ML20045D455
| ML20045D455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/18/1993 |
| From: | Wilkins J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| References | |
| ACRS-R-1528, NUDOCS 9306290038 | |
| Download: ML20045D455 (2) | |
Text
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-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ACRSR11528 1
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
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June 18, 1993 Mr. James M. Taylor Executive Director for-Operations U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Taylor:
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE ON ALWR SEVERE ACCIDENT -
5 PERFORMANCE During the 398th meeting of the Advisory - Committee on l Reactor Safeguards, June 10-11,.1993, we discussed with members Jof the staff public comments received on the Advance Notice of. Proposed-Rulemaking (ANPR)Lon:ALWR Severe Accident Performance.. We' had--the :
benefit of the documents referenced.
4 It is our understanding.that the staf f's - proposed approach. - f or proceeding with rulemaking involves.the following four. elements':
1.
Continuing' discussions with 'ACRS :concerning-a ' potential'.
. generic rule, 2.
Delaying a final decision on implement'ation of'the ruleLuntil-after final safety evaluation. reports 1 are. issued for ' the i
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and the CE. System 80+,.
3.
Coordinating the efforts of drafting-a generic rule and the.
e design certification rules for the AEWR andthe CE System 80+
to ensure consistency,-and 4.
Following the reviews of the evolutionary and passive reactor-designs'to ensure consistency of the draft rule with.these reviews.
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We agree with this. approach.
?
In our reports ' on this subject. dated May.17, 1991 and May 14, 1992, we developed and subsequently endorsed what is designated as:
Alternative 3
in the ANPR.
We continue.to recommend this alternative.
9306290038 93061B 1
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Mr. James M. Taylor 2
June 18, 1993 For your further consideration, we recommend that your approach accommodate the following:
1.
The amended regulations should not be so prescriptive as to preclude the use of a design feature which substantially reduces the challenge (s) to the containment.
For example, the approach should not require accommodation of large amounts of hydrogen generation if a design change (such as different core materials) precludes significant hydrogen generation, 2.
The recognition of passive design features to cope with some phenomena, e.g., a large volume-high strength containment, and 3.
Consideration for dealing with combinations of containment loads from severe accident phenomena, e.g.,
steam explosions and hydrogen combustion / detonation.
We expect to have further discussions with the staff on this matter.
Sincerely, A#
J.
Ernest Wilkins, Jr.
Chairman
References:
1.
Memorandum dated May 14, 1993, from Warren Minners, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, for John T.
Larkins, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
Subject:
Summary of Public Comments on Proposed Rule on ALWR Severe Accident Performance
- 57 FR 44513 (Predecisional Draft Commission Paper Attached) 2.
Report dated May 17, 1991, from David A. Ward, Chairman, ACRS, to Kenneth M. Carr, Chairman, NRC,
Subject:
Proposed Criteria to Accommodate Severe Accidents in Containment Design 3.
Report dated May 14, 1992, from David A. Ward, Chairman, ACRS, to James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, NRC,
Subject:
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Severe Accident Plant Performance Criteria for Future LWRS