ML20045B297
| ML20045B297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1993 |
| From: | Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Doughty J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306170158 | |
| Download: ML20045B297 (3) | |
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June 10, 1993
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Jane Doughty 75 Monroe Street Apartment 1 Portsmouth, NH 03801
Dear Ms. Doughty:
I am responding to your letter of April 8,1993, to Thomas E. Murley of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in which you commented on his reply to your letter of March 15, 1993, questioning continued operation of the Seabrook nuclear power plant during a major winter storm.
You expressed three concerns:
(1) that there are no standards for determining whether a plant should be shut down, (2) that Congress intended emergency planning to provide public protection independent and regardless of engineered design features, and (3) that during a severe winter storm, sheltering would be a grossly inappropriate option in the event of a severe accident resulting in substantial releases.
Let me try to address each of these concerns in turn.
First, as Dr. Murley had previously stated in his letter of April 8, 1993, nuclear power plants are designed to operate and shut down safely under very severe natural conditions, including earthquakes, high winds, and flooding.
The NRC determines the limits on operation of a nuclear reactor during the licensing process and these limits are reflected in license conditions and the plant technical specifications. As long as the Seabrook plant remained within its license conditions and technical specifications, there was no safety reason for the plant to shut down during the snowstorm.
Nevertheless, the NRC is now reviewing guidelines and practices related to storm preparation based on lessons learned from the effects of Hurricane Andrew. As a result of this review, the NRC could decide that revised guidance is appropriate.
That storm struck the Turkey Point Electrical Generating Station on August 24, 1992, with sustained winds of 145 miles per hour. The licensee made detailed methodical preparations before the storm.
The nuclear plants were placed in a safe shutdown condition on normal residual heat removal cooling well before the arrival of hurricane force winds.
On September 10, 1992, the NRC and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations agreed to establish a team to compile the experience gained from Hurricane Andrew's impact on Turkey Point. The charter called for the team to (1) review the damage that the hurricane caused the nuclear units and the utility's actions to prepare for the storm and recover from it and (2) to compile lessons that might benefit other nuclear reactor facilities.
Regarding the second point in your letter of April 8,1993, we agree that emergency planning should provide public protection independent of engineered safety features. However, the safety significance of emergency planning is not necessarily equal to that of other protective requirements.
As the Commission stated in a ruling during the Seabrook licensing proceedings:
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[A]dequate emergency planning is " essential" just as adequate lifeboats are essential for a liner carrying passengers at sea.
1 But it is only common sense to acknowledge that emergency plans, iike lifeboats, are a backstop, a second or third line of defense that comes into play only in the rare circumstances that engineered design features and human capacity to take corrective j
action have both failed to avert a serious mishap.
[CLI-90-02, March 1, 1990, 31 NRC at 213]
l Finally, with regard to the relative efficacy of sheltering as a protective measure, the statement in Dr. Murley's letter of April 8,1993, was as follows:
There may, in fact, be circumstances (such as a severe winter storm) where, in the event of a radiological emergency, sheltering rather than evacuation would be the appropriate protective action because evacuation in storm conditions would pose greater risk to the public.
j Dr. Murley did not mean to imply that any particular protective action, such as evacuation or sheltering, is always the best course of action in adverse weather conditions.
Rather, offsite authorities are expected to exercise their best judgment in such matters, taking due account of the particular circumstances that pertain at the time.
In closing, let me assure you that the NRC is very concerned about unusual circumstances and conditions, such as severe storms, and their possible impact on licensed nuclear power plants. During the snowstorm of March 1993, the NRC staff was in contact with affected licensees and monitored the storm's progress from NRC incident response centers at Headquarters and Regional offices in Atlanta, Georgia and King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
At selected sites, including Seabrook, NRC inspectors were on site throughout the storm to monitor conditions and evaluate licensee activities.
Sincerely, 1
Original Signed By Frank J. Congel i
Frank J. Congel, Director l
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards I
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES '
0FC C:PEPB:NRR TECH EDITOR RI:DRP RIhpRSS [
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NAME RAErickson:jc MMejac ABlough -
JJoM WC11 DATE 06/ 02/93*
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OFC AEOD OGC NAME KBrockman EReis FJCongel
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DISTRIBUTION FOR LETTER DATED: June 10,1993 O
Central Files i
NRC & Local PDRs PEPB R/F PEPB Staff i
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