ML20045D503
| ML20045D503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1993 |
| From: | Jordan M, Mcneil D, Zelig C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045D498 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-OL-93-01, 50-263-OL-93-1, NUDOCS 9306290075 | |
| Download: ML20045D503 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REC'JLATORY COMMISSION REGION III.
Report No. 50-263/0L-93-01 Docket No.
50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Hall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Examination Administered At: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2100 W. River Street Monticello MN 55362 Examination Conducted: May 24 - 28, 1993 Examiners:
T. Bettendorf, PNL RIII Examiner:
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Date Chief Examiner:
d d$/fd 6[w/93 D.R.QcNeil Date Approved By:
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M. J.// Jordan, Chief Date Operdtor Licensing Section 1 Examination Summary Examination administered durina the week of May 24 - 28. 1993 Report No. 50-263/0L-93-01(DRS))
Six non-licensed operators were given Reactor Operator examinations.
Results: All individuals passed all sections of their respective examination.
The following is a summary of the strengths and weaknesses noted during the performance of this examination.
Strenaths:
Knowledge of in-plant and control room equipment and instrumentation locations. (For details see Section 3b/c)
.o Procedural knowledge and execution during the simulator scenarios.
(For details see Section 3c) 9306290075 930622 PDR ADOCK 05000263 V
Examination Summary 2
' Weaknesses Shutdown reactivity management.
(For details see Section 3b)
Determining main. feed regulating valve position locally.
(For details see Section 3b)
Tech spec familiarity by the reactor operators.
(For details see Section 3c) e Diagnosis / communications between operators during simulator scenarios.
(For details see Section 3c) f b
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Examiners
- D. R..McNeil, Chief Examiner, NRC, Region III
- C. M. Zelig, NRC, RIII T. Bettendorf, Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL) 2.
Persons Contacted Facility
- B.11111, Plant Manager
- J. Swailes, General Superintendent of Operations:
- E. Sopkin, Operations Training Superintendent
- B. Day, Manager, Monticello Training /Special Programs
- T. Wellumson, Operations Instructor U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC)
M. Jordan, Chief, Operator Licensing Section 1,
- S. Ray, SRI, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
- L. Vick, HOLB, NRR
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on May 27, 1993.
3.
Initial License Trainina Proaram Observations The training department was found to be responsive to the needs of the examination team. The trainers were knowledgeable and courteous throughout the examination week. They put in extra time when necessary without complaint and maintained a professional attitude throughout the examination.
The following information is provided for evaluation by the licensee via their SAT based training program. No response is required.
a.
Written Examination Strenaths/ Weaknesses No strengths or weaknesses were observed in this category during this examination, b.
Job Performance Measures (JPMs)
Strenaths:
Candidates were very knowledgeable concerning equipment o
location and operation. The candidates were able to locate 1
,+ - + _ -
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equipment rapidly and understood how to operate the equipment without prompting.
e Candidates were very familiar with their operating procedures. They obtained and executed the procedures well and without prompting or clarification by the examiners.
Weaknesses:
When asked, candidates were unable to state what their source range monitors (SRM) should indicate when the reactor plant is shutdown. The operators were able to correctly state that 3 cps, was the minimum acceptable value, but were not able to clearly define an upper limit where they would become concerned and notify plant management.
One operator indicated he would accept IES cps which indicates a critical reactor.
e The candidates were unsure of how to use the local valve position indication on the main feed regulating valves. The copper position indicator on the valve body is not marked in percent so operators are estimating valve position. They also did not know whether they should use the top, middle or bottom of the moving position indicator connected to the valve stem to determine position. One operator used pencil markings on the back of the valve operator to determine valve position.
e Operators were familiar with their own responsibilities during emergency situations, but were unable to direct others to their correct assembly location where they should go, if they did not know. Operators were asked where to send an individual during a radiation release event if the person did not know where to go. The operators were unable to state the correct assembly area for the individual.
c.
Dynamic Simulator Scenarios Strenaths:
o Candidates were very knowledgeable concerning control room equipment location and operation. The candidates were able to proceed rapidly to switches and instruments and had a good understanding how to operate the equipment.
Candidates were very familiar with their operating procedures. They obtained and executed the procedures well.
I t
Weaknesses:
The operators displayed a weakness in tech spec familiarity.
The operators were familiar with entry conditions, but had to be coached by the SR0 when they were looking up individual tech spec issues.
e When directed to initiate drywell sprays the candidates would always retrieve the procedure, but would never use the procedure. They would line up the system from memory.
Retrieving the procedure in this case only consumed the-candidate's time, e
Candidates diagnostic skills for a feed line rupture were weak.
Although the examination team felt the candidates knew there was a feed line rupture in one of the scenarios, none of the candidates positively stated that there was a feed line rupture when questioned after the scenario. One candidate even left the vessel level control station during the feed line rupture which allowed vessel level to decrease unmonitored to a level of -60 inches.
Communication between the R0s and the SR0s was not consistent. The candidates frequently became informal in their communications. Repeat-backs were not consistently used.
4.
Ooerations. Security. Rad Protection. Other Strenaths:
Training, Operations, Security and Rad Protection were all professional in their dealings with the examination team.
The examination team was able to quickly process through the gate house and into the plant.
The examination team was able to quickly obtain all materials needed for efficient administration of the examination.
Weaknesses:
In some cases, operations and training appear to be non-responsive to each other's requests.
During the previous requalification cycle, operations requested training to develop multiple scenarios for requalification training. Only one scenario was developed. During the prep week for this examination training requested operations provide personnel to validate simulator scenarios and JPMs. Operations provided one person to validate in-plant JPMs. Training had to provide the i
remainder of the validation personnel. This is significant in that once the training personnel are exposed to examination material they are no longer allowed to provide training for the candidates. This imposes a difficult situation on a small training staff such as Monticello's because only a few people are available to train candidates.
In E
l addition, operations input on the validation of examination test items has proven to be invaluable for improving the quality of the examination, s
5.
Simulator Observations:
Simulator discrepancies were identified. These discrepancies are noted in Enclosure 3.
6.
Exit Meetina An exit meeting with the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant management was held at the Monticello training offices on May 27, 1993. Those attending the meetings are listed in Section 2 of this report. The following items were discussed during the exit meeting:
Strengths and weaknesses noted in this report.
The general observations relating to the plant noted in Section 4.
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-SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
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Docket No. 50-263 Operating Tests Administered On: May 24 - 28, 1993 The following documents observations made by the NRC examir an team during the May 1993, initial examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification tnd review, indicative of-i non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
ITEM DESCRIPTION C-2046A While performing procedure 0255-06-1A-1, Rev 34, page 18, it was noted that valve C-2046-A opened in approximately 2 seconds.
In accordance with the specified procedure, the l
valve is supposed to open in 4 - 6 seconds.
CV-1994 While performing procedure 0255-04-1A-1, it was.noted that CV 1994, No.11 RHR pump minimum flow valve stroked from full open to full shut in two seconds. This appears to be faster than the actual plant would be.
HI-HI indicator While performing test N o.' 0289a, SW Effluent Monitor for SW effluent Functional test, it was noted that on step 5 the simulator brings in the Upscale High-High indicator on' C-10.
=The procedure indicates only the High alarm energizes'.
The list of effluent setpoints indicates there is no setpoint
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for the High-High. This C-10 alarm may be in error.
Switch plate While performing an RHR operability surveillance, it was noted the switch and switchplate for CV-2394A do not match
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the description in the surveillance. This is apparently a modification that has not been installed in the simulator.-
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