ML20046C347
| ML20046C347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1993 |
| From: | Hood D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046C348 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308100166 | |
| Download: ML20046C347 (12) | |
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7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON DOCKET NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425 NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES. PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION. AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81 issued to Georgia Power Company, et al. (the licensee) for operation of the Vc ele Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Burke County, Georgia.
The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1, " Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," TS 3/4.3.2, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," and their associated Bases to relax surveillance test intervals (STI) and allowed outage times (A0T) for engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation based on Westinghouse topical report WCAP-10271 as previously approved by the NRC. The changes to TS 3/4.3.1 for the reactor trip system (RTS) are those directly associated with implementing the ESFAS relaxations as recommended by the NRC staff in previous SERs regarding WCAP-10271.
The licensee is making piant hardware and procedural modifications to perform routine testing in bypass of the ESFAS and RTS instrumentation without the use of temporary jumpers or the lifting of leads.
Therefore, the licensee 9308100166 930903 PDR ADOCK 05000424 P
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also proposes certain changes to the Vogtle TS to incorporate the provisions of " test in bypass."
i The changes to TS 3/4.3.1 would include:
(1)
Removal of the requirement to perform the RTS analog channel operational test on a staggered basis from TS Table 4.3-1 (Note 17).
(2)
Addition of a new Action to allow 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to restore an inoperable i
P channel to Operable status before requiring shutdown to Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to allow surveillance testing, j
provided the other channel is Operable (Action 7).
(3) kemoval of table notations g and 18 and appropriate references t
from TS Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1, indicating that the ESFAS Actions are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.
(4)
Changes to Action statements to allow for " test in bypass" (Actions 2 and 6).
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(5)
Retention of the current Action 6 as Action 9 for the reactor coolant pump undervoltage and underfrequency trip functions.
(6)
Addition of table notation f to identify those instrument functional units which have " test in bypass" capability.
The changes to TS 3/4.3.2 would include:
(1)
Increase in STIs for ESFAS analog channel operational tests from once per month to once per quarter (Functional Units 1.c, l.d, 1.e, 2.c, 4.c, 4.d, 4.e, 5.c, 6.b, 6.d, and 9.a).
(2)
Increase in the time that an inoperable ESFAS channel may be maintained in an untripped condition from I hour to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Action 20 and new Action 29).
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_3-3 (3)
Removal of current Action 15 which is no longer used.
Functional 1
Units which used current Action 15'would be applied to other i
Actions. A new Action 15 would be created (see item 4 below) since that number is no longer used.
i (4)
Increase in the time that an inoperable ESFAS channel may be bypassed to allow testing of another charnel in the same function from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (Actions 14, 17, 20, 22, and 25).
New Actions 15 and 29 would be created since the semi-automatic switchover to containment emergency sump function's A0T and the I
loss of power to the 4.16 kv ESF bus, for a channel to be bypassed during surveillance testing, would remain at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
(5)
Revision to Actions 14, 22, and 25 to allow 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to restore an inoperable Channel to Operable status before requiring shutdown to Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
(6)
Changes to Action statement 20 to allow for " test in bypass."
(7)
Addition of new Action 29 to allow Startup and/or Power Operation to proceed when the number of Operable channels is one less than the Total Number of Channels provided certain ronditions are met.
j (8)
Removal of table notation d and appropriate rM erences to i
establish consistency with previous amendments on Vogtle regarding j
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Addition of table notation "##" to identify those instrument functional units which have " test in bypass" capability.
(10) Administratively increasing each Action Statement number 29 and higher in TS Tables 3.3-4 and 3.3-8 so that each Action Statement number would continue to be unique.
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. Proposed revisions to the Bases for TS 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 would also be made.
T The licensee's submittal included Westinghouse report WCAP-13376 (Proprietary) and WCAP-13377 (Non-proprietary), Revision 2, " Bypass Test Instrumentation for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2,"
to describe the design modifications associated with the capability at Vogtle to
" test in bypass." The licensee notes, however, that it has elected not to implement, and has proposed no TS changes with respect to, the " test in bypass" capabilities for the reactor coolant pump undervoltage and underfrequency reactor trip functions that is described in this Westinghouse report.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
t The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazerds consideration.
Under the Commission's i
regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATIQN_REGARDING WCAP '102711 (1)
The proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously l
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The determination that the result of the i
proposed changes are within all acceptable criteria has been established in the SERs prepared for WCAP-10271, WCAP-10271 Supplement 1, WCAP-10271 Supplement 2 and WCAP-10271 Supplement 2, Revision 1.
Implementation of the proposed changes results in a slight increase in the postulatud instrumentation yearly unavailability.
This slight increase, which is primarily due to less frequent surveillance, results in a slight increase in core damage frequency (CDF) and public health risk.
The values determined by the WOG [ Westinghouse Owners Group] and presented in the WCAP for the increase in CDF were verified by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) as part of an audit and sensitivity analyses for the NRC Staff.
Based on the small value of the increase compared to the range of uncertainty in the CDF, the increase is considered acceptable.
The proposed changes do not result in an increase in the severity or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Implementation of the proposed changes may affect the probability of failure of the RTS, but does not alter the manner in which protection is afforded nor the manner in which limiting criteria are established.
(2)
The proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in a change in the manner in which the RTS/ESFAS provides plant protection or the manner in which surveillances are 1
performed to demonstrate operability.
Therefore, a new or different kind of accident will not occur as a result of these changes.
(3)
The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation are determined.
The impact of reduced testing, other than as addressed above, is to allow a longer time interval over which instrument uncertainties (e.g., drift) may act.
Evaluations have been performed to assure that the plant setpoints properly account for these instrument uncertainties over the longer time interval.
Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an overall improvement in safety as follows:
a.
Less frequent testing will result in fewer inadvertent actuations of ESFAS components.
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Longer A0Ts provide for better assessment of problems and easier repairs ultimately resulting in better equipment performance.
c.
Less frequent distraction of the operator and shift supervisor'to attend to and support instrumentation.
l testing will improve the effectiveness of the-s operating staff in monitoring and' controlling plant operation.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION REGARDING " TEST IN BYPASS":
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(1)
The bypass testing capability does not invol've a significant increase in the probability or consequences of'an accident previously evaluated.
Surveillance testing in the bypass-condition will not cause any design.or analysis acceptance-criteria to be exceeded. The structural and functional i
integrity of the reactor protection and engineered safety features actuation systems, or any other plant system, is unaffected. Operability of the reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation systems' is defined by the TS.
These systems are part of the accident mitigation response i
and do not themselves act as an initiator for any transient.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence is not affected.
Implementation of the bypass testing capability does not affect the integrity of the fission product barriers-utilized for mitigation of radiological ' dose' consequences as a result of an accident.
Plant response.as modeled in the safety analyses is unaffected. Hence, the offsite mass releases used as input to the dose calculations are unchanged.from those previously as'sumed. Therefore, the offsite dose predictions remain within the acceptance
'i criteria for each of the transients affected.
Since it has been determined that the transient results are unaffected by surveillance testing in bypass,'it is concluded that the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not' increased.
(2)
Implementation of the bypass test capability does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously' evaluated. Surveillance testing in bypass does not affect accident initiation sequences or response scenarios as modeled in the safety analyses. No new operating configuration.is being imposed by the j
surveillance testing in bypass that would create a new failure' scenario.
In additior.,no new failure modes are being created'for any plant equipment, ' Integrity of the bypass test instrumentation has been demonstrated by design l
confornance to applicable industry standards, evaluation,-
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- and testing for fault condition control, failure detection, reliability, and equipment qualification.
Therefore, the types of accidents defined in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) continue to represent the credible spectrum of events to be analyzed which determine safe plant operation.
(3)
The margin of safety associated with reactor trip and engineered safety features functions is evident by the results of the accident analyses.
Results of the safety analyses confirm that the acceptance criteria are met.
The required margin of safety regulated for each affected safety analysis is maintained. These conclusions are not affected by performing surveillance testing in bypass. Thereby, the adequacy of the revised TS for bypass testing implementation to maintain the plant in a safe operating range is also
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confirmed, and this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination.
Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publicat;on of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period.
However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
The final determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this
action, it will publish in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and j
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, l
Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room P-223, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4: 15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L r
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.
By September 8,1993
, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.
Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance t
with the Commission's " Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2.
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the local public 1
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. document room located at Burke County Public Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830.
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and 1.icensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order. As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition i
should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest.
The petition should also identify the specific aspect (s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a i
petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Bcard up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requiraments described above.
Not later j
than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated
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in the matter.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted.
In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion.
Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.
3 Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration.
The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration.
The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and
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make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700).
The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the folluwing message addressed to David B. Matthews:
petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counse'1, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, ar,d to Mr. Arthur H.
Domby, Esquire, Troutman, Sanders, Nations Bank Plaza, Suite 5200, 600 Peachtree Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2210, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or
.. request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the application for r
amendment dated March 1, 1993, as supplemented July 26, 1993, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the local public document room located at the Burke County Public Library, 412 Fourth Street, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of August 1993.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WL 00(
Darl S. Hood, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reacter 9rojects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4
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