ML20045G490
| ML20045G490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1993 |
| From: | Bielby M, Jordan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045G488 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-OL-93-01, 50-461-OL-93-1, NUDOCS 9307140035 | |
| Download: ML20045G490 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-461/0L-93-01 Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62 Licensee:
Illinois Power Company Mail Code V-275 Post Office Box 678 Clinton, IL 61727 Facility Name:
Clinton Power Station
.I Examination Administered At: Clinton Power Station Clinton, Illinois Examination Conducted: Week of June 7,1993
'1 Examiners: Colin Carroll, Sonalysts, Inc.
Marion Daniels, Sonalysts, Inc.
7/7!N Chief Examiner:
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7['7/h3 Approved By:
M. J.Nor4hrti Chief U
Date Operator Licensing Section 1 Examination Summary Examination administered durina the week of June 7. 1993 (Recort No. 50-461/0L-93-Ol(DRS))
Six initial Reactor Operator (RO) license examinations, and two Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) initial license examinations, were administered to non-licensed operators. SRO initial license examinations were also administered to three R0s.
Examinations were administered in accordance with guidelines of NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, Revision 7.
Results: All individuals successfully passed all sections of their respective s
examinations.
l The following is a summary of strengths and weaknesses noted during performance of this examination:
e 9307140035 930708 DR ADOCK OSOO 1
Examination Summary 2
Strenaths Candidates' teamwork during dynamic scenarios (Section 3.c.).
Candidates' communications during dynamic scenarios (Section 3.c.).
Exam reference material supplied to the NRC and contract examiners (Section 4.).
o Training staff pre-exam review (Section 4.).
Use of three training instructors to run simulator and handle communications during dynamic scenarios (Section 4.).
Weaknesses Crew inconsistency about who was responsible for referring to Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) for verifying subsequent actions (Section 3.c.).
Candidate and examiner delays at badging and dosimetry (details in Section 4.).
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REPORT DETAILS l.
Examiners
+M. Bielby, Chief Examiner, RIII NRC C. Carroll, Examiner, Sonalysts, Inc.
M. Daniels, Examiner, Sonalysts, Inc.
2.
Persons Contacted Facility
+J. Perry, Senior Vice President
+J. Cook, Vice President and Manager
+R. Frantz, Senior Licensing Engineer
+J. Lewis, Supervisor - Specialist Nuclear Program Analysis
+R. Mendez, Director - Material Management
+J. Miller, Manager - Nuclear Station Engineering
+R. Morgenstern, Manager - Nuclear Training
+D. Morris, Director - Nuclear Assessment
+J. Neuschwanger, Assistant Director - Plant Operations
+S. Parr, Soyland Representative
+R. Phares, Director - Licensing
+J. Sipek, Supervisor - Regional Regulatory Interface t
+F. Spangenberg, Nuclear Program Strategic Change Leader
+P. Telthorst, Supervisor - Operations Training U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
+P. Brochman, Senior Resident Inspector
+M. Jordan, Section Chief - RIII, BWR Operator Licensing
+Present at the Management Exit Meeting on June 11, 1993.
3.
Initial License Trainina Proaram Observations The training department was responsive to needs of the examination team.
The instructors were knowledgeable and courteous, and maintained a professional attitude throughout the examination week.
The following information is provided for evaluation by the licensee via their SAT based training program. No response is required.
a.
Written Examination Strenoths/ Weaknesses No operator strengths or weaknesses were observed in this category during this examination.
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b.
Job Performance Measures (JPMs)
Strenaths e
Candidates were very knowledgeable of plant equipment location and operation. Simulator control board manipulations were quick and accurate.
e Candidates were confident when answering JPM questions.
They often did not require reference material to verify answers.
Weaknesses e
Some candidates were not familiar with offsite assembly areas and evacuation routes.
They had difficulty finding the information in the emergency plan procedures, c.
Dynamic Simulator Scenarios Strenaths Crew members exhibited good teamwork. After individuals completed respective event response actions, they would consistently inform the Shift Supervisor (SS) they were free to assist in performing other actions.
o SSs exhibited good command and control authority, especially when directing Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) actions during major transients wi^h the limited crew size.
SSs remained in their position of authority, directed operator actions, gave periodic briefs and maintained accountability of plant status.
Crew members exhibited good communications.
Repeat-backs were consistently used. When a repeat-back was not used by an R0, the SS requested a verbatim repeat of the order.
The SSs also held periodic briefings at appropriate times when directing the E0Ps to keep the crew informed of the plant status.
Weaknesses Crews were inconsistent about who had responsibility for referring to the Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) to verify subsequent actions after immediate actions had been performed.
In some instances the SS attention was diverted because he had to remind crew member (s) to refer to the appropriate ARP.
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4.
Trainino. Doerations. Security. Rad Protection. Other Strenaths Training reference material continues to be well maintained and exceed requirements detailed in the cover letter and Enclosure 1 of the NRC's 120 day notification letter to the facility. All books were properly tabbed, labeled and indexed.
Training and operations personnel did a good pre-exam review. The review alleviated inappropriate wording and terminology, and identified questions with more than one correct answer or no ccrrect answer. As a result, there were no post-exam comments by the facility.
Three training instructors were allocated to run the scenarios.
During major transients the operators (candidates) needed to make multiple notifications to various departments. The use of three instructors enhanced the examination process because they were able to handle the large number of communications and provide timely feedback to the operators.
Relocation of the simulator operator console and incorporation of new software for inserting malfunctions has enhanced the preparation and administration of dynamic scenarios.
Weaknesses Delays were experienced by the candidates and contract examiners during initial plant entrance at security badging and health physics dosimetry. AtEthe plant access, security personnel were confused about the method of performing the escort briefing (whether to listen to tape or read instructions).
At dosimetry, the visitor paperwork for the contract examiners was prepared, however, the clerk was confused about proper disposition of the paperwork.
5.
Simulator Observations Simulator discrepancies were identified during the examination. These discrepancies were previously identified by the facility.
The facilities Simulator Problem Report (SpR) tracking system is a comprehensive list which tracks plant and modeling discrepancies as well as enhancements.
Some items are one time occurrences which are tracked until they can be validated and prioritized for resolution.
Examination discrepancies are noted in Enclosure 2.
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6.
Exit Meetina An exit meeting with the Clinton Power Station management on June 11, 1993. Those attending the management meeting are listed in Section 2 of this report. The following items were discussed during the exit meet ng:
Strengths and weaknesses noted in this report.
The general observations relating to the plant noted in Section 4.
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i SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Illinois Power Company (Clinton Power Station)
Facility Licensee Docket No. 50-461 Operating Tests Administered: June 7-10, 1993 i
The following document observations made by the NRC examination team during the June 1993, initial examination. These observations do not constitute.
i audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
After RWCU pump startup, zero flow was indicated and the discharge valve could not be throttled. When the discharge valve was opened, excessive flow caused the RWCU pump to trip (RT SPR-92-49).
Following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA),
Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) filled the vessel to the break.
Cold water should spill into the drywell (DW) and condense the steam causing depressurization, and opening of the DW vacuum breakers; however, the simulator did not drop DW pressure _ below containment pressure. (CM SPR-93-6).
During service water (SX) injection to the suppression pool (SP), the SP temperature continued to rise when it should have decreased.
Prior to this the reactor was blown down with seven Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valves open and reactor pressure indicating less than 10 psig. (SX SPR-92-195).
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