nuclear Island design. The following data have been gathered for each room or area being reviewed: (1) identification of the safety-related and nonsafety-related systems, and associated cabling within each fire area, which could provide cooling to the core to safely shut down the reactor, and removal of decay heat; (2) identification of fire areas containing radioactive material which could be released to the exclusion area or beyond should a fire occur in that area; O (3) identification of safety and nonsafety-related equipment contained within the boundaries of each fire area, which do not provide cooling to the core to safely shut down the reactor; (4) definition of the fire barriers surrounding a specific room or area which qualify rating the room or area as a separate fire area; , (5) a specific listing of types, quantities and character-istics of all combustibles within a fire area which could constitute a fire load; (6) quantitative listing of fire loadings which represent the combustibles identified for each fire area; I 9A.3-1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.3.1 Review Data (Continued) (7) listing of all the fire detection and suppression capa-bilities provided and their accessibility for each fire area; (8) an analysis of each fire area, defining the design criteria employed in providing fire protection to the safety-related equipment and associated cabling contained within the fire area (This is stated as protection by spatial separation (isolation) or by physical barriers (segregation). The protection of electrical cabling is stated as divisional separation where this occurs.]; (9) an analysis defining the consequences of the fire for each fire area [This is stated as loss of function and identifies the divisional backup capability available for safety-related systems. The loss of function that would not impair the capability of safe, cold shutdown is identified where nonsafety-related systems are involved.]; (10) an analysis of each fire area addressing the consequences or fire, if the fire protection system functions as designed [The fire protection system is defined as having the capability to detect, contain and extinguish the fire. The ability to restrict the fire to a discrete area, the result of the introduction of water to the fire area and the capability of extinguishing the fire by various means of suppression are stated. See Section 3.6 for a discussion of pipe break consequences.] ; (11) design provisions for protecting the functional capa-bility or safety-related systems and associated cabling O 9A.3-2
. . ~ . . _ -
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
'T 9A.3.1 Review Data (Continued) i from the results of inadvertent operation, careless operation or rupture of the extinguishing systems for each fire area are stated.
(12) the means of containing and inhibiting the progress of a fire in each fire area [This is defined as the use of a fire-resisting enclosure or barrier, fire-stops at wall penetrations, duct dampers, curbs or fire-rated doors into the area.]; and (13) room numbers are shown on the analysis pages which conform to those shown on the fire area separation , drawings. 9A.3.2 Steam Tunnel O The steam tunnel opens into the Turbine Building without a barrier wall as part of the Nuclear Island design. A method of protecting the steam tunnel opening from the hazards of the turbine oil sys-tem is required and is the responsibility of the Applicant. Pro-tection of the steam tunnel from the fire hazards of the Turbine Building should be included in the Applicant's fire hazard analysis. 9A.3.3 Separation A specific analysis has been prepared for each fire area where redundant systems of safety-related equipment or electrical cables are contained in a common fire area to confirm that adequate pro-tection has been provided by means of separation by distance, physical barriers, electrical isolation or adequate backup systems. The analyses appear in Section 9A.5 (Special cases). , , O 9A.3-3 p
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.3.4 Insulation Fire llazard Electrical cable insulation is contained in either solid-bottom, solid-cover metal trays or in conduits and does not represent an exposed, combustible fire hazard. 9A.3.5 Exceptions to Penetrations Requirements (1) Fire dampers are not provided in smoke removal ducts in the Control and Auxiliary Buildings. (2) Containment pressure control lines, consisting of two 42-in. lines, are ASME Class 2 piping with isolation valves on both sides of the fire barrier. (3) Containment vacuum breakers, consisting of two 24-in. lines, are ASME Class 2 piping with isolation valves provided outside of the Shield Building and check-valves in the containment. 9A.3.6 Wall Deviations The wall descriptions below represent deviations from tested and approved 3-hr fire-resistive assemblies. The Type 1 and Type 2 wall designs exceed the design of the tested and approved assemblies from which they were adapted. The Type 3 wall design, which is an adaptation of UL design X-601, provides 2-hr fire-resistive construction. The wall from the top of the termination cabinet in the control room and the electrical equipment room to the underside of the above floor is a seismically designed, 2-hr fire-resistive wall meeting UL design U-411. 9A.3-4
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.3.6 Wall Deviations (Continued) (1) Type 1 wall - The Type 1 wall is designed with 6-in. metal studs at 12 in. on center (seismic design) with three layers of 5/8-in. firecode gypsum board on each side of the studs. The design is adapted from ICB0 1495 for a 3-hr partition. (2) Type 2 wall - The Type 2 wall is a variation of Type 1 with 6-in. metal studs at 12 in. on center between 6-in.- steel, wide-flange columns at 4 ft 0 in. on center. Three layers of 5/8-in. firecode gypsum board line one side while 1/2-in. thick steel plate for bullet resistance and two layers of 5/8-in. firecode gypsum board line the other side. (3) Type 3 wall - The Type 3 wall has 1/2-in. thick Albi-Clad intumescent mastic fireproofing material applied () to top and back of 12 gauge steel electrical termination cabinets. The wall is adapted fr-m UL Design X-601 for light-steel column, 2-hr fire protection. 9A.3.6.1 Locations of Deviations The locations given below represent areas where the cited fire wall deviations occur: (1) Auxiliary Building (a) floor El (-)32 ft 0 in. Type 1 Wall in equipment removal openings between corridor and JPCS pump, RilR Pump C, and LPCS pump rooms; and (b) floor El (-)6 ft 10 in. Type 1 Wall between the . cable tunnel and the corridor. 9A.3-5
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A 3.6.1 Locations of Deviations (Continued) (2) Control Building (a) floor El (-)6 ft 10 in. Type 2 wall between cable tunnels and corridor, control room and corridor and computer room and corridor; (b) floor El (-)7 ft 10 in. Type 3 wall between cable tunnel and control room and cable tunnel and com-puter room on each side of building; (c) floor El 11 ft 0 in. Type 1 wall between electrical equipment rooms and corridor and control equipment room and corridor, also surrounding the duct chase. Type 3 wall is between electrical equip-ment rooms and control equipment room on each side of building; and (d) floor El 28 ft 6 in. Type 1 wall between redundant mechanical equipment areas and also at duct chase. 9A.3.7 Door Deviations Certain doors throughout the Nuclear Island facility have a multipurpose function such as fire, tornado, pressure, missile, l seismic, watertight and airlocks. Where possible, these doors are specified to rated and labeled criteria and are then identified as ! a labeled door. [ l When other criteria require the manufacturer to delete the label, the door is identified as equivalent. l 1 l Where the door is not constructed as a fire door, such as a contain-ment personnel airlock, it is identified by its main function. l l 9A.3-6
GESSAR II 22A7007 a 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 "N 9A 4 ANALYSIS 9A.4.1 Auxiliary Building 9A.4.1.1 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)37 ft 0 in. (1) Space - RHR Pump C Room A-037-ll. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RIIR pump C Yes, D2 Yes Line fill pump Yes, D2 Yes RilR pump C local panel Yes, D2 Yes Room cooler Yes, D2 No Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No () Maintenance trolley No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-) 32 f t 0 in, backed by the concrete foundation mat at El (-)37 ft 0 in. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive con-crete at El (-)l7 ft 0 in. There is a pressure-resistant door to the vestibule and a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door to the corridor. A watertight, pressure-resistant equipment removal panel is fitted in the corridor wall, and a doorway opening leads into the pipe chase at the rear of the room. O G 9A.4-1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.1 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)37 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion (Btu) 44 f t of divisional cable 5.7 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 6 13 1/2 gallons of Class III B 1.9 x 10 lube oil (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. J-6 and D-12 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col.J-6, D-12 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col.J-6, J-8 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration. 9A.4-2
4 i GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ] 9A.4.1.1 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)37 ft 0 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling ; systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. I i 1 (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting l the equipment on steel framing and providing floor l drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent operation, Careless operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: i r
. l l
(a) locat'.on of the manual suppression systems external l to the room; l l - i (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; i (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and ; (c) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. O 9A.4-3
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.1 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)37 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. A Type 1 fire-resistive wall protects the equipment removal opening. 9A.4.1.2 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - LPCS pump Room A-037-15 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling LPCS pump Yes, D1 Yes l Line fill pump Yes, D1 Yes j Room cooler Yes, D1 Yes LPCS local panel Yes, D1 Yes Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-)32 ft 9A.4-4
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ("N 9A.4.1.2 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) i 0 in. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a pressure-resistant door to the vestibule and a 3-hr fire-tesistive A-label door to the corridor. A watertight, pressure-resistant equipment removal panel is fitted in the corridor wall and a doorway opening leads into the pipe chase at the rear of the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) l 6 56 ft of divisional cabic 7.3 x 10 trays containing 9.5 lb/ft of XLPE-PR cable insulation 6 28 gallons of Class III B 4.0 x 10 lube oil (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. J-6 and G-12 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-6,G-12 Manual l Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. J-8,D-12 Manual l O 9A.4-5
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.2 Duilding - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Conseguences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-quishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting equipment on steel framing and providing floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the SuEpression System: l (a) location of the manual suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; O 9A.4-6
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 s 9A.4.1.2 Guilding - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (c) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. f-~3 b (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. A Type 1 fire-resistive wall protects the equipment opening. 9A.4.1.3 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - RCIC Pump Room A-037-13 (G 9A.4-7
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.3 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RCIC pump and steam turbine Yes, D1 Yes Turbine glanu seal system Yes, D1 Yes Line fill pump Yes, D1 No Room cooler Yes, D1 Yes RCIC . local panel Yes, D1 Yes Equipment drain pumps A&B No No Floor drain pumps A&B No No RCIC maintenance trolley No No (3) Radioactive _ Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Bgrriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel gratings at El (-) 32 f t 0 in, backed by the concrete foundation mat at El (-)37 ft 0 in. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a pressure-resistant door to the - vestibule and a 3-hr fire-resisting A-label door to the corridor. A shield block opening is provided in the corridor wall and a doorway opening into the pipe chase at the rear of the room. Communication to the RHR A pump room is via the overpressure ventilation opening in the common wall. O 9A.4-8
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.1.3 Building - Auxiliary: F1 (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) O (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIcat of Combustion (Btu) 6 44 ft of divisional cable 5.7 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE cable insulation 6 gal. of Class III B lube 1.2 x 10 oil (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. J-6 and D-12 in the corridor. 9 (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-6 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. J-5, Manual J-8 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. 9A.4-9
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAMD Rev. 0 9A.4.1.3 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and providing floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (c) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-10
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.3 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains eiectrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.4 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - RHR Pump B Room A-037-10 (2) Equipment: O Safety-Related Provides Core Cooling RHR pump B Yes, D2 Yes RHR heat exchangers B&D Yes, D2 Yes RHR B local panel Yes, D2 Yes RHR room cooler Yes, D2 Yes Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No Maintenance trolley No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-)32 ft 0 in. backed by the concrete foundation mat at El (-)37 ft 0 in. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive V(~') 9A.4-ll I
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.4 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in with concrete access plugs above the exchangers. Intermediate grating plat-forms are placed in the room at El (-)7 ft 0 in., 13 ft 0 in. and 29 ft 10 1/2 in. A concrete shield block exists in the corridor wall and a doorway opening leads into the pipe chase at the rear of the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 201 ft of divisional cable 26.1 x 10 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 6 13 1/2 gallons of Class III B 1.8 x 10 lube oil internal to the RHR pump (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. J-6 and D-12 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic ~'ol. G-1, Manual Category I, standpipe and J-5 hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. G-1, Manual J-5 9A.4-12
GESSAa II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
- ~g 9A.4.1.4 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)-2 ft 0 in. (Continued) d Fire suppression access at this level is through the concrete shield block opening at the front of the room.
No normal access fire-resistive doors are provided at this level. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. s/ (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and providing floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: 2 (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; O 9A.4-13
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.4 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d ) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. Additional information is described in items A-15, A-18 and A-24. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.5. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping pene-trations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. O 9A.4-14
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ( 9A.4.1.5 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - HPCS Pump Room A-037-9. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling HPCS pump Yes, D3 Yes Line fill pump Yes, D3 Yes HPCS local panel Yes, D3 Yes Room cooler Yes, D3 Yes Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No Maintenance trolley No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-)32 ft 0 in. backed by the concrete foundation mat at El (-)37 ft 0 in. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a pressure-resistant door to the vestibule and a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door to the corridor. There is a watertight, pressure-resistant equipment removal panel in the corridor wall and a doorway opening to the pipe chase at the rear of the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 13 1/2 gal. of Class II B 1.9 x 10 lube oil t 9A.4-15
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.5 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (6) Detection _Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6 and D-12 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. G-1,J-5 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. G-1,J-5 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Conseguences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the 30ss of the functic,r. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Conseguepces of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and providing floor drainage through the sump system. 9A.4-16
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
'N 9A.4.1.5 Bui' ding - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) a (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(v.) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup
/'~'s system.
b (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping i penetrations. l l ( (13) Remarks - The pump lube oil is contained in an integral t j reservoir and has no exposed piping. l i 9A.4-17
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND R0v. 0 9A.4.1.6 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - access corridor A-032-1, A-032-16, A-032-25. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Auxiliary Building pressure No No control exhaust fans A&B PRMS sample panel A No No Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No PRMS sample panel (RHR A) No No PRMS sample panel (RHR B) No No Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No Detergent sump pumps A&B No No Plant vent isolation Yes,Dl,D2 No valves Corridor isolation valves Yes,Dl,D2 No (3) Radioactive :laterial Present - none. I (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and steel. The floor is the concrete foundation mat. The following doors are provided: (a) one A-label double door at stair tower (b) one A-label door at LPCS room vestibule 1 9A.4-18 l l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O s 9A.4.1.6 nullding - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) one A-label door into RCIC room vestibule (d) one A-label door into RilR C room vestibule (c) one A-label door at IIPCS room vestibule (f) one A-label double door at access vestibule AB/FB interface. Type 1 fire-resistive panels are provided in the equip-ment removal bulkhead openings. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIcat of Combustion g (Btu)
' 6 767 ft of divisional and 99.7 x 10 nondivisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-PR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC throughout the corridors and manual alarm pull stations at Col. J-6 and D-12.
(7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. G-1,J-6 Manual Category I, standpipe and G-13 hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. G-1,J-5 Manual
) J-8,D-13 9A.4-19
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.6 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The plant vent isolation valves are separated by a distance of 8 ft 0 in. The corridor isolation valves are air operated and close on air failure. The solenoids for the air operators are separated by a distance of 8 ft 0 in. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on I raired pads and floor drainage. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Agair,st InarJvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; l 1 (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; O l 9A.4-20 l
i
! GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i
I l /~^ 9A.4.1.6 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) l (c) provision of floor drainage; and
\
(d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: I
- (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-l resistive enclosure.
i (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible.
/'"N (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cable in trays.
Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.7 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 f t 0 iri. (1) Space - Ri?P Par.ip A Room A-037-14. l (2) Equipment: } i r Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RIIR pump A Yes, D1 Yes i RllR heat exchangers A&C Yes, D1 Yes I Room cooler Yes, D1 Yes ' i RilR A local panel Yes, D1 Yes i i Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No !
-s Maintenance trolley No No l
\,,/ Isolation valves, drain to Yes, Dl,D2 No !
t radwaste (2) , i 9A.4-21
,- - . . - .,n., - .. ~ - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.7 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Oualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-)32 ft 0 in. backed by the conrete foundation mat at El (-)37 ft 0 in. The ceiling is the concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in. with concrete access plugs above the exchangers. There are intermediate platforms at El (-)7 ft 0 in., 13 ft 0 in. and 29 ft 10 1/2 in. There is a concrete shield block in the cooridor wall and a doorway opening into the pipe chase at the rear of the room. - (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 201 ft divisional cable trays 26.1 x 10 6 containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 13 gal. of Class III B lube oil internal 1.8 x 10 6 to the RHR pump (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. J-6 and D-12 in the corridor. O 9A.4-22
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~') 9A.4.1.7 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) V (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. G-13, J-6 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. D-13, J-8 Manual Fire suppression access at this level is through the concrete shield block opening at the front of the room. No normal personnel access fire-resistive doors are provided at this level. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and providing floot drainage through the sump system. (} 9A.4-23
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 UUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.7 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I, standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote beckup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression, and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. Additional information is described in Items A-16, A-17 and A-26. O 9A.4-24
GESSAR II 22A7007 - 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND t Rev. O fs 9A 4.1.7 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 32 ft 0 in. (Continued) Iv' The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable - insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and pipirig penetrations. l The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. The safety-related isolation valves are separated by a distance'of 3 ft 6 in. on centers. , 9A.4.1.8 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft ICjin. (1) Space - RWCU pump access cooridor A-06-19. s (2) Equipment:
'~' Safety- Provides Rel a ted Core Cooling RWCU Pump Room coolers A&B No No (located at opposite ends of the corridor)
(3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fi5e Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr' fire-resistive concrete. There is a pressure-resistant door to the vestibu]d and a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door to the corridor. There is a . labyrinth entry to each of the pump rooms. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat. of Combustion fx_/'} None - 9A.4-25 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.8 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-9, H-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. J-6, D-13 Manual H-6 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The second cooler is available and spatially separated to provide the function. l l (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-l tection against flooding is provided by supporting the i equipment from the ceiling and providing floor drainage through the sump system. l l l 9A.4-26 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /~' 9A.4.1.8 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) N}' (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression Syst'em: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) equipment mounted on the ceiling; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Rpmarks - none. 9A.4.1.9 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - RWCU Pump Room A-06-ll. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU pump B No Yes v 9A.4-27
/
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.9 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A wall separates the pump and the valve Room. The separation wall does not reach the ceiling, thus providing an over-pressure ventilation path to the doorway opening in the pipe chase connecting the RCIC pump room. An open door-way leads from the Pump Room to the internal access corridor. (5) Combustibles _Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 3 gal, of Class III B lube 0.4 x 10' oil internal to pumps (6) petection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6 in the corridor. 1 l (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-9, H-2 Manual l Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. H-6, F-1 Manual D-13 l l 9 9A.4-28
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.1.9 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) Oi (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The pump is nondivisional and nonsafety related. Provision for core cooling backup capability is described in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro- -~ tection against flooding is provided by equipment on s_/ raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); s and m 9A.4-29
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.9 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) TSc system is enclosed in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.10 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - RWCU Valve Room A-06-12. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU valves No Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. Labyrinth shield walls separate pumps A&B and provide the room for the valves. Open doorways are provided to the pipe chase and to the RWCU pump access corridor. O 9A.4-30
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~') 9A.4.1.10 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) V (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Ac tua ti_o_n Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-9, H-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. H-6, F-1, Manual D-13 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function (i.e., inability to manipulate valves). The system is nondivisional and nonsafety-related and no backup is required. s_-) 9A.4-31 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.10 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; _ (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression, and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - none. O 9A.4-32
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.1.ll Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. C\ (1) Space - RWCU Pump Room A-06-13 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU pump A No Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. Labyrinth shield walls separate the pump and the valve room. An open doorway provides access to the Valve Room and pro-
-s vides an overpressure ventilation path to the pipe chase.
x_,) Open doorways connect the Valve Room with the pipe chase and the internal access corridor. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 3 gal. of Class III B lube 0.4 x 10 6 oil internal to pumps (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room end a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6. 9A.4-33
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.ll Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-9, H-12 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. H-6, F-1, Manual D-13 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The pump is nondivisional and nonsafety-related and no backup is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protectio.7 Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression system external to the room; 9A.4-34
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
,- 9A.4.1.11 Building - T.uxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) %J (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely).
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. x, (13) Remarks - Provisions for core cooling capability are (_ discussed in Subsection 9A.2.5. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.12 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - corridor A-06-23, Zone 1&2 around entirc building at this level. (2) Equipment: Provides Safety- Core Related Cooling Remote shutdown panel (see remarks) Yes,D1,D2 Yes MSIV leakage control panels Yes,Dl,D2 No RWCU valve corridor isolation valves Yes,Dl,D2 No [ ) QJ 9A.4-35
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.12 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (3) 13adioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls, one of which separates the corridor and room areas. There is a 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud-gypsum wall along the cable tunnel. The ceiling and floor are 3-br fire-resistive concrete. Interior walls contain 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors to the rooms. Exterior walls contain 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors. The CRD Maintenance Room is separated from the corridor with 1 1/2-hr B-label fire-resistive doors. (5) Combustible Present Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 32 ft of divisional and 433.2 x 10 6 nondivisional cable trays containing 9. 25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation l l l (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC throughout the corridor and manual alarm pull stations at Col. F-1, 1 J-6 and D-12 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Wet pipe automatic All Automatic sprinklers, ordinary hazard, minimum density 0.15 gpm/ ft2 per head, 100 ft2 per head, waterflow alarm at the Control Roon 9A.4-36
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ( 9A.4.1.12 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) C}/ Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-2, H-9, Manual Category I, standpipe and D-13 hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. F-1, H-3, Manual extinguishers H-7, D-13 (8) Fire Protect _ ion Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability provided and accessible. 7g (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping '(_,) penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. Division 1&2 MSIV leakage con-trol panels provide backup for each other aad are pro-tected by a spatial separation of 60 ft. The remote shutdown panel is located in a separate 1-hr fire-resistive structure for security reasons. The provision of core cooling backup capability is described in Sub-section 9A.2.5. The redundant safety-related power operated valves are separated by a minimum distance of 3 ft 0 in. so that adequate spatial separation is main-tained between signal and power cables to the redundant valves. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. f3 ( I ss 9A.4-37
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.12 Building - huxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Supp_ression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems on the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. l l (b) The means of fire detection, automatic and manual i suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. l (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The corridor provides access to other plant areas. The introduction of combustibles during normal operations and maintenance periods is expected. The 9A.4-38
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O g ~3 9A.4.1.12 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) b Applicant is responsible for limiting the anticipated transitory combustible loading for this area to a load not greater than can be protected by the ordinary hazard, automatic sprinkler system. Door A-16-25 is built as a 3-hr fire-resistive door, However, other criteria pro-hibit affixing a label. The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.13 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - CRD Maintenance Room A-06-9. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provid.es Related Core Cooling Tables and miscellaneous tools for No No performing CRD maintenance llVAC fan nondivisional do No Leak test booster pump No No Flush tank No No CRD ultrasonic cleaner and tank No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - storage and maintenance of contaminated CRDs. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 2-hour fire-resistive concrete. The doors are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label. (v/ 9A.4-39
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.13 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loc. ding Total lieat of Combustion None by design. May contain - small quantities of combustible materials necessary for maintenance activities. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. F-1 in the corridor. (7) S_uppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. 11 - 3 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Italon 1211 hand Col. F-2, F-1 Manual extenguishers Ordinary hazard wet pipe All Automatic , sprinklers, having a w: ster density of 0.15 gpm/f t 2 and a coverage of 100 ft 2 per ! head l l (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-l resistive area. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. O l 9A.4-40
GEESAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 7-sg 9A.4.1.13 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) U (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the function. There is no effect on safety-related systems. Fire and smoke could involve low-level con-tamination cleanup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the S_uppression System: f-~x (a) location of the manual suppression systems external
- s. to the room; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely).
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. l (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remar,ks - none. O V 9A.4-41
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.14 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - Division 2&3 cable tunnel A-06-24. (2) Eguipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cocling None. This space contains only Yes,D2,D3 Yes Division 2 electrical cables in solid-bottom, solid-covered trays. Division 3 electrical cables are in conduit, embedded in a concrete duct bank in the tunnel along the building exterior wall. (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A single 3-hr A-label door is pro-vided at Col. J-6. The Division 3 cable cabinet at Col. J-12 is 3-hr fire-resistive construction with 3-hr A-label fire-resistive doors. (5) Combust _ibles Present: 1 Fire Loading l Total Heat of Combustion l (Btu) 1224 ft of divisional cable 159 x 10 6 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detectig Provided - Class A supervised POC is provided i for the are and for the inside of Division 3 cable cabi-net. A manua. alarm pull station is located at Col. J-6. 9A.4-42
GESSAR II 22A7007
, 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i
9 A . 4 .1'.14 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) l (7) Suppression Available: 4
; Location Actuation j i Ordinary hazard wet pipe. All Automatic sprinklera, having a water density of 0.15 gpm/ft a and a j coverage of 100 ft' per head Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-7,H-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. H-2,F-1 Manual i extinguishers 1
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: l (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive I enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. I (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. l (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss ! of the function. Division 1 cables provide backup at l l a remote location. i (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression. Suppression extin-h guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-f tection against flooding is provided by floor drainage I through the sump system. \ s I 't f 9A.4-43
._- _ ,_. . - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ._ _ - . _ _ , _ _ _ . . . - . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ , . - . _ , _ . . - _ . = - , . _ - _ . - _ , . _ . .._._-, _ m ,-
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.14 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (ii) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the crea; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d) the safety-related functions have a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (13) Remarks - A separate smoke removal system provides five to 10 air changes per hour in the tunnel. The tunnel contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. O 9A.4-44
- . . . . . - .. . - -- _ . - - . ~. - - -
GESSAR II 22A7007 1 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 1 9A.4.1.15 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - RHR heat exchangers B&D Room A-037-10. 1
! (2) Equipment:
- Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RHR heat exchangers Yes, D2 Yes j (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire.
i ) (4 ) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building . wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-)7 ft 0 in. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in, with concrete access plugs above the exchangers. There are intermediate platforms at j El (-)32 ft 0 in., 13 ft 0 in and 29 ft 10 1/2 in. The i concrete foundation mat is at El (-) 37 f t 0 in. There is a pressure-resistant door to the vestibule and a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door to the corridor. There are open doorways to the pipe chases at the rear of the room. The overpressure ventilation system vents upward through this room to the steam tunnel wall panels. (5) Combustibles Present : Fire Loading { Total Heat of Combustion j (Btu) i i 96 ft of divisional cable trays 12.4 x 10 6 containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE- ' FR insulation i !O i 9A.4-45 i s
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.15 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (6) Detect 1_op Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. 11 - 2 , 11 - 9 Manual Category I standpipe and hose reel ABC and IIal- .211 hand Col . 11- 2 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. i (10) Consequences of Fire _ Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding i s provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and by providing floor drain-age through the sump system. O 9A.4-46
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
} 9A.4.1.15 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) ,d (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. n V (12) F_ ire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire barriers are provided in vertical cable tray runs. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (d) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. Additional information ("'N is described in qubsections 9A.4.1.4, 9A.4.1.18 and I
\ ) 9A.4.1.25.
9A.4-47 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.15 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.16 Building - Auxiliary: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (1) Space - RHR heat exchangers A&C Room A-037-14. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RHR heat exchanqers A&C Yes, D1 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Fire walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El (-)7 ft 0 in. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in. with concrete access plugs over the exchangers. There are intermediate platforms at El (-) 3 2 ft 0 in., 13 ft 0 in. and 29 ft 10 1/2 in. The concrete foundation mat is at El (-)37 ft 0 in. There is a pressure-resistant door to the vestibule and a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door to the corridor. An open doorway leads to the pipe chase at the rear of the room. The overpressure ventilation system vents upward through this room to the steam tunnel wall panels. 9A.4-48
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.16 Building - Auxiliary: El (-16 ft 10 in. (Continued) [~') v (5) Combustible Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 92 f t of divisional cable 11.9 x 10 6 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulatica (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual pull station at Col. J-6 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-2, H-9 Manual Category I standpipe and [U} hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. H-2 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. , (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems ("%g backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. N-) 9A.4-49
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.16 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extinguishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operat_ ion, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (c) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire barriers are provided in vertical cable tray runs over 20 ft. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. O 9A.4-50
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O O) ( x/ 9A.4.1.16 Building - Auxiliary: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. Additional information is described in Subsections 9A.4.1.7, 9A.4.1.17 and 9A.4.1.26. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insu-lation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.17 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - RilR heat exchangers A&C Room A-037-14. i O l ( v' (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RHR heat exchangers A&C Yes, D1 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building wall. The floor is open steel grating at El 13 ft 0 in. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in. with concrete access plugs above the exchangers. There are intermediate platforms at El (-)32 ft 0 in., (-)7 ft 0 in. and 29 ft 10 1/2 in. ()
\'
The concrete foundation mat is at El (-)37 ft 0 in. There are no access doors at this elevation. A pipe chase is located at the rear of the room. 9A.4-51
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.17 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 42 ft of divisional cable 5.4 x 10 6 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-7 in the corridor. (7) Suppression _Available: Location Actuation Suppression is available through Col. J-6 Manual personnel access at El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (see Subsection 9A.4.1.16). (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 1 (b) Fi re protection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of_ Fire - The postulated fire assumes the I loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. 9A.4-52
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.17 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) ( ) (10) Consequences of Fire Su_ppression - Suppression extinguishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria f/ sed for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless _ Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: s (a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; ( (c) provision of floor drainage; i (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and t (c) the safety a r. elated function has a remote ba'ckup system. (12) Fire Containment or 1rihibiting Methods Employed:
)
(a) The functioits are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire barriers are provided in vertical cable trgy runs. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. () (d) Themeansoffiredetection,[suppressionand alarming are accessible.
'/
9A.4-53
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.1.17 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. Additional information is described in Subsections 9A.4.1.7, 9A.4.1.16 and 9A.4.1.26. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.18 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - RIIR heat exchangers B&D Room A-037-10. (2) Equipment Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RilR heat exchangers B&D Yes, D2 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - aone that can be released as a result of fire. j l (4) Qua_lifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, one being the Shield Building l wall. The floor is open steel grating at El 13 ft 0 in. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in. with concrete access plugs above the exchangers. There are intermediate platforms at O 9A.4-54
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.1.18 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) Os El (-) 32 ft 0 in., (-)7 ft 0 in. and 29 ft 10 1/2 in. The concrete foundation mat is at El (-)37 ft 0 in. There are no access doors at this elevation. A pipe chase is located at the rear of the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 42 ft of divisional cable 5.4 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-7 in the corridor. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Suppression is available through Col. J-6 Manual the personnel access at the (-) 6 f t 10 in. level (see Subsection 9A.4.1.15). (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: l (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. O 9A.4-55
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.18 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions of core cooling systems backup are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Cons _equences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting equipment on steel framing and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent operation, Careless oper_ation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
)
(a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-56
.= _ __. - - - -
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.18 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) Fire barriers are provided in vertical cable tray runs. 4 (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. J (d) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. Additional information is described in Subsections 9A.4.1.4, 9A.4.1.15 and 9A.4.1.25. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.19 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Battery Room II, A-ll-22. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 11 batteries Yes, D4 No Battery Room fan B Yes, D2 No Battery Room fan D No No 9A.4-57
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.19 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr A-label fire-resistive door. A 6-in. curb is pro-vided at the door entry. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion Battery cases represent the As noted exposed combustible load with-in this area. The amount of plastics used in the battery cases does not exceed the 3-hr fire-resistive enclosure. (6) Detec_ tion Provided - Class A supcrvised POC in the room O and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-12 in the electrical equipment area. (7) fuppression Available: j Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-ll, D-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel with an elec-trically safe nozzle. ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. J-9, E-13 Manual extinguishers (8) Pire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-58
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.19 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued)
)
(b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The battery system provides con-trol power for Division 4 logic circuits for the NSSS Systems. Division 1, 2, and 3 battery systems provide backup in the event of loss of this system. , (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin- ) guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. v 9A.4-59
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.19 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The battery room is provided with two 100% capacity fans, one fed from the emergency bus and one fed from the normal bus. The fans maintain a ventilation rate that keeps the hydrogen gas concentration at 1% or less. The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.20 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Battery Room E, A-11-21. (2) Ejguipment : Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling E batteries Yes, D1 No Battery Room fan B Yes, D1 No Battery Room fan D No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. O
. 4-60
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ,m Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. ( )l9A.4.1.20 (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr A-label fire-resistive door. A 6-in. curb is pro-vided at the door entry. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion Battery cases represent the As noted exposed combustible load within this area. The amount of plastics used in the battery cases does not exceed the 3-hr fire-resistive enclosure. () (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-12 in the electrical equipment area. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-ll,D-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel with an elec-trically safe nozzle ABC and llalon 1211 hand Col. J-9,E-13 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-61
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.20 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. This battery system provides control power to Division 1 electrical systems, some emergency lighting and the RCIC system. Division 2 and 3 battery systems provide backup in the event of loss of this system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design _ Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent gpp ra t_ ion , Careless Operation o,r Rupture of the Supprpspion System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipmen t; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (ruptur- unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. O 9A.4-62
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~^ 9A.4.1.20 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separ..te fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The battery room is provided with two 100% capacity fans, one fed from the emergency bus and one fed from the normal bus. The fans maintain a ventilation rate that keeps the hydrogen gas concentration at 1% or less. The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insultion in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. (} 9A.4.1.21 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Battery Room F, A-ll-17 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling F batteries Yes, D2 No Battery Room fan B Yes, D2 No Battery Room fan D No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - None. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and
-- ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a V
9A.4-63
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.1.21 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) 3-hr A-label fire-resistive door. Is 6-in. curb is provided at the door entry. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion Battery cases represent the exposed As noted combustible load within the area. The amount of plastics used in the battery cases does not exceed the 3-hr fire-resistive enclosure. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-3 in the electrical equipment area. ll (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-3, D-1 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel with an electrically safe nozzle ABC and lialon 1211 hand Col. J-3, D-1 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. O 9A.4-64
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.21 Buildino - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. This battery system provides Division 2 control power and ECCS control power. Division 1 and 3 battery systems provide backup in the event of loss of this system (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. () (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely) ; and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. o 9A.4-65
Gr."SAR II 22A7007 238 NUtoEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.21 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Er'. ploy _ed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The battery room is provided with two 100% capacity fans, one fed from the emergency bus and one fed from the normal bus. The fans maintain a ventilation rate that keeps the hydrogen gas concentration at 1% or less. The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.22 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Battery Room J, A-ll-18. (2) Equipment: Provides Safety-Related Core Cooling J batteries No No Battery Room fans (2) No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr A-label fire-resistive door. A 6-in. curb is pro-vided at the door entry. 9A.4-66
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.22 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (/; ( (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIcat of Combustion Battery cases represent the exposed As noted combustibles load within this area. The amount of plastics used in the battery cases does not exceed the 3-br fire-resistive enclosure. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-3 in the Electrical Equipment Room. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col . J-3, D-1 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel with an electrically safe nozzle ABC and IIalon 1211 hand Col. J-3, D-1 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. O 9A.4-67
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.22 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. This battery room is nondivisional with no backup battery system required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (a) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. O 9A.4-68
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.1.22 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) rS O (c/ The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Sub-section 9A.3.4. (13) Remarks - none. 9A.4.1.23 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Division 1 Electrical Equipment Room A-ll-15. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling IRM/SRM preamplifier cabinet A Yes, D1 No Bus C No No
) No No N/ Bus E2 Bus El Yes, D1 Yes Bus E Yes, D1 Yes Bus DC-E2 Yes, D1 Yes Bus DC-E Yes, D1 Yes Battery charter El Yes, D1 No Battery charger E2 No No Bus El-1 Yes, D1 Yes Bus DC-II Yes, D4 No Battery charger H1 Yes, D4 No Battery charger H2 No No Bus Al No No Bus Al-1 No No Bus E2-1 No No Air conditioning unit Yes, D1 No Air conditioning unit Yes, D1 No b
G 9A.4-69
GESSAR II 22A7907 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.23 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications _o_f Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a single 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door emergency exit to the Control Building. There are two 3-hr A-label fire-resistive doors that provide access to the battery rooms. A 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double door pro-vides access to the AB/FB interface stair tower. There are eight electrical penetrations in the Shield Building wall. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion (Btu) 811 ft of divisional and nondivi- 105 x 10 0 sional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation One gallon of Class III B lube 5 oil in each ACU 2.8 x 10 (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room l and manual alarm pull stations at Col. B-12 and J-9 in the room. 9A.4-70 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.1.23 Builoing - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) O' (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. J-ll, D-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel with an electri-cally safe nozzle ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. D-13, J-9 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. Backup is provided by duplicate systems in the Division 2 Electrical Equipment Room. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. O 9A.4-71
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.23 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Supperssion System: (a) Location of the fire suppression systems at the perimeter of the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely) ; and (e) the .fety-related functions have remote backup systems. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (c) The means for fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (d) Electrical systems are enclosed in divided cabinets. (13) Remarks - The lube oil systems are integral with the equipment. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4-72
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
- 9A.4.1.24 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in.
(1) Space - Division 2 Electrical Equipment Room A-11-9. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling IRM/SRM preamplifier cabinet D Yes, D4 No Bus D No No Bus P2 f:o No Bus F1 Yes, D2 Yes Bus F Yes, D2 Yes Bus DC-J No No Battery chargers J1 & J2 No No Bus F1-1 Yes, D2 Yes Bus DC-F Yes, D2 Yes Battery charger F1 Yes, D2 No
/h Battery charger F2 No No U Bus B1 No No Bus B1-1 No No Bus F2-1 No No IRM/SRM drive control cabinet No No Air conditioning unit Yes, D2 No Air conditioning unit Yes, D2 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none.
(4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are two 3-hr A-label fire-resistive emergency exit doors, two 3-hr fire-resistive A-label battery room doors and a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double door to the AB/FB interface vestibule. Eight electrical penetrations exist in the Shield Building wall. h [V 9A.4-73
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.24 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 1094 ft of divisional and nondivi- 142 x 10 6 sional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation One gallon of Class III B lube 2.8 x 105 oil in each ACU (6) Detection provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual pull stations at Col. C-1 and J-4 in the room. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-1, J-3 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel with an electri-cally safe nozzle l ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. C-1, J-3 Manual l extinguishers l (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: 1 (a) The function is located in a separate fire-l resistive enclosure. l (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. 9A.4-74
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.24 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued)
)
(c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. Backup is provided by duplicate systems in the Division 1 electrical equipment room. (10) Consequences _of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (} (a) location of the fire suppression systems at the perimeter of the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related functions have remote backup systems. O 9A.4-75
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 MUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.24 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (c) The means for fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (d) Electrical systems are enclosed in divided metal cabinets. (13) Remarks - The lube oil systems are integral with the equipment. The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.25 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - RHR Hea t Exchangers B&D Room A-037-10. (2) Eguipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling l RHR heat exchangers B&D Yes, D1 Yes (3) Radioactive Ma terial Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. l Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr l (4) fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grat-ing at El 29 ft 10-1/2 in. The ceiling is the 3-hr l l l 9A.4-76
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NGCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.25 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) fire-resistive concrete roof at El 50 ft 9 in, with concrete access plugs above the exchangers. There are intermediate platforms at El (-)32 ft 9 in., (-)7 ft 0 in. and 13 ft 0 in. The concrete foundation mat is at El (-)37 ft 0 in. There are no access doors at this elevation. Pour nonfire-resistive blowout panels to the steam tunnel relieve the overpressure ventilation system. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire 1.ending Total IIcat of Combustion , None at this elevation - () (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Suppression is available through Col J-6 Manual the personnel access at the (-)6 ft 10 in. level (see Sub-section 9.5.1A.4.1.15). (8) Fire Protection Desi.gn Criteria Employed: l (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 3 (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. 9A.4-77
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.2'3 Euilding - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (9) Conse_guences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are defined in subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipment on steel framing and by providing floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (c) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-l ' resistive enclosure. l (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. 1 9A.4-78 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.25 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) a Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible (13) between the various levels of this room. Additional information is described in Subsections 9A.4.1.4, 9A.4.1.15 and 9A.4.1.18. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.26 Building - Auxilicry: El 28 ft 6 in.
~
(1) Space - RilR heat exchangers A&C Room A-037.14. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RilR heat exchangers A&C Yes, D1 Yes , (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released I as a result of fire. I (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grat-f ! ing at El 29 ft 10-1/2 in. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-I resistive concrete roof at El 50 ft9 in.withconcroke access plugs above the exchangers. There are inter-mediate platforms at El (-) 32 f t 0 in. , (-)7 ft 0 in. l and 13 ft 0 in. The concrete foundation mat is at El (-) 37 f t 0 in. There are no access doors at this b(s,/ elevation. Four nonfire-resistive blowout panels to the 9A.4-79
GESSAR It 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.25 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) steam tunnel relieve the overpressure ventilation system. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None at this elevation - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Suppression available throuah Col. J-6 Manual the personnel access at the (-)6 ft 10 in.' level (see Subsec t. ion 9. 5. lA . 4 .1.16 ) . (P) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. The provisions for core cooling systems are defined in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water drains through the grating. 9A.4-80
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND , Rev. 0
?,
9A.4.1.25 Building - Auxi-liary: El 2P ft 6 in. ( Col. i.nued) O ; LJ \ v Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the equipre17t on steel framing and by providing floor drainage thrc! ugh the sump system. , (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection-Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of'the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (c! provision of floor drainage; e 7- (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikcly);
) and i
(c) 'the safety-related function has a remote backup system.
/
(12) Fire Containmei.'_or Inhibiting Methods Employed: i (a) The functions are, located in a separate fire-resistive enclos,ure. , (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided'and accessible. (13) Remarks - Vertical fire communication is possible between the various levels of this room. , Additional information is described in Subsections 9A.4.1.7, 9A.4.1.16 and 9A.4.1.17. O - \_) .
~
9A.4-81 ' , v, w
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.26 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued)
'."he room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4.
Fire-stops are provided for cable tray pcnetrations. The pump lube oil is contained in an integral reservoir and has:no exposed piping. 9A.4.1.27 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - Zone 1 HVAC Equipment Room A-28-15. 4 (2) Equipment: Provides Safety- Core Related Cooling Auxiliary Building equipment hoist No No Nuclear Island booster pumps A&B No No Drywcl1 booster pumps No No Nuclear Island water chillers A&B No No Drywell chiller No No Auxiliary Building preheat coil No No Auxiliary Building air conditioning unit No No Drywell chilled water expansion tan:. No No l Drywell chilled water air separator No No Nuclear Island chilled water expan- ! sion tank No No Nuclear Island chilled water air No separator No Nuclear Island chilled water pumps A, B&C No No Drywell chilled water pump No No i 9A.4-82
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.27 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) ()T Provides Safety- Core Pelated Cooling IIVAC Equipment Room vent fan No No Auxiliary Building pressure control supply systems A&B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double door to the stair ' tower. There is a 3-hr fire-resistive door for the emergency exit to the Control Building. Seven electrical penetrations exist in the Shield Building wall. sO) (, (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion (Btu) 470 ft of nondivisional cable trays 61.1 x 10 6 containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 46 gallons of Class III B lube oil 6.6 x 10 6 internal to the equipment (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at Col. B-12 and J-12. l l O 9A.4-83
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.27 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) O (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-12, 11 - 1 2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-12 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and available. Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. O (c) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The systems are duplicated in Zone 2. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and b'; floor drainage through the sump system. O 9A.4-84
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O "N 9A 4.1.27 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) J J (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems at the perimeter of the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or inhibiting Methods Employed: w
\
G (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The lube oil systems are integral with the equipment. The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4.
-w U
9A.4-85
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 MUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.28 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - Zone 2 IfVAC Equipment Room A-28-9. (2) Equipment: Provides Safety- Core Related Cooling Auxiliary Building equipment hoist No No Containment pressure control supply systems A&B No No Containment high purge supply system No No IIVAC Equipment Room vent fan No No Auxiliary Building air conditioning vent No No Auxiliary Building pre-heat coil No No Drywell chilled water pump No No Drywell booster pump No No Drywell water chiller No No Drywell chilled water expansion tank No No Drywell chilled water air separator No No Containment high purge isolation valve Yes, D1 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double door to the AB/FB vestibule and a tornado-resistant, unlabeled, 3-hr fire-resistive door providing access to the Diesel-Generator Building roof. There are five electrical penetrations and an HVAC penetration containing a con-tainment purge isolation valve in the Shield Building wall. Two 1-1/2-hr fire-resistive doors provide access 9A.4-86
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.28 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) to the air positive seal Equipment Room and to an unassigned area. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 590 ft of nondivisional cable trays 76.7 x 106 containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 6 20 gallons of Class III B lube oil 2.8 x 10 internal to the equipment (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room O) ( and manual alarm pull stations at Col. B-1 and H-1. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1, J-l Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ! ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-1 Manual i [ (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. 9A.4-87 [
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.28 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) O (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable trays and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the functions. The systems are duplicated in Zone 1. The containment high purge isolation valve has a Division 2 backup valve inside the containment. (10) Conse_guences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems at the perimeter of the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enc.losure. (b) Fire stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. k 1 9A.4-88
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.28 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The lube oil systems are integral with the equipment. The room contains electrical cable in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4.1.29 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - air positive seal A-28-16. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Centrifugal air compressor Yes, D2 No Moisture separator Yes, D2 No Air cooler Yes, D2 No Air receiver Yes, D2 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud and gypsum wallboard, one wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive building exterior wall, one wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete and the ceiling is 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud and gypsum wallboard. A single 1-1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door provides access to the room. 9A.4-89
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.29 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm station at Col. B-1 and H-l. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1, J-l Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-1 Manual O (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The systems are duplicated in the Fuel Building. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-quishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor and 9A.4-90 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
-x 9A.4.1.29 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued)
V drain to the IIVAC equipment roem drains. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of suppression systems exterior to the room; (b) provision of raised pads; and (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: The functions are located in a separate fire-("'s i ) (a)
\> resistive enclosure.
(b) Fire-stop; are provided for cable and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - none. I 9A.4-91
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAN. Rev. 0 9A.4.1.30 Building - Auxiliary: El 23 ft 6 in. (1) Space - A-28-17 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and one wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and the ceiling is 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud and gypsum wallboard. A single 1-1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door provides access to the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual pull station at Col. B-1 and H-1. l (7) Suppression Available: l l l Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1, J-l Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel I ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-1 Manual O i 9A.4-92 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O gS 9A.4.1.30 Building - Auxiliary: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) t )
%/-
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is unassigned. (b) The room is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (c) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The function is unassigned, how-ever, fire assumes loss of function. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - unknown at this time. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent 73 Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup-V pression System: (a) location of suppression systems exterior to the room. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) Separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The roem is not intended for use as a general storage area. O v 9A.4-93
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.31 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. and 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - steam tunnel R-9-12. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Main steamlines with onc Yes, Dl, D2, Yes isolation and one shutoff valve in each line (4) Maintenance crane (5-ton) No No Seismic restraint structure Yes No Steam tunnel equipment No No coolers Feed water piping and iso- Yes, Dl, D2, Yes lation valves Radiation monitors (4) Yes, Dl, D2, No D3, D4 Leak detection temperature Yes, Dl, D2, No detectors D3, D4 (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The area is open to the Turbine Building through the seismic restraint structure. Protection of this opening from fire hazards associated with the Turbine Building opera-tion is the responsibility of the Applicant. There are eight nonfire-resistive, metal blowout panels located in the walls that are part of the overpressure ventila-tion system. O 9A.4-94
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O <~ 9A.4.1.31 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. and 28 ft 6 in. (N) (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIeat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the tunnel and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-6 in the tunnel. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. G-6 Manual standpipe and hose reel t0 \- I (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the function. The valves are spatially separated and are designed to fail closed on loss of actuation power. The provisions for core cooling systems backup are discussed in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection againat flooding is provided by equipment on
"') \- '
raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. 9A.4-95
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.31 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in. and 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting tiethods Employed: (a) With the exception of the opening into the Turbine Building and the metal blowout panels in the walle, the functions are located in a separate fire-resis-tive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. i (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The isolation valve in each steamline is air operated. The shutoff valve in the same line is Division 2 motor operated. Each valve in a single steamline is separated by a distance of about 20 ft. The horizontal separation between valves in different lines is about 7 ft. The i 1 l 9A.4-96 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.1.31 Building - Auxiliary: El 11 ft 0 in, and 28 ft. 6 in. (/ x_ T (Continued) divisional limit switch functions for the isolation valves are discussed in Section 5.7. Each feedwater line is provided with an air-operated checkvalve and Division 1 and 2 motor-operated shutoff valves. The valves in each line are about 6 ft apart and the lines are separated from each other by about 22 ft. 9A.4.2 Control Building 9A.4.2.1 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - office area between Col. 4A and Columns 5B and 5F, Rooms C-06-1 through C-06-14, C-06-16, C-06-17 and ("" \/ C-012-2. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The building exterior walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The interior walls are 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion. The water heater closet is enclosed in 2-hr fire-resistive concrete and has a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. Area access doors are 3/4-hr fire-resistive D
.)
9A.4-97
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.1 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) C-label doors. The floor is the concrete building foun-dation slab, the ceilings in this area are 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The stair-wells and elevator shaft are of 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. Stairwell doors are 250 F rise in 30 min, B-label, 1 1/2--hr fire-resistive doors. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion The materials of construction for these As noted areas are noncombustible or have a flame spread, smoke-evolved, fuel-cont-ibuted index of 25 or less. The furnishings for the area are the resnonsibility of the Applicant. Furnishings should be reviewed for the fuel they may contrib-ute to the area. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in each room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. D-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4, E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. C-4, D-4, Manual extinguishers and E-4 Automatic wet pipe sprink- All Automatic lors, ordinary hazard, mini-mum density 0.15 ft2, 100 ft2 per heat water flow alarm at control room 9A.4-98
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.1 Building - Control: () V El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in separate fire-resistive enclosures. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) The concealed spaces between the metal joist ceiling and the underside of the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete floor above are devoid of combustibles. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. No backup is provided. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-(~ ) guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d) the automatic sprinkler is non-Seismic Category I. Inadvertent operation causes inconvenience only.
)
v 9A.4-99
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.1 Suilding - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The rooms are separate fire-resistive enclosures. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarning are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The control of any permanent or transitory combustible loading introduced through normal and maintenance operations is the responsibility of the Applicant. The area contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.2 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - access corridor C-06-19 between Columns A-B and 1-5. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualificatipns of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hour fire-resistive construction. Some doors are 3-hr fire-resistive construction, however, they are not labeled because of tornado, pressure, O 9A 4-100
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O g-~g 9A.4.2.2 Building - Control: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continucd) b missile and seismic criteria. The access door to the Diesel Generator Building and the personnel door to the Auxiliary Building are A-labeled. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion The materials of construction for this - area are noncombustible or have a flame ' spread, smoke-evolved, fuel-contributed index of 25 or less. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. D-4.
) (7) Suppression Available:
Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. A-3 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. A-3 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The corridor is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. O 9A.4-101
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.2 Building - Control: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Other entry and egress points to the Control, Auxiliary and Diesel-Generator Buildings are available. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The control of any permanent or transitory combustible loading introduced through normal and maintenance operation is the responsibility of the Applicant. The corridor contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4-102
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.2.3 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. {J~') (1) Space - Division 1 and 4 cable room, Room C-07-20. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None. This space contains Yes, D1 Yes Division 1 and nondivisional cable trays. Division 4 cables are in conduit embedded in the walls. (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete building exterior walls. One wall is Type 2 fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc- /^} C tion, and the cable tunnel / control room wall is a 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum wall suspended from the above floor construction and scaled to the PGCC termina-tion cabinets. The termination cabinets are Type 3 fire-resistive walls. The floor is the concrete building foundation slab. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. One 3-hr fire-resistive door is bullet resistive and unlabeled. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion (Btu) 6 850 ft of divisional and non- 110 x 10 divisional cable trays con-taining 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation O C 9A.4-103
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 WUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A 4.2.3 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the tunnel and a manual alarm pull station at Col. C-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Automatic wet pipe sprinklers, All Automatic minimum density 0.15 gpm/ft2, ordinary hazard, 100 ft /2 head Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and IIalon 1211 hand Col. C-4 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design, Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. 1 (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Cons _eguences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Division 2 cable systems are remotely located and provide backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-l tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. O 9A.4-104 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.3 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (Vh (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provisions of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); (d) the safety-related function has a remote backup system; and (3) inadvertent operation of the automatic sprinklers [v causes inconvenience only. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression, and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (13) Remarks - The cable tunnels and the control / computer rooms are provided with smoke removal systems. These systems supply a minimum of five air chances per hour. The area contains electrical cable in conduit and in I'V;\ trays. Cable insulation in conduit and trays is dis-cussed in Subsection PA.3.4. 9A.4-105
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.4 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - Division 2 and 3 cable tunnel, Room C-07-26. i (2) Ijguipmen t : Safety- Provides e lated R__ Core Cooling None. This space contains Yes, D2 Yes Division 2 and nondivisional cable trays. Division 3 cables are in conduit in a concrete duct bank against the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall. (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete building exterior walls. One , wall in Type 2 fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion, and the cable tunnel / control room wall is 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum wall suspended from the above floor construction and staled to the PGCC termina-tion cabinets. The termination cabinets are a Type 3 fire-resisti.ve wall. The floor is the concrete building foundation slab. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a 3-hr fire-resistive door that is bullet resistive and unlabeled. (5) Combustibles Present: i Fire Loading l Total IIeat of Combustion __ (Btu) 1000 ft of divisional and nondivisional 130 x 106 cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of , XLPE-FR cable insulation O 9A.4-106
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.4 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) { V (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the tunnel and a manual alarm pull station at Column D-4. (7) Suppression Available: ,. i Location Actuation Automatic wet pipe sprinklers, All Automatic minimum density 0.15 gpm/ft2, ordinary hazard, 100 ft 2/ head Modified Class III, Seismic Col. E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. E-4,F-1 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: I g ) (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive v' enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. t (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the
- loss of the function. Division 1 cable systems are remotely located and provide the backup.
(10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. m 9A.4-107
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.4 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems; (b) provisions of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); s (d) the safety-related function has a remote backup system; and (e) inadvertent operation of the automatic sprinklers causes inconvenience only. (12) Fire Containmen_t o. .nhibiting Methods Employed: , O (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (13) Remarks - The cable rooms and the control / computer rooms are provided with smoke removal systems. These systems supply a minimum of five air changes per hour. The area contains electrical cable in conduit and in trays. Cable insulation in conduit and trays is dis-cussed'in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-resistive wall type descriptions are in Subsection 9A.3.6. 9A.4-108
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR-ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.5 Building,- Control: El (-) 6 f t 10 in. (1) Sgace - Control room, equipment area and computer area, Room's C-06-21, C-06-?4, C-06-22. (2) Equipment:
- Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 14 PGCC modules with Yes, Dl,D2 Yes tennination cabinets D3,D4 l
f (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The control room has ! one wall of 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The cable room / control room walls are 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum'guspended from the above floor construction () and sealed t'o the PGCC termination cabinets. The termination cabinets are a Type 3 fire-resistive wall. The fourth wall is a Type 2 fire-resistive wall. A 3-hr, unlabeled, bullet-resistive double door provi, des access to the control room. The computer area is separated from the control room by a 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum wall. There is one 3-hr fire-resistive, unlabeled door. Computer input / output terminals are located in the computer area. The integrated ceiling system is noncombustible metal frame construction using Class A materials. O 9A.4-109
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAE4D Rev. 0 9A.4.2.5 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: e Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Each PGCC contains 356 lb of TEFZEL 200 44.7 x 10 cable insulation and 75 lb of XLPE-FR cable insulation. The TEFZEL contributes 2.14 x 106 Btu and the XLPE contributes 1.05 x 106 Btu, per PGCC. The total Btu fire loading for the 14 PGCC in the control room is in opposite column. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. D-4. A PGCC has eight heat detectors and four POC detectors in each floor section. (7) Suppression Available: O Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4,E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and IIalon 1211 hand Col. D-2,C-4, Manual extinguishers E-4 Total flooding IIalon 1301 Each PGCC Manual systems (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. O 9A.4-110 .
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.5 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (~N (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The remote shutdown panel pro-vides the backup to safely shut down the reactor. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppres!. ion extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Floor drains are provided. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) Location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d) the safety-related function has a remote backup. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosures. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable penetrations. O 9A.4-111
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.5 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - The divisional separation of the PGCC floor section modules is shown in Figure 9A-30. The cable tunnels and the control / computer rooms are supplied with smoke removal systems. These systems can supply a minimum of five air changes per hour. The transitory combustibles (computer printouts) should be stored in the space available in the chart room. In some of the main control room panels (e.g., P001) switches and devices for backup safety-related functions have been located side by side for optimization of the operator interface. Where this occurs, the particular control panel bay is given a divisional assignment cor-responding to the predominant division of the devices in the bay. Devices of a different division which are located in that bay are enclosed in a metal can, and their cables are routed out of the bay in flexible metal-lic conduit. The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 are thus met by providing the metallic barrier between divisions. Fire-resistive wall types are presented in Subsection 9A.3.6. The area contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. PGCC Halon 1301 System Description in Subsection 7.7.2.9. O 9A.4-112
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 l 9A.4.2.5 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) PGCC Fire and Safety Evaluation is presented in NEDO 10466-A February 1979 PGCC Design Criteria and Safety Evaluation 9A.4.2.6 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - Main corridor', Room C-06-15, with Storage Room C-06-27. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None. The main corridor provides No No access to the control room and to the support areas at this elevation. (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The corridor / control room wall is Type 2 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum bullet-resistive construction. The corridor / ! office area wall is 1-hr firn-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The storage room has one 3-hr fire-resistive concrete wall, two 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum walls and one Type 2 wall. The floor is the concrete building foundation mat. The ceiling is 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The corridor has a 3-hr fire-resistive, unlabeled double door to the access corridor. The storage area has a 1 1/2-hr 9A.4-ll3
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.6 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) fire-resistive, B-label door. The office areas have 3/4-hr fire-resistive, C-label doors. The control room entrance is a 3-hr fire-resistive, unlabeled bullet-resistive double door. Stairwell doors are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive, 250 0 F rise, B-label doors. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the corridors and a manual alarm pull station at Col. D-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4,E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. C-4,D-4, Manual extinguishers E-4 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. A fire in this corridor limits access to the area. 9A.4-ll4
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.6 Building - Control: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (b) provision of floor drainage. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The control of any permanent or transitory combustible loading introduced through normal and maintenance operations is the responsibility of the Applicant. The corridor contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-resistive wall types are presented in Subsection 9A.3.6. O 9A.4-ll5
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.7 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Support area between Columns 4A-5 and B-F Rooms C-06-1, C-2-8, C-06-17, C-11-3 through 12, C-ll-14. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None. This area contains the No No stair towers, elevator shaft, men's shower / locker room, duct chase instrument repair, storage and janitor closets. (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The building exterior walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The interior walls are 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion. The duct chase is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and haa no access at this level. Area access doors are 3/4-hr fire-resistive, C-label doors. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The stairwells and elevator shaft are 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction interior walls and 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls. The stairwell doors ute _30"F rise in 30 min, B-label, 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive doors. O 9A-4-116
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 g 9A.4.2.7 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) b (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion The materials of construction for these As noted areas are noncombustible or have a flame spread, smoke-evolved, fuel-contributed index of 25 or less. The furnishings for the area are the responsibility of the Applicant. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in each area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. D-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4,E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. C-4,D-4 Manual extinguishers E-4 Automatic wet pipe sprinklers, All Automatic minimum density 0.15 gpm/ft2, ordinary hazard, 100 ft /2 head (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in separate fire-resistive enclosures. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible, p 'J 9A.4-ll7
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAUD Rev. 0 9A.4.2.7 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) The concealed spaces between the metal stud / gypsum ceiling and the underside of the concrete floor above are devoid of combustibles. (9) Conseguences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function with little effect on the control equipment room. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Fro-tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Oyeration or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the fire protection systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely). (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The raoms are separate fire-resistive enclosures. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming arc provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The control of any permanent or transitory combustible loading introduced through normal and maintenance operations is the responsibility of the Applicant. 9A.4-ll8
GESSAR Il 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
/~'N 9A.4.2.7 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued)
U The area contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.8 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Main corridor Col. 4-4A and B-F, Room C-ll-15; access corridor Col. 1-5 and El-F, Room C-ll-27; and vestibule, Room C-11-25. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 1-hr, and Type 2, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum and 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The doors in the 3-hr and Type 2 fire-resistive walls are 3-hr bullet-resistant unlabeled doors. The doors in the 1-hr fire-resistive walls are 3/4-hr C-label 0 s. The doors l entering the stair towers are 1 1/2-hc, B-label doors ( with a maximum 250 F temperature rise in 30 min requirement. The door from the Auxiliary Building is . 3-hr fire-resistive, A-label door. The door to BOP is l l a 3-hr fire-resistive, unlabeled door. A 9A.4-119
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.8 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustiori The materials of construction for this - area are noncombustible or have a flame spread, smoke-evolved, fuel-contributed index of 25 or less. (6) Dett7 tion _Provided - Class A supervised POC in the corridor and a manual alarm pull station at Column D-4. (7) Suppression Available: Locati_on Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4,E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. C-4,D-4, Manual extinguishers E-4 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The corridor is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and supprescion capbility is pro-vided and accessible. 1 1 (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the l loss of the function. A fire in this corridor limits l access to the area. ! (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro- I tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. O 9A.4-120
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.8 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) The standpipe is Seismic Category I with rupture unlikely. (b) Floor drainage is provided. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The corridors contain electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in
)
Subsection 9A.3.4. Unlabeled doors and fire-resistive wall types are , presented in Subsection 9A.3.6. 9A.4.2.9 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Division 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Room C-21-26. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling PGCC termination cabinets Yes, D2, D3 Yes Power supplies Yes, D2, D3 Yes Distribution panels Yes, D2, D3 Yes ( 9A.4-121
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.9 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriors - One electrical equip-ment room wall is 3-hr Type 1 fire-resiscive metal stud / gypsum suspended from the above floor construction and scaled to the PGCC termination cabinets. The termination cabinets form a Type 3, 2-hr fire-resistive wall. The balance of the walls are 3-hr fire-resistive, bullet-resistive metal stud / gypsum. The vestibule wall is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling and floor are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The doors are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion No significant combustibles - (6) Detection P_rovided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. E-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Cols. C-4,D-4 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-122
GESSAR II 22A7007 , 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (} 9A.4.2.9 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The Division 1 .d 4 electrical ! equipment room is physically separated from this area and provides the backup. Division 2 equipment is separated from Division 3 equipment by 20 ft. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent [Gl Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d) the safety-related functions have a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
,- (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and k,) alarming are provided and accessible.
9A.4-123
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.9 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Fire-resistive wall types are presented in Subsection 9A.3.6. 9A.4.2.10 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Division 1 and 4 Electrical Equipment Room C-ll-20. (2) Eguipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling PGCC termination cabinets Yes, Dl, D4 Yes Power supplies Yes, Dl, D4 Yes Distribution cabinets Yes, Dl, D4 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The electrical equip-ment room wall is Type 1, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum suspended from the above ceiling construction and sealed to the PGCC termination cabinets. The termination cal 4 nets form a Type 3, 2-hr fire-resistive wall. One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior uall. One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum interior wall. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. O l 9A.4-124 l l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.2.10 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) {J
~'}
(5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIeat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. C-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and llalon 1211 hand Col. C-4 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: w,) (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. l (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the l loss of the functions. The Division 2 and 3 electrical I equipment room is physically separated from this area and provides the backup. Division 1 equipment is separated from Division 4 equipment by 20 ft. I (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drains. O O l 9A.4-125 I l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2-10 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d) the safety-related functions have a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.ll Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Control Equipment Room C-ll-21. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 14 PGCC modules with termination Yes,Dl,D2, Yes cabinets D3,D4 9A.4-126
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.ll Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The control equipment room has one 3-hr fire-resistive concrete wall. The equipment room / distribution room walls are Type 1, 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum suspended from the above floor construction and sealed to the PGCC termination cabinets. The termination cabinets form a Type 3, 2-hr fire-resistive wall. The fourth wall is a Type 2, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum bullet-resistant con-struction. One double and one single 3-hr, unlabeled, bullet-resistant door are provided. The integrated ceiling system is noncombustible metal frame construction using Class A materials. (5) Combustibles Present:
)
Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Each PGCC contains, on the average, 44.7 x 10 356 lb'of TEFZEL 200 cable insulation and 75 lb of XLPE-FR cable insulation. The TEFZEL contributes 2.14 x 106 Btu and the XLPE contributes 1.05 x 106 Btu per PGCC. The total fire loading for the 14 PGCC in the Electrical Equipment Room is in the opposite column. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at Col. D-4 (A PGCC has eight heat detectors and four POC detectors in each floor section). O 9A.4-127
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.ll Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4,E-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC or Halon 1211 hand Col. D-3,C-4, Manual extinguishers E-4 Total flooding Halon 1301 Each PGCC Manual systems (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The remote shutdown panel provides the backup to safely shut down the reactor. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; O 9A.4-128
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) 0 9A.4.2.ll (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (d) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The divisional separation of the PGCC floor section modules is shown in Figure 9A-31. The cable tunnels and the control / computer rooms are supplied with smoke removal systems. These systems can supply a minimum of five air changes per hour. On some of the main control room panels (e .g . , P001) switches and devices for backup, safety-related functions have been located side by side for optimization of the operator interface. Where this occurs, the particular control panel bay is given a divisional assignment cor-responding to the predominant division of the devices in the bay. Devices of a different division which are located in that bay are enclosed in a metal can, and their cables are routed out of the bay in flexible metal-3 lic conduit. The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 J 9A.4-129
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.11 Building - Control: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) and thus met by providing the metallic barrier between divisions. Fire-resistive wall types are presented in Subsection 9A 3.6. The area contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. PGCC Halon 1301 System Description is in Sub-section 7.7.2.9. PGCC Fire and Safety Evaluation is presented in NEDO-10466A, "PGCC Design Criteria and Safety Evaluation", February 1979. 9A.4.2.12 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - Division 1 HVAC Equipment Rooms C-28-12, C-28-14, C-28-18, C-28-20. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Outdoor air cleanup unit supply Yes, D1 No fan Control room return / exhaust fan Yes, D1 No Control equipment room return / Yes, D1 No exhaust fan Air cleanup unit Yes, D1 No MCC El-3 Yes, D1 No MCC Al-2 No No Chiller room exhaust fans No No Area exhaust fans No No O 9A.4-130
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O f"N 9A.4.2.12 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) U (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls, one wall is a Type 1, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion, and one wall is 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The stair walls are 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are two 3-hr fire-resistive, A-label doors in interior partitions. The door entering the stair tower is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive, B-label door with a maximum 250 F temperature rise in 30 min requirement. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total !! cat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-4, B-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and IIalon 1211 hand Col. B-5, B-2 Manual extinguishers O 9A.4-131
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.12 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The Division 2 HVAC equipment room is physically separated from this area and provides the backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Op_eration or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the room; (b) provisions of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely) ; and (e) the safety-related functions have a remote backup system. 9A.4-132
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) ()9A.4.2.12 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. I (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Fire-stops are provided for the Control Building wall penetrations. The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.13 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in.
/
V) (1) Space - Chiller Room C-28-21. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Water chiller unit Yes, Di No l Chiller air cooler unit Yes, D1 No Booster pump A Yes, D1 No Chilled water pump Yes, D1 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire __ Barriers - One wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete construction, two walls are 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction, and one wall () is a Type 1, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum 9A.4-133
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.13 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) construction. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete construction. There is one 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive, B-label door and one 3/4-hr fire-resistive, C-label door. (5) Combus_tibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of (Btu) 15 gal. Class III B lube oil internal 2.1 x 10 6 to the chiller unit (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-4. (7) Suppression Available: O Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-2, B-5 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. B-2, B-5 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protec2 ion Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. 9A.4-134
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~ 9A.4.2.13 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) D] (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. Division 2 equipment is physi- '
)
cally separated from this area and provides the backup. l (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; f1 V (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment: (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) The safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. () (b) The means of fire detection, suppression, and alarming are provided and accessible. 9A.4-135
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.13 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (13) Remarka - The lube oil reservoir is integral with the chiller and has no exposed piping. The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.14 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - outdoor Air Cleanup Unit Room C-28-23. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Outdoor air cleanup unit Yes, D1 No Control Building air discharge Yes, D1 No isolation damper (3) Radioactive Material Present - None. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One well is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall, and three walls are 2-hr fire-resirtive concrete interior walls. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is one 1 1/2-hr fire-rbsistive, B-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIcat of Combustion (Btu) __ 6 1090 lb of activated charcoal contained in 14 x 10 the air filtration system 9A.4-136
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
S 9A.4.2.14 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued)
(d (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-2 (Internal heat detection is provided in the charcoal filter beds.) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation 11odified Class III, Seismic Col. B-2,B-4 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. B-2,B-4 Manual extinguishers Water spray system internal to Charcoal Manual the unit for the charcoal filters filter bed (8) Fire Protection Declgn Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-(O) resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Division 2 equipment is physically separated from this area and provides the backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drains. 9A.4-137
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.14 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detectian, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. O 9A.4-138
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.4.2.15 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - Division 2 HVAC Equipment Rooms C-28-4, C-28-15, C-28-26, C-28-27, and vestibule, Room C-28-25. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Outdoor air cleanup unit supply Yes, D2 No fan Control room return / exhaust fan Yes, D2 No Control equipment room return / Yes, D2 No exhaust fan Air cleanup unit Yes, D2 No MCC F1-3 Yes, D2 No MCC B1-2 No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - nonc. ( ,j (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls, one wall is a Type 1, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion, and one wall is 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction. The stair tower walls are 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum. The floor and ceilings are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are two 3-hr fire-resistive, A-label doors in interior partitions. The door entering the stair tower is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive, B-label door with a maximum 250 F temperature rise in 30 min requirement. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Lor.tiing Total Heat of (ambustion None (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room (m) and a manual alarm pull station at Col. F-5. 9A.4-139
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.15 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. F-4, Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel F-2 ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. F-4, Manual extinguishers F-2 (8) Fire'Protectica Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumea the loss of the functions. Division 1 equipment is physi-cally separated from this area and provides the backup. g (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads an~ by floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) Seismic Category I standpipe located in the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equip-ment; and (c) provision of floor drainage. O 9A.4-140
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.15 Building - Cor. trol: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Fire-stops are provided for Control Building wall penetrations. The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.16 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - Chiller Room C-28-22. () (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Water chiller unit Yes, D2 No Chiller room air conditioning Yes, D2 No unit Booster pump B Yes, D2 No Chilled water pump Yes, D2 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete construction, two walls are 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction, and one wall is a Type 1, 3-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete construction. There is one 1 1/2 hr fire- [~ ) resistive, B-label door and one 3/4-hr fire-resistive,
~#
C-label door. 9A.4-141
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCIEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.16 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 15 gal. Class III B lube oil internal to 2.1 x 106 the chiller unit (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. F-4. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. F-2, Manual Category I, standpipe and hose F-4 reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. F-2, Manual extinguishers F-4 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire ascumes the loss of the function. Division 1 equipment is physi-cally separated from this area and provides the backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drains. O 9A.4-142
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
"'g 9A 4.2.16 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued)
(O (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. i (13) Remarks - The lube oil reservoir is integral to the chiller unit and has no exposed piping. The room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulatior. in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. I v 9A.4-143
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.17 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - outdoor Air Cleanuo Unit Room C-28-24. O (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Outdoor air cleanup unit Yes, D2 No Control Building air discharge Yes, D2 No isolation damper (3) Radioactive ?4aterial Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 2- and 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling and floor are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is one 1 1/2-hr, B-label door. (5) Combus_tibles Present: Fire Loading Total llea t of Combustion (Btu) 1090 lb of activated charcoal contained 14 x 106 in the air filtration system (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. F-2 (Internal heat detection is provided in the charcoal filter beds.) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Clasa III, Seismic Co,1. F-4, Manual Category I, standpipe and hose F-2 reel ABC and llalon 1211 hand Col. F-4, Manual extinguishers F-2 Water spray system internal to Charcoal, Manual the unit provided for the char- filters coal filter bed 9A.4-144
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () \ ! 9A.4.2.17 Building - Control: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) x/ (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Division 1 equipment is physi-cally separated from this area and provides the backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Water could pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drains. /N (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent i
\ '; Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
(a) location of fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; and (c) provision of floor drainage. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) TheCfunctions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppr-ssion and alarming are provided and accessible. [/
\
(13) Remarks - none. 9A.4-145
GESSAR II 22R7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.2.18 Building - Control: El 38.ft 6 in. (1) Space - Elevator Equipment Room C-38-3. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Elevator hoisting equipment No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 1-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construction and one wall is 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum construc-tion. The floor and ceiling are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door entering the stair tower is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive, B-label door with a maximum 250 F tem-perature rise in 30 min requirement. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None (6) Detection Proyided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station located at Col. J-4 at El 28 ft 6 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation ABC and Halon 1211 hand Stair landing Manual extinguishers at El 28 ft 6 in. O 9A.4-146
GESSAR II 22A7007 i 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 r^s\ 9A.4.2.18 Building - Control: El 38 ft 6 in. (Continued) l V' (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. l (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Separate fire-resistive enclosed stairways provide access and egress. (10) Consequences of Firc Suppression - Suppression extinguishes the fire. (11) Design Cr_iteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual suppression system external to the room. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (~' 8 3 ') Remarks - The room contains elecrical cable in conduit. i Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4-147
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3 Fuel Building 9A.4.3.1 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - CRD Water Pump Room F-032-26. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling CRD drive water pumps A&B No Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - None. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete building exterior wall. Three walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is one 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 112 ft of nondivisional 14.5 x 10 cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2 and B-7. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-2, B-7 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ADC hand extinguisher Col. H-2, B-7 Manual 9A.4-148
GESSAR II. 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.1 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (G'"g (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The CRD modules have a nitrogen closure backup systcm. Provision for core cooling backup capa-bility is described in Subsection 9A.2.5.
\- (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor.
Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent I Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-l ' sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equip-ment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and
) (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely.
9A.4-149
. _ . _ - _ . _ . m...__,__, , . _ _ _ _ . ~ . - . _ _ _ . . _ . _ = , _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.1 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 6 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, cuppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.2 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - SPCU Filter Domineralizer Room F-032-22. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Filter demineralizer No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Four walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A single 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door is provided. 9A.4-150
t GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.2 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in (Continued) (}
\s (5) Combustibles Present:
Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None -- (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2 and B-7. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. H-2, B-7 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel s ABC hand extinguishers Col. H-2, B-7 Manual
\-
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against ficoding is provided by supporting equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. f-~x (/ 9A.4-151
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.2 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 ft 0 in.(Continued) l} (11) Design Criteria Used for protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of the manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of legs for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlike'.y. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate pre-resistive enclosure; (b) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13 ) Remarks - none. 9A.4.3.3 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Detergent Drain Sump Room F-032-25. O 9A.1-152
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O g'"N 9A.4.3.3 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) b (2) Equipment:_ Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Detergent drain sump pumps A&B No No Decon transfer pump No No Booster pump No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none -hat can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete building exterior wall. Three walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. I-,sa i ,) There is one 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: i Fire Loading Total IIcat of Combustion l None -- l (6) Detection Provided - Manual alarm pull station at Col. 11 - 2 and B-7. 9 (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col . 11-2, B-7 Manual ! Seismic Category I, l standpipe and hose reel n i / 3 ABC hand extinguisher Col. 11 - 2 , B-7 Manual i x
\_J 9A.4-153
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.3 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - the postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and does not require a backup system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppressicn extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of rais,ed foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. O 9A.4-154
r GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 s 9A.4.3.3 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.4 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Decontamination Waste Tank Room F-032-24.
-/ (2) Equipment:
Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Decontamination waste tank No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - None that can be released as a result of fire. l (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr i fire-resistive concrete building exterior walls. Two I walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. l I I (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading t [ j Total lleat of Combustion I (, / None -- i 9A 4-155
. _ - _ ~ _ . ._. - . _
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.3.4 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continue;l) (6) Detection Provided - Close A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2 and B-7. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. H-2,B-7 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. H-2,B-7 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. Fire suppression capability is provided and O (b) accessible. (9) Consequence of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and does not require a backup system. (10) Conseguences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. O 9A.4-156
GESSAR II 22A7007 4 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 1 9A.4.3.4 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: t i 2 (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of a raised foundation pad for the equipment; l (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with j a rupture being unlikely. l (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: I (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) TP, means of fire suppression and alarming are l provided and accessible. I (13) Remarks - the room contains electrical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsec-t j tion 9A.3.4. i 9A.4.3.5 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - decontamination equipment area F-032-23. l O f 9A.4-157 4 w,,,,--ye r- n,,e,n ., , . ,-- - ,,.yw_,,,,,,,,, , _ , , , , , _ , _, _ _ _
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.5 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Decontamination high pressure No No booster pump Pneumatic system air No No compressor Pneumatic system air dryer No No Equipmene drain sump pumps No No A&B Floor drain sump pump A&B No No Vacuum pump No No Ilydraulic power pack for casM No No decon system (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete building exterior wall. Two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The fourth side is open and faces the concrete Shield Building wall. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Approximately 20 gallons 2.8 x 10 Class III lube oil (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2 and B-7. 9A.4-158
=. . . -- - _ _ . . - . - - - . _ _ - .
GESSAR II 22A7007
! 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i
9A.4.3.5 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) ' 2 . l (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation i Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-2, B-7 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. H-2, B-7 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: i (a) The function is located in an isolated area partially enclosed by a fire-resistive barrier. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. e (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and i does not require a backup system. (10) Consequ<tnces of Fire Suppression - When suppression f
; extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor.
j Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. i (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; i i 3
]
1 1 9A.4-159
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.5 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) provision of a raised foundation for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The equipment is isolated from any combustible fire hazards or other equipment. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The cask decon hydraulic power pack is in use only when a shipping cask is being decontaminated in the wash cell. The system is attended when operating. 9A.4.3.6 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Fuel Building access corridor F-032-7 and F-032-27. O 9A.4-160
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (s s I 9A.4.3.6 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) v' (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Core drive water filters No No A&B CRD pump suction filters No No A&B PRMS sample panel B No No i FPCCU pump room coolers Yes, Dl, D2 No . A&B Air positive seal Yes, D1 No compressor Air positive seal receiver Yes, D1 No Air positive seal Yes, D1 No equipment cooler ' '- ' (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall. One wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building, and two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are two 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double doors at each Auxiliary / Fuel Building interface vestibule, and one 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double door at Col. H-2 and B-7. 4 G' 9A.4-161
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.6 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Zone 1 has 175 ft and Zone 2 22.7 x 10 (Zone 1) has 575 ft of divisional and non divisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulati.:. (6) Detection Provided - C.iss A supervised POC throughout the area and manual alaria pull stations at Col. B-7 and H-2. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-7, H-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-7, H-2 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. O 9A.4-162
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
'"3 9A.4.3.6 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued)
(9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of one division of FPCCU room coolers. The units are spatially separated by a distance of 13 ft and have no exposed combustibles between them or in the immediate area. The air positive seal has a remote lockup system at El 28 ft 6 in. in the Auxiliary Building. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extint.tishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup-pression System:
\- (a) location of manual suppression systema by distance away from the equipment; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage to a sump; and (d) qualification of the seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a fire-resistive concrete enclosure. (b) The equipment is separated by distance. 9A.4-163
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.6 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (d) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The divisional cables are all of the same division. Vertical communication is possible between this area i and the open grating access platform directly above at floor El (-)l7 ft 0 in. Neither floor contains an exposed combustible fire hazard. Vendor data are not available at this time for the air positive seal compressor. The compressor is estimated to contain less than one gallon 'f lube oil. 9A.4.3.7 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - FPCC Backwash Tank Room F-032-12. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC backwash receiving tank No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. O 9A.4-164
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~N 9A.4.3.7 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - On wall is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. Three walls art 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A single 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door provides access to the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None -- (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Columns B-7 and C-13. () (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-7, C-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hani extinguisher Col. B-6, C-13 Manual (8) Fire Prctection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. O 9A.4-165
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.7 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The f nction is not safety-related and does not require a backup system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the tank on piers and by providing floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup-pression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of foundation piers for supporting the tank; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualificaticn of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: l (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure.
- (b) The means of fire detection suppression and alarming are provided and accessible.
l l (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4-166
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O r'%g 9A.4.3.3 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 ft 0 in. N] (1) Space - FPCC Pump Rooms F-032-13, -14, -15 and -16. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC pumps A&B Yes, Dl,D2 No FPCC drain pump No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are two 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors separating the room from the Backwash Receiving Tank Room and the FPCC heat exchanger area. A 2-hr fire-resistive concrete wall separates the FPCC pumps. (S) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the rooms and a manual alarm pull station at Columns B-7 and C-13. v 9A.4-167
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.8 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-7, C-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-7, C-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the O loss of one division of the safety-related pumps. The pumps are located in separate compartments and have a reinforced concrete fire-resistive barrier between them. The compartments are open to a common corridor. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided for each system by raised foundation pads for the pumps, a curb 12 in. high in front of each pump compartment and a floor drain within each pump compartment. The barrier wall between the FPCC pumps limits the suppression activities to a single compartment. O 9A.4-168
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~N 9A.4.3.8 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) t v) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup-pression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of a fire-resistive barrier between the safety-related pumps; (d) provision of a 12-in. high curb in front of each pump compartment for containing radwaste spills ()
\J and protection against flooding; (e) provision of floor drains; and (f) qualification of the Seismic Category I star.dpipe with a rupture being unlikely.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure with a f_re-resistive barrier wall between j the safety-related equipment. l l i t (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and access ible. \ l (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in i conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in (N I
\/ Subsection 9A.3.4.
l 9A.4-169 I 1 L /
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.9 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - FPCC heat exchanger area F-032-ll (2) Eguipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC heat exchangers A&B Yes, Dl, D2 No Equipment drain sump pumps A&B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. One wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive building exterior wall. The open end of the area faces the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive con-crete. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete refueling floor at El 11 ft 0 in. with an access plug over each exchanger. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lieat of Combustion (Btu) 6 The area contains 140 ft of 18.1 x 10 nondivisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-7 and C-13. O 1 9A.4-170 (
GES3AR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.9 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-7,C-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-7,C-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in an isolated area partially enclosed by a fire-resistive barrier with spatial separation of divisional equipment. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability are pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of one division of the safety-related equipment. i The units are separated by distance (11 ft 6 in. center i to center) and have no exposed combustibles between them or in the immediate area. !i i (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage. i, O i 9A.4-171 i
..r__..,-_-. .., ,, , , ,_ _ _. ,,--._,_ --
GESSAR II 22A7007 2J8 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.9 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation 3r Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the exchangers; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in remote area and is partially surrounded by fire-resistive walls. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. 1 1 (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. l Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. l An access platform with an open grating floor is at El (-)l7 ft 0 in. Vertical communication is possible between the two areas. Both areas contain cable insula-tion in closed metal trays. 9A.4-172 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.10 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. i (1) Space - standby gas treatment service area F-032-10. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Floor drain sump pumps A&B No No Pneumatic system air compressor No No Pneumatic system air dryer No No Water positive seal supply tank Yes, D1 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr es s fire-resistive concrete exterior valls, one wall is a \s,) 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior wall, and the fourth side is open to tFe Fuel Building access area. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion The service area may contain -- a transitory combustible load of radioactive charcoal in closed metal drums during maintenance operations. 1 gal. Class III B lube oil Not significant (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-7 and C-13. (% b) 9A.4-173
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.10 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-7, C-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-7, C-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in an isolated area partially enclosed by fire-resistive barriers. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The compressors are not safety-related and do not require a backup system. The water positive seal supply tank has a remote back up system in containment. ( 1.0 ) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by supporting the pumps above the sump. Drainage to the samp is pro-vided for the floor area. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup-pression System: (a) location of manual suppressian systems external to g the area; i 9A.4-174
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 g 9A.4.3.10 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) I NJ & (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in an isolated area partially enclosed by fire-resistive barriers. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in
-~ Subsection 9A.3.4. The charcoal is present only during \_/ maintenance cycles for the Standby Gas Treatment System and is totally enclosed in metal containers at all times.
9A.4.3.ll Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. (1) Space - stairtower, elevator enclosure F-038-2, F-032-1, 4, 5, 6. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None -- -- (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. O) t
%)
9A.4-175
1 GESSAR II 22A7007 ! 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 l 9A.4.3.ll Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr and 2-hr fire-resistive concrete and metal stud / gypsum. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1-1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double doors at one and of the stairtower and also in the center at the elevator area. A 3-hr fire-resistive unlabeled single door provides access to the annulus inspection C access room. A1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label, 250 F rise door provides access to the stairway. A 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double door provides separation between the Fuel and Auxiliary Buildings. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion Mone -- (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. C-13. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. C-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. C-13 '!a nua l (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. O 9A.4-176
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /~ 9A.4.3.11 Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. (Continued) N~)h (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the stairtower and elevator at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown functions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway or elevator shaft to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation 1r Rupture of the Suppression System: (~./ (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression detection and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. O 9A.4-177
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.ll Building - Fuel: El (-) 32 f t 0 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - The area contai as electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulatirn in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.12 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (1) Space - AB/FB vestibule F-032-28, 29 (2) Equipment: Safety Provides Related Core Cooling None -- -- (3) Radioactive Material Present - None. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers .Three walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, and one wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resi s '. ive B-label double doors at one end of the vestibule. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label, 250 F single door pro-vides access to the stairway. Three-hour fire-resistive A-label double doors provide access to the Auxiliary Building. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None -- (6) p_etection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2. 9A.4-178 1
i GESSAR II 22A7007 j 238 NUCLEAR .'SLAND Rev. 0 I g 9A.4.3.12 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: { Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and - , hose reel ! ABC hand extinguisher Ccl. H-2 Manual ) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: , I l (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. , (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss , of access to the vestibule and stairway entrance at j this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and i egress are available. No operating or shutdown functions, j either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. l 1 i I (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. ! Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. $ (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent ) Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup- i
- pression System
i j (a) location of manual suppression systems external to t i the area; 4 s_ 9A.4-179
. . ~ ~ - - . . . , , . _. . . _ - - - - . . . = - _ _ _ . _ - . , , - , _ _ _ . . . . - - . ~ _ . , _ _ . _ . . _ , . . _ _ . _ -
4 GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.12 Building - Fuel: El (-)32 ft 0 in. (Continued) (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.13 Building - Fuel: El (-)l8 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Standby Gas Treatment Support Equipment Room B, F-018-9, 10. (2) Equipment: Safety Provides Related Core Cooling SGTS local panel B Yes, D2 No SGTS Room cooling t; nit B Yes, D2 No SGTS heat removal fan A Yea, D1 No (see Remarks) SGTS exhaust fan B Yes, D2 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - None. 9A.4-180
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~') 9A.4.3.13 Building - Fuel: El (-)18 ft 0 in. (Continued) NJ (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall and three are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. A 2-hr fire-resistive concrete wall separates the Division 1 fan from the Division 2 equipment. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors providing access from either the corridor or the standby gas treatment unit B. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Tctal .leat of Combustion (Btu) 6 47 ft of divisional cable 6.1 x 10 tray containing 9.25 lb/ft [~') V of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-7 at the (-)33 ft 0 in. level. (7) Suppression Available Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-7 at Manual Seismic Category I, El (-)32 ft 0 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. B-9 at Manual El (-)l7 ft 0 in. O V 9A.4-181 l l l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.13 Building - Fuel: El (-)18 ft 0 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure with a barrier between the different divisional equipment. (b) Fire detectio. and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the functions of the Division 2 equipment. The system has a backup system in a remote location. The Division 1 heat removal fan is protected from the Division 2 equipment by a fire-resistive concrete bar-rier wall. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, wator can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by raised equipment foundation pads and by floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; 9A.4-182
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O rx 9A.4.3.13 Building - Fuel: El (-)l8 ft 0 in. (Continued) \v) (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) the safety-related functions have remote backup systems. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. () (m) (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The fan is part of the Division 2 SGTS. It is powered from a Division 1 electrical system so that in the event of a Division 2 power loss, heat removal from the charcoal filter bed can be maintained (see Section 6.8). 9A.4.3.14 Building - Fuel: El (-)18 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Standby Gas Treatment Unit B Room F-018-8. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling O) (, Standby gas treatment Unit B Yes, D2 No 9A.4-183
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.14 Building - Fuel: El (-)l8 ft 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - the unit contains 2115 lb of charcoal which may contain adsorbed radioactive iodine should LOCA occur or other event causing high airborne radioactivity within primary or secondary containment. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls, and two are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The room door is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 2115 lb of charcoal in the 27.3 x 10 unit (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station are provided at Column B-7 on the (-)32 ft 0 in. level. Class A thermistor over temperature alarms are provided in the charcoal filter bed. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Overtemperature water Internal to the Manual spray system unit O 9A.4-184
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O r'% 9A.4.3.14 Building - Fuel: El (0)18 ft 0 in. (Continued) ' I
/
Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-6 at Manual Seismic Category I, El (-)32 ft 0 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC ha, extinguishers Col. B-10 at Manual El (-)l7 f t 0 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The post 21ated fire assumes loss I (_,) of the unit and one division of the safety-related valves. The safety-related unit has a backup system in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage. Actuation of the manual internal spray system signals an alarm in the control room. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; p_ N/ 9A.4-185
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.14 Building - Fuel: El (-)18 ft 0 in. (Continued) g (b) activation of alarm on suppression system operation; (c) provision of raised foundation pads for the unit; (d) provision of floor drainage; (e) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being urlikely; and (f) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The unit is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - Manual overtemperature suppression system is provided internal to the unit. Actuation of the switch is from an accessible area outside the cubicle. The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.15 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (1) Space - FPCC Equipment Room F-017-13 0 9A.4-186
}
l GESSAR II 22A7007 i 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.3.15 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) j (2) Equipment: i J j t Safety- Provides j Related Core Cooling I Precoat tank No No ) Precoat pump No No Resin tank No No i
- Resin metering pump No No
\ l J (3) Radioactive flaterial Present - None. 1 (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The doors into the filter demineralizer holding pump room and into the Fuel Build-I ing access platform are both 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors. The ceiling and floor are i Tr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIeat of Combustion None (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-7 on the (-)32 (-)32 ft 0 in. level. i e i 9A.4-187
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.15 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-7 at Manual Seismic Category I, El (-)32 ft 0 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-10 at Manual El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. ll (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage. i (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; 9A.4-188
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.15 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containmcut or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Femarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection ( 9A.3.4. V) 9A.4.3.16 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in (1) Space - FPCC Filter Domineralizer Holding Pump Room F-017-12 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC F/D holding pumps A&B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls, and one is a 9A.4-189
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.16 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The room door is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-7 at the (-)32 ft 0 in. level. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation O Modified Class III, Col. B-7 at Manual Seismic Category I, El (-)32 ft 0 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. B-10 at Manual El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and does not require a backup system. 9A.4-190
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.16 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the pumps; (c) provision of floor drainage; and g-s
\s / (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. -
/
(b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-i ing are provided and accessible. 4 (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection. 9A.3.4. , s O ' y , : I 9A.4-191 - m
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.17 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. ) (1) Space - Precoat Room access platform F-017-7. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC heat exchangers A&B Yes, Dl, D2 No (portions) FPCC pump area panel No No FPCC local panels (2) Yes, Dl, D2 No FPCC control panel No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls, one is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall, and one is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall. The ceil-ing is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grating. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors into the Precoat Pump Room and the Standby Gas Treatment Room B. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIeat of Combustion (Btu) Approximately 5 lb of char- (not significant) coal in the charcoal filter 66 ft of nondivisional 8.55 x 10 cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 9A.4-192
_ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ . _ _ - _ ____ _ - - _ _ = . GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.17 Building - Fuel: El (-)17 ft 0 in. (Continued) (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull s tation at Column B-7 at the (-)32 ft 0 in. level. 1 (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-7 at Manual Seismic Category I, El (-)32 ft 0 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-10 at Manual El (-)17 ft 0 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-(} resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) The divisional heat exchangers are spatially separated (11 ft 6 in. on centers). l (d) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. l l l (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function of the filter and the loss of one division of the PFCC heat exchangers. The units are separated l by distance (11 ft 6 in. center to center) and have no I exposed combustibles between them or in the immediate area. O 9A.4-193 l
- - - . _ . . , , - , , , , ,- . . - , , . , _ ,y .- ,
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.17 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - suppression extinguishes the fire. Water drains through the open grating platform at El (-)l7 ft 0 in. down to the con-crete floor at El (-)32 ft 0 in. which is provided with floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against I nadve r ten _t, Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppressica systems remote from the area; (b) drainage of water through the platform to a lower floor where floor drainage is provided; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a fire-resistive enclosure. l (b) The means of firc suppressior and alarming are provided and accessible. l (c) Fire-stops are provided for cabic tray and piping penetrations. l (13) Remarks - The access floor contains a minor amount of combustible solids (charcoal). The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays 9A.4-194
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.17 Building - Fuel: El (-)l7 ft 0 in. (Continued) b(~N is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The area is directly above the FPCC heat exchanger room located on floor El (-)32 ft 0 in. The area is also directly below the access platform at 32 ft 0 in. (-) 5 f t 3 in. Vertical communication is possible between the three areas. The FPCC divisional panels are located in the same area; however, loss of these panels from any accidental reason will not affect safe cold reactor shutdown. 9A.4.3.18 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (1) Space - FPCC Filter Domineralizer Room A, F-07-17. (2) Equipment: O N ,) Safety-Provides Related Core Cooling j FPCC filter domineralizer A No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. i (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete' interior walls, and one wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is no door at this level. O 9A.4-195
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.18 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - manual alarm pull station at Column B-12. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-12, B-7 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-12, B-7 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumas loss of function. The function has a backup system in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. 9A.4-196
. . - = . . _
( j GESSAR II 22A7007 4 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i 9A.4.3.18 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (Continued) i (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the j Suppression System: { (a) location of manual systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment;
- (c) provision of floor drainage; and l (d) qualification of the Sosumic Category I standpipe t
l with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: O (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. I l [ (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are i l provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. This room has no access other than the equipment removal hatch at El 11 ft 0 in. 9A.4.3.19 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (1) Space - FPCC Filter Demineralizer Room B, F-07-12. O 9A.4-197
GHSSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRED Rev. 0 9A.4.3.19 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (Continued) h (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC filter domineralizer B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls, and one wall is a 3-nr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and removal hatch. There is no door at this level. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Manual alarm pull station at Column B-12. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-12, B-7 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. B-12, B-7 Manual 9A.4-198
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.19 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (Continued) i (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function has a backup system in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on
-s. raised pads and of floor drainage.
i \_/ (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of legs for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. ha v 9A.4-199
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 MUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.19 Building - Futi: El (-)6 ft 6 in. (Continued) (12) Fire tvatainment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The room has no access other than the equipment removal hatch at El 11 ft 0 in. 'J A . 4 . 3 . 2 0 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (1) Space - railcar truck unloading area F-09-25, 26. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling New fuel inspection stand No No 1 1/2-ton fuel inspection jib No No 2-ton railcar unloading jib No No 5-ton loading dock hoist No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - transient radioactive materials are present for short durations. New fuel element shipments are received and inspected in the area. Spent fuel, contained in an approved shielding shipping cask, is removed from the storage pool. 9A.4-200
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.20 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) (4) Qualific_ations of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls, and two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls. One of the exterior walls contains a nonfire-resistive tornado / missile-resistant door providing railcar or truck access. The railcar floor area is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete at El (-)9 ft 0 in. The dock floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceili g is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete with access plugs for cask transfer and new fuel handling. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) Ci U A transitory combustible loading is present during receipt and inspection of new fuel elements. The elements are contained in special wooden crates which have Ethafoam plastic protection inside the crates. Each crate contains two fuel bundles, separated in a plastic wrap. The normal shipment contains 16 such crates. Each crate consists of 720 lb of wood, 75 lb of paper and 25 lb of plastic. Cleaning precedures direct the cleansing of ele-ments with either acetone or denatured alcohol. 6 16 crates @720 lb of wood each 92.2 x 10 6 16 crates @75 lb of paper each 9.6 x 10 16 crates @25 lb of plastic 6 each 6.0 x 10 . O 9A.4-201
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.20 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) g Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 5 gal of acetone or alcohol 7.2 x 10 100 lb of cotton rags for 6 cleaning 0.8 x 10 (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC throughout the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Ordinary hazard wet pipe All Automatic sprinklers, having a water density of 0.15 gpm/ft2 and a coverage of 100 ft2 per head Modified Class III, Seismic Col. H-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. H-2, B-3 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. l (b) Fire suppres. on capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and does not require a backup system. There is a potential 9A.4-202
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.20 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) for damage to the new fuel elements should the postulated fire occur during the receiving / inspection cycle. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation of Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of a raised inspection bench; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: 1 (a) The area is isolated from other areas of the plant and is in a fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. l l (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4-203
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.20 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) h The only combustible fire loading is of infrequent, short duration of a transient nature. It occurs during the receipt, inspection and cleaning of new fuel elements. Automatic sprinklers have been provided for the entire area. The analysis is based on limiting the amounts of clean-ing solvent present at any one time to a maximum of 5 gal. contained in UL-listed or FM-approved safety con-tainers. Amounts in excess of 5 gal, should be stored in a location exterior to the Reactor Island structures in UL-listed or FM-approved storage cabinets. 9A.4.3.21 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - new fuel storage vault F-015-22. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling l Metal fuel storage racks No No Radiation monitors Yes No ! (3) Radioactive Material Present - new fuel elements. l (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The only entry is the steel access hatch. O 9A.4-204
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /~'j 9A.4.3.21 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) D' (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Approximately 540 lb of 7 x 10 plastic wrap for the elements are present at maximum stor-age loading in the vault. (6) Detection Provided - Manual alarm pull station at Column H-2. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation G Modified Class III, Col. H-2 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. H-2 and B-3 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes that the plastic wrap material is consumed. There is a potential of fire damage to the new fuel elements. Loss of function of the radiation monitor is assumed. C\ 9A.4-205
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.21 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can flood the vault if any of the plastic material plugs the vault drain. Flooding of the new fuel elements is acceptable from a criticality standpoint. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the vault: (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The new fuel is stored in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The fuel elements' protective plastic wrapping is the single source of combustible fire loading in the vault. There is no ignition source present. The vault contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The postulated fire is not considered to be of sufficient intensity to cause rupture of the fuel rods. 9A.4-206
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 f~~3 9A.4.3.22 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. U (1) Space - stairtower, Rooms F-06-4, -5. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr and 2-hr fire-resistive concrete and metal stud / gypsum. The floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double doors
- at one end of the stairtower and in the center at the
( ,) elevator area. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label single door provides access to the stairway. There are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors providing access to the Auxiliary Building. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 97 ft of divisional cable 12.6 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and manual alarm pull stations at Col. B-12. 9A.4-207
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.22 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-13 Manual Category I, standpipe and Aux Bldg hose reel Manual Col. B-12 Fuel Bldg ABC hand extinguishers Col. D-13 Manual Aux Bldg Col. B-12 Fuel Bldg (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive structure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the stairtower and elevator entrance at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown func-tions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. j (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower l l level of the structure. l \ 9A.4-208
i GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.22 Building - Fuel: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) U% (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive
] enclosure.
(b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.2.23 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (1) Space - FPCC access area F-05-7. 1 l O 9A.4-209
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.23 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FPCC heat exchangers A&B Yes, Dl, D2 No (portions) FPCC drain tank No No FPCC F/D local panel No No Auxiliary unit No No ADS pneumatic system air Yes, D1 No supply bottles (12) ADS air receiver A Yes, D1 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall, one wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall, and two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 250 ft of divisional and non- 32.4 x 10 divisional cable trays con-taining 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A. supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-12 and C-7. 9A.4-210
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.23 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-12, C-7 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-12 Manual Ordinary hazard wet pipe All Automatic sprinklers having a water density of 0.15 gpm/ ft2 per head (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate area in a fire-resistive enclosure. C\ V Fire suppression capability is provided and (b) accessible. , (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. O (9) Consequences of Fire: , (a) The postulated fire assumes loss of the nonsafety-related functions and one division of the safety-related functions. (b) The nonsafety functions do not require divisional backup. (c) The safety-related air system has a backup system l () located in a separate fire area. 9A.4-211
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.23 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) (d) The safety-related FPCC heat exchangers are separated by distance (11 ft 6 in. on centers) and have no exposed combustibles between them or in the immediate area. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. The floor is provided with drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the area perimeter; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) the safety-related function has a remote backup system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. O 9A.4-212
l GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O l i 9A.4.3.23 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) t (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - Vertical communication is possible to the platform below at El (-)l7 ft 0 in. l t e The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.2.4. 9A.4.3.24 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in, t (1) Space - access area (between Columns B and H, 1 and 5) F-05-27. 4 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling ! ADS air receiver B Yes, D2 No ) ADS pneumatic system air Yes, D2 No l supply bottles (10) l Motorized equipment hatch Yes No i plug l (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall with a tornado / missile door, one wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive con-l crete Shield Building wall, and one wall is a 2-hr fire-t resistive concrete interior wall. The floor and ceiling l l are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. 1 9A.4-213 l [ t _ _ _ . - , ._ _ - ._,, _ - _ , , ,_ ,_ ~ .., - _ , _ _ _ - - . __4 . . _ _ ._
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.24 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 139 ft of divisional and 18 x 10 nondivisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-1. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Ordinary hazard wet pipe All Automatic O sprinklers, having a water density of 0.15 gpm/ft2 and a coverage of 100 ft2 per head Modified Class III, Col. H-2 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. H-2, B-3 Manual 1 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: l (a) The functions are located in an isolated area in a 1 fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. l 9A.4-214
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 14UCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O N () 9A.4.3.24 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of, Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The safety-related air systems have a backup system located in a separate, remote area. The Shield Building, together with its equipment removal plug, is a passive safety system and does not require divisional backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppre. , ion extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent (J) Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the area perimeter; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) a remote backup system for the safety-related function. O v 9A.4-215
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.24 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The equipment removal dock is located in fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The equipment loading dock is adjacent to the new fuel inspection area and the railcar unloading area. The latter can contain a transient fire loading from new fuel element shipping boxes. The adjacent fire hazard is of low frequency and short duration. The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.25 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (1) Space - AB/FB vestibule F-05-29. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. O 9A.4-216
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.3.25 Building - Fuel: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) O4 (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, and two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double doors at one end of the vestibule. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label single door provides access to the stairway. The AB/FB doors are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label double doors. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - () (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Ordinary hazard wet pipe All Automatic sprinklers, having a water density of 0.15 gpm/ft2 and a coverage of 100 ft2 per head. Modified Class III, Col. H-2 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe end hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. H-2, B-3 Manual O V 9A.4-217
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.25 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the vestibule and stairway entrance at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown function, either safety or nonsafety-relaurd, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Firc Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of automatic suppression systems in the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the seismic category standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. O 9A.4-218
GESSAR II , 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O
\
s (~') 9A.4.3.25 Building - Fuel: El (-)5 ft 3 in. (Continued) V (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employad:
~
~ ~
(a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure; s (b) The means of fire suppression ahalarming are _ provided and accessible. ?' - 4 (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cablys in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. s
,. S. -
+
% 1 9A.4.3.26 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. .
( % Space - Standby Gas Treatment Unit Roch A, F-04'-8. (1)
d (2)
Equipment: <
, s 3 Safety 4 Providen.
Related Core Cooligg, ' 1
%_ s Standby gas treatment unit A Yes, D1 No t; s
(3) Radioactive Material Present - The unit containa 2115 lb . of charcoal which may contain adsorbed radioactive ' iodine should a LOCA occur. _s ; "
~
(4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers -'Two are 3-hr fire- 's resistive concrete exterior walls, and two are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls.4 The floor and ceiling Theroobdoorisa
~
are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. O. G s
'^
9A.4-219 y s 4
s GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A 4.3.26 Eui) ding - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 2115 lb of charcoal in unit 27.3 x 10 (6). Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room anr1 a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-12. Class A thermistor overtemperature alarms provided in the char-coal filter- bed. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation O Overtemperature water spray Internal of Manual system the unit Modified Class III, Col. B-12, C-7 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel Class ABC hand Col. B-12 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss - of function. The safety-related unit has a backup sys-tem in a remote location. 9A.4-220
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.26 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (Continued) (J~} (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by provision of floor drainage. Actua-tion of the manual internal spray system signals an alarm in the Control Room. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) activation of alarm on manual suppression system operation; n%s (c) provision of raised foundation pads for the unit; (d) provision of floor drainage; t (e) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (f) a remote backup system for the safety-related function. l l (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: l
'a) The unit is located in a separate fire-resistive l
enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm- [i
\ ing are provided and accessible.
9A.4-221
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.26 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - A manual overtemperature suppression system is provided internal to the unit. Actuation of the switch is from an accessible area outside the cubicle. The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.27 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Standby Gas Treatment Support Equipment Room A, F-04-9, 10. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provide:s Related Core Cooling O SGTS local panel A Yes, D1 No SGTS Room cooling unit A Yes, D1 No SGTS heat removal fan B Yes, D2 No (See remarks) SGTS exhaust fan A Yes, D1 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is a 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior wall, three walls are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete interior walls. A 2-hr fire resistive concrete wall separates the Division 2 fan from the Division 1 equipment. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The doors are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors providing access from either the corridor or the standby gas treatment unit A. 9A.4-222
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 [) 9A.4.3.27 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (Continued) v (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-12. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-12, C-7 Manual 7g Seismic Category I, t i standpipe and hose reel V ABC hand extinguisher Col. B-12 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure with a barrier between the different divisional equipment. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function of Division 1 equipment. The system has a backup system in a remote location. The Division 2 heat removal fan is protected from the Division 1 equipment by a fire-resistive concrete barrier wall. V 9A.4-223
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.27 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (Continued) (10) Conseguences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Caroless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) remote backup systems for the safety-related functions. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. The fan is part of the Division 1 SGTS. It is 9A.4-224
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCIEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 / 9A.4.3.27 Building - Fuel: El (-)4 ft 0 in. (Continued) b) powered from a Division 2 electrical system so that in the event of a Division 1 power loss, heat removal from the charcoal filter bed can be maintained (see Section 6.8). 9A.4.3.28 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Zone 1 equipment area F-ll-7. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Fuel transfer panels (2) No No Motorized plug for fuel trans-(s ( ,) for tube service room No No MCC A2-1 No No Bus A2 No No IRM/SRM preamplifier cabinet C Yes, D3 No Plant vent discharge radiation monitor No No SGTS vent sample panel No No CRD and RV temperature recording panel No No Fuel prep machines (2 in fuel pool) No No Jib cranes (3 at pool side) No No Fuel Building exhaust Yes, D1 isolation D2 No Generator resistor No No Control panel No No MG Room cooling unit No No Bus C60 No No No ('}
'~'
Bus C16 MG set No No No 9A.4-225
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.28 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls, and one wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall. One side of the area is noen over the fuel pool. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors to the stairtower and the con-tainment personnel air lock. There are fice electrical penetrations in the Shield Building wall. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion __ (Btu) 6 301 ft of nondivisional cable 39.0 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Column B-13. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. E-13 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Italon 1211 hand Col. E-13 Manual extinguishers O 9A.4-226
GESSAR II 22A700*, 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev, 0 9A.4.3.28 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 9 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed,: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of functions. The IRM/SRM preamplifier cabinet has a backup system located in a separate, remote location. The other functions are not safety-related and do not [~') L,/ require backup capability. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by raised equipment foundation pads and by providing floor drainage. t l i (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; i l (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; b (c) provision of floor drainage; 9A.4-227
GESSAR !T 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR IS..AD Rev. 0 9A.4.3.28 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 9 in. (Continued) (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely: ( c. ) provision of a remote backup system for the safety-related cabinet; and (f)' a distance of 8 ft 0 in. separating the safety-related valves. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping O penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area is directly below the HVAC equipment service floor at El 28 ft 6 in. The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.29 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Zone 2 equipment area F-ll-27. O 9A.4-228
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.29 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) [V] (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 15-ton equipment hoist and No No trolley MCC B2-1 No No Bus B2 No No IRM/SRM preamplifier Yes, D2 No cabinet B Sample panel No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior building walls, one ('~'); wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall, and one side is open over the fuel pool. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double door to the vestibule at Column 11-1. There are four electrical penetrations in the Shield Building wall. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 758 ft of divisional and 98.1 x 10 nondivisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of
,_ XLPE-FR cable insulation v
9A.4-229
GESSAR II 22A7007 I 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.3.29 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual alarm pull station at Col. H-2. (7) Suppression k.uilable: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. H-2 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. H-2 Manual extinguisher (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of functions. The IRM/SRM preamplifier cabinet has a backup system located in a separate, remote location. The other functions are not safety-related and do not require redundant backup capability. (10) Consequences of_ Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. 9A.4-230
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~') 9.4.3.29 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) V (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the area perimeter; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) provision of a remote backup system for the safety- [') related function. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The equipment loading dock is located in a fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. O V 9A.4-231
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.30 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - stairtower, Rooms F-ll-4, -5, -6. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and 3 or 2-hr fire resistive metal stud gypsum construction. The floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. These are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive unlabeled double doors at one end of the stairtower. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label 2500F rise, single door provides access to the stairway. Double 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors provide separation at the FB/AB interface. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 85 ft of nondivisional cable 11 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. E-13. O 9A.4-232
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /s 9A.4.3.30 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. E-13 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. G-13 Manual extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. {s"]/ (c) Fire-stops provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the stairtower and elevator at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown function, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. O v 9A.4-233
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.3.30 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for_ Protection Against Inadvertent operation, Careless Operation or rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection l 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.31 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (1) Space - AB/F B vestibule, F-ll-29. O 9A.4-234 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O J
"N 9A.4.3.31 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued)
J (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, and one wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double doors at one end of the vestibule. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label, 250*F rise single door provides access to the stairway. The FB/AB interface
) doors are one A-label 3-hr fire-resistive doors.
(5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 . 147 ft of nondivisional cable 19.0 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and manual alarm pull stations at Col. H-1. O 9A.4-235
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.31 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) g (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. C-1 Manual Seismic Category I, Aux Bldg standpipe ar.d hose reel Manual Col. H-2 Fuel Bldg ABC and Halon 1211 hand Col. C-1 Manual extinguishers Aux Bldg Col. H-2 Manual Fuel Bldg (8) Fire Protecticn Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the vestibule and stairway at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown functions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump et the lower level of the structure. 9A.4-236
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 Building - Fuel: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) ()9A.4.3.31 (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manaal suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive
/ enclosure; C )'
(b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. i 9A.4.3.32 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - shield annulus Fan Room A, F-28-8. O 9A.4-237
1 GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 1
\
9L.4.3.32 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Shield annulus return / exhaust Yes, D1 No system A (3) Radioactive Material P{esent - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door provides access from corridor. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-12 in the Auxiliary Building. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. C-7 Manual Seismic Category I, Fuel Bldg standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Col. E-12 Manual O 9A.4-238 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (Continued) (} V 9A.4.3.32 Building - Fuel: El 2G ft 6 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The safety-related function has a backup system in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment [ on raised pads and by floor drainage. V) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation,_Careles_s Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the seismic category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) provision of a remote backup system for the safety-(} related function. 9A.4-239 [
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.32 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located ii. a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.33 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - shield annulus Fan Room B, F-28-9. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Shield annulus return Yes, D2 No exhaust system B (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door provides access from the corridor, i i (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading i Total Heat of Combustion None - O 9A.4-240 1 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.33 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (V} (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. C-7. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. C-7 Manual Seismic Category I, Fuel Bldg standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. E-12 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. I
\_/)
(b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The safety-related function has a backup systen in a remote location. (10) Conse_guences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by provision of floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Supp_ression System: (3 g v) (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; 9A.4-241 L
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAED Rev. 0 9A.4.3.33 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) provision of a remote backup system for the safety-related function. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.34 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - HVAC equipment area, F-28-7 and F-28-27. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling FB air conditioning units 1&2 No No Sample panel No No 9A.4-242
GESSAR II 22A7007 ' 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
/
r i 9A.4.3.34 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued)
's_/
Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Closed cooling water pumps No No A&B Closed cooling water air No No separator Closed cooling water heat No No exchanger A&B Fuel Building pressure No No control exhaust fans A&B Fuel Building plant vent Yes, D1, No isolation valves D2 Shield annulus exhaust Yes, D1(2), No isolation valves (4) D2(2) Shield annulus return Yes, Dl, No proportioning dampers D2 shield annulus exhaust to Yes, Dl, No SGTS isolation valves D2 [v) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete exterior walls, and one wall is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall. The floor and ceiling (roof) are 3-br fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label double doors providing access from the stairtower and from the Auxiliary / Fuel Building vestibule. The fourth side is open to the crane high bay. O v 9A.4-243
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.3.34 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) ) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Zone 1 has 200 ft, and 25.9 x 10 (Zone 1) Zone 2 has 90 ft of non- 11.7 x 106 (Zone 2) divisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and manual alarm pull stations at Col. C-7. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-1, C-13 Manual Seismic Category I, Aux Bldg standpipe and hose reel Col. C-7 Fuel Bldg ABC extinguishers Col. F-ll, F-3 Manual Fuel Bldg (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive area. (b) The means of fire detection and suppression are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stope are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. 9A.4-244
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
/ 9A.4.3.34 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued)
V} (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of functions. The functions are not safety-related and do not requira backup capability. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area;
\- ' (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and i (e) the separation of safety-related isolation valves l by a minimum distance of 3 ft 0 in.
t (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a fire-resistive area. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm- ! ing are provided and accessible. i ()g (. i 9A.4-245 I l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.3.34 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area is directly above the refueling deck at floor El 11 ft 0 in. The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.35 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - Stairtower, Room F-28-29. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive metal stud / gypsum. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete and two walls are 2-hr fire-resistive B-label double doors at one end of the stairtower. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label 250*F rise single door provides access to the stairway. O 9A.4-246
.~ ~_
GESSAR II ,
.- " 22A7007 , s, 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 "
s ' s 9A.4.3.35 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. ( neinued) + s '. (5) Combustibles Present: 3 Fire Loading, Total HG.1t'of Combustion .'. None * (6) Detection Provided - Class A POC in tbc veEkifule,and,A f manual alarm pull station at Col. B-] in the, A?txiNary. ,, g s 5 Building. ,
~- -
3 Suppression Available: -
,', +
(7) - i~~ s,'. . _ . ,
, s..
_7 Actdation . Location ~
.. w r -,
,y _,
(
~
Modified Class III, Col. B-1 Mdnual 9 Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel Aux (Bldg' 3 ABC hand extinguishers Col . - B-1 Manual Aux Bldp ,,
>Munval Col. F-3 s Fuel Bldg .'
3, r. i y (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Emplo/Dch: *<4.
~
1 s . (a) The area is located in a separate ~ fire res5'stive - enclosure, s s -_- .
~
(b) Fire suppression capability is provided-Jn'$- .' ,
.,q ., .
accessible. , s , , . . .
~~
(9) Consequences of Fire - bie postulated fire asst l:fies loss , of access to the stairtower and elevator at this ' floor, elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress2re ' s i available. .
+
g % 4 9A.4-247 r
=
j'
-.-.. ..-. -.---- , , ,. ,n. - - , - - - --,-.-n---
CESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.35 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppressien extinguishes the fire, v: ster can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Pupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression system external to the area; (b) provtsion of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Fmployed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive structure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.36 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Spac_e - AB/FB vestibule F-28-5. O 9A.4-248
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.4.3.36 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (2) Equipment:
; Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - -
(3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, and one wall is 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive < B-label double doors at one end of the vestibule. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label, 250*F rise single door provides access to the stairway. Double 3-hr fire-i O resistive A-label doors are at the FB/AB interface. 1 (5) Combustibles Present: i i Fire Loading t Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A POC in the vestibule and a ,. manual alarm pull station at Col. B-13 in the Auxiliary Building. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation 4 Modified Class III, Col. C-7 Manual i Seismic Category I, j standpipe and hose reel l 9A.4-249
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.36 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) Location Actuation ABC hand extinguishers Col. F-ll Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the vestibule and stairway at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown functions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the_ Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and O 9A.4-250
l ! GESSAR II 22A7007 i 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O l l l t > 9A.4.3.36 Building - Fuel: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) I r ! (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe l with a rupture being unlikely. l l 1 (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: ; I I (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive j enclosure. } i < h } (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are j provided and aw essible. f i (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.37 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 1/2 in. l (1) Space - stairtower, Room F-51-4. i i i I i (2) Equipment: l I ! Safety- Provides j j Related Core Cooling i l l None (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. i i j (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr i fire-resistive concrete walls, the floor and ceiling are 2-hr fire-resistive concrete. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door provides access to the stairway. ; Three-hour fire-resistive unlabeled doors provide access l . l 9A.4-251 i i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.37 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 1./ 2 in. (Continued) to the Auxiliary Building roofs and to the IIVAC equip-ment area Room F-51-7. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the vestibule and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-13 in the stairtower. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. J-13 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. J-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequence _s_of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of access to the stairtower and elevator at this floor elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are l 9A.4-252 i l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.4.3.37 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 1/2 in. ,(Continued) available. No operating or shutdown functions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Ag inst Inavertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) There are no functions or equipment located at this floor elevation which require protection. Protec-() tion against flooding is provided by drainage. (b) The standpipe is Seismic Category I with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4-253
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.38 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 in. (1) Space - IIVAC Equipment Room, F-15-7. (2) ____ Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Containment PC exhaust fans No No A and B Containment IIP exhaust fan No No Room unit heaters (2) No No Space allocated for future No No containment Low purge exhaust filter No No train (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - One wall is the stairtower exterior 3-hr fire-resistive concrete wall. Three walls and the ceiling are of noncombustible metal construction. The floor is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The entry door is a 3-hr fire-resistive unlabeled door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station in the stair vestibule. O 9A.4-254
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.39 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 in. (Continued) ( (7) S,uppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Vestibule J-13 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Vestibule J-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. () (c) Fire-stops are provided for penetrations through the floor. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extin-guishes the fire. Protection against flooding is pro-vided by equipment supports and floor drains. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent i Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: l (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room;
) (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; 9A.4-255 4
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.38 Building - Fuel: El 51 ft 7 in. (Continued) (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification'of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions have a fire-resistive wall and floor to protect the Fuel Building and stairtower from fire. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for penetrations. (13) Remarks - none. O 9A.4.3.39 Building - Fuel: El 84 ft 7 in. (1) Space - stairtower, Rooms F-038-2, F-84-4, -5, -6. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling None - - (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor and ceiling are 3-hr 9A.4-256
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.39 Building - Fuel: El 84 ft 7 in. (Continued) fire-resistive concrete. There are 1 3/2-hr fire-resistive B-label doors providing access to the stairway and to the Shield Building personnel lock vestibule. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-13 at El 51 ft 7 1/2 in. in the stairtower. (7) Suppression Available: O Location Actuation l Modified Class III, None Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel j ABC hand extinguishers Col. J-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive l enclosure. { (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and j accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss N of access to the stairtower and elevator at this floor i i 9A.4-257 i i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.39 Building - Fuel: El 84 ft 7 in. (Continued) elevation. Alternate routes of access and egress are available. No operating or shutdown functions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) no functions or equipment located at this floor elevation which require protection; h (b) location of manual suppression systems on a lower floor elevation in the stairtower and remote from this floor; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. 9A.4-258
GESSAR Il 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.39 Building - Fuel: El 84 ft 7 in. (Continued) [~') v (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. 9A.4.3.40 Building - Fuel: El 101 ft 5 1/2 in. (1) Space - stairtower, Rooms F-101-4, -5, -6. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling CCW expansion tank No No Elevator hoist machinery No No with governor No No ( Elevator starter generator Elevator control panel No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, roof and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label 250*F rise door provides access to the stairway. A 3-hr unlabeled fire-resistive tornado-pressure-resistant door provides access to the exterior platform serving the Reactor Building roof ! ladder. nv 9A.4-259
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.40 Building - Fuel: El 101 ft 5 1/2 in. ~ (Continued ) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC and a manual alarm pull station at Col. J-13 at El 51 ft 7 1/2 in. in the stairtower. (7) ~_-.-Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, None Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Col. J-13 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capbility is pro-vided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of accecs to the stairtower at this floor elevation and loss of operation of the elevator machinery. No operating or shutdown functions, either safety or nonsafety-related, are involved and no backup capability is required. h 9A.4-260
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.3.40 Building - Fuel: El 101 ft 5 1/2 in. (Continued) (10) _ Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Drainage occurs via the stairway to a sump at the lower level of the structure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems on a lower floor elevation in the stairtower and remote from this floor: (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe (} with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive 1 enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and l alarming are provided and accessible. l (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. ! Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. I i l O G 9A.4-261
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4 Reactor Building 9A.4.4.1 Building - Reactor: El (-)28 ft 7 in. to (-)12 ft 3 in. (1) Space - drywell, R021-2. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Recirculation pumps A&B No No Drywell equipment drain sump No No pumps A&B Drywell equipment drain sump No No exchanger Pedestal floor drain collection No No sump pumps A&B Drywell floor drain sump No No pumps A&B CRD removal plauform No No SRM/IRM motor modules and No No drive mechanism (3) Radioactive Material present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under shutdown conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling directly above the drywell is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. Th'e floor is the concrete base mat. O 9A.4-262 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O fT 9A.4.4.1 Building - Reactor: (Continued) El (-)28 ft 7 in. to (-)12 ft 3 in. V' (5) Combustibles present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Zone 1 has 16 ft and Zone 2 2.1 x 10 (Zone 1) has 32 ft of divisional cable 4.2 x 106 (Zone 2) trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 6 120 (60 gal. in each pump motor) 17.3 x 10 of Class III B lubricating oil (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC system at El (-)39 ft 6 in. and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 210 , external to the drywell at El (-)5 ft 3 in. N- (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 180* Manual Seismic Category I, @El (-)5 ft 3 in. standpipe and hose reel (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. 9A.4-263
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.1 Building - Reactor: El (-)28 ft 7 in. to (-) 12 ft 3 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of a single recirculation pump. While the pump is not safety-related, backup is provided by the second pump. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - suppression extin-guishes the fire. Protection against flooding is provided by a floor drain sump at a lower elevation. (11) Design Crit,eria Used for Protection Against Inadverte*nt Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) the recirculation pumps are rod hung and water O cannot collect around them; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. O 9A.4-264
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~N 9A.4.4.1 Building - Reactor: El (-)28 ft 7 in. to (-) 12 ft 3 in. (m,) (Continued) (13) Remarks - The recirculation pump motor has two oil reservoirs for cooling and lubricating the motor bear-ings. One reservoir contains 7 1/2 gal. The other reservoir contains 52 gal. The lubricant is a Class III B oil. The volume of spill or rupture from either pump is relatively small and would drain to the drywell sump. The analysis assumes the potential loss of only one pump at a time. The pumps are spatially separated on opposite sides of the reactor. The recirculation system piping has valves with hydraulic actuators. The fluid is FYREQUELL EHC phosphate ester having a flash point in excess of 600*F and is considered 3 a noncombustible fluid. There are approximately 35 gal, present in the drywell, backed by an 80-gal, reservoir located in the containment. The valve actuators are spatially separated on opposite sides of the reactor. The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Electrical penetrations are made with a conduit sleeve and seal. I l l l Vertical fire communication is possible within the i i drywell. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire ! hazards, provide the necessary protection. l l l D O l l 9A.4-265
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.2 Building - Reactor: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (1) Space - drywell, R-021-2. 9 (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 1-ton Reactor Building No No maintenance hoist 30-ton recirculation pump motor handling hoists A&B No No CRD removal jib No No TIP indexing mechanisms No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under shutdown conditions. Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall is O (4) 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling directly above the drywell is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grating. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Zone 1 has 11 ft and Zone 2 1.4 x 10 (Zone 1) has 69 ft of divisional and 9 x 106 (Zone 2) nondisional cable trays con-taining 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC system and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 210 . O SA.4-266
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.2 Building - Reactor: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 180" Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss b) q, of functions. The functions are not safety-related and do not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by a floor drain sump at a lower elevation. l (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation f Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: 1 (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) location of the TIP indexing mechanism opposite the drywell suppression system; 9A.4-267
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.2 Building - Reactor: El (-) 5 f t 3 in. (Continued) (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The me. ins of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Electrical penetrations are made with a conduit sleeve and seal. Vertical fire communication is possible within the drywell. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.3 Building - Reactor: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - containment (excluding the drywell), R-031-5. O 9A.4-268
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.4.3 Building - Reactor: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) C). (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Motorized trolley for drywell No No equipment removal hatch Motorized plug for drywell No No personnel hatch Containment equipment drain No No sump exchanger Containment equipment drain No No sump pumps A&B Containment floor drain sump No No pumps A&B TIP drive units (5) No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be () A released as a result of fire. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall forms the inside of the containment and is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grating. The lower portion of the containment is the water-filled suppres-sion pool, backed by the concrete foundation mat. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. About 30% of the ceiling is open grating. The outer wall of the containment is the steel contair.- ment vessel, backed by an annulus air space and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The drywell equipnient removal plug, the drywell personnel hatch plug and the containment equipment removal plug are fire-resistive. However, they do not have a labeled fire-resistive rating. v 9A.4-269
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.3 Building - Reactor: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None (6) Deteg_ tion Pr_ovided - Class A supervised POC in the llVAC systems and manual alarm pull stations located approxi-mately at azimuths 100* and 280*. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 100" Manual Category I, standpipe and & 280* hose reel (8) Fire Protec_ti_o_n Design Criteria Employed : (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Cpnsequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the functions. The functions, are not safety-related and do not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire _ Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. O 9A.4-270
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O gs 9A.4.4.3 Building - Reactor: El (-)6 ft 10 in. (Cont inued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 73
\v/
(b) The 'eans of fire detection, suppression and alaraing are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - An 80-gal. reservoir for the recirculation piping system holds the valve actuator fluid. The fluid is FYREQUELL EHC phosphate ester, having a flash point in excess of 600 F. It is considered to be a noncombustible fluid. The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 7-s b 9A.4-271 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.4 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in O (1) Space - drywell, R-021-2. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Feedwater piping Yes Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access during shutdown. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling directly above the drywell is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grating. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 Zone 1 has 107 ft and Zone 2 13.9 x 10 (Zone 1) has 120 ft of divisional cable 15.5 x 106 (Zone 2) trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC system and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 180 at El (-)5 ft 3 in. O 9A.4-272
/
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O r~N 9A.4.4.4 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) b (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 120" Manual Category I, standpipe and and 300* hose reel
@EL (-)5 ft 3 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible.
/} -/
(9) Consequences of Fire - There are not systems or equip-ment in the area for a postulated fire to damage. The provisions of core cooling bacAup capability are described in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by a floor drain sump at a lower elevation. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the manual fire suppression remote from l the area; l I I l t () G/ (b) provision of floor drainage; and 9A.4-273
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.4 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Electrical penetrations are made with a conduit sleeve and seal. Vertical fire communication is possible within the drywell. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.5 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. l (1) Space - containment (excluding drywell), R-ll-5 and R-ll-6. 1 ! (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides l Related Core Cooling Standby liquid control No No tank HCU modules (177) No No l Main steam flow local Yes, Dl, D2 No panel A 9A.4-274
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
~D
[b 9A.4.4.5 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Main steam flow local Yes, Dl, D2 No panel B Main steam flow local Yes, D3, D4 No panel C Main steam flow local Yes, D3, D4 No panel D Reactor vessel level and Yes, D1 No pressure local panel A Reactor vessel level and Yes, D2 No pressure local panel B Reactor vessel level and Yes, D4 No pressure local panel C Reactor vessel level and Yes, D3 No pressure local panel D Recirculation pump local No No panel A (') Recirculation pump local panel B No No CRD air station No No CRD master control panel No No Jet pump local panel A No No Jet pump local panel B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has , controlled access. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall forms t j the inside of the containment and is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The outer wall of the containment is the steel contain-ment vessel, backed by an annulus air space and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The containment personnel air lock has a door at each end. (O L.) l 9A.4-275 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.5 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combusion (Btu) 6 Zone 1 has 419 ft and Zone 2 54.2 x 10 (Zone 1) has 501 ft of divisional and 6 nondivisional cable trays con- 64.8 x 10 (Zone 2) taining 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC system and manual alarm pull stations at azimuth 120 and 290". (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 120 , Manual Category I, standpipe and Azimuth 290", hose reel ABC and Halon 1211 hand Azimuth 30*, Manual extinguishers Azimuth 160 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. O 9A.4-276 [
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.5 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) ( } (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes partial loss of function. The divisional reactor vessel level and pressure panels are segregated by quadrants, and the postulated fire assumes only the loss of a single division based on spatial separation and single failure criteria. The CRD hydraulic modules are spatially separated by zones, and emergency closure backup capability is provided by a nitrogen system. The main steam flow local panels are discussed in Section 9A.5 (Special Cases). (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression, extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent [J') Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (d) separation of the safety-related functions by distance. i ! N/ I l 9A.4-277
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.5 Building - Reactor: El 11 ft 0 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The areas contain electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.6 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. (1) Space - platform between 90" & 180 inside containment.
- 2) Equipment:
Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Rod position MUX cabinet A Yes, D1 No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete drywell, fuel transfer ioom and RWCU valve room walls. The fourth wall is 9A.4-278
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O g-w 9A.4.4.6 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. V the steel containment vessel, backed by the air annulus space and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The floor is open steel grating. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete operating deck. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 113 ft of divisional cable 14.6 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station located at g azimuth 120" at El 28 ft 6 in. J (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 120" Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Azimuth 120 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible, s_- 9A.4-279
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLA!!D Rev. 0 9A.4.4.6 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. Lontinued (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The rod position MUX Cabinet B provides backup and is physically separated from this area. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (d) provision of a remote backup system for the safety-related function. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. g 9A.4-280
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /~N 9A.4.4.6 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. (Continued) (c) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.7 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in (1) Space - Fuel Transfer Tube Valve Room access platform (} %/ (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Motorized access plug for No No fuel transfer tube access (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitable conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. One side is open. One wall is the steel containment vessel, backed by 3-hr fire-resistive shielding concrete. The Iloor is open steel grating. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive shielding g concrete. A motorized concrete shield plug provides s_-) access to the room. 9A.4-281
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.7 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 120 at El 28 ft 6 in. (7) Suppression Availeble: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seis- Azimuth 120* Manual mic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimutn 120" Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-l resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is l provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The rod position MUX cabinet A provides backup and is physically separated from this area. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. O l , 9A.4-282 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O g-w 9A.4.4.7 Building - Reactor: El 26 ft 6 in. (Continued) V (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. x_, (b) The means of fire detection, cuppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. However, the vertical separation distance, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. O G 9A.4-283
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 MUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.8 Building - Reactor: El 35 ft 0 in. O (1) Space - drywell, R-021-2. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Drywell cooling units No No A,B,C,D,E&F Valve handling mono- No No rail with hoists A&B Main steam piping Yes, Dl, D2, Yes with isolation valves D3, D4 (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access during shutdown conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling above the drywell is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grating. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 600 ft of nondivisional cable 77.7 x 106 tray containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 180 at El (-) 5 ft 3 in. O 9A.4-284 L
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
/' 9A.4.4.8 Building - Reactor: El 35 ft 0 in. (Continued)
( (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 180 Manual Category I, standpipe and @El (-) 5 ft hose reel 3 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. 7s (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray penetration. N~/ (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The main steam isolation valves close upon actuator disabling and are also provided with backup. The drywell coolers are arranged around the drywell perimeter with spatial separation between all but two of the units. The provision of core cooling backup capability is described in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating. Protection against flooding is provided by a floor drain sump at a lower elevation. m 9A.4-285 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.8 Building - Reactor: El 35 ft 0 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) Location of the manual suppression system external to the area; (b) Provision of floor drainage; (c) Qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (d) Provision of a remote backup system for the safety-related functions. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the drywell. However, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. O 9A.4-286
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.9 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. 7-ss 5,v) (1) Space - RWCU Backwash Tank Room access platform. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Electrical distribution No No panels (2) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - Three walls are the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete steam tunnel, drywell and Backwash Tank Room walls. The fourth wall is the steel containment vessel, backed by the air annulus space and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The (n) floor is open steel grating. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete operating deck. There are seven electrical penetrations in the Shield Building / ( containment vessel wall. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door provides access to the RWCU Backwash Tank Room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 190 ft of nondivisional cable 24.6 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC
/N system and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 40 at -' El 28 ft 6 in.
9A.4-287 i l t
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.9 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Azimuth 40 Manual Category I, standpipe and @El 28 ft 6 in. hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 40 Manual
@El 28 ft 6 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The functions are not safety-related and do not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; g 9A.4-288
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (Continued) (} %./ 9A.4.4.9 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. ['Nl \
\/ (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays.
Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the con-tainment. Ilowever, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. O kJ 9A.4-289
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.10 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. O (1) Space - service platform, 90 to 180 quadrant. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Recirculation system flow No No control unit A (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete drywell, RWCU Backwash Tank Room and fuel pool walls. The fourth wall is the steel containment vessel, backed by the air annulus space and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The floor is open steel grating. The ceiling is the 3-hr h fire-resistive concrete operating deck. There are one electrical penetration and three HVAC penetrations for containment exhaust, shield annulus exhaust and vacuum relief in the Shield Building / containment vessel wall. (5) Combustibles Present: l l Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 120 . 9A.4-290
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued)
) 9A.4.4.10 (7) Suppression Available:
Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 Manual Seismic Category I @El 28 ft 6 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 120 Manual
@El 28 ft 6 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-
, vided and accessible.
(c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related, but does have a backup system in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating ! to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Sup-pression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; 9A.4-291
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.10 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in - O conduit. Cable inculation in conduit is discossed in Subsection 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the con-tainment. Ilowever, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire
- hazards, provide the necessary protection.
l I O 9A 4-292
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.ll Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (
)
(1) Space - containment, R-37-5. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Standby liquid control No No storage tank Standby liquid control No No test tank Standby liquid control Yes, Dl, No pumps D2 Standby liquid control No No panel Recirculation system flow No No control unit B Rod position MUX Yes, D2 No ("]
\#
cabinet B Leak detection system No No local panel Leak detection system No No sample panel Containment high purge No No isolation damper (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. (4) Quali fications of Fire Barriers - The drywell wall forms the inside of the containment and 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The floor is open steel grating except for the standby liquid control area, which has a curbed and drained concrete floor. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. d 9A.4-293
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.ll Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued ) The outer wall of the containment is the steel containment vessel, backed by an annulus air space and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. There are five electrical penetrations and two HVAC penetra-tions for containment purge and vacuum relief in the Shield Building / containment vessel wall. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 343 ft of divisional and 44.4 x 10 nondivisional cable tray containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 320 . (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 317 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 28 ft 6 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 317 Manual
@El 28 ft 6 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is l provided and accessible. 9A 4-294
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) (} V 9A.4.4.11 (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the nonsafety-related functions, the rod position cabinet and the containment purge isolation damper. The cabinet and damper have remote backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the gratir.g to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Ina.vertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System:
\' location of manual suppression systems at the (a) perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; (d) ren.ote backup for the safety-related rod position cabinet and containment purge isolation damper; and (e) separation of the safety-related SIC pumps by distance.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive 4 (}
\' enclosure.
9A.4-295
l GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 1 9A.4.4.ll Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) h (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment, floweve r , the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. The SLC pumps are separated about 7 ft. The pumps are divisional; however, loss of both pumps would not jeopardize safe plant shutdown. 9A.4.4.12 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (1) Space - Backwash Tank and Pump Rooms, R-37-6, R-37-7, R-37-8. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU F/D backwash receiving 'No No tank RWC f ' F/D diain pump No No O 9A.4-296
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 [ h 9A.4.4.12 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) V (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitable conditions. Qualifications of Fire Barriers The walls, floor and (4) ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. There is a 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door. The room is. provided with a 12-in. curb at the door. (5) Combustibles present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None O V (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station located at azimuth 45 at El 28 ft 6 in. (7) Suppression Available Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 45 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 28 ft 6 in, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 45 Manual
@El 28 ft6 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 7-~ U 9A.4-297
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.12 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and does not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. Provision against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. O 9A.4-298 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~] 9A.4.4.12 Building - Reactor: El 37 ft 1 in. (Continued) V (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - none. 9A.4.4.13 Building - Reactor: El 45 ft 1 in. (1) Space - RWCU Heat Exchanger Room, R-45-5. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU regenerative heat No No exchangers A,B&C g RWCU nonregenerative heat No No
) exchangers A&B ,
RWCU Heat Exchanger Room No No cooler (3) Radioactive Material Present - None that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitable conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls and floor are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete with access plugs above the exchangers. A 1 1/2-hr fire-resistive B-label door allows personnel access. The blowout panel prevents overpressure in the event of equipment failure. Ov 9A.4-299
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.13 Building - Reactor: El 45 ft 1 in. (Continued) O (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station located at azimuth 45 at El 28 ft 6 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 40 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 40 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection and suppression are provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and does not require backup. The provision of core cooling backup capability is described in Subsection 9A.2.5. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. 9A.4-300
GESSAR II 22A7007 J8 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.13 Building - Reactor: El 45 ft 1 in. (Continued) ()) \_ Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing floor drainage, which goes to radwaste. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and O \ (d) qualification of the seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employe,{: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and available. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in S.bsec-tion 9A.3.4. v 9A.4-301
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.14 Building - Reactor: El 48 ft 7 in. O (1) Space - RWCU Valve Room access platform. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU local panel No No Reactor water sample cooler No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Three walls are the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete drywell, heat exchanger and valve room walls. The fourth wall is the steel contain-ment vessel, backed by the air annulus and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The floor is open steel grating. The ceiling is the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete operating deck. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 104 ft of nondivisional cable 13.4 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station located at azimuth 120 at El 28 ft 6 in. O 9A.4-302
GCSSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.14 Building - Reactor: El 48 ft 7 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 40* Manual Seismic Category I, OEl 48 ft 7 in. Standpipo and hose reel . ABC hand extinguishers Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression are provided and accessible.
)
(c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray duct piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. There is no backup system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and 9A.4-303
GESS.4R II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.14 Building - Reactor: El 48 ft 7 in. (Continued) (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment, lloweve r , the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.15 Building - Reactor: El 50 ft 7 in. (1) Space - RWCU F/D Drain Valve Room, R-50-6, R-50-7. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU F/D valves No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally 9 9A.4-304
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O h 9A.4.4.15 Building - Reactor: El 50 ft 7 in. (Continued) restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitabic conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. An unlabeled door provides access to the room, and a blowout panel provides overpressure in the event of equipment failure. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total IIcat of Combustion None (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in llVAC h systems and a manual alarm pull station located at azimuth 120* at El 28 ft 6 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 50 ft 7 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 120 Manual
@El 50 ft 7 in.
(8) Pire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. l (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. 9A.4-305
GESSAR IX 22A7007 ! i 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O l 9A.4.4.15 Building - Reactor: El 50 ft 7 in. (Continued) , ? i (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss [ of function. The function is not safety-related and i does not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. l However, no equipment in the area is subject to water flooding. P.otection against flooding is provided by floor drainage. l (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent I Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: l 1 t (a) location of manual suppression systems external to , i i the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe [ with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: I (a) '2he function is located in a separate fire-f resistive enclosure. l (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. l (13) Remarks - none. O l l 9A.4-306
- - - - , - - - r- c
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.16 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. ll (1) Space - access platform, O' to 90* quadrant. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Containment air conditioning No No units B&C , (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The third wall is the steel containment vessel, backed by the air annulus and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall. The floor is partly open steel grating and partly 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 140 ft of nondivisional cabic 18.1 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at Azimuth 40 . O 9A.4-307
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.16 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 59 ft 7 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Azimuth 40 Manual OEl 59 ft 7 in. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss O of function. The function is not safety-related. Addi-tional air conditioning capability is provided in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and } 9A.4-308
GESSAR II 22A7007
- 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 l
j 9A 4.4.16 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) j 1 l 1 (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe j with a rupture being unlikely. l l l (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: f (a) The function is located in a separate fire- l 1 j resistive enclosure. ! I i ! i (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and ! alarming are provided and accessible. 1 ) (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. I Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec- l tion 9A.3.4. l l Vertical fire communication is possible within the l I l j containment. Ilowever, the vertical separation distances, 1 l combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire j hazards, provide the necessary protection. . l 1 !
- 9A.4.4.17 Building - Reactor
- El 59 ft 7 in. [
l f l (1) Space - RWCU Precoat Pump Room R-59-4. [ l t (2) Equipment: i Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Resin feed tank No No l RWCU proccat tank No No RWCU precoat pump No No j RWCU F/D instrument panels (2) No No f i l 9A.4-309 1
GESSAR XI 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.17 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Con tinued ) h (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concreto. Open doorways provide entrance from the access platforms at either end of the room. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion (Btu) 6 149 ft of nondivisional cable 19.3 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the IIVAC O systems and manual alarm pull stations at azimuths 40 and 300 . (7) Suppression Available Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 59 ft 7 in. standpipe and hoce reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 40 Manual
@El 59 ft 7 in.
Azimuth 120
@El 59 ft 7 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-310
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.4.4.17 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) O~ (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the functions. The functions are not safely-related and do not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression axtinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by providing a floor drain sump at a lower elevation. O \' (11) Design Critei... Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems externaJ to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. O U 9A.4-311
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.17 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) ll (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. Ilo w e v e r , the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.18 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (1) Space - access platform, 90 to 180 quadrant. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Containment air conditioning No No unit A Ilydrogen mixing blower Yes, Dl, No D2 (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. O 9A.4-312 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /N 9A.4.4.18 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - Two walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The third wall is the steel containment vessel, backed by the air annulus and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building wall. The floor is partly open steel grating and partly 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 71 ft of nondivisional cable 9.2 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-PR cable insulation k'} / (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 40 . (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 59 ft 7 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Azimuth 120 Manual
@El 59 ft 7 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. n ( \
%.)
9A.4-313
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.18 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire: (a) The postulated fire assumes loss of the functions. (b) The safety-related hydrogen blowers are located on opposite sides of the containment and are separated by 3-hr fire-resistive concrete walls. The hydrogen decombiners are separated by a fire-resistive wall. (c) The air conditioning units are not safety-related; however, additional capacity is provided in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of or external to the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. O 9A.4-314
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.18 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) l l (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. Ilowever, the vertical separation distances, combined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.19 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (1) Upace - RWCU llolding Pumps Room, R-59-5. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU holding pumps A&B No No (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitable conditions. O 9A.4-315
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.19 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-restive concrete. A unlabeled door provides access to the room. Blowout panels are provided for overpressure relief in the event of equipment failure. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station located at azimuth 120 at El 48 ft 6 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 Manual Seismic Category I, @El 59 ft 7 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 40 Manual
@El 59 ft 7 in.
Azimuth 120
@El 59 ft 7 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive shielding enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. 9A.4-316
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O m i 9A.4.4.19 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the function. The function is not safety-related and does not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage, which goes to radwaste. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. () (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. 9A.4-317
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.19 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. 9A.4.4.20 Building - Reactor: El C4 ft 6 in. (1) Space - RWCU Filter Demineralizer Rooms, R-64-6, R-64-7. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling RWCU filter domineralizers No No A&B (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitable conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. Access plugs are in the ceiling above each unit. l (5) Combustibles Present: i Fire Loading ! Total Heat of Combustion l None - l (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the HVAC system and a manual alarm pull station located at l i azimuth 45 at El 84 ft 7 in. O 9A.4-318
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.20 Building - Reactor: El 64 ft 6 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120' Seismic Category I, @El 59 ft 7 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 120 Manual
@El 59 ft 7 in.
(8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure with a concrete wall between the units. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The function is not safety-related and does not require backup. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floors. Protection agairest flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage, which goes to radwaste. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems cxternal to the room; 9A.4-319
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.20 Building - Reactor: El 64 ft 6 in. (Continued) (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4 9A.4.4.21 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (1) Space - equipment platform, 180 to 360 segment. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Hydrogen mixing blower A Yes, D1 No Containment air condition- No No ing units A,B&C Hydrogen recombiners A&B Yes, Dl, No D2 O 9A.4-320
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O ! 9A.4.4.21 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) N_/ (3) Radioactive Material Present - none that can be released as a result of fire. The area is normally restricted and has controlled access under acceptable habitable conditions. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete, the steel containment vessel backed by the air annulus and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The floor is partly open grating and partly 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The ceiling is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading I i Total lleat of Combustion b (Btu) 6 280 ft of divisional cable 36.2 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the llVAC systems and a manual alarm pull station at azimuth 300 . (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 300 Manual Seismic Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Azimuth 300 Manual
)
V' 9A.4-321
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 UUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.21 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the functions. The safety-related hydrogen blowers are located on opposite sides of the containment and are separated by 3-hr fire-resistive concrete walls. The hydrogen recombiners are separated spatially, and a concrete block wall is provided between units. The air conditioning units are not safety-related, but additional capacity is provided in a remote location. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water drains through the grating to the suppression pool. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. O 9A.4-322
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ( }) 9A.4.4.21 Building - Reactor: El 59 ft 7 in. (Continued) (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) The safety-related equipment is physica~ly and spatially separated. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. [) %d Vertical fire communication is possible within the containment. However, the vertical separation distances, ccabined with the absence of exposed combustible fire hazards, provide the necessary protection. 9A.4.4.22 Building - Reactor: El 84 ft 7 in. (1) Space - Reactor Building operating deck, R-84-6, R-84-7. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Dome cooling fans (at ceiling) No No Fuel preparation machine No No Fuel transfer power wench No No Fuel transfer control panel No No Refueling platform No No 7-w (_) Polar crane (with 25-ton and No No 125-ton hoists) 9A.4-323
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.22 Building - Reactor: El 84 ft 7 in. (Continued) (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. The area has controlled access. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls and ceiling are the steel containment vessel, backed by the air annulus and the 3-hr fire-resistive concrete Shield Building. The floor is partly open grating and partly 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. Open stairways provide access to the lower levels of the containment. The personnel air lock provides access to the containment from the stairtower and contains a door at each end of the lock. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised PCO in HVAC sys-stems and manual alarm pull stations located at azimuths 120 and 315 . (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Azimuth 120 , Manual Seismic Category I, Azimuth 315 standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguishers Azimuth 120 , Manual Azimuth 315 0 9A.4-324
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
~'h 9A.4.4.22 Building - Reactor: El 84 ft 7 in. (Continued) -
(V (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of the functions. The functions are not safety-related and do not require backup. (10) Consequence of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water could pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on / raised pads and by floor drainage. N.)i (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems at the perimeter of the area; (b) provision of floor drainage; and (c) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The area is located in a separate fire-resistive [')
%/
enclosure. 9A.4-325
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.4.22 Building - Reactor: El 84 ft 7 in. (Continued) (b) The nicans of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The area contains electrical cables in conduit. Cabl'e insulatior; in conduit is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The control of the permanent and transitory combustible loads introduced through normal and maintenance opera-tions is the responsibility of the Applicant. 9A.4.5 Radwaste Building 9A.4.5.1 General The Radwaste Building does not contain any system or function that could affect the safe, cold shutdown of the reactor. Therefore, a detailed, room-by-room fire hazard analysis is not required. The basic fire protection features are presented in a method sim-ilar to that used in a room-by-room analysis. 9A.4.5.2 Facility Features The Radwaste Building has 3-hr fire-resistive exterior walls with 2-hr fire-resistive concrete and metal stud / gypsum interior separ-ations. Interior doors are 1 1/2-hr, B-label fire-resistive doors, some of which are fitted with 1 1/2-hr fire dampers for room venti-lation intake. Exterior doors are 3-hr fire-resistive, A-label doors or doors designed to withstand other criteria. The Radwaste Building is not contiguous with any other structure. O 9A.4-326
4 GESSAR II 22A7007
, 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 1
J l 4 9A.4.5.3 Fire Detection l l Fire detection is provided throughout the facility with the use of i Class A supervised POC detection systems. Alarms, both trouble and fire, report to the radwaste control room, as well as to the main control room Nuclear Island. Manual fire alarm pull boxes j are located at each fire hose and at extinguisher stations. i I 9A.4.5.4 Fire Suppression Systems ! Fire suppression systems include: i i } (1) NFPA 14, Modified Class III standpipes with 100 ft of lined hose and nozzle located so that each room is less j than 100 ft from a hose station. Water flow alarms are l provided. I ! (2) NFPA 13, automatic wet pipe sprinklers provided in areas j where dry radioactive waste is processed and stored. l The design criteria for the systems are a minimum water 2 i density of 0.15 gpm/ft , with a maximum 100 ft per sprinkler head. Water flow alarms are provided. l (3) ABC hand extinguishers provided on each floor of the , facility, located at or near the hose stations and alarm pull boxes. 9A.4.5.5 Penetrations Wall, floor and ceiling penetrations for piping, HVAC and cable trays are fitted with fire-stops or fire dampers with the same fire-resistive rating as the wall, floor or ceiling. Since radioactive materials are processed, many of the walls are much thicker than an equivalent fire wall thickness for shielding 3 purposes. A density of 150 lb/ft silicone foam fire-stop mate-rial is used throughout the facility for pipe penetrations. 9A.4-327
l GESSAR II 22A7007 l 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O j i 9A.4.5.6 Consequences of Suppression The facility is provided with floor drainage to holdup tanks. Any fire water drcins to the tanks. Raised pads for equipment and curbs are provided to control and confine water to specific areas. 9A.4.6 Diesel-Generator Building, Division 1 9A.4.6.1 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - diesel-generator equipment - G-06-1. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Diesel generator Yes, D1 Yes Starting air compressors (2) No No Starting air receivers (2) Yes, D1 Yes Diesel control panel Yes, D1 Yes Genclator control panel Yes, D1 Yes 480V MCC-El-2 Yes, D1 Yes 125 Vdc MCC-DC-El Yes, D1 Yes Air driers (2) Yes, D1 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - None (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The interior separation doors are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors. The exterior vestibule double doors is a 3-hr fire-resistive unlabeled door due to tornado pressure and seismic requirements. O 9A.4-328
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 [~D 9A.4.6.1 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) G' (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 1395 gal. Class III B lubri- 200.9 x 10 cating oil Note: 795 gal. are in the diesel engine crank case, 450 gal. are in the external oil reservoir, and 150 gal. are in external piping, filters, heat exchangers and coolers. 6 30 gal. Class III B lubri- 8.6 x 10 cating oil in each air compressor 6 466 ft of cable trays contain- 60.3 x 10 ing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR ("% cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone to sense fire before the CO extinguish-2 ing system can discharge. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. A manual alarm station is provided at Col. B-1. A U 9A.4-329
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 tJUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.6.1 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) ll (7) Suppression available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC dry chemical and Halon Col. D-1 Manual 1211 hand extinguishers Col. B-1 Thermal /IR actuated CO2 total All Automatic flooding system, time-delay discharge, minimum concentra-tion 34%. The system is interlocked to shut down air dilution-causing equipment in the building. Audible and visual pre-discharge alarms are provided. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The Division 2 Diesel-Generator System provides backup for this system. O 9A.4-330
GESSAR II 22A7007 233 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.6.1 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (O) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs and by floor drain trenches to the sump. CO 2 discharge requires manual restarting of equipment that has been shut down by the detection sys-tem. The room atmosphere cannot support. life, until ventilation is re-established and an oxygen level deter-mination made. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of the standpipe external to the room; 9 (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d ,' cross zoning of the thermal /IR detection / actuation system, requiring two detectors to sense heat or flames prior to CO discharge; and 2 (e) qualification of the Reismic Category I standpipe with a rupture beily in7ikely. (12) Fire Containment or . ni . . ,;ing Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. O i ( / x_/ 9A.4-331
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.6.1 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping and cable tray penetrations. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Lable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The CO 2 system can be manually discharged from the control room. A manual fuel shutoff valve is provided external to the building. 9A.4.6.2 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - Day Tank Room G-10-2. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 1100 gal. diesel fuel day Yes, D1 Yes tank l l l
- (3) Radioactive Material Present - none.
1 (4) Oualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. l l 9A.4-332 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i
/~'
( 9A.4.6.2 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 1100 gal. diesel fuel, 158.4 x 10 Class II combustible liquid (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before the CO xtinguishing system can dis-2 charge. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. () (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1 Manual Category I standpipe and hose reel ABC dry chemical and Halon Col. D-1 Manual 1211 hand extinguishers Col. B-1 Thermal-activated CO2 total All Automatic flooding system, time-delay discharge maximum concentra-tion 34%. The system is-interlocked to shut down air dilution-causing equipment in the building. Audible and visual predischarge alarms are provided. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separated fire-
\- resistive enclosure.
l 9A.4-333
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.6.2 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (d) The room is provided with diking to contain a fuel spill, in accordance with NFPA 37-1973, para-graph 526. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The Division 2 Diesel-Generator System provides backup for this system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs. CO discharge requires manual 2 restarting of equipment that has been shutdown by the detection system. The room atmosphere cannot support life, until ventilation is re-established and an oxygen determination made. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of the standpipe external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for equipment; (c) cross zoning of the thermal detection / activation system, requiring two detectors to sense heat prior to CO2 discharge; and 9A.4-334
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
) 9A.4.6.2 Building - DG 1: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) v' (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely.
(12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The day tank is Seismic Category I and is designed and fabricated to ASME Section III criteria. /7 () 9A.4.6.3 Building - DG 1: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - HVAC Equipment Room G-28-1. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Fume control fan No No Recirculation fan Yes, D1 Yes Supply fans (2) Yes, D1 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The access [) door is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. The
%/
9A.4-335
GESSAR 11 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.6.3 Building - DG 1: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) g emergency exit door is a 3-hr fire-reristive unlabel door due to seismic and tornado pressure requirements. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total lleat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provide _d - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm station at Col. B-1, El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-1 Manual Seismic Category I, El (-) 6 ft 10 in, standpipe and hose reel ABC dry chemical and Col. E-1 Manual IIalon 1211 hand extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The Division 2 Diesel-Generator System provides backup for this system. O 9A.4-336
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O
) 9A.4.6.3 Building - DG 1: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) f~d u
(10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (ll) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; %./' (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) remote backing for safety-related system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. I v 9A.4-337
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.6.3 Building - DG 1: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - none. 9A.4.7 Diesel-Generator Building, Division 2 9A.4.7.1 Building - DG 2: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - diesel-generator equipment - G-06-1. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Diesel generator Yes, D2 Yes Starting air receivers (2) Yes, D2 Yes Starting air compressors (2) No No Diesel control panel Yes, D2 Yes Generator control panel Yes, D2 Yes 480V MCC-F1-2 Yes, D2 Yes 125 Vdc MCC-DC-Fl Yes, D2 Yes Air driers (2) Yes, D2 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The interior separation doors are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors. The exterior vestibule double doors in a 3-hr fire-resistive unlabeled door due to tornado pressure and seismic requirements. O 9A.4-338
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
') 9A.4.7.1 Building - DG 2: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued)
( (5) Combustibles Present Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 1395 gal. Class III B 200.9 x 10 lubricating oil Note: 795 gal. are in the diesel engine crank case, 450 gal. are in the external oil reservoir, and 150 gal. are in external piping, filters, heat exchangers and coolers. 0 30 gal. Class III B lubri- 8.6 x 10 cating oil in each air compressor 533 ft of cable trays 68.9 x 10 containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-PR cable insulation 3 J (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone to sense fire before the CO 2 extinguish-ing system can discharge. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. A manual alarm station is provided at Col. B-1. i v) 9A.4-339
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.7.1 Building - DG 2: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1 Manual , Category I, standpipe and hose reel Col. F-1 ABC dry chemical and Halon Col. E-2 Manual 1211 hand extinguishers Col. B-2 Thermal /IR actuated CO2 All Automatic total flooding system, time-delay discharge, minimum concentration 34%. The sys-tem is interlocked to shut down air dilution-causing equipment in the building. Audible and visual pre-discharge alarms are provided. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetration. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The Division 2 Diesel-Generator System provides backup for this system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Pro-tection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs and by floor drain trenches to the 9A.4-340
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /N 9A.4.7.1 Building - DG 2: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) h sump. CO 2 discharge requires manual restarting of equipment that has been shut down by the detection system. The room atmosphere cannot support life, until ventilation is re-established and an oxygen level deter-mination made. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of the standpipe external to the room: (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for equipment; [~} V (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) cross zoning of the thermal /IR detection / actuation system, requiring two detectors to sense heat or flames prior to CO 2 discharge; and (e) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. [~'\ (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping and cable tray
\ ~'} penetrations.
9A.4-341
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.7.1 Building - DC 2: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The CO system can be manually discharged 2 from the control room. A mezzanine floor at El 10 ft 10 in. is provided for the neutral grounding resistor equipment. The mezzanine is identified as G-10-5. The floor is open steel grating. The Division 2 cable chase, identified as 1-13-11, is also open to the area and is protected by the area's extinguishing and alarm systems. A manual fuel shutof f valve is provided external to time building. 9A.4.7.2 Building - DG: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. ll (1) Space - Day Tank Room G-10-6. (2) I'q ui pmen t : Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 1100 gal. diesel fuel day Yes, D2 Yes tank (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. O 9A.4-342
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.7.2 Building - DG: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 1100 gal. diesel fuel, 158.4 x 10 Class II combustible liquid (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before the CO extinguishing system can 2 discharge. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. (7) Suppression Available:
\
Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-2 Manual Category I standpipe and Col. F-1 hose reel ABC dry chemical and Halon 1211 Col. E-2 Manual hand extinguishers Col. B-2 Thermal-activated CO2 total All Automatic flooding system, time-delay discharge, maximum concentra-tion 34%. The system is , interlocked to shut down all ! air dilution-causing equipment i in the building. Audible and visual predischarge alarms l are provided. 4 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: i i i (a) The function is located in a separated fire-resistive enclosure. ! 9A.4-343 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 MUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.7.2 Building - DG: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is pro-vided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (d) The room is provided with diking to contain a fuel spill, in accordance with NFPA 37-1973, para-graph 526. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The Division 2 Diesel-Generator System provides backup for this system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs. CO discharge requires manual 2 restarting of equipment that has been shutdown by the detection system. The room atmosphere cannot .upport life, until ventilation is re-established and an oxygen determination made. 1 i (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent l Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of the standpipe external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for equipment; i (c) cross zoning of the thermal detection / activation l system, requiring two detectors to sense heat prior to CO2 discharge; and 9A.4-344
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (N, 9A.4.7.2 Building - DG: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) kJ (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed
?
(a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-ing are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The day tank is Seismic Category I and is designed and fabricated to ASME Section III criteria. O l,
/
9A.4.7.3 Building - DG 2: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - HVAC Equipment Room G-28-5. (2) Equipmeric: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Fume control fan No No Recirculation fan Yes, D2 Yas i Supply fans (2) Yes, D2 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. i l (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The access ()
\m ,/
door is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. The 9A.4-345 l l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.7.3 Building - DG 2: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) emergency exit door is a 3-hr fire-resistive unlabeled door due to seismic and tornado pressure requirements. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm station at Col. B-1, El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-1 Manual Seismic Category I, El (-) 6 ft 10 in. standpipe and hose reel ABC dry chemical and Col. E-1 Manual Halon 1211 ar3 extinguishers (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. O 9A.4-346
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (N 9A.4.7.3 Building - DG 2: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) V (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The Division 1 Diesel-Generator System provides backup for this system. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression system external to
/N, the room; %-)
(b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely; and (e) remote backup for safety-related system. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. i
'% J 9A.4-347
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.7.3 Building - DG 2: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (b) The means of fire suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - none. 9A.4.9 Diesel-Generator Building, Division 3 9A.4.8.1 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (i) Space - diesel-generator equipment G-06-9. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling IIPCS diesel generator Yes, D3 Yes Starting air receivers (2) Yes, D3 Yes Starting air compressors (2) No No Engine generator control Yes, D3 Yes switchgear (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The interior double doors are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors. The exterior vestibule double door is a 3-hr fire-resistive unlabeled door due to tornado pressure and seismic requirements. O 9A.4-348
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~ ) 9A.4.8.1 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) G' (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 240 ft of divisional and 31.0 x 10 nondivisional cable trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation 6 30 gal. Class IIIB lubricating 4.3 x 10 oil in the air compressors 465 gal. Class IIIB lubricat-ing oil associated with the diesel engine. This quantity includes the crank case capacity as well as inter-coolers, filters and external piping.
)
(6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors and infrared detectors. A manual alarm pull station is located at the entry door. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, are in each zone, to sense fire before the CO2 extinguishing system can discharge. The system alarms on any single detector sensing fire. O N. 9A.4-349
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.1 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-2 Manual Category I standpipe and hose reel ABC dry chemical and flalon Col. C-3 Manual 1211 hand extinguishers Thermal /IR-actuated CO2 total All Autcmatic flooding system, time-delay discharge, minimum concentra-tion 34%. The system is interlocked to shut down all dilution causing equipment in the building. Audible and visual predischarge alarms are provided. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: O (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for cable tray and piping penetrations. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The generator powers only the IIPCS System for core cooling, with no backup provided. Subsec-tion 9A.2.5 describes alternate methods of core cooling. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. O 9A.4-350
; GESSAR II- 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 4
1 () 9A.4.8.1 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs and by floor drain trenches to the
! sump. CO 2 discharge requires manual restarting of
!! equipment that has been shutdown by the detection system. The room atmosphere cannot support life, until ventila- ! tion has been reestablished and an oxygen level deter-mination made. , l (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertcat i Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of the standpipe external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for () equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; t (d) cross zoning of the thermal /IR detection / activation [ system, requiring two detectors to sense heat or j flame prior to CO discharge; and 2 i i i (e) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: l (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive ! enclosure. i (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarm-1 () ing are provided and accessible. 9A.4-351 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Revo 0 9A.4.8.1 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping and cable tray penetrations. (13) Remarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.4. The CO system can be manually discharged 2 from the control room. 9A.4.8.2 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - Electrical Equipment Room G-06-10. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling MCC R24-55350 Yes, D3 Yes O Switchgear E22-5004 Yes, D3 Yes Battery chargers (2) E22-L004&5 Yes, D3 Yes Resistor E22-5005 Yes, D3 Yes Transformer, dry type E22-5003 Yes, D3 Yes MCC E22-5002 Yes, D3 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The interior separation doors are 3-hr fire-resistive A-label doors. A 3-hr fire-resistive A-label emergency exit door is provided into the Auxiliary Building at Col. E-4. O 9A.4-352 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 I h 9A.4.8.2 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) V (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 251 ft of divisional cable 32.5 x 10 trays containing 9.25 lb/ft of XLPE-FR cable insulation (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual pull station at Col. B-2, as well as a manual alarm in the Auxiliary Building. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation 10 (_,/ Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel Halon 1211 hand extinguisher Col. E-4 Manual (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The *iunction is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. The system powers only the HPCS System for core cooling with no backup provided. Subsec-tion 9A.2.5 describes alternate methods of core cooling.
N
[O l 9A.4-353
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 11UCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.2 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs and by floor drainage through the sump system. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppres-sion System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised founda-. ion pads or legs for equipment; (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and l alarming are provided and accessible. l l (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping and cable tray j penetrations. i O 9A.4-354 l 1 l
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 /~'s 9A.4.8.2 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) O (13) Femarks - The room contains electrical cables in trays. Cable insulation in trays is discussed in Subsec-tion 9A.3.5. 9A.4.8.3 Buildi g - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (1) Space - Division 3 Battery Room G-06-ll (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Division 3 batteries Yes, D3 Yes Ventilation fan A Yes, D3 No Ventilation fan B No No N
)
'- (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion Battery cases represent the As noted exposed combustible load within the area. The Btu content of plastics used in the battery cases does not exceed the 3-hr fire-resistive enclosure. 9A.4-355
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.3 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual alarm pull station at Col. B-2. Manual alarm is available through the emergency exit into the Auxiliary Building. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-1 Manual Category 1, standpipe and hose reel Halon 1211 hand extinguishers Col. E-4 Manual Fire suppression equipment is also available in the Auxiliary Building through the emergency exit. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. No backup is provided for the batteries. Subsection 9A.2.5 describes alternate methods of core cooling. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs and by floor drainage through the sump system. 9A.4-356
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.3 Building - DG 3: El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) [/
}
(11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room: (b) provision of raised pads or legs for equipment: (c) provision of floor drainage; and (d) qualification of Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: f3 w/ (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - The room is provided with two 100% capacity fans, one connected to the Div 3 power bus and one con-nected to the normal power bus, to maintain the hydrogen gas concentration at 1% or less. The room contains elec-trical cable in conduit. Cable insulation in conduit is discussed in Subsection 9A.3.4. O U 9A.4-357
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.4 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Division 3 Day Tank Room G-13-13. (2) Equipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling 550 gal. diesel fuel oil Yes, D3 Yes day tank (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The enclosure is 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. The door is a 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door. (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 6 550 gal. diesel fuel, class II 79.2 x 10 combustible liquid (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised rate-compensated thermal detectors. The detection system is a cross-zoned system requiring two detectors, one in each zone, to sense fire before the CO extinguishing system can 2 discharge. The system alarm on any single detector sensing fire. A manual pull station is located at Col. B-2, El (-) 6 ft 10 in. O 9A.4-358
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.4 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (Continued) (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Seismic Col. B-2 Manual Category I, standpipe and hose reel ABC dry chemical hand Col. D-3 Manual extinguisher at El 13 ft 0 in. Thermal activated CO2 Day Tank Hoom Automatic total flooding system, time-delay dischargo, minimum concentration 34%. The system is interlocked to shut down equipment except the diesel generator. Audi-ble and visual predis-charge alarms all provided. O (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (b) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (c) The room is provided with diking to contain a fuel spill, in accordance with NFPA 37-1973, para-graph 526. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. No backup is provided. Subsection 9A.2.5 describes alternate methods of core cooling, i 9A.4-359 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.4 Iluilding - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (Continued) h (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs. CO 2 discharge requires manual restarting of equipment that has been shut down by the detection system. The room atmosphere cannot support life, until ventilation has been re-established and an oxygen level determination made. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression system external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for O equipment; (c) cross zoning of the thermal detector / activation system, requiring two detected to sense fire prior to CO discharge; and 2 (d) qualification of the Seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Pire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. O 9A.4-360
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O n 9A.4.8.4 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (Continued) (V) (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (13) Remarks - The day tank is Seismic Category I. It is designed and fabricated to ASME Section III criteria. 9A.4.8.5 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (1) Space - Diesel-Generator Engine Combustion Air Filter Room G-13-14. (2) Equipment: () N/ Safety-Related Provides Core Cooling Oil bath air filters Yes, D3 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, floors and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A single 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door provides access to the area. A 3-hr fire-resistive concrete duct to the building exterior at the roof provides passage for combustion air to the filter. The opening at the roof is weather protected. rh 9A.4-361
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.5 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) 5-gal. Class IIIB combustible 7.0 x 106 fluid internal to the air filter housing. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the area and a manual pull station at Col. B-2, El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-2 Manual Seismic Category I, @El (-) 6 ft 10 in, standpipe and hose reel ABC hand extinguisher Entry to room Manual (8) Pire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The room is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire suppression capability is provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. (d) The room is provided with diking to contain air oil spill. O 9A.4-362
GESSAR II 22A7007 , 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i 9A.4.8.5 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft 0 in. (Continued) (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. No backup is provided. Subsection 9A.2.5
- describes alternate methods of core cooling.
(10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by equipment on raised pads or legs. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: (a) location of manual suppression systems external to the room; O (b) provision of raised foundation pads or legs for equipment; and (c) qualification of the seismic Category I standpipe with a rupture being unlikely. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The function is located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (c) Fire-stops are provided for piping penetrations. O V 9A.4-363
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.5 Building - DG 3: El 13 ft0 in. (Continued) (13) Remarks - The air filter assembly and piping is safety-related and designed to Seismic Category I. Spillage is unlikely during normal operation. 9A.4.8.6 Building - DG 3: El 28 ft 6 in. (1) Space - IIVAC Equipment Room G-28-10. (2) yrquipment: Safety- Provides Related Core Cooling Supply fans (2) Yes, D3 Yes Fume control fan Yes, D3 Yes Recirculation fan Yes, D3 Yes Summer / winter ventilation fan Yes, D3 Yes (3) Radioactive Material Present - none. (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls, ficor and ceiling are 3-hr fire-resistive concrete. A 3-hr fire-resistive A-label door provides access into the room via a 3-hr fire-resistive stairwell enclosure. A 3-hr fire resistive A-label door is provided for emergency exit into a tornado-missileproof vestibule. Two exits are provided from the vestibule, one into the Auxiliary Building, the other to the roof of the DG2 and DG3 building. O 9A.4-364
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.4.8.6 Building - DG 3: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (5) Combustibles Present: fire ~ Loading Total Heat of Combustion None - (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and a manual pull station at Col. B-2, El (-) 6 ft 10 in. (7) Suppression Available: Location Actuation Modified Class III, Col. B-2 Manual Seismic Catrgory I, @El (-) 6 ft 10 in. standpipe end hose reel in stairwell at ABC dry chemical and r m entry Manual O Halon 1211 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (a) The room is a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes loss of function. No backup is provided. Subsection 9A.2.5 describes alternate methods of core cooling. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - When suppression extinguishes the fire, water can pool on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by floor drainage to the building sump. l s_s i 9A.4-365
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.4.8.6 Building - DG 3: El 28 ft 6 in. (Continued) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the ~~ ---- Suppression Systemi (a) location of fire suppression systems external to the room; (b) provision of raised foundation pads for the equipment; and (c) provision of floor drainage. (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Employed: (a) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (b) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (13) Remarks - An alternate fire hose is available through the emergency exit vestibule and into the HVAC equipment 1.oom of the Auxiliary Building. O 9A.4-366
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O gx 9A.5 SPECIAL CASFS U 9A.5.1 Piping Penetrations, Peactor Building Piping penetrations through the Peactor Building and drywell have unique design considerations. The stress and containment require-ments along with the temperature inputs to the concrete walls leave little design latitude. As a result, some of these pene-trations for high energy piping may not contain a 3-hr fire-resistive barrier such as have been provided throughout the other Nuclear Island buildings. Penetrations Type 6, Type 9, Type 10, Type 13 and Type 14 meet the 3-br fire barrier rating established for the Reactor Building. Drawings of these penetration types are in Figures 9A-38, 9A-42, 9A-43, 9A-45 and 9A-46, respectively. A fire retardant silicone foam is utilized as a fire barrier for ("N
\- Type 4, Type 5, Type 7, Type 7A, Type 8, Type 12, and Type 15 penetrations. Cured foam of this type has a temperature limit of 300 F. Areas that are to be foam-packed can be seen on the penetration drawings in Figures 9A-36, 9A-37, 9A-39, 9A-40, 9A-41, 9A-44 and 9A-47, respectively.
The temperature of the interfacing concrete with the penetration assemblies exceeds 200 F. It is not feasible to utilize a fire l retardant packing for renetration. Types 1, lA, 2, and some 3 due l to this temperature limitation. Process pipe design temperatures are listed in Table 9A.5-1 for these penetration types and are in excess of 300 F. Packing that can withstand temperatures in excess of 300 *F has relatively high thermal conductivity l coefficients. Filling the annular space between the process pipe and the wall sleeve with fire-retardant packing can result in excessive concrete temperatures due to the thermal conductivity of the packing. Penetration drawings can be seen in Figures 9A-32 through 9A-35. For Type 3 penetrations 25 SC, 42 SC, 50 SC, and 65 SC, a fire-resistive silicone foam is used to fill the 9A.5-1
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.1 Piping Pene_trations, Reactor Building (Continued) annular space between the process pipe and wall sleeve. This foam packing will have to be removed and replaced periodically because of inservice inspection requirements. The suggested location for the foam can be seen in the Type 3 penetration drawing in Figure 9A-35. The remaining Type 3 penetrations will have to remain without packing due to excessive concrete temperatures. 9A.5.2 Fire Door Deviations The design of a nuclear facility must meet many criteria, includ-ing fire resistivity. Un-labeled fire doors are an example of compromise with other overriding design criteria that must also be met. Table 9A.5-2 lists those doors that have been designed or modified such that a UL or FM label cannot be affixed because of the modi- l fication. Many of the listed doors are constructed as a fire door; some, such as the airlock doors between the lock and the Peactor Building, form part of a pressure vessel and are of special construction. The door number listed in the table can be located on Figures 9A-1 l through 9A-15 (A-100 through 107, -111, -112, -115, -116, -117, l
-121, -122). It should be noted that many of the doors listed as I deviating from the recognized labeling requirements have a labeled l fire door backup.
l l 9A.S.3 Charcoal Filters for Process Tanks and Drain Sumps l Several tanks and sumps are fitted with small charcoal canister-type filters to adsorb radioactive halogens and particulates that may be in the gases vented from the tank during filling or draining operations. 9A.5-2
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9 A.5.3 Charcoal Filters for Process Tanks and Drain Sumps O (Continued) We have not required temperature monitoring nor automatic or manually actuated fixed fire suppression systems for these filters. Valves cannot be installed in the lines to isolate the filters as valve closure would result in pressure gradients that could cause tank or sump failure. With the exception of the drywell equipment drain sump, manual fire supprestion systems are available at or nearby each filter. Each Nuclear Island has the following process vent filters: Vent Diameter Flow Sch 40 Pipe Number of Length Filter Unit (cfm) (in.) Units Required (in.) P55-DD016 20 4 1 12 P55-DD015 20 4 4 12 I G36-DD120 102 10 1 18 V; G46-DD120 302 14 1 30 P48-DD001 5 1 1 12 P48-DD002 20 3 1 12 The filters contain the following amounts of charcoal: Amount of Charcoal Filter Number (lb) P55-DD016 8.4 P55-DD015 8.4 G36-DD120 25.1 G46-DD120 55.8 P48-DD001 4.2 P48-DD002 7.0 i 9A.5-3
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.3.3 Charcoal Filters for Process Tanks and Drain Sumps (Continued) The filters are located as follows: Filter Number Location G46-DD120 Fuc i pool backwash tank vent filter - located on Column line 10 between Columns A and B at the (-) 17 ft 0 in. level in the Fuel Building (building arrangement drawing K-021). G36-DD120 RWCU backwash tank filter - located on Column line 9 between Columns A and B at the 40 ft 0 in. level in the Reactor Building (building arrangement drawing K-108). P48-DD001 Cask decontamination vacuum pump discharge vent filter - located approximately at Column line C, between Columns 3 and 4, (-) 5ft- 3 in. level, Fuel Building (building arrangement drawing K-016). P48-DD002 Decontamination tank vent filter - located approximately at Column B-3, (-) 32 ft- 0 in. level, Fuel Building (building arrangement drawing K-015). P55-DD015 RCIC pump room equipment drain sump - located at the (-) 32 ft - 0 in. level of the Auxiliary Building in the RCIC pump room (building arrangement drawing K-015). P55-DD015 Drywell equipment drain sump - located at about 45 azimuth in the drywell at floor elevation (-) 21 ft - 0 in. (building arrangement drawing K-015). 9A.5-4 L
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 3 i 9A.S.3 Charcoal Filters for Process Tanks and Drain Sumps (Continued) Filter Number Location P55-DD016 Containment equipment drain sump - located at approximately 90* azimuth in the Containment Building at the (-) 6 ft - 10 in, level (building arrangement drawing K-016). P55-DD015 Equipment drain sump - located at Columns A-10, Fuel Building at floor level (-) 32 ft - 0 in. (building arrangement drawing K-015). P55-DD015 Equipment drain sump - located between column lines A and B between column lines 4 and 5, Fuel Building at floor level (-) 32 fu - 0 in. (building arrangement drawing K-015). The Radwaste Building contains no canister-type charcoal filters. Radwaste tanks are vented through a common vent system to the inlet side of the building exhaust filter system. This filter system contains a charcoal adsorber bed that is provided with a water deluge fire protection system. 9A.S.4 Pipe Break Analyses The Nuclear Island portion of the carbon dioxide piping systems has been analyzed for high energy line failure. The high pressure fire water systems have been analyzed for moderate energy line failure. These analyses may be found in Section 3.6. O V 9A.5-5
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5 Fire Separation for Divisional Electrical Systems There are some cases where cables of more than one division are in relatively close proximity and require special justification. These areas are listed below and justification of each is evaluated in the discussion. 9A.5.5.1 Scram Solenoid Circuits Wiring to each of the four groups of scram solenoids is run in separate rigid steel conduits for the purpose of preventing any possibility of the scram solenoid circuits being exposed to a
" hot" short (i.e., two energized switch legs of different group circuits shorted together that could negate the scram command to more than one group of control rods). The four conduits do not require other special separation. Overheating of the conductors, as by fire, cannot cause an unsafe failure because solenoids can be de-energized by shorts to ground or between conductors without creating an unsafe condition.
9A.5.5.2 Turbine System Sensor Inputs to RPS Including the NSSSS The turbine system sensors (stopvalve position, first-stage high pressure, and control valve fast closure) initiate Reactor Scram. l The steamline low pressure and low condenser vacuum sensors l initiate closure of the main steamline isolation valves. These sensors are located in the Turbine Building. l i The design of the sensor signal cable installation includes special l protection of the cabling to prevent disabling damage by either l i the SSE event or a design basis fire in the Turbine Building
- insofar as is practical.
The types of sensors used for the RPS signals are listed in Table 9A.5-3. l 9A.5-6
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 l' ) 9A.5.5.2 Turbine System Sensor Inputs to RPS Including the NSSSS \ss/ (Continued) The design employs individual rigid conduit raceways in the Turbine Building for the individual conductors from the ser. sors having switch contacts in a manner similar to Figure 9A-34. The signal conductors from the analog type sensors are two conductor-shielded cable and are routed in rigid conduit raceways with conduit embedded or routed away from potential fire hazards. In both cases, the conduit from the separate divisions are separated from each other to meet IEEE 384-1974. 9A.5.5.3 Main Steamline Radiation Monitor Detectors These detectors are physically located in the steam tunnel near ('~g the main steamlines, just downstream of the outboard main steamline \~ l isolation valves. The cabling from each detector (one for each division) is brought out in rigid conduit embedded in the wall between the steam tunnel and the RHR A (Division 1) pump room. The pull boxes at the end of the conduits are embedded with covers flush with the wall. The conduit remains embedded in concrete from the pull boxes to the appropriate divisional cable raceway. Thus, the cabling and conduit are separated by distance or equivalent fire barrier all the way, from entry in the wall of the steam tunnel up to the control room monitor device. The conduit is routed inside the tunnel with spatial separation compatible with location of the radiation elements which are ('N arranged for optimum measurement of radiation from all four main
~- steamlines.
9A.5-7
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.S.5.3 Main Steamline Radiation Monitor Detectors (Continued) The tunnel space where the detectors are located must be considered at part of the Turbine Building fire zone because the end of the tunnel opens into the Turbine Building without a barrier wall. The Applicant is to provide a fire protection system to protect the Steam Tunnel / Turbine Building interface from potential fire hazards associated with the Turbine Building. By design, this area has no exposed combustibles. Additionally, the conduit and the detectors have some physical protection from the steam lines and hangers in the area making it improbable that fire from below could damage the redundant detectors or cable. The radiation monitor trip devices have a downscale trip such that a downscale reading from the detectors will provide a trip. This trip is in addition to the normal upscale trip so that a failure in either direction will result in trip. Leak detection temperature detectors of the main steamline LDS measure ambient temperature around the main steamlines and will provide a main steamline valve isolation signal at fire-induced temperatures well belou the threshold of damage to tne radiation monitor cable. Furthermore, a common failure to all of the radiation monitor divisional cables can only affect the radiation monitors and not the remainder of the divisional equipment. 9A.S.5.4 Main Steamline ADS Relief Valves The main steamline relief valves each have *wo solenoiC valve pilots in close proximity at the valve operator. One of the two solenoids is Division 1. Tne other is Division 2. If either solenoid becomes energized, the associated relief valve will open. O 9A.5-8
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.5.5.4 Main Steamline ADS Relief Valves (Continued) The Division 1 and 2 signal cables are run in separate conduit from their location on the valve to the appropriate divisional penetration and, from there, via divisional raceways to their control logic circuits. These valves are located in a low fire loading area and are inaccessible during plant operation so that a transient fire loading cannot be introduced. The conduit is arranged so that Division 1 and Division 2 cables leave the relief valve area in opposite directions. The solenoid valve coils are located inside metallic enclosures on each valve so that a fire inside the coil compartment of one pilot would not influence the coil or cable of the redundant pilot. ( The ADS valves installation is arranged in two groups of four valves each with adequate spatial separation to ensure that disturbances (i.e., fire, pipe rupture phenomena, falling objects) affecting one group will not affect the other group. For line
~
breaks, requiring ADS for depressurization, the design assures that at least three of the eight valves are available. Electrically, the ADS logic system load drivers isolate the divisional signals from other components, in their respective , ! division, so that any damage to the cable at the valves would be limited to that particular cable. Fire damage to a cable or solenoid coil cannot result in inadvertent opening of the main
- valve because shorts, opens or grounds at the solenoid cannot cause the solenoid to be energized. Short circuits at this i
location cannot jeopardize lE power supplies because circuit resistance is sufficient to permit appropriate circuit protection ( coordination. i l 9A.5-9
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.4 Main Steamline ADS Relief Valves (Continued) It is felt that with this degree of redundancy, attention to design, and electrical isolation, plant safety will not be compromised by having the Division 1 and 2 cables in close proximity at the ADS valves. 9A.5.5.5 Main Steamline Isolation Valve Limit Switch Interlocks with PPS There are eight MSIV, two in each of four main steamlines. One MSIV on each main steamline is located outside (outboard) containment in the main steam tunnel to the Turbine Building. The other MSIV on each line is located inside the drywell (inboard). The steamlines are arranged so that none of the valves is located vertically above any other MSIV. The electrical connection services to each valve are made in three junction boxes (A, B and C). Pneumatic control junction Box A, on the control cylinder at the top of the valve operating mechanism, terminates the 120V 60 Hz control voltage to the coils of the operating and test solenoid pilot valves. Valve limit switch junction Box B - located on one side of the valve operating mechanism and oriented across the valve operator from Box C and about 3 ft below Box A - provides interlocking connections for valve limit switches to the NSSSS isolation logic and to valve position indicating lights at the control room panel. Valve limit switch junction Box C - located at the same height but the opposite side of the valve operating mechanism from Box B - provides initiation signal connections from MSIV limit switches to the RPS logic for reactor scram. Box C is separated into O 9A.5-10
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O 9A.5.5.5 Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Interlocks (g-')s with RPS (Continued) two compartments by a steel barrier to provide separation between switches which provide scram trip signals upon MSIV closure. Inside the drywell, .20 VAC power from RPS Division 2 Bus "F" enters Box A to each of inboard MSIVs for operating the control and test solenoid pilot valves. This power also enters Box B for connection to limit switches for activation of Division 2 valve position indicating lights. Division 2, 125 VDC Bus "F" power enters Box B for connection to limit switches for interlocking to the NSSSS Division 2 logic (arms valve test logic). Divisional 125 VDC power enters Box C of each inboard valve for connection to limit switches which cpen when the MSIV closes to initiate a reactor scram trip signal to the divisional scram logic as follows: O O (1) Division 1 125 VDC Bus E to Box C of inboard MSIV on steamline A for Division 1 scram logic. (2) Division 2 125 VDC Sus F to Box C of inboard MSIV on steamline B for Division 2 scram logic. (3) Division 3 125 VDC Bus G to Box C of inboard MSIV on steamline C for Division 3 scram logic. (4) Division 4 125 VDC Bus H to Box C of inboard MSIV on steamline D for Division 4 scram logic. l
^T (b
9A.5-ll
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.5 Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Interlocks with RPS (Continued) Outside Containment A similar arrangement of divisional power enters the A, B and C junction boxes of the outboard MSIVs on each main steamline and for similar purposes. In the case of the scram initiation function, the outboard valve limit switches provide redundant trip signals to the signals provided by the inboard valves on each logic. The MSIVs and limit switches have been fully qualified for the service and the pneumatic electrical components meet the separation and isolation requirements of IEEE 279-1971. Failure of the MSIV or its control and interlocking O circuits that might occur by a postulated fire, either within the drywell or outside the containment, cannot prevent closure of at least one of the MSIVs in each line. The closure of an MSIV will result in a scram trip signal to a single division scram circuit. The closure of a valve on two or more steamlines will result in reactor scram. Si:ar e the outboard valve scram signals are redundant from the inboard valves on each line, a fire either inside the drywell or outside the primary containment will not affect the redundant capability to cause scram. O 9A.5-12
- - .= - _ _ - - - _ _ . _ .- __~ .. . . _ , __ - .
j GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O l 9A.S.5.5 Main Steam Isolation Valve Limit Switch Interlocks O with RPS (Continued) j The conduit leaving junction Box C is routed away from 9 the valve, in opposite directions from that of , junction Box B. 1
, 'the cabling from the inboard isolation valves in the ! drywell are run in individual conduit.
9A.5.5.6 Under the Reactor Pedestal i i This area contains the following electrical cables: Rod Control I. t and Information System (RC&IS) cabling, neutron monitor system cabling, and other cables, as required. (1) RC&IS Cables The RC&IS cables are separated into two groups (A and B) for routing out of the area: under the pedestal, through pull boxes inside the pedestal; then through raceways into the drywell; from there, through drywell cable seals and raceways to rod position multiplexin, panels located within the primary containment. "A" groups pass through pedestal raceways located on one side of the space and the "B" groups pass through raceways approximately diametrically opposite the "A" groups. l No other cables occupy the raceway with the RC&IS cables. t All RC&IS cables are contained individually in flexible metallic conduit under the vessel and are installed f resting on top of the control rod drive housing flanges. The installation is arranged so that the "A" and "B" l
- cables travel in opposite directions along the rod housings and pass through the penetrations on opposite i
i sides of the reactor pedestal. I 9A.5-13 i
.- ,_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . - ~ , __... _ __ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ __ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.S.5.6 Under the Reactor Pedestal (Continued) (2) LPRM Cables The LPRM cables are similarly individually contained in flexible metallic conduit under the vessel. These cables are divided into four divisions of cabling, corresponding to the four divisions of the reactor protection system. The cabling is also supported on the control rod drive housing flanges. Ilowever, the LPRM cables are on opposite sides of the housing from the "A" or "B" RC&IS cable. The cabling is routed along particular rows of housing flanges and through the pedestal and drywell in a manner which brings the Division 1 LPRM cables into the 0 to 90 quadrant of primary containment; Division 2 into the 180 to 270 quadrant; Division 3 into 90 to 180 quadrant; and Division 4 into the 270 and 360 quadrant. Once in the containment, the cables continue in the separated divisional penetrations and cable raceways to the main Control Room. (3) SRM/IRM Cables The cables for the SRM/IFW detectors are individually contained in flexible metallic conduit. These cables are routed along with, and pass through, the same divisional penetrations with the LPRM cables. (4) Other Cables All other cables under the pedestal are classed as nondivisional. These cables are routed in rigid conduit 9A.5-14
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 () 9A.5.5.6 Under the Reactor Pedestal (Continued) through nondivisional conduit openings in the pedestal wall to nondivisional cable raceways in the containment. (5) Pire Damage Analysis The cabling inside the flexible conduit for the RC&IS System and for the Neutron Monitoring System are all low level signal cable and not likely to be involved in an electrically generated fire internal to the conduit. Even though such a fire is postulated, it would be contained in the individual conduit without damage to the surrounding conduit. The nondivisional cabling in the conduit is low voltage, [\ q } fault-protected cable and not likely to be involved in an electrically generated fire internal to the conduit. The space under the reactor vessel is devoid of combustible material except for the cable insulation inside the various conduit. The applicant is required to have administrative procedures to control combustible materials. These procedures will require that combustibles not be stored in areas with divisional cable or within electrical equipment areas. The pedestal has a personnel and equipment opening into the drywell, but the opening is above floor level of the drywell. The combustible material within the drywell is negligible. l I 9A.5-15 t
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLRND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.6 Under the Peactor Pedestal (Continued) The reactor recirculation control valves, located in the drywell, are hydraulically operated valves. The hydraulic control unit is located outside the drywell with small fluid lines extending to the valve cylinders in the drywell. The hydraulic fluid is fire resistant Fyrequell EllC phosphate ester. The maximum hydraulic fluid spill in the drywell is 20 gallons per valve, on small line leakage, and about 2 gallons of fluid on catastrophic line break (line break cutoff valve is provided). The control valves are located away from the access opening in the reactor pedestal such that line leakage will not spray inside the pedestal space. The Reactor Recirculation System pump motors have an integral oil system containing approximately 60 gal of oil for bearing coolant lubricont. These pumps are also located away from the access opening under the pedestal. The volume of possible spill is too small to reach the bottom of the pedestal opening and the leakage will drain into the drywell sump. The space under the pedestal and in the drywell is not accessible during reactor operation. Maintenance during reactor downtime might involve welding in the area under the pedestal, but the applicant is required to have administrative procedures which will require special fire protec-tion during the welding or other maintenance operation and housekeeping procedures for cleanup after the maintenance work. O 9A.5-16
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.6 Under the Reactor Pedestal (Continued) It is concluded that design features in the area under the pedestal are adequate for protecting the redundant trains against damage by fire. 9A.5.5.7 Local Instrumentation and Control Panels Safety-related panels are generally designed and located to serve a singla division. Ilowever , some local panels or instrumentation contain equipmer+ of more than one division where operational considerations or instrument piping considerations dictate against location or separated structures. In such cases, spatially diverse equipment allows for the disabling of all equipment on a single panel or rack. These multidivisional panels and racks are either divided intern-ally into compartments, with barriers between the divisional equipment for separation, or the divisional components have separate metal enclosures and separate enclosed metallic raceways (conduit) to obtain effective physical isolation and low probability of disabling damage to the equipment from a fire generated internally or externally. The incoming cables for each division are in separate conduit and, where possible, the conduit is embedded in concrete or separated by greater than 3 ft horizontally, 5 ft vertically. Those panels having multidivisional equipment are tabulated as follows: O 9A.5-17
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.7 Local Instrumentation and Control Panels (Continued) Panel Division Location Main steam flow 1 and 2 Inside containment Div 1 quadrant at panel A 11 ft 0 in. Main steam flow 1 and 2 Inside containment Div 2 quadrant at panel B 11 ft 0 in. Main steam flow 3 and 4 Inside containment Div 4 quadrant at panel D 11 ft 0 in. Main steam flow 3 and 4 Inside containment Div 3 quadrant at panel C 11 f t 0 in. Remote shutdown 1 and 2 outside containment Zone 1 of panel Auxiliary Building Standby Liquid 1, 2, ND Inside Div 2 quadrant at Local Control containment 37 ft 1 in. Panel The main stean flow panels have instrumentation involving analog signals only. If one of the four panels is damaged, the other three remaining panels will provide the required protective action signals for high flow on any of the main steam lines. For example, if panel A were disabled by fire, panel C would protect for high flow in either MSL A or C, while panel B or D would protect for high flow in either MSL B or D. The remote shutdown panel has equipment for normal cooldown operation to bring the reactor from hot shutdown to cold shutdown condition. There is suf ficient diversity in the control functions available in the control room and in the remote shutdown panel to assure that a fire at either location would not negate the safe 9A.5-18
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
'~h 9A.5.5.7 Local Instrumentation and Control Panels (Continued) shutdown function of the other. Separately fused power supplies and transfer switches are provided for all control functions of the remote shutdown panel.
The SLC local panel in containment could be damaged by fire in a manner that could start the injection pumps but would not activate the injection valves. The damage to the local panel could also prevent the capability of starting the pump from the local panel but could not prevent start by the control room switches, nor prevent opening the suction and discharge valves to the pump from the control room. 9A.5.5.8 Leak Detection System Ambient temperature is measured to detect leakage of primary IT coolant into or wi thin the below tabulated spaces. O Temperature sensors of redundant divisions are used in the spaces to detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and to generate signals that are ultimately used to provide isolation closure signals to the containment isolation or NSSSS valves. The following table indicates fire areas where redundant divisions of leak detection equipment are located: Area Monitored Division MSL Pipe Tunnel 1,2,3,4 RHR Equipment Area 1 1,2 ! RHR Equipment Area 2 1,2 RCIC Equipment Area 1,2 RWCU Heat Exchange Room 1,2 RWCU Pump Room 1 1,2 () RWCU Pump Room 2 1,2 9A.5-19
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.8 Leak Detection System (Continued) Area Monitored Division RWCU Domin Room 1 1,2 RWCU Domin Room 2 1,2 RWCU Valve Room 1,2 RWCU Demin Collector Tank 1,2 RWCU Valve Most Room 1,2 Turbine Building (MSL area) 1,2,3,4 The Division 1 and 2 elements are located in separate temperature detector assemblies 'nd the signal lead cables are brought out in acparate rigid (or flexible) conduit. The sensors are located to sense ambient temperature within the listed areas. In event of fire in the spaces protected by temperature detection, it is expected that a signal will be generated by the ambient sensors at compartment temperatures well below the threshold of damage to equipment of either division. This signal would appear to the leak detection temperature sensor as a leak in the process piping or equipment within the compartment. 9A.5.5.9 Standby Liquid Control The following SLC equipment is located in the same general area of primary containment at the 37-ft level, azimuth (approximately) 250 (Division 2 general area) on a concrete slab outside the drywell: O 9A.5-20
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 -w 9A.5.5.9 Standby Liquid Control (Continued)
)
Divisional Equipment Designated Division Pump C41-C001A 1 Pump C41-C001'B 2 Injection Valve (Explosive) C41-F004A 1 , Injection Valve (Explosive) C41-F004B, 2 Suction Valve (MO) C41-F001A , 1 Suction Valve I (MO) C41-F001B , 2 , Control and Power Cabling to "A" 1 Equipment s Control and Power Cabline to "B" 2 Equipment Standby Liquid Local Control Panel 1,2, and Nondivisional (see Section 5.9) Nondivisional Equipment Boron Storage Tank
~} Test Tank ,
Storage Tank Heating Elements / Power Cabling for Storage Tank Heaters The cabling inside containment is routed in separate conduit or trays for each division, separated from each other, to meet IEEE 384. Conduit will be embedded in concrete where feasible.
/
The electric drive motor and cabling for the redundant pumps are located more than 5 ft apart and the pumps and motors are more than 5 ft fromthelocalcontrolppnel. The injection valves and cabling are located more than 3 ft apart centerline to centerline. The control cables for Division 1 and 2 equipment are in separate conduit and separate from the power cables. The Division 1 power and control cabling is routed out of the Division 2 area by (~') conduit embedded in the drywell wall,- around to the Division 1 V 9A.5-21
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 WUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.5.9 Standby Liquid Control (Continued) area; then, through Division 1 penetration and raceways to outside containment. Division 2 power and control cables exit via the Division 2 penetration and raceways. The area within containment, where the equipment is located, is partially compartmented by the drywell wall on one side, the containment on the other side, and a concrete floor and ceiling. The ends of the area are open to the rest of the containment at the 37-ft level. The immediate area, on either end of the SLC area, and the SLC area itself are very low fire loading areas. Postulated fire damage to the electrical equipment in the SLC area could not inadvertently result in injection of boron because this can only be done by activation of a switch on the control room panel. It could damage the continuity circuit to cause a false " loss of continuity to the squib valves" alarm. Fire could also damage the power cabling to the pump suction valves or to the pump motors preventing opening of valves or start of pump motors on command from the control room (see Section 9A.S.7 regarding damage to the local SLC panel). However, the SLC equipment is not required for safe shutdown of the reactor, since it is redundant to the RPS. 9A.5.6 Carbon Dioxide Storage Carbon dioxide storage for the Diesel-Ganerator Building fire suppression systems is the respensibility of the Applicant. The system requirements are: Diesel-Generator 1 - 5600 lb Diesel-Generator 2 - 5600 lb Diese)-Generator 3 - 3200 lb 9A.5-22
4 GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.6 Carbon Dioxide Storage (Continued) After initial discharge, a second discharge for the largest single hazard area must be maintained in the storage tank. Therefore, the Applicant must maintain a minimum of 11,200 lb of CO 2 ff Diesel-Generator Building fire protection. In the event of malfunction of the automatic sequencing for CO2 discharge to a hazard area, manual activation of the discharge sequence is provided in the control room. 9A.5.7 IIVAC Systems The majority of the IIVAC systems are provided with fire dampers where the duct penetrates a fire-resistive wall; however, there are some exceptions. There are some cases where divisional control valves are in the same fire area. These cases are presented, and the justification and/or effect on the plant operation relative to reactor safe shutdown is presented. 9A.5.7.1 Control Building The smoke removal systems for the cable rooms and control room are a function of damper arrangement, utilizing the existing air con-ditioning system. The cable room tunnel exhaust ducts are not provided with fire dampers. The cable rooms are provided with automatic wet pipe sprinklers and POC detectors. The cable trays are solid bottom, covered metal trays. A postulated electrically initiated XLPE-FR cable insulation fire in a closed tray or PGCC would evolve little smoke or heat. The anticipated transitory combustible load, a function of the Applicant's fire safety program, is expected to be negligible. Inlet ducts are equipped with fire dampers to prevent hot smoke or gases from entering the areas from fire sources exterior to the areas. O 9A.5-23
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.S.7.2 Division 2 Cable Tunnel - Auxiliary Building The Division 2 cable tunnel is provided with a dedicated smoke removal system. This system is not fitted with a fire damper. The duct inlet is fitted with a possible leak spray nozzle fed from the cable tunnel automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. POC detection is provided. The cable trays are solid bottom, covered metal trays. A postulated electrically initiated XLPE-FR cable insulation fire in a closed tray would involve little smoke or heat. The anticipated transitory combustible load, a function of the Applicant's fire safety program, is expected to be negligible. Inlet and exhaust ducts from the normal ventilation system are fitted with fire dampers to prevent hot smoke or gases from entering the tunnel via fire sources exterior to the tunnel. 9A.5.7.3 SGTS Exhaust Stack - Fuel Building The SGTS exhaust stack begins at the (-)5 ft 3 in. level of the Fuel Building and extends through the roof of the building. There are no fire dampers in this stack; however, fire stops are pro-vided where the stack penetrates a fire-resistive floor. The stack is fabricated of 3/8-in. steel plate and is 18 in. in diameter. Since the exhaust gases that enter the stack pass through a charcoal filter bed equipped with water sprays that pre-clude a high temperature condition, and the stack must function to maintain safe plant conditions, fire dampers are not necessary or desirable. 9A.S.7.4 Reactor Building HVAC Penetrations There are two Reactor Building HVAC penetrations. These ducts are 42 in. diameter and are manufactured from 3/8-in. seamless SA106 , grade B pipe with the divisional isolation valves welded to the pipe. Transition to ductwork is provided downstream of each valve. The valves are positioned on either side of the Reactor Building wall. Fire dampers are not provided for these penetrations. 9A.5-24
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.7.5 Reactor Building HVAC divisional isolation valves within the Reactor Building are located in opposite quadrants of the building. Since the Reactor Building has no fire separations and is considered one fire area, fire dampers are not provided. There is no HVAC penetration between the Reactor Building and the drywell portion of the Reactor Building. 9A.5.7.6 Auxiliary Building: (-) 32 ft 0 in., Zone 1, Col. E-ll There are two air-operated divisional valves located 3 ft 6 in. apart. Failure of these valves as a result of an area fire would result in a loss of corridor ventilation at this level of the building. Rooms containing ECCS equipment would not be affected, since they are separately exhausted from this system. The dedi- ,r- cated smoke removal system would provide ventilation from this \_,- area; safe reactor shutdown would not be prevented. The area is provided with POC detection. 9A.5.7.7 Auxiliary Building: (-) 32 ft 0 in., Zone 1, Col. D-ll The normal ventilation system for the ECCS areas is supplied by divisional valves located 4 ft 0 in apart in this area. Loss of both of these valves as a result of an area fire would result in loss of ECCS room pressure control. The SGTS can provide pressure control for these areas if normal exhaust is lost as a result of fire or other system failures. The area is provided with POC detection. 9A.S.7.8 Auxiliary Building: (-) 6 ft 10 in. Two divisional SGTS valves are on 5-ft centers in this area. (O) Failure of both of these valves as a result of fire or other 9A.5-25
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.5.7.8 Auxiliary Building: (-) 6 ft 10 in. (Continued) occurrence would result in failure of the SGTS to exhaust the ECCS O areas. Since these valves and the area are protected with wet pipe sprinklers and POC detection, it is unlikely that the valves would be affected by fire. The normal valve mode is fail closed upon loss of the air-operated motor. Loss of either or both valves would not prevent safe reactor shutdown. 9A.5.7.9 Auxiliary Building: (-) 6 ft 10 in. Two divisional valves that provide ventilation to the RWCU area are located on 3-ft centers in the corridor. Loss of these air motor-operated valves, as a result of fire or other causes, would result in loss of ventilation to the RWCU area. These valves provide ventilation only if the area is entered for sur-veillance or maintenance activities. The valves are protected by automatic wet pipe sprinklers and POC detection. 9A.S.7.10 Auxiliary Building: 28 ft 6 in. HVAC Equipment Room, O Zone 1 The pressurizing air supply to the Reactor Building has two divisional valves located in this ;oom. These valves are sep-arated by 12 ft. The loss of both valves as a result of fire or other causes would result in loss of pressurizing air to contain-ment. Leakago of air from the reactor to the annulus, as a result of this loss, would Le handled by the annular ventilating system and would be routed tc either the plant exhaust or SGT System if high radiation occurs. The HVAC roort is provided with POC detection systems. 9A.S.7.ll Fuel Building: (-) 17 ft 0 in. There are two divisional valves located on 8-ft centers in this area that control room ventilation to the divisional SGT system. 9A.5-26
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 (~' t 9A.5.7.ll Fuel Building: (-) 17 ft 0 in. (Continued) L Loss of these air motor-operated valves, from fire or other accidental causes, will result in the loss of comfort ventilation in the SGTS rooms. The SGTS is separately cooled; therefore, there would be no loss of SGTS availability nor would safe shutdown be prevented. The area is provided with POC detection. 9A.S.7.12 Fuel Building: (-) 17 ft 0 in. There are two divisional valves located on 8-ft centers, separated from the valves discussed in Subsection 9A.S.7.ll by about 20 ft. These air-operated valves are part of the outside air system that supplies cooling air to the SGTS charcoal filter beds. One valve is normally closed except when needed for system operation. The loss of these valves, from fire or other accidental causes, will result in lack of ability to provide air cooling to the SGTS. The (~'s SGTS is provided with water sprays in the charcoal filters that \- can be initiated manually upon high temperature alarm should the outside air system be inoperative. POC detection is provided. SGTS(A) is located in a separate fire rated compartment from SGTS (B) , so that a single failure would not fail the entire system. 9A.5.7.13 Fuel Building: (-) 5 ft 3 in. There are two divisional valves located on 8-ft centers, that are part of the fuel pool air sweep system. This system is used only when low level radioactivity is present in the fuel pool. Loss of
, the system would result in loss of sweep air. High radiation level in the Fuel Building exhaust is monitored and, if detected, the air is sent to the SGTS. The valves are protected by an automatic uet pipe sprinkler system and POC detection is provided.
O v 9A.5-27
GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 9A.S.7.14 Fuel Building: (-) 5 ft 3 in. O There are two divisional valves, located in an identical configuration as described in Subsection 9A.S.7.12, and which per-form the same function. This building level has wet pipe sprinkler provided as well as POC detection. The analysis and justification is the same. The fire dampers in the common duct, which feeds both divisions of SGTS, could close as a result of fire in an area which feeds SGTS. However, since fire and LOCA are not required to be considered concurrently, the SGTS is not required for safe shutdow i under fire conditions. 9A . 5. 7.15 Fuel Building: El 28 ft 6 in. There are several sets of divisional valves, located on this mez-zanine floor level, associated with the fuel and reactor building ventilation system. These valves are located in pairs, about 4 to 12 ft on centers, and there are three pairs spatially sep-arated from each other around the building walls. The loss of any pair of valves, from any cause, would result in using the SGTS at a reduced flow rate to pick up the affected system. The area has POC detection. No plant operations are performed on this level and the possibility of fire is remote. 9A.S.7.16 Control Building: El 28 ft 6 in. The HVAC equipment systems for the Control Building are housed in two 3-hr fire-resistive rooms. The systems are divisional and 100% redundant. There are two valves of the opposite division in each area. The loss of either division, for any cause, will result in transferring the HVAC load to the standby division. Both divisional areas have POC detection systems. O 9A.5-28 i
GESSAR II 22A7007 j 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O ; Table 9A.5-1 9 PENETRATION DESIGN TEMPERATURES Penetration Penetration Design Temperature No. Type (*F) 9 SCD 1 575 10 SCD 1 575 11 SCD 1 575 12 SCD 1 575 13 SCD 1 575 16 SCD 1 575 17 SCD 1 575 44 SCD 1 575 47 SCD 1 575 48 SCD 1 575 63 SCD 1 575 64 SC 1A 575 164 SC 1A 575 28 SC 2 480 29 SC 2 575 53 SC 2 575 58 SC 2 575 166 SC 2 330 25 SC 3 140 27 SC 3 480 37 SC 3 400 39 SC 3 400 41 SC 3 350 42 SC 3 300 43 SC 3 300* l 50 SC 3 267 150 65 SC 3
* (308'F Maximum Upset Temperature) 9A.5-29 - - - - , - . - -- , - . ,,,_-...----...,.,-.---.,-,_,,,.n.--.,. - - . , - - - - , - , - ,
Table 9A.5-2 NONFIRE RATED DOORS Door No. Building and Elevation Location - Function Design Criteria R-8-1 Reactor (-) 31 ft 7 in. Exterior Wall - Annulus Pressure - Seismic R-8-6 Reactor (-) 5 ft 3 in. Exterior Wall - Annulus Pressure - Seismic R-ll-7 Reactor 11 ft 0 in. Exterior Wall - Personnel Bulkhead Doors in Pressure Vessel F-84-8 Reactor 84 ft 7 in. Exterior Wall - Personnel Bulkhead Doors in Pressure Vessel u F-7-4 Fuel 84 ft 7 in. Exterior Wall - Personnel Bulkhead Doors in Pressure Vessel Z CO e F-27-12 Fuel (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure, @$ Watertight gg i F-7-25 Fuel (-) 5 ft 3 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure ** " ss F-27-31 Fuel (-) 5 ft 3 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure mH F-29-32 Fuel (-) 5ft 3 in. Exterior Wall - Exit Tornado Pressure, $ z Seismic U F-25-33 Fuel (-) 9 ft 0 in. Exterior Wall - Cork Car Tornado Pressure, Mis-sile, Seismic F-7-43 Fuel 11 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure F-8-44 Fuel 11 ft 0 in. Fuel Transfer Room Shield Shielding, Seismic, Plug Pressure F-27-45 Fuel 11 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure F-7-53 Fuel 28 ft 6 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure F-27-57 Fuel 28 ft 6 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure x" o> F-4-62 Fuel 51 ft 7 1/2 in. Exterior Wall, Exit Tornado Pressure, <
,j Seismic o ow O O O
- f. f')
N N..] ~J Table 9A.5-2 NONFIRE RATED DOORS (Continued) Door No. Building and Elevation Location - Function Design Criteria F-5-68 Fuel 84 ft 7 in. Secondary Containment Seismic, Pressure F-4-72 Fuel 101 ft 5 1/2 in. Exterior Wall, Exit Tornado Pressure, Seismic A-12-49 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, Seismic A-10-3 Auxiliary (-) 12 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, w Seismic $ A-ll-4 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, = Seismic $0 rm . A-14-6 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, Mm y Seismic $$ U A-13-5 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, y[ Seismic g A-15-7 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, y Seismic A-17-9 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, Seismic A-19-10 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, Seismic A-20-11 Auxili ary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, Seismic A-22-12 Auxiliary (-) 32 ft 0 in. Secondary Containment Watertight, Pressure, Seismic w xw A-16-25 Auxiliary (-) 6 ft 10 in. Exterior Wall - Exit Tornado Pressure, Watertight, Seismic
@$o o
04
Table 9A.5-2 NONFIRE RATED DOORS (Continued) Door No. Building and Elevation Location - Function Design Criteria A-10-27 Auxiliary (-) 6 ft 10 in. Secondary Containment Pressure, Seismic A-39-28 Auxiliary (-) 6 ft 10 in. Secondary Containment Pressure, Seismic A-14-29 Auxiliary (-) 6 ft 10 in. Secondary Containment Pressure, Seismic A-19-37 Auxiliary (-) 0ft 10 in. RHR Blowout Panel Pressure, Seismic A-9-42 Auxiliary 11 ft 0 in. Vestibule - Exit Tornado Pressure, Seismic U m A-9-52 Auxiliary 28 ft 6 in. Exterior Wall - Exit Tornado Pressure, Seismic 5o cm 5 ' ' ' Light Auxiliary 29 ft 10 1/2 in. Steam Tunnel, Eight [Og Blowout Panels ([e h ne P 5 A-10-62 sure Relief to Steam " Tunnel y[ C-19-14 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Exterior Wall, Equipment Tornado Pressure, Mis- $ Doors sile, Seismic $ C-19-13 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Vestibule, Exit Tornado Pressure, Seismic C-19-5 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Exterior Wall, Exit Tornado Pressure, Seismic C-19-17 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Corridor, Equipment Doors Oversize Doors for Equipment Removal C-15-18 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Cable Tunnel Bullet Resistive, Seismic C-15-20 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Control Room Bullet Resistive, zU Seismic j$ C-22-21 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Computer Room Bullet Resistive, '$" Seismic O O O
( O r Table 9A.5-2 NONFIRE RATED DOORS (Continued) Door No. Building and Elevation Location --Function Design Criteria C-15-22 Control (-) 6 ft 10 in. Cable Tunnel Bullet Resistive, Seismic C-25-44 Control 11 ft 0 in. Exterior Wall, Exit Tornado Pressure, Seismic RW 43-46 Radwaste (-) 6 ft 10 in. Exterior Wall, Truck Dock Shielding, Seismic DG-1-1 Diesel Generator (-) 6 ft Exterior Wall, Equipment Tornado Pressure, w 10 in Division 1 Removal, Exit Seismic $ DG-1-6 Diesel Generator (-) 28 ft Vestibule, Exit Tornado Pressure, 2 e 6 in. Division 1 Seismic $$m , DG-5-1 Diesel Generator (-) 6 ft Exterior Wall, Equipment Tornado Pressure, yy i 10 in., Division 2 Removal, Exit Seismic wz DG-5-3 Diesel Generator (-) 6 ft Exterior Wall, Exit Tornado Pressure, (( 10 in. Division 2 Seismic p DG-5-7 Diesel Generator (-) 6 ft Vestibule, Exit Tornado Pressure, $ 10 in. Seismic DG-9-1 Diesel Generator (-) 6 ft Exterior Wall, Equipment Tornado Pressure, 10 in. Division 3 Removal, Exit Seismic DG-10-9 Diesel Generator 28 ft Vestibule, Exit Tornado Pressure, 6 in. Division 3 Seismic N l
%N '
O>
<w
.O '
O C4 l
Table 9A.5-3 RPS AND NSSSS SENSORS LOCATEC IN TURBINE BUILDING Quantity and Sensor Location Division (s) Function Status 1 Turbine Stop- Turbine stopvalve 1 - Div 1 Scram reactor Contacts closed valve Mechanism 1 - Div 2 on stopvalve wnen stopvalve open. position 1 - Div 3 closure Contact opens when Limit switch 1 - Div 4 stopvalve closes. (contacts) 2 Turbine Con- Located near tur- 1 - Div 1 Scram reactor Contacts closed trol Valve bine with hydrau- 1 - Div 2 on turbine when control valve y fast closure lic sensing lines 1 - Div 3 control valve not in fast closing g sensors leading to sensor 1 - Div 4 fast closure mode. Contacts open , e to scram reactor on Ea control valve fast Oy w i closure. Em g 3 Turbine First- Located near tur- 1 - Div 1 Bypasses signals Analog signal to W% stage pressure bine with sensing 1 - Div 2 1 and 2 above on scram logic wH Transmitter with analog output lines to pressure trips at turbine first-stage inlet 1 1 Div Div 3 4 low first stage pressure circuit. f" z C pressure 4 Low Turbine Senses condenser 1 - Div 1 Close main steam Analog signal MSIV Main Condenser vacuum from pres- 1 - Div 2 isolation (MSIV) logic circuit. Vacuum sure trips on 1 - Div 3 on low condenser Transmitter main condenser 1 - Div 4 vacuum with analog output 5 Main steam- Main steamline 1 - Div 1 Close main steam Analog signal to line low pres- (One each line) 1 - Div 2 isolation valves MSIV logic. sure Transmitter near turbine 1 1 Div Div 3 4 on lo' steamline pressure x" o> with analog I$ output c O O O
4
\ / 238 0
4 l 2 ! S ! 4 i S f 6 A FIR E AREA S EPAR ATI C O _GE_N. .E.R A. L ...N_ OT. E_S_ _OO_. OR ._S_ _Y M. B..O L. . S _ _ e a. L u Uet (. self 4 M f t t. ali se%de est fat uss tT 4 h(( Pt Al e 0TE s L ( t o t ag gs #ise nesequG9 **'%'* IO 7 b 3'Efr% ApesP GAspt S (OEpttRJC f g g Op % set E T ut tag 04 TT { E t PL ATE W Eaf h-3 8 t< f *1 45 escitp Otug40,43 ass t.aaeings e# 4 s
& at ( I L E C Y G'r aL . N%a f. G ##P848 #f eel T R a'-Ons feegt) peef DAf te sati S. a s, ,
p 7t 0 445. 4 (f eL ees49 TO seAWE 64eff RAteg at Tie same 44 et at f eattD g g , ,g, e at . e f eu g t. eat sitig om ang ag 70 og pipf 8e00f tD a5 4esta(svyp ese tag des if w* #34 54 f.eam bei guea. , et '.g is( (g eg gt-%4 riethPe ## '9 4 Es a -
,.i.m egt g ese 44 *e
- h t M . 91 2J %PGAvt 0 9 St at .mpes se vJ %u se D
% w e W..tf f aWs es( T) # f e t 99 38 4sw 'e sete.lGeg'a, 9'aut 'utAa. 45e etW 4%
_ s ee aw1 To et r^ es 4 t 4 a g.. f e. t.e a g e g e :.as g ap ypv_ W49 Of Med ( k' ' P '-
- a w e n -ia.as f.e#pst e g ,,e p .me n.e,x s gg se ut s'g e g 'a> n t . e a. eso wnt es 0L4 W: 7 Ist e* es 4 Cohoassi t est e jt ;.ig e.. sing y 9 5 3 a s . sg g .1'#5 h
+
na s'a s s . aes. vt ==. a rmm . ies.4,s wa t se e ,=t anoor t o a s a se ai,aef iss +w.r t roese s a grw a g g ons eset leasesent e T.e e, f uer a -m e gse gr+ gv w s* T C h #m Weg RPast 19 9 F es seNW1ee e avse0& meg e,ees 3Pf C 5 9 e.f f, speawf D f'#t P490 Feet 7ta . ADO W WLE tu haEpaf +04 sed et t a,see S Q trit t PRE l5 ef. OP th tE f #4 5 stagt se 9 i*@ pet ma ff r. wf 'di 57f46* 9: eaa (4 to se rc.esgtnu;tfc to **' f 8 G8'? e a'#9uW 4 Mot .48!Oct .e a3 98) Cat erep ep 49 sf P paid 4 **t ta' t 3 wt ' At %'X e *e # SC eat.gf 90 gi (dlustes 4'f D TO ***'#4# I'** * *** I*' A L4 e 64 J 4 i tstr om 9 49 4At t 0 wf. la. 4Fi'O e 0 *
- GO 4 toep174atf r 8e a . Apptf D F ';# uti P 4 ( 45 eCSO+vec e .ee g ,Ae, eat (s
(, # # # % 48 b 'a#f 'C pf 4'4 w'en f ee m eet 5 % .e4 f e e, e seg i44 r ref
, e. t . . _.._,.~.....a.,_e....f..,~.
_^esD ' S I f dW See464 m & E 4. L D*t 4M% P4d' $ ( tl D e t se S sera, A matt 0 4 JL a' L a8Et tD (If WeCGS CIL449 # *RS LanS'S et { f r i 4 eat i .l f DeJet S (f t seOS ea i Oestf euf f o9
*
- tat t
. seawl att apg'ssenes peo'f 0 49 tg C ?p g f es0LfR a t.s Fei af ssfiWt
- b. ette Waff D 4 etG 08'i teettif: et w f f 9 i'M et.
- et paeset et e e as og nu t tid se se
- se ao -e t t-osp i 3 g 44 63 4 Qg g'At aavt3 at i segue to g af t 1' N1 C Oestf eu tiOm
%A.. move A i Nt t 441 #ec'f ;'t D e ?ns i geve g e a 1(D 9 ist *(*
pg f * *t .aSta t D DG v'(f 1 ilJorW15 ef Danief W f f C 3 48 4 au T TE ,, tv ser ea 80 %g r t ces .3 J i ~ t i M e i 2 1 5
- 4 i S 8 6
A \ /
GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 A ON D R AWING S : ALL BUILDINGS a C 0 LEGEN -DRAW ING INDEX-
. ... D. - W.A L L S
, e e. . .. , , , c . . . . . . < , c.... e.,,,<, ..u.3
. ..c . .. . t . . ue . ... .o a c.< ,, .mcu c..a. ,, ..,,,,,,,, m ce. - w .,- .~
.u . <n.,.
.+ . ', nusme, -
.a. u. , ,~- . . a.c.
.<o...
, . c . . - 4 2 -4 ., .....
. ._ _. n_...raz
..n
,ix.~..,......,.
, , , . . . . . . . .,,o..,m m 1
,, , .._ . . . , -.. s .mw n . =* .
. .(e.
. .. ..c. h.< . a. . ..ar.ra.ua. u.L
. <P e. . Y . 9,0 0. % .hg .(.f,0.....,m.,.
ag e. . FU L E GE ND - DOOR S- - - -
.... ...s.... . , . m. s . . u - ~ .
- c. .x. e. . n....s
.t
. ~ . c..<.........x .e .u<.-...a..>.,.,.,,w
.s....,...
. .. . c . . .. .c r
<c
., , .. . .. o . . .
.u ,,.,m,~
...m...,~ . . . . . m...........ms.......
ROOM 8 DOOR NUMBERS g 3 % a . .- . . . . . . n n.. . s. o m.-.....m.. - M 1 4 L f J Drawing A-100, Rev. 0 i i 7 i . i , i o ; ,, . ;, , e .--- \ Figure 9A-1. Title Sheet - All , Buildings 9A.5-35/9A.5-36 ,
r 4
\
, 238 4 r , , , , , ; . , , , .
(Q (") :) 6 '" a l i !I %*: T
~
i w- ( ^l 2"." 'i~ h W
~~~
. m .. ~ o ., m-~ y e
- r. -
e K'/ ,e a - n-w% , '[,g:;: . p si =- h ,y' . op ,....,.s
, 4, m - - cm..
- g. n. - .,-e%.4 e
3 ;s t
,i 1;
rm.s.. M *+t ,. " ' e
. .. <a
f -
- lY %?l?' ~ '} , US$ '
lO^ 5.*T.i&.a. A he h. !, ( , 1.* ,-- . . . '. .'3, *W : M4 .*- l tI c * * - = ;
'/ %*
Oa% n .V.k"".
, .. r .c>t - ;-h;. Il
. . p ' 1,",*#
/ . ;.7Z.~Z2" -
r
. : ._.m ..
' ~ l l ' c.,.,._
,' I +*
T g, ,nl ! i i . . , ,>
.o ,; . . _ j i
.t' w-: I. .e. ,__ ; .;,, [
s, _m . r j .am o 4.j . Ng '7 y8N / .1.N/^s f. 4
- \ !
9_ - / - C.',S, l N + ' r3. a-3u~.a. )um, l i I
.........m t
- w. s **a T *. ,.
,,-'W. i
.:';c .1,, _ ,
.. .+
.~u
+ n,',a,
. ~ , . . t".
, s I
..4-y j +y . . .
,/
,\/ '\/ 's,'
FUEL N ~h .~ T 'y ?T I i'Ey' t-( BLDG ' EM 4 ^ S**"i
.., \. \
N / /' N',b;j q: ___ g . . - _ -,, s. p' yEf:*#y1 rm b . sr a : c/, D
@ t..r US., - f=a"p I" b7- Y, . '.
"e.c ~a
,e ,,4 '-: ,.
2 .,
. > a; ppr 4 r .. ., Y /
. y.." d -sg. . q n ~ .1. p wou.
'O n
p
.'ql ,.t ; f7.g l A l
1- _ -._' - .r '. 1---. , ;*- aa
'jRef - _-
~~~
t yr l S.
- Y'D
+' __ .
,m.
~-
M,s.r,.%"- e4-j i
.L'44 l - **su _ _ , _ , 9 i
5 juiy.
,; , .---g-i x ..v-2 4 . ee ~ u.
....v g .
,bd.
- ,,, .'a ' 9
,r y ~ *rtv + .g' <. ~s 'f'4 # 3,,
_, estF , ,A ,.as~, r _
-W ev t w' ~t* 'W n s }4 sf ,....
l t ,. ,<J -t jl i ! I '.7,,,g , g.
. . v .s.It u .** v,_ 't.it*
( w i
- ~~
.A>
. 3 '
fy '8.. ) it j t A , A e g 8
$ I 4 I 6
i
$ I I
4
GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i r i e ! S , o , o i o , a ia (-17,
' ' Ty :-) 6% . 1i; *
(., o., T . " ' [ ] T f i a it.
- i t
, l l s d-- l t I
. . , . ~ . . ,,
]l. ,, , _ , - . . . .
N b+**I c.o y <
- s r.c.r m i ,..;,m ,w.- ,.-
t., r, t 44, - _ .. . . . . . a , p - +. ;-7;,- ,
~~'
JM e. *%***,lX, W, , .> ,'(
- j n ,,.,. . ,,,,-
t..m.[O..v
'6 f.' a>*r ',n ,
p u.. w # . .r . a... ip j r ; _ e
-9.,_ ; ___.._...p. ..#_ . ti- 4; 4 t . -
-m 4;i
- . en ~j +-- r y .
.s + 5 .a.- e > ' ', 7J ,,,, .
, A c44 -
**a ,oire, 3 td** ?m n,t h. 4***.* y Q k;ms ~4 .- **
F"", m. * * " . * . * *
- fi_, **1 t .
r i 7b 4 -~~raC7;'fQS _r l )9 l & ' r* [ J i 3 V" =?
~
l l f*/ ! - t4 %L. I , C 3 "%,, jQ,9k//Nos i z m ;g 4 7M
. .M = 2
(..) g 4_ T
"' "['"I , .
/. -- q a 7% x I I2 A . .s g
; . .. 1 if F 2 r ~at v etAN' gl q<QQ' I
~^ N (l[+-__k'vZl.M*
( f' ' % ,, 'W 'W S ' / , cf. /1
>4g' '
%Nf@lCa leenM.
i ; ....d. o , *^i$.7...#
- r. . - . , , . . .r ..
. yw'r* \. . , .
% ,.c s-M*y *
, ., ma -p ,.A l r -"t: $
.'** vs W~*
#d
.e "o j y*yMi s .
M / \,sms t d'r, s, g, ' 4, . . I ,A.. . #.M s. r
/ ,
- Dv2 : . -
. L L. i dL,, .'"?# *a,- F r t * *
- 6 ,,
f.a,,* . f,
'I.
..fm w'% %I
.(g 7*, ', , * * . . .
,yg .
4_.,, I
\ N- .'T . n; ,, "'
( .q % h, ,: 7'* s ,< ., 1. .,,.c ' ' ' ' *
- l
,,3, h ,.y\ x .}w,/
\, *h) b .' 4[. ,
Q 'l *'"*u. ere*/y W AUXILIARY ( . a , . .., - E ** 4
!me! "" '" 'sW . . I BLDG
If. 4 c**4 y j
/ , ,, ., ,;nu,,..,, ,..,, p, 4 [ ..L
--- r N l P#
- a s ~e 'a' r,;";0" T. NP i
&ty. 4 ' ' ' '
-C L.
ix y /,
/ _.,_7
_,, i
]'z'd; ,
' < a, x ! ovi 4r , ,'j;;,,; g
,.1
,e u
l - HiACTOR . BLOG .,J hy,,g,eoI I .!L. .W-' i
~ ,! 2 k',t w M J'* *o (, { SL 2.
- C' f _
j . .~*it.n*' ~ .. I ! ~ > ,( Q' . @g;,,f _, . "' Mir~< ! "* ['**EMt, . , , Jr, AI z ,Q, - ,I . -r s
,,,,.,,, f.4MAf%, Ca ~ - i g; >v'
TC " ', l~" q.' t,7u-- O.
~ '
fy e %-7'p*fn,f"' - \
"~ d,, velhwy ;,' a.m,y-*
l
- g. I n , - ,
a p>u ou ..
.v .) "
i @ ,? 7. $ y** ~ g 7 f [.'~'"n."";h,9 7 -*i - 2)t -~
, I
~: : , . -
".J ' ,
i ! , U n a. c, r , l I : l' 1 i 2 i t ,>) T) (0 i' ) ( ') 0 [
&. .. s -
~1 Drawiny, A-101, Rev. 0 b $ h f _
Figure 9A-2. Floor Plan at El (~) 3 2 ' 0"
- Reactor, Auxiliary and o Fuel Buildings 9A.5-37/9A.5-38 ,
4
\
l 238 6 4 5 6 I a l 7 1 3 y 1 ! (?) d\ A
! !J.#,.h I J I
a_ . '.' . . . 4
-l .i*E=M s ,,,
-w * .
- w. . . . .
c>7 h. e ~+ "g+1 eJL l. i;r _j +, e4sw.ne fb>
.. .i
*c.*.-""
sr= .. ,d ~ . o ,3,_ 4., A O- ...-e 1 e
-. .. b i
,e
-' "It ~
- i 'i 'ai j ll .
x s/ eu.A
*~r- ^ihi:%d g '
' ve .
i .:...F
-g& *Sk.LiN "l"^g w ,3 ;g~ -- -' }
f6 g, - -mw ; :-s-- . . . -
-{ L; _ n i7 f *1r:*-.I.7 - gato l
A
.#w ma
'\ . \ MP 1' )
' 3 LG*h rsa. ' - .e . , , x s ,- 't, '
j."~"' . '\\'<\ >\ ' , c ., ., I.m'.'.". ' ,3 . x- s -
'%.e.'
,,7 ;
_ 4 s
. ;k. t /,2 -
S c 4
.g. ,
y 3 .. .
- w lMV ' i' , '. N N >-p'. -
.r h, ---
g f wi._19 9. ii
.'N g s
**g' oN. g,s.
AM . e 5' D c_ --.'-,,
.e d'- . ..- . _ ' . --&.,ijk s_ .
'y' '.\' //'\ /- / ,
n: - s
, L. -
.A g)- - - - . ._-- _ ..
[ ((j" ,. -
.% 3r.~a_ / d N tmh s@:
lg n g' ~ - _ ___ _r... s m a
-- :. ' by.~l' . - . .\ g~u ,. y
- s. r -- - . -
SL . n.e, s m 1.1.
; T -
FUEL \
/
(W .'-
)
\\s(- M BLDG *
.he- n. ekg f..m AA..~r". .' , \- .
l
~ \ Y [ f t m
\
y r ,. m'I E ~ifN!I- - f f%I' . .- (f'y - --- -A ~ _ _ .
.y
~= [W w., ,i l , , *\,
'j -
( .----- - m A _& _f
*?$ L% t
'C s ec., , n +- A&+W G
- pu +, h g _)(
- f. **f.* ! l**" -+
+,,,
t. ( p_- . _- _- _ '
- u] - - _ ;s
$p:* - b' f$ . -
- /
- 9 f Qg _ FL h,,
7 1 + wt v.e .sc,t . *, s' i w H ;Ma y-q
%*6&^* M rs .an Ei *.3 k' 1we priij g;i c
*"y (g gi
' a.* =to 54 ._3 l a- e , , _..
t 7----
.gff w-wla. ~b_
l ~ ~~'t l
+
f^) bM @ DIESEL _ GENERATOR ~ () ( BUILDING DIV I f 3 2 ' 3 e e i g i 6 i s
{ GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O
, r 1 a , s .c, , i, , a , 3 . ..
Wp rr, k.- @ @O O @ @ 9 9 a a3. r 'i '%es .i -; 1lf . . . . I
;-rl.
t . A,
-- . -+
! DIESEL GENERATOR St.DG Div 2 8 3 1 4 y',
4 _i *,_y * ** k , 5 . O JVT'
~
d***y;*;U. 7' fB f1*,__ J 1 . 4[-I --.' - ! I..fz. T -T.T~Y '", '. " '*";fy.? W, TW !
- 1 j
r mrm. . . ;-+w E g aessa ,d,,,__~ , itp!y , q_,m_- 1 ._ g g , -. , _ , 7 %1 - \/
,4 j: 9 .1**"
. .=___m , _Ll .< m- .t.enm m 4a.J 4 ,. e!
- .'J' L ,,.,, m , I, a .
.c * %m 1
.x-I hM .
~
a.m
. . p. r .. 2 2 '--
.A,7.ir ,
e":
-.A
~
- ~ -~ 4 :
I i g Ew . 8 J . jy; A ? . w~ , e ,, -
,v,_
(f- ' ; % ) $1?i ' _ _ _ Q--._.3Y .A M D. - G f T .. gy;"fT ~ ~ L
%' D _
/,. , , . . ,,.s
, , ~
n-* e Eis o p=.e_. ... _ __ .
;m .
**. _ a y.
. _ (.a -- t
- 1 < ,- % . 's / hjyf. I Y
l
,a Ns r.
s-7.- A r ed a -l n Al / RE ACTOR .. . i r-P=< BLOG Ne\ s
*? O N c 1
- mw l
u p;- @ L* ' ;'.JT s z . e.,
f . \ .< ,, mg -a I I ,\
\
gy -.
.' g ?,
./ f '7p8 s- -ir i
( *S[ n g p,g
+
a js%
. . k .i ,pg 4 e-t i. .
. 1,.4 ,
g- _
,j _ _ a (g, - -
4V
. . - J( i I s < ".
=
~
' % ) / v* Q.4I *N_
s
.y ;
.L m # n '1 y( G dt* .~
;;,3
. q> >. - vtf -',,' 't._
>=* iM [(
[O . ma u.r I ",
$w:C
@l1*. ( e^o
,,- .nr. <
g 7 .d_ nt f ". f , 4' , 3 ::, ua -- v.[- {f'\;U- m.& : m[d,@ .'\ &Jp %Q, y&*C.A'g*n g$,,.V l u - n +.'
' . . N ,/ ,,,*. .
Q ?=$ $ &l $}e,,, t'MY- hhenE ? 1 .' l tn.
- f. s.
- *->L I
. t m.
.~ n
- p. "
- d-o
[ h3
- .s_,
f .--t...m l - - *, l 1 y i
% .- 6 r r %* i
.t"g y ,4'g. . -r ; 0 ,.
% '7 t - T@ j # , ,. "]" ~~- y 7, --
re d j'., t , , . , vu-4
.. er h .
. -)) ; ff, s &s t ..a '
nap e- m ' *4% . ?" , - . _ _ _ .% --
' MW - &Ye.. MN ~~. ' g; 2 l. '"; "L * "na-
- 4'gh, , .>-
-h
~"i-,.~ W ame_uu +. mrd, 6.*,h . <EY g h . ; L' *' "
IG ' " ' , ,+
^
'*** i
- 'ii' " 6q,mn.4 '~
*2't" ) d J)J
. ~~ - "*
*Tj,, , .' ~ i Mu _,
'{ ' 4*+110
.' W 9 l T
-/ '
! CONTROL EUT 4 D'_-g. . ? L - lN
~.
.aa a...-
r l l l -BLDG ;
} } v
'. ') iej g ,d rt s, ., l' w. l 4 Drawing A-102, Rev. 0 i . i , i io i o i a , , e- j Figure 9A-3. Floor Plan at El (-)5'3" l & (-) 6 ' 10" - Reactor, 7 Aux. & Fuel Buildings 9A.5-39/9A.5-40 [ 1 1
? \
238 [ i ! ! s ! 4 i s t 6
^
e n- @ D i ce,e~ i T i..- l l l e" O i
, Fae l
r .?.*. .f %. ..r.ga na . L s, b ' _'.=
.rm i -r 1. y4 i' 1 8 -i (n _ "
r
...a.
i a
.. j, _ _
' /
_ _ . . _ . . ._ 'e-.* w- -w
, _ .i. ._.
s o
@ _g
'( Y L eis i , MITG* . >
. T ' ~ ~ ~ % "..M?
\ r ~F'% .~~ 7-'~ ~-'I'~
,f e- =-
^~E ~ p0-
,!,t- - 1, ~ faW l
~r- ; n -
++ ~ ~ e" / .)~u "* .
C 7 f. ,n.
.,- - -- L _ _ _ _ ._ jl , 4,,
g _ H %,y:. , . . , ' ' 3.;. - _ , _ L-4 n-~ 4 e s I
,m,,,
yy \ sb .f - i i a t, p,d! M; / j ! ivCf,$ ',-
, . , m-__ % i .
o i-
-r,j p'y?,y [
% 'NJ'# i
- t. ..* , , , , , , . . .
i i:
.neg y;*A a GM 5em_, - -- - -
L- p f, - g----- C - - - - - t . - 3 . e M
-0 --- 4' '5 f
(m.
. . . " ,,y '__
_ ra. Nhm '.E FUEL s N r] i,
/
n M-~ t#-- 6,T' BLDG ".._.L I
~"( ,
^ ^ ' Re i: f.e t-+ yf i_n e' a mi
- , , ' ' -'- * *****/.Q '
xe
- d. . '
F .-fp ,
- r=.%
te ? 7 8 u- -'....- __1.a_',
. a w . w .af 4 ..
y m .-
\
~ .ee >f.-) ,,_
<-Q ' \(s
,.s.
_.,;.g , .. g ~ p) ebwuT." _.mg _ _ _a'.' 5f *+ 4 : s / j.
;-- 2. =, - w. (\,.y l
rp l eu 4 +
- -g e,,,,, *
]m__e - -] 0 l
@) -t- --- i
- f^ * '
y 4 ne> s l
- w. ,
l o i be.l et e6 it o I t u O@Q a 7211
/
h) + ~ ~ g
' -- d ^ ~ hg, __D ^
I - I n. w 3 ._
--+- t
.a ___-_.
tet.,, ,[ y, m'- _ __ __ . _ _ _ . _ . -- kC'
-s-ggfwg &m.G . - b. -_ -,o N
5 e .a t . n4-~. .a^
....,c,,p sa s at e I'l- .
f j %@, a # 1 e : i ' n-~ s' *
] t.
h_ - - - .._ . ..' . . _'i . : I j , @*'.$'I3L~# d-~ { - ---{i l 34 - % . _4 s _ ___ _ p r 'J - -- 1*--
------f-s s SO DIESELGENERAI0fL O @
BLDG DIV I n i
- 4 I 5 I 6 2 8 5
5 1 l
,e
GESSAR 'I 22A7007 NUCLEAri ISLAND Rev. 0 , l P g 9 9 9 9 10 t it i 82 i il r '4
) (Y tr)
& (i,)('p (=; &
>. ,- fc- > C) mas._ap @. * -
DIE $EL GENERAT0Ft-.. r Q) n ,
.~ Pp R. 4 i
lr i i , ~ . . , . . - , , . -; _.- . .,, ,
, m.i _. QLOG _ _ DiV 2 Q,,J., - - # _31
! - _J 'I% ,
I d. ' Llb $6 - t,.. e - mh a, . . . . . . . . , . 18.3 4. ,
. e viet e43 to a, wg
[ + "* *4 s(( 4* .' r af' el' a s a " - ~ f , f:7T tryt
- 7,a 4 T ," ; r *3 ,,, i j e
,-_+--- -_- ,, - .4 ,.,
N + '
- pn.**eg :Te , ;
',,;,,_I,a.
n. l 4., . U. f. . . .- . u _ q-l*})" . ,,,,m ; q,+ w [ nut'h
~
%'4^#*5- #U p-'
'-7 dig, .___';**i i . . . e m .., , ,~
~
l jf,**g- ~- , P"8' 8 ] a[ b 1 [
" ' 7 " ' e ,
e-, r,.tt Lg.. - #.u '" C #P e44,' g ,,-g T 4 - 64 3 c
' ~
.. r *.is .*
.. O i5 , ,jp,. e, ****" '....
(s.)
.-s. -< g,- 4 ,. ;.. ,
~ '
f g*;
- 4 4 3f' ik ,.% /. G. -'
_1
~ / I" "-
l > t.. --4 ,4 .. (( ! M F,.W yr Dw ans,s um e av, , . < .w i i 1 ,, j - w ! P V 4* E r%.i-
.'.t n, tissa M'. 9TJ AN4 . p,S F P 4 =L el *
' ~
"[8 " "
l ;
-' (#
i ((' , ; ,. . i ! S -se s *, e mo reg y>Y, %y m. a T*i Sk.
$*sr * ,
2 =, *s.n
. s,"e 's ? .et.4 l
,y .,,,,4 ,,u, 1% . . ,
i/ "r. *( p W 4-+-- y. . , , , .
'7 5f f y, x
~
%u L &],,% M,. t
~
1(* , crr L > p a.
.l
~~.. .
-p. s,
. . .*~
..* * ,l -
x
,y &
T% ! i v, e ./ N-. s, . . - ' *L C 7*l,* ! AUXILIARY bu n,.. 4
;* ;*,~, .
, i.-
, '- a :. .. , ,
f' jc m.. g] & ' DG D. ti t (<r.s't.a
-Qy l- p* ** 3).;.w.- 6 *r 4
'p z me MC em
*r. . ,
RE ACTOR BLDG \ -
,,....,% d . : @t4 ,-a--
J., . _ _
- - i. .
ae s ni j. r x,- - s, w y ,- , . . , , . p., . l #L . - --o m.. y n,,, h .
*[:'q'-
. /; .
/
- ~g
, n sa .-
y w-I i- ~ i u. ' r....., r :,, --
"; __ m-q c, j m
i _ ..
,,, - .y __*
l 3;- - l M;! .;-- [O l ,',i*if.t." ; ,
$.N "- O
, f'E w.,E i t =c c.,u; 1 . _.. ..
. _ _. ~___, __.. .
.1 ,j c e" E ' F
+ 't y=[".,
.r =g --hD! */ V
=-
5 p.7.7 ". .,j . .. l *k[ t-
' , " *,'1,*
g, w m *' %'%f34r. Fa', A'a i ! .
*~
.r. .
~ t a 1I i! __ _.f. ___..@.__m P_; " dr.. . i ['.L a -_ ,T. g}L W ':_L i ,J - l , '1 >1 l ' ,O , - 6) *@ . (D e.; t- G c' i
@y '4, _ () CON T..R.O_ L_ 1 BLOG l I i
l Drawing A-10 3, Rev. 0 1 i
'I l
u
. , , , i , i o i n i ,2 ! r -- g Figure 9A-4. Floor Plan at El 11'0"
- Reactor, Auxiliary f and Fuel Building 9A.5-41/9A.5-42 i
e
\
i y 238 i t i ! s ! 4 i s i s J a O @@ I O 4 i I
.i 3 i
i tl i 1 9s..y --- ym - A ,,,j l IEi ~L
- \
I
- f. I y.A h b "i; i, / '! *+4 F e {. ,/ l ~i r;*:7- f,
! (2 - - .-- .
,- 1
{ ,. ......,.q _
< t .,.m, I
i i
/ ;
[ g; .
- . - _ _ f . - _ ,. ; .( ,
_-p. ,
. , , , . ,/ .
l a'n -
..s ,
. . . . , i 'l \
/ ,= - : I c - +I ' ,
,,n n. , -~.
- .s '*r.- 1
, l t
p
.n l1 .4 f j 3 s,. , , . *- d. /
,L,5,.7'
< . - Y *YE*1 o
YE
.. m e ,
~
, e CWi7 /
s
, f / ~/' M T
<s,-
#- \
\
,q i
. j )* l e
/$ ~
i , ,, - e
-.- +
. , s ,. m s
3 7 g.;,.n.o
.w ~~ . ,
e i~ ~ ~-'; ,W ,,,,i;;.3 N~
, m, es ...a '. ? ! A - '
;*~
-;.' .---- 5- ,%, , yyu a .!
=-'-f m..,,,-ereg ,
\ ...
th FUEL BLDG ' s i h*( [j t k fi'Q *" p, . ,, ,
, , o 4
. . . %. L. . . '
m . l; 2
" ' ' 4'%4't.
( *>] - ti f , .' . i _Ns s- e
,' . )
(y -- .
. .. 4.,,4 4 4
s a .. - q, . . . , . y w
/. t, wpm e
- 49. <. J'
* * * ' i
# ,i +
- f. L ".. , . 'k.m {] . 1 , 7 Q' ,' . . _ . , i n o * *e
- en o*,1 8 hyy ffgi r vytees,n jui gud , s , e s. .o u sq N
.ip p
r f!.4 a- or p p pf 8 89m. ? * '9 m h Y?'1 - $$ mi mamm _ . . ,,
- _ _ , . . _ _ _ _ . . + _
DIESEL. GENERATOR BLDh 44 - J" 8- ' y s
, "E-5 ~ . ,. m_ [ k nd ]
r m --.m.g l ( =. ) I t 3 7 3 9 3 4 I S E 6 i / 1 1 t 1
GESSAR II 22A7007 iNUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 ,
; r , e . . , o . .. , ,, , is !
@ $;. m @ - O cp e @ O Q p c- -r __]L__T J C-i DIESEL. GENERATOR -j {
jff,W .er-g BLDG Ot.V.2 0 5 ,
'.g l =,: bl h -- - -
N
. _. g
. 633 ,
l
,e _ g*jtl- ,- - .- ,~<g;l
.p i' .,g.7We 9 !'. , *-***==t' I e
i
. +* _ .n.
+ t j j x.'.~M**
7,
. . _ -..p._._;__.'_'"-
, /g
; -e! -.. _ g s . )
l l . . _ . . __r-- 14 4p'fMA j M/MyfC ; 7 "J,.". E'.%* g n' ~"-
. . - l., '
FET- ' [.frM'
*r
. , h,[
.y.,
y h _ . E b Y.*'* . c.l j L y,4,,,,,r., [- %
.. u ,.. . -
lH, c g'_
, . v - ... . . ,
W4 !.._... 5
- f. m, -
e e
-$9/4* 84 .N, _
p ,
'r_3
[-- , ,
- . ,dg ,
_c.:.
,- cu.- i__c
. , . -f,E
..' # ,9*
y-=." /'
- Mem syd,
/ p l . h ,% ; v
~
- 2 ,
-. ] L 1. b I;?.q~~3mp:!, ,
o
*n y- a, *- ca, %. m aa -
$(,% . %N_. q i w g
,= %' W-n q ,
+.. , e- )
- a , e3,,.. .. _so m.,+
, a, , 1 3; ~
.,~....... -4 a
r -, d[# it i, _,
'_---"#* r' m 4- -
a :
*--E-*-
1 -- 4:cu
. , 25.
l.
- .g ,<s ;. e ~*** g l* x j j eg
; ~ * " "
o p
%k [$) #n
- 3,l..,, .- ~ a I 4
mu n --- w a p-~r, wW e ~- c.-Qa ,&... . ,
,a,. es..e - ..
l Cr?n ,%. u s,3 /. i
,(
irg' m+- 'N J
~ , . -
t.
/ ;': ;: y%y~
N -.- ___ f(fl'.' *:.L
, {
- .-_ - e l s ,
.y % ,! N *e I t G 1 - . . - _ . _ . p_ - -- _ - + ,.,
7 i %AQIO,R BLDG _) ,,,,,,,,,,,4 1 f AOXILIARY N BLOG sm
--+-----
3
- --* c 7-- --+- j w y ,,_.g
. a*,
, , . . - . J . [ . _. 1 _ _ . _ __._EL D _____1_____ ._ _. _ .s ri revepa -
# 1
. ii_
[ , ,_ g; .. p;
) ,y A dE [ Aft ,"*** F-
,.~^ -.~ fa 1
.-- _ r' y ~W v_: 4 .-
= ,. '
_,h*_ip",=e ;! I CON T R OL _ BL OG. [a I - jj
- f l j
W',
- ~c ,}3 'e ,e & e a e
-- y._ 'y&-p - 1, Drawing A-104, Rev. 0 1 7 i . , , i e i n i ,2 i , 9-l Figure 9A-5. Floor Plan at El 28'6"
- Reactor, Auxiliary f and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-43/9A.5-44 .
e
\
f 238 h i I 2 ! 3 ! 4 ! 6 ! 6 1 _J i l m- . _. #'
\
I
- g. b ,4 -
6
,,a , f .
x.
,__.-_c l hN 4l I l , s -
N ,
-N. . . . . . -, " - -
h N em fj
- 't '
4 ,- 4 . . .~ g.5 gm r .. - , ". _., / e ( )_ . .Q
, .r . _ .
.a ltK ---
y
- M - ----
m-e j
---p_'.
(
/
- / ,, l %
(p _ . _y.__ _ f/ Q,, a-- '_ N / h.*/v l
, y / \ ,/ <
\
j / l; . i. y s' 1 0 , _ N, k- )
. _ ... ,/ i M ,. i.
I f , ,\ 4.ms e,1 a T
,'j. ' _ _ _ _ A \ . .( i ** e I G. ..l _L \ _ L_. ~ ,_' y 'AK t l \ l . rse--
s lj \ l um Ge %U '
, f.q , , l l ,< -
r
\
\,
mi* - .. _7.i , . y D \ N'# 'f ' s ,
-'_gg y/ / '\ rges yree! ,emAmos
-; -_. g-] _g-{
. r __ 7 4y ,t. .g ~.(waamm81lP,y . , ,
l r a. . . cesec 4 *. :
.. /, . s\ , / xa=og j \
_Q~ s _#*C ' _ _ $__./ d \-._h # b b! _. .._ -, - - - - E
\j/ 4
\ j
.j
, 'j - ,7_"ggg .__ s_ ,
,,....l.{_
.-. -.--.\ .-
l \ ,em- s.se
, . x k n ' t n vsw s
/ ' . ~T .r n Trc NC ~-a-.o s . .. (3s s / , s ce'!.
\'7 / g/
se M i
\
*-7.9,
\ . .\pi . . ., l.
( - F , __[ , _) __ m _..\.n._ a _ [.n_ , d, _ ,__ ,ep,.T>, Q c y - , ma a a s o w v s w + ' S ea4 W e W **m$f '\ J- - m
%.wa i
-.~
\l u(+ \ #l L --I -+
*g ...e \~ fx r,c;; e r
I
- t. ~,,
g g[T ga
, j. *p
_ x. i/j ._m
*o 1 '-
_ .___L. ,,. . .-_
-Y , o..y
. .f{;. 1 %.bb . ,
i.- , . _ a' -
,,w h ( *"-I, e s ., w , .3, _'I _ . N en aw
- M a e %z:* b. o.f \ ._ >w M u _a.<t.r.=m.
aar.a A* , .a.
,~*; - j ;. ..\..x +
e j g 6 d
=-.dg . = s . e, .w Wr ___,i . -p p,y,
.n_,
__; w, @ _ _s
~----* q, xv-_>
q,. l ,3 (; , . m ., x h- >
= Y.6 - 4 *t-.A. Q' 4mg
- 1 gs w *--
- N A
. 3 y ggjg:,0,r m.c ma_.-F.g\ . 4,3 s
g Q:y _._.__ -_. . r_9.. y_ /- w - ar-NW ':i;,7CQS,a n
. m. . r .
-- w w* n//. . ca 4 g39 g 4
4 ai r-- x m g% ,g s " y%. s A
- v. z1 F
t 1
% e,,A, s a. -m ms iM G g] . g**--
!<~ *~ ; i %y -t i /'- .\
l,,, .x'MF
,4 '%f Te t
g g*f I g - _ - _ t, _ g m y : y%a.r-l'.,_ tac + - - i-
". l f. . I C Y
.,, mt .. ' . -Am: i,O
,a..
_. . a _fw ~~'"nQc n- n 1 l ~
- s-
~-
- T~ ~ ~ s..e -
Mli' I A!! . DIESEL GEN d C[ @ _ " ' * ' (4( Gd 1( BLDG DIV.1. O
- Wl; K
s 3 2 3 5
- 4 3 5 I 6 i
( l l t
GESSAR II 22A7007 PJUCLEAR I SLAT 1D Rev. 0 __ . _ _ , 6
' S 0 " i? ' '3 '*
1 F t I 1 I I 1 l ( *- $ **) t- ( e.. m ,) ce. t*, a) ('N
- r)J s
l 7 PD** { ,g I~ / ' [ h[$%E r a v as a ! ('c II
/ - .= a . _ _.. ; - , . _ _ <.e ff- . ., _ _ ; . 7 j ,-. 6i .k
,. ,w , . J
; , N
, g . 7,' t * ' f r1 1 :;n.a
/I
[
' 5%j h
~
l t
-- - - - R ,"TI'
,-; ,q ;
- f , I I . ,. , i 6 n
-i J / -
*s. i e . Q' u s ._,_,r, s_.m II IU -
i ,, D1 .7, c --+
- _. - - . 4 5 ,
' M2*,*. s/ s -
f e i ' (~REACTOft BLDG/x ~ i ,
<N. t =.;m.~,*. 1,_. -
)
'I tg
, , , . - , j t ,c.- -
t c
.+ .
j j
'*1.'.'0. ' . ,w e [ '- Mx p '-
.I a
'S e ~ - d I-- ' ' 3 --
s In ,/ , .a . . i , r
.j.- - * ,
~*
c6 _< u , .y - n.e era 4 s
\ sM H ,' f.' S ' ***y,-
T**x
? '
w p G.w A. ,.ea R'-li....-..:i ., e . "o} t c. _'.*..* a- -__ 1
* .n.
m ,.
,! o j,
s .
=,
n
.[
'T , >
l /
;. ~. m
- i. - r.,.,.
r.m. -, - ,, . g1
..o- m . .
! l,a
- P */. -
- j a
-.'6 . , :
p +a $- -,n.r. q;
# r .8
. 8:
.o ,' . s l
s
., ,s ii ( / ' '
I^I, _ _.. y' j j ') ; l . ' rm.a ~et . .__ __x .n. _ f' f,g ,. )(g 7
..j ; . _-.
m. j
,n, ,d e
}-s e
. .o r,-} ,pp.
g .q. .tr i
- s
,6 a s n
-- S Lt. ; I f ^-} \~*
. v:s y ,~ 1 1 *. . -~,-
Mxmpr-- . j f'f,7.% [ f** '
,g ;
i',, } f ' h. ' , t$,*. .dy+ e' (_}[s ER.DO' AUXIUt4{f_ l T . * ~ - , [ 49 .)l -'- y r.. : utl.,.y / n- s. L. ,. _., l
\$,
's '_..', s'
^
~l, f I
, -f ,.m F.,l I[].
e e i,.n 1nn
~m...- .- ,
' -, n. L . - . . x .g) - -n .q j 1 r ~< 4 .
~
Niw ' vri&m YJ e . $ , ,, i cl m'p.-
,s y \r .
. . '$'. ,w/.i.n. fd
+
(%my d l;. 'N / 1 I
;im[ !
'*d7. - l.j.s.'. h!{[
- i
'9 Y l LI , il , II -- ! 't ~ -
p G h.m.. f - i 4.
.. n \ \\s
!! d ,}
-,'A , 'yy,,
M_ a--~ ~ (5,p f~ l C ..y; .'.. ' l M*k a w
- ws ;f.g s.,,..g .i. v. E s -
n.i
>t j
.r.i v
-[
. j
,i
). .
wx
..- wn . ,
l
- w. , m-a.,a, , . .s v
. n. = ~
new, '
-2 *
<' i CONTROL
--- 4 .
1,, i g I
,a 9) 9._-... _ _ , - ,
[ , _. s
.,m. ,1 91'.
')
t . 3 (t'., y -) g) (a , a /4 fj 1 l - - , r e
- A) - Va ,
r.a,m,aL ' @M i
.) ,
Drawing A-105, Rev. 0 l 1 i 7 I 8 I s I o I is i q f f f**** ( Figure 9A-6. Roof Plan at El 51'11"
- Reactor, Au:: ilia ry and Fuel Buildings 9A.5-45/9A.5-46 l .
L .- a&..--m - _ . . _ _ _ . . . , . W _
\ 238-l i l t _
i ! r ! 3 ! a i s ! 6 ,
. i y@w l
~+-
t no
- y,n l *L.%*
p =- ,
> t-x; t,/ - -- .
e, .....
#O8EM
_1 b d
, A. = , __ -w= 1 N - f ~
,1 n-
= ,. -
/ g w. _
@ e ss
__7 STiAL., % @ ; P- AN ts C ' KKdJS 1 :->I '~ M2iG R- l 's msx1: x ll.'CM' - x
~/
/ -
EEAcJoR BLQG
.g ._
__ ._ g ;_ , e' wrM D
, vc e6.M A
*hy-esys/
lr l _f__-_.~-..- -- _ i . - , - - , p' s ni
' 3 ..
;~?
s v. ,
< \\/ "
n,Y _
.v yd N
( ELACTOR BM 1% g g_ ' ._- I - g3[ _ ;zy, , c/ ll!g 1 %/ w h M?Y';?' 747 rh5
'e Il L '
g , N .
. e : .. .u ,ur -
, * ~
.f..l 4' $y r
.a %..q
.n_mfu mp .t .
,w 4 ,yln
,+m 4 u
,,,w. L % q IIIT-' I ']p] q "3 - - - -
, ; . . .. N.N6 2
's _. 2 ? ..- ',,. -J, ,". hQQ
~
4 ,$D%
.e) i a ~ . .
eu 3 2Sd
- C/ (Q
%%TI N _ LOO % %AR J $ met ~'* hju E.% "Ci E
a ' 2 I 5 '
- I 5 i 6 I
1 l I
/
- r. .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - _ , , ... . _ . _ _ _ _ . , - - - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ - _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
GESSAR II 22A7007 ., NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O t F 8 ! ' ! * !
" l '2 ; e5 ; 4 6h
.c I
k oi . (
- W ' O %,*;
Q"d
? *+
- r. *. n p. .u s y 4 .a 8.
g PE ACTO R BL DG e.,r j h*"' --
., x / RE ACTO.R BLOG f N _.
i! h,d _ _. 'k cy, W] '
~w
\. . W *ky ~ ~ ' @ - - -- . [""* g ,,' .l 11 i,.. t, ss
's pp. ss /
.,,, \p-'.p"n tr ri-- y i
l p@ t; m u - w.,,.,.w. j
.i\
N s l w~
+ +; -
. . p y' mt MT i C
.u.m 4%N/ ., e i
-- sI- k 'C%g:t s
= ~~ s <
y , :r - <2 '.
- y v.~" : .cN - - em
_ .1MS _ 'ie.,, f.-T4_l .__ Y4 t,.. l .,@(t $M Ij ~ j " " ' * - "
- __~4_-_.___ . r__.__
-- -- ~ i e x
+=.y.- -
\
'\, g _ E E .~ ~ , '
"'~h g _.1. w'm s
N : f' ' ,' i, , a i m .__. _ _ NI i._.
\i
__s d> c!n 4' Tet ea.a46 f 8 f #9 q g., p [ ~ f y p T 7& M . g -a
..rf. n .T... _.
1 i ( l v .u . . .-
"C,7 +
+t ,
.h 4 [ f,j., , 7%., RE ACTOR BLDG N l, ; ' ;.. P y.
p v fCI,%' .' y = e -- .
, . -==- i
- m. [ g k = & - 4@; # Erd ~ saf ~
1
- r. r ~.y ._.,_g,m _ f_ '. ~y e, l z .,,,.., .
. -- x a
y.,
.a i Ligrw iesju.d t Lf s ?"' y> o;\I ' . e' i ,
phhwt .4Ai "
?~q '
1 . =.1* @y-- w n.'.; ,_n' e 1 Af'f.:TW.
!'1 I Md, A \ .,EtR. m '_;;L 2.7bg
- .,.-.w.
s,- . , - % zq;- y ,,o ~..m I 3 y. s.
,5 i . 1 "
d.. ;;..,0. , , d) i [g) n; ', (d)
- k. P /s a 4,*,
PiRT IA-L f'L. OC R. P AN @, y.-- ct io .5Vi m, . i 4 1 Drawing A-106, Rev. O J i , i , i , i e i n i .: e e t -- l Figure 9A-7. Partial Plans - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel Building 9A.5-47/9A.5-48 ;
t I
, 238 i
i e i n !
+ 1 s ! e a
W i
' ' L*;*,L
.g. kr
'kVv e
.v.s.ew e ., .ne <
"?,- ' TT( ,
o n.:'a e e 27' c c r ,e s *r
- l
, . = * ,
F, 9.* 14, > 0***f8
. o. :, Y-
*' *b ,,,n, .
kh .g
\
- . o,~.,1 %
4 s i yd tyt.LDLDQ j w. N N , . . . , .
., - s
\ L. ,
'x
,. L k @ '.;
- p. .% . -.et. ,., ,,.. .A. . < .
m , m
, t Pt
- s f 9_
i 4 f 4 4 ..~ t eA * '
. gg-
- r :c; y,v 4 - -
- _
g i
- e *~ c '
j 4 :.n r i -
;, s ', _
o c-
.m a ! ,
N. c. _; r : - (,,,,b - [-ta4 *** **
- l ' % i c, _ ;
+ ve s.ftvae o.
;;:r - m ~
[,w p, ---, , , , , ,y 5 rn5 -
% . f =e 1 ii . _ _ -
_ ____-4 b_ d 1.! -- e
\
H
...m,
**w"****
+ F**
j e't.+ s a I ' r -: -
. . . . - eo i
me 1**;w r 5 n.v i 1 . )'
- esy . , ,
( $e 4 8 l i I (A> .f) g (r) (s J
.. O m= . .? wk .?w
.:.- .v v . - . a e s
j E I a e g i i 4 I g I 6 u- -
-__-a- --
I i i
/
6
s GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
. . . . l l
I
! O I l 80 ; it
] ,2 ; il , se I
!f a
l 8 l L ._., l-qF
-- l
'%MR ** N . D' og
' , I F p**. g.a g e p r . 5
( . i
-- s -N- f\ \, _ ,
f .W N xcui:= w A-
>,n ~
- r. n. .e <
,p N '
j m e ___. . i
..a j
y 4{f ;191) 'E. -
/ v ..- -..
.a i
l ,. c7- M~ 9, . ro F M. ~. > : L~,. ; -
" d ,9 ' ?
</
h s ,.. .
"A****
r [- . ae n . ,. FM - *),"' * ~ -
- d. /
bh* .3 0 l # ) '
, _ [fg*f
\
, j !
J
~~--
w .. s. ' K s
"' ~
N I' / I" j
/g; ... ,- 14~ ,,1,_.,..
i_"s ".;' _ -, ,/ - /
~.
! ,1 ;
i$". u .. g 1 8'.{. ;p.j e
,.u, t
l %. ,,,,, g . t. k
, I A, ;
3 . / -
- -] g-..y t N,. 4 . , y sp%
L 1
, s tel
. 1 T ,7
.n57 -,.
t 4~ hs**"I ( J ow ( = _ xw cs ' I i . . W w- ?
/ P.
.f kr xS_P n.
s e ,
/ 's a G
j l i & 5 /
/ //
j *,) ^ ., ~ l / *
\ /,' t [-
Y ). , 4 . .,- l 1
/
,.' /s -
. n p.'.b d i , .- ;-+---- P reg -
?
b h i
- j. &.,,..*O
. e. s . . -
., , .' r->
l + m.[,sn-R -,
/ g
. ., i l'EALLOO%. i
_m ., h :..m.o r Drawing A-107, Rev. 0 ~ l
. , . . i , i e i ,, i ,, , , ,-
l _ Figure 9A-8. Partial Plans - Reactor, Auxiliary and Fuel e Buildings l 9A.5-49/9A.5-50 i
4 I 238 l 4 i t 7 } 9 i e ! S ! 6 Il C r.
.s-
?
-m., l e.
- i. ,, M.j g z . -
. f8 . . . *** _
. H-e4
,, &* , s s' *t A; Q, j ', j\
< 2 *V %, ' % .4 Q* QUIL 6L L, .,
I ARY , o 6
- h b , g Y '
i IU
!-. l 6.-
;:!!. . ,+ ;>-
.* oiv i , , , ..+t. ,
i
', OtUJ L p 'A, .m., . c , , , . , , .,
s D* "L"" -4
**t'
+' r. e ,^.r wr e. u
'8
", d q " ' *
- 4.,. ...i / Z ,,," ," *, ," 'u l f { [. '*b6:f ~
,8 4,,,
e :ii3G'I 'N : . . . . .o, ..., '
'i**
.3.,..,a,,..,
il;)7 .. 4 b! ., . . , . 4 1 - t le - l ! !, ;;a;g - y _ , , p
~! .
j w+ :. 44
$1 / *..
,p4o e n w .w, A C!Sjy I- , ,) ,;md as T-ME
- t. .*.,.L jb w,,mW t v ,.> !g': S f.
r..~.e. < ?~Es'ilf.
& ,t m s[, . p. u..,J t .-, ,
.. . _ _:r u. p. h..
l [h, t 't 6 c te pad * [ * * !q ~~ IC 7 _$) 0 e a-* eeout t { , i.= .e... l{,. , l l { ! ,', l $. .' *i.'".! .~
**a. . .,. ,K ..,
sg
.. , /,f, ,, . . .l
. 4 ,
g . . , . , . ..... .. . .a
.. ..~r n
~ a ,6t 1
+ .o: ++ s. L
.n...o..,.....
.< . 1. ..
4 *e' O L! u. 1 n4 , ;.
, D..$3 4 j ','f*gf. - ,,.5 e 4
,e..,
/ ,k, i gy ,$, .<4-r k..q e,
.7.,
c i. .th,y ,
'n n, '.u. ."'. . . . . n, .
y .- . .. I , , . . . , , . s-9 c, 9% - Jff.,f - Te
- ~
'i=~s",.';'
f D ry* p_ I , H ,,. ""- t
- ~ .t . ** t
*,6 r% (I). g.).
! n2 h%) 4 &l 3j - = = .
=4-- ' . ,w-,, Q f.%.. - ,- r.a i.4 (4g
.t,., p .. p. e.s,.,2 am ,, .>(
s .g. . 9 t +e c* I ' . e L- 7, A 'Y* -l A. .g Q,*g ,r.
** " * '
- g g* f .
l*$'t "L , h** $.. U 3 i
-- - e
( y p
&' f$*%'* %a%* _ ",*t.
l f* *
- g .s . N* t s ip'd *. # 1 5 e~} [
? ) te *
}L ,a 'l =+. +1 - ;-p', g . =i r2
.,i,_
Q
~
W t; . Y - a..
.,a , g el m. ' ZM 3 ,,E, - .c - ,
s . j s m.d. a g , a, ,.
.,2
- p,,c j
J't i p*
- j . * ' ** O ' .4'wA ,, 6 =%1*,l, . . . h' h'i.*- . l.1. 6 La .C. _ .*
- t _ at. + +
+ . . . ==. .
.. e ,, a., t g 4
sa ' .we, ' I,W
"*= ..a== .se etm e .
- l 8 & V4 ,9 v9 7 81% Amt 8 3 ,9r3r ss Qt "s, '
t s ",
; - f , s* o
, r -,
J l
~
l l i l l a i 3 ' 3 I 4 3 3 6 e 7 S l b o
GESSAR II 22A7007 - 1 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 4 f F ; 8 i 9 i o ; H i 12 , i) ! ie
,-..- .. t!
. < A l -~
.% r *- - -- , . . . .o
.* r 8='
e., 1s g L F
*88'.*.>**-
<o..
- 9. !4 swg . 8.
g
..-'s
~
h
,'."*.,'[,, ,) = [
( a r, - .. f.j'/ W =..... N
= ;. .. . . . . , '_ d. .
'***'5
,...s.,
......e l , , ,
1 L,- sj I' l
.i==.=.
a-_, . . L._J
*WEL h%
l I' _ S E C i t o li A (us, C Ibi (4.) @ @~ lb- Ej i)
,) ,
v
.. , .,). _ _ _ . .
v - " C .J . P8 _. PZ . . . _ .. ** 8 . .__ __t' O. _
~
. *t+ % ** ..
, ,ty - ' * * . 2% s H . _.. -*f. . ; ' * * * ',T'.
#* " * ' * =
'I tt*g, AUXILIARY *=
$.1.
BLDG D l j t 1, ,
,.i a-s p.
; g y's e - - { v, 4
- p- mp ,w1 u.. w ..,
l ,g,,,,,4 w l a orv i
, . pg7 ,h
, ..u.. ........,,,
3
- - gep m.--
) _
C .:,b. i f "ot 1' i, t
, ;*.!;.e,T.'C.'.*m'*. _i ;.* . GN" :- d
- s. 4 p';
i.: . g,l e(, u-a.u - , i RN e 4e --.
. L. . - - , ,i,,,
J }p }.. I
, , et oc . ' - + . , -
;Ehj IE-J (2) . I' 7 -Q ye.v . ,,
- - - -....m,,q_j4
- ....,j
% tit 222 :: : : tM cu u.;-r%p.t W ft . ++ t: r.
q we E , v- ~ . . - - t L d Ah. ,%vf i t i. e.1
- d, *sc.0.c u e.a!
*,T w _G A ! '.~.:
y ;
.ow .. ,, ...r _.
4
. - . , t,
- s, '* ' %. 4 ,i n s __ __
. n ' . ..,. i .. .
hn - - + , ' .:b}f?!dililL - }k t g,j t,, @*;e.4 , e' . . . 1 . e) 4
@e - ,
2 u-,- g4 . g- - l 2 - g E h;,!
;;; j Q,*c '
f! j +.. ; i . . , . , - ..+ g' .s d}
'
- I yx,j 1,,' - - t*C***a *e
- s#t -
s _ j '.Q,.% 3 3 '- . w. g;f
~ ',*$*x l*..' . . s. . . t. . . .,
**'* ; e fru. -.r-i.ihg, e.-
i 3 wW- ~~ ~
- W-i.-..- ,d 7 r-
-48 ye:0 (b;;:):s h $, , m' f_ f..'V
'~
- i :J a s g.t *! .
w"" 5:- .t.' E90 ,GP ., "".a,c *,,f2P3-. , -y.- s.
- m. n; -
u y-g.7 i O4 " M{ ,
- h.. ..
/ }j b ,ye.*
t - .- .
&^g F y fM }s,..
m mA : w.y'.- ,{
! l
..,s, . e - S(.,1. -? y, *?;h 7 -
a. g' 1 ea -- g A.
. - gs .%., s. .. u aL..o._,/ . :.r%
i > o c , f . ,, 1 f.- I
.rs l k
-s {
g+r n,= Y* gN ,' y' ) ^ l ; ?:e
.we sgw~a y ne v gr .c.g'~ / 2*.A . , .n ; ><
.. m.2 . .. } gu -
Eu . gp a 4 :,- y;; t h, re= L o_f,,,! a5- A -_ e . ".,, N
- g<j. } ,
<- m.s .y ,v._(7;.a. ,,_ 1 4 C l wyn .A *
',..m,...u......,
w . . y .+m,, rr
, a n-
.4 ;.J - 4*tS
, :_ ar % %-
, _; W _
c &. '1* _f 1- . F & f _.M_1.E Q_.
. 1 i
l1-Drawing A-111, Rev. O
~' I i r i e i 9 8 e i n i '2 f t i i* l Figure 9A-9. Floor Plans at El (-) 6 ' 10"
& 11'0" - Control Bldg. 9 9A.5-51/9A.5-52 .
j
O \ ' 238 \ s I ? ! 3 l 4 ! $ I 4
.L*
(Ms
, tv.' . r 4-" gese.
, [ ,
go.n w , ,
~
i t h~~ ~ ~~ g i p t; 4
.. ~
r v
-----4--.Lr.
W' e j: g l i ka" _ .p;, .
*k. ,/ U (N
EwIet_ E eu t C
/p y 6;.., /~.~-4 ;
\<j (D :
U*< 7
. -; ; *s t ; ,,-c ,
G
,r : ' . ,;t Se . T,,,,, _
s 2 -, '+, , , , _ .
'l .f2 d #d *w Agg;tgfyy o HL DG I , .
. _._____.__+ _ _ _..
o , . . . ,. _- _. ._ _. v ,._,,,.
..y 3
. . . - ...m ir 39- L.,
Wu. Nd . . 3...
. o . 3 +1 .
+
. 7, .-
, . . m. . _ .
. .i .
. O .
. ,I . , i ,5 7,'^" " M,. +2.'.b.-'""dr, , _ ,i 7,;?f
- u. , , - ..
j,. s g, - 1,. , _ ) ,.- - .. 1. g e. ,
! .4 I. I a i
a. t r c. ._ ,p _ L, . 1. r i .f.a _ _1v; . ,- 3. .. i
.' b -
tt : Le m >' mrum I. l . sew {- 1 L. . pJpr j Uft. i .l t , m j +i a i ,3 ;f,.t fu. a,h
~ 3.
t
.s.
-..-- ngwn.p\,q
, 7
..t....,...
. i, oc.yawt a -- I i..,,,...,
;; ; t v a su Q i . . . . . . ..
cres ewt l e . . . #, ; e ., , - *- ;a. g g f - '- - g ;. g . , _ l7 .. .. , g. c wg l',~~ 1.".*_'_.__- i: j ..;_ t [' .a , H . t,_ - -k_nii " a.
,lj .~j n!. .T m. ,+J.7
.s..
i. p.
; 3 . m.
v- .-], -.
. . m ,y ar i. 4 l IT ..
i.t f ! - '. ,j - N* S ! ' ,k e m.
- .w ':- .
f,[J m c: >; .. .---.,p..{i)1.j, y fn., ' f, 3, e i , . s g p. g. p -- m- m, --
, (J . . . - m -1*^ g, s.
_ ., s. ..;. .v.. . n.
. _ _ a'
c.T, u. . ,. ;
', * *4..~ 4 . h*
~
pi . ' n .ti *s-*** '_ - _ .- - f. . . __ s- <: _ _Ris &.
?t*w w.
V_ L. (A(] N 5 ka D_ $$ $ * .S i i 2 3 3 4 i S 6
\
9
GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCI, EAR ISLAND Rev. 0
, , . 1 , y ,.g ~
s
'emme ees
- 5" % .. r,.,
v- I ,. . _
).--.
v;~, i . , .
._\.
jt 'I. I~' 'k, r, - i
,t p . . . . . . N
.- -~~~ p I
-h( .e v>h- ..~ .
- u. es 5 c.
,4 TT_ - - . .
5 . .m L_ i .d ' %P. F.LY PLAN. ~ n, 98 4, C ff' (Y) Q') h) (f\ ; [')
'a . .
o -a +- e * < .i ,
- e l 5. .t e+
> t. :
j tu i Amuutt I m or. ll .t , eu knaa.lM s,' Ot. . . - at i .t ,t . . D,'.' h St" - -
- _. v ." ;
. n. ,s. .,g , :.... . . .
, c, nyg t,3 i" t 1 ,. j -
, . . . _ _ . 1 m ou ,
r ? .i e 1 l .
*j4 -' ,. 0 -l' -
P4 f(ffil 9 t* '%
- 4 l 'I, 6
%d
' p teh <
.g. '.
[ i9, i, l j.j ."n
- 9;. ! .. yg; <-
I , a. ; ti t.' i' i i
, , t I - m.:';: l 1
[fi
>s't
!j fl r .
l t -- 4f (8
- l /A [ .- -- f , ,
. ' *3*.;7 a
.f . l- -
7 l .A , l_ -
,, J I <
.g. l 4p. 6 .
ej3 u.v. . , .. . . . j . ,:
!rij :w.m; .-
- .=r .
j , wa.= . . .
,, ..] i t h . *+ + , **" l $ j 4
l I l (ay.l l i l ' '. ] 7 ' 1 l 6 l
, s - ..
' ~* ,- -.
' n
+
r,
'/ . . - ,
hei '*e. ,'/ i ! {' , eg y
- yy l I
1, j y b...,f u , j f,** h e rori.t im
, 1 tv t. >
j s4 - ~r. '. f , f, }
, ! .'. I l i l + ,., = .,v i
*l 4I t ,
fj i4
,n >
J e
.1 ti G.*'*."..*...j
- 4. e i j e .! -, k t _ - n, s .,*m . tere
- J <
l e . - - . - - i , .*-% T ,e ~ , * *n2 ,U ECaff F P;A4 f Drawing A-112, Itev . 0 i r i e i , r o 7 ,, i q , . _t __f -- f .- Figure 9A-10. Floor Plans at El 28'6" and Roof - Control } Ilu i ld inq ! l 9A.5-53/9A.5-54 .
\ l i 238.f 4
i ? t i e t 5 l 6 l { . I g E * falv (5') ?) I,D) ((E) l I ,e t o .e r *.n
.e m f
l
, a.s +a .e.4be e v e., ns c O
f.
- t. n-u; Y& ,p' o.. ,s. , +
1.
,a P s . n'*.>
r,t. eL C ,,,,,,,,,,ii
** 5. e
- o*
e f # e s .n. e. u
- Wat ,
af gm . A4 4, ll 35'L Aft ,(',4es t f eas t o',ssM Nw /8' j _ses 99.t9 ,.r anss+e kant "n.' I! see 'sne e m .s . , . . . e oesir -
- a si.
!J
{ =JeaiV , a 1 = - ~ :.J '.,.w, moe,,,. l ,.wn se.es,. t l r t;,. _) ;t . l ,I 1 ce..s
. se~- ,
a . (,y
.m>
T
- w. ( _-. . #),f,
,_,, ,,4
,;n; -
{*6 . { .--> y.. i
, w, f r et ; f. .-.--/, g..
on; P . ?. . -. =.; ., z.m. --._
..,Ne , . v. 3. - r+b . A L 4 , . -t
, j .e .<-- ee , a t v..
. .f go. - . ,
4 .iJg,, ~ . D Q ""* * , .**f . %,s.- 6e =mt a g
- esen't aan a "'*'N n,,,.,.,,,,..,,
j a :.e54' 7 siu h i W S - sa *=4
. 7, [ n
- .x,
- . h .w.,
< ..,. 5 /'. , ..,~.,~.-
w '2.*'.&,*- ...a.aJs ( . ,.- b l',i s ,. . -w m I rm33 a..5e.=..=-
,y-e
_ ' j.;. m---p M, a 1j t ,g.. . . l. l2g,, .c-r,, - .T,i cr,4 4 e me44 ( ta.sn
'.m FCP _g-<et-w--
g._..__.*.t___ 3 a g 4 _,,,.j _ _ , ,,e .,'.. t I po 'fl A L ,tw . ht .,. ,
. . . {,* I ,4 er,t s.anven ms m e * *ou v , c s,... s,, s. . . . .
r i
,4/.
Ne.:.- t . - y@),. - . 4 -- w e P,m'.**,',ff"** rg~b Gorijs a ' t aa ! s't 'ust e' s i
-1* ** r * *'4 f' '
i 4
** O 4 W .an... , ,l( 7,-
- M,4 dn i A , Ml! .,, ..} at e o i >a = a.-
9,6"-fl- goI'! .a =quer s * *.,.f .kr, _,. ,, , , *G** r'*%'ly".'
~
v !.. * * *_ ' i . v_ '. .',. _ . . _f _ t, o
..._j.,v,yp.
ys . g 1 -
'gi.s s .g, , ,
1,. 4->.., I.y**aa D "**'d .. "** v4se s'g
*1.y. . .#9' . . . . .f'm...; ' -- . +.<.,, ,m. {3 , f wg
/ ..._. , al a F
. __7_. i .w.',,,s ...
. ,5. _ S,A . m = 6,r.,,,m.%._'.-*---"-"--r,*
r (f.v) J' e i t...u.y,,'.+"
. _ } } __. _. _---'lsa.
* *" '- r"
- Ir.ae c. ,g ,--', ag
,g * * *
. . . ..% ".*^44..
... e . as es . s1 , n I 2% ::2:.Y' Z 'd hf,',"*,"* .c a m .... 6 .H
;,wrN:.7::". Z.'N: ,
t aev== > ;N F $ .
~
I,6 ) ' k 6
- f, y'A e w c_austna' t.,.v__t .v l pe n=}s. e-v t.o r ,a w t wmx t e' v
".'s,.-
.<w,., . -e s ': mer
,4.
..n..,
- e. --
4 aowg e.***= - H e. 4- *
. }$
__e - _
+
g FLOOR PLAN at E L (-) 4 3'- 10 J I f R i 1 r i 3 6 3
' 4 3 5 i 6 2
l l 1 e 4 8
I , GESSAR II 22A7007 ' NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
,,,.,,,o , ..
1
., 4 , ..
. . f,- - . .
. , , _r-.
. . - z ,.__., .... . . . . . . .
p . . ...=*s.*.. , t~-* * * * (+, t. *. _ l
<..-,,,_.4 a
1 Mnh e m t,o
- ,3 r.>-
!--..; u; . m< .
~... ,
/ ,. , ., .,
..., ..e...
.. .. . . t.v. :,, ,
(,)
";gm.
i p:' y
, _.-~^1.,.,.* =.7:=n.
3 . - - m r n., , ,.,_ g,.~ . . . a .. iN . . . , - i+. .., c 1'
.._,.Y
.. , ..... p? <m.... ,~., .y ,
?.~ n.*i 'm, i l j:'.
.. . :: '.~',
2.- , .n. , .e.., ,,.we ,4 =a (o.yy~ .. 5- s.:
....- r, !. ** l :I .-
_1-. . . ___:W.w v_ _ a.: J <'.\ 1 . _ . . . .
%. . f'4 .*!%,' * "' . , , . G) - ,. 4, .. ..
4 , - . .. 5 * 's.p_ w y'l ,.1,. .p;.n .y ----._.m j 14,,, _ . - -. ,,*,,qa,,, g't
- y. ,.. ,4,.u . h %5 . .-,j
* * * * *r..- 3 5' gt4,. 8s'n Sn.u_m
- n n , n, . , , ,D ,, [ .S
- lk'*\ # 5gb,. !
a 1 , h ?, W. \. Y.i.md. ?. , " ". ,,lT h. I ':i e F..
, s_..
ew
.. a. ~. - : e.
...s i
m 3 a - W ( ,r
. ib.c, . . . .m y e%........ 3,- r ... .n..
. ~ , . a >r= r_.
. -+
, voq . m m, i
3 7 - f "' . ...va.. ~< x3 ,
'y .. e . - .. e :
-.-; ff ,;
?" J
- i. c l
[ ! .2, ... C % M'if,"i%NY
% 2
_ '8"-%'Y'm j m-~t.s. ~. - s
.. d 4v ) !qY;f;,.' A"f.44 4
- i. ' i f 5
.t a' x ( .o., _
j i' e nr.., T klif g, a"t '~F'
- I i
- v' r ce. .c. i 1 - , ,
. . 1.
***..,r--
se -_:- l
*au t y \
.,,' ,di; ;: . n r.
-;, . . . . u...
. . . _m . . . . ; ,,
7 l is
- l. ,s
...e......-_...__-._m_.
. . u a% T,.
. .. -_ v u a 2 _. , , , l
.e .f.,9_..
.: ;s> .. .. _ . ._ _k I. . . . .
. ... . e, .s .u v .
,..,...,,..;n.,,..s l
,- .s.+... .. , ,
- l .. w . .
- .nav.%~.$.'.%?z;*:hm.~.%~;~;Q l
" N q
! ,: o 1
e.
% ' . t o
..u m.p. )- ,.m... ',, , . . un,. . .
.m..- ,l l . . . - : . w .i -
- s. ll 7 '.. .i .'.
,4 m . . g .r.. m t- .
1.1 i H r (h j b ._: m ;:_:ft,
. A yo y,
FLOOR PL AN of EL M 27'-iO
..,.,....,..,...u..,..
i 1 M i Drawing A-115, Rev. 0 i 7 i . i , i e i n i ,, , , 9 --. l i l Figure 9A-ll. Ploor Plans at El (-) 4 3 ' 10" l
& (~) 2 7 ' 10" - Radwas te ,
i Building 9A.5-55/9A.5-56 i
l
' I. 238 i /
i ;
? 5 !
4 l 5 l 6 i s A
,, e 1
- 6) -
(s)_ (6. ) { (o,) s (i) Q> v.:* m ' m p;4m= + C t.**.,'y'**''* (* ,** aann a
- p. o.s. ,,c.,..g, 4
.a*** *'t
-- j,.f ,'. m.P * "
,% u J.. . o . . , .*****
. .w
.--~. - --- - . . _ , , , , n,c..,,-
ln., s e ,. . i'I J.4 w s 8st wf apa itt a fee,
' " s ,---g+---,g s-,.y h .*e nauw 4 o w . g . _ .. ., ' e....d (w)
~ M'4A 2, . .
(;.. , .,Ry,'* * ** +
** y . - e .o w, .._,
' l f. m.... g,...' ,,- g
.m-'
. . = .'*.
. --- mg
% . y . '. .. . _. W, y,, n. . 4 .,g4 4 .g. . 4
) .
*-* .. e s .. ,. . < w, 0 i. J f 1 **w . . . * , :
va w w .e ,' : <e w . . . . . .
- u
.3e6. op. . . . . ..I I, u,,:,, ,,,, ' c . .t . I
! .m i
( 6 a# .- p, 1 'er .-- M 1lr-4p--. cs w-e , y , *=, .* x .' .,
, -- y . . . , _ .
,} e% -.i ! , p 1. J. . .. . i g o...
),'
* ' J4E I6 _ ,,, , ! .,,4. , , , , ;, +.
. j. g . J7 t. . . t 3 , <.~
.,. ...
- i4 ....... .
v a.. . H ,' . , M *a s
.L..... i. . ,. =4,,.6, .n ....m4 t ,, ..[,
', 1,
. . e,. %. ',
*
- Wf ; g, E ' ' g,,L. .Z.I~ d i i *, j
,,*. !.a ny ...
s,.- l p* -g n
, , _ , .,e g qp yg , ; n, .. ,, ,y,-
p+ T'y.: y.**, ". 'y . f 3., . , , ; * ,} g . .a
. + ), -.3 s , - , !
J-
. rel 4) t l ;,$ . +
t
" ' s + .+, . . . !: : , . . ... e .
m.. . a" j.q ' . e, ,c.e . ,
/
,- ..t ?'* . .d..1.
- 1. 1,'gg.' d... W,
~
, r- n.
.4.e.g ,..~.1 .
e.c. e_ s , ,..m I.4 * . i.. ,,, - v* * 'I . n.. l.
. . . t.m b . ,. . ,,m g {
r h ,i] p
#at uty /
r"_.---e . h v.wv--vups* p e, g-n ;,, p[
. L<, ya- ".
7 g,,, (*N; cf) ,
% 1 +! , u- w . ,p,j._ _gl't t . i s,i s - . - - . a , t,4. ~- . - - . y - a - - y - --. --
I e4
,,a. .. erg . . . ,eu die g' M .*** .ts_=e* f_ . . . .q ' _
.. < . . l .. ,
, ' a r* *9 , ,q .#**9.,..
s er vt
, .. **d*
g h* ',a (A es i 6 f 9 edr* Pt
^
is)
. - - . - _ ..--s... .__
t,r(.e,, ' 46 er* 8. S I'. 88" & rA e rl t
'm. a 6.n ==
' nJ.*C L h ess S's,tsgge fj t s (i} e i n .
Q._ 1 _?M i sn e ' F l.00R PLAN at E L M 6'- 10 , J I 4 I $ I 6 e I 2 8
)
I 1 I
f GESSAR II 22A7007
- CLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0
~
i r , . , , , o , n i a , o , .. (a) . . . "6,=* a-
@ f- .
-. a
_i w ( ,- '7 /.V r) +j =.. . . . I i),,JM., , g , p .- {. >, ., t. . . ilf,- -
, , .g . . . . . . .
-* ""~""'"""
54 l ,') - , , , 4 fi ~ ~*~s" ( a ,> l . . , ,
. .. t J
"'* 8
'k_ *- ,
~
M O A?L
')
I (A) (Y)
(~c )
fo) (T) 6)
~
P/JHIAL PL AN of EL 22. Ilb -
~~-
, n .. u e -
o .m f* ,.: . r , -.- ' _ _., __7 9
, p__,_,-__
- e. ,-
. _- p _
- x , -
_.__.,g 'm-O P
- t1 .i r; .y
/ A '
y :. (D -.t, n+p t ! r .. . :. , : t
* ~
i 1 r '
.m, -
~ c 1
.1 s...-. . . . , . . . . . . . . - . ~
, f , a=&* m .[. som* s*
i
, )
.- ., ~ , . . .
- . ~ , ~ - ,
, . 3 s.. f
--,,'**' . , . . ,. 'p.. ,, . .. - _ -. -
* ' ~ ' '
- *- ? :, ; ! . .L et V.,
(,2_y , 7 9 --
- 7. ,I e - . . . ,
, 'I
, 'r + ,
*a: .:2M - 7, ,
0 1 'l'
.i &
s e ,o , ~ -4r,t'." ..f- w eI
- t . f.
. h.;l l
, , , ! j' ,' ,,t,.A-
*TM.*Ep i{ p [ . f, li
, I ., .. -
,i..
- - _ . . - - . .1l'.
H *). . . - m i' jag,
* - ,;y *
- m.
,..'. a. ~
_ i
- 'L. o) . . , . ,. . .-..
i p -. .. <.1 n.- w , q pr 3 , ; ,m_ -
., '.m. tn /..
!.*y
+- 5 ,-
c.$, p' c'. i ;;n ._ ,4.,,3 s..- e....s-.
"u
.... pu , .%.c,., --m E l) . - ,
os. .w,ge o i ,<' --- _ > -. . . .' *" ' t
, , , i
- .ep- - 6 ..2u, ;
.- . . . . ... .. c m , . e. . ....cy t- -. ,,,, ..i q g,. ...
y ,,,,
~ m.~.
....s.. - ._...~ . . , . . . ,
t...>.
.e t
wh;.._,,
.g T g r. ta v ur.
P, [. -_i:
; ;+= T " * ' '
- 5 .'
l- , ;% p ~~t .
.u,.- &..
L . . . _ . ft s..,., , s i d - v
;,. ?*=
, e hh .. - . b ,; _.;zA.
4 d ' he. . .y, .,. .7., ..r. r .,-. .- .-...
>l j , (1) b. , ;._.'.*w. _ra1.
. j.. -A.s.b.wf
...%.'m_., 2 .
- a. ).,. .,
.t ysw, 8 g ves. et a *.
- A 84 51
- l. . .. , , ,
- y. I . ,,,.,._.,, s yf (f) . _ - - -_. . , ._ *.M M !f,
,, ,+. . .]i. ; w a. n . , . .r
=
. .2-yy.
L w FLOOR Pi AN at EL 9'- 2 1 3
'l j -j i l I i l
Drawing A-116, Rev. 0 j i r . . i , i o i n i ir ta e t --- Figure 9A-12. Floor Plans at El (-) 6 ' 10 ' ,
& 9'2" - Radwaste Building 9A.5-57/9A.5-58 .
b I
# 238
' ! ? 3 !
4 ! S I 6 A r, e P-? Ni,) v h (N) (c') v, i
@< ('E y
)
e i I l I 6 1 l (O , , I I t i l l C 1 ! > l it) 4 > 1 I o
*'t' -. .,
,,l -..n-.
g*..,a..e - . -u . J 3*
)
- 4. ,o,.+,,-*- ....,..,
.m.,,
.n,~ -- .
( 3) y t"> - . , . - - ,-
+
! 7 ,
(31
*- ('
.-i& ' v"o i ,
.g . -
.g t. s : i l l., ..", .y! . ,,[*jL.-*,. ,'..*'; ',. -.e-r f.:V, s'.
.s! - , , ;i,) a-r* - 5p-
. . .y ,
t -}
.a . . .
w ,r .
-c i
**%_.-~~
$ i, l
.r~*--... <
- v. ,.. . ' . # , u . - '
'x i,
. , i . J i a.
. -% 4 y e
,} t . .! .-'..
' ren f. .I % .
l n "T , c ~- . *I e +
.a,
' . i* .,.,...
t 4
..n.,.,
.* . %.i .4 ,. #.s .,
e t .. . E A bW
/ u ., r i
.. S v e,,
I
' *,esnu o s.o a g .* ew ': ,
-w fn' f*
'7 --
- .). g . ,j.-.._.. .}.__ _._.f."=-""
Sg .. ..,,,<,e, e .fg .i ao s,een t $ a=e a
- r c er t ,
+
.w i 3 .
...r
..w,. ,fA.,...
4)
. i t6j t 9
. eg . - . .
i i (r}- .* -
<~4 1 .
M ',' try ,l 6- , -r. L , , sa>..ggs;t V .g . ce p s . .n. c 4 m.,, n.e.. ,. w..a,n n. FLOOR PL AN at EL 32'-2 J m
* ' 2 3 3 4 i S 3 6
}
s O
GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i r ! e i
, , o , n i it , es , i4 t , I.
j ,..- . ,,~t ..r 1 .g, ,,..... . . . . . N.-i.,..,..,_.,..... i , g ,. -. ,.._ ._ ._ ..
-. 4
- . .- .j ._ a . . .
si!v ytAN. e
*PO r
.i .
1
' \
- j. (
l 1 Il ,. I i.* i
- s. ail
- (e)
('c')
. (o)
, (s ) (iyii)
, o k pr.+
k .> u - , >
.F.,,--
~
S c;*;'.
' f'g (g)
. + ,
ye M.. l (36 .. . , - i r'i t ' p h'h 6 4J '# 4- ,# '
- p. ..... e
,a ,,,,, ,
'an
~ ~ * -
<..~ l e s :. <. iq , ; m. .
. j t,
-4 . -
g , , , ,
)g ' . . < (4 j O'
* "'/
y
- o. .
g;I .
+
- r
- s b.T, -
g'I *
* 'm..~.. i *
- to T,'? .M
- l E :. ** *;?L'** rs)
('s y, ..T' _ ' - ' ~ .
-i my
. s. e p g
' X,
;;,, ,, h j.w. I' a
,, p)
~ .. u. ,o-. ,
-.. 3 (i,) . . , ! .
- g,i y
+ .,. A
. . - - --+
.g I g 1
h .. c,> g. } i g q 1,3 .. . . l
........u.....
..u s.-
. .m.
.m ROOF PL AN of EL 54'-2 i i
l . Drawing A-117, Rev. 0 i r i e i , i o i n i in L._. __.L _ f --- Figure 9A-13. Floor Plan at El 32'2" and Roof Plan - Radwaste 1 Building I l 9A.5-59/9A.5-60 )
e i
, 23E L
i ! r ! 3 ! e i s ! s A g) (a) in) (c) (0: ,e EJ ' i l se,s m
\
u.. 4 a,- , . - . ,4 rm r g _.,.g_ g pte ,' e 3. . .-.---. ny. J 'T...... .....
. . l . . .. , . . u.__w .--
- c. p. <. 3. e e y p. .+--"E
. u .e , g- CM, L,.I l
+ - 13 0 i!
t
- r=, , ,
Tr i .
..h._. _ _ _ . .A' T' r4 4 -
4 g g',h j,A~.~.. j . W. c . . ... . , ,
'-" i
^
'-"** . D.IV i
= *'
, o s, ; .n. ; ! ~
. H.*n.],- a .,'
. 1P s s: # Z l
,f .
_ rg . ___..;i . _ . . . -
.3:s ,
a, ., . .
-- b .
vas:7*+ i. D e.
- v. .
.t- 'F...w.
. < w.
.w..,.;,,, ..
<'* ,f* N .
FLOOR PL AN at EL P)6'-lO E tai * , .,c1 :ci (ri
.- t,u r ,
. I i 1
S,.*
! "*. ' at * * *_. i 3
4, as*e .. is r-e ; 4.- ra
%u e,,,
.. _ i . _ ,_
p :4. t a r,s .- . , fa
~
- u. .- . Y.,. t, .-
Gyd ~k
. . - - .orq.s .m ..e, . - . .
1 i t .
.,_. W.; ' i -_ Y/ .
9
,,%..*.A:
5 ,mm w %.A-1 l c, ..+ 4 a _. _f .
.D!Y_J
., ...y
*-*--** i.* .i i u. . .,,,,.g. ,
2
., nu u . , , , , _
=
<.~..-
, .., s. , .;
i . .c ,; I d. ( ip- - - - _ . . _ _ h .e. n. ,a e.j saw .*
._ ____ e+aA. .
..~.- , ,
.s FLOCR PL AN of EL 10'-10 J
m i i 2 3 3 ' 4 i S i 6 I
GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 i r ! e _ i
- i o i n ; it , is , +4 st st 4 er.g &
( ~88 88
. ~ *T 4 r an.'c.A
' s, , ( e, ; 'c) (o] <>, -
;r,
; 7 I ,
1-1 g .
.-g
,. _ a.mvw s n.4
.~I . t
. , 4 4
. .i . ., t. .
m *-.
; -s .- t 8 3
a . . _ , I, . ,
,. . . . . . .- . y i.. w ..
w . . - ,,. .... . . ,
~ e 1
* *'** c:my ' d ' *,*,; . . > . . . . . - .
wm 1., ! . ; -e-
.....,n..
a 4.p 4r . : n,n.
- s ..x .*1- 7,' .:*,
l /; }
.i c. iv j L'.O_. , ; .++m~*
i
., ,.4 , m, .,,; . -
., .., .. c i
i .mo- :. ,. . . ,. ,, ,. .. .. < . ..u s ,. gm, . , , - . ,. .. -
.ui. , .
..v...
. . . . .: . p
! i ;. . .
'.:.,:; == .t o
.n%
-- . S
~,. . .
~- r
-l y%~u ..
_. .._.. . P .~.'. p s [ . , s . [
. nae L c,. .
, .__ ,, . ins _ 6 .
.._~.___.i _2 :--__-p m h "7 - " "
g m m. FLOOR PL AN of EL 28'-6 [
- e
-a t aa nim, g
i u ._c,.u, t I
'A; ( ei j ir- vi /s) l e ].
r I ! , .T. 4 - . . k *- ' r s. s- O ...,c, ' -f-I -Q,
- 1 i
.,n
[ p _ v= +- w ~ . f =-
, . ,, I iy i+, , , , , '
..y .. , . , ., .--
i ! .q
*,,* A, .m . ., m..4 . . .4 -. e
, , i.
..,o
, .i . . . .
I
....a -6 i
w-i
.j -s-t
- i. '
1 , . . y-T / i< _ .....,i t, cl
.n. . l
-er ; ' -~ , i i' a.
.wu ,
tv % - i
~.._..
% .a '
,n J_,l j . ._ .
+
.- - T- . . ! ' ' . .i a a
., ,3 , , .
.. p -}.. ...
( - * , q ---- O!.*:.. . k . y.
'n' (M . L*."...,evi. N ROOF PLAN at E L 5 l'-O j, _ _.
- .. a::'j
, e-- .-
j, TEL PLAN _ l i
-1 1
Drawing A-121, Rev. 0 , i r i e , i o i n t [. - - 6 i ir t_ t --- Figure 9A-14. Diesel-Generator Building Fire Area Separations - , Div 1 Floor & Roof Plans 9A.5-61/9A.5-62 .
e
\ / 238 L
i ! 2 1 3 1 4 ! S ! 6 s fa) ( c', f o ,. (j ) y i) (, i
-- : o.-) .-
?
~
..i....
, a .. ..... ,,, rec . , 3 p -4 r--* j ---, . . .., t r . -ij
'- -=. ..g.r, 6> l 1;
'a e
. q ~ .__ 7, ____ . __.. . 6. a %.=,, , ,,,
f . k, , _ g J ~ ' t
-- 9 _ . . . "1 l' .,
ts OlV +' 2
.ew a
., . I e
m,s,as-
%w .* , s L, ,w .
- b. 6.,,-..o
. i.
en l . mm, eo.m T,' l
' Li .S i) 3 L. s - .
4 u .- . [
~ -
'2*
saape Et < se o .
-.6(
m -
-W71.*
- ~- p 9_ _g {) ;
i
- g. [ ts 1 e i' *
%.t.g ,aj
}
- d. -%...p , g
*m a- . g 7
,-7 w (i r .
- . . ~ , , . ,L r,,. . . . . .e s u a -__ - ,,>T' ---. --. - . N -. --- - . ~ . _ Y ,
g j
, Div 3 L .; w l . .... .a 7. y
<0
~
9e m. s-, 3r : -y._--,. __ .-y- y 7
/ t Joe t as teet
..,'. . __ _M r*** g h , e nj,
.---- U. ~. ,
' '- J a um.= ea , n_ a ssa; ..
-f RQg.*' t " y- g7,% i&**.e.e 4y .c *
'* i
- ~i p E~.l .o A- . L& l
' ^
4
-[2^
E FLOOR PL AN of EL (-) 6'- 10 'S N'*- .p g . is A ra-) < c. ) ea i; _ i; fi+ ;-
. ...., ..e.
, ,w. . .v. -- \ ...s -
" , e ,:
a- 6. . .a. . . , . m .. s r,; ., . . .. . .
. J.. m r. _ = e .m r
plV. 2 g, ,,.,,... J
, ..r - w~.*
,. > v s,
.- j f ams' d
+u= ,3 .. g _
ae> < s e s .. . V
~. a, n, .
**"m' . .u s 2- ,.
_1 A- - . - - - - _ _ c C g, q w(
- i. .
_ . _ _;""2._
,..g.
hN N M ,
.., ,a, .,
.a m.no .,. .
e
. .~. 9a=
PlV_.3 "jc-, I'
- y, -1.n_..mw (. 2 a . 4
. .. - 41r' Y
- a. .d C A8k t w ,.
_ l ** . att e<we ~~e ,
.~ i , . a. . , s .s. . .., .[r. . ' "
. = = . .e n 82 .n. ; otv 2
' '+-
m . u ,. . ..3 i
**'**6
--t
,1 e-.
- 4. __ .
.am.. . e , . .~ ' + , ,,
s (.t* a a t i aa v ,
~ ""
FLOOR PLAN of EL 10'-10 8 13'-O m e
- 2 i 3
' 4 3 5
- 6
/
o
GESSAR II 22A7007 NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. O i r t e , , i o . ii , er , o , is h
~ } 'B)r ( t,) (5 ) 't. (7, )
r 4j I
! A
. ,. .-, , - j I.
A __._...e L?__. p . _ _ ,y v . - _ [.C L . .. .,,
,- ,,, .w. , .
- 1 _
i 1 .wp , , -. , .*'
.. ;,,,7, y
. , .,~~; .3 u ,1.
,g. .r. ... g 4
l
,<s+.-7..
j
; -. .en 4
( ..
.v.. . ...t,i . 2 ..
' . c. 2 . .%.
1 'i i i 4' f
> )
i I
. e giy.a.. r ad es
<.,.A.'.
.i
- ess /
1 ti s
, 'I i
i . w =. 3 f.c y . -i
, ~t&+.,--..
s6 sr 6 I n u ,, , ., )% t , i ,. ,,... .
, c, f 8 0 l
e e'r,
~.__y.
-j /
nrat.s
- . g.9 g.
f*O
'r 13 -'
- t'~
t
**1 M '{~' k ]gK*l,, t D I*0d g
. p I we 7.'
(**/ C d, u .
.t ,
' 'sy
]- . i +
gg ,.;' 3.s J.. .~ yp ..l M- ; l 1
~ 1*,'C'
- l s
- e. a .
a
' " '"'? ,s9..
M;a; ' l
, e .a. m'i+o'.n. u. . a_ .' . ., ,J,L* . + , * ' ai
- 8 s.- ..: N4g e i. ;r
, M* ~ l . ['ne I (.Q p!v_ p .
o i g, c. - j h ;:,n ,,,.... AO* aa'*- m -l 7,., *Jl,,,, X ,-
. ..i :. .g 'i 6 . -y _ sc * *%, t-s me i
's
~,
; 3 E r' fg a~re.n <, g . .. 3 ., g ....n.tm g. ,- -
s i " a .s
,, ; ,, . n 4. x'..a
. .l ' u
- . k. , 0 r o - - -- 4-- '#
i . g) g,,,_ hL __p .EE. N.-- - ; - ;
]
,, ,, w. vw
.t II FLOOR PLAN of EL 28'* 6 -
"*' + '
[ ; i'; Fa
~
- n';
r (i) (T) Y
' 'M -- -- -
-- - ~ - y; -f.
(,, ,. .. ... .
- ., .a y> . . . -
qi.. 3 ,,s... r a. ..
, i . . .
1i r e.A,.c 'I e '. a. .
~
"' Y ;;; -
; - M- .a - ,
. , , - %~ % a'.* '..
. . . . s- ' . l i . ,,
. - m .+ /w s m
.}!
,~ e-- --
i . ' * * - ( -.,a_2'
- . .- .. t
- . ~~ ...wl ,
i2F -< ' _ . l- - *s. _XEY. PLAN _ c
.... , s - - - ...s._.e .,
- . e. m N O R h..A..*.A.M,. v,fis.~
+, . , . . . o=,... ,
c ,.= ._ . , (3 . -~ . . s r
, ~._ ...
'1*--
- 2 :
,,,, -h w .a 4 - M
', N,, %,,,., *y,, ,
. _. ,, .. , : -e i
s e v.
.. l' .~ u, '@
. ws
(
<t i
,g (., 4---. -.-.
.. . m .x 3 .
cf
.t : ~ - - - '.,- 3 .nj.c_ ; g : . p
~
yI a (q- }. __ p _ _ . . -. i .,,
.;. io.e. 4 . .. . . g j ROOF PLAN of EL Sf-O ,
m t >> a l 1 Drawing A-122, Rev. 0 .- i i i ,o I~- i e , 9 -. l 4 r . , ,, t Figure 9A-15. Diesel-Generator Building Fire Area Separations r Div 2&3 Floor & Roof Plans 9A.5-63/9A.5-64 ,
4 k 238 e I ! 2 ! 3 1 4 l S l 6 h y @ N>M Q y e-
,@.. . ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
, - - l t
rx.~~7T ; g
.-r -
ifN95%
,.o.,
fwi j .,,,f g m+~' a - . * * * ~ ' */* rw '
=
] ; r e e en ea. -
(~y y . - __ _ - _ __ _ J .i .!_, n'es '. s'm g' i
,C51* . I f.% 1 l i
'l - _ _ M.$7. .i. ', Wa
. r. 3, . - +e e* t=e j _ W Ne+t en p
( *p -- - - . _,. s_W s/ 6 v v -4 A.TO g.
"' -... - b*!n i 7, ej e/ e-I vie, i . .. . . .t . --
w/- l / a'sti e t' s j c .. -:re - 7 . -- - 4 e -- - i I , l hhN" - [ ' j[j . l
,'A "
f 3".A l /x /x (Nr g- . . ._.9
-Ms,aN .
'. - - - _._j. _
1!. t c,., , / f* 5 g - [
.. 74 N * 'i * .
~
;"1",,",
o g- -__ _ ,7 : Q /N /, Q. - . 4 ( N
./
c
..- g N
e s. guv e. , [ Nu.e.,, G / Ii -
~
, so s _ ---- - _
- - - .47, ..
. . ~ .
- s. s+ 2 .., m,, ; N ;;;m w...,+
w- - ~
-,, + . - .-
i Nfx /\ / l! '
~
E> , Ep{'); =,? **
, - ' \ / \- _/\ ' u- - 4 0---
j
. sr,a:
\ L
$_1sC'4 7'A b
,' av.s.s.
u-p** 4 , gi) / kh w! py l +-
?d. 'a M.ai n i. m.
', []4 p* en p l-:
. . o p.54 - -
.f.
,,- m*_-
3f x ( 0 ;.',y ll b,W ~ Ng 1 %;;;7+
- - _ t
,C t *3 Y. ,p >%
eiD
'j' 6p __ # . ..
_ j _ _ n ._.- 1.__ i ..
,_ g%g _g2',-
l l
-L L u
vy - - ry, - m-t ; w:w.= , n
.g-s---f _--y " '
~- .
.. . c , o .u .
)
3,-
- r . . .. .
l *** *gb. g., h
' nm y 't$m$ h n.m
/., ; L
- w k. ,% "y htljt I
,.....,J 1
'l .:..
o. C,,,: IL*1 A Le's av a n u s e ; _ _ s4.,__ _
+
l . _ . . , _ _ _ - _ s . 6 (O) (C} ( t.) d g es, .. e ,a .., i - i 3 a e i 5 i e i 9
GESSAR II 22A70b7 ! NUCLEAR ISLAND Rev. 0 I l P t 8 l 9 g o l 4 ; I? , 13 i i4 J l
' -) !*) ')
- l' ) Q)
*
- I
._.98..t _
- 1 g T ! I I . s
- C)
N o ( )
<. a * , , - -._ - -
s.e.rer
. . .rt,.aa%r~
. .....J- h. ***',O ,
M e_. L i ' ' ' '
},, . .
;pe'** "**vbgg _li. M.T.
's U,sTo T F* . '/ .
~4 a J ___ - . _ g 4 p)& "Q ,
(r) e i
.,-s.-. .- .
_~v~- p,t,,,
- b. . -
Q; m.pss c (] '",#<. ,.*** Ra e " " " "
*-+4' l
'(**Laf , ,IvM I
som u', i
- 4'31 .
.. ,' Mg
- -- -' d ~' '
f 7' ; ~~ MI #
>==
[ Sby;*9 kf(1 . ,.,. j '[ybt i l y
, r;\[ . *.;4P . .
i ,,,, , l ...3 s,, ,sr i r** * ' m-l
- ls*rw ~ w .
h.
~
"* e e-.. ..e t- t ?
n e.", A- t .. m , ... w n,..,.
.. . cot*l we. , \r , , . . , ,
I l ':J j - L'i+. '
, 2 e
i
# _ d _. , .
C "4
- Ol' +- 4 i
. f f 'W %% ; 4h l m NtHi g . _ _ .
. ) f %. ,y (g O'7 . . . _1 l
--H? # :
3 3 h4 g i MEY PLAN j[e&Dx y x 1342r. e , ..v ;hI,! i .
-e
- 'UN $
f - Nr9 l h..sm~ atMAnd**'*w
> J :: o "Lla * - \ + ;.. , . . ; n - '
, , - - .tk[,,
.s.
.Esa'f n iJfu-f i I a., 9 _*$'p-p
-N.,,, f. . s i *., ..
_m ,g - gg ,g i
't':*r.. s"t s y . .(Ly, e ,w s+e , ,
e... w1 - -
. <, . . j m ' .
,h Q
*m . '...Q s
-p Q .
... %.g .
<p 3 ,,,, ,.
..,......x..-=
,,3,
.e.
* * - - E l) 'hg S. *
^k g ,
'4+ ;
7; : '\ .I / AUXILIARY -
- _.._'"/ -
\ BLDG
'g,,,, f
^***. .!.T N'9'M,,.
l t " . ...... , rs s gh*y _O. b. c' "I O.T."M. . .. '
- -.f '2.f} . O *' *??' Q x N u...__ - y
<4 .
p.. t_. . _- [ av i f*I m l cre i - l HEACTOR BLDG , J ME1 ma
.Lz
, ~ ~
a
--, ~$7#
[ i T[,"f ?W , E*EYc ! 0
- l. ~.f;'n::: , , ~
%, eu's a e
u __ _ : ,
,.G i cc =< ,. , .+_,,apgg3,36v __31%.. ,
W,j y e,
,, .., j Mm , q
+,aca ,. m g :Wi:7,..
, . , i
,f'
. ~^
4sih.,
$4 u V
Q?l{4 wi l - E,.-r ==* ,s ~y.wfy. _,
, _. ..s. +.H >
g , -
%r* s n. ;p m t ) . . . ..
l 8, [@
=- .' , , , @,*J'; .e l j O e_ < .u
{ ; ; t I( ) k) (D b b b ',, I D &, ... . i l
~
l L. E GE N D A ., . . . ., :.. n 1
- .4 cau , [ Aji. e s os ~;4e..e l Drawing FP-015, Rev. 5 p awwi e *.ee : % a Ju 8 a J?tchs i y i 3 i 9 i o I si i :2 9 f ? "*
Figure 9A-16. Reactor, Aux. & Fuel Bldgs Fire Protection Equipment Floor Plan at El (-)32'0" I l 9A.5-65/9A.5-66 l l
e I
, 238 4
1 j P 3 t 4 ) S 1_ 6 J . W) lh a O hh d h_ i I l gi."*:;:* j y l \ll ,
?.$T'I
/ / f ,/r A 4 -{'-, y/ /{'; b'r 4 5.
~
lT**w' g*' /
/},/ / q
/
'T^ ?
, , . ,, f a / ,/ /,Qr.'j$~4
./E ?;7fl #?
,/
h$ G. Df..'*0T.'kbLl' 'gh m j'.. f
/., -
,2'.
A ,
, ';? / _ j. .. u L L t
y/j /D.f f, U e_.. w / v 4, e ,/,/ .
- gn;yy" = '/if}'. j
,( /.,f'\ .~ "f'v;,n,o Ay w,I g. -
\ W,s== 1' s.$f,.<~ n'* *l*** ,
K,ur / vn 4 ~ e ,A / % c
.aw K Y ,j) Q ,/ -
.-y 'n 4 ,Y 0 l~
y
.-2_
4_. . _ _ - . . . _ . , T-4.u . h l l /I -
, h 'N; L ,krf , lt ,l ,/, { y a ~ .
.Lenu 3 yv , xj v]
Y % ^/,/ -
; {'
o . , O_ - , , , , , , _ w~ ;i
; w
?:
- ^ .i, 7 ,'. A '
S y - -- - ..
.. , . - ;)- ((,5 n,,',**
/>-
2-QM h=4
- /
i lf % *
.s- e. ..< n_,
J,y4 s "- I t
,.,.,4 ._
47 4 _..e 2 g gu_ _ _, / WL
- m,; , .>.n
-r : r- ,
; .9 .
e sn 4
\,.
FUEL \ ,, gy. \ " *T BLOG / p1. In 1.#::r - , 1
\
^
....5 .. w T4., 9o _1' r y, . - _
'c' -
' _w,3 ,,-
=, v '
s J
'1 T T _--f " nE ._
g _ __ ,
.) __
ew__ p_ .,
- [. \
smur a
/
[( g' _ __ . _ . . _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ T3t 4 _4 ' [ :=. . , c m
- e. .o . , wm-
,M M+oo pr
, so-.% e u4%
p ~v L1 , m = _m
-r o ., -- y .+
Q - -
-}' g.s b
;==A osg 4
, e %,- _ ,
q I
'*L'pA*>OL f fI L,4g fM' w r .
red - 1 5%*M" m j i' I. l m~ : W Ei$ E t W- '.Y U _ . M I'"d* O Eh,,~D*=6 Ly j! M] [
~.-l r-h @1 t Ti1 (5) DIESEL
. e =. ,
(b (
'GENER TOR _ "
BUILDING DIV I
'r k
, Q ,*: 3F s A .m 4 T.4
& ABC E n T s i Am es e
2 i 3 e 4 3 3 6 e $
\
r
1 1 1 G l:G S A R II 22A7007 1UC LI: A R I SI.A W Rev. 0
~
( ; r. , e , + , o , ii i er , a , 4 egy
. 11 1 .
- hi ' flh h 6 h I';') ,
,% "' } t * * ! - DIESEL GENERATOR BLDG w M asa ,, , L_ , ,. . _ . _ _ . Div 2 6 3_ , I j pg ( h_, ' = = ~ ^" -
'g - 9_ 4 j{ / / '
'O*' / '4 j. . gw ' p~-
{5? I,n {D,#,' Y *j/"f / .y' h f , Y f: ,'~* f',l *** )i.]/
,' l } ,
,1L-- ',' - ,/
~~ % .* **y* "M*/ .Q QW, . h3ry'r_f~;Q( 5 y / r*
/ / ,l,,f,,rt". A _v Y ,* 7'. , :.ljn*wssu '
- g '. sg g
- , w ins ,
nm o r#_ .
*,:i ***K.(j
.4*g g ; , j. . $h ?j ,.
r.,,... ,_ c, y a k - . -1. ,t .. 4/ x- g
,- ~
i M1 -
- ~*
i
de)
;~4
~
W y~' , (. fms[o m' r
, ,',,, ' ' c y w.-- pq n * *D " '
- f. - emp @w
[ . N i gr.- _ _ 4_
+
~~. ._
(; , w a. o.
,. 4 g, .
i
.~~' g f - #
7 --yg / .. N A . $ af g__RE ACTOR BLOG s \ p 'f i d_'--1,. _i , g D* 3 nrm e;. \ ' c.g a ; l W k O r , '? ,a ,.,n u_, P / yh \ i
% d -
f ' {. *<. ** ', <
,,, ' 7g; ,
- s. t A
,\ t ( F._ r=A ',G. .
j l
\ *e T
[7*' I', 9 5; ' - ..- #p$ h [.p,,r-li y / g
'[. y.., y F.e *J k'-
s * ' [; f.y p ,o _ - . - 7
- 4wa 1 (p.
N
,/ / ,' ; , /
";/;' ' I's 3 91 ( AUXILIARY -
pQ h,
'7 . \, / t-
[
- - m-
~
r, ,, , b . .nr v;; , *** d"J~-, ' m 7 p BLDG r* W.:t- <G, -,< v - i
*r - ^;t' ',,,,w,
,,e mJ t
i f.' I ' * *. . etyAr . . , , / F v,/ x,.y- m- /
.l Se -+ ~D Mk.:.w.ul.
L 4-- ::m' ' As \ w c. Y as ~
'~QLA< _Q T/i,f
/
n - m."4]3 m t.,*py d g M = 43 ..t L' ' , ' A: r, - n,yg n l.t i t..t u , . . p -w c,
/ 'M
-, - 1.* n.n., w p -% . . .
. . .. _w y e -
cu t : =? '"' j;fi-
.yn' 'r*.
f'y Qi*
y ;g --.. Jyg y /' t/'y?.,r.yw4 ,-'/. L]7 -m - r y ' ~
.., . j '
y'-- $,, / J
. .hi?6 E*b%-:
s m W y;.( > v "L - ; ydd'. # ';,u _:fg me %4., t j Tumi .,]. ' ~ 9fw., M.-4, =_.r;-' mW 4,#h i 3 -, . M ' (' _;;'l' "* *
,)s;.
* ' r.m e t tr x ,e. ,;
*? '*** b 'l w ,
f Q*qm
- if % ", ' 4
, o -~ . r g + y -+ -
,[' _ _ _ ._ . y g U.k.; ' : .<
- /
CONTROL E.2 Q' [r. . . . . - l l _ __ -- g , i l _BL D G. g s 1 ( e J: ?, (~) 5) _e; y g *m. n___ - JVED A -, ,,rs. . . , , . _ y ,' L AJ + Drawing FP-016, Rev. 5 _ . g r .., ,, i I i i i 7 a e i , o ,,}}