ML20046D730

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Forwards for CRGR Review,Revs to 10CFR100, Reactor Site Criteria Revs to 10CFR50,new App to Part 50 & Associated Reg Guides & SRP Sections
ML20046D730
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/10/1996
From: Morrison D
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To: Jordan E
NRC/CRGR
Shared Package
ML20007B779 List:
References
FRN-61FR65157, NRC-2021-000179 AD93-2-026, NUDOCS 9609030314
Download: ML20046D730 (20)


Text

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UNITED STATES j

,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'c WASHINGTON D.C. 20565 0001

!by 10,1996 y

i MEMORANDUM T0:

Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Committee to Peview Generic Requirements FROM:

David L. Morrison, Director i Office of Nuclear Regulatory Re i

s

SUBJECT:

REVISIONS OF 10 CFR PART 100, REACTOR SITE CRITERIA, REVISIONS TO 10 CFR PART 50, NES APPENDIX S TO PART 50 (FINAL RULES) AND ASSOCIATED REGULATORY GUIDES AND STANDARD REVIEW PLAN SECTIONS Attached for CRGR review are the subject documents. The NRC staff is recommending that the Commission issue the cited regulations as a final rule in the Federal Reaister. The availability of associated regulatory guides and standard review plan sections will also be published in the Federal Reaister.

This rulemaking covers two topics. First is the final rule revising 10 CFR l

Part 100, "Reacter Site Criteria," for future plants. The second topic is a final rule codifying geologic and seismic siting factors for new plants.

Both topics address the relocation to 10 CFR Part 50 plant design criteria from Part 100 and Appendix A, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants to 10 CFR Part 100." Implementation of these changes are intended i

to help provide a more stable regulatory basis for the siting of nuclear power plants by decoupling decisions of site suitability from those involving plant design.

The first proposed revision to these regulations was published for public comment on October 20, 1992 (57 FR 47802). Due to the substantive nature of the changes, the Commission requested that all parts (10 CFR Parts 50 and 100), be re.ssued for public comment. The second proposed revision to these regulations was published for public comment on October 17, 1994 (59 FR 52555). A summary of the public comments on the second proposed revision to the regulations is attached (Attachment 1).

The recommended changes to the regulations are described in the attached Federal Reaister Notice and are intended to accomplish the following:

1.

The regulatory action applies tc applicants who apply for a construction permit, early site permit, design certification, or combined license (construction permit and operating license) on or after the effective date of the final regulations. The current regulation will remain in place and be applicable to all licensees and applicants prior to the effective date of the final regulations.

2.

Part 100 will state basic site criteria.

I

Edward L. Jordan 2

3.

Source term and dose calculations are relocated to Part 50 consistent with the location of other design requirements in the regulation.

4.

Also placed into Part 50 is the earthquake engineering criteria currently in Section VI of Appendix A to Part 100.

5.

The revised Appendix A to Part 100 (now designated as Section 100.23 to Part 100) describes requirements; detailed guidance has i

been moved to supporting regulatory guides.

6.

The specification that the Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion is one-half the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion has been deleted and replaced with two options.

7.

Section 50.54 has been revised to state that plant shutdown is required if vibratory ground motion exceeding the OBE or significant plant damage occurs.

The staff briefed the Chairman on April 1, 1996. A list of questions was sent to the EDO (Attachment 2). Staff responses to these questions will be provided to the CRGR later.

The ACRS Extreme External Phenomena Subcommittee reviewed the rulemaking and supporting guidance documents on April 3,1996; the full-committee meeting was held cn April 11, 1996. A letter was written to the Commission (Attachment 3

- The ACRS letter and staff response will be provided to CRGR later).

The rule changes are scheduled to be discussed with the Commission in early June. Therefore, we request that the CRGR review these rule changes and associated guidance documents in May to support this schedule. The CRGR should also be aware that in the non-seismic area, as noted in the draft Commission Paper, there is currently a differing view by the Office of Nuclear i

Regulatory Research regarding the proposed dose evaluation method contained in 10 CFR 50.34.

For further information contact Dr. Andrew J. Murphy, RES, 415-6010 (Email AJMI) on issues related to seismic and earth sciences and Leonard Soffer, EDO, 415-1722 (Email LXSI) on the other issues related to site suitability.

Attachments: See Next Page l

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Attachments:

1.

Sumary of Public Coments (October 1994 publication) 2.

Chairman's Questions 3.

ACRS Letter 4.

Comission Paper 5.

Federal Register Notice of Rulemaking 6.

Resolution of Public Coments' - Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Rule 7.

Regulatory Guide 4.7 (General Site Suitability Criteria) 8.

Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 2 (Seismic Instr.) (Draft was DG-1033) 9.

Resolution of Public Coments on DG-1033 10.

Regulatory Guide 1.166 (Plant Shutdown) (Draft was DG-1034) 11.

Resolution of Public Coments on DG-1034 12.

Regulatory Guide 1.167 (Plant Restart) (Draft was DG-1035) 13.

Resolution of Public Coments on DG-1035 14.

Regulatory Guide 1.165 (Seismic Sources) (DG-1032) 15.

SRP Section 2.5.1, Revision 3 (Basic Geologic and Seismic Information) 16.

SRP Section 2.5.2, Revision 3 (Vibratory Ground Motion) 17.

SRP Section 2.5.3, Revision 3 (Surface Faulting) 18.

Resolution of Public Coments on DG-1032, and SRPs 2.5.1, 2.5.2 & 2.5.3 19.

Regulatory Analysis 20.

Environmental Assessment

1 1

DISTRIBUTION:

R. McMullen N. Chokshi T. King R. Rothman 1

G. Bagchi J. Taylor A. Ibrahim SGEB r/f RES-20-4 I

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ATTACHMENT 4 COMMISSION PAPER

i The Commissioners 2

BACKGROUND:

On April 12, 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) issued 10 CFR Part 100,

" Reactor Site Criteria" (27 8 3509). On November 13, 1973, the AEC issued Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, " Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for i

Nuclear Power Plants," (38 8 31279).

A proposed rule to revise Part 100, Appendix A to Part 100, and sections of Part 50 was publisheo for comment on October 20, 1992 (57 8 47802). The proposed rule change combined two separate initiatives dealing with non-seismic and seismic issues, and included a minimum distance to the exclusion area boundary of 0.4 miles, guideline limits for population density, and required both probabilistic and deterministic seismic hazard evaluations. The comment period, extended twice, expired on June 1, 1993. Extensive comments, both domestic and international, were received.

The Commission was briefed on August 3, 1993, on the status of the proposed rule and the nature of the comments received.

In an SRM dated August 12, 1993, the Commission raised several concerns regarding the prescriptive aspects of the proposed revisions to Part 100 as well as its form and content.

In response, the staff prepared an options paper, SECY-94-017, dated January 26, 1994.

In an SRM dated March 28, 1994, the Commission approved the staff recommendations; however, due to the substantive nature of the changes to be made to the rule the Commission stated that both parts were to be resubmitted for Commission review and reissued for public comment prior to the final rulemaking. Outlines of the draft regulatory guides and standard review plan section were to be submitted to the Commission for review, to demonstrate how the basic site criteria are to be implemented. The draft regulatory guides and standard review plan section were to be issued for public comment after receiving Commission approval of the outlines.

The second proposed revision to these regulations was published for public comment on October 17, 1994 (59 FR 52255). On February 8, 1995, the NRC stated (60 FR 7467) that 1 intended to extend the comment period to allow interested persons adequate time to provide comments on staff guidance documents. On February 28, 1995, the availability of the five draft regulatory guides and three draft standard review plan sections that were developed to provide guidance on meeting the proposed regulations was published (60 FR 10880) and the comment period for the proposed rule was extended to May 12, 1995 (60 FR 10810).

Included in this package are the Federal Register notice for the final rule (Attachment 1 the resolution of public comments on the rc :ter cite criteria and-piFopniid s)e,ismic and earthquake engineering criteria ' 6E"66hlisFTpsif

~

f blints~(Attichments 2 ar.d 3), the ACRS letter on the ruleihikT6h"(AtilchEiht 4-3f,'~T' draft public announcement (Attachment 5-f), and the draft congressional l

letters (Attachment 6-5).

j

The Commissioners 15 Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, dated July 21, 1993.

Item V(B)(5), "Value of the Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion (OBE) and Required OBE Analysis," to the supplemental I

information to the regulations was slightly modified to address the noted concerns.

The regulation was not changed to incorporate by reference the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 4, " Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary on Standard for Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures." In response to the August 12, 1993, SRM pertaining ta the prescriptive aspects of the first proposed revisions to Part 100 as well as its form and content, the final regulation contains only the basic requirements;the detailed guidance is provided in regulatory guides and standard review plan sections. ASCE Standard 4 is cited in the 1989 revision of Standard Review Plan Sections 3.7.1, 3.7.2, and 3.7.3.

The reference to aftershocks in Paragraph IV(b), Surface Deformation was deleted.

Paragraphs VI(a)(1), " Safe Shutdown Earthquake," and VI(b)(3) of Appendix A to Part 100 contain the phrase " including aftershocks."

In the proposed regulation the " including aftershocks" phrase was only removed from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion requirements (Paragraph IV(a)(1) of Appendix S to Part 50).

Guidance Documents Many of the commentors have provided editorial and technical suggestions that would clarify the documents. A few commentors provided more substantive comments requiring a careful assessment of their implications.

For example, the Staff clarified the procedure in SRP Section 2.5.2 used to assess the adequacy of an applicants submittal. Also, Regulatory Guide 1.165 (Draft was DG-1032) discusses how uncertainties in the SSE can be addressed through a suitable sensitivity analysis.

In general, no technical changes were made to the staff positions described in the draft guidance documents.

It is anticipated that the availability of the related regulatory guidance and standard review plan sections will be published in the Federal Reaister coincident with the effective date of the final regulations.

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Affairsi(01RA)h0fficejoflManagementland? Budge'; "concerning!whether thisjfinal rui ssist a ymaj o ri rul ens; defined sin { Section; 804 RegulatoriLEnforcem2ntifairness(A.ctlof)11996MThe;of(theismalllBdsines(tM. s3._

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D h al irul elwij l j be2 amend edMo3ncl ud elaiRegul ato ry21 exi bil i tyfAn alysi si RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the Commission:

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.I ATTACHMENT 5

i FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE OF RULEMAKING 4

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

l I.

Background.

II.

Objectives.

III.

Genesis.

IV.

Alternatives.

V.

Major Changes.

A.

Reactor Siting Criteria (Nonseismic).

B.

Seismic and Earthqune Engineering Criteria.

i VI.

Related Regulatory Guides and Standard Review Plan Sections.

VII.

Future Regulatory Action.

i Vill.

Referenced Documents.

IX.

Summary of Comments on the Proposed Regulations.

l A.

Reactor Siting Criteria (Nonseismic).

8.

Seismic and Earth uake Engineering Criteria.

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Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.

n XIll?

Regulatory Analysis.

MMXIVi!

Regulatory Flexibility Certification.

MVrXVf~

Backfit Analysis, j

!. Background The present regulation regarding reactor site criteria (10 CFR Part 100) was promulgated April 12, 1962 (27 FR 3509). NRC staff guidance on exclusion-area and low population zone sizes as well as population density was issued in "egulatory Guide 4.7, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations," published for comment in September 1974. Revision I to this guide was issued in November 1975. On June 1, 1976, the Public Interest Research i

Group (PIRG) filed a petition for rulemaking (PRM-100-2) requesting that the NRC incorporate minimum exclusion area and low population zone distances and population density limits into the regulations. On April 28, 1977, Free Environment, Inc. et. al., filed a petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-20). The l

remaining issue of this petition requests that the central Iowa nuclear project and other reactors be sited at least 40 miles from major population centers.

In August 1978, the Commission directed the NRC staff to develop a i

9eneral policy statement on nuclear power reactor siting. The " Report of the Siting Policy Task Force" (NUREG-0025) was issued in August 1979 and provided 4

recommendations regarding siting of future nuclear power reactors.

In the 1980 Authorization Act for the NRC, the Congress directed the NRC to decouple 1

siting from design and to specify demographic criteria for siting. On July 29, 1980 (45 FR 50350), the NRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) regarding revision of the reactor site criteria, which discussed the recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force and sought public comments. The proposed rulemaking was deferred by the Commission in December 1981 to await development of a Safety Goal and improved research on accident source terms. On August 4, 1986 (51 FR 23044), the NRC issued its Policy Statement on Safety Goals that stated quantitative health objectives with regard to both prompt and latent cancer fatality risks. On December 14, 1988 (53 FR 50232), the NRC denied PRM-100-2 on the basis that it would 3

2

Population density considerations beyond the exclusion area have been required since issuance of Part 100 in 1962. The current rule requires a " low population zone" (LPZ) beyond the immediate exclusion area. The LPZ boundary must be of such a size that an individual located at its outer boundary must not receive a dose in excess of the values given in Part 100 over the course of the accident. While numerical values of population or population density are not specified for this region, the regulation also requires that the nearest boundary of a densely populated center of about 25,000 or more persons be located no closer than one and one-third times the LPZ outer boundary.

Part 100 has no population criteria other than the size of the LPZ and the proximity of the nearest population center, but notes that "where very large cities are involved, a greater distance may be necessary."

Whereas the exclusion area size is based upon limitation of individual risk, population density requirements serve to set societal risk limitations and reflect consideration of accidents beyond the design basis, or severe accidents. Such accidents were clearly a consideration in the original issuance of Part 100, since the Statement of Considerations (27 FR 3509; April 12, 1962) noted that:

"Further, since accidents of greater potential hazard than those commonly postulated as representing an upper limit are conceivable, although highly improbable, it was considered desirable to provide for protection against excessive exposure doses to people in large centers, where effective protective measures might not be feasible... Hence, the population center distance was added as a site requirement."

Limitation of population density beyond the exclusion area has the followin' benefits:

(a)

It facilitates emergency preparedness and planning; and (b)

It reduces potential doses to large numbers of people and reduces property damage in the event of severe accidents.

Although the Commission's Safety Goal policy r rovides guidance on individual risk limitations, in the form of the Quratitative Health Objectives (QHO), it provides no guidance with regard to societal risk limitations and therefore cannot be used to ascertain whether a p2rticular population density l

would meet the Safety Goal.

However, results of severe accident risk studies, particularly those obtained from NUREG-1150, can provide useful insights for considering potential criteria for populatic; Jensity.

Severe accidents having the i

highest consequences are those where core-melt together with early bypass of or containment failure occurs. Such an event would likely lead to a "large release" (without defining this precisely). Based upon NUREG-1150, the probability of a core-melt accident together with early containment failure or byp' ass for some current generation LWRs is estimated to be between 10-' and a

10- per reactor year. For fuure plants, this value is expected to be less i

than 10-* per reactor year.

If ; re :tcr w:: located nearer t: : larg city th;n current "C practiccep mitted, the likelibccd of expe:ing : large nt:bcr of p: ple 10

ignific:nt rele ::: cf radic :tiv: ::taehl weuid b Obcut th: :::: :s the 11

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Even ifsa reactor,was l,ocated near_er t_o a l_arge_ cit,y than_ cur _ rent IIRC 5Nifice' permitted,;the IN11 hood of expos'ing,a 1arge number of people,to" l

significant' releases of: radioactive material would be less than the like11 tis 6d i

of a core-melt'and early containment failure' event, because,the' wind,would"^ ~'

blow:towards:the: city 'only'a fraction of the: time, thereby reducing'the^^^~

l likellbood of affecting the' city;.'This,value is: expected;to be'less':thiiiT10f per reactor, year, for:futura reactor de'ign'sc.It is worth' noting'that events s

having theuery: low likelhod of abouti10$~be ' incredible?,;and as'such, hse per reactoriyant or, lower have"'

t been regarded to past licensing actions to n'ot:been i nd totbe incorporated;into the~ design basis of.the, plant.h:~ -

Hence, ba

, solely upon' accident likelihood,xit might be' argued that'sittiii a l

. reactor ' nearer. to' a large ' city ~th_an ' current'NRC.p' actice would p.ose i

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- r r.isks- - -

b, L,.1f _a re_act_or vert sit _d_away th_e city, being affected would betroducefrom;l_arge_ cit <ie_s_, th_e I,W_1b_od <_o e

j d further because the radiologica1Jdosi~

consequences would be reduced with distance as:the concentration of~~~~~~

radioactive mater,ial ' becomes. diluted :by the, atmosphere an'd,the :invehf6p) becomes' depleted due'to the natural processes of fallout and: rainout bef65 1

reaching the city. Analyses: indicate thatif!a< reactor were^10cated7 t a

' distances' ranging from 10 to about 20 miles away from a city, degiending'iiii66 its size,'the'11 celihood of. exposure"of;1arge' numbers of people within the-city would be reduced by factors of ten.to one hundred or more comp ~ared witt,i l

locating a reactor very close'to a cie J^

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a In s mmary, next-generation reactors are expected to have risk u

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characteristics sufficiently low that the safety of the public is reasonably l

assured by the reactor and plant design and operation itself, resulting in a i

very low likelihood of occurrence of a severe accident.

Such a plant can j

satisfy the QH0s of the Safety Goal with a very small exclusion area distance j

(as low as 0.1 miles). The consequences of design basis accidents, analyzed using revised rource terms and with a realistic evaluation of engineered Y

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uncertainties in geosciences parameters. Because of uncertainties about earthquake phenomena (especially in the eastern United States), there have often been differences of opinion and differing interpretations among experts as to the largest earthquakes to be considered and ground-motion models to be used, thus often making the licensing process relatively unstable.

Over the past decade, analysis methods for incorporating these different interpretations have been developed and used. These "probabilistic" methods have been designed to allow explicit incorporation of different models for 1

zonation, earthquake size, ground motion, and other parameters. The advantage of using these probabilistic methods is their ability te-not only to incorporate different models and different data sets, but also to siight them using judgments as to the validity of the different models and data sets, and thereby providing an explicit expression for the uncertainty in the ground i

motion estimates and a means of assessing sensitivity to various input parameters. Another advantage of the probabilistic method is the target exceedance probability is set by examining the design bases of more recently licensed nuclear power plants.

The final regulation explicitly recognizes that there are inherent uncertainties in establishing the seismic and geologic design parameters and allows for the option of using a probabilistic seismic hazard methodology i

capable of propagating uncertainties as a means to address these uncertainties. The rule further recognizes that the nature of uncertainty and the appropriate approach to account for it depend greatly on the tectonic regime and parameters, such as, the knowledge of seismic sources, the j

existence of historical and recorded data, and the understanding of tectonics.

Therefore, methods other than the probabilistic methods, such as sensitivity analyses, may be adequate for some sites to account for uncertainties.

Methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing the regulation are described in Regulatory Guide 1.165, " Identification and Characterization of Seismic Sources and Determination of Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion."

The key elements of this approach are:

Conduct site-specific and regional geoscience investigations, Target exceedance probability is set by examining the design bases of more recently licensed nuclear power plants, Conduct probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and determine ground motion level corresponding to the target exceedance probability Determine if information from the regional and site geoscience investigations change probabilistic results, Determine site-specific spectral shape and scale this shape to the ground motion level determined above, NRC staff review using all available data including insights and information from previous licensing experience, and Update the data base and reassess probabilistic metho.is at least every ten years.

Thus, the approach requires thorough regional and site-specific geoscience investigations.

Results of the regional and site-specific 19vestigations must be considered in applications of the probabilistic method. The current probabilistic methods, the NRC sponsored study conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) or the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) seismic hazard study, are regional studies without detailed information on any 16

1 provided in regulatory guides and, to some extent, in standard review plan sections. Both the NRC and industry have experienced difficulties in applying prescriptive regulations such as Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 because they inhibit the use of needed latitude in judgement. Therefore, it is common NRC practice not to reference publications such as ASCE Standard 4 (an analysis, not design standard) in its regulations. Rather, publications such as ASCE Standard 4 are cited in regulatory guides and standard review plan sections.

ASCE Standard 4 is cited in the 1989 revision of Standard Review Plan Sections 3.7.1, 3.7.2, and 3.7.3.

Comment: The Department of Energy stated that the required consideration of aftershocks in Paragraph IV(B), Surface Deformation, is confusing and recommended that it be deleted.

Response: The NRC agrees. The reference to aftershocks in Paragraph IV(b) has been deleted.

Paragraphs VI(a), Safe Shutdown Earthquake, and VI(B)(3) of Appendix A to Part 100 contain the phrase " including aftershocks."

The " including aftershocks" phrase was removed from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion requirements in the proposed regulation. The

)

recommended change will make Paragraphs IV(a)(1), " Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion," and IV(b), " Surface Deformation, of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part j

50 consistent.

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XXI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this regulation is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required.

The revisions associated with the reactor siting criteria in 10 CFR Pa-t 100 and the relocation of the plant design requirements from 10 CFR Part 100 to 10 CFR Part 50 have been evaluated against the current requirements. The Commission has concluded that relocating the requirement for a dose calculation to Part 50 and adding more specific site criteria to Part 100 does not decrease the protection of the public health and safety over the current regulations. The amendments do not affect nonradiological plant effluents and have no other environmental impact.

The addition of s100.23 to 10 CFR Part 100, and the W tion of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50, will not change the radiological environ, antal impact offsite. Onsite occupational radiation exposure associated with inspection and maintenance will not change. These activities are principally associated j

with base line inspections of structures, equipment, and piping, and with maintenance of seismic instrumentation. Base line inspections are needed to differentiate between pre-existing conditions at the nuclear power plant and 29

. _ _ =.

i 9

ATTACHMENT 14 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.165 DRAFT WAS DG-1032 i

(SEISMIC SOURCES) r l

l l

i l

i

1 The PSHA should only be updated if it will le:d 10 high?

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p.er m.

27 seismic hazard analysis (for CEUS ite: cdy) using original 28 or updated sources as determined in Step 2ier : :ite 29 specific PS".A (or sites in other parts of the country)

--,n._,,,.

30 pe rt_o r_m i a r s i_t,e,_s.p.e,c_i f,i c PSWU R_f_e_r.e__nc_e f9.

The ground i

.e 31 motion estimates should be made for rock conditions in the 32 free-field or by assuming hypothetical rock conditions for a

)

33 nonrock site to develop the seismic hazard information base 34 discussed in Appendix C.

15 i

1

1 2.

Use S.,.3, to scale the response spectrum shape corresponding 2

to the controlling earthquake.

If, as described in Appendix 3

C, there is a controlling earthquake for S,,,,.., determine 4

that the S.,

3, scaled response spectrum also envelopes the 5

ground motion spectrum for the controlling earthquake for 6

S.,3.... Otherwise, modify the shape to envelope the low-7 frequency spectrum or use two spectra in the following 8

steps. See additional discussion in Appendix F.

For j % e 9

rock site go to Step 4.

10 3.

For-% e nonrock sites, perform a site-specific soil 11 amplification analysis considering uncertainties in site-12 specific geotechnical properties and parameters to determine 13 response spectra at the free ground surface in the free-14 field for the actual site conditions.

15 4.

Compare the smooth SSE spectrum or spectra used in design 16 (e.g.,0.3g, broad-bandspectrausedinAjdvancedt{ight 17 WlaterR[eactordesigns)withthespectrumorspectra 18 determined in Step 2 for rock sites or determined in Step 3 19 for the nonrock sites to assess the adequacy of the SSE 20 spectrum or spectra.

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22 EpjK@RneediM T jo obtain an adequate design SSE based 23 on the site-specific response spectrum or spectra, develop a 24 smooth spectrum or spectra or use a standard broad band 25 shape that envelopes the spectra of Step 2 or Step 3.

26 Additional discussion of this step is provided in 27 Appendix F.

28 D.

IMPLEMENTATION 29 The purpose of this section is to provide guidance to applicants and 30 licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.

31 This pr:p :cd revi',icn h:: b: rek:: d t: en;;;r:g public 32 p:rticip:tica in it: d rchpzent.

Except in those cases in which the 33 applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with the 17

l l

l 1

1 specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the acthod to be de:cribed l

2 4*-th}ie ::tive guide reflecting public c:=:nt will be used in the 3

evaluation of applications for construction permits, operating licenses, early i

4 site permits, or combined licenses submitted after the i=ple ent: tion date to 5

be specified in th: :tive guide EFFECTIV. E?DATETOF3THE.TF.INARRULE. This guide

.:: id @'ll not be used in the evaluation of an application for an operating j _ _ _

6 7

license submitted after the impic=cnt: tion d:t to 5: :pecified in th: ::tiv:

8 guid: EFECTIyEiDATEZDFjlHE] l@ QRULE if the construction permit was issued

(

9 prior to that date.

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18

1 APPENDIX E 2

PROCEDURE FOR THE EVALUATION OF NEW GEOSCIENCES INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE 3

SITE-SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 4

5 E.1 INTRODUCTION 6

This appendix provides methods acceptable to the NRC staff for assessing 7

the impact of nr. information obtained during site-specific investigations on tt nd..t. ba - _ _d _,fo_r., the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA).

ial a a 8

- fu

. se _se

_m 9

Regulatory Position 4 in this guide describes acceptable PSHAM :n:ly:::

10 that were developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) and the 11 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to ch.,_a_r_a_ct_er.-~th.e._ise_is..m_ic_tha._za,rd w

ize1

'fbW%.MemvW.0rJnucle.MXww vg:

W oweM.v$yv,l cAN are puawww.r.w?.p.v'.w we.@t,s.ystint: th: centrollin ::rth ;;kes and to develop 12 an inws.c3Xvawmmw.cNMMu.

v h uye 13 the Safe Shutdown Earthquake ground motion (SSE). The procedure to determine 14 the SSE outlined in thi: Dr:ft Regulatory Guide _EB_5 DC 1032 relies primarily w

15 on either the LLNL or EPRI PSHA results for the Central and Eastern United 16 States (CEUS).

It is necessary to evaluate the geological, seismological, 17 and geophysical data obtained from the site-specific investigations to 18 demonstrate that these data are consistent with the PSHA data bases of these 19 two methodologies.

If :f nific:nt differences E_nlFIEfs_niE_f6s_WtWfds.ht_Tffsd

=

. - ~ ~ _ -

20 QliRilfE3M[dji between th: investigationj rc:;lt:SiiGQilyjMfE 21 N"NNN

' ' ' - " - + ' - * * - ' ' - - " " '

L OA= M '.*2 M =',.m = A"

  • """'""**'""'t.

22 differ =:: ould result in a significant increase in the hazard estimate for a s i t e, _wwd._yi<hv.4.;.mmym.wcupi.istnewt nform.w.-at..c vam i_e wmed._w,4mvs._tva._l,.lyd..s.v.te.od_.g on.

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_ _ ~ _ _ _

l 24 PSHA may have to be modified to incorporate the new GM.4_fcil: information.

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ATTACHMENT 18 4

l I

RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS DG-1032, SRP SECTIONS 2.5.1, 2.5.2 & 2.5.3 i

i I

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}

r

If, however, new data indicate that there is a potential for a significant change in the hazard estimate, such as the discovery of a previously unknown capable tectonic source at the site, then sensitivity studies will be carried out to estimate the impact of the new data on the seismic hazard.

If the resulting value is approximately enveloped by the PSHA database, no further analysis is necessary.

Analyses along these lines were performed by NUMARC (now NEI) and EPRI in regard to the effect on the seismic hazard in the Wabash Valley as defined by the LLNL and EPRI PSHA's of the discovery of paleoseismic evidence for a prehistoric earthquake of an estimated magnitude of 7.5.

They demonstrated that the occurrence of such an event centered at Vincennes, Indiana, was enveloped by the PSHA input, and a new PSHA was not necessary.

It is expected that the results of this analysis of the new information about he Wabash Valley will be typical of most assessments of new data that initially imply i

that there might be a change in the seismic hazard.

A similar exercise was accomplished regarding new information and its impact on the seismic hazard of a site on the Savannah River Reservation.

In this case the seismic design was impacted by the new information because of the significance of new data.

~

Although advice from the scientific community will be sought, obtaining its consensus regarding the significance of new data is a difficult, if not an

)

impossible task.

Licensing activities should not be delayed for a substantial amount of time waiting for this to come about. The staff will make a Judgement on the significance of new data based on strong technical evidence, and communication with, but not on a consensus of, the scientific community.

In most cases, if it can be shown that the new data only has an impact on the site being evaluated (source zones only applicable to that site), then a new

. reference probability need not be calculated.

When more than one site is affected, then it may be necessary to recalcu' ate the seismic hazard at all i

sites cnd de'/cicy new reference robability AnybVeFall7riV61oji?6ffthildifi tiish%sld?s1]hheijdirlsTFhikisisktjyrCofithe[aMep}abil#f16fdthQsfersncs P$953E0$tX-The procedure described in lines 21-23 which is similar to the staff's " sanity check" for the PSHA described in DG 1032. The staff is no longer required to perform a deterministic seismic hazard analysis.

1 2.

Page E-2, lines 2-4.

These referenced lines have been modified to read; "If new information identified by the site specific investigations would result in a significant increase in the hazard estimate for a site, and this new information is validated by a strong technical basis, the PSHA may have to be modified to incorporate the new technical information.

In general, major recomputations of the LLNL and EPRI data base are planned to be undertaken periodically (approximately every ten years), or when there is an important new finding or occurrence that h::, b;;cd en sensitivity tudic:,

rc;ulted in 0 ;ignificant increa:c in the hazard c;timate."

3.

Page E-2, line 13. The word "effect" has been replaced with " affect".

5A t

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