ML20044D323
| ML20044D323 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1993 |
| From: | Sexton D UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Higdon J NRC |
| References | |
| FRN-58FR21546, FRN-58FR58804, RULE-PR-73 AE81-1-024, AE81-1-23, AE81-1-24, NUDOCS 9305190002 | |
| Download: ML20044D323 (2) | |
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From: Dmik 6cdon
Subject:
Reassesment of Design Basis Threat (DBT)
Reguarding the reassesment of the (OBT) at Nuclear Power Facilities I would like to share my thoughts.
I do believe that more control of vehicle approches to Protected Area Barriers would be benificial and any hardening up in this area would i
serve as a deterrant, But certainly not the solution. Any Dedicated well l
trained adversary or group of sabatuers can gain access to the Protected l
Area at any Nuclear Power Facility. Access by Air (via guided parachute) could easily be achieved with up to 100 lbs. of weaponery and/or Ordinance per intruder. Ground assault by a 3 to 5 man team could very easily cut or scale the P/A fence and place charges on Vital Area Equipment i
in minites.
The point is the human element, (Terrorist) can beat structural Barriers. The (DBT) must always consist of armed intruders (3 or more) inside the P/A reguardless of how they gained access. A planned Nuclear sabotage operation if launched on any Nuclear site would be Catastrophic within minutes of the initial intrusion. Only a dedicated armed and well trained tactical response team (Security) can and will stop the consequense 4
of the intrusion. If something is to be learned from the THI incident, it should be if terrorist, instead of a mental patient, spent 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in the Protected Area of a Nuclear Plant, The entire Eastern Seaboard would be another Cherynoble disaster. The inability to locate, isolate, and evacuate the intruder in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> should be a sign that tactical training and response team numders should be increased instead of decreased.
The (DBT) determins both of these "Crutial" defensive public safety elements.
Thank You for your time, Dwain Sexton
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