ML20045D470

Forwards 1988 Proposed Rule for Regulation of U Enrichment Facilities for Interested DOE or Martin Marietta Staff

ML20045D470
Person / Time
Site:	Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	06/17/1993
From:	Grobe J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Hall J ENERGY, DEPT. OF
References
NUDOCS 9306290046
Download: ML20045D470 (8)

Text

Oct

4 1

JUM i 7 Department of Energy Docket No. 070-07001 ATTN: James C. Hall, Manager, Docket No. 070-07002 Uranium Enrichment Transition 200 Administration Road Oak Ridge, TN 37830

Dear Mr. Hall:

At a recent gaseous diffusion training course in Oak Ridge, attended by NRC, DOE, and Martin Marietta staff, some interest was expressed in the content of the 1988 Proposed Rule for Regulation of Uranium Enrichment Facilities. The NRC developed the 1988 proposed rule for application to new uranium enrichment facilities that would be licensed rather than certified.

(The proposed rule that the NRC is currently drafting for the Gaseous Diffusion Plants will be based on a certification process as required by the Energy Policy Act of 1992.) Roy Holliday, a Martin Marietta engineer at the Portsmouth Site, expressed a desire to obtain a copy. We have enclosed the 1988 proposed rule so that you may provide copies to interested DOE or Martin Marietta staff as you deem appropriate.

Sincerely, Original signed by John A. Grobe Jack A. Grobe, Chief Fuel Cycle & Decommissioning Branch

Enclosure:

1988 Proposed Rule for Regulation of Uranium Enrichment Facilities cc w/ enclosure:

D. C. Bocher, DOE-Paducah E. W. Gillespie, DOE-Portsmouth J. W. N. Hickey, NMSS bec:

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Vol $3. No. 78 i

Friday. Apnl 22. 1988 Tws secton of tre FEDERAL REGtSTER a t: the NRC Public Document Room, restructuring would be a federally contaris notas to it e pu%c of sne 1717 H Street NW., Washington. DC chartered enrichment corporation.

P'oPo**d

'55"*c' of '*S *nd ron rtrnTwrn :NronuaTion caracT:

which might be subject to regulation by regulat ont _The purwse of mese nooces A. Thomas Clark. Jr Office of Nuclear the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 7

Zn*,",g Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S.

Commission. The NRC staff has also

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majung pnx to ine noophon of tre rna Nuc! car Regula tory Commission, been meeting with some private ruses.

Washington. DC 20555. telephone (301) companies, all of which are expressing 492-0037.

an interest in engaging in uranium NUCLEAR REGUt ATORY sueeututMTARY $NronadATioec enrichment under NRC license and Colm1SSION regulation.

Dackground This advance notice of proposed 10 CFH Part 76 A uranium enrichment facilityis a rulemaking is being published to provide production facility as dermed by section the public, the Department, and the 11(' ) of the Atomic Energy Act of1954, pmspective regulated Industry an Regulation of Uranium Enrichment v

Fsemties as amended.The regulations which opportunity to provide advice and, currently govern the Commission's recommendations to the Commission on aamcy: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

review and evaluation of an application the subject of uranium enrichment for a production facility are contained in licensing.ne NRC staff has developed actio+c Advance notice of proposed 10 Cm Part 50. Part 50 provides no guidance. provided below, which would rulemaking.

specific guidance for licensing uranium form the foundation for a new rule. if sase&Any:The Nuclear Regulatory enrichment lacilities.The NRC staff haa initiated. Because rulemaking may take Comnussion (NRC)is considering the never received an application for a several years, and applications for additico of new regulat2ons Title 10 uranium enrichment facility. The s taff, private enrichment might be imminent.

TPart 7e), foe uranium enrichment however. has licensed facilities which the NRC staff will proceed with the facilities.The constructs,on and process uranium hexafluoride. which is review of applications and Issuance of operation of such facilities currently the principal chemical form of uranium appropriate licenses and permits on the would be hcensed pursuant to the used in the gaseous diffusion process basis of the current regulations in to Comminion's regulations in to CFR Part and the centrifuge process, the current CFR Part 50 and the guidelines 50 for other production and utilization roethods used to produce enriched contained in this advance notice subject uranium.

facilities, such as nuclear power plants.

to any revisions which might be f

in this notice. the Commission presents Ilowever. other methods for enriching appropriate based on comments its current analysis of the applicability uranium can be and are being received.

of the existing regulations, in 10 CFR developed. For example. for several As noted above, current regulations Part 50. to.urstuum enrichtnent facilities years the Department of Energy has already provide a framework for the and poses questions for the purpose of fostered the development of an Ato.nic licensing review of production facilities.

eliciting comments on whether a Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) The initiation of a rulemaking to more separate set of regulations for uranium process for enriching uranium. The closely define the substance of NRC commercial use of these methods would review should not hold up the

. enera$e CnteNa Presented als es et to re#adon We pmcmi,ng to comptedon of submmed

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in this notice may be proposed for Commission.

applica tions.

codification m the new regulation. These On April 7.1988, the Department of critena may also be modified. depending Energy (the Department or DOE)

Uranium llexaflu n.de and Pubb.e on comments received in response to published a notice in the Federal Health and Safety of Uranium this notice. and upon further staff Register (51 FR 11811) requesting Enrichment

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expressions ofinterest for participation Although the regulation of uranium cares:n' e cotament period expires onin the Department's uranium enrichment enrichment facilities couldinclude any July 21.1988. Comments received after program, In addition, on February 17 type of technically feasible enrichment this date will be considered if it is 1987, the Department submitted a report process, as a practical matter the two practical to do so. but assurance of to the Congress on the privatization of predominant techniques, gaseous consideration cannot be given except as DOE's uranium enrichment enterprise.

diffusion and gaseous centrifugetion.

to com.nents received on or before this The report was prepared in response to enrich the uranlurn utilizing the chemical issues raised in Conference Report H.R.

form of uranium hexalluoride. The I

Acomessts:Nai/ comments. to: The 9M005 (House joint Resolution 738 principal reason for using this form is Secretary of the Commission. U.S.

Continuing Appropriation.1987).The that the compound is a gas at Nuclear Regula tory Comnussion.

letter transtnitting the report indicated reasonable temperatures and pressures.

% ashington. DC al555. Attention:

that a more specific recommendation The release of uranium hexafluoride Docketing and Service Branch.

would be made by the Department at from process equipment is a more the end of March on the restructunng of severe chemical (toxicologicall harard Delivercomments to:11555 Rockville pike (One White Flint North) Rockville.

the enrichment enterprise. On March 31.

than a radiation (radiological) hazard as 1987. the Department provided further discussed below.

MD. between 7 30 a m. and 415 p m.

Examme copies of comments received details on the proposed restructunng.

If uranium hexafluoride is released to The principalcomponent of the the atmosphere it will react l

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Federal Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / Friday. Apnl 22.1E38 / Proposed Ralme nnf sally with moisturt m the air to he staff considers that an intake of 50.46, SON. 50.4a. m48, m55a.

a cc hydrogen fluoride (HF) and about 9 mg of uranium is the level at 50.00. M61. 50 02. 50.64. M72. 50.73.,.,

anyl fluoride (UOJ.). Both which s!!ght transient kidney injury is and 50.109.

s compouods can be toxic.%hogen expected to occur, and an intake of Appendices A. C. F. C. H.1. J. k. L

< fluonde is a conceive and vapor which about 40 mg of uranium is a reasonable N. O, Q. and R.

can severely Amage tiam upecially estimate of the threshold level at which a

i n t applicable for reasons the moist tissue of tha luass if inhaled in permanent kidney damage may begin to g"se[." y' sufHcient cxmcentraKm if uranyl occur (see NUREG-1140).8 Therefore, for nuoride is inhaled or ingested. it can design purposes the staff is considering sewn cause internal injury to the kidneys and the calculated maximum amount that an som rmwen sufDcient quantities cao be lethat adult at or bebond the controlled site

.,,om.

in order to demonstrate that the boundary could inhale, as a resuh of se no.. e.nd chemical hazard of uramum credible accidents oflow probability to developmem only

bexafluoride teaction products far be in the range of 9 to 40 mg. Facilities Appenda D Re=m"I exceeds that ofits adiation hazard one designed such that maximum effects APPenda F Rapewunng only might consider the following example would not exceed this range should not Arpenda P Raemd related to just one of the reaction have a significant adverse effect on the B. Those Sections of M CHI Port 50 products. uranyl fluoride. If a person health and safety of the public.

lYhich Apply Completely

-0 inhaled sufficient uranyl fluoride, as a Fer exposure to HF. levels which result of being exposed to a plume from cause permanent injury are not clearly

1. Sections related to aduurustrative released uranium hexafluoride (enriched defined. Exposure to IF at a procedures: Section 50.1 through 50.10, to six percent U-235), such that there concentration of100 mg/m

• is 50.12, 50.13,50.20 through 50.32. Sc3eb.

'n was a 50/50 chance of surviving (50 estimated to be tmbearable for one 50.37 through 50.eCL 50.41. 50.42,50.45, percent lethality) the chemically toxic minute.lf at13 mg/m a wo*Id be 50.50 through 50.53. 50.56,50L58. 50.58, d

effects, that person wocid tTceive only detectable by amell and cause possible 50.70. 50.75. 50.80 through 50.110 except

d about 2.5 rem comrmtted (Itfetime) total irritation. Above 28 mg/m 8. HF would 50.100.

body dose equivalent or about the cause irritation and possible health

2. Appendix B.

e r.axfmen amount a radiation worker effects.* nerefore. the staff considers

', can recette in one calendar quarter (3 thai 28 mg/m 8 HF is the maxunum C Those Sectons of M CFR Pba.Ja1 rew}, Uttdously, even further chemical concentration that a person at or beyond which Apply Partially em injury could be rustained by the same tS controlled site boundary could be 1 Paragraph 8 (S) and (i) of I be f

indwtesial from the hydrogen fluoride exposed for short periods, as a result of he prodooed during the same release of credible incidents oflow probability.

n t apply all other paragraphs appy.

arsnrum bexafhroride.

Enrichment facilities designed to limit

2. Section Sc35a refers to informathm,

any release to a value below this requested bythe Attorney Genemi for

=am Stardards Based m reference concentration will not have a antitrust review. Paragraph (c)is e

j significant adverse effect on the health reserved. Paregraphs (a). (b). and (d)

Based on the above desesseion the and safety of the public, apply only to nuclear power reactors, s:sif will be guided mainly by the Paragraph (e) applies to a uranium 4

chemial e.ffects of reaction products Analysis of the Apphcabality of to cm enrichment applicatica.

from uranium hexafluonde in its outlook Part 5e to Uranitum Endment

3. Section 50.34. Contents of r

es.

en design for the protection of the health he NRC staff has reviewed each Applications; technical information."

e and safety of the public.The Atomic section of10 CFR Part 50 to determine applies in part to a uranium enrichment Faergy Act provides authority for the which sections do not apply, which plant. The extent to which paragraphs of Commisalon to consider any sectkuis wiB apply, includtng the nature i 50.34 apply is discussed below:

i consequence to the public health and of their applicability, and those which safety inherent in the physical will apply in part.This analysis is based A. Paregicph /ol. Preliminary Scfety characteristics of licensed source or on the staffs judgmerit as to technical Analysis Report special nuclearmaterial such as and mM,a1 applicabihty. The The following paragraphs pertain urtatum hexa 0uoride.The staff herem analysis is intended to form a basis for I

principally to nuclear power plants: (1).

proposes reference values to be used for the NRC staffs approach to licensms of (3){i), (4). (10), and (11). Replacement i

tbs evaluation of sites and designs with urar=rm enrichment fac2hties paragrapbs related directly to the intent 7

A. Dose Sections of M CM Parf 50 of these paragraphs should be prepared These nt e

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Proposed reference =la-Ior UO.F.

Which Do Not Apply unless they are only applicable to sad HF. based on chenscal toxicity are

1. Sections and appendices related nuclear power plants.

ittedned to be comparable with the only to nacieer reactorlicensing-B. Paregmph (b) Fino/ Safety Ano/yris leal erismeIintent of the reactorsitinz Sectrons 50.34a. 50.36a 50.f3. 50,44.

Report criteria in 10 CFR Part 100. Le., a whole.

I The following paragraphs pertain body radiation dose guideline value e copies #Ninmo-me may 1,e purdaaed b s

taed at the point where it is believed the scnne nden et tw= nia. us covemment principally to nuclear power plants-(1).

tot clinically observsble threshold Pnntag Ot5ce. P.O. Bau s:'on Wastungtart DC (2)(i). (4). (6)(v). (6)(vli). and (9).

res.

'.'ects begin to occur The staff thus 2* S*K Cas==* "* ** **d** * **

Replacement paragraphs related directly NaOenal Tsdudcml bdsommoen Servtas. m Pwe to the inteat of these paragraphs ehould P poses vecs quantities oc goy.1 po.4 sineigs.id. VA szist. A cop, i..le.

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' 1eamentration ralues which are at the end W tw pubae tascacs= and/w coorms ai be prepared unless they are only d as '

hP=cr range or a vera ge threshold level

• e MC P@ac Dmnt Rwm. tn7 H 5tm' applicable to nucieat power plants.

j kr chemically tonic effects which. if R?arp*ers en Tananeal stare C Pamg?cph fc). PhysicalSecurity Plan

,, Wed. could caU3e tra35ient or Concemmie f3Po**m to ll7. md Lt. Hyd%eas 8* *nen t inntry.

Prodear uo.4sn s,w t. Ny m.

This paragraph applies m its enntr

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l'cderni Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / l'riday Ap il 22 r

,graphId) Sofeguards

,1988 / Proposed Rules aingency Plan Existing Regulatory llasts for Applying Safeguards to Enrichment Facilities Draft GeneralDesign Criteriafor This paragraph applies in its entirety.

Uronium Enrichment C. Puragraph (c) applies in its entirety.

1. Section 50.34(c) requires that each

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F. Paragraph (f) does not apply, applicant for a license to operate a The staff has prepared draft Cencral production or utilization facility must Design Criteria for utanium enrichment C Paragraph (g) does not apply.

include a physical security plan as partwhich are intended to apply to any

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4. Section 50.35 applies. except for of their application.

techmque used for that purpose. These paragraph (al(4)(ii). which refers I

2. Section 50.78 requires each holder draft General Design Criteria have been nuclest power reactor siting criteria. A 3

of a construction permit (issued under drewn from several sources. including replacement paragraph related to siting those previously proposed for other Pan 50). If requested by the should be prepared.cnteria for a uranium enrichment facility Commission, to submit insta types of fuel cycle facilities and those in

5. Section 50.30 applies in part i information on Form N-71. permit use in 10 CFR Part 50 for nuclear power uranium enrichment. The following er ficMi n thereof by the Inkrnational plants. They are intended to provide 3

paragraphs related to nuc! car powei Atomic Energy Agency,and take such generalguidance as to topics which i

plants will not upply:(c)(1) i)(A) and other action as may be necessary to must be considered and the overall (c)(1)(lil(A). Paragraphs (c)((1 1 D and implement the US/!AEA Safeguards performance objectives related to each Agreement,in the manner set forth in criterion. ne actual implementation of (c)(1)(il)(B) apply to fuel repro)(cc)(as)in8 plants, but could equally as well apply Ii 75.0 and 75.11 through 75.14.

the general design criteria will be 1

3. Section 73.1(b!(1)(1) states that Part different than in the case of nuclear

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to urunlurn enrichment plants.

Paragraph (c)(2) uppHes to both nuc! cur P'.escribes requirements f r the power plants and will depend upon the 73 power plants and reproccasing pinnts.

physical protection of production and specific processes and designs being This parngraph could apply to uruniumutilization facilities licensed pursuunt toconsidered and will be commensurate enrichment planta in the some manner with the safety function of the specific P""

• na it applies to luct reproccasing planta. 4. The material control and y

g related to those desi ns. As experience All other parngraphs apply to urunium(1). (2). (5), and (0). 5 70.51(c) andnccountability requirements 8

is guined on the application of the enrichment except (c specific to nucicar po)w(7), which la 70.51(d) pertain to enrichment incilities.criteria. modificatione may be deemed er pinnta.

appropriate to the criterlu. It is al

0. Section 50.54. " Conditions of

5. The Material Control and cxpected that designs to imp!cment the so IJcenacs." app!!es in part 1o uraniumAccountab!!ity Reform itule. as criteria willin most instances not be enrichment. Purngrnph (n) applies to contained in il 74.51. 74.53. 74.55. 74.57 comparnb!c whh that of nuclear power nuclear power plants and fuel and 74.59. pertains to facilitics authorlud to ponne plants. In particular, the confinctnent reprocensing planta. but could be kilograms or more)ns five formula criteria might apply to only limited arcas

/ upplied to n ururSm enrichment pi nt,nuclear ma(terial. cxcept for reproccasing of atrategic special of the plant where significant releases The fo!!owing paragraphn npply to a n

could occur which. in turn, could cause uranium enrichment plant in their pinnts and nuc! cur renctors licensed exposure in excess of the reference entirety:(b). (cl. dl. (c). (fl.

pursunnt to Part 50. Dun thin rule (11 In). Ip). (vj. x(i. ty). (un). u(g). (h). (1).

vnluen for toxic effects, would apply 1o an enrichment facihty An discunned in a previous section of following purug(rapha upply unty to nd (cc). The that handles or produces high enriched this notico, the current technologica.

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nucient power i

(a). (fl. tu. (w). (pinnte (ll. (m), (o). (ql (r).

urunlum (but not these litnited to lowuntng the chemical form urunlum (I-1). a nd (k tl. and (bb) Parngrapha enriched uranium production).

banuoride would be of more and muy or). npply to operntor licenning

0. Sections 70.51, 70.57. nnd 70.56 (in Immediate concern. In this section we i

uranium enrichment.muy not bc opplicabic to their entirely) perinin to any incilhy provide thcac draft criterin as bn cd on authortwd to panscan specini nuclear the NRC atoffs current conalderations

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7. Section 50 55. Conditions ofmaterial to modernte atrategic un to potenthd hnzntd to the health and runatruction permita." npplica in p.srt toalgnificance. cxcept that nuclear anfety of the public. We note. In uranium enrichmrnt. The fo!!owing reactura licensed pursuant to Part 50 areporticular. thut the drah critoria i

parngraphs apply in their entirely to cacmpted from 1170.57 and 70.5ft. Thua presented for design for effects of Purngraph (c) opplicaurnnium enrichment: (n), lb). (cl. and idl.

an enrichment incl)lly that handica or.

natural phenomenu are charncterized by only to nuclear producen uranium enriched above to

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return periods. Thenc criterin should be both nuclear power pinnta and fuelpower pinnia. Paragtnph (f) applien to percent but less than 20 percent (in the used in conjunction with data provided t

U 235 laotopel would be subject to by competent authoritten which relate and conh! upply to a uruntumreprocrealng pinnte Iquality naauranccl 1170.51,70.57. nnd 70.511.

design varinbles such as ground enrir.hment plant, Existing Safeguards Regulations That do accolcrutinn and wind spred to return Pcriod'

8. Section M57. "lanunnce of not Apply to Enrichment racilities but operating liconac." applina in part to Could be Applied Elther by a Condklon Ccnceol()csijtn Critoria Ib) upply wholly Parnstnph Ici npplicauranium cnrir.hment. Pntagrapha in) and License or by Amending to CTH Part g,

only to nuticar power pinnfa L Section 14.31 (t.c.. the 1,ow r.ntichedmust include the principnl design g

o Section M71. %Infrnance of titunium Reform Hule) contnina mutettal criterin for the propoacd factlhy. These lol through bit upply whohy Paragraphrecords. making of reporta." porngrnpha control and accountab!!(ty (MCA Al General Dealun Criterin catnhbah regulations for facthtten acthortred ic minimum raquircrc-ota for the poncipal 1 appiten to nurIcar power pinnta. but possnu apccial nucient material oflow dentsn criterin which are commcnaurnte mid apply to a ur f

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anium entti hment strategic stunificance but arcctficnlly with their anicty function. Thcac cacmpta production and utthrntion General Dealgn Criterin may not be f arilitica hrenacd puraunnt to Pntt ',o romplete Any omiulona do not rehrt c

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the appite ont from the scepnrement of sn

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I Federal Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / Friday. April 22. 1988 / Proposed Rules 333 3 providing trie necessary safety features have safety significance shall be for accessibility to the equipment of in the design of a specific facility. In protected against dynamic effects, onsite and available offsite emergencv addition to satisfying the General including effects of missiles and facilities and services such ashospi J '

Design Criteria, the applicant muste discharging fluMs. that may result from fire and police departments. ambula (1) Design against the loss of natural phenomena. accidents at nearby service, and other emergency agencie s confinement capability or other industrial. military, or t ansportation -

cspability which would jeopardize the facilities. equipment failure, and other Design Basis for Normal Operation. for health and safety of the public where similar events and conditions both Accidents.and/orProtection Against such loss of capability results from any inside and outside the facility.

singl failure in systems having safety fiWeTRMITSTrstHre1Pand Explosions Design

)Prov e diversity in systems Structures, systems, and components (a) Enrichment facilities must be commensurate with their s' fety which are determined to have safety designed so that the concentration of l

a function:

significance must be designed and

. hazardous materials at,or beyond the v

(3) Minimize the possibility of non.

located so that they can continue to boundary of the exclus on ares (1) under random concurrent failures ofimportant perform their safety functions effectively n ernal operating conditions. shall be as.

elements in protection systems:

under credible fire and explosion I w as is reasonsbly achievable and (2)

(4) Provide design criteria and design exposure conditions.TUCbTe as the result of design basis accidents bases for resistance of parts of the EndGaWelGtEncMilliWrTstsihn including those of low probability, shall facility to upper Ilmit accidents and for GEIMIEsiNrecticalphroughoutsbeP n t create any undue n,sk to the health maximum probable na tural phenomena facility.8lianientatlyin%ciittionPvital to and safety of the public.

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when the consequences of such events the control of haurdous materials and (b) The design of the facility must be endanger the health and safety of the to the maintenance of safety control.

adequate to provide protection against public; functions. Explosion and fire detection, severe external events that could result (5) Provide adequate protection for alarm. and suppression systems shall be in the release of quantities and employees from hazards which could designed and provided with sufficient concentrations of hazardous maten,al effect their performance of actions capacity and capability toaihtm!re;thF which may be of public heal,th and required to protect the pubhc from ladverse effects)($55kliisiels1EiEd U$10alon/gp safey significance.T such eventa shall take into account their exposure to hazardous materials.

ct 4ystems 3

There may be some facilities for

'are efeiffilisiifd filiise'sa e historic frequency and severity fu the.

which the General Design Cnteria are EslyIM%81'he design must indude region of the site and the potentialrisk not sufficient and for which additional provisions to protect against adverse to public health and safety. ancluding the criteria must be satisfied in the interest effects that might result from either the inventory of hmrdous materials in the of public safety. Also sorne of the operation or the failure of the fire facility and the size and the proximity of General Design Criteria may not be suppression system.

the population at risk.The type of severe events to be considered will necessary or appropriate for a specific Sharing of Structures. Systems, and among sites, however, earthquakes.

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facility. For facilities such as these.

Components tornadoes, and floods shall be departures from the General Design Criteria must be identi!Ied and justified.

Structures, systems. and components considered in all cases, as desaibed in which are determined to have safety paragrapha c. d. and e below.

Genero/ Requirements significance must not be shared between (c) Historical information concerning t

IQuaUty Standards'and Records $

an enrichment facility and other the regional seismicity interpreted in facilities unless it is shown that such light of regional structural geology and IStructures/syittems.4nd components 6 sharing wiu not impair the capability of site geological conditions shall be used which are detenninedro have safety the ennchment facility to perform its for determining the maximum vibratory ificance sh~all be designed' si

fa ricated. erected.and tested in safety functions. including the ability to ground motion which reasonsbly could return to a safe condition in the event of be expected to affect the site during the Iaccordance with the quality-assurance an accident.

opera ting life of the facility. Such an cnteria set forth in Appendix D to 10 earthquake wiU have a mean return CFR Part 50. Appropriate records of the Proxu.mty of Sites period of the order of 500 years.: Design design, fabrication, erection. and testing An enrichment facility located near earthquakes of shorter return period i

of structures, systems, and componenta other nuclearfacilities must be designed may be proposed, and shau be justified r

which are determined to have safety to ensure that the cumulative effects of through considerations of the I

significance must be maintained by or their combined operations will not incremental risk to public health and under the control of the licensee constitute an unreasonable risk to the safety relative to the 504 year interval.

throughout.he life of the facility, health and safety of the public.

(d)llistoricalinformation concerning Protection Against Environmental Testing and Maintenance of Systems the regional and localincidence and Conditions and Components seventy of tornadoes shaU be used to -

establish a site. specific design tornado i

{,) gtructures. systems, and Systems and components that are event.The characteristics of the design components which are detennined to determined to have safety significance have safety significance shall be must be designed to permit inspection, designed to withstand the effects of and maintenance. and testing' gmund enobba throush the see of sessauc nok chaps

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b, cornpat)ge wiug. the environmental conditions associated with operation.

g"geDcy pgIty

,a,, n,,, w."reetswe Pens im Uw-

%% w %% w %t maintenance. shutdown. testing. a nd Structures, systems, and components Appled Techaotory counca ATc w t's accidents.

which are determined to have safety Npemni w c-newaous soma d

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(b) Structures systems. and sigmficance must be designed for components which are determined to emergencies. The design must provide is

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1328h Toderal Register / Vol. 53. No. 7a / Friday. April 22.19aa / Proposed Rules g

tornado shall be determined considering propaga ting failure, or gross rupture

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both the tornado frequency for the region in which the facility is located, as during the design life of the facility.

Process Sc/ety

) wellas the frequency of occurrence for a Compartmentalization of process Protection Systerns tornado of a given Intens!ty within t 'at inventory, when used as a method of (a) Protection systems shall be region.'

reducing the amount of hazardous designed (1) to initiate action that will

[elne design besis Dood as a ma terial capable of being relea sed by mintrnum shall be the Standard Project any single or local failure of primary assure that specified acceptable flood as defined and in common use by containment, shall be considered in operating design limits are not exceeded the Corps of Engineers.The Standard design as a means to effectively isolete as a result of operational occurrences and (2) to sense potentially hazardous or Project Mood is the floor resulting from and contain the process inventory in accident conditions, and to activate the most severe flood protection rainfall modular units or states for all depth area-duration relationship and reasonable normal or abnormal systems and components required to Isohyetalpattern cf any storm that is

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ensure the safety of operating personnel considered reasonably characteristic of and the public or to give audible and the reglon in whlch the watershed is Ventilation Systems visual alarm so that action can be taken in a timely manner to ensure such located,1f snow rnell may be Ventilatlon systems required for the safety. Systems and components sha!!

oubstantial, appropriate amounts shalj confinement of hazardous materials be activated autornatically where this be included wlth the Door producing shall be designed and appropriately mode is compatible with the safety rainfall. When Doods are predominantly tested to ensure their operability during requirements to be satisfled.

caused by snowmelt. the Standard Project Flood shall be based on critical normal or abnormal conditions. T (b) Protection systems shall have combinations of snow. temperature and accomplish this objective, these systems reliability and in situ testa bility. The wa terInsses, shall be designed to meet the fo!!owing design or protection systerr s shall (f) Structures, sys tems, and requirements:

consider alternate rnethods at least components which must withstand the (a)no desired ventilating alt Dow sufficient to ensure that (1) no single design basis carthqual e to meet the direction shall be rnalntained under failure results in loss of the protection functions and 2 removalfrom service requirements of paragraph (a) shall be operating and accident conditions.

of any compon(en)t does not result in loss designed using a suitable dynamic (b) ne ventilation system shall accommodato changes in operating of the protection system such that it will o e ons rate at hey Ithsta conditions. such as varlations in operate with acceptable reliabl!!!y. The temperature or pressure. and shall be protection systems shall be designed to e cc w cro 1 edemon rated '

capable of safely controlling all off-permit the periodic testing of their

' hat the use of an equivalent static load gases that could be associated with funcilons while the plant is in operation tethod provides adequate n rmal or accident conditions.

to determine competency to perform jonserva tism.

fgj Conservative estimates of (c) The continuity of necessary their Intended safety functions.

ventilation shall be assured by means of (c) Protection system shall be atmospheric dispersion of hazardous alternate equipment, fall sufe systems, designed to fallinto a safe stete orinto material based on local meteorological or other provisions.

a stato demonstrated to be acceptab!c conditions shall be used to evaluate the on some other defined basis if impact of normal operations ~and of (d) Provisions shall be made for conditions such as disconnection of the deolgn basis accidents lo demonstrate testing. during normal opera tions, all system, loss of energy or motive power.

comp'innce with the requirements of component functions having safety or adverse environments are persgrnph (a).

signlRcance to the extent necessary to

• PI'"C'd*

Confinement Darriers and Systems provide reasonable assurance that they wtH perf rm their design safety Instrumentation and Control Systems l

Con 0nernent systems shall consist of Instrumentation and control systems confinement barriers and equipment c) Ven da i sys e s shad be shall be provided to monitor vertsbles which control against the release of hazardous materials to the envirenment.

designed to permit the continued and operating systems that are l

ccuPancy of any and all areas where significant to safety over anticipated

}

ne confinement systems which are such occupancy is required for normal ranges for normal operation, for signlucant to safety shall be designed to plant operall ns, f r safe shutdown, and abnormal operation, for accident protect agalnst the effects of accidents r maintaWng b facWty in a sak conditions, and for safe shutdown.

or external natural phenomena and shall shutdown condition.Their design shall These systems shall ensure adequate be fabricated crected. sppropriately include protection spelnst the intake safety of process and utility service teoted. and maintained to ensure and accumuistion ni hazardous operations in connection with their prevention of abnormal!cakage. rapidlymaterials. The design shall also permit safety function.%e verlables and the timely and safe evacuation of systems that require constant m r,.e m.n.A, u,d m tr s. ro,n.ao, r.n,- Pers n"IIf m 8U are88-surveillance and control include process

• n, i,an nu t n,.

tr=,,.n,.t ra,,an. wa-, r

,n.. a, (f) Ventilallon systems shall be systems having safety signlucance, the w.

1 e a, tian,,t m.t, an.m.,.~i,rer,m, wma, designed to conune the hazardous overall confinement system, 7

c.,it,,r m,,a Itr'nNid[.M7s materials during normal operatinn and confinement barrlers and their reum.nnsr.m.m.wma.N,iIj,"r,7 to ensure that the release of hazardousnuncluind systems. and othnt sysicms f-twa,.bm.n. s,.s A.wom nv.fl v. pt.m.Mt.,i.t. Nt:p rmr:n.

materials in the efDuent gasee is as low that affect the overall safety of the plant.

• wt r%s*29. onon,, tw in,

r.,,,,io,"

as reasonnbly athlevabic. Such systems Controls shall be provided to maintsin If.

shall also be designed to retain their these variables and systems wilhin the

, -..<* la,1, in p,u.... r., n.,, m[a, [*7 ", ',*,C.,. "

confinement and separation capabuhy prescribed operating ranges under all r

sp4 10 minimtte relenace resulting from er normal conditions. Instrumentation and nrrident ronillflon centrol systems shall be doelgned to foil into n anfr' alnle m to mumn a sinte

% "21

• n N r, ;

S n _. i; a.n IT02.1%iT. 410.30l..1.o;.n3

.L Iederal Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / Friday. Apnl 22. 1983 / Proposed Rules

~

3333; demonstrated to be acceptable on some electric power source or circuit, reliable (b) the equipment containing the fissile

=

other basis if conditions such as and timely emergency power wdl be matenalis located behmd suHicient disconnection. loss of energy or motive provided toinstruments confinement barners and shielding to reduce th power. or adverse environments are systems utility service systems, and probabihty and extent of accident expenenced.

process systems in amounts sufficient to contamination of the environment a ta Separation of Protection Systems and

• II

• P"i "'.to be shut down safely ' accidental radiation exposure to ed Control Systems and to be maintained in a safe shutdown personnelin the event of a enticahty Protection systems shall be separated condition with au safety devices accident.

from control systems to the extent that a essential to safe shutdown functioning.

or Ancillary Criteria for Nuclear Criticaht,

change or failure in a control system NuclearCriticalitySafety Safety leaves intact a protection system with Safety Margins (a) Process and storage systems shall

-l acceptable reliability and independence

'#9""***

The design of process and storage be designed to ensure that no Control Areas systems shallinclude demonstrable mecharusms that could cause n

margins of safety for the nuclear segregation of fissile matenals can be A control room or control areas shall criticality parameters that are

{t pone w

be designed to permit occupancy and commensurate with the uncertainties in a

f

,d pendent n e actions to be taken to operate the plant the process and storage conditions. in g

safely under normal conditions and the. data and methods used in matuiaj.

under abnormal or accident conditions calculations, and in the nature of the (b) Components whose nuclear to either operate the plant safely or to immediate environment under accident criticality safety is dependent on a shut down the plant and maintam the conditions. All process and storage limiting concentration of fissile material plant in a safe condition. There shau be systems shall be designed to be shall be designed so that either (1) an alternate system designed to aUow maintained subcritical and to ensure mechanisms that could cause critical the plant to be put into a safe condition that no nuclear cnticality accident can concentrations of fissile matenals are if any one control room or control area occur unless at least two unlikely, not present or (2) concentration is ss is removed from service.

independent and concunent or controlled by positive mstrumental Process Systems as Primary sequential changes have occurred in the means. Confinement Barriers conditions essential to nuclear criticality (c) Process and storage systems shall sa fety. be designed to ensure that the transfer Process components and systems are the pnmary confinement barrier. The Methods of Control of fissile material from safe systems to n unsafe systems is not possble as a design of each process system shall (a) Favorable geometry. in which consequence of any single failure or provide capability for the system to equipment or systems.are sut> critical by operating erTor. mamtain its integrity and operability as virtue of neutron leakage under worst (d) Confinec ent system coropo necessary to protect the public health credible conditions. is the preferred shall be designed to ensure that le and safety. Provisions shall be included method of nuclear criticality control from equipment'or from one for the safe handling of anticipated (b) Where the favorable geometry confinement zone to another nontoutine process conditions. method of nuclear criticality control is confinement zone cannot result in a Utility Services n t practical, the use of permanently condition that would result in nudear fixed neutron. absorbing matenals enticality. Onsite utility service systems shall be (poisons) is the next preferred method of provided when such onsite service is control. (e) The spacing between discrete necessary for emergency use to protect (c) Where both the favorable accumulations of fissile matenals shall be controded so as to maintam a the health and safety of the pubhc. geometry and the permanently fixed suberitical state. Onsite utihty services shall meet the neutron-absorbing materials (poisons! following cntena: methods of nuclear criticality control are If) A criticahty monitonng system (a) The design of each utihty service not practical administrative controls of shall be maintamed in each area where system required for emergency moderation, fissile matenal special nuclear materialis handled. conditions shau provide for the meeting concentration, total fissile material, or used or stored which will energize of safety demands under normal and the use of soluble neutron-absorbing clearly audible alarm signals if abnormal conditions.The design of materials (poisons) shall be employed accidental criticality occurs. utility services and distnbution systems when combined with margins of safety Radiologico/ Protection having safety significance shallinclude alternate svstems to the extent rneasurements or appropriate analysis and engineered safety features. Exposure Control necessary to maintain, with adequate Radiation protection systems must be j capacity, the ability to perform safety eutron Absh i prodded for au areas and operaticns t functions assuming a single failure. Where solid neutron-absorbing where onsite personnel may be exposed (b) Emergency utility services shall be materials (poisons) are used for the to radiation or airberne radioactne designed to permit testing of their prevention of nuclear criticality, the materials. Structures. systems, and functional operability and capacity. design shall provide for positive means components for which operation. including the full operational sequence to verify their continued efficacy. maintenance, and required inspectens t, of each system for transfer between Soluble neutron absorbing materials may involve occupa tional exposure normal and emergency supply sources, rnay be used as a primary nuclear must be designed. f abncated, loca ted. and the operation of associated safety cnncality control provided (a) two shielded, controlled. and tested so as to j systems. independent methods are provided to control external and miernal radiation (el provisions shall be made so that. in ensure the presence of the required exposures to personnel The desigr. m.at the esent of a loss of the pnmary concentration of neutron absorbe and include means to: {-

.13202-rederal Register / Vol. 53. No. 78 / Friday. April 22, 1988 / Proposed Rules lal Prevent the accumulation of radioactive snaterialin those systems information guidance set forth in requiring access: Reguinfory Cuide 3.2.5. " Standard for a basis of design calculation (b) Decontaminate those systems io Format and Content of Safety Analysis cornparable to the twenty five tem jwhich access is required: Reports for Uranium Enrichment whole body value used for guidance in (c) Control access to areas of potential Facilities." and experience gained in 10 CFR Past 1007 contamination or radiation: previous evaluations of other types of I.ist of Subjects for Proposed 10 CFR (d) Measure and control fuel cycle facilities in order to determine Part 76 contamination of areas requiring access; the individual topics fo?its review and I (c) Minimize the time acquired to evaluation of the safcty of a uranium Cla s sified informa tion, llazardous enrichment facility >These to substances. Penally Radiation perform work in the vicinity of follows: seismology. geology. pics are a s protection. Reporting and recordkeeping radioactive components: for example, by hydrolo meteo6tdgi31t'eloc,atforifac,tofs.M. tequirements. Security measures. Source providing sufficient space for case of operation and designing equipment for structural analysis.wnechanical' material. S Uranlum. pecial nuclear material case of repair and replacernent; and gguipynArgna)ysjs. criticality (f) Shield personnel from radiation prevention, fire / explosion prevention 0d The authority citation for this and protection. ventilation system exposure. b document is: , analysis. identification and sharing of Radiological Alarm Systems - atructures, syatems, and components,(Sec.161. 68 Stat. 948. as amended (42 USL

lmportant to safety. radioactive waste Radiological alarm systems must be 22011; sec. 201 aa Sta t.12s2. ae e rnended (42 USE $644).

provided in accessible work areas as ' treatment. packaging. and disposal. appropriate to warn operating personnel ' radiation pro:cction,' chemical safety.b Dated at RoclM:!c. MD. this 16th day of Scgifent3r$1fjia'and ernergency of radiation and altborne radioactive April 19aa. material concentsations above a given planning. decontamination ed ,f setpoint and of concentrations of decommissioning.Lanagemeny -/ for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. F samuel l. CMik. brganizatldrIaiidqualityassuranc$ d.

1. 1. "'"#7 #5 C##"#""""

radioactlve materialin effluents above technical specifications.fhtiman factor'sl. (Mt D c. eAcaa3 Tiled 4-21-88: 8:45 arn! controllimits. Radiation alarm systems calibration and testing their operability. ' b ^ retorlicensipg.s must be designed with provisions for ~ @Upi:[a'l sumo cwe m&aw e plotection'{off n c assified in rma Effluent and Direct Radiation t is expected Monitoring that each of these topics will be ~- addressed separately in any safety FEDERAL tlOME LOAN DANK DOARD (a) As appropriate ef0uent systems evaluation report prepared by the staff must be provided. Means for measuringfor a uranium enrichment facility. 12 CFR Parts $22,541,542,543. 544 545,547,548,549,563,569s,569b.

• amount of radionuclides in efDuentsQuestions Related to the Regulation of ing normal operations and under 569c, and 571

)! dent conditions must be provided Uranium Enrichment Fac!!illes for these systems. A means of measuring in light of the previous discussion. the lNo.33 271) the flow of the diluting medium either Ll.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commluton is air or water, rnust also be provided. particularly interested in receiving Extension of Time Pertod for Board (b) Areas containing radioactive comments concerning the following: Action on Certain Outstandfrig malcrials must be provided with

1. Are the siting criterla set forth in Proposale systems for measuring the direct the General Design Criteria appropriate Date: A ril 31+ 1868-radiation levels in and around theseand complete for uranium enrichment P

facilities? areas. AotHCW federal Home loan Dank Elnuent Control

2. Are there factors related to Da rd.

protection of the environment and the A CTION: Proposed rules; extension of Facilllles rnust be designed to providepublic other than the chemical toxicity time period for board action. means to !!mit levels as low as is of the reaction products of uranium reasonably achievable the release of hexaDuoride, that are not taken into SUMMAMW Pursuant to its recently radlonctive materials in ef0uents during account in the bounding conditions in the Cencral Design Critettat adopted regulatory review procedures. normal operarlona: and control the release of radioactive materials under

3. Should the criteria of Appendix D see Board Res. No. 68-209. published in to 10 CFR Part 50. "'Qunfity Assurance the Federal Register on Thursday, April accident conditions.

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and 21.1968 the Federalllome Loan Dank Board ("Doard") hereby gives notice that

1. ""* I"I " 8 Fuel Reprocessing Plants." be applied in it is extending the time period for Board The facility must be des!gned so us toIls present form to uranium enrichment action on the following outstanding i

facilitate decommissiontng Provisions fa cilitics7 rnust be made to facilltate

4. What activilles should be Proposed regulations outlined in decontamination of structures andperformed by a licensed operator and sueettutNTARY tWOMMATION unill j

equipment. and facilitale the removal of what requirements should apply? October 11.1988, 1 rndtonctive wastes and contaminated

5. Should the technical specification This extension of time will allow the i

materints at tha time the facility is categories applicab!c to fuel Board to further study the issues ra(sed l permanently decommlntoned. reprocesstng plants, as set forth In 10 by the proposals in 14ht of passage of Reilew Plan Toples for NRC Staff CFR 50.30. be applied to uranium the Competittve Equality Danking Act of ""'I' " * " ' I' ' 1987. The Doard is not soliciting "e Commission has taken into

8. Considering the discuulon in this nt the inforraation contained in the notice concerning the health effects to proposals. It Is only cutending the time fue paragraphs in thia notlec the persons by the uptak e of uranium, what period for ponible Daard action until October value of uranium mnn should be used 11.1988 pursusnt te its recently d%

odopted reguintery review precedua e N o:i e gg F4702. INT...l10.30)..107 8a _}}