ML20045A645
| ML20045A645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1993 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Graham P GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| References | |
| EA-93-118, NUDOCS 9306110149 | |
| Download: ML20045A645 (19) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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nectON IV
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611 HYAN PLAZ A DRIVE. SUITE 400 AR LINGTON, T EX AS 760118064 g
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50-458 License: NPF-47 EA 93-118 Gulf States Utilities ATIN:
P. D. Graham Vice President (RBNG)
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
SUMMARY
This refers to the enforcement conference held-in the Region IV office on May 28, 1993, concerning security issues identified during an inspection (NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-14) of activities authorized by License NPF-47 for River Bend Station. The subjects discussed are described in Enclosure 1.
Your presentation at the conference was informative and provided a better understanding of the issues involved.
Those in attendance at the conference Jr are listed in Enclosure 2.
A copy of your presentation is provided in.
Any enforcement action taken will be addressed in separate correspondence.
In accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", a
~
copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in-the NRC's Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, f
f w
s L.
. ' al an, Director Div s'on of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
1.
Meeting Summary 2.
Attendance List 3.
Licensee's Presentation i
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9306110149 930608 PDR ADDCK 05000459 PDR f
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p Gulf States Utilities cc'w/ enclosures 1 & 2:
Gulf States Utilities ATIN:
J. E. Booker, Manager-Nuclear Industry Relations P.O. Box'2951 Beaumont,' Texas 77704 Winston & Strawn ATTN: Mark J. Wetterbahn, Esq.
1401 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005-3502
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Gulf States Utilities ATTN:
Les England, Director Nuclear Licensing P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville Louisiana 70775 Mr. J. David McNeill, III William G. Davis, Esq.
Department of Justice
- Attorney General's Office-P.O. Box 94095 j
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9095 H. Anne Plettinger
. 3456 Villa Rose Drive Baton Rouge,-Louisiana. 70806 President of West Feliciana Police' Jury P.O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Cajun Electric Power Coop. Inc.
ATIN:
Philip G. Harris 10719 Airline Highway P.O. Box 15540 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70095 Hall Bohlinger, Administrator Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135-t t
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J. L. Milhoan Resident inspector DRP Section Chief (DRP/C)
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4S03 MIS System DRSS-FIPS RIV File Section Chief (DRP/TSS)
DRS Senior Resident Inspector, Cooper B. Murray, FIPS A. B. Earnest, FIPS G. F. Sanborn, EO J. Lieberman, OE W. L. Brown, RC fsDD:DRSSh E0()
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J. L. Milhoan Resident Inspector DRP Section Chief (DRP/C)
Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503 MIS System DRSS-FIPS RIV File Section Chief (DRP/TSS)
DRS Senior Resident Inspector, Cooper B. Murray, FIPS A. B. Earnest, FIPS G. F. Sanborn, EO J. Lieberman, OE W. L. Brown, RC Rly4 M C:FIPS
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r-A ENCLOSURE 1 MEETING
SUMMARY
Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities Facility:
River Bend Station License No.:
NPF-47 Docket No.:
50-458
Subject:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE (EA 93-118)
On May 28, 1993, representatives of Gulf States Utilities met with the-Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas, to discuss an apparent security violation identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-14.
During the conference, the history behind some of the issues, root causes, management initiatives, and corrective actions were discussed.
i 1
4 ENCLOSURE 2 ATTENDANCE LIST Attendance at the Gulf States Utilities Enforcement Conference on May 28, 1993, at the NRC Region IV office.
GSU i
P. Graham, Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group K. Suhrke, Manager, Site Support S. Woody, Director - Nuclear Station Security J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer J. Booker, Manager, Quality Verification / Safety Assessment R. Koffman, Nuclear Security Representative NRC J. M. Montgomery, Deputy Regional Administrator D. D. Chamberlain, Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Sa feguards T. P. Gwynn, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
B. Murray, Chief, Facilities Inspection Programs Section (FIPS)
J. Gagliardo, Chief, DRP, Project Section C.
W. L. Brown, Regional Counsel G. Sanborn, Regional Enforcement Officer A. B. Earnest, FIPS, Physical Security Inspector Contractor A. G. Rasdon, Burns Security Project Manager
v
-1 ENCLOSURE 3 1
i i
1 l
GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY i
SECURITY ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE NRC INSPECTION REPORT 93-14 t
t MAY 28,1993
-PAGE 1 i
c e-RIVER BEND STATION NUCLEAR SECURITY ORGANIZATION i
VICE PRESIDENT PHIL GRARAM MANAGER SITE SUPPORT KEN SUHRKE DIRECTOR NUCLEAR STATION SECURITY STEVE WOODY I
I I
I (GSU)
(GSU)
(CONTRACTOR)
(GSU)
(CONTRACTOR)
FFD BURNS PM SUPERVISOR ACCESS PERFORMANCE SECURITY SECURITY AUTHORIZATION
& TRAINING OPERATIONS OPERATIONS LOGISTICS BOB CARTER RICHARD KOFFMAN AL RASDON NEW POSITION GRADY RICHMOND SHIFT SHIFT SHIFT SHIFT SHIFT SUPV SUPV SUPV SUPV SUPV (1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
ASSIST ASSIST ASSIST ASSIST ASSIST SHIFT SHIFT SHIFT SHIFT SHIFT SUPV (1)
SUPV (1)
SUPV (1)
SUPV (1)
SUPV (1)
CAS/SAS CAS/SAS CAS/SAS
.CAS/SAS CAS/SAS SUPV SUPV SUPV SUPV SUPV
)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
PAGE 2 SECURITY SECURITY SECURITY SECURITY SECURITY FORCE FORCE FORCE FORCE FORCE j
i
AGENDA l.
Opening Remarks Phil Graham 2.
GSU Management Expectations Ken Suhrke 3.
Security Management Involve-Steve Woody ment in Training Activities 4.
Description of 4/16/93 Event Ken' Suhrke and Actions Taken 5.
Procedural Issues and Al Rasdon Corrective Actions Steve Woody 6.
Security Management Over-Steve Woody sight Issues 7.
Open Discussion All 8.
Closing Remarks Phil Graham PAGE 3
o
'Y GSU MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS (OVERVIEW)
A.
PROVIDE PROGRAM DIRECTION 1.
Vision s
2.
Sound Procedures 3.
Training Requirements 4.
Resources to Perform Responsibilities B.
MONITOR PROGRAM 1.
Key Performance Parameters 2.
Management Observations 3.
Security Force Morale C.
ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM j
Make Changes as Needed D.
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1.
Defined Individual Responsibilities 2.
Coaching / Correcting / Performance Appraisals PAGE 4
i GSU MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS
(
SUMMARY
)
The Security Director and his organization are accountable for the following:
1.
Conservatively complying with Physical Security
- Plan, procedures, instructions, and regulatory interpretations.
2.
Following procedures -- all Plant and Security procedures.
Procedures must be made right, and Security personnel must own Security procedures.
l 3.
Security personnel are to report problems to make the program better.
Personnel are to take initiative to fix or escalate.
Management is to promptly resolve problems.
4.
Perf ormance monitoring parameters are established with "first-class" goals established.
Action plans to achieve goals are to be established, communicated, and implemented.
5.
Communication throughout the Security organization is to be emphasized and vigorously pursued.
6.
Organizational responsibilities and accountabilities are to be clearly defined and communicated.
7.
Security contract force and its leadership are major participants in problem identification and resolution.
8.
Security personnel are to be trained and qualified to perform assigned jobs.
9.
GSU's and Burns' management personnel are to observe Security personnel performing jobs to verify that all are being performed correctly.
10.
Security hardware is to be properly maintained so that personnel don't develop " work-around" attitude.
11.
Security personnel are to keep informed of changing technology and keep our programs at forefront.
Attitude is to keep improving our program and to strive for excellence, "Best of the Best."
12.
Be protective of Security program needs when interfacing with others.
13.
Be open with auditors and regulatory inspectors.
14.
Delegate and hold delegatees accountable.
PAGE 5
J SECURITY MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT IN TRAINING ACTIVITIES A.
TRAINING VISION B.
MISSION C.
TRAINING PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS 1.
Facility Upgrades 2.
Developed Tactical Shooting Simulator'- 10/91 3..
Developed Physical Confidence Course - 12/91 4.
Added One Instructor to Training Staff - 2/92 5.
Purchased Firearms Training System - 4/92 D.
TRAIN THE TRAINERS 1.
Adversary Team Training - 4/92 2.
Contracted with Tactical Training Specialist - 5/92
.t 3.
General System Course - 5/92 4.
Tactical Team Training' '7/92.
5.
Advance Tactical Team Training - 5/93 6.
Interface with Operations (In-Plant and Simulator)
E.
PROVIDE ADVANCED TRAINING FOR SECURITY FORCE 1.
Conducted Initial Tactical Exercise with Contracted Specialist - 9/92 2.
Conducted Follow-up Tactical Training Exercise - 1/93 3.
Conducted Follow-up Tactical Training Exercise-with
)
Contracted Specialist - 4/93 F.
CONCLUSION 1.
Security Management has been proactive and aggressive in training activities as evident through highly skilled and motivated force.
'2.
Morale is high, change in Security force attitude has occurred.
3.
We have been told'that we're at forefront of tactical readiness.
I PAGE 6
t i
DESCRIPTION OF 4/16/93 EVENT AND ACTIONS TAKEN A.
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT 1.
At approximately 8:21pm on 4/16/93, an on-duty Security Officer instinctively fired her weapon at a participant in a tactical exercise, 1
a.
The Security Officer was located near the exit turnstile of'the PAP and fired at the participant between the PAP and the Plant Services Building, j
b.
No one was injured; glass panes were broken.
i 2.
The Security Officer began training shift at 2:00pm and, j
following pre-exercise briefings, participated in first series of exercises between 4:30pm and 7:15pm.
t
-3.
The Security Officer went "on duty" at 7:40pm following post-exercise debriefing.
4.
" Shadow Officers" for next set of exercises took positions at 8:05pm.
5.
First exercise for new training shift started at 8:20pm.
6.
The drill terminated promptly af ter the weapon was fired.
7.
Local law enforcement and NRC personnel were notified.
l' B.
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATIVE TEAM
~
1.
The Team was called and convened at approximately 11:00pm l
on 4/16/93 and worked throughout the night.
.l 2.
Team Charter t
a.
Determine root cause
]
b.
Develop recommended corrective action 3.
Team Members:
Kenneth E.
Suhrke, Chairman Robert P.
Carter, Access Program Supervisor Dennis Collins, NSC Consultant Ray Day, Burns Trainer Lesley A.
England, Director-Nuclear Licensing i
Kenneth J.
Giadrosich, Supervisor-Quality Engineering-Richard W.
Koffman, Nuclear Security Representative i
I Craig R.
Maxson, Senior Human Performance Engineer Al Rasdon, Burns Site Manager i
John E.
Somerindyke, Nuclear Security Administrator i
PAGE 7
t e
e Stephen L. Woody, Director-Nuclear Station Security l
William J.
Fountain, Senior QA Engineer David N.
Lorfing, Supervisor-Nuclear Licensing J.
Harvey McQuirter, Senior Licensing Analyst.
4.
Action Plan a.
Immediately put a " hold" on training exercises using weapons and blank firing.
b.
4/16/93 Weekend 1
(1)
Interviewed on-duty personnel using prepared j
question list (2)
Interviewed the Security Officer using-prepared question list (3)
Arranged interview for psychologist / Security officer l
(4)
Determined sequence of events (5)
Developed preliminary corrective action (6)
Developed and distributed questionnaire for Security personnel who. were not interviewed on early morning of 4/17/93 c.
Follow-Up (1)
Reviews of our investigation / root cause (a)
West Feliciana Parish Sheriff J
(b)
East Baton Rouge Police
- 1 (c)
Burns Security-(2)
Follow-up meetings with shifts regarding responses to questionnaires (3)
Developing cool-down procedure (4)
Completed procedural review (5)
Met with crews on procedural compliance issues (6)
Conducted Training Department review for Security training procedure (7)
Finalize corrective action and implement-(8)
Train on corrective action i
-PAGE 8 i
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5.
Root Cause The reflex action was caused by realistic training a.
and other conditioning enhanced by continued emotional involvement from the previous exercise.
b.
No physical restraint or barrier to ensure on-duty Security Officer's reaction
'to an exercise situation j
CONCLUSION:
ROOT CAUSE WAS NOT RELATED TO PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS OR TO INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
'i 6.
Corrective Action a.
Discontinued further training exercises using blank ammunition until acceptable corrective action is in place.
b.
Future training exercises using blank ammunition will be done at the end of shift.
i c.
Future training exercises using blank. ammunition will utilize focused cool-down period.
d.
Temporary safety restraint will be' utilized by on '
duty Security Officers during future training i
exercises using blank ammunition.
i Incorporate results of procedure reviews.
l e.
f.
Address results of external reviews.
g.
Ensure that on-duty Security Supervisors understand and accept their accountability for all Security activities when training exercises are being j
performed, i
CONCLUSION:
THIS INVESTIGATIVE TEAM'S EFFORT IS AN I
EXAMPLE OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT'S_
AGGRESSIVE AND THOROUGH OVERSIGHT AND i
INVOLVEMENT.
b I
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i PAGE 9 i
4 PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DRILLS AND EXERCISES 1.
River Bend Station's Definition of Drills 2.
River Bend Station's Definition of Training Exercises B.
HOW THE TRAINING EXERCISES WERE CONTROLLED 1.
Security Training Shift Supervision 2.
Controllers and Advisors 3.
Security Training Instructors C.
HOW THE ON-DUTY PERSONNEL ARE CONTROLLED DURING TRAINING EXERCISES 1.
Sdcurity Shift Supervision 2.
Security Position Instructions D.
DIFFERENCE FROM EARLIER EVENT (QA AUDIT-REQUESTED DRILL) ' (NRC REPORT 93-02) 3 1.
The QA drill was graded and tested the~ ability of the Security force to respond.
a.
Violation consisted of the following procedural non-compliance:
(1)
Operations and Security _ shift personnel were not notified that a drill was being conducted (2)- Material' introduced into the Protected Area was not searched by a qualified person (3)
Perimeter barrier was broken by throwing the material over the fence b.
Subsequent QA audit-requested drill. in February 1993 was properly performed by Security, observed by QA, and in compliance with drill procedure.
PAGE 10
E.
The training exercises conducted on 9/15/92, 1/16/93, and' 4/16/93 were performed to train students on tactics and validating defense strategies.
They did not test on-duty.
personnel.
j CONCLUSION:
BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, GSU DOES NOT.
NOW BELIEVE THAT DRILL PROCEDURE PSP-4-501 IS APPROPRIATE TO TRAINING EXERCISES WHEN THE EXPERT CONSULTANT WAS HERE TO EVALUATE OUR DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES.AND TACTICAL TRAINING.
F.
ROOT CAUSE Procedural weakness.
Procedure did not distinguish between.
drills and training exercises nor provide guidance for conduct of training exercises.
G.
CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Specific Event Proceduralize the training exercise process to clarify the difference between Security drills and training i
exercises.
Review our existing Procedure PSP-4-500 for addressing the identified weaknesses. or create a new procedure 2.
General a.
Continue to review and revise our Security procedures with a targeted completion date of April 1994 to ensure plan compliance.and adequacy.
This action was discussed at our April 1993 Management Meeting.
b.
Sitewide action is continuing, which will modify the use of IPC for site procedures.
Security currently has five IPCs issued against the current 36 procedures.
CONCLUSION:
1.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.FOR THE JULY 1992 QA AUDIT DRILL PROCEDURE NON-COMPLIANCE VIOLATION WAS EFFECTIVE, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE DRILL CONDUCTED'IN THE FEBRUARY 1993 QA AUDIT.
2.
OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS IDENTIFIED DURING THIS EVENT. IS NOT A CONTINUATION OF THE PROCEDURAL NON-COMPLIANCE WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE l
PREVIOUS VIOLATION.
3.
THROUGH OUR EVALUATION, WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE WEAPON DISCHARGE WAS NOT RELATED TO THE PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS.
PAGE 11
h SECURITY MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT ISSUES.
A.
EVENT-SPECIFIC ISSUES 1.
Physical Security Plan Describes Overall Organization 2.
GSU/ Security Contractor Responsibilities 3.
Management Personnel Onsite for 4/16/93 Event a.
GSU Operation Shift Supervisor b.
GSU Security Management c.
Burns Training Supervisor / Instructors d.
Burns Security Shift Supervisors Nuclear Security Services Corporation e.
4.
Management Onsite for 9/92 and 1/93 Tactical Training.
Exercises CONCLUSION:
ADDITIONAL GSU MANAGEMENT PRESENCE ON EVENING OF 4/16/93 WOULD NOT HAVE PRECLUDED WEAPON DISCHARGE.
B.
GENERAL ISSUES 1.
Key Improvement Areas Discussed at 4/12/93 Meeting a.
Human Performance Improvement b.
Procedural Weakness and Compliance c.
Delegation / Accountability j
d.
Communication Improvement 2.
Still Vigorously pursuing these efforts
?
PAGE 12
OPEN DISCUSSION SIGNIFICANT POINTS 1.
The Security Contractor, including its management, is part of the Security team at River Bend Station.
Accountability for the Security Program is with the Director-Nuclear Station Security.
2.
GSU has defined expectations for Security.
We have made significant improvement in Security force readiness and morale through the tactical training program.
Security Of ficers like it.
3.
We have identified a procedural weakness that resulted from the lack of clarity between drills and training exercises.
This is a different issue from the July 1992 QA drill, which was a procedural non-compliance issue.
4.
The weapon-discharge event was an " incident waiting to happen" per the human f actors and clinical psychologist, given the intensity of the training and inadequate "cooldown" period.
The weapon discharge was not the result of the Director-Nuclear Station Security not being onsite at that moment nor was it due to procedural weakness.
5.
The sitewide procedure governing the IPC process was recognized as being potentially confusing to personnel.
This procedure is being revised to improve the process and significantly decrease the potential for confusion.
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