ML20044B610
| ML20044B610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/10/1993 |
| From: | Harold Denton NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-93-036, SECY-93-36, NUDOCS 9302120272 | |
| Download: ML20044B610 (7) | |
Text
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POLICY ISSUE February 10, 1993 SECY-93-036 (Informat. ion)
For:
The Commissioners From:
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of International Programs Sub.iect:
REPORT OF CONSULTANTS MEETING ON NUCLEAR SAFETY ASSISTANCE TO EAST EUROPE AND THE FORMER S0VIET UNION, FEBRUARY 1, 1993
Purpose:
To inform the Commission of the results of a meeting of experts called to obtain advice on effective approaches NRC might consider for improving nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union and East Europe. The experts were selected based on their participation in a meeting on the same subject at the American Nuclear Society annual meeting in Chicago, November 1992.
Discussion:
On February 1,1993 the Office of International Programs held a meeting with experts who have had substantial involvement with issues concerning nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and East Europe (EE) for a one day workshop designed to obtain broad and independent views of the international safety assistance being offered to these l
countries. The purpose of the meeting was to help the l
Commission in developing its recommendations to the Executive Branch for future safety assistance strategies.
The Agenda and list of participants are at Attachment 1.
The meeting produced a set of observations and major areas of agreement, as well as a set of recommendations, which are submitted for information. These are at Attachment 2.
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020013 g,7,33 a, genton, os,,ctor Office of International Programs
Contact:
M. B. Congdon, 0IP NOTE:
TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 504-2744 IN 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THE
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DATE OF THIS PAPER DISTRIBUTION:
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U. S. NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS Experts Meeting on NRC Strategies for Nuclear Safety Assistance to East Europe and the former Soviet Union February 1, 1993 AGENDA I.
ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT SITUATION AND OVERVIEW OF CURRENT ASSISTANCE 8:30 AM Welcome, Introduction, and Statement of
Purpose:
How can the safety of nuclear power reactors in East Europe (EE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) be made compatible with western levels in the next decade?
Harold Denton, Director, Office of International Programs 9:00 AM Views of the experts:
Each of the expert participants is invited to give his own assessment of the most pressing safety issues facing the countries of the FSU and East Europe (5 - 10 Minutes Each)
Robert Bari, Brookhaven National Laboratory; Milt Levenson, Retired; Robert J. Budnitz, Future Resources Associates, Inc.,
Gary Vine, Electric Power Research Institute; t
Herbert J. Kouts, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (could not attend);
Edward. A. Warman, Stone and Webster Engineering; W. Reed Johnson, University of Virginia; David Squarer, Westinghouse Corporation 10:00 AM Design-specific technological risks and potential improvements VVER 1000s and VVER 440/213s; VVER 440/230s and RBMKs; Future generation of advanced reactors and construction plans.
II.
THE ENVIRONMENT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY IN EAST EUROPE AND
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THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 11:00 AM Implications of operating environments Russia and Ukraine Experience of Finland and Hungary with VVER 440/213s Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary 12:00 N00N Dr. Selin's Remarks 12:30 LUNCH
4 111.
ARRIVING AT APPROPRIATE NRC STRATEGIES 1:30 PM Risk Reduction Strategies: Approaches offering the best potential for safety improvements.
Safety and the Regulatory Infrastructure; Operational Safety; Backfits; Feedback from Operating Experience; Human Factors; Emergency Response Planning 1:45 PM issue for Discussion:
To what extent should probabilistic safety analysis-type techniques be used to identify cost-effective improvements, or, alternatively, is it more practical in the short run to attack known dominant causes of risk?
2:30 PM Key barriers to be acknowledged and dealt with in order to arrive at effective solutions:
Lack of regulatory authority and independence; Personnel and the problem of safety culture; Economic structure; Competing international incentives and resistance; 3:00 PM Key strategies for NRC to encourage required improvements by the year 2000 Individual training and advice; Transfer of analyses, i
methodologies and inspection philosophy; Support for government regulatory legislation.
3:45 PM Wrap-up and final conclusions.
4:00 PM END f
4 OBSERVATIONS, MAJOR AREAS OF AGREEMENT, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES OF NUCLEAR SAFETY ASSISTANCE TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND EAST EUROPE On February 1,1993 the Office of International Programs of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission convened a meeting of senior U.S. nuclear safety experts who have had substantial involvement with issues concerning nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and East Europe (EE) for a one day workshop designed to obtain broad and independent views regarding international nuclear safety assistance being offered to these countries. The meeting was convened by the Director of the Office of International Programs, Harold Denton, who challenged the experts to consider the question: How can the safety of nuclear power reactors in East Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) be made more compatible with western levels by the year 2000?
A number of themos and areas of agreement emerged from the discussions (recommendations are outlined below). First, there was agreement that a review of the G-24 data indicates a substantial amount of analytical work underway.
This is a good basis for identifying solutions to safety problems at nuclear power plants, but real safety improvements must be imp'. Aented at the plant level. The international community appears to be moving from the first, I
analytical, stage to a second stage of activity, namely stabilization of the current reactors to prevent further decline in their operating condition, accompanied by the start of hardware upgrading.
In this regard it was pointed i
out that recipient countries have made varying degrees of progress in improving reactor safety, and needed now is a plant-specific and country-specific approach to further assistance, since this is the most effective way to make the transition from analysis to hardware.
A second area of agreement was that the G-7 emphasis on 1) improving safety in the best of the Soviet-designed reactors (the VVER 1000s and 440/213s), and 2) stressing the need to shut down the less safe plants (the RBMKs and VVER 440/230s) while providing minimal safety improvements to them, needs to be re-evaluated. There is little evidence that western recommendations to close j
down the less safe plants are being followed.
Instead, it appears increasingly likely that Russia and Lithuania (and possibly Ukraine) will continue to rely on their RBMKs for the indefinite future, and that countries with VVER 440/230s will also continue to operate them.
It therefore makes sense to equip these plants with requisite operational improvements and upgrades to minimize design-basis and severe accidents; the rationale being that no nation can afford the consequences of another severe nuclear reactor accident.
A third area concerned the balance between further safety assessment and implementation of safety improvements. There was broad agreement that it is time to begin the most urgent upgrades as soon as possible, and to demonstrate to the recipients real progress in improving safety.
Further analysis and safety assessment can continue as needed.
But there is a strong perception in the recipient countries that no real assistance, in terms of money and hardware improvements, is forthcoming. They believe that western funds are being spent only on western contractors doing paper studies. Meanwhile many of the nuclear power plants are continuing to degrade as a result of economic dislocations, political and structural problems, and lack of v~
maintenance.
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Fourth, there was widespread agreement that many of the key hardware fixes to the least safe plants, while not trivial, were not necessarily as expensive as has sometimes been claimed. All empha:ized the importance of seeking the most practical and economical solutions to achieve the most safety for the least cost. This involves making use of practical knowledge gained to date from site specific safety reviews and relying in a major way on advice from plant operators and managers, as well as local regulatory officials, rather than relying principally on central design authorities and government officials.
For needed hardware upgrades, local labor and materials can be used.
Fi#th, the issue of the liability of Western contractors for damage occurring 1'
at plants where they have provided assistance must be resolved before hardware installation can start.
Sixth, there was broad agreement that one of the most important aspects of assistance from the United States and the other western cou.itries is to help the recipients help themselves and one another where practical. A number of the countries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, are moving ahead with improvements and are raising their safety levels. The other countries also need to "de-Sovietize" their nuclear power programs and adopt a more independent stance, train their own experts, develop their own quality control programs, and take ownership of their own safety and regulatory programs.
f Competent technical institutions with a variety of capabilities are available at low cost in all of these countries.
This must be a domestic effort in each case, and the United States and the other donor countries can only offer advice and assistance.
Finally, it appeared to the experts that there is no coherent western assistance strategy.
The G-24 data portrays a shotgun approach, with considerable emphasis and overlaps in some areas and lack of emphasis in others.
Objectives, priorities, and an implementation plan need to be developed.
There is little evidence yet of a coordinated, comprehensive 3
technical and financial plan as to what to do where and how to raise the necessary investment funds. There also seems to be a lack of a broader energy strategy.
For example, neither waste management / disposal considerations nor replacement power options for those plants that ought to be shut down appear to be a part of the plan.
I RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
There is a need for the West to move from the analytical phase of its assistance effort to a stabilization phase to prevent further decline in the reactors' operating condition, in which plant-specific improvements are put ir. place with an integrated approach to hardware upgrades, management improvements, and training.
It has been nearly seven years since the Chernobyl accident, and only limited improvements in plant safety have been seen in the former Soviet Union, although there have been some greater improvements in East Furope, i.e., Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria and Lithuania.
2.
The donor countries should revise the einh sis in the G-7 Action Plan R
from providing assistance to the safest <t.<e Soviet-designed reactors
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(the VVER 440/213s and VVER 1000s), to providing substantial assistance also to the least safe. This means higher priority should be given to safety improvements to RBMKs in Russia and Lithuania (and Ukraine unless their Chernobyl RBMK reactors are shut down) and to VVER 440/230s in Russia, Bulgaria, and the Slovak Republic, including hardware upgrades to prevent or mitigate severe accidents.
3.
In these reactors, high priority should be given to improving maintenance. This includes spare parts, and maintenance and programmatic assistance. Assuming ongoing efforts to implement operational improvements are being made, stopping the continuing decline of the material condition of these plants is essential. Maintenance training is equally as important as additional operator training.
4.
Also of high priority is enhanced fire detection, fire fighting capability, and fire prevention.
In most cases this does not involve additional risk analysis and only requires employment of the most economical solutions. Many Soviet-designed reactors, for example, do not even have automatic smoke / fire detectors.
Fire protection involves not only minor hardware upgrades but also getting rid of certain obvious combustible building and insulating materials and increasing the awareness of operational staff through expanded training.
Plant-specific assessments (e.g., walkdowns) to find and correct deficiencies are recommended.
5.
Most agreed there should be provision for additional venting capacity for the RBMK and VVER 440/230 confinement systems through deployment of technology that is readily available. While costly, this upgrade could help minimize the environmental consequences of some major accidents.
6.
It is also important to provide adequate auxiliary feedwater and low pressure emergency core cooling systems for these reactors. Again, the most economical solutions should be sought. Often these can be implemerted without major construction or hardware upgrades simply by working with plant managers to discuss how to achieve redundant, independent diesel generation and feedwater.
In addition, every reactor should be provided with an independent, alternative shut down capability that can be isolated from the main control room.
7.
While fixing what needs to be fixed on these reactors, we should support continuation of safety analyses of these reactors as need?d in the following four areas:
traditional safety analysis, including deterministic analyses, traditional design-basis accident, and safety margins against code requirements; analysis of operations, including normal operations, off-normal operational events, and responses during emergencies; i
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), with early emphasis on level-1 PSA studies of reactor responses to initiating events-through prevention of core damage; and, r
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4 analysis of abnormal events and operational data, with principal e
emphasis on events that might be precursors of more serious events.
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It is also necessary to determine whether the Chernobyl " fixes" for the RBMKs (e.g., faster acting control rods, increased enrichment) have been implemented at all operating RBMKs.
If not, it is crucial that Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania do so on a priority basis, and we should determine whether western assistance could move the process forward.
9.
Additional analysis should also be dedicated to accident prevention methodologies, such as Leak Before Break analysis and detection equipment, which can often lead to iqwovements in maintenance and operation that are more cost effective than major hardware fixes.
10.
Some of the experts stressed instrumentation And control upgrades that could either improve the reliability of reactor protection or better assist the operator in handling off-normal events and accident management.
Others suggested simple seismic upgrades such as adequate anchorage for important equipment.
11.
The United States should use a lead plant concept to concentrate its assistance at one or two sites.
Presently the experts see US assistance spread thinly among various recipients. A lead plant approach would seek to achieve significant safety upgrades at selected sites, and it would set a strong positive example for other plants, as well as improve the atmosphere for accepting our assistance in these countries.
12.
The United States should use the G-24 mechanism primarily for the exchange and coordination of information, and should continue its policy of concentrating on bilateral assistance -- spending as rrany of its scarce resources as possible in the recipient countries, where costs are lower.
I 13.
Energy conservation measures should be employed to use electricity more efficiently and demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of market-based energy pricing in pursuing alternatives to continued operation of the least safe plants.
14.
Appropriate U.S. Government agencies should give serious attention to resolving the critical issue of the legal liability of a donor in order to encourage U.S. companies to participate actively in delivering the i
needed assistance.
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