ML20044F923

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Discusses Enforcement Discretion in Response to Concern Re Capability of 161-kV Transmission Sys to Provide Independent Offsite Source of Electrical Power,Delineated in Edsfi Repts 50-313/91-02 & 50-368/91-02.NOV Will Not Be Issued
ML20044F923
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/1993
From: Milhoan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Yelverton J
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
EA-93-108, NUDOCS 9306010202
Download: ML20044F923 (5)


See also: IR 05000313/1991002

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REGION IV

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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 400

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AR LINGT ON, T E X AS 760R8064

MAY 24 1993

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Dockets:

50-313

50-368

Licenses:

DPR-51

NpF-6

EA 93-108

Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

J. W. Yelverton, Vice President

Operations, Arkansas Nuclear One

Route 3, Box 137G

Russellville, Arkansas 72801

SUBJECT:

ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 91-02)

This refers to the NRC's inspection of the electrical distribution systems at

the Arkansas Nuclear One (AND) facility September 10 through October 18, 1991.

The inspection report, which was issued on November 21, 1991, described a

concern about the capability of the 161-kilovolt (kV) transmission system to

provide an independent off-site source of electrical power to the facility, as

required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 17. This issue, which was

identified by Entergy Operations, Inc., and discussed with the NRC during the

inspection, was left as an unresolved item pending conclusion of the NRC's

review. As you know, the NRC has conducted an extensive review of this matter

to determine whether compliance with General Design Criterion 17 had been met

at ANO prior to the discovery of this condition and your implementation of

corrective actions.

The NRC appreciates Entergy Operations' cooperation and

assistance in responding to several requests for information to support this

review.

General Design Criterion 17 requires, in part, that power from the

transmission network to the on-site electrical distribution system be supplied

by two physically independent circuits, and that each of the off-site power

circuits be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of

all on-site power suWies and the loss of the remaining off-site power

circuit to effect a safe shutdown of both units.

The two required sources of

off-site power are supplied to the ANO site through the 500kV switchyard 'and

the 161kV switchyard.

The 500kV switchyard normally supplies power through an

on-site autotransformer to the 161kV switchyard.

On October 5,1991

Entergy Operations infor* the * of an engineering

evaluation, which had been initiated to follow up a concern raised some days

earlier.

The evaluation had determined that the minimum design voltage at the

161kV switchyard could not be assured under all operating conditions,

particularly during expected summer peak loading, if the 500kV system were not

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available.

The potential for degradation of the available voltage occurred as

the result of increased off-site loading of the 161kV transmission system.

That potential had not been detected earlier, in part, because the 500kV

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transmission system had maintained the 161kV transmission system at acceptable

voltage levels and, in part, because Entergy Operations had not instituted

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formal procedures requiring periodic review of the transmission network to

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assure that the off-site voltage levels required by ANO were being maintained.

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When the deficient condition was identified, immediate procedural changes were

implemented to assure that two acceptable sources of off-site electrical power

would be available as required by General Design Criterion 17.

In addition,

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modifications to the 161kV transmission system were completed prior to the

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summer of 1992, when peak loading conditions were expected.

To assure that

transmission system load growth does not again result in inadequate off-site

voltage levels, Entergy Operations now requires that off-site voltage levels

be re-evaluated every 2 years.

The NRC is satisfied that the procedural

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changes and the modifications provide assurance that adequate voltage levels

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will be available under all operating conditions.

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The NRC has determined that General Design Criterion 17 was not met at ANO

between 1980 and 1991, because there was no assurance that the 161kV off-site

power circuit could have supplied sufficient voltage for the full auxiliary

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loads (shutdown loads) of both units using the assumptions in the general

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design criteria. As a result of this condition, ANO also failed to comply

with General Design Criterion 5, which states, in part, .that systems important

to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown

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that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their -

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safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an

orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units.

Entergy Operations, Inc.'s failure to ensure compliance with these

requirements created a potential, during peak loading conditions, that

insufficient electrical power would have been available to maintain ANO

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Units 1 and 2 in a safe shutdown condition.

Although the probability of the

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loss of the 500kV system during peak conditions concurrent with a loss of all

on-site power is low, the NRC considers this a significant regulatory concern.

Therefore, the violations of the general design criteria are classified in the

aggregate as a Severity Level III problem.

In accordance with the " General

Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement

Policy) 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, a penalty is considered for a Severity

Level 111 problem.

However, in accordance with Section VII.B.4 of the

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Enforcement Policy, I have been authorized not to propose a civil penalty

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because:

1) this condition was discovered by Entergy Operations as the result

of various engineering evaluations in preparation for the electrical

distribution system functional inspection;

2) the uniqueness-of the local

distribution system had masked the problem, making it highly unlikely that

Entergy Operations would have identified this condition through its routine

surveillance and quality assurance programs; and (3) when the problem.was

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identified, immediate corrective actions were implemented and physical

modifications to the transmission system were completed prior to the next peak

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loading period.

In addition, because the existence of this conditinn is not

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

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indicative of present performance at ANO and there was no prior notice of a

potential problem, a Notice of Violation will not be issued in this case.

No response to this letter is required.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of

the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC

Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

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Mi hoan

E egional Administrator

CC:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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ATTN:

Donald C. Hintz, President &

Chief Operating Officer

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, Mississippi

39286

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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ATTN: John R. McGaha, Vice President

Operations Support

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, Mississippi

39286

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway

ATlN:

Robert B. McGehee, Esq.

P.O. Box 651

Jackson, Mississippi

39205

Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

James J. Fisicaro

Director, Licensing

Route 3, Box 137G

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Russellville, Arkansas 72801

Entergy Operations. Inc.

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ATTN:

Michael B. Sellman, General

Manager, Plant Operations

Route 3, Box 137G

Russellville, Arkansas 72801

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Honorable Joe W. Phillips

County Judge of Pope County

Pope County Courthouse

Russellville, Arkansas 72801

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. ,Entergy Operations, Inc.

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.Winston & Strawn

ATTN: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.

1400 L-Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20005-3502

Arkansas Department of Health

ATTN: Ms. Greta Dicus, Director

Division of Radiation Control and

Emergency Management

4815 West Markham Street

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3867

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B&W Nuclear Technologies

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ATTN:

Robert B. Borsum

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Licensing Representative

1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525

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Rockville, Maryland 20852

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Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, USN (Ret)

214 South Morris Street

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Oxford, Maryland 21654

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ABB Combustion Engineering

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Nuclear Power

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ATTN: Charles B.. Brinkman

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Manager, Washington

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Nuclear Operations

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12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330

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Rockville, Maryland 20852

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