ML20045A677

Vol 1 to Regulatory Review Group - Summary & Overview

ML20045A677
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/11/1993
From:	Gillespie F, Jerome Murphy NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
NUDOCS 9306110190
Download: ML20045A677 (22)

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fy LI Volume One

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g Regulatory Review Group

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Summary and Overview u

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g

Office of the Executive Director For Operations l

Frank Gillespie Mary Drouin Joe Murphy Byron Siegel Cecil 1homas Mack Cutchin I

Johns Jaudon Administrative Support: Nancy Olson Claudia Craig Technical Editor: Louise Gallagher I

Tony Cerne

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'I REQUEST FOR COMMENTS

SUMMARY

On January 4,1993, the Executive Director for Operations established a Regulatory Review Group (referred to hereinafter as Review Group). The Review Group has conducted a comprehensive and disciplined review of power reactor regulations and related processes, programs, and practices with special attention placed on the feasibility of substituting performance-based requir:ments and guidance founded on risk insights for prescriptive requirements and guidanc.. The recommendations of the Review Group and a summary of the basis for those recommendations are contained in a report to be made available on May 28,1993. The comment period will end June 29,1993, in order to allow the final report with comments to be provided to the Executive Director for Operations by July 15, 1993. The report is in four sections: (1) a brief summary and list of recommendations, (2) a detailed analysis of regulations and processes, (3) an analysis l

of four licenses and process, and (4) potential applications of risk analysis approaches within the regulatory structure beyond current usage.

l The overall intent of the Review Group was to identify where increased flexibility could be made available to licensees with little or no direct safety impact. The Review Group believes enhanced safety would result from the elimination ofirrelevant' items and their I

inherent cost allowing management attention to focus on safety relevant problems. While the group was in a position to address flexibility in a regulatory context, the current or future value of that flexibility is clearly a utility decision. Therefore, comments that I

address the value or potential value of the specific reconunendations either in absolute or relative tenns are requested on the report. In addressing the value, we ask also that the regulatory method and time for implementation be considered and discussed. In those areas where the commenter disagrees with a recommendation in total or in part, comments would be appreciated in at least as much detail as is provided in the report so that changes and corrections in the supporting material can also be evaluated.

A public meeting is planned for June 15, 1993, to answer questions and receive l

comments on the report. The meeting will take place in Room IF-7/9 at 2:00 p.m., at the NRC headquarters building located at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. Copies of the referenced material are available for inspection and/or copying for a fee in the I

NRC Public Document Room,2102 L Street, N.W. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS g

R EQ UEST FOR C OMM ENTS..................................................................

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SUMMARY

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RE PORT OR G ANIZ ATION................................................................. 2 l

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GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................

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S PECIFIC RECOMM END ATIONS.....................................................

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I 4.1 Re gula ti o ns..................................................................

7 4.2 Opera tin g Licenses.........................................................

15 4.3 Risk Te chn ol ogy...........................................................

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INSPECTION PROGRAM REVIEW AND REC OM M END ATIONS..........................................................

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AN ALYSIS OF PUB LIC COMM ENTS................................................

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ANALYSIS OF STAFF COMM ENTS................................................

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SUMMARY

The Review Group has conducted a comprehensive and disciplined review of power I

reactor regulation and related NRC processes, programs, and practices for their implementation. In conducting this review, special attention was placed on the feasibility I

of substituting performance-based requirements and guidance founded on risk insights for existing prescriptive ones. The Review Group then went beyond specific documents and examined the processes that use and generate the documents with the view that the l

documents are the product of a process. This examination of processes included industry's role and their potential roles. The findings and recommendations of the Review Group focused on identifying specific problems, their cause, and achievable solutions.

I A detailed review of the regulations affecting operating reactors, four selected licenses, supporting guidance in selected areas, public comments from the Marginal to Safety Program and the 1992 CRGR Review, and recent industry requests was conducted. Based on the screening that resulted from this review specific issues were identified and pursued both as to regulatory substance and process. Several public meetings were held to discuss and receive comments on material placed in the public document room. The Review Group focused on the analysis ofinformation and the development of recommendations rather than the generation of material that would duplicate inforrration previously I

accumulated. The focus of the public comments was therefore on the completed analysis and recommendations of the final report. This was intended to provide the EDO with both specific recommendations and public perspective on forward-looking information.

The Review Group raised significant questions and provided recommendations on the g

processing and priority oflicense amendments that are focused on relief of burden and the Marginal to Safety Program. Of primary importance in each of these amas la the question of responsibility for the development of technical justifications as it pertains to l

the role of the NRC and the nuclear industry. A secondary effect of the existing regulatory stnicture is its enforcement, formally and informally, through the inspection process. The final issue addressed was the relationship of the overall inspection program I

to overall industry safety performance. The effort centered on a review of an NRR assessment that is being conducted and reported separately.

The review of risk assessment methods and possible applications as a solution to both identified problems and regulations in geneml was evaluated, and both short-term and long-term applications were identified.

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2. REPORT ORGANIZATION The report is organized into four parts in order to enhance its readability and to segregate I

those topics that come under the responsibility of different staff offices. The first part provides a summary and overview of the other three plus a section on public comments I

and their impact on the conclusions, recommendations on followup effort, and staff office comments on the recommendations relative to implementation schedules and resource impacts.

I The second part of the report covers the details of our analysis of regulations, guidance -

documents, and the rulemakmg process that for reactor regulation is dominated by the l

Marginal to Safety Program. The review was limited to 10 CFR 21,10 CFR 26,10 CFR 50,10 CFR 73 and Division I regulatory guides as they relate to operating reactors.

Specific subjects were picked for development based on both our review and past:

l comments received by the Commission on the same or related topics. Each subject was treated separa:ely with a summary of the analysis and specific recommendations. The -

main purpose of each analysis was problem definition with the belief that the specific I

facts involved would lead to a specific recommendation. This made the public comments -

on these issues important as they related to the scope and depth of the problem in each issue area. The detailed data sheets are included in the report to ensure that the bases for I

our recommendations are clearly traceable. In the case of reporting requirements, for example, we included the question matrix. For the rulemakmgs, guidance documents, I

and generic communications, each time a culling process was used the complete list reviewed is included. The review of the inspection process was based on the NRR assessment report and supporting data that are to be submitted to the Commission in July

.g 1993. The significant resources applied by NRR to the Inspection Program Assessment could not be duplicated by the Review Group. The Review Group does comment on the approach, level of detail developed, and recommendations. As a result of scheduling l

differences, the inspection program portion of the review has not been published for public comment.

l The third part of the report covers the details of our analysis of four representative licenses. This section provides recommendations where immediate action could yield tangible results. The analysis involved an item-by-item evaluation of each license I

selected, with a specific sample of items being selected as representative of a class of items that can be dealt with in a similar manner. A major factor in the consideration of which items appeared to be candidates for reduction in regulatory burden or enhanced flexibility was the proposed disposition of the item in the New Improved Technical Specification Program.

8 The fourth part of the report deals with the integration of risk analysis techniques into the regulatory process. The emphasis in the report is on trying to define specific applications I

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and then to generalize these to groups with similar characteristics, The approach to quality assurance and technical specifications was developed in some detail. The intent is to provide a starting point for more detailed discussions pertaining to possible pilot plant I

implementation. The importance of timely evaluation of this section's recommendations is the start of a major EPRI effort in addressing the possible expanded use of risk analysis -

g in regulation. The would include possible pilot plant applications.

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3. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS l

The Marginal to Safety Program with the addition of performance-based regulation is I

addressing or will address the relevant changes to regulations. The Review Group i

identified 10 CFR 50.54 as a major addition to the queue for consideration. This nile as I.

applied to security, quality assurance, and emergency planning provides an uneven process relative to the changes in implementing analogous program plans. The lack of definition of acceptable criteria within which plan changes can be made without prior I

NRC approval has caused unnecessary expenditures of resources by the industry and the NRC in processing amendment requests for matters that, from a safety perspective, should not require NRC involvement. For example, the Review Group would g

recommend that any change that reduces a prior commitment but.still meets or exceeds the performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55a, Appendix E, or Appendix B should require timely notification of the NRC but not an amendment or prior approval. This -

.l would give the staff an opportunity to take formal action if it so chose. The applicability of 10 CFR 50.54 should also be extended to fire protection plans with their corresponding elimination as a condition oflicenses.

I The staff's approach to miemakings should be modified. The change would involve the encouragement of the industry to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the I

petition-for-rulemaking process,10 CFR 2.802. Resources would focus, as a first priority, on petitions whose analytic and data support was reviewed and found complete I

and compelling. These could then be issued with a staff-prepared Federal Register notice stating the staff position and requesting public comments as a proposed rulemakmg. The initial staff obligation in this approach would be to issue guidance addressing the level of detail and sufficiency expected in a petition that reduces burden and has no safety impact.

Because of the difficulty of defining the meaning of " Marginal to Safety," particularly in l

PRA terms, the Review Group recommends that the redefinition started last year of the Marginal to Safety Program to address performance-based regulation as its principal objective be completed. This change would recognize that the marginal aspects of plant l

operations need to be dealt with at the license and implementation level. The real impact of moving toward a higher degree of performance orientation in regulations will be realized only when the alternative practices and implementing programs are provided.

The licensing process should be modified to eliminate the effect of the informal I

promulgation outside the regulatory process of the NRR priority system. This has significantly tempered the number and type oflicensing action requests and commitment changes that licensees have submitted. The staffin the past has been guided by a set of I

priorities, which placed the safety of operating reactors first, advanced reactors second, plant life extension third, and the elimination of unnecessary burden at operating reactors last. Specific resources were allocated as a base level for advanced reactors and plant life

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I extension that did not have to compete on an absolute scale as did those items dealing with solely economic benefits for operating reactors. A balance needs to be established to ensure that some level of attention is devoted to this effort in the same way resources I

are allocated to other programs.

I The Review Group's expectation relative to the impact of Volume Four of the report, Risk Technology, is that it provides a startmg point for specific applications to quality assurance implementation in the short term and to the next phase of possible technical I

specification improvements in the longer term. The possibilities of the application of risk analysis to quality assurance is enhanced since neither a mie change nor license amendment is required for full implementation of an alternative approach. The regulations require only staff approval if the change is viewed as a reduction in commitments. The industry should take the responsibility for the development of an alternative approach to implementing quality assurance requirements. This is an area h

where the application of risk-based techniques may prove very appropriate in the near term. Recognizing that the issues to be addressed deal primarily with the implementation of a new approach to replace fully developed practices, the proponent for such a shift

=I should be in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

The Review Group reviewed all Division 1 regulatory guides, first to determine their I

applicability to operating reactors and second to determine if revision is necessary. The screening process resulted in our recommendation that only 13 of 122 guides deserve attention.

Licensees should take advantage of existing opportunities offered by the Commission via I

the Technical Specification Improvement Program line-item improvements. If used, the process is an efficient and effective approach to the implementation ofIlcense improvements. The issue is: why are licensees not taking advantage of what would l

appear to be advantageous changes? The Review Group agreed with the industry observation that amendment requests dealing solely with economic relief fall to the bottom of the priority list; it is the staff view that the need for each licensee to customize I

requests eliminates the opportunity for rapid action. The recommended solution has two parts. First, the generic safety evaluation report to be used by the project manager needs to contain alternative resolutions intended to envelope the expected submittal. Second, I

because industry is in the best position to identify the problems relative to burden, the industry should submit topical reports detailing alternatives. Of the specific items found I

in the licenses reviewed and detailed in Volume Three of the report, most were generic in i

nature and would fit the process described.

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4. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Regulations I'

In its assessment of the regulations and implementing guidance, the Review Group identified a number ofitems in the regulations and implementing guidance that were inconsistent, needed improvement, or would be amenable in performar.ce-based techniques. Those items are listed below and can be founc. ' Volume 2 in the identified section. The items are classified as recommendations and potential improvements.

Recommendations are relatively significant, far-reaching suggestions for rules and the l

regulatory process, while potential improvements are less global and significant and suggest improvements in specific areas. None of the items listed below is needed to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants, but, if implemented, would result in a l

reduction of regulatory burden, both for the staff and licensees and may improve safety because of the reduction of resmrces applied to relatively unimportant issues.

4.1.1 Recommendations A definition of the term " current licensing basis" should be developed and the I

scope and depth of the term " design bases" should be clarified. (See Section 2.3.10.)

o 10 CFR Part 21 should be reviewed and revisions proposed that recognize the existing procurement practices and conditions and allow the level and type of l

dedication to be graded based on the safety significance of each pan. Specifically, the Review Group recommends: (1) substitution of the word "or" for the word "and" in the definition of commercial grade; and (2) a section be added to the l

definition of dedication such that dedication also consists of those actions necessary to provide reasonable assurance that the item will perfonn in service. These

.hanges appear in bold type in the following excerpts of 10 CFR 21.3. (See I

Section 2.3.1.)

Commercial Grade is an item [that] is not a part of a basic component until after dedication.

I Commercial grade item means an item that is (i) not subject to design or

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specification requirements that are unique to facilities or activities licensed l

pursuant to Parts 30, 40, 50, 60, 61, 70, 71, or 72 of this chapter or (ii) used in applications other than facilities or activities licensed pursuant to Parts 30, 40,50,60,61,70,71, or 72 of this chapter or (iii) to be ordered from the i

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manufacturer / supplier on the basis of specifications set forth in the manufacturer's published product description (for example a catalog).

Dedication of a commercial grade item occurs after receipt when that item is designated for use as a basic component and consists of those actions necessary to provide reasonable assurance that it will perform in service.

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 should not be revised or modified. Rather, certain I

of the implementing documents and guidance should be revised to facilitate implementation of Appendix B in a performance based and graded manner. It should be noted that, if the implementing guidance is modified, this will facilitate l

licensees to revise their individual quality assurance (QA) plans. Advise licensees -

that they may apply quality assurance in a graded manner to their fire prevention and protection system in accordance with the provisions of Criterion II of l

Appendix B to Part 50 consistent with the system's importance to safety. (See Sections 2.3.13., 2.3.14, and 4.4) l Significant staff resources should not be devoted to a wholesale revision or updating of the regulatory guides. Revisions should be made only on a case-by-case basis when good cause is demonstrated. (See Section 2.3.15.)

The following regulatory guides should be considered within the' context of the above recommendation:

'g Regulatory Guides 1.84,1.85, and 1.147, which delineate ASME Code Case acceptability, l

The regulatory guides that delineate NRC expectations for quality assurance (1.26,1.28,1.29,1.30,1.33,1.37,1.38, and 1.39') should be reduced to the fewest possible number (i.e., one preferably, but no more than three) and l

include the NRC position on commercial grade procurement and dedication.

Industry and the NRC staff should pursue the investigation and development of I

probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods for use in the application of 10 CFR 50.59. (See Section 2.3.19.)

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' There are other regulatory guides that relate to quality assurance, but these

,l generally refer to process control instead of program elements.

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The Marginal to Safety Program should be focused on and be responsive to specific and detailed petitions for miemaking that are performance-based, propose to eliminate regulatory burden, and are safety neutral. (See Section 2.3.17.)

Recognize and advise the staff and public of the availability of an integral I

approach to licensin;; actions such that a number ofissues may be proposed in a license amendment request if the overall level of safety remains the same. (See Section 2.3.17.)

I The industry should take advantage of the petition-for-mlemaking process and submit complete, technically sound petitions in accordance with the NRC

-l Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, which the staff could publish expeditiously as a proposed rule. (See Section 2.3.17.)

l Consider revision of 10 CFR 2.802 to clearly distinguish between a petition for rulemaking proposed for public health and safety reasons and one proposed to eliminate burden. The accompanying guidance should clearly state the level of I

detail needed for each type of petition such that the request can be evaluated by the staff in a timely manner. The staff should be advised of the restraints regarding negotiated miemaking. (See Section 2.3.17.)

Ensure that there is a clear delineation of NRC expectations in the security area.

I This would mean either stating that 10 CFR 73.55(a) [which invokes 73.55(b) through (h)] is the NRC standard " effectiveness" in security or revising 73.55(b) through (h) if they am not a sufficient def'mition of NRC expectations. (See l

Section 2.3.18.)

Eliminate the requirement for submittal of quarterly security logs. This would l

eliminate a small burden that appears to have no benefit. (See Sections 2.3.16 and 2.3.18.)

Revise 10 CFR 50.54(p) to eliminate the reference to safeguards effectiveness making the basic regulatory requirements for physical security consistent with performance requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(a). This would provide a more I

consistent level of protection a'. each facility. (See Section 2.3.18.)

I Revise existing guidance to provide an approach in security similar to that used for safety systems for compensatory measures such as allowed outage times. (See Sections 2.3.18 and A.3.2.4 of Volume 3.)

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Add the following definition for commitment to 10 CFR 50.2 and the following section to 10 CFR 50.54. The definition and change process should be implemented only for future ::ommitments and not backfit. (See Section 2.3.2.)

Commitment means any condition or action agreed to or volunteered by a I

license holder that was relied upon, in whole or in part, by the Commission as a basis for a safety decision and both the condition or action and the decision that made use of the information are contained in the docket file.

I Proposed changes in commitments that do not involve an unreviewed safety question shall be submitted to the NRC in accordence with the reporting l

requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e). Changes to commitments that involve an unreviewed safety question must be submitted to the NRC and receive approval prior to implementation. A proposed change shall be deemed to I

involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or if a I

possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or if the I

margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

I The rules governing items in which licensees are allowed to make changes to their facility or procedures (10 CFR 50.59), QA program (10 CFR 50.54(a)),

safeguards plan (10 CFR 50.54(p)), fire protection plan (10 CFR 50.48), and l

emergency plan (10 CFR 50.54(q)) should be made consistent. 10 CFR 50.54(a) would be amended such that changes to the QA program description that do not reduce commitments previously accepted by the NRC would not need NRC l

approval and would be submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). Changes that do reduce commitments would be submitted to the NRC for prior review and approval. 10 CFR 50.54(p) would be amended such that I

changes to the security plan that do not decrease safeguards measures below the requirements of Part 73 could be made without NRC approval and submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). 10 CFR 50.54(q) would be amended to allow I

changes to the emergency plan without NRC approval as long as the plan continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and/or Appendix E and a I

report is submitted to the NRC in accordance with 50.71(e). Changes to the emergency plan that would not meet the minimum requirements of the regulations would not be permitted without Commission approval. (See Sections 2.3.9 and l

A.3.2.2 of Volume 3.)

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I The staff should insure it continues its current practice of maintaining appropriate control of changes to material that is removed from Technical Specifications and placed in licensee-controlled documents. (See Section 2.3.10.)

The reporting requirements in 10 CFR 26.71(d) should be modified to allow submittal of fitness for duty performance data on an annual basis. (See Sections I

2.3.4 and 2.3.16.)

I The fitness for duty program audit frequency should be changed to allow audits to o

be performed at intervals no greater than every 3 years and areas of the program that are conducted by contractors should be audited at least every 18 months. (See Section 2.3.4.)

Revise and reissue Regulatory Guide 1.86 to reflect the current NRC organization l

(not AEC) and address the areas ofinconsistency with 10 CFR 50.82. (See Section 2.3.3).

l Develop quidance and consider the revision of 10 CFR 50.82 to discuss the type of license needed to undergo decommissioning after the original 40-year license has expired. The guidance should explore the option of a new possession-only license I

or renewal of the original license for possession-only purposes. The guidance discussed should not be treated as a surrogate for the regulation. (See Section 2.3.3.)

e The industry and staff should continue to build a consensus view in the ASME I

Code Committees to revise the Code and address design basis testing and test frequency based on risk techniques. (See Section 2.3.7.)

g The staff should continue work on the Inservice Testing (IST) Program guidelines.

e These guidelines would provide a type of framework for licensees to take advantage of using the most recent addenda and editions referenced in the l

regulations rather than what was originally committed to in the IST programs.

The Review Group recommends issuing a generic letter informing licensees of the NUREG (which will offer generic approval of subsequent addenda and editions of I

the code per 50.55a(f)(4)(iv)) and the flexibility allowed iflicensees take advantage of it. The Review Group also recommends that Inspection Procedure 73756 be I

reviewed for continued applicability in light of the issuance of the NUREG and the inspection procedure be revised as appropriate. (See Section 2.3.7.)

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I The Review Group found that the improved procedures that request public comments on the technical and cost-benefit aspects of the generic correspondence adequately addressed the previous concerns identified with generic communications I

that request information from licensees. Therefore, although it is a topic to be evaluated in the future in the Marginal to Safety Program,10 CFR 50.54(f)

I appears to be applied in an appropriate manner in issuing generic communications that request information and neither it nor the generic communication process needs to be changed for requesting information. (See Section 2.3.6.)

- I License amendments to delete reporting requirements requested by licensees of the type identified as "Not Required" in the Seabrook and Surry license reviews l

performed by the Review Group should be acted upon by the staff. (See Section 2.3.16.)

Evaluate the need and/or the frequency for the generic reporting requirements that are contained in documents that are administratively controlled by the licensee.

(See Section 2.3.16.)

Evaluate the need for each of the individual reporting requirements contained in periodic reports (See Section 2.3.16.)

Eliminate the operating license condition governing fire protection programs.

g (See Sections 2.3.5. and B.3.2.2.)

Revise the current NRC guidance documents, including inspection procedures, to l

clarify that, while the various fire protection codes and standards referenced therein specify practices accepted by the NRC, other alternative methods of compliance with the regulations can be developed. The revised guidance should emphasize that the use of performance-based criteria may provide an equally acceptable, plant-specific way to meet the intended requirement. (See Section 2.3.5.)

Continue to devote an appropriate level of NRC resourc= :: the Marginal to Safety Program in an effort to address industry concerns with the current fire I

protection regulations. (See Section 2.3.5.)

g 4.1.2 Potential Improvements Replace the guidance for Generic Letter 88-16, which states that the revised l

Technical Specifications reference the specific-approved topical report number and date used in the reload analysis, with a more generic flexible statement such that a license amendment would not be needed to reference the most current NRC-11 I

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I approved topical report used in performing the analysis. The specific-approved topical report revision would still be required to be referenced in the core operating limits report. (See Section 2.3.8.)

Develop a generic communication system that differentiates between generic I

communications that request action or provide information or one that uses one type of generic communication to request information or action and a second type to forward information. This would lead to a less complicated system for tracking l

requests and actions and would create less confusion among licensees and the staff.

Office level guidance would implement this change in procedure. (See Section 2.3.6.)

I It should be noted that NRR is exploring the use of an administrative letter to replace generic letters that only provide information or are administrative in l

nature.

Add the following definition to 50.2 to clarify four areas of the regulations (10 I

CFR 50.23, 50.45, 50.56, and 50.92(a)):

" Alteration means any modification to a facility which changes the design bases of the facility."

I (See Section 2.3.10.)

I 10 CFR 50.7 should be revised to the extent necessary to reflect stanitory changes regarding the timeframe for an employee who believes he or she has been discriminated against to file a complaint to the Department of Justice. (See l

Section 2.3.10.)

l While licensees provide sufficient space for residents, the rule (10 CFR l

50.70(b)(2)) should be updated to address the current policy of two full-time inspectors at single unit sites. (See Section 2.3.10.)

l The following policy statements have been superseded by rulemakings or are no longer applicable. These policy statements should be deleted. (See Section 2.3. I 1.)

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Planning Basis for Emergency Responses to Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents I

Commission Policy Statement on Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and l

Existing Plants Commission Policy Statement on Fitness for Duty of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel 12 I

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I Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program; Policy Statement Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants; Revised Policy Statement I

Below Regulatory Concern; Policy Statement Policy Statement ofInformation Flow I

The following policy statements address conduct of operations at nuclear power L

plants. The policy statements should be reviewed and evaluated to determine whether they should be combined or go into mle.naking or whether the portions of l

the policy statements superseded by rulemakings should be deleted. (See Section 2.3.11.)

l Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operations I

Education for Senior Reactor Operators and Shift Supervisors at Nuclear Power Plants; Policy Statement The following policy statement appears to have been interpreted as a requirement and imposes a regulatory burden on licensees. The policy statement should be I

reviewed and evaluated to determine whether revisions are necessary or miemaking should be undertaken. (See Section 2.3.11.)

Availability and Adequacy of Design Bases Information at Nuclear Power Plants; Policy Statement An Information Notice or other suitable generic communication should be issued to remind licensees that the training and retraining in behavioral observation for the fitness for duty rule should not focus solely on aberrant behavior resulting from l

substance abuse. This Information Notice should also provide guidance on what the staff considers to be appropriate action for aberrant behavior that is not substance induced. (See Section 2.3.4.)

I-Provide a discussion of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research prioritization I

system in the preface of the Regulatory Agenda. In the Regulatory Agenda, identify under which category each rulemaking belongs. (See Section 2.3.17.)

g Schedules should be established for all rulemaking activities in the Regulatory Agenda. The schedules should include the date the action was originally approved by the EDO to improve tracking of the action. (See Section 2.3.17.)

I The abstract information for each rulemaking in the Regulatory Agenda should be kept current. (See Section 2.3.17.)

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Rulemakings and petitions for tubmaking whose schedules are significantly beyond the 2-year and 1-year resolution guidelines should be brought to resolution -

I promptly. In those cases where the priority of the rulemaking is so low that staff resources are not anticipated to be available for several years, the rulemaking should be dropped. (See Section 2.3.17.)

Review the existing security requirements (particularly Appendix B to 10 CFR 73) to determine if they should be expressed in a more performance-based manner.

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(See Section 2.3.18.)

Regulatory Guide 1.16 should be reviewed and revised to eliminate reporting L

l operating information.

4.2 Operating Licenses As a result of its assessment, the Review Group identified 12 recommendations. The I

recorrmendations are presentd below in the order in which they were identified. The Review Group believes that the recommendatioss generally apply to all licenses; therefore, their order of presentation is not impos: ant. References to the sections in I

Vclume Three in which the recommendations were identified are puvidal in parentheses.

To improve the clarity and specificity of the recommendations, many of them have been l

slightly reworded from the way in which they appear in the individual plant assessments.

Also, subsequent to the identincation of the recommendations, actions have been taken or l

are being taken to address a number of them. Where such actions have been or are being taken, it is so noted.

'l It is important to note that the recommendations have the potential to reduce the regulatory burden on and enhance the flexibility available to the rvnsees. - None of the recommendations needs to be implemented to ensure safety. Howver, since the I

implementation of the recommendations would result in a reduction in licensee manpower requirements, this excess manpower could indirectly benefit safety if it were redirected to safety-significant work.

Ensure the past practice of treating certain Comrnission policy statements, I

regulatory guides and other non-requirements as legal requirements by generically including them in the licenses.vithout following a disciplined process appropriate o the use. (See Volume III, Section A.3.2.1.)

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I Consider developing NRC staff guidance that considers Technical Specification l

requirements for design features that provide safety margin in excess of NRC requirements, for example, systems that provide additional redundancy.

(See Volume III, Section A.3.2.1.)

I Provide a ccasistent approach for making changes to " plans," such as the fire e

protection, physical security, emergency response, and quality assurance plans, within their proper regulatory and safety contexts. Eliminate the regulatory I

requirement that compliance with physical security plans be imposed by a license condition. (See Volume III, Section A 3.2.2.)

Reevaluate the information/ data the NRC needs from nuclear power plant licensees e

in order to accomplish its mission of protecting the health and safety of the public (taking into consideration the efforts of the CRGR and the Reporting Requirements l

Task Force). Information/ data requirements without a clear nexus to that mission and duplicative reporting requirements should be eliminated. (See Volun e III, Section A.3.2.2.)

Subsequent to its identification of this recommendation, the Review Group reevaluated the reporting requirements contained in a number of the Commission's regulations and I

several operating licenses. That reevaluation and its results are discussed in Volume Two of the Review Group's report.

Invite the industry to provide the NRC with candid insights on li'censees' reasons e

for not taking more advantage of the inherent flexibility afforded them. (See l

Volume III, Section A.3.2.3.)

In its report on its assessment of the Seabrook license (Appendix A to Volume Three),

l the Review Group found that many licensees have not taken advantage of the considerable flexibility that is already available to them. The Revicw Group listed possible reasons for this and recommended that the industry provide its views on the subject. The Review I

Group believes the opportunity for the public to conun ' on this report provides that occasion. The Review Group will consider any como 1 eived on this subject and, therefore, considers that this recommendation will hau. e s.dequataly addressed.

Provide additional flexibility in the implementation of the physical security plans, I

such as providing Technical-Specificatian-type allowed outage times. This recommendation parallels one resulting from the Regulations Review Task.

(See Vohime III, Section A.3.2c4.)

I Adopt a graded approach to limiting conditions for opemtion and surveillance requisements wherever practicable, and to the implementation of specific review 15 I

committee functions, e.g., station onsite review committee procedure and design change reviews. The appropriate application of risk assessment methodology could be valuable in establishing both the bounds and direction of such an I

approach. (See Volume III, Section A.3.2.4.)

I Eliminate the practice ofincluding fire protection plans and the provisions for making changes thereto as license conditions. (See Volume III, Section B.3.2.2.)

Expand the scope of 10 CFR 50.54 to include all the " plans" that are required by the Commission's regulations, including the nre protection plan. Eliminate the inconsistencies in the change requirements for these plans. (It is noted that this l

recommendation is similar to one that resulted from the Review Group's review of the Commission's regulations). (See Volume III, Section B.3.2.2.)

Permit line-item improvements in accordance with the Improved Standard Technical Specifications to be made available to individual licensees (on a plant-specific basis) in addition to lead and subsequent plant licenseen.. (See Section I

B.3.2.4.)

I The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) plans to establish an organizational stmeture to deal with individual plant requests for Technical Specification improvements.

Therefore, the Review Group considers that appropriate action has been initiated to g

address this recommendadon.

Expand the use of performance-based requirements to supplant prescriptive criteria

.l in license conditions and technical specifications. In items exhibiting inherent flexibility, the functional requirement is distinguishable from the technical details needed to implement that requirement. As evidenced in the Technical l

Specification Improvement Program, licensee-controlled programs that govern such implementation details can provide both flexibility and tl.e requisite assurance of systein functionality. (See Volume III, Section C.3.2.4.)

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Each licensee should conduct a comprehensive and thorough assessment ofits own license to identify any items that have the potential for reducmg regulatory burden or enhancing flexibility without decreasing the current level of safety. Each g

licensee should inform NR.R of any license changes that it would likely pursue and the schedules on which it would pursue them. NRR should consider this information in view ofits other regulatorily mandated work before it decides l

whether to redirect additional resources to this effort. (See Volume III, Section 3.4.)

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I 4.3 Risk Technology The current state of the art in probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) technology was examined I

to determine under what circumstances information, either qualitative or quantitative, gleaned from PRA methods could be used in the regulatory process. It was determined I

that PRA methods provide an integral tool that can be used to help ensure coherence and consistency in the regulatory process, and provide a means of converting' diverse deterministic requirements to performance-based requirements, providing equivalent I

protection to public health and safety while offering increased flexibility to licensees if the PRA-based criteria are met. To this end, the current state of the art in PRA methods.

were assessed considering how the many strengths of these methods could be exploited, l

while minimizing the significance of those weaknesses that still remain in the application of PRA-based methods in regulation.

l Based on the above, it is recommended that the use of PRA-based techniques in the regulatory process be charactenzed into three general classes, each having similar requirements in terms of the boundary conditions and assumptions used in the analysis, as I

well as similar requirements in terms of the depth and breath of the review that would be required by the NRC staff.

I 1.

Reliance on Ouantitative Results from Multiple Plant-Specific PRAs I

Examples of this category would include performance-based responses to the Maintenance Rule and PRA-based approaches to graded quality assurance.

I 2.

Reliance on Sincie Plant-Soecific PRA Ouantitative Results in Selected Areas l

Examples of this category would include optimization of selected Technical Specifications, evaluations of "unreviewed safety question" under 10 CFR 50.59, and use of precalculated configuration management analyses to support extension j

I of allowed outage times under certain circumstances.

l 3.

Reliance on Numerical Results from Sincie Plant-Soecific PRA I

An example of this type of usage would be the development of PRA-based Technical Specifications requiring on-line updating of PRA models.

Beyond the technical recommendations, more specific recommendations regarding the nature of the regulatory environment needed to introduce the use of PRA-based analyses in a broad fhshion are offered.

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I The current state of development and use of probabilistic techniques in the industry can support use of PRA-based regulatory approaches at the present time. Several utilities have ongoing programs using PRA methods and "living" probabilistic

'I analyses to improve operations and maintain plant safety and efficiency that could be extended to the regulatory environment and provide increased licensee flexibility while maintaining or improving the safety envelope. It is recommended that the Commission elicit licensee proposals in this regard to support such an -

effort.

I The development by NRC of methods for optimizing Technical Specifications using PRA-based techniques is nearing completion and, with publication of a l_

handbook early in CY 1994, will provide a technical basis for judging the acceptability of PRA-based approaches proposed by licensees. This handbook can provide guidelines for methods or similar techniques that could be used in a pilot I

program in the near future if there is industry intereg in such an application. In addition, this handbook could serve as the point of departure for discussions -

between the NRC staff and the industry leading to industry-proposed guidance, I

suitably endorsed by NRC. It is recommended tha..his handbook be published as a regulatory document or perhaps as a regulatory guide.

NRC programs and interests on the development and implementation of PRA-based methods in regulation currently span multiple offices and organizations. An I

integral agency plan covering the research, development, implementation, r.nd use of PRA-based techniques in regulation is needed in maintaining a consistency of approach throughout the agency and in allocating resources. This plan would also l

assist in the efficient use of the limited number of NRC staff with expertise in quantitative risk assessment.

A reasoned approach is recommended for the transition to the more PRA-based

-l approaches, testing benefits gained versus costs ofimplementing pilot programs before proceeding to complete implementation industrywide. As indicated above, certain PRA-based approaches can be implemented now, while others will be I

suitable for trial investigation in the near future. An investigation of the usages that are compatible with the current strengths and limitations of PRA methods needs to be pursued in suppordng a transition to PRA-based regulation.

In effect, the NRC currently uses PRA insights to primarily add requirements to I

to the industry. This utilization of PRA needs to be changed to allow PRA-based insights to reduce regulatory burden when it is shown that such a reduction does not reduce the safety envelope of the plant. Thresholds (e.g., NRC guidelines

.l on content of submittals, acceptable PRA methods, and decision criteria) must, therefore, be established by the NRC for each PRA usage class (as described I

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above) in concert with any industry-proposed pilot applications of these potential uses.

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5. REACTOR INSPECTION PROGRAM REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS to be supplied 1

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6. ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC COMMENTS to be supplied I

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