ML20044D811
| ML20044D811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/14/1993 |
| From: | Stoiber C NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-93-131, NUDOCS 9305200329 | |
| Download: ML20044D811 (39) | |
Text
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POLICY ISSUE May 14, 1993 StcY-93-131 (Notation Vote)
FOR:
The Commissioners FROM:
Carlton R. Stoiber, Director Office of International Programs
SUBJECT:
JOINT DOE /NRC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON U.S. NUCLEAR SAFETY INITIATIVES FOR SOVIET-DESIGNED REACTORS PURPOSE:
To obtain Commission approval of a Joint DOE /NRC report.
DISCUSSION:
The NRC and DOE have worked together to prepare a " Joint Report to Congress on l
U.S. Nuclear Safety Initiatives for Soviet-Designed Reactors" (Attachment 1) to respond to a request in House Report 102-555 accompanying the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act,1993 (Public Law No. 102-377).
DOE has asked that the Commission provide its formal concurrence on the report as soon as possible. Attachment 2 contains the transmittal letters with which DOE plans to forward the report.
The ED0 concurs in the report and 0GC has no legal objection. The State Department Senior Coordinator's office has reviewed the report in draft and their comments are reflected.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Commission concur in this report by May 25, noting any comments to be provided to 00E.
,/
Carlton R. Stoiber, Director Office of International Programs Attachments:
2, as stated i
NOTE:
TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Contact:
WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE J. R. Shea, 0IP AVAILABLE 504-1771 l
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C&
Y Em>.%
T 2-Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Friday, May 21, 1993.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Wednesday, May 19, 1 9 9_3, with an infor-mation copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC OCAA OIG IP EDO SECY
m 9
rb REPORT TO CONGRESS ON U.S. NUCLEAR SAFETY INITIATIVES FOR SOVIET-DESIGNED REACTORS h
JOINT REPORT BY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g 1993 j
cm.,
ATTACHMENT 1
w EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The United States is engaged in providing technical and financial assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
The objective of the program is twofold: in the near term, to help reduce the likelihood of a serious nuclear accident; in the mid to longer term, to help the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe to strengthen their nuclear safety culture and infrastructure to assure long-term safety.
International concern over the operation of Soviet-designed reactors remains substantial.
These plants have significant weaknesses in the areas of operational safety and design.
The designs of RBMKs (Chernobyl-type reactors) and VVER-440/230s are particularly inconsistent with current Western safety standards. They cannot practically be upgraded to meet contemporary standards for safety and should not be operated any longer than necessary. The analyses done on the newer Soviet designs, the VVER-440/213 and VVER-1000, indicate that, while they are superior to the RBMKs and VVER-440/230s, they are also inconsistent with current Western safety standards.
It is believed that with sufficient resources modifications can be made to these newer designs to make their operation more acceptable.
In spring 1992, a U.S. interagency team developed an assistance program for these reactors.
At the Lisbon Conference on assistance to the New Independent States (NIS), held May 23-24, 1992, the United States announced a nuclear safety initiative based on this plan, which would assist Russia and Ukraine.
Safety assistance to Lithuania and other countries of Eastern Europe having Soviet-designed reactors is covered by separate programs.
The purpose of the Lisbon Initiative is to undertake a set of integrated activities that will protect the health and environment of Russia and Ukraine and their neighbors by reducing the chance of nuclear accidents and developing measures to limit the consequences of incidents that might occur.
This initiative is not new, but builds on the foundation of the ongoing U.S..U.S.S.R. nuclear safety cooperation program, which began to be discussed following the 1986 Chernobyl accident and was formally established in 1988.
The initiative consists of four elements of cooperation between the United States and the NIS of the FSU that have been established and are being coordinated by the Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Agency for International Development (AID), and the Department of State (DOS).
Congress, through AID,-bee-authorized $25 million in FY-92 funds to start work r
p immediately on these key elements of nuclear safety assistance. DOE has been provided $21.9 million for three items of the initiative, and NRC has been s/
provided $3.1 million for 44*r fourth item.
ou
The elements are:
1.
Build upon the existing U.S./ Russia Operational Safety Initiative for VVER-440/230 reactors.
The Operational Safety Enhancements will include the expedited development of Emergency Operating Instructions (E0!s),
performance-based E01 training, and administrative and operational controls for VVER-440/213, VVER-1000, and RBMK reactors in Russia and Ukraine.
2.
Establish two regional training centers -- one each in Russia and Ukraine; for the one in Ukraine we will supply a computer-based
/
simulator for VVER-1000 reactors) the Russian site already has a simulator. The centers will serve as a focal point for training plant operators and engineers as well as inspectors and other plant regulatory personnel and for establishing comprehensive Western safety management systems in existing reactors in the NIS.
3.
Accomplish key risk reduction actions as part of a U.S. effort to address the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.
These actions are intended to effect near-term reductions in risk for the older Soviet designs, the RBMKs and VVER-440/230s, and a VVER-1000 in e e Ukraine, y
without encouraging extended operation of the older designs.
In order to be effective, these actions must be accomplished as soon as practical.
U.S. industry participation is being solicited to carry out these actions.
4.
NRC will assist Russian and Ukrainian regulators in training and 'in developing consistent safety standards and procedures.
Expert Working Groups (EWGs) have been formed in each of the first three areas of assistance.
Primary points of contact from each country have been identified for each working group. Meetings have been held or are scheduled to develop detailed implementation program plans for each working group and to proceed with the work.
Except for the EWGs for the training centers, all EWGs will have joint participation from Russia, Ukraine, and the United States.
Separate working groups are being set up for training cante i
ch country.
In the area of regulatory assistance, three meetings sre held with Russian and Ukrainian regulators to establish priorities and divelop implementation y
plans.
This part of the overall assistance program isidirected toward extensive training in the United States and the provision of computer-based equipment. A number of training visits have already occurred.
At the G-7 Summit meeting in July 1992, the heads of state included the safety of nuclear powerplants in the FSU and in Central and Eastern Europe as part of their final communique. They agreed that a special effort should be undertaken to improve the safety of these plants. They also endorsed a program of short-term actions and longer term safety improvements. They supported establishing, as appropriate, a supplemental multilateral mechanism or fund to address immediate concerns not covered by bilateral assistance programs.
1
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON U.S. NUCLEAR 3AFETY INITIATIVES 1.
INTRODUCTION The United States is engaged in providing technical and financial assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
The objective of r
the program is twofold:
in the near term, to help reduce the likelihood of e--
g a serious nuclear accident; in ti.a mid to longer term, to help the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe to strengthen their nuclear safety culture and infrastructure to assure long-term safety.
Following the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the United States in 1988 instituted a program of cooperation with the Soviet Union in reactor safety, including a number of technical exchanges and evaluations that were aimed at better understanding Soviet-designed reactors and their operation, as well as determining to what degree U.S. regulatory and operating experience might be relevant to the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe where Soviet-designed reactors also were in operation. Discussions also took place with Eastern European countries. These analyses found a generally poor safety culture resulting in operational safety problems throughout the Soviet system.
In addition, significant design and construction deficiencies were found in most of the models, indicating these would not meet Western safety standards.
The cooperative program with the Soviet Union included the Operational Safety Initiative, begun in 1990, which was determined to be the quickest way to have an impact on the safety culture and safety prospects for operating reactors.
This effort focused on improved operating procedures, training, and management at a selected nuclear powerplant, the Novovoronezh VVER Model 440/230 in Russia.
Except for two fast breeder reactors, all nuclear power reactors in the New Independent States (NIS) are of two basic designs, the VVER pressurized water reactor design and the RBMK light water, pressure tube, graphite moderated Chernobyl design.
For each design there are early prototype units that led to standardized designs. There are 59 reactors.
The VVER models are:
ten 440/230s, sixteen 440/213s, and eighteen VVER-1000s. The RBMKs come in the 1000 and 1500 Mwe versions, thirteen of which are 1000 MWe designs.
The RBMK reactor design evolved from a military production reactor that could also produce electricity, with little appreciation for nuclear safety as we understand it. While there have been improvements in each subsequent generation, the inherent de:ign is seriously flawed from a safety point of 1
view.
The major design deficiencies of the RBMKs are as follows:
Fundamentally unstable reactor design and poorly designed systems o
for shutdown of the reactor; this probably was a cause of the Chernobyl accident.
Design changes have been made to reduce this deficiency.
Lack of separation and redundancy in critical electrical and fluid o
systems and general susceptibility of systems important to safety to common-cause failures, o
Little or no fire protection.
o No containment system and a confinement system that does not enclose the entire primary coolant system and with limited pressure retention capability.
The VVER-440/230 is the first production model of the VVER concept and was also designed in a manner that does not conform to Western nuclear safety requirements. While there are some inherent positive features of the design (such as large water inventory and low power density of the fuel), major design deficiencies in the VVER-440/230s include:
Lack of separation and redundancy in critical electrical and fluid o
systems and general susceptibility of systems important to safety to common-cause failures.
o Inadequate fire protection.
Insufficient safety systems to cope with primary system leaks.
o o
Lack of an effective containment or confinement system.
While international awareness of design and operational problems associated with RBMK and VVER reactors has increased since the Chernobyl accident, the actual extent of the problems did not become fully known until the breakup of the Soviet Bloc and the initial phases of the disintegration of the Soviet regime.
Further studies were performed, principally by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which conducted Safety Review Missions to VVER-440/230 facilities in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Russia in 1990 and 1991.
These studies confirmed the earlier U.S. findings.
International concern over the operation of Soviet-designed reactors remains substantial.
These plants appear to have significant weaknesses in the areas of operational safety and design. The designs of RBMKs and VVER-440/230s are particularly inconsistent with Western safety standards.
There is a growing Western view that these reactors cannot practically be upgraded to meet contemporary standards for safety and should not be operated any longer than necessary. The likelihood of a serious accident from these plants is considered too high. The analyses done on the newer Soviet designs, the VVER-440/213 and VVER-1000, indicate that, while they are superior to the RBMKs and VVER-440/230s, they are also inconsistent with Western safety standards.
It 2
1
is believed that modifications can be made to these newer designs to make their operation more acceptable.
In addition, the breakup of the Soviet Union has resulted in the removal of vital nuclear resources that were available to the countries of the FSU and Eastern Europe from the Soviet Government.
While each country has a differing level of indigenous technical expertise, some fundamental aspects of reactor operations were maintained solely by Russia, such as fuel manufacturing and long-term spent fuel storage, reactor testing and design information, and comprehensive nuclear related research and analysis.
This has caused each country to begin the development and implementation of their own nuclear infrastructure that is capable of maintaining operational reactor safety that is acceptable by Western standards. As can be expected, this has also resulted in the identification of the limitations each country has regarding financial and technical resources to implement the necessary changes.
II.
U.S. COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE l.
Joint Coordinatina Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safe _tv (JCCCNRS) Proaram As a result of more than 40 meetings, exc an. s of hundreds of documents and
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joint projects sponsored by the JCCCNRS, was formed in April 1988 under the Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy with the FSU (now with Russia and Ukraine), the United States learned much about the vulnerabilities of the Soviet nuclear power program and generated ideas to assist the safety of this program, in response to the Chernobyl accident.
2.
Operational Safety Initiative (Russia)
The United States program of cooperation w th the Soviet Union in reactor i
safety included an Operational Safety Init.
.ve to improve the safety culture and safety prospects for operational reac" cs as soon as possible.
The Operational Safety Initiative was first proposed by the Secretary of Energy in September 1989 and an implementing agreement was signed in Moscow on March 16, 1990.
The initiative is being implemented through the JCCCNRS.
J The Operational Safety Initiative involves the application of lessons learned in the United States over the last 10 years in the development of symptom-based emergency operating instructions (E0!s), performance-based training materials, and improved work control processes. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and key utility representatives are assisting the Department in transferring U.S. expertise and lessons learned by U.S. utilities. The Novovoronezh VVER Model 230 was the plant selected for this work.
Procedures and training materials have been completed and operations management and control improvements will be implemented at Novovoronezh by the end of 1993. The procedures are now being verified by the operations personnel with modifications being made as appropriate. Training on the E01s f
y is to be completed in October to allow implementation at Novovoronezh in November with regulatory approval, and plans are being made to implement the procedures at other plants in Russia.
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3.
Lisbon Initiative (Russia and Ukraine)
After the fall of the former Soviet Government in 1991, steps were undertaken to accelerate U.S. efforts in nuclear safety.
Under the direction of the National Security Council, the Department of Energy (D0E) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), working through the Department of State (DOS) and other agencies, prepared a report containing options and a plan to address international concerns over the safety of Soviet-designed reactors that was the basis for discussions with other countries and multilateral organizations.
In March 1992, this plan was used by representatives of the Group of Seven highly industrialized nations (G-7) to prepare an action plan on the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. At the Lisbon Conference on assistance to the NIS, held on May 23-24, the Secretary of State announced the U.S. initiative based on this plan.
He pledged $25 million to start work immediately on four components of nuclear safety assistance to Russia and Ukraine that will build upon and expand the ongoing work of the DOE and NRC.
In June, the presidents of the United States and Russia issued a joint communique, which also reinforced a plan for assistance in the area of nuclear safety.
Finally, at the G-7 Summit meeting in July 1992, the heads of state included the safety of nuclear powerplants in the FSU and in Central and Eastern Europe as part of their final communique. They agreed that a special effort should be undertaken to improve the safety of these plants. They stated that the action program should develop clear priorities, and they supported establishing, as appropriate, a supplemental multilateral mechanism or fund to address immediate concerns not covered by bilateral assistance programs.
The purpose of this initiative is to undertake a set of integrated activities that will protect the health and environment of Russia, Ukraine, and their neighbors by reducing the chance of nuclear accidents and developing measures to limit the consequences of those that do occur.
This initiative is not completely new, but will build on the foundation of the i
ongoing U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear safety cooperation program. As proposed by the Secretary of State, the Lisbon Nuclear Safety Initiative consists of four elements of cooperation between the United States and Russia and Ukraine that have been established and are being coordinated by DOE, NRC, DOS, and the AJency for International Development (AID). The elements are: (1)
/
- stablishing two regional training centers, 2) Implementing other measures to provide immediate operational safety enhancements, (3) Providing risk reduction measures for RBMK and VVER reactors, and (4) Assisting regulators in training and in developing safety standards and procedures.
DOE is responsible for implementation of the first three elements, and NRC for the fourth. The projects address the following elements:
(a)
Provide immediate operational safety enhancements through improvement of emergency operating procedures and improvement of nuclear plant equipment servicing and maintenance practices; translations of U.S. standards, guidelines, and ancillary materials; support to help keep safety procedures and training materials updated; development of alarm response procedures; improvement of diagnostics methods and hardware; and training for technical support personnel at nuclear powerplants.
This includes implementing these procedures and practices at two VVER-1000 4
l l
plants (one in Russia and one in Ukraine), at two VVER-440 Model 213 plants (one in Russia and one in & Ukraine), and at an RBMK 7
in Russia.
(b)
Establish two regional training centers -- one each in Russia and Ukraine; for the one in Ukraine we will supply a computer-based simulator for VVER-1000 reactorsf the Russian site already has a f
simulator. The centers will serve as a focal point for training plant operators and engineers and for establishing comprehensive Western safety management systems in existing reactors in the NIS.
Establishment of these centers will be conditioned on agreement that the facilities will be open to personnel from other Eastern European countries and the Baltics.
-- These training centers will cover the full range of civilian nuclear issues from training to maintenance.
(c)
Provide risk reduction for RBMKs and VVER-440/230s through measures selected in discussions with the Russians and Ukrainians.
Items being considered are:
improvement of confinement performance for severe accidents, development of methods to prevent uncontrolled hydrogen explosions, installation of dedicated emergency diesel generators and feedwater pumps in protected areas, and improvement of basic fire protection and detection.
(d)
Assist regulators in training and developing safety standards and procedures and an improved regulatory structure. This initiative
)
includes computer hardware and software transfers to enable the i
regulators to perform independent safety analyses and to modernize i
their basic administrative capabilities.
i These elements will be carried out within the interaational policy framework established at the 1992 G-7 Economic Summit, including seekin the earliest practical shutdown of the older Soviet designs, the RBMKs and VVER-440/230s.
Thus, our assistance is not intended to prolong the life of these older plants
/
any longer than is absolutely necessary.
It must be noted, however, that the j
decision to shut down or continue to operate these facilities is that of Russia and Ukraine alone.
j Congress, through AID, has authorized $25 million in FY-92 funds for the initiative.
DOE has been provded $21.9 million for three items of the initiative, and NRC has been provided $3.1 million for the fourth.
Expert Working Groups (EWGs) having participation from the United States, Russia, and Ukraine have been formed in each of the first three areas of assistance.
Primary points of contact from each country have been identified for each working group. Meetings have been held or are scheduled to develop detailed implementation program plans for each working group and to proceed with the work.
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III.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINJ a.
PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS AND PROGRESS (1)
OPERATIONAL SAFETY The Lisbon Initiative addresses Operational Safety Enhancements that build upon the U.S./U.S.S.R. Operational Safety Initiative for the Novovoronezh VVER-440/230 reactor. The Operational Safety Enhancements include the expedited development of E0Is, performance-based E01 training, and administrative and operational controls.
Actual development of work products on E01s, training materials, and maintenance / diagnostic practices to be implemented at powerplants would be done by the Russians or Ukrainians.
These work products will be made available to other countries with these Soviet-designed reactors.
Agreement has been reached on target sites for development of the E0Is:
Rovno (Ukraine) and Kola (Russia) for VVER-440/213s; Balakovo (Russia) and Zaporozhye (Ukraine) for the VVER-1000s; and Smolensk (Russia) for the RBMKs.
(2)
TRAINING CENTERS One training center will be established in Russia and one in Ukraine, each with a full scope VVER-1000 simulator.
The United States will provide the simulator for the Ukraine training center as part of the Lisbon Initiative.
Agreement has been reached for the United States to support regional training centers at Balakovo in Russia, and Khmeinitsky in Ukraine.
Both locations have VVER-1000 reactors.
U.S. simulator and training experts have visited these and other locations to perform initial technical reviews; determine training program needs; evaluate existing simulator technology, equipment, and indigenous capabilities; and to establish technical points of contact.
Separate EWGs for each country have been established and are working to establish functioning training centers with the necessary support equipment.
Using U.S. training methods, the EWGs will support the establishment of processes to accomplish the following at each training center:
maintenance of procedures and training materials; normal operation and alarm response procedure development; translation of U.S. standards, guidelines, and ancillary materials; improvement of nuclear plant equipment servicing and maintenance practices in each training center; improvement of diagnostic methods training and hardware; and training for technical support personnel at nuclear powerplants.
(3)
RISK REDUCTION Key risk reduction actions were proposed as part of a U.S. effort to address the safety of Soviet-designed reactors.
These actions are intended to bring about near-term reductions in risk for the older Soviet designs, the RBMKs, VVER-440/230s, and a VVER-1000 in Ukraine, without encouraging extended operation of the older designs.
In order to be effective, these actions must 6
~
be accomplished as soon as practical.
U.S. industry participation is being solicited to carry out these actions.
The United States has initiated feasibility and conceptual design studies of the actions described below.
Discussions will be held to identify which, if any, of these actions will be performed.
Key risk reduction actions include the following for the RBMKs:
verification of completion of recommended post-Chernobyl fixes and identification of any remaining high risk fixes; confinement performance upgrades for severe accidents through filtered venting, hydrogen control, and reduced leakage as well as other options; installation of a dedicated emergency diesel powered feedwater pump in a new, dedicated structure for an RBMK in Russia; assurance that basic fire protection needs are identified and provided at one plant in Russia; and identifyc* automatic reactor trips for remaining high-risk failure modes.
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1 Planned measures for the VVER-440/230s include confinement performance i
upgrades for severe accidents through filtered venting, hydrogen control, and reduced leakage as well as other options.
For the VVER-1000 the measures include assurance that basic fire protection needs are identified and provided at one plant in Ukraine.
Risk reduction measures have been discussed with the Russians and Ukrainians with a firm agreement on implementation of fire safety improvements with the Russians at Smolensk, an RBMK, and with the Ukrainians at Zaporozhye, a VVER-1000.
Fire safety assistance has commenced.
Fire safety walkdowns have been completed at two units at Zaporozhye (VVER-1000) and at two units at Smolensk (RBMK).
Information obtained from these plant walkdowns has been incor~porated in a fire hazards analysis that includes recommendations for specific plant improvements.
Russian'and Ukrainian fire safety experts have participated with a U.S. architect / engineer in performing the analysis and in the development of recommended improvements.
The Russians have expressed significant interest in U.S. assistance in completion of auxiliary feedwater upgrades at the Kursk RBMK plant that they have initiated but do not have the funds to implement. Agreement has been reached to evaluate this as an item to be accomplished under the initiative.
b.
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT Fundamentally, all mechanisms are now in place that are needed to implement any action to further the Lisbon Initiative, and the Central and Eastern European Countries and Baltic (CEEB) Initiative (discussed later). This includes processes for inter-governmental funds transfers, as well as mechanisms to obtain the services of the private sector and experts within the U.S. national laboratories.
The DOE, under the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy (DOE /NE), is responsible for program definition and implementation of three areas under the Lisbon Initiative: the training centers, operational safety enhancements, and risk reduction measures. To assist DOE /NE, the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has been designated to assist in providing technical project management support and independent oversight for the subcontracting to private industry that will ensue from the nuclear safety initiatives.
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a..
Industry expertise and services are being procured through the BNL International Nuclear Safety Project Office.
BNL has identified dedicated contract specialists, who will be supplemented as required by contract and procurement analysts, from the BNL Office of Contracts and Procurement who are specialists in relevant technical areas.
I IV.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ACTIVITIES WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 1.
JCCCNRS Cooperative Activities in Nuclear Safety NRC activities with the FSU (Russia and Ukraine) to enhance nuclear safety through cooperative exchanges have been underway since 1988.
Activities have been conducted under twelve working groups (WG), which have met approximately twice a year since 1988.
A number of working groups have now completed their work or are being subsumed by the Lisbon assistance program as the JCCCNRS efforts focused increasingly on assistance programs rather than cooperative exchanges.
Working groups that have completed their tasks or have been discontinued are:
WG-2:
Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Powerplants in the USSR and the U.S.
WG-4:
Fire Safety WG-5:
Modernization /Backfitting WG-10:
Erosion / Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Component's Working groups whose activities have been subsumed by the Lisbon Nuclear Reactor Safety Initiative are:
WG-1:
Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices WG-8:
Exchange of Operational Experience WG-9:
Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment and Systems for Supporting Operations WG-11:
Initiative on Operational Safety of Civilian Nuclear Powerplants The remaining working groups are:
WG-3:
Radiation Embrittlement, Structural Integrity and Life Extension of Reactor Pressure Vessels and Supports WG-6:
Severe Accidents WG-7:
Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations WG-12:
Nuclear Power Plant Aging and Plant Life Extension 2.
Development of Assistance Proiects Under the Lisbon Initiative The fourth element of the Lisbon Initiative was developed when the senice regulators of the NRC, Gosatomnadzor (GAN) of Russia, and the State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SCNRS) of Ukraine met July 20-24, 1992, in Rockville, Maryland to create and prioritize the regulators' safety proposals.
These proposals drew largely from the experience of the various working groups. A list of seven priorities was agreed to for GAN and sixteen for the 8
SCNRS. The NRC has secured funding from AID for most of these projects and has begun the implementation.
A Russian GAN team visited NRC from December 14-18, 1992, to negotiate implementation schedules for the Russian projects.
Similarly, a Ukrainian SCNRS team visited in March 1993 on the implementation of Ukrainian projects.
Summaries of the progress on the funded projects follow.
a.
RUSSIAN PROJECTS Russia 1.
Licensina Basis and Safety Analysis Project
Description:
Provide on-the-job training and technical assistance on NRC's practices and process for licensing nuclear powerplants, research reactors, and facilities-utilizing radioactive materials.
Accomplishments:
Russian Priority 1, while unchangeo in purpose, was extensively revised during the December 14-18 meeting to specify the details of training activities and to identify the knowledge to be transferred. A small group of GAN executives met with the NRC in Rockville, Maryland during the period March 15-26, 1993.
The discussion included the following topics: NRC's regulatory structure and the corresponding licensee organization; civilian licensing principles as applied to reactors, the fuel cycle and materials; licensing legal basi's and process; and utility organizational relationships.
In addition, the GAN executives identified goals for future groups.
The first week's concentration on commercial nuclear reactor licensing issues included a one-day visit to Virginia Power corporate headquarters to study corporate and site operating organization relationships. The second week concentrated on fuel and materials facility licensing issues, and included a one-day visit to Westinghouse Electric's Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division fuel Fabrication Facility to study corporate and site operating organization relationships.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Under Russian Priority I nine teams of GAN representatives are scheduled to visit the United States from March 1993 through FY 1994 (six groups in 1993 and three in 1994). Activities include:
studying reactor and fuel cycle and material licensing processes, financial fees collection, NRC licensing information software and hardware, reactor license renewal, and visiting the Watts Bar nuclear reactor site. The first team completed its efforts March 26, 1993.
The next Russian team will begin training April-May for 2 weeks. This two-man team will receive an overview of regulatory documents and industry standards and their use by the NRC.
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Russia 2.
Insoection Proaram Activities Project
Description:
Provide training and technical assistance on the NRC's inspection program.
Accomplishments:
During the December 1992 meeting between the NRC and GAN, Russian Priority 2, f
while unchanged in purpose, was extensively revised to specify the details of training activities and to identify the knowledge to be transferred.
It is currently expected that Russia 2 will commence in June 1993 and continue for a 2-year period.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Two teams of GAN representatives are scheduled to visit the U.S. from June through December 1993 and two teams of NRC representatives are scheduled to visit Russia in FY 1994. While in the United States, GAN representatives will study the NRC inspection process and participate in inspections at commercial power and research reactor sites, fuel facilities, material licensees, and vendor companies. While in Russia, NRC representatives will consult with GAN on development of the Russian inspection program and participate in a joint inspection of a Russian nuclear powerplant.
In summary, the NRC and GAN have agreed to 4 training team visits, 3 in 1993 and a 4th in early 1994. The 4th team will involve joint participation'in a pilot team inspection at a Russian nuclear powerplant.
r Russia 3.
Creation of an Emeroency Suonort Center in Russia Project
Description:
Provide assistance in establishing incident response programs over a period of 3 years.
Accomplishments:
During GAN's December 1992 meeting with their NRC counterparts the following objectives were satisfied:
achieving a general approach to the project; identifying basic documents to be exchanged; discussing U.S. and Russian concepts of operation for emergency response; and defining milestones and a tentative schedule for 1993.
A GAN specialist visited the United States from February 20 to March 6, 1993, and participated in discussions with the NRC. The GAN specialist observed NRC response activities at its regional office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, during a full-scale exercise at the Susquehanna nuclear powerplant.
Demonstrations of HF communications, functions, and capabilities of the Oconee nuclear powerplant Emergency Response Facility and capabilities of the NRC Headquarters Operations Center were witnessed by the GAN personnel.
Based on these discussions GAN and NRC agreed on a phased approach in developing the Emergency Support Center in Moscow that would include a prototype phase to validate operational concepts and procedures, the establishment of minimum effective response capability and finally, the creation of an integrated fully operational emergency center. The discussions resulted in the identification 10
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of training on the use of the RASCAL code, a visit by an NRC working group to GAN in Mayn1993, and a tentative schedule for a GAN specialist to observe a full-scale exercise at NRC Headquarters in late summer 1993.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
NouvW A U.S. team is tentatively scheduled to '.isit Russia in the second quarter of FY 1993 to study potential infrastructure issues and observe incident response operations related to the emergency support center development.
An additional Russian team visit in 1993 is tentatively scheduled for August to observe NRC exercises.
Russia 4.
Analytical Support Activities Project
Description:
Provide assistance in implementing and applying analytical methodologies in performing safety analyses.
Accomplishments:
During the December meeting with GAN in Rockville, Maryland, the NRC and GAN came to an agreement on the computer codes to be provided to the Russian regulators and the level and method of conducting basic training on fundamentals of safety philosophy and analyses. The code training has been divided into two sessions to be conducted at the NRC headquarters and the appropriate national laboratory sites.
A third Russian team will visit the NRC in 1993 to study NRC management practices in effectively utilizing technical assistance to perform audit calculations and technical reviews.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The NRC has recently posted a notice with Commerce Business Daily soliciting technical contractor support for the procurement and installation of engineering / scientific workstations. The workstations will be used by the regulator to perform severe accident analyses using the U.S. computer codes that will be modified for the Russian nuclear powerplants.
In addition, an agreement has been reached with a national laboratory to provide some of the analytical code training.
Russia 5.
Establishment of a Reculatory Trainino prooram l
Project
Description:
Assistance would be provided in establishing a regulatory training program in Russia over a period of 2 or 3 years.
Accomplishments:
A planning meeting was conducted in Moscow, Russia, November 16-19, 1992, to develop a realistic plan to implement the ideas pertaining to the establishment of a regulatory training program.
There was agreement that technical assistance would be provided to address the highest priority training needs in 1993.
Longer term programs to address continuing technical training needs will be pursued as resources permit.
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The December 14-18, 1992, meeting between GAN of Russia and NRC resulted in some changes in the Memorandum of the Meeting previously negatiated during the November 1992 trip. These changes, requested by GAN, reduced the length of time for the various Russian assignments at the NRC Technical Training Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee to 3 weeks maximum.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Projected for the next quarter, a group of 5 Russian GAN personnel will have a 3-week assignment at the NRC Technical Training Center during July 1993.
The Russian personnel are typically the managers who are responsible for implementing the programs that will be discussed.
They will receive technical training and briefings on subjects that include the ideology and methodology of technical training conducted for NRC personnel and teaching methods and course materials that may be used for training of GAN specialists.
A second group of GAN personnel is scheduled to visit the NRC Technical Training Center in August 1993. This group, comprised mainly of the personnel responsible for implementing technical training program, will review the use of training aids, including simulators and the necessary equipment to support the development and presentation of training programs.
The third group identified will be assigned to the NRC Technical Training Center in November 1993. This group is sub-divided into three smaller focused groups consisting of radiation protection specialists, engineering support specialists, and operator licensing examination personnel. The radiation specialists will study site access training, radwaste management, safety aspects of industria' radiography, transportation of radioactive materials, safety aspects of well logging, irradiator technology, advanced radiological environmental monitoring, radiological emergency response, radiological emergency planning, and radiological accident assessment. The engineering support specialists will be briefed on fire protection for powerplants, welding technology and codes, nondestructive examination and inservice inspection. Operator licensing examination personnel will receive training on examination techniques and the operator licensing examination program.
In addition, all three specialist sub-groups will participate in NRC courses on Fundamentals of Inspection, Inspecting for Performance, and Incident Investigation Team Training.
Russia 6.
Creation and Development of a Materials Control and Accountina System Under the Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons program, the United States has offered Russia an assistance program in nuclear materials accounting Lnd control as requested by GAN.
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Russia 7.
Fire Protection Support Project
Description:
Provide technical assistance for development and review of fire protection inspection methodology and the implementation of this methodology at Russian power reactors.
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Accomplishments:
During the December 1992 NRC/GAN meeting, Russian Priority 7 was revised.
It was determined that this project should continue to encompass the developm...t of a historical fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown licensing analysis document, which describes the typically approved U.S. licensing approaches to fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown; the bases for licensing decisions; the regulatory documents under that the NRC reviews were conducted, and the unique approaches which the NRC found acceptable and for which the HRC staff granted licensing exemptions.
It was also determined that GAN specialists will interact with NRC fire protection specialists.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The NRC will develop a historical fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown licensing analysis document.
Upon completion of the first document, the NRC will provide it to GAN of Russia for their review, comment, and use in preparation for future activities. Approximately 2-3 months after completion of the historical fire protection / safe shutdown licensing document, two or three GAN specialists will come to the United States to interact with NRC and regional fire protection specialists for the purposes of learning about NRC fire protection regulations, fire protection and safe shutdown licensing practices and procedures, and NRC fire protection and safe shutdown inspection methodologies. The GAN representatives will be briefed on the training sessions and experiences available from or with various U.S. sources.
The GAN representatives will return to Russia and consult with GAN management.
GAN will then propose further training, experiences and regulatory document developmental activities, and pilot fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown licensing and inspection activities to be conducted under this Russian Priority both in the United States and Russia.
b.
UKRAINIAN PROJECTS Ukraine 1.
General Proaram on the Development of SCNRS of Ukraine Project
Description:
Provide assistance in development of Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety.
The NRC will provide assistance in the development of Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety.
This project provides for overall discussion of the direct assistance program to evaluate the direction and effectiveness of the assistance effort.
Accomplishments:
The SCNRS Chairman visited the NRC in March 1993 to discuss Ukrainian direct assistance efforts.
The Chairman requested an NRC presence at SCNRS to assist in the overall direction of USNRC efforts to develop the appropriate regulatory organization and to ptovide recommendations where further assistance may be needed in the development and structuring of SCNRS.
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Projected Schedule and Plans:
The NRC plans to have further discussions with SCNRS to identify the appropriate level of expertise needed to assist the SCNRS development.
Ukraine 2.
Establishment of Reaulatory Trainina Proaram Project
Description:
Provide assistance in establishing a regulatory training program in Ukraine over a period of 3 years.
Accomplishments:
A planning meeting was conducted in Kiev, Ukraine, November 9-13, 1992, to develop a realistic plan to implement the ideas pertaining to this project.
There was agreement that technical assistance would be provided to address the highest priority training needs in 1993.
A group of 5 Ukrainian SCNRS personnel completed a 6-week assignment at the NRC Technical Training Center, Chattanooga, Tennessee from February 1 - March 12, 1993. The Ukrainian personnel participating in this program were the managers responsible for implementing the technical training programs at SCNRS.
The briefings included discussions on technical training programs conducted by U.S. utilities, structure and content of technical training provided to NRC personnel, inspection fundamentals and techniques, and the process and methodology of conducting operator licensing examinations in the United States.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Current plans are for a group of 6 SCNRS personnel to visit the NRC Technical Training Center for a period of 3 or 4 weeks in the April-May 1993 timeframe.
This group will be comprised of personnel responsible for the actual implementation of the technical training programs. The technical training topics to be covered during this assignment period will include use of the Code of Federal Regulations, regulatory guidance, NRC Inspection Manual, and updated safety analysis report in the development of NRC inspections; fundamentals of inspection; and the methods and process for conducting licensing examinations of operators in the United States.
Arrangements will be made for an SCNRS individual to attend very specialized courses or specific technical briefings in the United States during 1993.
These courses may include the following:
o Welding Technology and Codes Course o
Nondestructive Examination and Codes Course o
Eddy Current Testing Course o
Inservice Inspection Course In addition, future plans include providing the necessary microcomputers to support a computer based training program and equipment needed in the development and presentation of the SCNRS technical training program. Also, an analytical simulator for a VVER-1000 will be procured for SCNRS when funding is made available.
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Ukraine 3.1.
Proaram for Development of a System for Safety and licensina of Nuclear Powerolants Project
Description:
Provide training and technical assistance on the NRC's process for licensing nuclear powerplants, with particular emphasis on the NRC's safety analysis process.
Accomplishments:
From January 15 to March 12, 1993, a SCNRS representative visited the NRC to study the NRC organization and Part 50 and 52 licensing processes, and to tour Comanche Peak. This included familiarity with the use of regulatory requirements, codes and standards, regulatory guides, bulletins, generic letters, and the standard review plan.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The priority was revised in March 1993 and may include extensive licensing and safety analysis training for approximately ten SCNRS technical specialists.
Under this project, the NRC will host a SCNRS representative for 2 to 2-1/2 months, commencing approximately July 21, 1993, to provide experience in the responsibilities and activities of a licensing project manager.
In addition, NRC will host a SCNRS specialist in the area of Reactor Systems and Containment for 1-1/2 months beginning approximately June 9, 1993.
The NRC agreed to consider the feasibility of the following:
A 2-month continuation of the licensing project manager visit in FY 1994.
Hosting 8 SCNRS technical specialists for 1-1/2 months each beginning in fall 1993. The specialties include:
construction, instrumentation and control, electrical engineering, plant systems / balance of plant, nuclear fuel core / spent fuel, radioactive waste management, radiation protection, mechanical engineering / materials.
A 2-to 2-1/2 month duration visit to Kiev early in CY 1994 by an NRC licensing project manager to consult on the completeness and implementation practices of the Ukrainian Nuclear Power Reactor Licensing System.
Ukraine 3.2.
Proaram for Develcoment of a System for Safety Analysis and Licensina of Nuclear Powerplants Project
Description:
Provide assistance in implementing and applying analytical methodologies in performing safety analyses.
Accomplishments:
Development of the statements of work for contractor support and finalization of specifications for the workstation has been completed.
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The objective of this project is to provide 4 Ukrainian regulatory organization, the SCNRS, assistance in:
- 1) implementing and applying analytical methodologies in performing safety analyses, and 2) the development of research support for regulatory activities.
More specifically, this assistance will include:
Training and technical assistance in analytical methodology, computer codes and safety analysis, and the regulatory process.
Computer codes and the necessary manuals and related literature for:
thermal hydraulic analysis; severe accident analysis (with core melt); and consequence analysis (spread of activity); and A workstation and personal computers needed to implement the program.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The NRC has recently posted a notice with Commerce Business Daily soliciting technical contractor support for the procurement and installation of engineering / scientific workstations. The workstations will be used by the regulator to perform severe accident analyses using the U.S. computer codes, which will be modified for Ukrainian nuclear powerplants.
In order for the NRC to meet the objectives of this project within a reasonable timeframe, and since the NRC's own staff resources are limited, it is planned to utilize technical organizations in Russia, and also organizations in the United States, to provide some of the support needed to implement the program.
NRC will provide SCNRS with the following computer codes and related documentation:
ORIGEN-2, RELAP5/M003, CONTAIN 1.11, CORCON/ MOD 3, MACCS, and VICTORIA.
NRC plans to provide basic training on fundamentals of safety philosophy / analyses in such areas as:
safety criteria (fuel cladding, fuel enthalpy, vessel / primary system pressure limits, etc.]; accidents / transients selected for analyses and selection basis; codes utilized for different analyses, and the basis and limitations of the various models in these codes; system ESF modeling; single failure; the parameters to be varied, interpreting the results and identifying and understanding the significance of uncertainties.
In order to accomplish the above, NRC will provide support to SCNRS for its technical staff to train in the United States during 1993.
It is projected that two teams made up of 2-4 technical specialists will visit NRC headquarters and various laboratory sites for this purpose.
A team comprised of SCNRS technical specialists will participate in training for 2 weeks. This will cover basic training on fundamentals of safety i
philosophy as indicated in the above paragraph. During this assignment, code training will be provided on CORCON/ MOD 3.
The second team of SCNRS technical specialists will be assigned for 2-3 weeks to receive basic training on fundamentals of safety philosophy as indicated in the above paragraph and code training on RELAP5/M003, CONTAIN 1.11, and VICTORIA.
In addition to the technical issues discussed above, NRC will provide information and assistance to the SCNRS staff in the use and management of technical assistance contractors by NRC to perform technical reviews and 16
related audit calculations, including the use of NRC developed computer codes.
A senior technical SCNRS manager will study NRC management practices in the development of regulatory research needs and priorities, familiarization with computer codes used by NRC to conduct audit evaluations, and also in utilizing technical assistance contracts.
Ukraine 4.
Joint Inspection of Ukrainian Nuclear Powerolants for Assessment and Development of Inspection Procedures of SCNRS Project
Description:
The objective of this project is for the NRC, through participation in joint team inspections with the Ukrainians, to assess and provide recommendations for improvements to Ukrainian nuclear powerplant inspection practices.
Accomplishments:
r During the period October 3-22, 1992, the NRC participated in tht preparation -
for, conduct of, and documentation of a team inspection with the Ukrainian SCNRS at the Khmelnitsky nuclear powerplant. The purpose of.this trip was to assess SCNRS inspection practices and identify areas which may need increased inspection emphasis, and to identify inspection techniques and procedures which may be used to enhance team and individual inspector effectiveness.
The NRC representatives met both with SCNRS managers in their national headquarters in Kiev and with SCNRS inspectors at the Khmelnitsky nucle'ar powerplant. This effort provided a foundation for subsequent activities under Ukraine 4 and Ukraine 5.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The NRC team report will serve as a basis for Ukraine 5, Development of Ukrainian Nuclear Powerplant Inspection Activities Based on the Results of Joint Inspections.
Under this Ukrainian priority, the NRC agreed to a visit to Ukraine by NRC j
representetives for 1-1/2 months in March 1994 to observe and consult on the implementation of the Ukrainian inspection program.
Ukraine 5.
Development of Ukrainian Nuclear Powerolant Inspection-Activities Based on the Results of Joint Inspections Project
Description:
l The NRC will assist the Ukrainians in applying the information gained from the-joint team inspection efforts under Ukraine 4 in the development and-planning of Ukrainian nuclear powerplant inspection activities. ; Specific recommendations will be offered on the development of a reactor facility l
performance assessment process (similar to the USNRC Systematic Assessment of 1
Licensee Performance (SALP) process) and methods to incorporate'the results into inspection planning.
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Accomplishments:
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Under this priority, one SCNRS representati[SALP, plant performance revie tudied the inspection results j
from Priority 4, the NRC inspection program,to formulate the Ukrainian and NRC's enforcement program, in beginning inspection program.
This was achieved in the United States from January 18 to March 12, 1993.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Four groups of Ukrainian representatives and a group of U.S. representatives may visit the United States and Ukraine respectively in late 1993 or early 1994, in the implementation of inspection program development activities.
The NRC is considering the feasibility of the following:
Two SCNRS team visits from May - July, 1993 for the purpose of familiarization with NRC regional inspection planning and conduct.
A visit by an experienced NRC regional inspector to Ukraine from July to September 1993 for approximately 2 to 2-1/2 months to consult on the development of the Ukraine inspection program.
Four SCNRS team visits from September 1993 through January 1994 to participate in the conduct of the NRC core reactor inspection program at reactor sites.
Ukraine 6.
Proaram on Enforcgment Reablations Project
Description:
The objective of this project is to provide assistance in the development of enforcement legislation to support the ability of the SCNRS to take appropriate enforcement action and of severity levels to characterize the safety and regulatory significance of inspection findings for the purpose of developing enforcement actions.
InitM efforts were begun to provide pertinent legal guidance that may be signit. ant in the development of nuclear legislation, currently being considered by the Ukrainian parliament. Additional practical guidance on NRC enforcement issues will be provided in the future.
Accomplishments:
During the period December 7-17, 1992, the Director of the Office of Enforcement, NRC, met with the Chairman of the SCNRS and its legal and inspection staff in Kiev Ukraine. This was a joint meeting on Ukraine 6 and
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Ukraine 13 (f.egal (Eamewo,rk).
The Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle, NRC, participated in this meeting to discuss issues associated with Ukraine 13.
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The following accomplishments were achieved during the 2-week visit to Kiev:
o SCNRS provided a briefing on the current state of their enforcement program.
o Initial briefings were provided on the NRC enforcement program.
Draft comments were provided for civil penalty provisions in the o
draft law to set up a regulatory agency in Ukraine.
Arranged for weekly conference calls with the Ukrainian o
enforcement contact.
Conducted joint meetings with personnel working on Ukraine 13 o
(Legal Framework), to understand the legal system in Ukraine and provided comments on the draft law.
o Briefed Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission on fundamental considerations in establishing a nuclear regulatory agency.
An obvious significant issue stemming from this effort was the critical need to establish a legal foundation for the SCNRS in Ukraine.
In addition, discussions and training on enforcement systems in U.S., in Ukraine, and on NRC's severity levels were conducted in December 1992, January 1993 and March 1993. Discussions will continue on severity levels as t.he NRC continues to provide assistance in this area. The NRC has provided comments on article 79 of the Draft Ukrainian Nuclear Law.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Near-term future support will consist of weekly telephone calls to address legal questions pertaining to the legislation, translation of NRC enforcement policy, and briefs of Ukrainian personnel visiting the United States.
- Arrangements for future meetings will be developed and, if possible, held in r
g Kiev.
After the implementation of the Ukrainian law on the utilization of atomic energy and during the process of developing regulatory requirements, the NRC will provide assistance in the development of a program on enforcement regulations.
In March 1993, SCNRS representatives came to NRC for further training and discussions. The SCNRS is developing severity levels for their violations as-well as changes to their legislation to be able to issue civil penalties against the license holders. A visit by SCNRS staff to the United States is expected in August and NRC is expected to visit Kiev in October.
Future implementation plans:
o Review the draft national law (Ukrainian Nuclear Law) to determine what changes are needed to permit the SCNRS to take appropriate enforcement action (article 79 of the Draft Ukrainian Nuclear Law).
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i Provide assistance in support of the determination of the enforcement philosophy for the SCNRS-type of sanctions, amounts of penalties, process to impose penalties, appeal etc.
Support a review of existing administrative, civil, and criminal codes o
to see where changes are needed in establishing Ukrainian Nuclear Law.
Assist SCNRS in the development of changes in the codes in coordination o
with other interested parties to achieve the enforcement philosophy of the SCNRS.
Ukraine 7 & 8.
Procram on Physical Protection Reaulation and Proaram on Safeauards and Nonoroliferation Reaulation Under the Safe and Secure Dismantlement program, the United States has offered
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Ukraine an assistance n these areas.
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Ukraine 9.
Proaram on Waste. Spent Fuel, and Nuclear Materials Manaaement Project
Description:
Provide the Ukrainian SCNRS with the information to establish regulatory control over radioactive wastes and spent fuel.
This effort will focus on management and disposal of radioactive waste 'and spent fuel.
The objective of the activity will be to provide the Ukrainian SCNRS with the information it needs to establish regulatory control over radioactive wastes and spent fuel within its territory.
This work will provide an expert review and assessment of the past and current regulatory program in Ukraine, and will then offer specific recommendations to the SCNRS on how best to improve regulatory control. Of particular importance in this work will be identifying measures that can be implemented within the fiscal and technical constraints under which the SCNRS necessarily operates.
Accomplishments:
Work on this project was initiated during the fall of 1992. The principal activities and accomplishments involved efforts necessary to obtain contractor support.
Early in February 1993, initial discussions were held with the Ukrainian SCNRS, including an exchange of views regarding the scope of work to be undertaken by NRC and its contractor and the Ukrainian SCNRS. A meeting to formalize the action plan was held in Washington, D.C. during March 1993.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The following plan, consisting of six tasks, is designed to achieve the program objective. Accomplishing this will require close collaboration between NRC and its contractor on the one hand and SCNRS on the other.
SCNRS input will be particularly important for determining the regulatory environment, regulatory resources, radwaste inventory and effects of past practices in Ukraine. The specific tasks include:
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SCNRS will determine the current statutory and regulatory environment regarding the treatment, storage and control of radioactive waste and l
spent fuel in Ukraine.
o SCNRS will identify existing regulatory resources.
This would consider enabling legislation, if any, current and projected levels of regulatory personnel, availability of outside technical support, technical and administrative strengths, computer facilities, and other physical facilities.
o SCNRS will assess effects of past regulatory practice.
This would be a qualitative survey that would address past incidents involving radioactive waste and assessments of how such incidents might have been prevented or mitigated by changes in the regulatory program.
SCNRS will identify and evaluate the current waste and spent fuel o
inventory in Ukraine, including quantities, location, physical and chemical characteristics, condition from a hazards standpoint, organization responsible for managing the waste, and additional qur.tities being generated each year.
o N'tC will develop, in consultation with SCNRS, recommendations for waste management in Ukraine, including regulatory issues that should be addressed, specific regulations needed to address these issues, applicability of analogous IAEA, U.S., or other standards, needed technical staff resources, and required staff training.
These recommendations will be presented to SCNRS.
NRC will deliver computer equipment needed to implement recommendations o
and train SCNRS staff in its use.
The NRC agreed to develop a draft radwaste survey questionnaire and provide computers and software for radwaste inventory.
The SCNRS Scientific and Technical Centre agreed to initiate the radwaste and regulatory survey.
SCNRS and the NRC will jointly develop a statement of work for SCNRS support of the activities above and a draft regulatory questionnaire.
The next meeting is planned for Kiev during May.
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Ukraine 10.
Fire Protection Support Project
Description:
Provide technical assistance for development and review of fire protection inspection methodology and the implementation of this methodology at Ukrainian power reactors.
Accomplishments:
Funds have not yet been made available to support this project.
In March 1993, the NRC met with the Ukrainian SCNRS to outline implementation plans should funds become available in the near term. The NRC proposed to modify the original SCNRS request to provide technical assistance to SCNRS in their development and review of fire hazard methodology and the implementation of this methodology at Ukrainian power reactors.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
When funded, the NRC will review the fire protection / safe shutdown licensing process for all of the nuclear power plants licensed by the NRC.
The results of this review will be used to develop and deliver a detailed and comprehensive, historical NRC fire protection and safe shutdown licensing analysis document which describes the typical approved U.S. licensing approaches to fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown, the bases for licensing decisions, the regulatory documents under which the NRC reviews were conducted, and the unique approaches which the NRC found acceptable and for which the NRC staff granted licensing exemptions.
Upon completion, the NRC will provide the final document to SCNRS of Ukraine for their review, comment, and use in preparation for future activities.
Approximately 2-3 months after completion of the historical fire protection / safe shutdown licensing document, 2 or 3 SCNRS specialists will come to the United States to interact with NRC and regional fire protection j
specialists for the purposes of learning about NRC fire protection 1
regulations, fire protection and safe shutdown licensing practices and procedures, and NRC fire protection and safe shutdown inspection methodologies. The SCNRS representatives will be briefed on the training sessions and experiences available from various U.S. sources.
The SCNRS representatives will return to Ukraine and consult with SCNRS management.
SCNRS will then propose further training, experiences and regulatory document developmental activities, and pilot fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown licensing and inspection activities to be conducted under Ukraine Priority 10 both in the United States and Ukraine.
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Ukraine 11. Creation of an Incident Response Center in Ukraine Project
Description:
Provide assistance in developing an Incident Response i
Center and essential support capabilities in Ukraine.
Accomplishments:
Funds have not yet been made available to support this project.
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A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held on March 11, 1993.
It was agreed that an initial working group meeting will be held in the U.S. once funding is formalized.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Once funding becomes available, two major steps.are envisioned.
The first would be to develop general response concepts with the State Committee for Emergency Preparedness, including identifying the role of SCNRS and agreements with other organizations. The second step involves the development of the necessary support and communications to complete the system in a phased approach for adequate testing at each phase.
Initially, development will begin with Zaporozhye and SCNRS Headquarters and then progress concurrently at nuclear powerplant sites and SCNRS Headquarters.
Until funding becomes available, the NRC plans to provide planning and related documents for translation in Ukraine and the SCNRS intends to translate and provide similar documents to NRC.
In addition, the NRC will exchange questions and answers with SCNRS while awaiting formal funding.
If funds are available in fall 1993, the first SCNRS team would visit NRC in about November 1993 to develop plans for the first phase.
Ukraine 12. Proaram on Developino an Incident Reportina System Project
Description:
Develop an operating experience closed loop feedback system for the improvement of nuclear power plant safety.
Accomplishments:
Funds have not yet been made available to support this project.
A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held on March 11, 1993, to begin formulating implementation plans.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Once funding becomes available, systems, standards, and methods for the reporting, collection, analysis, and evaluation of operating experience, utilization of results in probabilistic safety assessment, and feedback to power plants will be developed.
The first priority will be the reporting and collection of information. This 1
aspect will be to provide electronic means of communication, collection, storage, and analysis of data.
It is anticipated that questions and answers of both SCNRS and NRC will be periodically exchanged beginning in the spring of 1993 in preparation for a fall 1993 meeting. During the fall 1993 meeting, the NRC will identify specific information needs and propose information systems.
It is anticipated that information systems will be needed for:
(1) component system reliability and failure modes; (2) event descriptions and sequences; and (3) human performance. Use of international information will also be considered.
It is anticipated that training of Ukrainian specialists will begin in the winter of 1993.
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Ukraine 1 aram on the Creation of a Leoal Framework Project
Description:
Provide assistance in developing a le 1 basis and in drafting legislation to establish the legal framework for e SCNRS.
The NRC's Office of General Counsel will provide assista ce to the Ukrainian SCNRS in developing a legal basis for its regulatory a hority and in drafting legislation to establish the legal foundation for the tate Committee.
Specific objectives are:
Develop a national law which provides a lega framework for SCNRS o
jurisdiction over entities to be regulated nd provides SCNRS with the authority to accomplish its mission.
Develop supplemental national laws for pecific areas related to nuclear o
regulation.
Develop a computer system to facili te the rapid access of Ukrainian o
legal material and relevant intern ional legal information.
Accomplishments:
During the period December 7-17, 199, the Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle, NRC met ith the Chairman of the SCNRS and its legal and inspection staff in Kie, Ukraine.
This was a joint meeting on Ukraine 6 and 13.
The Director the Office of Enforcement, NRC, participated in this meeting to discuss issues associated with Ukraine 6.
The SCNRS provided detailed d'scussions on the current status of the Ukraine legal system, current legal asis of the SCNRS, the status of the draft law and the relationship betwee SCNRS and other Ukrainian ministries and committees.
Specific stat tory concepts and provisions were reviewed.
While in Kiev, Ukraine, RC representatives met with and briefed a Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissio on fundamental requirements for a regulatory agency.
NRC and SCNRS points f contact have been identified and a schedule of weekly phone calls establis ed to exchange information regarding ongoing activities.
In March 1993, rep esentatives of the SCNRS came to NRC for further training and discussions o the draf t nuclear law.
Projected Sche le and Plans:
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An NRC legal epresentative intends to visit Kiev in "b r 2 = after the Parliament p ovides its comments on the draft law.
The current initiatives
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are as foll ws: Alevelop the regulatory philosophy and mission of the SCNRS; review the draft national law and provide comments and assistance in developin the law's provisions; and assist in further revisions to the national aw after the first reading in the Ukrainian Parliament.
In Aug t, SCNRS legal representatives may come to the United States for train g on NRC's legal program.
In this regard, consideration is being given to as ignment of a SCNRS legal specialist to the U.S. for training within the 24
Ukraine 13.
Procram on the creation of a Leaal Framework Project
Description:
Provide assistance in developing a legal basis and in drafting legislation to establish the legal framework for the SCNRS.
The NRC's Office of the General Counsel will provide assistance to the Ukrainian SCNRS in developing a legal basis for its regulatory authority and provide comments on legislation to establish the legal foundation for the State Committee.
Specific objectives are:
o Develop a national law which provides a legal framework for SCNRS jurisdiction over entities to be regulated and provides SCNRS with the autnority to accomplish its mission.
o Develop supplemental national laws for specific areas related to nuclear regulation.
to Develop a computer system to facilitate the rapid access M o
Ukrainian legal material and relevant international legal information.
Accomplishments:
During the period December 7-17,
- 1992, the Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle, NRC met with the Chairman of the SCNRS and its legal and inspection staff in Kiev, Ukraine.
This was a joint meeting on Ukraine 6 and 13.
The Director of the Office of Enforcement, NRC, participated in this meeting to discuss issues associated with Ukraine 6.
The SCNRS provided detailed discussions on the current status of the Ukraine legal system, current legal basis of the SCNRS, the status of the draft law and the relationship between SCNRS and other Ukrainian ministries and committees.
Specific statutory concepts and provisions were reviewed.
The NRC representatives provided discussions and training on the legislative and regulatory system in the U.S.,
the legal basis of the NRC and the process for developing regulatory requirements and for licensing nuclear facilities and the possession and use of nuclear material in the U.S.
While in Kiev, Ukraine, NRC representatives met with and briefed the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission on fundamental requirements for a regulatory agency.
NRC and SCNRS points of contact have been identified and a schedule of weekly phone calls established to exchange information regarding ongoing activities.
In March 1993, representatives of the SCNRS came to NRC for further training on NRC legal processes and procedures and discussions on the draft Ukrainian national law establishing the legal framework for the SCNRS.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
An NRC legal representative intends to visit Kiev in the fall of 1993 after the Ukrainian Parliament provides its comments on the draft law.
The current initiatives are as follows:
Develop the regulatory philosophy and mission of the SCNRS; review the draft national law and provide comments and assistance in developing the law's provisions; and provide comments and assistance in developing further revisions to the national law after the first reading in the Ukrainian Parliament.
In August, 1993 an SCNRS legal representative is scheduled to come to the United States for training on NRC's legal program.
In this regard, the SCNRS legal specialist will be assigned for training within the NRC Office of General Counsel for'approximately one month.
This training will be coordinated with training activities conducted for a licensing specialist under Ukrainian priority 3.1 (Licensing of Nuclear Powerplants) and with training activities conducted for an inspector / engineer assigned to enforcement duties under Ukrainian priority 6 (Program on Enforcement Regulations).
Assistance will be provided to SCNRS in developing the regulatory philosophy for supplemental
- laws, in reviewing the relevant administrative laws and codes and in the SCNRS drafting appropriate statutory language in coordination with other appropriate Ukrainian organizations and ministries.
In addition, SCNRS plans to identify legal material relevant to nuclear materials and facilities and to construct a computer data base for legal materials.
NRC will assist by providing necessary computer hardware and software.
NRC Office of General Counsel for approximately one ionth. This training will be coordinated with training activities conducted.or a licensing specialist under Ukrainian priority 3.1 (Licensing of Nucl r Powerplants) and with training activities.Jnducted for an inspector engineer assigned to enforcement duties under Ukrainian priority (Program on Enforcement Regulations).
Assistance will be provided to SCNRS i developing the regulatory philosophy for the supplemental laws, in reviewi g the relevant administrative laws and codes and in drafting appropriate 1 guage in coordination with other appropriate organizations and mini ries.
In addition, SCNRS plans to ide ify legal material relevant to nuclear materials and facilities and t construct a computer data base for legal materials.
Ukraine 14. Proaram for the Development of Research Sucoort for Reaulatory Activities (Phase 1)
Project
Description:
Development of research support for regulatory activities.
Accomplishments:
Funds have not yet been made available to support this project.
A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held in March 1993 to begin formulating implementation plans.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The initial phase of this project will begin with Ukraine Priority 3.2.
During this period, a senior technical manager from SCNRS will develop, in conjunction with the NRC, future activities to be accomplished under this priority.
Ukraine 15. Proaram for Reaulatina Radioactive Sources Utilized in Industry and Medicine Project
Description:
The objective of this program is to assist the Ukrainian SCNRS in developing an appropriate regulatory program for the use of radioactive sources within its territory. This work will include a review of the extent of use of radioactive sources used in industry and medicine, an assessment of the past and current regulatory program for such sources and development of recommendations for an efficient and effective regulatory program to control such sources, taking into account the resources available to operate the program.
Accomplishments:
Funds have not yet been made available to support this project.
25
A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held in March 1993 to begin formulating implementation plans.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
The following plan is a preliminary one aimed at achievement of the program objective.
It assumes that necessary funding will be provided.
- However, certain preliminary steps will be taken in advance.
Priority 15 tasks include the following:
o SCNRS will determine the current statutory and regulatory environment regarding the use of radioactive sources in Ukraine. This would include identifying responsible government agencies; determining how they are organized and interact; determining what laws, policies, regulations, guides and standards exist and the extent to which they are applied; and specific regulatory concerns, o
SCNRS will identify existing regulatory resources, such as current and projected levels of regulatory personnel, technical and administrative resources, availability of outside technical support, computer facilities and other physical facilities, such as analytical laboratories.
o SCNRS will assess the current extent of use of radioactive sources within Ukraine, including the types, size and geographical distribution of practices as well as projections of future practices.
NRC will develop, in consultation with SCNRS and considering the above o
factors, recommendations for an appropriate regulatory program to control the use of such sources.
Recognizing the limitations noted above, several near-term activities have been identified:
The NRC intends to develop a preliminary questionnaire to gain an o
initial understanding of the regulatory framework and use of radioactive sources in Ukraine.
The NRC plans to develop a detailed questionnaire to obtain additional o
information on the regulatory framework and use of radioactive sources in Ukraine.
NRC plans to provide copies of current laws, regulations, and standards o
governing use of radioactive sources. Also, SCNRS will provide information identifying appropriate organizations and their areas of responsibility, SCNRS and NRC plan to meet in Ukraine in the fall to review project o
status and prepare a more detailed implementation plan.
26
Ukraine 16. Proaram on the Creation of a Competent Oraan of Ukraine and of Reaulations Governina the Transportation of Radioactive Materials Project
Description:
Provide Ukrainian SCNRS the information it needs to establish regulatory control over the transportation of radioactive material, and to provide technical assistance to facilitate implementation of this regulatory program.
Accomplishments:
Funds have not yet been made available to support this project.
A preliminary meeting with SCNRS management was held in March 1993 to begin formulating implementation plans.
Projected Schedule and Plans:
Ukraine does not have its own system for regulating the transportation of radioactive materials, but rather relies on the system developed by the FSU.
This initiative would assist Ukraine in developing its own regulatory system for transportation, and in developing technical resources to replace those that are no longer available to Ukraine since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Because of the lack of technical resources, and the complexities involved in creatir.g a regulatory system for transportation, the Ukrainian SCNRS has suggested that the initiative be undertaken in a staged approach over a 2-year period.
The Ukrainian SCNRS stressed that one of their top priorities is the training of personnel to enable them to evaluate independently the safety of radioactive material shipping containers. Although the program would not formally start until funding becomes available, the NRC and the Ukrainian SCNRS agreed that it would be desirable to have a Ukrainian designee attend a 2-week training course on radioactive material shipping containers as soon as practicable.
The next course is being given in California in August 1993.
In addition, the parties agreed that the designee should be assigned to the NRC for a minimum of 2 months to observe the NRC's regulatory program for transportation.
It is anticipated that a detailed statement of work would be completed by 1993. The statement of work would be based on the results of a questionnaire compiled by staff to determine the present status and transportation needs, on feedback from the Ukrainian designee assigned to the NRC, and on bilateral meetings between the NRC and Ukrainian SCNRS.
No dates or times were set for the bilateral meetings.
During the meeting the NRC determined that the following may be helpful until funding can be made available:
The NRC intends to submit a questionnaire to the Ukrainian SCNRS on this o
topic.
The questionnaire would be used to help define the existing status of the Ukrainian regulatory system for transportation, organizational responsibilities and resources, and to determine quantity, type and form of radioactive materials being shipped. The Ukrainian SCNRS plans to respond to the NRC questionnaire.
27
The Ukrainian SCNRS will make preparations for a designee to attend the o
two week training course on radioactive material shipping containers and arrange for the designee to be assigned to the NRC for a two month period to observe NRC's transportation program.
In addition, the NRC provided the Ukrainian SCNRS with training schedules for its Technical Training Center and for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) training course on radioactive material shipping containers.
Further, pending funding decisions, the NRC has reserved two slots in the August 1993 LLNL course for Ukrainian participants.
NRC staff would provide information on computer codes used to analyze o
shipping containers, appropriate NRC regulatory guides, the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and Department of Transportation on the transportation of radioactive materials, and NRC's policy statement on responding to transportation incidents involving radioactive materials.
V.
U.S. INITIATIVES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND'THE BALTICS DOE ACTIVITIES A.
REGIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT DOE began its assistance program for Eastern Europe in 1991 as part of the ongoing AID Regional Energy Efficiency Project (REEP) that seeks to promote more efficient, environmentally sound energy use, both nuclear and non-nuclear, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
As part of this project, DOE was allocated $2.4 million in FY 1991 funds for nuclear assistance and assigned the task of working with the IAEA to develop and manage a program to upgrade nuclear reactor safety in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), Hungary, and Bulgaria.
Under this program, DOE, in coordination with AID and the IAEA, established a series of projects designed to initiate nuclear assistance in Eastern Europe.
The limited funding required implementation of programs that would provide beneficial assistance to a broad audience while applying projects to specific needs where possible. The following programs have been initiated and are underway:
1.
Plant Transient Analyzer: BNL developed a project to provide the Bulgarians the ability to model and analyze operational transients for the VVER-440/230 nuclear reactors. The program consists of the acquisition of computer hardware (3 computer workstations), installation and startup of the plant modelling system and participant workshops. The goal was to provide the Bulgarians a better understanding of plant operations under various transient conditions that can be translated into improved operational and emergency procedures.
2.
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) Training Programs: ANL conducted seven workshops and expert missions on various aspects of nuclear powerplant safety in Eastern Europe. Workshops were held at specific reactor' plant sites or at central locations through Eastern Europe. The workshops 28
focused on safety in operations, application of probabilistic risk assessment techniques, and prevention and management of accidents.
3.
EPRI Advanced Containment Experiments (ACE) Consortium: DOE is sponsoring CSFR and Bulgaria in the ACE' program to provide the participants up-to-date research results in areas such as assessment of filtration systems, radioactive iodine behavior in an accident environment, and interaction of molten core materials with concrete.
This program provides these countries a better understanding of accident analysis techniques and a fundamental basis for containment designs and implementation.
4.
DOE, in coordination with the IAEA, is implementing several nuclear assistance programs that utilize U.S. industry to supplement regional and national projects that are part of IAEA's regular program of technical assistance and cooperation for 1991-1992 and that have been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, as follows:
Strengthen the technical capability of organizations operating a.
nuclear powerplants in Eastern Europe through the transfer of new methods, techniques, and procedures in the field of plant maintenance and service activities, thus helping to improve the safety, reliability and economic operation of nuclear powerplants.
b.
Provide Bulgaria the expertise to establish a systematic in-service inspection program as part of a Nuclear Powerplant Quality Assurance program and to develop the in-service inspection capabilities, including specialized staff and equipment.
Review the site and seismic safety aspects of the Kozloduy nuclear c.
powerplant and advise on the measures to be taken to improve shortcomings.
d.
Provide the IAEA Division of Nuclear Safety with a cost-free expert to provide coordination, technical evaluation, and to assist with the implementation of U.S. nuclear safety assistance projects related to Soviet-designed reactors.
5.
Fellowship Program: DOE is coordinating with the IAEA and the U.S.
National Research Council to invite Eastern European nationals to the United States for extended visits to U.S. facilities and sites for safety training on specific needs.
The 1992 follow-on program for Eastern Europe and the Baltics is closely modeled after the Lisbon Initiative elements for improving safety to ensure a consistent approach is maintained for all U.S. assistance programs involving Soviet-designed reactors. DOE has been allocated $2.85 million under the FY 1992 REEP, which now includes Lithuania as a recipient under Eastern European assistance funds.
In September 1992, AID sponsored an Eastern European nuclear assistance program workshop in Washington, D.C., which was attended by representatives of each country with nuclear power programs. The workshop provided the opportunity for DOE (as well as others) to discuss the scope of the 1992 29
program of assistance and to receive inputs from each participating country regarding their perceived needs for nuclear assistance.
DOE is nearing completion on procurement actions necessary to select U.S.
industry expertise to provide assistance to Eastern European countries in the areas of:
1.
Operational Safety Imorovements to correct Eastern European nuclear safety culture deficiencies that affect all types of nuclear plants and the basic nuclear power infrastructure, in order to reduce near-term risks and to support an acceptable long-term nuclear power program.
2.
Interim Kev Risk Reduction Actions for the highest risk plants (RBMKs and VVER 440/230s) to reduce the hazard from these plants during their remaining lifetime.
Plant upgrades that could encourage plant operations beyond the next few years should not be taken unless it becomes clear that the country cannot limit plant lifetime.
3.
Uparade of the Better Plants, the VVER 1000s and 440/213s, as necessary based on safety analyses. This may include assessment of upgrades needed for VVER 1000s under construction.
Known safety problems that have a significant impact on safety and are amenable to effective interim corrective actions should be addressed in the near term to reduce the risk from these plants.
Given the relatively limited funds available for nuclear safety assistance to Eastern Europe, the U.S. role will primarily be to participate in and fund operational safety improvements (i.e. emergency operating instructions and training, additional analytical capability, etc.); the up front planning and analysis work such as project feasibility studies; cost and schedule analysis; and conceptual design work that will guide the specific projects that may be funded by other financial institutions such as the World Bank and the European
/
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Projectjfdefinition will take into account assistance that has been requested by the Eastern European countries possessing the nuclear powerplants.
NRC ACTIVITIES A.
EASTERN EUROPEAN PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
PROJECT ONE: TRAINING ON REGULATORY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES ADDRESSED BY NRC.
Familiarization with NRC procedures, requirements, and documentation. Work with NRC staff on ongoing NRC programs of interest to recipient countries.
1 Separate assignments cover a spectrum of regulatory issues.
New topics will be identified at periodic intervals, and new recipient country staff will be accepted by NRC.
30 H
i
PROJECT TWO:
TRAINING COURSES AT NRC'S TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER (TTC)
Participants from recipient country regulatory bodies attend courses offered by NRC's TTC in Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the NRC staff and people from other countries.
Recipients can select courses of interest to them from a course syllabus prepared annually by TTC staff.
The first course attended by Eastern European participants was a 1-week workshop held in August 1992 on the conduct of inspections.
New topics will be identified at periodic intervals, and new recipient country staff will be accepted by NRC.
PROJECT THREE:
INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEETINGS Short-term (less than one month) reciprocal visits / discussions with NRC staff by small teams of regulatory personnel on a range of regulatory and safety issues proposed by the recipient countries.
Familiarization visits to U.S.
nuclear facilities.
PROJECT FOUR:
INTERNATIONAL PIPING INTEGRITY RESEARCH GROUP (IPIRG-2)
Participation by regulatory staff of recipient countries in NRC-led international consortium of government and industrial entities formed for conducting large-scale pipe fracture experiments under realistic condit. ions and developing and experimentally validating methods for predicting the fracture behavior of cracked nuclear reactor piping under various conditions.
Research is performed by a U.S. contractor.
Participants are provided with the most up-to-date fracture analysis tools (computer codes) available.
Workshop meetings to exchange and discuss results are incorporated.
PROJECT FIVE: SEVERE ACCIDENT RESEARCH PROGRAM Participation by recipient country regulatory staff in NRC-led international cooperation program on severe accident research.
Participants will contribute their applications of NRC developed computer codes and other nuclear safety methodology to their nuclear installations, and make the results available to the NRC.
Program elements include, among others, the following analyses:
core melt progression; fuel-coolant interaction; fission product behavior; core-concrete interactions.
Participants gain access to all relevant computer codes and are assisted in using them, i
PROJECT SIX:
INTERNATIONAL THERMAL-HYORAULIC CODE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM Participation by regulatory staff of recipient countries in a collaborative international effort on NRC's thermal hydraulic codes (RELAP 5/ MOD.2 and MOD 3).
Participants share experience on code errors and inadequacies, and they cooperate in resolving deficiencies and maintaining internationally recognized thermal hydraulic codes.
Participants also share experience on full scale powerplant safety-related analyses performed using these codes.
31
~
O PROJECT SEVEN: TEMELIN SAFETY REVIEW Advise the Czech regulators on how to perform a safety review of the Temelin nuclear powerplant in accordance with NRC procedures and requirements.
The review is aimed at verifying the licensability of the plant, which will be outfitted with a new Westinghouse digital instrumentation and control system and Westinghouse-fabricated fuel.
PROJECT EIGHT:
INSPECTOR TRAINING PROGRAM NRC is initiating an in-depth program of familiarizing Eastern European regulatory inspectors with NRC inspection techniques and methodology.
Under this program senior inspectors and resident inspectors will be brought to the United States to work alongside NRC inspectors for varying lengths of time.
9 32
The Honorable Tom Bevill Chairman l
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations l
U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am pleased to forward to you a copy of the report on U.S. nuclear safety assistance programs for Soviet-designed reactors as requested in House Report 102-555 accompanying the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law No. 102-377).
The Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have i
summarized U.S. bilateral assistance programs that provide technical and financial assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors in the Frmer Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics. The objective of U.S. nuclear safety assistance programs is twofold:
in the near term, to help reduce the likelihood of a serious nuclear accident; in the mid to longer term, to help the countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to strengthen their nuclear safety culture and infrastructure to assure long-term safety.
This report describes the basis and scope of these U.S. assistance programs.
Sincerely, 1
i Hazel R. O' Leary Enclosure cc:
The Honorable John T. Myers Ranking Minority Member ATTACHMENT 2
f IDENTICAL LETTER T0:
Senator J. Bennett Johnston cc: Senator Mark 0. Hatfield Chairman Ranking Miniority Member Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations Senator J. Bennett Johnston cc: The Honorable Malcolm Wallop Chairman Ranking Minority Member Committee on Energy and Natural Rescuces Rep. George E. Brown, Jr.
cc: The Honorable Robert S. Walker Chairman Ranking Minority Member Committee on Science, Space and Technology Senator Joseph I. Lieberman cc:
The Honorable Alan K. Simpson Chairman Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation Committee on Environment and Public Works 4
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