ML20044D514

Responds to to H Denton Transmitting Constituent Nc Peiffer Raising Concern Re Probability of Recurrence of Feb 1993 break-in at Facility.Forwards NRC Fact Sheet & Executive Summary Addressing Concerns

ML20044D514
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/21/1993
From:	Rathbun D NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
To:	Wofford H SENATE
Shared Package
ML20044D515	List: ML20044D514 ML20044D526 ML20044D535
References
CCS, NUDOCS 9305190241
Download: ML20044D514 (17)

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'o UNITED STATES

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~,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIMilON E

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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,cf April 21, 1993 The Honorable Harris Wofford United States Senator Federal Square Station P.

O.

Box 55 Harrisburg, PA 17108

Dear Senator Wofford:

This replies to your April 5 letter to Mr. Harold Denton which transmitted a letter from your constituent, Nathan C.

Peiffer.

Immediately after the unauthorized entry into the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant site, the NRC staff forined an Independent Investigation Team which conducted a detailed review of the circumstances surrounding that event.

The Independent Investigation Team recently reported to the Commission on its findings and I am enclosing copies of the " Executive Summary" and the " Findings and Conclusions" section excerpted from the Team's report.

In addition, this intrusion event and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City led the Commission to direct its staff to "... reevaluate and, if necessary, update the design basis threat for vehicle intrusion and the use of vehicular bombs..." at NRC-licensed nuclear power plants.

The Commission expects to receive an initial briefing on the reevaluation effort from its staff on April 22 and the effort to be complete by the end of this year.

The 1979 accident at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island plant was the most serious in the history of the commercial nuclear power industry in this country, though the impact on the public health and safety and the environment was minimal.

In the wake of that accident, the Commission required a large number of improvements in both nuclear power plants licensed for operation and those under construction.

Over all, a total of 13,408 separate items were required to be implemented at licensed nuclear power plants around the country.

Currently, 13,322 items have been implemented and only 86 remain open from the implementation standpoint.

These actions and other safety improvements mandated by the Commission in the intervening years, as well as many made by the industry itself, have made nuclear power plants licensed for operation safer today than they were in 1979.

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April 21, 1993 l

The Honorable Harris Wofford United States Senator Federal Square Station 1

P. O.

Box 55 Harrisburg, PA 17108 l

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Dear Senator Wofford:

This replies to your April 5 letter to Mr. Harold Denton which transmitted a letter from your constituent, Nathan C. Peiffer.

Immediately after the unauthorized entry into the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant site, the NRC staff formed an Independent Investigation Team which conducted a detailed review of the circumstances surrounding that event.

The Independent Investigation Team recently reported to the Commission on its findings and I am enclosing copies of the " Executive Summary" and the " Findings and Conclusions" section excerpted from the Team's report.

In addition, this intrusion event and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City led the Commission to direct its j

staff to "... reevaluate and, if necessary, update the design l

basis threat for vehicle intrusion and the use of vehicular bombs..." at NRC-licensed nuclear power plants.

The Commission expects to receive an initial briefing on the reevaluation effort from its staff on April 22 and the effort to be complete by the end of this year.

The 1979 accident at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island plant was the most serious in the history of the commercial nuclear power industry in this country, though the impact on the public health and safety and the environment was minimal.

In the wake of that 1

accident, the Commission required a large number of improvements in both nuclear power plants licensed for operation and those under construction.

Over all, a total of 13,408 separate items were required to be implemented at licensed nuclear power plants around the country.

Currently, 13,322 items have been implemented and only 86 remain open from the implementation standpoint.

These actions and other safety improvements mandated by the Commission in the intervening years, as well as many made by the industry itself, have made nuclear power plants licensed for operation safer today than they were in 1979.

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-2 I hope this information, as well as a copy of a fact sheet about l

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which is also enclosed, will be helpful to you in replying to Mr. Peiffer's letter.

Sincerely, I

\\

Dennis K.

Rathbun, Director i

Office'of Congressional Affairs Enclosures.

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

i The Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating S l

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(TMI-2).

units, one operational (TMI-1) and the other defueled for final decontam 10

'Ihe site, shown in Figure A, is located on an ating license in 1974.

i At 6:53 a.m. on Febmary 7,1993, Eastern Standard Time (EST f

full power and with no unusual plant operations in progress o i

d past the service, an intruder drove a station wagon into the TMI site entrance Nonh Gate guard house traveling in the outbound traffic lane hour (56-64 km/h) (see Figure B). The No h

nt h

i The intruder to present an owner-controlled area (OCA) badge before entering t e s h

continued into the OCA on the outbound traffic lane, across the b Susquehanna River, and was observed to travel through Nonh Gate notified other onsite SPOs, thus prompting othe The vehicle passed through a second stop sign, and continue h f ont l

protected area (PA) Processing Center (PC) building. The v PA Gate 1 of the PC, and turned south traveling an ad f il d l

h allowing the bottom of the gate to pivot upward for the vehicle to pas The PA alarm system generated alarms upon detectmg that the The vehicle l

prompting the security personnel to asses ilding l

19.2 m) inside l

roll-up door constructed of cormgated aluminnm, and came to a fh hicle. The vehicle the Turbine Building. The turbine roll-up door collapsed on top o t e ve El and door came to rest upon striking a secondary system condensa Group, Inc. (SEG) resin liner and pushing it approximately 6 fe fittings and the lid of the resin liner coneniner were damag kh steam line, deing insulation on an auxiliary steam line. The roll auxiliary boiler support equipment and caused minor damage.

l The plant operators in the control room were notified of l

d heard l

operations shift foreman, who witnessed the vehicle travel th lso alened by an the vehicle breach the PA gate and the nubine r l

i t ol room responded by implementing emergency res

)

Executive Summary xv NUREG-1485

1. -

itoring the continued operation of d

performing required notifications, and maintaining an mon TMI procedures.

the plant at full power in accordance with rvene at predesignated vital i

The security staff responded by posting security personnel to n id of offsite responders conducting an riving on site, the U.S. Army explosives areas, confirming vital area integrity, and with the a nd noted a suspicious bag and material f

assessment and searching for the intruder. A ter ar it entered the vehicle and condu il ordnance disposal (EOD) unit surveyed the veh c e a within the vehicle. Shonly thereafter, the EOD un d intruder. The intruder was located preliminary search for explosive devices. During security personnel found and apprehended the unarme i ne the bottom of the Turbine Building in a sma offered no resistance. The intruder was initially quest o d from the Turbine Police, then escorted off site in custody. The vehicle was remo fh i that no explosives were Building, and the EOD unit completed a detaile d t d observation f ility.

and treatment in a Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ac present.

ram following the When the licensee began implementing the emergency respo ergency responsibili-operations shift supervisor's classification of th d

These orgamzations responded by ties. The licensee also notified the Commonwea C

and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NR ).

activated its emergency response I

l d security issues which restricted i

activating their respective response facilities. The l censee orgamration in a limited manner because the event invo ve ch as the Technical Suppon site access, precluded the use of predesigna from notifying and i

il staffing the emergency response organi7mti t which resulted in the organizations.

staffmg of selected positions within the emergency response b within the Upon visually inspecting plant equipment, verifying p fi technical specification license criteria, and con r tion Program, the NRC I

i On February 7,1993, in conformance with tigation team (IIT) be i

included members with a broa i

established to investigate the event (Appendix A s t e l nning, plant systems and and defining the scope of the team's charter luded an industry consultant, two d one observer from the NRC i

operations, and criminal investigation. 'Ibe team nc mine what happened, and make i

observers from the Commonwealth of Penns d

l appropriate findings and conclusions. This repon oc Section 1 is a narrative of the event.

NUREG-1485 xvi Executive Summary

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The Section 2 describes the facility, systems, a se functions.

i nt and Section 3 describes the human factors considerations in imple l d from integrating programs in response to the event including complications whi the security event response, the emergency plan, and support facility.

h Section 4 is a mmmary of precursors and related experience February 7,1993, event.

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ent, Section 5 is a summary of the regulatory aspects of the acti including regulatory criteria; licensee obligations; and the NRC's assessment processes.

d Section 6 addresses the safety significance of the event and conclusions.

Appendix B is Appendix A is a copy of the team's charter for the investigatio i

and previous a description of the team's activities including a list of interviews, investigations performed by IITs.

Facts and data in this report are current as of March 29,1993.

In summary the team concluded the following:

The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety mimmal safety significance.

i Whether the intruder acted at random or to obtain attent 7, 1993.

sufficient information to establish a motive for his actions on Fe Maimmining power operations was an appropriate decision f h

The security force responded appropriately to the spe intruder.

i There were conflicts between operations, emergency i

that resulted from limited key card access, the lock ng o t e and personal safety concerns.

i he The licensee focused on re-establishing the security l

d rocedures to intruder threat. TMI management departed from the E-P an an Executive Summary xvii NUREG-1485

ider the possibility of address the immediately known conditions and did not fully consresp radiological sabotage which could warrant full scope emergency ff response The NRC focused its response on security dil ical o

sabotage.

k s that also Previous TMI events, drill critique.s, and other reports ident were evident during the Febntary 7,1993, event.

i system The NRC requirements for establishing and maintaining a p and as used during the security program licensing process ehicle reduced the amount f

vehicle to breach a PA barrier. In this event, the d

luating The NRC's security inspection program was not effective in the types of challenges demonstrated by this event.

d The decision to maintain stable, steady-state reactor ope 1202-13);

with an established emergency procedure (EPnot c priate in all security event conditions covered by the GPUN procedure.

d nts The need to deviate from the security and emergency pla However, compen-may have been appropriate during the February 7,1993, event.50 satory alternatives were not considered and the use of 10 CFR not properly implemented.

ibited the The event exhibited numerous issues which delayed co necessary flow of information.

i NUREG-1485 xviii Executive Summary

6 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The results or tne team's review follow in numbered sections which list t selected supportive findings, and conclusions.

l 6.1 Safety Significance of the Event i

Finding The event involved an intmder who challenged the TMI-1 security barr d

arsi dismpted nonnal site operations on Febmary 7,1993. The unarme only the PA and did not breach a VA boundary.

Conclusion The event resulted in no actual adverse reactor safety consequenc safety significance.

6.2 Intruder Background and Threat Characterization Conclusion Whether the intruder acted at random or to obtain attention, the IIT information to establish a motive for his actions on February 7,1993.

i 6.3 Continued Plant Operation Findings Before the event, the reactor was stable and operating at full rate emergency systems were out of service. The operating crew s

plant procedures and technical specification requirements.

Control room operators appropriately focused on monitoring plant conditions to detect plant parameter trends while t the Turbine Building.

The reactor systems, emergency safety features, and balance-tion equipment were not challenged.

Section 6 6-1 NUREG-1485

L-l If required, the reactor could have been shut down and coolet room.

I Conclusion i,

Maintaining power operations was an appropriate decision for this event.

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6.4 Site Security Response 6

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Findings j

Security hardware systems at the time of the intrusion were funcl compliance with NRC regulations and licensee procedures.

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l The security shift was staffed in compliance w

-i responders outside the PA may not meer the requirements for imme capability.

Security personnel were well motivated and aggressive in ispoiwiing The PA fence and associated detection and nece<< ment system security access restrictions functioned as designed during the event.

l The response to guard VAs was consistent with approved proc}

l Selected officers recently received specialized tactical training th!

conductmg search-and-clear operations and in controlling the intru

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Conclusion e==d by the The security force responded appropriately to the specific challenge r

intruder.

r 6.5 Operations, Emergency Response, and Security Interface i

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i, Findings The concern for personal safety dictated actions by the control roo t

Operations Coordinamr.

The perceived threat to personnel prompted the operationf ately lock the fire doors which isolated the control toom from I

NUREG-1485 i

6-2 i

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equipment needed to fully implement the emergency response orgamzation. This action resulted in no clear safety benefit to protect control room staff.

l Use of double-cylinder dead-bolt locks to secure normally occupied areas could be a l

safety hazard to personnel.

i The computer command procedure of reducing the number of key cards that would open VA doors reduced the possibility of an intruder entering a VA but resulted in i

only one member of the onshift operations crew maintaining a valid key card to er.ter the VA. Although the control room personnel and other selected crew members 1

possessed VA keys, they were isolated during the event.

i Conclusion l

There were conflicts between operations, emergency response, and security actions that i

resulted from limited key card access, the locking cf the control room fire doors and personal safety concerns.

6.6 Emergency Response i

6.6.1 Licensee Response Mndings Information on the event was quickly relayed to the control room. The event was l

appropriately classified as a Site Area Emergency, and the Emergency Director l

position was established.

i The shift supervisor was initially distracted from maing the event classification and e

emergency declaration by personal safety concerns and the need to confer with TMI l

management.

TMI-1 managers promptly reponed to the site and assumed control.

During the event, the Egmgewy Director was located at the CAS, which had the effect of relocating the Egmgesy Control Center from the preselected and appropri-ately equipped control room area to the service building. This action created confu-sion and complicated the implementation of the emergency response plan.

Emergency notification could not be perfortned in the normal manner, the alternate j

method was cumbersome and time ennanning, and the people performing it were not j

trained. This licensee resolved this pmblem by using alternate methods of makmg offsite notifications and callours.

6-3 Section 6 NUREG-1485 l

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During the first hour of the event, the licensee did not consider staffing emergency facilities at normal or altemate locations. The licensee required approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to establish and staff selected altemate emergency facilities.

The licensee appropriately ended the Site Area Emergency event upon locating the l

intmder, verifying the status of equipment, and searching site areas.

l Conclusion The licensee focused on re-establishing the security of the facility and eliminating the l

intmder threat. TMI management departed from the E-Plan and procedures to address the i

inunediately known conditions and did not fully consider the possibility of radiological j

I sabotage which could warrant full scope emergency response capabilities.

r 6.6.2 NRC Response i

Findings The NRC staff on duty at the Operation Center and Region I received the event notification, promptly evaluated it, and notified NRC semor managers.

l The NRC senior managers promptly evaluated the event and activated the Region I j

and Headquarters response centers.

f The NRC appropriately responded to the site.

The NRC kept other Federal agencies and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania authorities informed of the status of the event.

The protective measures team of the Region I Incident Response Center was not fully i

staffed.

'Ihe NRC Headquarters Operations Center was not staffed with reactor safety or protective menents teams.

r The NRC did not follow established procedures in calling out to its emergency response personnel.

1 Conclusion The NRC focused its response on security concerns auf did not fully staff response facilities l

in preparadon to address the broader implications of any radiological sabotage.

j Section 6 64 NUREG-1485 1

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i 6.7 Precursors Findings As a result of an intrusion in 1976, the licensee obtained information indicating the difficulty of conducting an adequate search for an intruder.

The circumstances of an intrusion in 1980 demonstrated weaknesses in intercepting l

vehicles which have passed by the North Gate and in searching for an intruder.

t Several past drills provided indications of a lack of understanding of the plant staff's role in a security event.

I Difficulties in the command and control of security and operations were found during security events and drills.

Conclusion Previous TM1 events, drill critiques, and other reports identified weaknesses that also were evident during the February 7,1993, event.

6.8 Regulatory Aspects E

6.8.1 Vehicle Entry into Protected Area i

t Findings The performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 73 for establishing and maintaining a physical protection system do not effectively address the use of a vehicle for en the PA in a manner similar to the February 7,1993, event.

PA barrier design specified in 10 CFR Pan 73 is not required to prevent a vehicle j

from entering the PA.

Current NRC licensing reviews and NRC evaluations do not require consideration of {

i vehicle erary into the PA.

The method of entry into the PA significantly affected the security program response strategy toward protecting the VAs and preventmg radiological sabotage.

i The NRC staff has not effectively defined and communicated its expectations for the licensee's security program performance in response to vehicle intrusions.

Section 6 6-5 NUREG-1485

Conclusion The NRC requirements for establishing '.nd maintaining a physical protection system and as used during the security program licensing process do not consider use of a vehicle to breach a PA barrier. In this event, the use of a vehicle reduced the amount of time the security force had to assess and respond to the threat.

6.8.2 Security Inspection Program Findings The NRC had conducted the muumum inspection program for TMI because the facility was assessed with SALP 1 ratings for superior performance in the security area. The current program guidance discourages mspectors from requesting demon-strations of integrated program capabilities for inspection purposes. The types of findings noted as a result of this event may have been more evident if the NRC had conducted performance-based assessments.

The NRC has not performed a performance-based assessment of the security program at TMI since June 1986, at which time the staff evaluated security system hardware but did not evaluate the protection strategy.

The current invion program does not provide for a routine, focused integrated t

review of the performance of the licensee's security program.

Conclusion f

The NRC's security inspection program was not effective in revealing and evaluating the types of challenges demonstrated by this event.

6.8.3 Procedure Guidance on Plant Operation Finding Before GPUN ;cvised emergency procedure EP 1202-13 in 1989, the procedure required an immediate shutdown by tripping the reactor if the mtruder posed a threat to the security of the unit. The revised procedure specifies remnimng at power and maintainmg plant stability unless instability is caused by the intmder, then manelly trip the unit. The licensee per-formed a safety determination and concluded that the procedural change did not require a written safety evaluation to determine if an unreviewed safety question exists.

l 1

NUREG-1485 6-6 Section 6 l

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l Conclusion s

The decision to maintain stable, steady-state reactor operations was in accordance with an i

l established emergency procedure (EP 1202-13); however, this procedure does not contain 1

l qualifying guidance to the operators and may not be appropriate in all security event l

conditions covered by the GPUN procedure.

i 4

i 6.8.4 Deviations from Procedures and License Conditions I

Findings i

The licensee's E-Plan permits the ED to approve and direct deviation from establish j

procedures, equipment operating limits or t~haient specifications without involdng j

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y). As an example, the ED deviated from j

emergency plan implementing proceimos, which are required by the technical j

swifications, when the =Wr. of the initial response emergency organization were directed to stand by at home instead of r===4iag and staffing the emergency -

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ieg++= facilities at their predesignated or a specified alternate location.

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Site managers and Region I pw.um I stated that the licensee invoked 10 CFR j-50.54(x) for the suspension of security measures, it is unclear if this action was I

.yrori iety implemented and if an SRO approved this action before it was imple-l

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mented, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(y). The licensee did not report to the NRCOC j

that it had==ami~t certain security measures in accordance with the provision of-l j

10 CFR 50.54(x).

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l Conclusion 1

l The need to deviate from the security and emergency plan implementing documents may have been.yropriate during the February 7,1993, event. However, compensatory alterna-l l

tives were not considered and the use of 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y) was not properly imple-j l

mented.

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6.9 Communications i

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Findings SPOs i-rvycily used eimhvidc ~=iaraa* near the inauder's vehicle before a j

determination had been made if the vehicle contained an explosive device.

J Security managers did not give guidance on proper comnumications discipline.

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Only certain telephones were specified by procedure to be used for emergency notifications and callbacks, and these telephones were not accessible because the l

control room fire doors were locked.

The individuals making notifications and callbacks were not trained in the procedures they were to follow.

The CAS was used as the Emergency Control Center for this event. The CAS communications capability was not designed to support both emergency preparedness and security functions.

The licensee telephone system had an offhours restriction that did not permit outgoing calls from cenain telephones. This restriction was not completely lifted until 2:30 p.m.

The NRC staff did not have access to ERDS data because of a' telephone line failure at TMI.

i Conclusion The event exhibited numerous issues which delayed communications or inhibited the neces-l l

sary flow ofinformation.

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NUREG-1485 6-8 Section 6 1

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