ML20045A205
| ML20045A205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1993 |
| From: | Mccoy C GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9306090521 | |
| Download: ML20045A205 (3) | |
Text
anon van cmani 40 inver mm Center Pa%ay Pou Omu Box 1295 Barmr>gr a n, Abit; art.a 35.?O1 lehy oorie,'NS 877 7124 L
Georgia Power C. K. McCoy m nmacot naar I! ' &cd)thern clectrC systern yoyUn ho;cr1 M
June 3, 1993 LCV-0026 Docket No.
50-424 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT B_EPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company (GPC) submits the enclosed response to the violations identified in Inspection Reports 50-424/93-09 and 50-425/93-09 concerning the inspection conducted by Mr. B. Bonser during the period of April 18 through May 8,1993.
Sincerely, C. K. McCoy CKM/NJS i
Enclosure xc:
fggigia Power Company Mr. W. B. Shipman i
Mr. M. Sheibani NORMS j
U. S. Nuclear Remilatory Commission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. B. It Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle l
9306090521 930603 I l DR ADOCK 05000424 PDR
o ENCLOSURE VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT-UNIT 1 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424:425/93-09 The following is a transcription of the violation as cited in the Notice of Violation (NOV):
" Technical Specification 6.7.1a requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities delineated in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978, delineates the types of safety-related activities that should be covered by written procedures for startup, operation, shutdown, and procedures for performing maintenance.
Procedure 13503-1, Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, provides instructions on how to energize and de-energize the Solid State Protection System.
Contrary to the above, procedure 13503-1 was inadequate, in that it did not contain appropriate instructions to operators that Bypass / Permissive light board indications may not reflect actual safety inje.ction block conditions when the Solid State Protection System is in Test. The failure to incorporate this guidance contributed to a safety injection and an unnecessary challenge to core safety systems.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) (Unit 1 only)."
RESPONSE TO VIOLATION (50-424/93-09-1)
Admission or Denial of the Violation This example of the violation occurred as stated in the NOV.
Reason for the Violation This violation was attributed to personnel error on the part of the control room team for allowing the Solid-State Protection System (SSPS) to be returned to service when a safety injection (SI) signal would not be blocked. The control room team, led by the unit shin supervisor (USS), questioned among themselves the action of placing the SSPS in " Operate." The error occurred when the operating crew placed the SSPS switch in " Operate" even though they had not resolved their initial concern or completed a full assessment of the current plant conditions.
Contributing to the cause of this violation was that Procedure 13503-1, Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, was not written to be performed under the plant conditions that existed when the SSPS was returned to service. The procedure did not provide adequate precautionary guidance to the operators to warn them of the potentially misleading indications, nor did it provide other l
guidance to ensure that P-11 conditions were met and the SI signals were appropriately blocked.
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I
r ENCLOSURE (CONTINUED)
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 1 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-424:425/93-09 s
Also contributing to the cause of this violation were the numerous activities which were occurring as as a result of restoration of plant systems following the refueling outage.
Corrective Stens Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
- 1. The control room team was reminded to request assistance when operational questions arise and/or to take sumcient time for review prior to changes in the configuration of plant systems.
- 2. A caution was added to Procedure 13503-1 to warn operators of the potential for an SI when taking the SSPS to " Operate."
Corrective Stens Which Will He Taken to Avoid Further Violations
- 1. Procedures 13503-1/2 will be further enhanced to require verification that conditions within the SSPS are established to permit blocking of the P-1I signal. This action is expected to be completed by July 1,1993.
- 2. The details of this event will be reviewed as a " Lesson Learned" in licensed operator requalification training. This action is expected to be completed by August 20,1993.
- 3. Appropriate actions will be implemented to strengthen the ability of the USS and the control room team to focus on key plant activities during an outage. The actions will be implemented by the next refueling outage scheduled to begin in September 19?3.
Date When Full Compliance Will He Achieved Full compliance was achieved on April 18,1993, at 0756 EDT, when the SI actuation signal was reset. Additionally, since this event resulted in an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharge, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was both declared and terminated at 0824 EDT, and appropriate notifications were completed.
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