ML20044A864

Application for Amend to License SNM-1107,requesting Change to Criticality Safety Control Practices at Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility

ML20044A864
Person / Time
Site:	Westinghouse
Issue date:	07/02/1990
From:	Nardi A WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Haughney C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
RS-90-21, NUDOCS 9007160225
Download: ML20044A864 (22)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:f N l Q i Westinghouse Water Reactor Ba ns Electric Corporation Divisions Pr!!sbuth Pennstrama 15230 03M RS 90-21 July 2,1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Charlie Haughney, Chief Fuel Cycle Safety Branch Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Washington, D,C. 20555 F Gentlemen: 1

Subject:

Amendment of License SNM 1107 l The Westinghouse Electric Corporation hereby requests a change to certain nuclear criticality safety control practices at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility. The enclosure and attachments to this letter provide detailed information relating to this request. j i A check for $150, to cover the costs of this application for approval, is enclosed. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at the above address, 1 or by telephone at (412) 374 4652. Sincerely, r l WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION /y A. J. Nardi, Manager Regulatory Services j L I m O' C }lh ' 1h' L

l .c ENCLOSURE TO LETTER RS 90 21 Amendment of License SNM 1107 Docket 701151 Westinghouse requests a change to currently licensed nuclear criticality safety control criteria to enable use of a K., limit (including bias and uncertainty at the 95% confidence level) of 0.98 for the fuel assembly wash tanks located in the final assemb!y fabrication area of the Columbia Facility. The following information is submitted in support of this request:

1., providing a justification for increasing the K., limit from 0.95 to 0.98, at the 95% confidence level, including bias and uncertainties of the calculational-sequence and metholodgy,

2., describing the current administrative and physical controls for the wash tanks, in conjunction with postulated events,

3., providing an itemized table of " contributing causes" and list of contingencies which address each item; and, 4.

Additional pages to SNM 1107, describing controls for the wash tanks under the increased K,n limit of 0.98. This information supports a conclusion that increasing the K,n limit from 0.95 to 0.98, for this particular application, will not compromide the safety of operations involving the wash tanks. Prompt approval will enable Westinghouse to more efficiently control the nuclear criticality safety of this production operation, while continuing to maintain a high level of safety in licensed operations. L l P 4 r,

/ I s. ATTACHMENT 1 l JUSTIFICATION FOR INCREASING THE K.m UMIT i INTRODUCTION Westinghouse currently operates two fuel assembly wash tank systems consisting of three tanks each. Figure 1 provides a generallayout of wash tank system design. Each set of three wash tanks is contained within a 93 inch diameter pit that does not contain water. Both pits have a liner of some 4 inches of concrete, that extends approximately i 20 feet below grade level. The first wash tank is the Detergent Tank; this tank is 20-inches in diameter with a 16 gage stainless steel liner. The central tank contains ultrasonic cleaners and is the first rinse tank; this tank is rectangular in shape,15 x 34 inches, with a 16 gage stainless stee! liner; the ultrasonic cleaning modules are approximately 4 inches square by 12 inches, and are positioned along the left and right sidee of the tank. The third tank is the final rinse, or D.l. Water tank, and has dimensions identical to the first tank. Fuel assemblies are moved from the detergent tank to the first l and final D.I water rinse tanks, consecutively. Each tank has a physical constraint that limits its contents to one assembly; and, procedures are maintained in the fuel assembly t area to require these physical constraints as a condition for operation of the wash tank { system. Fuel assemblies are transported throughout the final assembly fabrication area via a conveyor crane system. Fuel assemblies are connected, and remain connected, to this L system until properly secured in " dry" storage racks designed to provide 12 inches edge-t l to edge separation between assemblies, or, loaded into designated RCC fuel shipping containers. This same transport system is used to load fuel assemblies into the wash I tank system. A fuel assembly remains connected to the conveyor system while in the wash tank system. This prevents movement of assemblies overhead, and eliminates the I potential for inadvertently dropping an assembly into an already loaded tank. Fuel assemblies must meet strict design and tolerance limitations, due to the physical constraints in reactor design. A procedure and engineering specification system has been implemented to assure that these strict design and tolerance requirements are met and documented. All materials for assembly fabrication are purchased in accordance with these procedure and engineering specifications. All materials aie inspected by tnc L Quality Assurance function to verify proper materials for assembly fabrication; this L' includes fuel pellet characteristics such as enrichment, diameter, length, and density. Other material dimensions such as fuel cladding inner and outer diameters are also verified. Inappropriate materials are physically identified and documented. Area OC procedures require that these determinations shall be in writing. Materials that meet the design specifications are transported to the line function for assembly fabrication, by individuals who are independent of both the line function and quality assurance. All

CCOQGCATED PtT COVED / / ^ ASSEWELY h ~N INSPECTION T MANWAYS / C V so e m f F / \\ h N M ss' [ rt et2 Amens 39' e h @S/ pd'""d @U/ / i 'N m Yd Ei %q i [ WASH TANMS / 16 GAGE y I STAtMLESS,! s 4 STEEL /' ,,.9 e-N / c) CONVEYOR SYSTEM PATA l g C I TOP VIEW D g TTI Z a 7 FLOOR ELEVATION h '~ n I / -DETERGENT 1 TANK 4* CONCRETE Z s 1.- O 2 m v + 3l / e o m j i D.I Z MIMSE d TAMK SIDE VIEW '^""

r r 1 material transfers are required to be documented in writing. After at.sembly fabrication, - additional parameters such as assembly (st*, ice pitch are verified to be within tolerance l limits. 4 h is this precise knowledge of the systems to be controlled that justifies the increase in K., control limit, for these specific systems only, from 0.95 to 0.98. p I ) i I -j. t t l l ' t w,-~-.:

p I BEACTIVITY CALGE&]lQtOEDiQD_QkQ91 Reactivity modeling codes used to predict the K., of fuel assemblies moderated and reflected by water have been validated and benchmarked in accordance with ANSI /ANS standard 8.1-1983, " Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors", section 4.3, validation of a calculational method. For the current calculation sequence, Scale Ampex Nitawl, Xsdrnpm and Keno IV, some 80 criticality benchmark cases are modeled. In all 80 cases, excellent K., convergence is obtained from Keno IV. From these calculations, the method Keno IV K., bias and uncertainty at the 95 percent confidence level is determined. In actual K., calculations involving fuel assemblies, the uncertainty is added to the bias and uncertainty from the benchmark. This in turn yields a K., plus bias and all uncertainties at a 95 percent confidence level. The final K.,, equation is given below: Final K.,, = K,,,, + B,,,,n + sqrt{(Ks,,,)* + (Ks,,,,n)'} o where: Final K.,is the calculated K., with bias and all uncertainties included at the 95 percent confidence level, K,,, is the average K, generated from Keno IV, B,,, is the bias associated with the Keno modeling methodology from the benchmark work,~ which is 0.0083, Ks,,,, is the uncertainty on the Keno calculation for a two sided 95 percent confidence level, Ks,,,,is the uncertainty associated with the Keno modeling methodology from the benchmark, which is 0.0018,. Personnel performing calculations are required to have one year of direct relavent experience in reactivity calculations. Reviewers are required to have five years direct experience in reactivity calculations. CALCULATIONAL RESULTS Results of fuel assembly calculations are deplicted in Figures 2 through 4. For these calculations, only the Westinghouse model 17 OFA assembly is used since this is currently the most reactive fuel manufactured at Columbia. Fuel assemblies are modeled as infinite in length with pellet densities at 96.5% of the theorectical density (TD) of UO,. Pellets are typically 95% TD. For conservatism, pellet chamfering and dishing are not considered for these calculations, due to their many varations, in addition, neutron

l FIGURE 2. 17 OFA FUEL ASSEMBLY U-235 STUDY l-Keff +/- 2 SIGMA TREND 0.96 i O O Koff (> D +/ 2 al9mm D o. 0.96 ~t g 0.94 -- ~~ t K I D i l' p,/ i f O .j ! I 0.93 i 4 0.92 O t 0.91 ( 4.6 4.6 4.7 4,8 4.9 6.0 I ENRICHMENT, WElGHT PERCENT i l l

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e t u FIGURE 3. 1 1 1 1 i l l 17 OFA FUEL ASSEMBLY l U-235 STUDY r;L H Kef f+Blas+U ncertainties 3

1 -

1.4 90 0.98 l - FIN AL M ONITOR l O Koff U 1.486 U~ I - 0.97 1 i I f F 1.480 b 4 -- - - ~O i i N [ 0.96 A i i L i l K J M *476 ~'- -+ - + O l l k N i ( j j - 0.95 O t R 1.470 --+ - - * - - t - r - ( 1 i ( - 0.94 1 1 1-466 ~-i t i I 1 1.460 -- O.93 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 ,.y ENRICHMENT, WElGHT PERCENT

1..

'l i i 2 - ' k:) n.l 0.'l!-L :j u,. j :,.., t e

5 $ 1.. t FIGURE 4. 17 OFA 5WT% FUEL REFLECTOR THICKNESS STUDY Keff+Blas+ Uncertainties 1.00 i i i l I -- - - +i 0.96 -- 7 -~--+ i i 1 i i j 7 l I K-j y 0.90 ~ ~ - + I- --h - h - - -- i I i i i l i 0.86 -i- - --- - i - S '- - - N - b } i I i i i 0.80 O 2 4 6 8 to 12 REFLECTOR THICKNESS,1NCHES

i. L poisons, such as ZrB, coating on pellets, are not modeled, since it is possible that an occasional assembly may not be poisoned. Figure 5 provides a typical input deck for a 17 OFA assembly witn a 12-inch water reflector at 5.0 wt% 8"U. Figure 2 provides the_ K, and Ks. Keno calculated values as a function of the 8"U no n enrichment._ A least squares fit curve indicates that there is' reasonable agreement between all data points. At a "U enrichment of 4.96 the best estimate Keno K,n value 8 exceeds 0.95. The decrease in K., from 4.95 to 5.0 8"U enrichments is attributed to the uncertainty in the. actual Keno calculated K., average : Figure 3 indicates the Xsdrnpm and Keno calculated values. The Xsdrnpm " final monitor" or Kw values agree quite well. The K,n values generated from Keno include the bias and 'all uncertainties at the 95 percent confidence level. At a 8"U enrichment of 4.65 the upper bound K,n exceeds 0.95. However, for a 95 percent confidence level, the K,n of a single (8"U enrichment of 5.0) 17 . OFA fuel assembly in water is not expected to exceed 0.968. Figure 4 indicates that the o ' 17 OFA reactivity varies as a function of the reflector thickness. For a reflector thickness L of 3-inches, the 17 OFA assembly reactivity exceeds 0.95. This shows that if a neutron 1 absorber poison plate is to be installed, it is required to be installed within 3-inches of the assembly. ' ' Additional calculations involving 17 OFA fuel, at 8"U enrichments of 4.6 and 5.0, show that regardless of the final K,n being less than or greater than 0.95, loading of two assemblies - in a wash tank is unacceptable (ie. produces K,n greater than 1.0). a o i -i 4 k

y .'#s .s ; :q - p 1 FIGURE 5. i o-l KENO 5.0 *U ENRICHMENT 17 OFA FUEL ASSEMBLY 124NCH REFLECTION-- ? Start cant 10 500 310 5 27 27 10 4 10 16 4 9 17 1 -10 1 0 1011 00 9*0 042590 - Reflector carri M .0,0.1,0 0,0'.0.041.0'1.0 Mathial number densities v f 1-4192235 0.0011944. f il: .1 '192238 '0.022407. q l; '18016-0.047202 'I T 2-+240302 -0.043326 IF '

3 31001 0.066767 2<

31 38016

0.0 33384

j .4! 324000 0.017386 1 i 4: 325055 0.001732 4f326000 0.058019 l '!4 328000: 0.008142 .l N MLted bar geometry i y . BOX TYPE = 1 '&i,

CYLINDER ' 1. 0.39200 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5

~! CYLINDER- - 0 0.40000 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 w L YLINDER 0.45700~ 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 q C rm 1 CUBOID. 3 0.63000 -0.63000 ' O.63000 -0.63000 30.0 -0.0 27*0.a _4 BOTTYPE' 2- .i f l ZHu,tICYL+X 1 0.39200 30.0 -0.0 27*0,5 ZHEMICYL+X 0 0.40000 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 4 .' / ZHEMICYL+X 2 ' O.45700 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 ' CUBOID ' 3.0.63000 0.00000 0.63000 -0.63000 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 ~ ' BOX TYPE-3- [N, . CYLINDER 3 0.56100 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 I

• 4 CYLINDER 2 0.60200

-30.0 -0.0'27*0.5 = jlf f ECUBOID - 3 0.63000 -0.63000 0.63000 -0.63000 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 i @# V LBOX TYPE ' 4 ! ZHEMICYL+X 3 0.56100 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 ~ D[% t ZHEMICYL+X. 2 0.60200 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 -0@J $nj @f fCORE BDY 0 10.71 -0.0 10.71 -10.71 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5 CUBOID 3 0.63000 0.00000 0.63000 -0.63000 30.0 -0.0 27*0.5

^

~ M6 ' . CUBOID 3 41,19 .-0.0 41.19 41.19 30.0 ~-0.0 27?0.5 --q$lf; Loading patternfor mixed box genmsiy

ff Q w 1 '2 9 l-1 17 i i1 10 e '.

' 2 I 1 'l 117 1 11.10 !W ? L3 ' 4 4.1 315 3 1110 .'s, 3.771-6123 11 10 ' 3 l 6 6 - 1. 4 14 10 1 110 ], j4 1I1 315 3 1 1 11 m p q.y 1 -;[ih y, ,, MO jid

r i l.' F q ATTACHMENT 2 i h EVENTS / CONTROLS -4 1. Inappropriately trained personnel 1,1 Calculations are performed in. performing and reviewing criticality accordance with written approved calculations, procedures. ( 1.2 Calculations are performed by an' individual with one_ year experience-in reactivity calculations. 1.3 Calculations are reviewed by an Individual. with five years of experience in reactivity l' calculations. 2. . Inappropriately validated codes, 2.1 Reactivities are calculated using l the SCALE AMPEX MODULE CODES NITAWL, XSDRNPM, and - KENO IV. i i 2.2 Codes are validated through - bench marking. approximately. 80. various criticality experiments consisting of heterogeneous and-homogenous arrays. \\ ~ l 1 3. Inappropriate y moJeled 3.1 Reactivities of all assembly types calculations. are calculated. using qualified codes and methodology. 3.2 Wash tanks are modeled with assemblies -of highest reactivity, 5 using optimum moderation and full reflection. p L; 3.3 Assemblies are modeled infinite in length. I t

p 7 m .l* l*' .-). w' i,.1 g Ji: N 3.4 l Assemblies are essentially isolated from' other assemblies when 3 : -loaded into the wash tanks. f 1 ,L "4 . 3.5 Roof leaks. that may produce .1' partial water densities do not yield higher reactivities among l assemblies in the wash tanks i since they are isolated from each other as wel1 as all other special 1 ' nuclear material. I 3.6 Oil leaks from the. conveyor - i system.would produce lower assembly reactivities since the-hydrogen content relative to water is lower. 4. Inappropriately used results.

4.1 Methodology

blas,- and-all uncertainties for:. a 95 percent confidence level, are added to calculated values. 4.2 No calculations are excluded as a : result of poor convergence. - 5. Inappropriately released materials ' 5.1 Materials are procured ' in - for assembly fabrication, accordance with approved written l procedures and specification

i drawings.

i 5.2 All UF, is sampled to verify-enrichments do not exceed 5.0 - wt% "U. 5.3 Quality Assurance inspects 1 all materials in accordance = with -specification drawings. - I 5.4 Materiais that are out of l specification are appropriately identified, documented, and dispositioned. L

g 7 y ~ ~ -~ 9 Ei! _( +gw t 5.5 ' Mechanical Production Control delivers all materials = to the. Manufacturing Component : for. 1 assembly fabrication. e4 5 _6. Assembly. fabricated with 6.1 Assemblies are fabricated in; O attributes of more reactivity than accordance with written approved that modeled, procedures and specification drawings. ~ O 6.2 Pellet ; diameters, cladding y.1 w, ' thicknesses and assembly, lattice M pitch meet very rigorous tolerances. L 6.3 All attributes are verified by Quality.. D Assurance prior to assembly washing. jj q 7, -More than one assembly loaded 7,1 Written procedures limit onel into single wash tank -- assembly per wash tank, 7.2 The wash tanks are provided with physical constraints to limit each tank'to one assembly, l 7.3 Assemblies arei lowered into-- a j jl wash a ta'nk using a. conveyor. transport system, and i remain-connected to this system while in - the wash tanks. 7.4 The transport system is designed to; provide adequate separation distances between adjacent Li assemblies. during " transporting i L and washing. q i ' 8.i ' Equipment failures resulting in 8.1 The transport system maintains. more than one assembly' loaded assemblies in a single file that ?j into a single wash tank. does not allow shuffling. 8.2 Assemblies are lowered into a L wash tank-using a conveyor: $j, transport system and remain connected to this system while in g

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e '4 a J,. n, (* e- /- i F the wash tanks.- 8.3 Assemblies are not transported over other assemblies already in-l . wash tanks. 3 1 8.4 Assemblies at the back end of the washing process are removed prior to assembly' movement at the front endt 8.5 ~ The assembly conveyor system' =3 receives-routine _ preventive. maintenance to assure that - assemblies are not damaged during transport. .t 9 9. Equipment' failures resulting in 9.1 - 10CFR7130 foot drop tests of . more' reactive assembly.- assemblies in : RCC shipping containers showthatthe assembly reactivity is decreased due to fuel 1 rod.and grid compression. 9.2 - Fuel assemblies are. typically less than 20 feet from the wash tank floor during loading. t .f

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[ ATTACHMENT 3 a:N CONTRIBUTING CAUSES / CONTINGENCim.S a. L No detailed written procedures for a.1' Supervision is responsible for the - processess, safety aspects of all operations, a.2 Written procedures are-requiredz for all process operations. - a.3 All' procedures = for operations involving SNM must be approved by Regulatory Affairs. a.4 Routine audits by Regulatory - ' Affairs are performed to assure compliance, + b. Procedure changes improperly b.1 Supervision is responsible for the authorized by shift supervisors, safety aspects of all operations. b.2 - Changes to procedures involving. special nuclear materials must be -- reviewed andL approved by; Regulatory Affairs - prior _ to 1 implementation, b.3 Routine audits' are performed by Regulatory < Affairs to. confirm; compliance. c.- Failure to follow procedures, c.1 Supervisor. overchecks of-operators. c.2 Regulatory Affairs audits. .d. Poor communications between d.1 Operations performed in personnel. accordance with written approved procedures. d.2 Process steps documented through checklists provided as part of procedures.

p,o 'o f '. ',' r W y x ,,r n 'l, ~ -}{ 4 t ,w w; d.3 Procedures and enecklists are l. subject to Regulatory Affairs j+' inspections. s

p" identification of e.1 Quality Assurance inspects -and e,

inadequate

L assembly materials.

' releases all materials for assembly fabrication. -I r. e.2 - Supervision is required to verify.: the: - proper ~ identification ' of B" materials for transfer., e.3 Materials transfers are controlled L by approved ; procedures.and. p engineering drawings, d a 1!

f. '

Failure to investigate and f.1 Materials are procured in i y }j 4 document materials that are out of accordance with approved written h specification. procedures. and. specification L drawings. ~ ) f.2 Quality Assurance inspects all: q materials in-accordance with a specification drawings'. -{ f.3 Materials that - are. out - of' specification are'. appropriately-I identified, : documented, and j dispositioned. ~ .o f.4 Mechanical Production Control ' delivers all materials to the

l Manufacturing Component for-f l'

' assembly fabrication.- d g.- Failure to audit controls. g.1 The audit program is a condition - d of license SNM 1107. 1 g.2 The audit schedule is controlled _f by a computerized tracking. -l system. m t; i i5 g, ' t !!. f E '..,,, %_ t } ' 1h,W., -l '! k (i ih\\

ll .+ 4 _. l

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[ ' LTABLE OF' CONTENTS - Section ELER-4. Authorizations and Exemptions Table of Contents 4.0 4.1 Release for Unrestricted Use '4.1 14.2L Authorization for Use of Materials at Offsite 4.2-1 Locations 4.3 Record Storage 4.3-1 4.4 Exemptions from the Requirements of 10CFR70.24 4.4-1 4.5 Nonradioactive Industrial Waste-4-5. 4.6 Possession of Licensed Material at Reactor 4.6-1 Sites 4.7 Leak Testing Sealed Plutonium Sources 4.7-1 4.8 ' Disposal of Aqueous Products 1 4.8-1 -4.9 -Authorization for Use of_a 0.98 K,f7 for_ Fuel '4.9-1 Assemblies-Contained la Hash Tanks 1 Docket No. 70-1151 Initial Submittal Date: 4/30/83 Page No. ii License No. SNM-1107 Revision Submittal Date: 7/02/90 Revision No. 22

r7 .- ? ( f (, i

SCHEDULE OF REVISIONS' 1

y Page' Revision .Page Revision Number' Number Number-Number '3.1410 2

4. 9-1.

22

3.1 -11 2--

l '3.1-12 3-3.2-1 2 6 E3,222' .2'

3. 2-3 j-2 3.2-4 3

3.2-5 2 3.2-6 2 I ~3.2-7 2 b 3.2-8 3 3.2-9' 3 .3.2-10 2 3.2 3

j

.3;2-12 3

3. 3-l '

2' -7

3.3 -2 s

~3.3-3< 2 s l 4.0-1. 9 4.1 -14 a

4. 2-l '

3 l "t i - 4 '. 3 2 4 4 3 4.5-1 14 4.6-1 2 4.6-2 2 4.7-1 8 4.8-1 '14 t' 4.8-2 14 Docket No. 70-1151 Initial Submittal Date: 4/30/83 Page No. vii License No. SNM-1107 Revision Submittal Date: 7/02/90 Revision No. 22 v. 5l h

~ 9 d, Mg Lj REVISION RECORD:

• 'Revisibn' Date of'

~ l Number

Re.vi sion Pages' Revised Revision Re410D.

n g"Tm 7/23/87 New pages 1.11-6 Added authorization for '13 :: a ~ through 1.11-8. off-site drying of calcium-fluoride. 14 t 8/14/87 Revised page 4.5-1. Added drying ' of. calcium j fluoride to ' scope -. of y, . operations. i y7 Revised pages 4.8-1 Delete Hestern Zirconium 'm and 4.8-2. as an, authorized' recipientLof HF. Revised page 4.1-1. Update document date. Revised pages 1.11-2, Added encapsulated 1.11-4, 1.11-5, and materials to_briquetting.

3 1.11-6.

description. .15-8/18/87-New pages 1.14-1 thru Added. criteria to 1.14-5 and 2.2-14. preclude foreign contaminants from UF6 m cylinders. 16-1/25/88 Revised page 2.2-3. Add interlock. pressure requirement-positive pressure gloveboxes. 4 N 17' 2/8/88 Revised page 2.5-1. Update - of. Emergency 1 3 Plan Section. <A ? =18 5/25/88 Revised page 2.5-1. Update of Emergency. .a Plan Section. 1 v, .it , 19 8/12/88 Revised page 2.5-1.- Update' of Emergency

1. g Plan Section.

N v'h

20' 9/30/88 Revised pages.2.1.2,.

Add frequency criteria j 1 2.1-3, 2.2-9 and-to the definitions A. 2.2-10.- Section. Revised in ' criteria ' for-bulk ' containers, a 0' 21 6/23/89 Revised page 2.5.1 Update of Emergency ft Plan Section. D 221: 6/29/90 New page 4.9-1 _ Increase Keff limit ' @w for Assembly Hash Tanks. s: m \\' 1 l Docket No. 70-1151 Initial Submittal Date: 7/23/87 Page No. ix License No. SNM-1107 Revision Submittal'Date: 7/02/90 Revision No. 22 'l ' Yr} } n ' (C i ' '(L

n } r v. W-SECTION 4-TABLE OF CONTENTS

e Authorizations and Exemotions LEagg 4.1 '

Release for Unrestricted Use 4.1 > ,4.2 Authorization-for Use of Materials at Offsite-4.2-1 Locations I c4.3 _ Record Storage-4.3-1 -l L 414 Exemptions fromj the. Requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 4.4-1 4.4.1 Isolated Areas 4.4-1 '4.~ 4. 2 Low; Concentration Storage Areas. 4.4-1 4.4.3 l Shipping Package Sscrage Areas-4.4-1 l 4.5 Nonradioactive Industrial Hastes 4.5-1 j l' 4.6 Possession of Licensed Materials at Reactor. Sites 4.6-1 'l 4.7 Leak Testing Sealed Plutanium Sources 4.7-1. .4.8 Disposal of Aqueous Products 4.8-1 l -4.9' Authorization for Use of a 0.98 K,ff for Fuel 4.9-1 l '" ',^ Assemblies Contained in Wash Tanks .i n l, l a ig< oi - Y j'

";g it;- m,.

di ' x

Docket No. 70-1151 Initial Submittal Date

4/30/83 Page No. 4.0 1 3 License No. SNM-1107 Revision Submittal Date: 7/02/90 Revision No. 22 ,1!!.i, l> , ; ;l? g' -q -j k ' ]i-\\, jp - . \\!

F q f x L.: ) ,m 4 4.9 Authorization for use of a 0.98 K.. for Fuel Assemblies Contained in Wash Tanks, /1,c Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph 2.3.2(8) of this license application, fuel assemblies contained in wash tanks located in the final assembly fabrication j '~ area of the Columbia Facility may use a K., limit of 0.98 (including bias and uncertainty at the 95% confidence level), provided the following conditions are met: r 4.9.1 Physical constraints shall be provided to limit each wash tank to one assembly. L 7 4.9.2 - Fuel' assemblies shall remain connected to the conveyor transport system when loaded in a wash tank. 4.9.3 New fuel assembly designs shall have their respective reactivities, K,,, determined by a validated calculational method. g L IL l

e L

i ~ lL, Docket No. 70-1151 Initial Submittal Date: 4/30/83 Page No. 4.9-1 p L-License No. SNM-1107 Revision Submittal Date: 7/02/90 Revision No. 22 e ua s

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