ML20045E025
| ML20045E025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/24/1993 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 9306300334 | |
| Download: ML20045E025 (78) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS SION.
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ikI;3' BRIEFING ON STATUS OF DESIGN BASIS THREAT REEVALUATION-(
LOCitiOB:
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1 b3$6' JUNE 24, 1993 1
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NEALR.GROSSANDC0.,INC.
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, Northwest-Washington, D.C.
-20005 202) 234-4433
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1 DISCLAIMER i
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nucloak Regulatory Commission. held on June 24, 1993, in the Commission's office at One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected or edited, and it may contain inaceutacles.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided.by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of I
the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with i
the Commission in any proceeding 'as the result of, or addressed to, any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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l' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6
BRIEFING ON STATUS OF DESIGN BASIS THREAT REEVALUATION e
i i
PUBLIC MEETING 9
Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Rockville, Maryland Thursday, June 24,'1993 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to
- notice, at 10:00 a.m.,
Ivan
- Selin, Chairman, presiding.
I i
COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
IVAN SELIN, Chairman of the Commission JAMES R.
CURTISS, Commissioner FORREST J. REMICK, Commissioner E. GAIL de PLANQUE, Commissioner NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
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2 STAFF SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
i WILLIAM C.
PARLER,- General Counsel JOHN HOYLE, Assistant Secretary.
JAMES TAYLOR, Executive Director'for' Operations THOMAS MURLEY, Director, NRR ROBERT BURNETT,
- Director, Fuel Cycle. Safety and Safeguards Division, NMSS'.
FRANK CONGEL, Director, Division of1 Rad. Protection and Emergency Preparedness, NRR _
l l
MIKE SMITH, Chief, Operations' Branch, NMSS l
1 I
4 1
e NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
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P-R-O-C-T-E-D-I-N-G-S i
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10:00 a.m.
3 CHAIRMAN SELIN: Good morning, ladies and l
4 gentlemen.
5 First we should congratulate Mr. Burnett 6
on the raid he staged this morning, just to increase 1
7 the interest in our meeting today, which as you all 8
know has to do with the briefing by the staff on a j
9 recommendation regarding possible modification of the 10 design basis threat to include vehicles and vehicular 11 bombs.
12 Following the intrusion at the Three Mile 13 Island facility and the bombing of the World Trade 14
- Center, the Commission requested the staff to 15 reevaluate and, if necessary, to update the design 16 basis threat for vehicle intrusion and the use of 17 vehicular bombs.
We were briefed in April of this 18 year and gave some guidance to the staff about options 19 and directions to follow in continuing the evaluation 20 and we approved that the final decision should be held 21 off until a public meeting was held and there was --
22 such a meeting was held on May 10th.
23 Today's meeting serves as a means for the 24 staff to explain directly to the Commission what 25 options are being considered.
By this means the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSORIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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Commission hopes to gain a better understanding of the 2
staff's recommendations.
3 I would like to note the developments 4
this morning in New York where the FBI arrested a 5
number of individuals.
Media reports indicate that 6
the individuals were involved in a conspiracy to 7
murder public officials and to bomb public facilities.
8 The NRC has been in contact with the FBI this morning.
9 We continue to monitor closely developments relating 10 to these latest arrests.
We're watchful for any 11 developments regarding NRC licenses and are prepared 12 to take appropriate and timely steps as warranted.
13 I
understand that copies of the 14 viewgraphs are available at the entrance to the room.
15 Commissioners, you do have any remarks?
16 Mr. Taylor, you may proceed.
17 MR. TAYLOR:
Good morning.
18 Mr. Chairman, you noted that we had had 19 a previous meeting with the Commission and also a 20 public meeting.
At our previous meeting we discussed 21 various options on the subject without making any 22 recommendation.
In a paper which we provided to you 23 on the 14th of June, we developed the options we had 24 previously discussed and one refinement of the 25 options, which we prefer to call option 5, which we'll l
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1 discuss today.
2 Today we are in a position of from the 3
staff giving the Commission a specific recommendation.
4 Some of the information in support of what the staff 4
5 has done is safeguards material and we will avoid 6
trying to discuss anything that is safeguards and 7
classified in this meeting.
8 With those thoughts, I'll ask Bob Burnett 9
to continue.
10 MR.
BURNETT:
Just a little further 11 caution. There were provided with the staff paper two 12 enclosures, 7 and 8, which are classified information 13 and there is a tendency since we've all read that to i
14 inadvertently use it in our discussion.
I'll be 15 particularly careful to try to avoid that.
l 16 Today's meeting is really a continuation 17 of the April 22nd meeting to address the design basis 18 threat for radiological' sabotage at power reactors.
19 (Slide) Specifically, I would like to be 20 addressing the subjects shown on slide 1.
Would you i
21 put up slide 1, please?
22 These are almost the exact same agenda 23 items that we had in April, but in addition we will 1
24 culminate with specific staff recommendations in this 25 case.
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6 1
(Slide)
Slido 2, please.
2 During the April meeting I informed the
'l 3
Commission that a gag order was in place on all l
4 information around the World Trade Center. bombing.
5 That gag order has now been lifted.
However, the FBI 6
has chosen not to make any additional 'information 7
available.
So, I have no additional information to 8
augment our knowledge basis at this time.
9 As you'11
- remember, the staff was 10 directed to reevaluate the design basis threat because 11 of these two incidents, the incidents at Three Mile 12 Island and the World Trade Center.
On March lith, 13
- 1993, staff outlined a
two-phased program to 14 reevaluate the design basis threat.
Phase.' was to 15 reevaluate whether the threat should be modified to 16 include an adversary use of a vehicle and possible 17 containment of a bomb on that vehicle.
Phase 2,
18 you'll remember, were to look at the other attributec 19 of the design basis threats, that is the number of 20 attackers, the weaponry, the motivation and those l
21 types of attributes.
That effort will not be t
22 completed until December of this year and will be 23 forwarded to the Commission at that time.
24 Also at the April meeting we discussed 25 four possible options that staff had under NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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consideration
- but, as Jim
- said, delayed our 2
recommendation until we had the advantage of meeting i
3 with the public.
4 (Slide)
Next slide, please.
l i
5 Holding a public meeting to solicit 6
public input on the design basis threat was a rather 7
new appro 3ch for me.
I've been in my current position 8
for 16 years and I must admit I went into it with some 9
degree of trepidation, but with a great deal of 10 interest.
I normally receive a lot of calls from 1
11 public interested and different groups on what we're 12 doing and where we're going, so I pretty well expected i
13 a large turnout.
I was surprised that only 150 showed 14 up at the meeting, but it did include the right 15 people, industry, Committee to Bridge the Gap, Nuclear 16 Control Institute, and a citizen from the Three Mile 17 area.
18 We were informed by NUMARC that they 19 would represent the nuclear reactor industry and speak 20 for
- them, so that each facility would not be 21 commenting on each of our questions.
22 The meeting started out rather well, I 23 think.
To begin with, all parties agreed that 4
24 reexamination of the design basis threat was 25 warranted.
However, I learned very rapidly but for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TR'ANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
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different reasons.
Public interest representatives 2
stated that the design basis threat was inadequate and 3
should be raised
- a c:r..iaer both vehicl=J vehicle 4
bombs, number of attackers, different and increased 5
weaponry, et cetera; where industry representatives, 6
on the other hand, felt that the existing ~ threat 7
statements was too paramilitary and did not represent-8 the real threat directed to nuclear reactor community 9
in the United States, which shows some. confusion on 10 the way we.use the design basis threat and I would 11
-like to specifically hit that in a few slides.
12 In addition, the Commission had asked us 13 to put together the best cost estimates that we could, 14 knowing that industry had employed certain vehicle 15 denial systems already at a few of the' sites and we 16 could get our hands on real good data.
- However, 17 during that meeting, that data was not available, but 18 NUMARC did note that they would. provide it at a later 19 date.
In accordance with their word, they did.
On 20 May the 27th we received a letter which is included as 21 to the Commission paper.
22 I would like to also note that it was not 23 possible to convene what I'd say a consensus on what-24 the two incidents that had triggered this evaluation, 25 on what those incidents really meant.
I will talk NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
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more specifically about that in slide 4, pleaso.
1 2
(Slide)
The Committee to Bridge the Gap and the Nuclear Control Institute both felt that the 3
4 two incidents demonstrated that the design basis 5
threat was out of date and inadequate.
Also, they 6
felt that the present method of creating and changing 7
the design basis threat was wrong because it depended i
8 on trends noted in worldwide incidents and failed to 1
9 identify one-of-a-kind incidents that had not yet
)
10 occurred.
11 The industry, on the other hand, felt 12 that there was no credible threat directed to the i
13 nuclear reactor community and buffeted their statement 14 by reference to the recent FBI report, which I have i
15 with me if any of you all care to peruse through it.
i 16 But the important part of the report tracks incidents 17 in America that have occurred from 1987 to 1991.
In 18 1987, the FBI attributed nine events to terrorism.
In 19
'88, nine more.
In '89, four.
In '90, seven, and in 20
'91, five.
The industry felt that that was a downward
{
21 trend and that should be taken into account.
22 Additionally, they did not see that the TMI and the 23 World Trade Center incidents were related to terrorism 24 directed at nuclear reactors.
The TMI incident 25 certainly wasn't the act of terrorism.
The World NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
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Trade Contor had not been attributed to terrorists
-l 2
- yet, nor was it directed towards the reactor
)
3 community.
Also, they noted that there'd been no 4
linkage between these two incidents and also they
~
5 called our attention to the fact that terrorists on a-6 worldwide basis had never attacked such a hardened 7
target as a nuclear power reactor.
8 (Slide)
Slide 5, please.
9 I
mentioned earlier some 10 misunderstandings between what we would call the real 11 threat'in America and the design basis threat.
So, I 12 think maybe a few words are in order to-better 13 articulate the relationship between these two threats.
14 The design basis concept was created to do several
~
15 things.
It was to serve as a standard to note change.
16 It was to be used to develop the regulatory 17 requirements, that is to define the capabilities of a i
18 security system and to provide a
standard for 19 evaluations.
It was not a statement of the actual or 20 real threat present in America directed towards the 21 reactor community.
22 Since it takes so much time to implement 23 new security precautions and that a real threat could 24 generate in a rapid fashion, the design basis threat' 25 is a level of protection that is required above the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
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real threat to account for the dynamics that could 2
occur in a developing threat.
The actual threat in 3
America agreeably, according to all information, is 4
low.
It's the best way to think about these two 5
threats, as the difference between the real threat, 6
that is what we have seen at reactors, and the design 1
7 basis threat is separated by an area that we and the 8
staff call the margin of prudence.
9 (Slide)
Could I have backup slide 1,
10 please?
11 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
Is that a new term 12 or is that an existing term?
13 MR. BURNETT:
Let's say over the years 14 that difference has been called many things.
Okay.
15 I personally have referred to it as a margin of 1
16 safety, but that term got confused with the same term 17 used more in the safety in reactors world.
I have 18 called it prudence, but lately we felt that this best 19 demonstrated what it was.
I 20 What this graph is attempting to show is 21 the left-hand side you have the actual threat, which 22 is characterized as low, and the hypothetical threat 23 which is the design basis threat, which is somewhat 24 higher in relative terms.
As you move to the right, 25 we have the TMI intrusion and we've had the World NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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Trade Center.
'So, what we've tried to show is that' I
{
2 we have to integrate those two new tools into the 3
. design basis threat so that we reestablished this 4
comfort level or the margin of prudence.
This is how 5
staff has worked for years and years, however the 6
words have changed.
7 I want to make clear at this point, this l
i 8
is not to say that we expect a truck bomb threat at a i
1 l
9 reactor in the near future.
What we're trying to say l
10 that it's somewhat more likely now because of these l
11 two events that if a threat was to ' develop in ' America, l
12 it most likely would utilize a vehicle and contain an 13 explosive.
14 Also, up to this point, we have given 15 greater credit to the ability of the law enforcement 16 organizations to interdict a would-be saboteur of this 17 type, just as it was done today.
However, in the case 18 of the World Trade Center, that demonstrated that 19 large quantities of explosives,- which has been 20 estimated between 500 and 1500
- pounds, were 21 accumulated by anywhere.from four to ten people and 22 was delivered without detection of law enforcement.
23 Therefore, the contingency planning requirements that 24 we now have in place at our reactors cannot be 25 considered quite as effective as we did some time ago.
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That started staff in a detailed analysis of truck 2
bombs worldwide.
I'd like to note at this time that 3
approximately ten percent of the bombs that we 4
studied, which were 500, were in ranges above 500 5
pounds and that five percent of those bombs were in 4
6 quantities in excess to 1,000 pounds, and that three 7
of these larger weapons have gone off and directed at 8
targets in America.
A 1400 pound bomb was created and 1
9 delivered to the IRS building out west.
Fortunately i
j 10 it did not go off, but it was not detected beforehand.
1 11 A 1275 pound bomb was exploded at the University of 12 Wisconsin in the early '70s and, of course, the World 13 Trade Center, which is estimated to be between 500 and 14 1500 pounds, i
15 (Slide)
Next slide, please.
16 During the April meeting the Commission 17 requested that we solicit the best cost data that was 18 possible utilizing industry input.
Again, as I said, 19 the NUMARC did provide us with very important data and 20 we do appreciate it in their May 27th, 1993 letter.
21 That data was combined with data available to the 22 staff and has aided us in developing and fine tuning 23 the costs of the options that were presented during 24 the April meeting.
I'll run down these just very 25 quickly.
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14-1 Option 1, which was to do nothing.
It 2
costs $25,000.00 to $150,000.00 for the original 3
designs and about $4,000.00_a day to implement if the 4
contingency planning was called upon.
5 Option.2, which is protection with an 6
active barrier.of the entry points with some-l t
7 protection on either side, was estimated between $200K 8
and $400K assuming four active barriers and 800 feet
}
9 of passive barriers, which would give you 100 feet on i
10 either side'of the entry gate times four.
I 11 Option 3 was.all of the above in 2, but.
i 12 protect the entire perimeter.
That was been 13 established at something betw'oen
$300K and
$2.9 i
14 million, and took a rough estimate of 7,000 feet of f
i 15 passive barrier to come up'with those numbers.
i 16 (Slide)
Option 4 is $400K to $4 million 17 with all the same assumptions.
{
f 18 please note that these estimates vary i
19 widely and that's because there's so many variations 20 between our sites.
The length of the perimeters, the 21 type of soil that the facilities'are built upon, and 22 depending on which. size vehicle is ultimately 23 selected.
i 24 (slide)
I'd like now to skip up to slide 25 8.
~
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1 The recommended approach would requiro 2
reactors to protect against a design basis vehicle 3
with an explosive at their existing protected area 4
boundaries.
The staff would dpvelop criteria that 1
5 could be used by the reactor licensee to determine how i
6 much protection was provided by stopping the vehicle 7
at that point.
It is estimated by NRR that total 8
protection against the design basis vehicle that was 9
identified in Enclosure 8
and provided to the 10 Commission under separate cover would be achievable at 11 80 to 90 percent of the reactor sites.
However, that 12 leaves something like 10 to --
13 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Without having to move 14 fences or --
15 MR.
BURNETT:
Without having to do 16 anything but put the new requirement at the existing 17 fences.
18 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
In other words, Option 19 3 applied across the board would, by itself, meet
{
20 Option 5 requirements --
21 MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
22 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
-- for 80 to 90 percent 23 of the sites?
24 MR. BURNETT:
That is exactly the way to 25 say it.
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1 1
However, there are some sites that from 2
our analysis we believe.that putting the barrier at 3
that point will not give complete protection against 4
the design basis vehicle and weapon Tat has been I
i 5
articulated in Enclosure 8.
For those sites, we would 6
allow in our rule that the site would have a choice of 1
7 providing substantial barriers to' deflect a blast or 8
extend beyond their existing protected area fences 9
just the. vehicular denial portion, which~would be a 10 concrete barrier Jersey bounces or decorative pots or 11 a trench, an S-curve trench. just on the side where.
)
12 they have trouble with standoff distances to vital 13 equipment.. Or they could yet present a case to this 14 Commission showing that they could achieve almost
}
15 total protection or significant protection, which we 1
16 will use the word, and that to get total it would 17 require a disproportionate amount of ' money for the l
18 added protection that would result.
19 So, the rules that we would write, and we 20 have examples of it here today, would make that type 21 of a cost benefit tradeoff possible.
This approach 22 would provide complete protection against the TMI type 1
23 incident and would give us a cost effective response 24 to the vehicle bomb.
Estimates for Option 5, which we 25 are calling this, would' add about $50,000.00 to Option NEAL R. GROSS l
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17 1
3, which the Chairman just related it to, to do this
{
l 2
added analysis and submissions.
3 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
For those --
4 MR. BURNETT:
For those limited --
5 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
-- ten to 20 percent of 6
the sites?
7 MR. BURNETT:
Actually, let's keep it in 8
the five to ten area.
9 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
But that's for 10 the analysis and submission, not for taking any 11 option.
l 12 MR. BURNETT: 'For those five to ten.
l 13 MR. TAYLOR:
The staff would expect the 14
. licensee to submit such analyses.
We would then i
15 review --
16 MR. CONGEL:
Excuse me.
I think we have 17 it the other way around.
For those sites that can 18 easily' demonstrate conformance,
-it would cost i
19
$50,000.00 more than Option 3.-
It's the five.to ten 20 percent of the sites that it's not clear that you 21 would have to do analysis that. could range to some 22 higher value.
23 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
I see.
4 24 COMMISSIONER ~REMICK:
Not only analysis, 25 but perhaps changes.
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18
+
6
-1 MR. CONGEL:
Perhaps.
2 MR. BURNETT:
Yes, perhaps changes.
I'm 3
glad he cleared that up for me.
And it is correctly j
4 stated in our Commission paper.
5 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Bob, could I just 6
pursue a detail here?. Option 3, as I understand it, 7
would require vehicular intrusion protection around 8
the entire protected area perimeter, the effect of j
9 which would be to enable a license to rebuff a vehicle.
i 10 intrusion of the specified' size around the entire i
11 perimeter of the site.
12 MR..BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
13 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
If I could draw 14 your attention ---
15 MR. BURNETT:
But keep in mind that that 16 inherently at about 90 percent of the' sites will give r
r 17 you adequate standoff range for a contained weapon in 18 that vehicle.
19 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Yes, I understand l
20 that.
Page 7 of the SECY paper -- I'll wait until you i
21 find the page, because I'm going to refer to it.
The
~
22 paragraph that begins,
" Sites not' meeting these 23 criteria - "
24 MR. BURNETT:
Yes.
25 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
"-- would have
~
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choices that would include," and here's the language-2 that I don't understand, "using more substantial and 3
expensive barriers for a portion of their protected 4
area to reduce vehicle penetration. "
- Now, do I i
5 understand Option 3 to say the adoption of that alone I
6 will reduce vehicle penetration and are you in turn j
7 here talking about more expensive barriers to protect 8
against the effect of the blast at whatever point the 9
protected area perimeter is?
)
10 MR. BURNETT:
Yes.
l 11 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: So, the purpose of 12 this option here for that site that doesn't meet-the 13 criteria is not to reduce vehicle' penetration.
14 MR.-BURNETT:
That's correct.
l l
15 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
You already i
16 accomplished that.
. hat you really-mean to say here W
l 17 is that the vehicle had reached that point, it had not i
18 penetrated the barrier because you've adopted Option 19 3.
20 MR. BURNETT:
But there is a subtlety 21 that you have to keep-in mind.
There are different 22 types of barriers available on the market.
Some-
)
q 23 barriers give with the-approaching vehicle and 24 actually will' penetrate a. fence by 20 or-30 feet.'
1 25 Okay? ' Others stop the vehicle stone cold at the fence NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
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l 20 i
f 1
line.
The cheaper ones allow a small amount of l
l
-2 penetration.
All right.
l 3
COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Which ones would 4
we permit, I guess is the key question?
5 MR. BURNETT: Well, either.
Let 's say he.
6 has a lot of standoff range and the 30 foot wouldn't.
7 bother him.
Okay?
'So then he stops the vehicle and 8
he's still protected-against the design. basis 2
9 explosive.
However, at some sites, we anticipate the f
10 leeway will be much closer.
He will have to keep a.
11 better control on penetration distances.
12 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: '
The intent of 13 Option 5, if adopted, the result of it would be that 14 at all of the sites around the entire perimeter you're 15 recommending that the licensee be able to rebuff a 16 vehicle penetration with a vehicle of the specified i
17 size?
l 18 MR. BURNETT: That is correct. The truck l
19 would be stopped in all cases.
It's only the 20 variability would only be addressed to the contained l
21 bomb.
22 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
That's not really what 23 this says.
What this says.is that if you;have a site 24 where it's particularly expensive to get the surrogate 25 for protecting the site, namely a reasonable standoff i
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21 1
distance, we would entertain an analysis-that says 2
that, yes, it would be very expensive.
Not half a 3
million, but maybe $5 million to get the standoff 4
distance, and yes, a truck perhaps could get onto the 4
5 site, but we would look in much more detail at the i
6 actual buildings and the actual hardness and the i
7 actual systems and just as we do with Charpy tests and 8
a lot of other tests, that we would entertain an 9
analysis that said, the plant is actually safe but you
)
10 can't do it with a once over lightly $50,000.00 11' analysis.
In a situation where the licensee were 12 faced with much-larger costs than: the average, he 13 might take on these costs or he inight convince us with 14 a second order, much more detailed '. analysis, that 15 really there isn't a problem there, not because of 16 rough standoff distance based on generic engineering, 17 but because of the particular geometry of that plant.
18 MR. BURNETT:
Oh, I agree.
I thought we 19 were saying that.
20 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
But conversely, if he.
21 can't convince us-of that, he's going to have to fix 22 something.
Right?-
23.
MR. BURNETT: That 's it.
I was trying to i
24 convey that exact same thing.
Maybe didn't do it 25 quite as well.
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COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
But then 2
whether or not you require the fix depends on your i
3 assessment of the cost and whether the costs are 4
disproportionate to the benefit.
5 MR. BURNETT:
Correct.
6 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Are you going 7
to discuss what criteria or how you would do that?
)
8 MR.
BURNETT:
Okay.
- Now, we're 9
discussing the philosophy of this new change.
If the 10 Commission approves this approach, we have to write 11 all of the supporting guidance and criteria. That has 12 not been done yet.
(
13 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Excuse me.
I don't 14 think that statement was accurate. What the statement 15 says, this is a backfit analysis.
It's a cost benefit 16 analysis and therefore we entertained the possibility 17 that in some plant the cost of getting the same level 18 of security as we would get at the other 90 or 95 19 percent is just not worth it.
What the language says 20 at the bottom of the page Commissioner Curtiss quoted 21 is, "The staff will accept close alternative measures 22 if they provide substantial protection, et cetera, and 23 the costs of fulling meeting design goals and criteria 24 disproportionate with the added protection which would 25 be provided."
In other words, we do recognize the l
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possibility that one or two or throa of these plants 2
may have a lesser degree of protection than --
3 MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
4 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
-- all of the others, if 5
the costs of getting that protection are not 6
consistent with the benefit of additional protection.
7 So, it's really a three step option, if I understand 8
it.
First you do this quick analyr.is, this 9
$50,000.00.
Are you in the ball park or not?
The 10 second, if you're not in the ball park, then you do a 11 more detailed analysis, including some very specific 12 countermeasures if necessary, taking into account what 13 we really know about the plant to get better security.
14 And the third, for a couple of these plants, we may be 15 in a position where the licensee convinces the staff 16 that's the best we can do without an enormous 17 expenditure and then that expenditure is not i
18 worthwhile.
19 MR. BURNETT:
Absolutely.
20 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
At which point 21 Commissioner de Planque's
- question, I
- think, is 22 perfectly relevant, which is what's the ball park that 23 we're talking about before we decide the costs are 24 disproportionate with the --
25 MR. BURNETT:
And by the way, this has NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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been raised by every reader of our document, including 2
us who wrote it.
3 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Right.
i 4
MR.
BURNETT:
But, you know, we were 5
working on a time schedule to come up with the 1
6 recommendation on the design. basis threat.
We all 7
know that we have a significant task ahead of.us to
[
8 write this criteria.
It would be included in a 9
proposed rule which -would be briefed to the.
10 Commission.
So, we will all fine tune it and get it 11 right.
12 (Slide)
I think that if you went to i
13 backup slide 4 that is in your package, I think this 2
14 is the actual rule change that we would anticipate at 15 this time would be incorporated in ~73.55, which is the 16 implementation section of security to protect against i
17 the design basis threat.
l 18 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Bob, let me pursue 19 the question that Commissioner de Planque has raised, 20 and there are actually two aspects of this, one I'd 21 like to come back to in'a minute.
You have pointed 22 out in the SECY paper itself that the concept'.of the 23 design basis threat has traditionally been associated 24 with adequate protection.
I guess there was one 25 exception when we had a generic letter that we issued NE'AL R. GROSS COURT REP 3RTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
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that was an enhancement.
But that's the issue I want 2
to come back to at some point in just a moment.
3 What you're proposing here is an i
4 enhancement as we understand that term in the context 5
of the backfit regime.-
'It 's. not an adequate 6
protection issue, it's an enhancement.
I guess I'm 6
7 curious here with the language that you have proposed 8
to employ in determining whether the costs are 9
justified by the benefits.
The staff will accept the 10 proposed alternative measures if they. provide 11 substantial protection against the land vehicle bomb h
12 and the costs of fulling meeting the design goals and 13 criteria are disproportionate with the added h
14 protection which would be provided.
15 Why is it that we haven't simply employed' 16 or adopted the 50.109 backfit standard here for 17 purposes of evaluating what a licensee has to do?
18 After protecting the perimeter with essentially what 19 is Option 3, why haven't we said,. from -' that point i
20 forward for those five to ten. percent of the licensees 21 that may have problems with standoff distance, we're 22 going to employ the' garden variety backfit' standard 23 that we've got in 50.109 as opposed to the language 24 that you've got here?
25 DOCTOR MURLEY:
First, let me say that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
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..a-
26 1
the backfit analysis that's done for this rulo 2
change -- I'm sure you understand that every plant 3
that's subject to this rule change, we don't have to 4
do a plant by plant analysis to show a regulatory 5
analysis for each plant.
We've done it generically 6
and we've satisfied ourselves that generically the 7
backfit test is met for this rule.
8 Now, I think you're question is fine if 9
you've done it generically.
Why not apply it then --
10 for those few plants that might not meet it, why not 11 apply the same cost benefit criterion? The answer is 12 we don't have a good answer at this stage, except we 13 know it's going to be very difficult to quantify the 14 radiological savings from this rule.
So, I guess --
15 and that's what you have to do in order to get a 16 dollar per man rem saved from the backfit criterion.
17 I am reluctant to get into that, quite 18 frankly, because I don't think -- there is not a good 19 estimate for the probability or the frequency of the 20 sabotage event or terrorist event and that's what you 21 have to do if you're ultimately going to get these 22 frequency numbers.
I would rather come back to the 23 Commission, I think, with a range of options.
This 24 may be one.
But to me this is almost the worst option 25 because it gets you into a murky probabilistic area 1
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that I don't think there are any answers to.
1 2
COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
I share the 3
concern that you have with some of the difficulties 4
that would attend applying the typical backfit 5
standard to this determination.
What you're essentially saying, as the Chairman has described, is 6
7 protect the entire perimeter. The Option 3, everybody 8
has to do that and that can be done at the costs that 9
you estimate.
You've done the backfit analysis for 10 that or will and concluded that that's a reasonable 11 step to require.
Then when you get to the point of 12 assessing whether there are plants, and I gather there 13 may be five to ten percent of them where protection of 14 the perimeter nevertheless would permit a vehicle 15 laden with a bomb to reach a point where, because 16 there's not sufficient standof f distance you'd affect 17 the safety performance of the
- plant, then the 18 licensee, I guess, is under this approach.
I'm really 19 simplifying it.
Has the option of saying, "We think i
20 it's more expensive to move our protected area 21 perimeter way out past where it is currently," or, "We 22 think it's much more expensive than the benefit that 23 would accrue to taking a variety of other steps."
24 I do realize that the backfit regime as 25 it exists under 50.109 does contain constraints and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE N.W.
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28 i
1 maybe some difficult concepts to apply hero.. But at 2
the same time I'm troubled by the notion that-the 3
standard here for assessing whether to make a change
{
4 or not is are the costs disproportionate.
It's a 5
highly judgmental standard, it seems.to me, and in 6
analyzing whether one believes the costs are or are 7
not disproportionate, I'm not left with any. standard t
8 that one would apply and I-think it's really at the r
9 heart of commissioner de Planque's question.
What 10 standard would we apply in determining on these 11 specific five to ten percent 'of the plants' that q.
12 additional steps ought to be taken?
Is it a dollar 13 amount that we'ought'to settle on, $2, $3 million? Is 14 it --
15 DOCTOR MURLEY: Ultimately that's what it P
1 1
16 will be, yes.
But we haven't done the necessary 17 homework and options that are needed to come up with 18 such a number.
19.
CHAIRMAN SELIN:
I'm actually very taken 20 b'y this analysis, but the approach is very sensible
~
21 and good solid. engineering.
But when you finally do i
22 get down to that last two percent, you do have a 23 problem and the question is how comfortable ~can we be 24
= going forward with that problem?
Basically, if I-25 might paraphrase what you're saying, nobody -- this is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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design basis threat.
It's not a relative frequency 2
. threat.
Nobody can put a probability on all these 3
pieces.
So, we're saying in order to get a margin of 4
prudence, the new term of art, we ought to do things 5
if they're pretty straightforward, and if they're not, 6
guarding against ridiculous threats.
That takes care 7
of, say, 85 percent of the sites.
8 The next step says, well, let's do a more 9
detailed analysis for the ones where the surrogate 10 doesn't work, without setting out 1n advance how'much
~
11 would be willing to spend. We look at the numbers and 12 we
- say, they're so low. that a
wide range of 13 sensitivities to the threat would still come to the 14 conclusion that we should do something like your 15 Option 5, and then a second set of guidance that says, 16 well, we also fall and we have to do more detailed 17 analysis and maybe we have to move some fences out.
18 We don't have to cross state highways.
So, it's a 19 little more expensive, but we're still in the same 20 ball p: '.
- t 21 Then you're left with a couple of people 22 who really are literally between a highway and a hard 23 place. They just don't have the geography to move the 24 fences out or for some other reason they can't do it, 25 and instead of arbitrarily saying, "What will it take I
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3
,r-,
.s
+.. -,, -
.c.-,
y
30 1
to satisfy us," an analysis where you posit a relativo 2
frequency out of thin air and then calculate it in 3
great detail or you set in advance how much is it 4
worth for us to protect against an unlikely threat, 5
you're basically saying, well, let's see what they 6
come in with and we'll try to figure out something 7
that all parties can agree to --
8 DOCTOR MURLEY:
The way I view it, Mr.
9 Chairman, is this allows them the capability -- if 10 they don't. meet the literal words of the standoff 11 distances from their protected area boundary, they've 12 got the option of several things.
The obvious one is 13 they can buy up some land or whatever and extend --
14 but they could also build a sacrificial kind of a 15 wall.
16 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
A berm or something.
17 DOCTOR MURLEY:
They could do 3-D finite 18 element analysis of reinforced concrete and convince 19 us that the equipment is going to hold up and that's 20 how I view this --
1 21 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Yes.
The trouble is 22 that a couple of guys will come in and just say, 23 "There's nothing reasonable for us to do, and it's 24 hard for us in advance to agree on what we mean by_
25 reasonable." It's not an unusual problem, but I think NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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that's really what the problem is.
2 MR. BURNETT:
But, you know, there is l
l 3
other support for this type of approach.
Remember 4
when we select a design basis explosive, and I'm just 5
going to call it X,
this is a subjective analysis 6
based on many, many events and I have intelligence, I 7
have events and I have opinions.
We meld all that 8
together in a mixing pot and then I come up with a 9
design basis explosive.
I don't think that that thing 10 should be chiseled in stone.
I mean somebody could 11 come in higher or lower.
There's some probability on 12 either way.
So, from my perspective, I could support 13 this type of a tradeoff because.of the uncertainties 14 even in the identification of the bomb.
15 Suppose a site gives you 75 percent 16 protection of X.
Then we've got to look at that.
Say 17 it costs 500 percent more to get the next 25 percent.
18 That obviously is disproportionate. Now, you're going 1
l 19 to get down, as the Chairman says, to these ones right 20 around the line.
I hate to say it, but we're just 21 going to have to sit down with a reason and with other l
22 reasonable men and work it out.
23 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Let me make a 24 couple of suggestions here because perhaps we're left 25 with doing exactly that.
It does seem to me that it's i
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32 1
worthwhile trying to articulate in advance soma sort 2
of standards, and particularly as you move beyond the 3
comfort of 50.109, which we know well and which has 4
been applied and used and perhaps not appropriate 5
- here, but to articulate in advance some sort of 6
standard that you would employ for defining 7
disproportionate, what is it that we believe a
8 disproportionate cost would be.
l 9
Secondly, I would encourage you, for what 10 it's worth, to address this issue in the context of 11 some heavy influence from Headquarters.
We all have 12 been around to see sites around the country and as you 13 travel from region to region you can see a distinct l
14 difference in the approach that's taken to security.
15 Some regions approach security differently than -
16 others.
I think that's well understood.
17 So, as we get down to the small number of 18 sites that we're talking about here, the five to ten i
19 percent, perhaps if we're able to establish some 20 criteria, and then with some strong involvement from 21 Headquarters, maybe that's what we're left with in i
22 this context.
23 MR. BURNETT:
And that would be in the 24 rule package for public comment when it goes out, our 25 criteria.
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DOCTOR MURLEY:
Yos.
Even though wo 2
don't have it today, what we're asking for is the 3
approval for the general concept, but we would intend 4
to develop it.
5 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Oh, you would?
6 MR. BURNETT:
Oh, yes.
It would be in 7
the rule package, sir.
8 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Something between zero 9
and light, DCN light is the right frequency for this?
10 Go ahead.
11 MR. BURNETT:
Should I move on?
12 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Yes.
13 MR.
BURNETT:
(Slide)
Next
- slide, 14 please, which would be slide 9.
15 The Commission during our last briefing 16 asked the staff to analyze what mechanisms are available to move licensing changes into the licensing 17 i
18 world if we felt it warranted.
I would like to cover 1
19 two in particular.
There are at least four that j
20 comes to mind.
We've used the generic letter in the 21 past.
We did not feel that that was the right way for 22 this particular package.
I would like to talk about 23 the immediate effective rule and an expedited 24 approach.
25 So, slide 9, the immediate effective rule NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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34 1
does have some pros associated with it.
It does 2
accomplish the rulemaking portion of this effort as 3
rapidly as it could be done and it shows a very high 4
priority on the subject.
However, in order to support 5
an immediate effective rule, the NRC staff would have 6
to justify that we think that the threat is eminent, 7
of an eminent nature, and we do not have that t
8 justification today.
Therefore, we do not think an 4
9 immediate effective rule is warranted, which gets me 10 to slide 10, which is expedited rulemaking.
l 11 (Slide)
It has the potential to shorten 12 the time in the rulemaking cycle.
It does shorten the 13 public comment period to 30 to 45 days, but we feel 14 that that is still ample for public's interaction.
I 15 do note that we have held one public meeting on it 16 already.
The industry is very much aware that this 17 agency has been looking at this issue since 1983 and 18 we also think that current events, this was written 19 last night, for expeditious handling are justified.
20 So, the staff will be suggesting that.
21 (Slide)
Which gets me to my last slide, 22 slide 11.
23 So, what we've said through our briefing 24 and the package is based on the staff review of the 25 TMI and World Trade Center incidents, we do not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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believe that changes to respond to those types of 2
threats should be considered in the sense of adequate 3
protection as Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act j
4 articulates.
But we've concluded that option 3, which 5
significantly increased the protection of the health 6
and safety of the American public and satisfied the 7
elements of backfit.
l 8
Therefore, the staff is recommending that 9
the design basis threat for radiological sabotage be l
10 modified to include a vehicle for transportation of 11 personnel and hand carried equipment and/or I
12 explosives.
I call your attention to backup slide 2.
13 That is the actual wording that' we would put in Part 14 73.1.
15 In addition, we would recommend to modify 16 73.55 to reflect the changes in the design basis 17 threat and allow for consideration of alternative 18 security measures when existing protected area 19 barriers do not provide complete adequate standoff 20 ranges.
That's articulated and we've already looked 21 at that in backup slides 3 and 4.
22 We recommend an expedited rulemaking to 23 achieve these changes.
We also recommend that the 24 design basis vehicle as described in Enclosure 8 be 25 utilized for this purpose. And lastly, that the staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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36
\\
l 1
continue its phase 2 study based on the Commiss' ion I.
2 approval of Option 5.
3
- CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Mr. Taylor, what would l
4 be the likely schedule?
Let's t ay, just for the sak'e 5
of
- argument, that the Commission approved your 6
recommendations within a relatively short time, say a 7
week.
What would be the various milestones and in 8
particular at what point would 80 percent of the 9
plants have -- you know, how much time would you give 10 them and the ones that are fairly straightforward, at 11 what point would they have implemented the measures?
12 MR. TAYLOR:
Well, we'd have to complete 13 the rulemaking first, and the expedited rulemaking 14 process.
I would assume'that would take at least 15 several months.
Is that right?
16 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
You mean to draft the 17 rule and publish it?
18 MR. TAYLOR: Well, we' have t'o publish it.
19 MR. BURNETT:
Draft it, publish it.
20 MR. TAYLOR: Develop the type of criteria 21 you've talked about this morning and put that out for l
22 public comment and then incorporate public comment.
23 So, you're talking at least a period of months --
24 MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
25 MR. TAYLOR:
-- to complete a rule.
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37 1
CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Wall, how close are you 2
to having a draft rule that you would : be ready to 3
publish?
Three months?
4 MR.
TAYLOR:
Well,- we've developed a 4
5 couple of draft -- the actual rule changes, we think, 6
will be --
i 7
MR.
BURNETT:
Actually
.it's the 8
supporting documentation, the guidance to help this 9
tradeoff and the regulatory analysis which-will take' 10 the time.
The. actual rule-language which we've 11 presented-in the backup slides is most likely'--
12 CHAIRMAN SELIN: Fine.
So, let's say the 13 Commission --
14 MR. BURNETT:
-- the rule.
t 15 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
-- today told you to go i
16 ahead, just a question of developing a schedule, not i
17 as a prediction.
How long would it' take to put a 18 package together?
19 DOCTOR MURLEY:
The backup material that 20 we would need to support going over the draft rules.
21 MR.'CONGEL:
We had talked about having 22 the portion for NRR analysis done in a four month.
23 period, to'have a complete regulatory analysis.
You i
~
24 also asked a question about implementation --
25 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
It would be four months NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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\\
1 from-today. before you'd be ready to publish your 2
package?
j 3
MR. CONGEL:
Based on waiting for more 4
feedback on commitment for feedback from NUMARC. They 5
promise. us some more details on especially 'in the 6
cost.
That's the kind of time frame we talked about, i
7 sir, yes.
l 8
CHAIRMAN SELINi You're going to let 9
NUMARC set the schedule --
10 MR. CONGEL:
No, sir.
11 CHAIRMAN SELIN: -- when you've published 12 a package to tell them to -- I don't think that's --
13 MR. TAYLOR:
Mr. Chairman, I think we're 14 going to have to come back to you.
We're obviously 15 not prepared to --
16 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Okay.
17 MR.
TAYLOR:
We felt like we should 18 present the recommendations.
19 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
The presentation was 20 terrific.
Now, there's always the possibility that 21 one actually gets what one recommends, in which --
22 prepared to say what the implications would be.
23 MR. TAYLOR:
Glad to get to the ten yard 24
.line.
But I think we'll have to get back to you with 25 some type of outline of expedited schedules to.
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i 39 1
complete our work and then the necessary rulemaking.
2 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Up to the point where 3
the 80 to 90 percent of the plants would actually have f
j 4
improvements in place.
I'm less concerned with how 5
long the problem plants would take to get --
4 6
MR. TAYLOR:
I think we can probably lay 7
that out in a
time line and get back to the 8
Commission.
9 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Commissioner Curtiss?
10 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
I just have one 11 follow-up question that I alluded to earlier.
I guess 12 this is the first time that the design basis threat 13 has been modified since it was first established?
14 MR.
BURNETT:
No, we modified it for l
15 Category 1 facilities to inhibit vehicles only from 16 intrusion about 1988.
17 COMMISSIONER CURTISS: Okay. And when it 18 was first established and modified up to this point, l
19 I gather from what you say in the paper that in.those i
20 cases it was always done on -- what it reflected was l
21 a determination with regard to what was necessary to 22 provide adequate protection.
23 MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir, it was at that 1
24 time.
25 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Is there any NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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s
-e-..
40-1 significance to the fact that we're modifying the 2
design basis threat
- now, not for-an adequate 3
protection-purpose but-for basically-a safety.
4 enhancement?
I'm suggesting there is and I don't see 5
any, but I'm just curious.
]
6 MR.
BURNETT:
- Well, you're right to 7
perceive that it is slightly different.
Okay? But we 8
believe that when we put the contingency planning 9
requirements out in '88, we did that through a generic 10 letter.
So, we set the precedent for not using the 11 adequacy determination as the starting point.
12 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Okay.
i 13 MR.
BURNETT:
But it is different.
14 There's no doubt about
- that, and-we wanted to 15 highlight that.
i 16 MR. TAYLOR:
I think we reasoned this 17 issue and decided this was the basis.
If we felt it 18 met an adequate protection, I think if we knew of an 19 immediate type thing, we would be telling you quite J
20 differently.
But we think this is a
safety 21 enhancement that is important.
1 22 MR. BURNETT: If we had a highly credible 23 working threat today, this briefing would have been l
24 different.
25 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Right.
Right.
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i
_.-. -_ ~ _ _ _.-.._._-... _,..
41 1
Does the General Counsel see any significance to that, 2
to the fact that. this is a
safety enhancement 3
modification of the design basis threat as opposed to 4
an adequate protection?
5 MR.
PARLER:
Obviously if it were 6
adequate protection, cost would not be a factor.
The 7
only reason why you're able to consider, and properly 8
consider in my judgment, the Option 5 is that this 9
issue, both for purposes of the vehicle intrusion and 10 the explosive have been viewed by the staff as 11 enhancement
- measures, not adequate protection 12 measures.
So, yes, you have that difference, but that 13 doesn't cause me any problem.
14 May I make one point, Mr. Chairman, that 15 might be helpful in a different context?
16 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Commissioner Curtiss?
17 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
Oh, go ahead, 18 please.
19 MR. PARLER: I assume that I've responded 20 to your question.
21 I sense that there is some desire for j
22 urgency with the rulemaking, even though the case 23 apparently cannot be made by the staff, and it's clear 4
24 from what I just said it cannot be made by the staff t
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42 1
adequate protection.
But I seem to get the impression 2
here that a lot of extra additional stuff has to be 3
collected, perhaps from NUMARC and others, before the 4
Agency can proceed at getting the Commission's 5
approval to move forward with rulemaking, proposed 6
rulemaking, in accord with the Commission's decision.
7 We have a draft of a rule.
As a matter 8
of fact, under the APA an agency can initiate proposed 9
rulemaking even without the text of the rule.
10 The other point that I wanted to make is 11 that if these criteria for what others have described 12 as possible problem plants or the two to five to ten 13 percent of the group, if the " development of those 14 criteria to respond to how are we going to go about 15 deciding the disproportionate thing is going to create 16 a problem for rulemaking, which it might because I've 17 heard here that each one of these situations might be 18 different, considerably different because of the 19 characteristics of the site and other characteristics, 20 it would seem to me that if that is the case, it might 21 be difficult to come up with meaningful criteria in a 22 rule.
l 23 So, if that has the potential for 24 delaying the initiation of the proposed rulemaking 25 substantially, perhaps other means may be considered
~
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43 1
for that particular aspect to be handled so that the 2
rule could be initiated for the vast majority of the l
3 non problem plants.
4 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
In response to your l
5 comments, speaking just as one Commissioner, not as.
l 6
the Chairman, number one, I really think we need to 7
move quickly on this.
I'm dismayed by the thought 8
that it would take months and months to get out.
l 9
Number two, I fully agree with the last thing that you 10 said, Mr. Parler.
If we're really talking about the 11 two to five percent holding up the 95 percent, that's 12 not very sensible.
We need a mechanism to deal with 13 the majority while not leaving just a gaping hole for 14 the other few pieces.
The third is I think it's a 15 terrible piece of public policy if we're in a position 16 that the people we regulate effectively can set the 17 schedule rather than our setting the schedule 18 ourselves.
If we are truly dependent on that, then we 19 need to find another avenue to get to the schedule.
20 Commissioner
- Curtiss, do you have 21 anything else?
22 COMMISSIONER CURTISS:
No, I don't have l
23 anything else.
24 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Commissioner Remick?
25 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Just some thoughts i
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so I can know what I think.
2 The staff is saying it's not necessary 3
for adequate protection, but the staff _ is saying that 4
they have qualitatively decided that it meets the 5
backfit rule's substantial improvement and overall 6
safety to public health and safety.
I understand the 7
difficulty of trying to quantify that, but it is a 8
qualitative
- judgment, I
understand, that you're 9
making.
So, it is subject to being able to defend it 10 in some way.
So, staff is going to have to carefully 11 give consideration how they do justify that 12 qualitative judgment.
13 Let's say that Option 3 is a prudent 14 thing to do and then the staff is saying that that 15 would meet -- in 80 to 90 percent of the cases, that 16 that would satisfy the concern over vehicle bomb.
In 17 my mind, that becomes pretty soft.
Now, maybe the 18 staff has been able to quantify that better than I 19 would guess, but maybe you have.
But I start to get 20 a little concerned there.
I understand the approach 21 as you described it, and that seems like a reasonable 22 approach, but like the others I do have concerns about 23 the criteria that you're going to establish.
If I l
l 24 look at the proposed wording, which would implement 25 that, I get concerned that it's, in my mind, a garbled l
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version of 10 CFR 50.149 and it worries me that wa 2
take that requirement and change the words so that 1
3 there is confusion over the meaning and how it's going to be implemented and how we established criteria.
4 5
So, coming to the point, has the staff 4
6 considered another option, 3-A or 5 minus, I don't 7
know what you call it, of proceeding with the vehicle 8
barriers around the entire perimeter?
But since I 9
think we're in a very soft area, where you come a very 10 soft area with the rest of it, of then through some 11 mechanism,
- 50. 54 ( f) or whatever is appropriate, 12 getting some of the additional information that will 13 put us in a better position than knowing what type of 14 rulemaking may or may not be necessary for the 15 vehicular bomb part of this?
I just throw that out.
16 I don't know if the staff has given consideration to 17 that option.
18 Then, one other thing.
It seems to me 19 that to propose expedited rulemaking is inconsistent 20 with staff's statements that the NRC staff, FBI and 21 CIA assessment is no significant change to actual 22 threat lull.
I'm not sure how that sits with 23 arguments for expedited rulemaking.
I think the 24 Agency should proceed, but I'm not sure why we should 25 forge ahead without getting adequate comment on this.
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46 1
Now, I realize. that expedited rulemaking.does not 2
necessarily mean there will-not be an adequate, but I 5
3 hesitate to see us forge ahead in. areas where we're 4
saying it's not needed for adequate protection without 5
careful - thought about what-we're doing and the 6
consequences and what we might get into when it comes 7
down to implementing criteria,.especially when those 8
criteria are based on versions of existing backfit 9
language.
10 So, I dor t Irnow 1 the staf f - has - 'a 2
11
. response on the 3-A or, ainus 3 optiot 12 DOCTOR MUR1O.
I think w.'th regard to 13 the last point,-what the stat? in sayinc; is we think.
14 the margins are less toda, than we pr ceived'them to 15 be some time ago and we wo..a like to reestablish
[
1 16 those margins.
But it doesn't meet our test of 17 adequate protection.
18 Now, you said that there was an area that 19 was soft.
Did you mean 'in the area of standoff 20 distance and that --
21 COMMISSIONER REMICK: Yes. When i't comes l
22 down to the statement that there have been 80 or 90 23 percent of the plants, this would be sufficient, it's 24 not only standoff distance, but it is facilities.
I 25 realize you've had residents go and walk down some of i
l NEAL R. GROSS j
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- - = _.. _. ~ -, ~. ~.. -
47 1
1 these and so forth.
Now, when it comes down to it, my l
l 2
guess would be that -- I don't know.
Maybe the staff 3
is more confident than I guess I feel at this point 4
you should be about that 80 or 90 percent and it might l
l 5
change one's views if it was 60 or 70 percent versus 6
80 or 90 percent.
But maybe you feel very confident i
7 about that estimate.
8 DOCTOR MURLEY: My sense is that we think 9
that will hold up, yes.
10 MR. BURNETT:
In fact, my understanding 11 is we've identified a very small number of sites, 12 which is Enclosure 7.
We think all other sites will 13 meet the criteria.
Then you also, in one of your 14 comments, you said that maybe it sounded like the 15 staff was violating its own principles by suggesting 16 expedited over shall we call normal rulemaking.
17 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
No, I've just l
l 18 pointed out that your bottom line on threat is 19 inconsistent in my mind with proposing expedited.
20 MR.
BURNETT:
But if we had a real 21 credible threat or an imminent threat, we of course 22 jump over expedited rulemaking to immediate.
23 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
Sure.
l 24 MR.
BURNETT:
Expedited, in my 25 understanding, is a mechanism for this middle area, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W, l
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48 1
that we think it's very important.
We're very 2
interested in the solution, but we're also interested 3
in public comment and everything they have to say.
So 4
that expedited doesn't really reduce the data or 5
jeopardize the data but puts you into a format of 6
gathering it faster.
That was where at least my staf f 7
was coming from.
8 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
That I could agree 9
to if that is the intent.
10 MR. BURNETT:
And that is our intent.
l 11 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
I think it's 12 extremely important that people have a chance to look 13 at this very carefully and analyze things and provide 14 the feedback and that we don't forge ahead assuming l
15 what the outcome is going to be of that analysis.
16 MR. TAYLOR:
Commissioner, Bob mentioned 17,
which looks at some sites --
18 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
Yes.
19 MR.
TAYLOR:
which is safeguards l
20 material.
But that sort of showed you a little bit of 21 a spa-of some sites where we have looked closely 22 enough to at least give you what we conceived as --
23 and certainly shows a variability among several sites 24 from one that will obviously require a great deal of 25 analysis and to one or two that would have much less NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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49 1
analysis and potentially maybe not have to do much 2
other than Option 3.
So, it was an attempt to span 3
and also outline, I think just from that information you can gather, outline how important these analyses 4
5 will be on a plant-specific basis beyond the 80 6
percent which we have reasonable confidence the 7
solution is relatively straightforward.
8 COMMISSIONER REMICK:. Well, it gives me 9
some comfort that the staff really feels confident on 10 those approximate numbers.
11 MR. TAYLOR:
This was done by a survey 12 through do you want to add to that any further 13 information?
14 MR. CONGEL:
Yes.
We've been through 15 several iterations on it and the degree of confidence 16 that we had with each iteration is increased and the 17 number that we gave of the 80 or 90 percent, if 18 anything, refers to a conservative estimate.
- Namely, 19 it's probably like the 90 percent.
20 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
Okay.
Good.
21 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Anything else?
22 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
No, that's all.
23 CHAIRMAN SELIN: Commissioner de Planque?
24 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Yes, I have a I
25 couple questions.
You explained in Enclosure 1 some l
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50 1
of the actions that the plants have already taken.
2 But then said, "Well, this doesn't quite accomplish 3
for many of these what we have in mind in option 3."
1 4
Can you give us a better quantitative feel for that?
5 How many of the licensees might already satisfy Option i
6 3?
7 DOCTOR MURLEY:
I'm sorry.
8 MR. BURNETT:
We're talking about the 9
question that they asked on how many of the people
)
10 have installed vehicular control systems and how many l
11 of those systems might satisfy the new criteria?
12 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Yes.
This is 13 the last item in Enclosure 3.
14 MR. BURNETT:
Right.
I personally don't 15 have that data.
16 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
I'm sorry, 17.
18 MR. BURNETT:
But we're looking.
19 DOCTOR MURLEY:
We'll ask Phil McKee to 20 answer that.
He can answer.
i 21 MR.
McKEE:
I can provide some 22 information on that.
In our survey that we've gotten 23 over time from licensees, we've got a number of 24 activities and we're aware at least at 30 sites a 25 number of licensees have taken actions such as putting NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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.51-1 cabling in the fence.
We call them Jersey bounces, 2
cement barriers.
Very few, if any,_ that we're aware i
I 3
of have really taken actions to put active barriers in I
i 4
the vehicle access which would say that they really j
5 couldn't satisfy option 3.
And also, looking at the
)
6 design basis vehicle, we're finding out'that some of l
7 the measures taken may not be adequate to protect 8
against vehicles of certain size.
They.may stop a 9
smaller size vehicle.
So,-I think in that-sense, 10 really if you look at all the sites, very few in their I
11 entirety would meet the criteria'for Option 3.
i 12 And many have taken ' actions that go I
13 beyond the perimeter.
They've got. some - things-in
[
14 access controls outside~ and extended.
So, that 1
-15 really, unless they maintain and man those stations on l
1 16 the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis, somebody'could come through'that j
17 and then have access into the protected area._ So, a
{
18 lot of measures were taken. We didn't want to get the 19 sense that those measures would be acceptable l
20 completely if you implemented Option 3.-
They might be 21 able to use some of those measures and apply it, but 22 probably they'd have to do more.
23 MR. BURNETT:
Have to augment it.
24 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Yes.
Okay.
25 There's something subtle that troubles me a little bit J
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6 52 i
l 1
about-the rationale given on page 5 of the paper for l
I
+
1 c
2 a substantial increase.
It seems -to me that the point i
j 3
you're making is that TMI demonstrated a vehicle could i
4 actually get on site, and in the'World Trade-Center-i 5
situation where you can have a bomb aboard a vehicle 6
without having any notice, and coupling those two 7
together you see the linkage - with a substantial 1
8 increase.in overall protection of public health and j
9 safety.
10 But if you go back to the paragraph on.
11 TMI, the linkage with actual safety is made in two 12 sentences there where it says, "There was confusion 13 and misinformation given to operations and security 14 staff until a' positive assessment'of the intrusion i
15 could be made.
Out of the confusion and concern for 16 personal safety, operation staff made' decisions that 17 could have negatively affected public health and 18 safety."
l 19 Now, if you go with Option 3 and you have 20 the perimeter barriers that will actually stop the 1
)
21 vehicle and now assuming in most of the plants you 22 have an adequate standof f distance, I assume then that 23
- we're not talking about any physical damage to the i
24 plant that would afiect public health and safety.
25 That leaves the argument that I.see here given in the i
l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
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,,I
53 1
TMI situation that you have some confusion among staff 2
and some difficulties in directing what should'be 3
done.
Are we addressing that in any way?
You're 4
linking that to could have negatively affected public 5
health and safety.
It's the rationale that's 6
troubling me a little bit.
7 DOCTOR MURLEY:
I'm not totally sure I 8
get the thrust of your question.
Let me answer 9
generally at least, that our thinking was that that 10 rationale we gave is a rationale for having a vehicle 11 denial system, period.
12 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Right.
13 DOCTOR MURLEY:
And I believe at least 14 that that rationale does justify a vehicle denial 15 system.
I guess I don't --
16 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
But if you had 17 an incident --
l 18 DOCTOR MURLEY:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
-- if you have 20 a vehicle bomb go off on the perimeter, it's stopped 21 at the barrier but it goes off --
22 DOCTOR MURLEY:
Yes.
23 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
-- my guess is 24 you're going to cause a lot of confusion anyway, which 25 is the point that you make on the TMI incident.
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{
1 DOCTOR MURLEY: Yes. No doubt there will 2
be confusion, but you won't have the confusion and the 3
uncertainty of --
4 MR. TAYLOR: A vehicle actually going in.
5 DOCTOR MURLEY:
-- a vehicle and people 6
actually in the protected area.
7 COMMISSIONER de PIANQUE:
So you don't 8
see that kind of problem leading directly then to any 9
health and safety concerns?
10 MR. BURNETT:
Not as bad as it was in the 11 TMI incident.
12 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Okay.
All 13 right.
It's just a little worrisome that you make 14 that linkage there and have you truly avoided that 15 problem?
16 DOCTOR MURLEY:
I think we have, yes.
17 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Okay.
18 MR. BURNETT:
And the truth is we won't 19 really know until we have an incident.
But we've 20 addressed it the best we can bassi on the data we've 21 got.
22 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
True.
23 Okay.
Just one more question.
You 24 mentioned the coordination with DOE and I recognize 25 that's something we're more or less required to do.
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55 i
1 Would there be any problem with them if we went for 2
Option.3 or Option 5?
3 MR. -BURNETT:
I have met-with and 4
discussed these approaches with my opposite.
He 5
happens to be also in attendance in this meeting today 6
with his boss.
We met this morning also.
The 7
philosophy behind the two protection systems are 8
essentially identical in producing the same type of 9
protection.
I've had to word it that way because.
10 their design basis threat is classified and there are
~
11 differences between our threat and their threat.
But-12 the resulting implementation of security precautions 13 are very. consistent.
14 COMMISSIONER de PLANQUE:
Okay.
That's
- l 15 all.
Thank you.
16 CHAIRMAN SELIN: Well, I'm very impressed i
l 17 with this piece of work.
I think it's very sensible.
l 18 I think you've taken the approach it's better to get l
l 19 it roughly right than exactly wrong.
We have to be l
20 careful we're not capricious on this last five or ten 21 percent because that would undermine the full 22 credibility of the agency.
But I think you've taken 23 one of these things that's. sort of almost intuitively 24 self-evident but not, as Commissioner Curtiss pointed j
25 out, falls quite far outside the way we normally do l
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56 1
business and I think personally you've done a very 2
good job at getting there.
You've also satisfied most 3
of Commissioner Remick's earlier questions that what 4
we do shouldn't make it harder to run the plant 5
properly from an operations point.
I believe you 6
solved that question.
I didn't see anything in the 7
approach that would just make it more difficult to run 8
the plant on a day to day basis.
But, personally, 9
I'm very interested in how we get from here to there 10 without turning the keys over to the people who are 11 trying to regulate but control the steps ourselves.
12 The last thing I'd like to say is any 13 time you start with a design basis threat, whether we 14 call this adequate protection or enhanced protection, 15 you have the concept of enhanced protection because 16 somebody is always
- saying, "Well, this big is 17 reasonable but bigger is not reasonable," and part of 18 that is it would cost too much to overwhelm it and 19 implicitly it's too unlikely.
So, we're getting into 20 some new legal ground.
I'm not so sure we're getting j
21 into as new substantive ground.
I mean basically you 22 have a whole lot of people trying to posit what we 23 should protect against, nobody believing any of these 24 things will really happen, and we take a look at how l
l 25 hard it is and how plausible it is and see if we add NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
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57 l
1 it up it comes out sensibly.
1 2
But I think it's very important'to avoid 3
truly capricious behavior on the part of the 1
4 Commission or the staff when we get to those small.
5 number of cases _that don't fall into some kind of-l 6
guidance or guidelines consistent with what courts 7
normally have to deal with, these not completely 8
predictable situations.
Personally I think it would j
9 be very helpful.
10 Commissioner Remick?
]
11 COMMISSIONER REMICK:
Just one minor 12 response.
I fully agree, certainly licensees should 13 not be establishing our schedule, but the history of 14 the Agency is that when we estimate things from a 15 regulatory perspective, quite often we under estimate.
16 those costs.
So, it's always valuable to get perhaps i
1 17 more detailed costs.
But at the same time, I think 18 those could be provided during the process of comments i
19 on the rulemaking process.
I think we have found that 20 many times we under estimate costs.
21 CHAIRMAN SELIN:
Right.
I agree with 22 that.
We need all the information, but we need to 23 control the process.
24 Commissioner Curtiss?
25 Commissioner de plangue, anything else?
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58 1
Thank you very much.
2 (Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m.,
the above-3 entitled matter was concluded.)
J 9
1 e
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I
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER This is to certify that the attached events of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
TITLE OF MEETING:
BRIEFING ON STATUS OF DESIGN BASIS THREAT REEVALUATION PLACE OF MEETING:
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND DATE OF MEETING:
JUNE 24, 1993 were transcribed by me. I further certify that said transcription is accurate and complete, to the best of my ability, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing events.
~
i
/2 Reporter's name:
Peter Lynch f
l l
i HEAL R. GROSS coutf toponfets Awe TRANscassens 1333 RNODE ISLAND AVINUI. M.W.
(202) 234-4435 WASNeest0N. DA 2000S (202) 232-6000 i
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i
COMMISSION M'dETING ON VEHICLE THREAT June 24.1993 4
O BACKGROUND O
THREAT ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS O
PUBLIC MEETING O
COSTS ESTIMATES 0
NEW OPTION O
RULEMAKING OPTIONS O
STAFF RECOMMENDATION 1
T l
l
. m.
f BACKGROUND O
TMI INTRUSION & WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING PROMPTS TWO PHASE REEXAMINATION O
PHASE 1 - VEHICLE THREAT PHASE 2 - DESIGN BASIS THREAT (DBT)
CHARACTERISTICS O
4/22/93 COMMISSION MEETING - VEHICLE THREAT Option 1.No change l
Option 2 Protection at Protected Area (P.A.) vehicle access points Option 3 Protection at the entire P.A. perimeter Option 4 Same as 3 with required stand-off distance i
O STAFF RECOMMENDATION DELAYED PENDING l
PUBLIC MEETING ON DBT i
2 t
j I
4
y l
THREAT ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS O
NRC STAFF, FBI, & CIA ASSESSMENTS - NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE, " ACTUAL" THREAT LOW O
STAFF ANALYSIS OF 500+ VEHICLE BOMBINGS WORLDWIDE IDENTIFIES CHARACTERISTICS O
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN " ACTUAL" THREAT AND HYPOTHETICAL DBT PROVIDES MARGIN OF PRUDENCY O
INCREMENTAL INCREASE IN " ACTUAL" DOMESTIC THREAT RESULTS IN INCREMENTAL DECREASE IN MARGIN OF PRUDENCY UNLESS DBT MODIFIED O
ACTUAL THREAT ASSESSED LOW, BUT SOMEWHAT 1
MORE LIKELY 3
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PUBLIC MEETING - MAY 10. 1993 O
150 ATTENDEES, INCLUDING UTILITY REPS, PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS, AND PRIVATE CITIZENS O
PRESENTATIONS BY NRC, CBG, NCI, NUMARC, &
ONE PRIVATE CITIZEN O
ALL SIDES AGREED THAT REEXAMINATION OF DBT WARRANTED O
COMMENTS ON ADVERSARY CHARACTERISTICS, VEHICLE THREATS, COSTS ETC SOLICITED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS O
NO CONSENSUS ON IMPLICATIONS OF TMI & WTC INCIDENTS 4
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PUBLIC MEETING - MAY 10,_1993 - continued O
CBG/NCI - DBT INADEQUATE, TERRORISM HAS ARRIVED IN U.S.,
DBT SHOULD INCLUDE REALISTIC HYPOTHETICAL THREATS O
NUMARC - SECURITY ADEQUATE, NO CREDIBLE THREAT DOMESTIC TERRORIST TREND DOWNWARD TMI & WTC NOT RELEVANT. NO LINKAGE NUCLEAR PLANT NOT SOFT TARGET 5
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REVISED COST ESTIMATES O FOUR OPTIONS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED Option 1 No change i
Cost of implementing vehicle contingency plan
$25k to $150k + $4k per day Option 2 Protection at existing P.A. vehicle access points t
$200k to $600k i
Option 3 Protection at the entire P.A. perimeter
$300k to $2,900,000 l
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4 REVISED COST ESTIMATES - continued Option 4 Same as 3 with required standoff distance Case 1 (no additional measures needed to protect against vehicle bomb) - $400k to $3,000,000 Case 2 (additional measures needed to protect against vehicle bomb) - $700k to $4,300,000 O VARIABLES THAT CAUSE LARGE COST RANGE
- Kenetic energy of DBV
- Length of perimeter (2,000.- 9,000 feet)
- Location of vital area structures relative to protected area barrier 4
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4 NEW OPTION 5 O
REQUIRE A BARRIER AGAINST DBV WITH EXPLOSIVE PAYLOAD O
FOR SITES WHERE A VEHICLE BARRIER PROVIDES INADEQUATE STAND-OFF, LICENSEE HAS OPTION TO TAKE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE STAND-OFF OR PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES WITH COST ANALYSIS i
O NRC DETERMINES ACCEPTABILITY OF LICENSEE PROPOSAL ~
O PREVENTS TMI-TYPE INTRUSIONS & PROVIDES PROTECTION AGAINST VEHICLE BOMB i
O MOST SITES (80% TO 90%) $50K MORE THAN OPTION 3, REMAINING SITES ADDITIONAL COSTS 8
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RULEMAKING OPTIONS O
IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE FINAL RULE - Allowing for public comment only on the final rule.
Pros: 1. Most time saving course of action to achieve prompt and enforceable licensee response.
- 2. Forcefully demonstrates the priority placed on protecting the public health and safety.
Cons: 1. Demands justification of the credibility and i
immediateness of the threat.tojustify avoidance of Administrative Procedures Act (APA) requirements::1) publication of a proposed rule with opportunity for public comment, and 2) the thirty day prenotice of effective date-i
- 2. Litigative. risk due to shortcutting APA procedures and concerns regarding backfit and environmental review 9
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RULEMAKING OPTIONS - continued O
EXPEDITED RULEMAKING PROS: 1. May significantly shorten the time between i
Commission decision and implementation. 2. Eliminates litigative risk due to shortcutting APA procedures and i
other requirements.
CONS: 1. Allows less time for public comment, and 2.
Resource intensive 4
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s STAFF RECOMMENDATION O APPROVE OPTION 5 i
-1)
Modify DBT for radiological-sabotage (10 CFR 73.1) to l
include the use of a vehicle for the transport of personnel, hand carried equipment, and/or explosives 4
i 2)
Modifications to 10 CFR 73.55 to reflect the change to the DBT and to allow for consideration of alternative j
security measures when existing ^PA barrier does not provide adequate stand-off distance i
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3)
Use expedited rulemaking to achieve this change e
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Use the design basis vehicle threat as. described in to the Commission paper O CONTINUE PHASE 2, BASED ON COMMMISSION APPROVAL OF OPTION 5 i
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MARGIN OF PRUDENCY New DBT Level Hypothetical DBT Reestablished Margin of Prudence Margin of Decreased Prudence Margin l +WTC Bomb
+TMI intrusion
" Actual" Threat I
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PROPOSED CHANGE TO DESIGN BASIS i
THREAT -
73.1 Purpose and scope (a)
Purpose (1) Radiological Sabotage 4
(i) (E) four-wheel drive land vehicle used for the l
transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or l
explosives i
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DRAFT RULE LANGUAGE FOR VEHICLE PROTECTION 4
Add new paragraphs (7) and (8) to 10 CFR 73.55(c):
(7) Vehicle control measures shall be established to protect against the use'of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain rapid access to Vitalareas.
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4 DRAFT RULE LANGUA GE-continued (8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures establishedin accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) with the design goals and criteria forprotection l
against a land vehicle bomb specified by the Commission.
Each licensee shall either (i) certify to the Commission that l
the vehicle control measures meet the criteria specified, or (ii) propose alternative measures in addition to the measures establishedin accordance with 10 CFR l
I 73.55(c)(7), describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb, compare the costs of the alternative measures with the l
costs of measures necessary to fully meet the criteria.
The Commission will accept the proposed alternative measures l
if they provide substantialprotection against a land vehicle bomb, and the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are disproportionate to the addedprotection which l'
would be provided.
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