ML20044H068
| ML20044H068 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1993 |
| From: | Mcdonald D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-CR-5009 NUDOCS 9306070337 | |
| Download: ML20044H068 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES f
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20666-0001
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May 27, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 LICENSEE: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E)
FACILITY: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. I and 2
SUBJECT:
MEETING MINUTES REGARDING THE MAY 19, 1993, MEETING TO DISCUSS A PROPOSED REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENTS TO ALLOW FUEL MOVEMENT IN MODE 6 WITH AN OPEN PERSONNEL AIRLOCK BACKGROUND BG&E requested the subject meetir.g to discuss proposed technical specification (TS) amendments it expects to submit this summer. The TS amendments would allow movement of fuel with both personnel airlock doors open during Mode 6.
The current TSs, as well as the Standard and Revised Standard TSs, require that one of the two personnel airlock doors be closed during fuel movement due to fuel handling accident concerns. BG&E emphasized that all other TS requiraments, relating to containment integrity and fuel handling, would remain the same for all modes of operation, including Mode 6.
BG&E indicated that it would submit the TS amendments request as a lead plant.
Several utilities have expressed interest in pursing the proposed change for their facilities. BG&E will identify several of the utilities or the owners groups who endorse this proposed change in its submittal.
PURPOSE The meeting was held to al' low an exchange of information between the NRC staff and BG&E relative to the proposed TS changes.
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A list of' attendees is ibeluded as an enclosure to this meeting summary.
SUMMARY
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. 1 BG&E is currently ~ performing a reanalysis of the fuel handling accident for the Calvert Cliffs facility. The reanalysis is assessing the radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident with the airlock doors both open, for either unit, during a refueling outage and'the unit is in Mode 6.
The preliminary results indicate that the doses to the thyroid and whole body would be within the 25% (75 rem thyroid and 6 rem whole body) or less of the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines as specified in the Standard Review Plan c
(SRP), Section 15.7.4.
Although the Calvert Cliffs facility is not an SRP 1) design, BG&E indicated that it used the current standards and guidance documents specified in SRP, Section 15.7.4, in performing the reanalysis. The 9306070337 930527 hiN b ;d (,
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4 NRC staff noted that the requested change would be a change in the licensing basis for the facility and that the current requirements would be used by the staff in assessing the acceptability of the requested change.
It was further noted, that BG&E should assure that the results of its reanalysis includes consideration of the assumptions used by the NRC staff when it performed its confirmatory analysis of the consequences of a fuel handling accident at the Calvert Cliffs facility.
The NRC staff indicated that, since the Calvert Cliffs facility has been approved for extended burnup fuel (60 MWD /MT), BG&E should use a value 20%
higher than the Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.25 value for iodine-131 inventory.
RG 1.25 provides the guidance which identifies the assumptions to be used in performing an analysis of the radiological consequences of fuel handling accidents, however, NUREG/CR5009, which assesses the effects of extended burnup fuel, notes that the calculated iodine gap-relea.;e fraction is 20%
greater and should be used in performing fuel handling accident analysis for extended burnup fuel.
BG&E indicated it would consider this increase in iodir.3-131 in its reanalysis.
Other items discussed, which BG&E may want to consider, included extending the current TS required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> decay time to a longer time period prior to fuel movement and the use/non-use of the containment purge system during fuel movement.
In relation to the need for the proposed change, BG&E indicated that the current requirement to have one of the two airlock doors shut during fuel handling results in undo wear and tear on the doors and their support systems due to the extended number of opening and closing operations of the doors.
The inner and outer doors are inter-locked to assure that only one door can be opened at a time to assure the current TSs are being complied with.
It was noted that the doors weigh about 1900 pounds each and, with the inflatable seals, were designed to assure a sealed containment during power operation with a limited number of operations.
BG&E indicated that outage related activities during fuel movement has required heavy usage of the doors with an average of about ten operations per hour and heavier usage during shift turnovers. The extended number of operations has resulted in failures of the interlocks requiring repair and loss of access for periods of time. One te two days have been lost in the refueling schedule due to these problems.
In addition, other system components are also affected by the heavy usage of the doors. These include the mechanical linkage mechanism, control valves (including packing), and the inflatable seals which require increased maintenance and frequency of replacement. Deaicated personnel, one inside and one outside of the airlock, are assigned to assure proper operation of the doors and initiate corrective actions if the doors fail to operate properly.
Another concern expressed was that the heavy usage of the airlock, during shift turnover or the initiation / completion of a major activity, has resulted f
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. May 27, 1993 in congestion when large g'roups of personnel are entering or exiting the containment. These situations have resulted in cross contamination of personnel on occasions.
BG&E further indicated that it approached this issue consistent with its approach to other shutdown safety issues, that is, to evacuate personnel and secure containment on an expedited basis.
If a fuel handling accident were to occur during an outage, the airlock doors would have to be cycled to let personnel out which would impede a prompt evacuation of the personnel, or that 10 CFR 50.54(x) would be invoked, which allows departure from TS requirements in an emergency when needed.
BG&E concluded its presentation indicating that it has determined that the benefits of the proposed changes provide an adequate basis to support the request if the final results of the reanalysis, utilizing current criteria and NRC guidance, results in the consequences of a fuel handling accident being within the expc,sure guidelines.
Daniel G. Mcdonald, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-l Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu'iation
Enclosure:
List of Attendees cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
n}4 i Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Unit Nos. I and 2 cc:
Mr. Michael Moore, President Mr. Joseph H. Walter Calvert County Board of Engineering Division Commissioners Public Service Commission of 175 Main Street Maryland Prince Frederick, Maryland 20678 American Building 231 E. Baltimore Street D. A. Brune, Esquire Baltimore, Maryland 21202-3486 General Counsel Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Kristen A. Burger, Esquire P. O. Box 1475 Maryland People's Counsel Baltimore, Maryland 21203 American Building, 9th Floor 231 E. Baltimore Street Jay E. Silberg, Esquire Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW Patricia T. Birnie, Esquire Washington, DC 20037 Co-Director Maryland Safe Energy Coalition Mr. G. L. Detter, Director, NRM P. O. Box 33111 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Baltimore, Maryland 21218 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702 Mr. Robert E. Denton Vice President - Nuclear Energy Resident Inspector Baltimore Gas and Electric Company c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Commission 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway P. O. Box 287 Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702 St. Leonard, Maryland 20685 Mr. Richard I. McLean Administrator - Radioecology Department of Natural Resources 580 Taylor Avenue Tawes State Office Building B3 Annapolis, Maryland 21401 Regional Administrator,. Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
w ENCLOSURE MEETING WITH BALTIM0RE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT MOVEMENT OF FUEL IN MODE 6 WITH OPEN CONTAINMENT May 19. 1993 LIST OF ATTENDEES NAME AFFILIATION Daniel G. Mcdonald NRR/DRP/PDI-1 Bruce Montgomery BG&E Thomas L. Sydnor BG&E Lee Russell BG&E Brian Mann BG&E Matt FitzPatrick BG&E Girard Gnycelcuwski BG&E Dan Collins
'BG&E Robert A. Capra NRR/DRPE/PDI-I Richard Lobel NRR/DSSA/SCSB Ken Eccleston NRR/DRSS/PRPB Jim Pulsipher NRR/DSSA/ Cont. Sys. Br.
Calvin W. Moon NRR/ DORS /0TSB Jack Donohew NRR/ADAR/PDAR
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i May 27,1993 in congestion when large groups of personnel are entering or exiting the containment. These situations have resulted in cross contamination of personnel on occasions.
BG&E further indicated that it approached this issue consistent with its approach to other shutdown safety issues, that is, to evacuate personnel and secure containment on an expedited basis.
If a fuel handling accident were to occur during an outage, the airlock doors would have to be cycled to let personnel out which would impede a prompt evacuation of the personnel, or that 10 CFR 50.54(x) would be invoked, which allows departure from TS requirements in an emergency when needed.
BG&E concluded its presentation indicating that it has (etermined that the benefits of the proposed changes provide an adequate basis to support the request if the final results of the reanalysis, utilizing current criteria and NRC guidance, results in the consequences of a fuel handling accident being within the exposure guidelines.
Original signed by:
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Daniel G. Mcdonald, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
List of Attendees cc w/ enclosure:
See next page Distribution:
See attached sheet PDI-1:LA PDI-1:PMea245)
PDI-1:D CVogan cd DMcDonald)Nvl RACapra 6
li 2293 osT/27/93 05 /27/93
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY FILENAME: CCl-2.MTS
DISTRIEUTION LIST FOR MEETING
SUMMARY
OF MAY 19, 1993:
- Docket ~ _ File
'NRC'&~ Local PDRs PDI-1 Reading T. Murley/F. Miraglia,12/G/18 J. Partlow, 12/G/18
.S. Varga J. Calvo R. A. Capra D. Mcdonald C. Vogan OGC-E. Jordan, MNBB 3701 R. Lobel,17/G/21.
K. Eccleston,10/D/4 J. Pulsipher,.8/D/1 C. Moon, II/E/22 J. Donohew, 11/D/23 ACRS (10)
V. McCree, EDO, 17/G/21 C. Cowgill, RGN-I e
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