ML20043J064
| ML20043J064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/14/1990 |
| From: | Thompson H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Stern D BERNABEI & KATZ |
| References | |
| FOIA-90-92, FOIA-90-A-19 NUDOCS 9006270244 | |
| Download: ML20043J064 (2) | |
Text
' d' UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSIO 5
w AsHINO 1oN. D. C. 206%
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MAY I i 1993 David Stern Esquire Bernabei & Katz IN RESPONSE REFER 1773 i Street, NW TO F01A-90-A-19 Washington, DC 20009 (F01A-90-92)
Dear Mr. Stern:
This is in response to your letter dated April 3,1990, in which you appealed Mr. Donnie H. Grimsley's response dated April 5. 1990. Mr. Grimsley's response denied, in its entirety, the Office of Investigations' (01) Report of Investhetion No. 2-85-031 which was subject to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) nouest for this record.
Acting on your appeal, I have carefully reviewed the record in this case and have determined that since an enforcement action, including a proposed civil penalty, was issued on April 12, 1990, most of the 01 report can now be made publicly available. Your appeal is, therefore, partially granted and partially denied.
Portions of the report will continue to be withheld from public disclosure pursuanttoExemptions(6)and(7)(D of the F01A (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) and (7)(D)) and 10 CFR 9.17(a)(6) and (7 (iv) of the Commission's regulations.
TheinformationwithheldpursuanttoExemption(6)consistsofthenamesof individuals whose emplo.yment was terminated by the utility, and other personal information the disclosure of which would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
I find that there are overriding privacy and public interests in protecting this information.
The interest in disclosing the information does not outweigh the significant privacy interests of the individuals who, if their identities were disclosed, could reasonably be expected to be sub,iected to harassment or other harm.
I.1formationwithheldpursuanttoExemption(7)(D)consistsofthenameofa person granted confidentiality by the staff.
I am unable to identify any legitimate public interest in this information.
-This is a final agency action. As set forth in the FOIA (5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B)),judicialreviewofthisdecisionisavailableinadistrict 9006270244 900514 hShRN
-A-19 PDR
4
't David Stern, Esquire court of the United States in the district in which you reside or have your principal place of business or in the District of Columbia, Sincerely, f/t)/ #%
u
. Thompson, J,, Dep Executive Director o Nuclear Mate ials 5 y, Safeguards i
d Operations Support t
Enclosure:
i O! Report No. 2-85-031 I
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I REPORT OF INVESTIGATION l
Title:
TENNESSEE VAlt,EY AUTHORITY:
Alt.EGED$UPPRES$10NOFNUCLEAR$AFETYREVIEWSTAFF(NSR$) REPORTS, l
AND HARASSMENT / INTIMIDATION OF NSR$ EMPLOYEES ll' Licensee:
Case Number: 2 85-031 Tennessee Valley Authority Report Date: August 29, 1988 L
400 W. Sumit Street l
Knoxville, TN Control Office: O!:RI!
Status:
CLO$tD t
Reported By:
Reviewed By:
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arty y Robinson,' Investigator
/pil Y orse, Director Offier of Investi ations Effice vesti stions Field ice, Reg on !!
Field Office, Reg on 11 L
A r Participating Personnel:
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[. L. Williamson, Sr. Investigator
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Mn 1.~ Hayes, Direc. tdt Of fice of Invest'ig,itions D. D. Murphy, Investigator i
Office of Investi ations Field Office, Reg on 11 J. Kindt, Investigator t
l Office of Investigations l
. Field Office, Region 11 Ir.fer.T.sSon in his ra:c:d was d?'c'.ed 1-G. H. Claxton, Investigator in ac:: d3nce w;th the fleetam of Inictrnation ations OfficeofInvestigon!!
Act,exem rons 6Y M tield Office, Reg pm J. C. Stone Nuclear Reactor Regulations r
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3 On October 7, 1985, the Office of Investigations Field Office Region !!
(01:R!l) self-initiated an investi Nuclear Safety Review $taff (NSR$)gation of allepations by members of the TennesseeYaleyAuthority(TVA)thattheir writtenregortswerebeingwrongfuIlyeditedbyN5R5Managementinaneffortto
" tone down the significance of the findings. These allegations surfaced during the conduct of 0! investigation 2-85-00g which pertained to discrimina-tion against TVA employees, outside of the NSR$
the investigation of alleg. for reporting safety concerns.
On February 21,1986, ed Harassment / Intimidation (H/l) of MSR$ members was added to the scope of this case' O! interviews of the entire NSR$ staff revealed 16 separate issues that involved alleged suppression of NSRS reports, H/I, or a combination of both suppression and H/1.
0! investigation of these issues, which included monitoring and review of concurrent investigations conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and Quality Technology Company (QTC), a TVA contract investigative organization, resulted in the following findings:
Two issues involved only H/1. One of these allegations was substantiated, and one was not.
Eight issues involved only suppression of information.
Four of these allegations were substantiated, and four were not. Six issues involved both H/l and suppression of infor1 nation.
In all six of these allegations, the H/l was substantiated and the suppression of infonnation was not substantiated.
The most significant of the substantiated allegations that involved only discrimination (H/I) pertained to a group of NSRS members that were directly involved in a direct presentation to an NRC Commissioner. This presentation concluded that 10 CFR 50. Appendix 8 requirements were not being met at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear. Plant. These staff members were removed from their supervisory duties, were not promoted when others who were less qualified were promoted, and were se meaningful function. gregated into a group within NSRS that perfonned no No leader of this group was designated by the NSRS Director.
The most significant of the substantiated allegations that involved only suppression of information was the non-issuanca of a final remrt of an NSRS s
9 Major Management Review of TVA's Corrective Action System. T11s review produced many significant findings of major problems in TVA's Corrective Action System. The decision not to issue this report was made by TVA's Contract Manager of Nuclear Power just a few weeks prior to his issuance of a letter of certtfication to NRC of TVA's overall compliance with 10 CFR $0 Appendix 8.
This certification letter relied heavily upon the theory that as long as identified deficiencies were in the Corrective Action System, overal' compliance with Appendix B could be concluded as being maintained. This investigation further revealed that, despite the coss' taent by TVA Nuclear Power Managefnent to do en updated review of corrective action, because the original report was not to be issued, there was evidence that such an update would not have been conducted if the fonner NSRS Director had not written a formal memorandum to the Contract Manager of Nuclear Power reminding him (the i
Case No. 2-85-031 1
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Contract Manager) of this couaitment and requesting that the updated review be donea I
A11 instances of substantiated H/1 within the scope of this investigation.
I went no higher in the TVA Management structure than the M5R$ Director. The culpable individuals all either retired, resigned, or were trentferred during the conduct of the field work of this investigation.
i The status of this investigation is CLOSED.
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1 ACCOUNTA81!.!TY e
ihefollowingportionsofthisReportofInvestigation(CaseNo. 2-85031)will i
not be included in the material placed in the Public Document Room. They i
consist of pages 4 through 47.
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Case No. 2-85-031 4
i TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace No.
SYNOPS!$................................
1 ACCOUNTABILITY............................. 3 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS......................... 9 i
DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION........................
11 Purpose of Investigation......................
11 Background.............................
11 Group (1) - H/I Only 12 i
i Allegation No.1 (Discrimination Against NSR$ Members involved in Appendix B Presentation to NRC Comissioner)..
12 i
W111 fulness / Intent...................
13 l
Concl u s i ons......................
13 Allegation No, 2 (H/I of HARRISON by WEGNER)........
13 Wi11 fulnes s/ Intent...................
14 Conclusions......................
14 Group (2) - Suppression of Infor1 nation Only...........
14 1
Allegation No. 3 (Non-Issuance of NSRS Corrective Ac t i o n Re po rt ).......................
14 Wi11 fulness / Intent...................
19 Conclusions......................
20 Allegation No. 4 (TVA Policy Comittee Downplayed Results of Black and Yeatch Independent Design Review)...
21 l
Wi11 fulness / Intent...................
24 l
Conclusions......................
24 Allegation No. 5 (Suppression of Memo on Pipe Support Calculations)........................
25 W111 fulness / Intent...................
26 Conclusions.............,........
26 Allegation No. 6 (Non-Issuance of NSRS Appendix R Report)..
26 Willfulness / Intent...................
27 Conclusions......................
27 Allegation No. 7 (Cover L tier of NSR$ Report on Terminations Downplayed Findings of Report).........................
27 Wi11 fulness / Intent...................
29 Concl u sions......................
29
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AllegationNo.9(N5R$DirectorTonedDown'N$R$Re AfterThimbleTubeReport)............ ports 29 W111 fulness / Intent. -..................
30 Conclusions......................
31 1
l AllegationNo.9(N$R$DirectorDeleted$19nificant sections of Draft Memo on Weld Problems)..........
31 W111 fulness / Intent...................
32 Conclusions......................
32 l
Allegation No.10 (NSR$ Director Unresponsive to Safety Issues Pointed out by NSR$ Staff Member)..........
32 W111 fulness / Intent...................
32 Conclusions......................
33 Group (3) - Both H/I and Suppression of Infonnation.......
33 i
Allegation No. 11 (NSRS Director Attempted to Make Staff Member Omit Details of Report on Cable Routing).......
33 i;
Wi11 fulness / Intent...................
35 Conclusions......................
35 l
Allegation No.12 (NSR$ Management Would not Pennit Staff Member to Pursue H/I Aspect of Cable Crimping (Tenninations)
Investigation).......................
35 W111 fulness / Intent...................
36 Conclusions.......................
36 Allegation No.13 (NSRS Management Would not'Pennit Staff
(
Member to Pursue Possible Collusion Aspect of ANI l
L Investigation)........................
37 L
Wi11 fulness / Intent...................
38 Conclusions....................... 38 Allegation'No. 14 (NSRS Staff Member Restricted in Interviews of EEB Members, and NSRS Management Delayed Reporting Diesel Generator Findings Until Plant Shut Down for Othe r Reasons ).....................
38 W111 fulness / Intent...... -........ -.....
39 Concl u s i on s......................
3 9 Allegation No.15 (NSRS Management Suppressed Info'nnation On Welding Problems, and H/I d NSRS Members for P These Welding Issues).............. ursuing Wi11 fulness / Intent...................
39 41 Concl u s i ons......................
41 Allegation No.16 (NSRS Deputy Director H/I'd Staff Member and Suppressed Infonnation in NSRS Procurement Report)...
41 W111 fulness / Intent...................
42 Conclusions...................
Status of Investigation....................
43-43 Case No. 2-85-031 6
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'1'$UPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION e'
- ......................45 LIST OF EXH181TS...
................47
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l APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 10 CFR 50.7 Employee protection.
]
Discrimination by a Commission licensee.... against an employee for I
engaging in certain protected activities is prohibited. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation, terms.
conditions, and privileges of employment.
If the permit is for construction of a nuclear power plant, the holder of the pemit shall notify the Connission of.each deficiency found in design and construction, which, were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant, and which represents p
(iii) A significant deficiency in construction of... a structure, system, 1
or component which will require extensive evaluation, extensive redesign, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction pemit or to otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure., system or component to perfonn its intended safety function.
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DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION t
l Purpose of Investination This investigation was initiated on October 7, 1985, by the Office of Investi-gations (01), Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), based upon allegations received from members of the Nuclear Safety Review $taff (t$R$) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) during the course of the 01 investigat'.on of Case Number 2-85-009, entitled Allened Discrimination Anainut TVA Employees by TVA Menacement for Rosortu.c Safetv 51enificant concerns. lese allegastons by the N5R5 members perusined to she 'aproper eetting of N5R$ reports by N$RS Management in an effort to ' tone down" the significance of the findings. On February 21, 1986, the investigation of discr< mination, in the fom of Harass-ment and Intimidation (H/l), of NSR$ employees was added to the scope of this investigation.
Background
The NSRS was created by TVA in 1979, as the result of a TVA NUCLEAR PROGRAM REVIEW (Exhibit 1 pp.11,1-4), in the afterinath of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident, as an independent staff advisory function to the General Manager and Benrd of 96 rectors of TVA regarding Nuclear Safety matters. The NSR$ functioned in this c6pacity from the Sumer of 1979 until the Spring of 1986, 6t which time the NSRS was renamed the Nuclear Manager's Review Group (NMRG). The offices of NMRG were relocated from Knoxville. Te xessee to Chattanooga, Tennessee.
NMRG was also relocated in TVA's organizational structure, reporting to the Manager of Nuclear Power instead of directly to the TVA Board of Directors through the General Manager.
During the approximate seven year existence of NSRS, it was primarily headed by two Directors Harrison N. (Newt) CULVER, from January 1980 January 1985; and Kermit W. WHITT, from January 1985 - April 1986, when NSRS became hMRG.
E. Gray BEASLEY wa: the Acting Director of NSRS for the few months from the time of its creation in mid-1979 until CULVER's appointment in January 1980.
CULVER stated, in his interview by 01. (Exhibit 2) that he initially divided NSRS into two sections Operations and Design / Construction. He advised that he directed his staff to do management reviews, primarily in the Operations area at first, to get a feel for the status of TVA's Nuclear Program as a basis for the direction of future NSR$ projects. He stated that he developed femal policies and procedures for NSR$ concurrently with these management reviews.
He advised that NSR$ looked at specific events or areas, as appropriate, when they occurred, but the primary direction was in the self-initiated management reviews.
CULVER advised that, at first, he would provide a copy of NSRS' draft reports on these reviews to the appropriate TVA 1.ine personnel involved, for their review. He stated that he soon discontinued that practice because he was not getting any feedback from the Line on the draft reports. He stated that he.
felt that the Line's attitude was that they would respond to an official report, and did not care about a draft. CULVER advised that he initially sent the original final NSRS reports to the appropriate Office Manager, or Division Director, with a copy to the TVA General Manager / Board of Directors if he Case No. 2-85-031 11 L-
L (CULHR) decided that the subject matter of the report tas significant enough.
He stated that he did not tant to Cbvrden the Board t:ith a bunch of trivia', so i
' he did not send copies of all the MSR$ reports to them. CULVER stated that he soon realized that he was "short-circuiting" the top level Office of Power i
Management by sending the reports directly to Office Mananers or Division Directors, so he started sending the reports to Hugh PARR; S, the Manager of the Office of Power.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This background on NSR$' early reporting procedures is ipnt because, instead of setting a precedent of reporting directly to tw hural Manager /8 card of Directors, per the organizations intent of ths a LEAR PROGRAM REVIEW 1 CULVER, on his own initiative, gave TVA Office of Power Management an apparent, if not an actual, right of rebuttel/ disagreement with NSRS reports without having to address these disagreements to the General Manager. This situation, plus CULVER's self-admitted philosophy of not bothering the Board with " trivia."'
i resulted in many negotiations on NSR$ findings between NSRS and Line Management without any Board involvement /arb' tration. And, when NSRS Manag a nt gave any appearance of, or actually did, compromise with the Line on a finding, conclusion, or reconrnendation, the NSRS members would.
in a number of cases, perceive this compromise as a " toning-down" or
" watering-down" of their (the Staff's) findings by NSRS Management in an effort to appease Line Management.
O! interviewed 30 former and current NSRS members, two of which were corfiden-tial, regarding any instances of suppression of infomation and/or H/l while in NSRS. Of these 30 people, 16 of them expressed the following 16 allegations.
These allegations fell into three basic categories: (1) H/l only, (2)
Suppression of Information only, and (3) H/I in association with Suppression of Infomation.
Fourteen of these staff members stated that they had not been t
harassed, intimidated, or had any infomation suppressed by NSRS Managers.
l INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
For purposes of this report, the allegations will be grouped into the above categories as follows:
l H/1 only - 2 allegations i
Suppression of Information only - 8 Allegations H/I and Suppression - 6 allegations Additionally, for purposes of continuity and clarity, evidence of Willful-ness / Intent and Conclusions regarding each allegation will be stated innediately following the narrative of the investigative results pertaining to that allegation.
Group (1) - H/I Only Allegation No. 1 NSRS members Jerry D. SMITH, Phillip WASHER, and Robert C. SAVER allegedly were discriminated against by NSRS Mana.ger WHITT for their (J. SMITH, WASHER, and SAVER) participation in a presentation to NRC Comnissioner James K. ASSELSTINE, on December 19, 1985, that concluded that 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8 Requirements were not being met at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The nature of the discrimination was the removal of the supervisory duties of J. SMITH, WASHER, Case No. 2-85-031 12 I
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and SAUER; and the assignment of those three individuals to a newly creat' d e
section, eithin NSR$. that had no.Section Chief and did not perfo m any productive cission within NSRS, INVEST! GATOR'S NOTE: This allegation was investigated by the Wage-Hour Compliance Section of the U.- S. Department of Labor (DOL) as a result of separate complaints filed with D0L by J. SMITH, WASHER, and SAVER. The 00L. investigations substantiated that these NSRS members had been discriminated against as defined in Section 210. Energy Reorganization Act and 10 CFR 50.7. 0! review of these 00L investigation reports and exhibits detemined that the investigations were thorough, with logical conclusions. The D0L reports are attached (Exhibit 3. J. SMITH) (Exhibit
- 4. WASHER)(Exhibit 5, SAVER).
Willfulness / intent l
The timing of the reorganization within NSRS (February 3,1986) which
. eliminated the supervisory duties of J. SMITH, WASHER, and SAVER by assigning them to a non-productive, newly created, leaderless section; plus the fact that only individuals that were an active part of the ASSELSTINE pre entation/ follow-up substantiation were assigned to this section; is evidence of willfulness / intent on the part of NSRS Management (WHITT) to discriminate against those NSRS members who presented TVA Appendix B problems to the NRC.
Conclusions The allegation of discrimination is substantiated, and was done willfully and intentionally.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: WHITT has terminated his employment at TVA.
Allegation No. 2 NSRS. member Michael A. PARRIS0N alleged that he was verbally harassed by William WEGNER, a contract advisor to S. A. WHITE, Manager of Nuclear Power, TVA, in that WEGNER unduly badgered him (HARRISON) regarding his explanation of an NSRS position on TVA non-compliance with Appendix 8.
The alleged verbal harassment took place in a meeting at the Offices of TVA Nuclear Power.
Chattanooga, Tennessee, on January 16, 1986. This meeting was attended by numerous representatives of TVA upper management from the Offices of Nuclear Power, Quality Assurance (QA), Watts Ba'r Nuclear Plant, and NSRS.
HARRISON stated, in his 0! interview on A>ril 9,1986 (Exhibit 6, pp. 31-32),
that he and WHITT went to the Offices of luclear Power for what he thought was going to be an informal, internal discussion with TVA Managers Charles MRSON, William COTTLE, and William (Willy) BROWN regarding the reasons that NSRS felt that Watts Bar was not in compliance with Appendix 8.
HARRIS 0N advised that the meeting was attended by many more people than MASON, COTTLE, and BROWN, to include WEGHER and the QA Manager, Robert MULLIN. HARRISON stated that WEGNER kept asking him to explain why NSRS felt that Material Traceability was an area of non-compliance. HARRISON said that he must have repeated his explanation to WEGNER at least eight times, but WEGNER kept asking him, "Where is the violation? Where is the non-compliance? Convince me."
HARRISON stated that Case No.. 2-85-031 13
WEGNER finally got up and left the meeting.
HARRISON stated that he thought that WEGNER thought that he (HARRISON) was one of the " biggest fools he (WEGNER) had ever met." HARRISON advised that he thought he was going to be fired that very afternoon.
COTTLE stated (Exhibit 7) that he did not wrceive any harassment or intimida-tion in WEGNER's line of questioning of NAtRIS0N in the January 16, 1986, l
meeting.
COTTLE stated that there was definitely a communication problem between WEGNER and HARRISON, and it appeared to be because HARRISON was trying i
to present second hand knowledge regarding areas of non-compliance with Appendix B.
MASON stated (Exhibit 8) that WEGNER's questioning of NARRIS0N in the January 16, 1986, meeting was not badgering, harassing, or intimidating in any way. MASON advised that HARRISON did not appear to be intimidated, and that HARRISON himself did not seem to be totally convinced of the NSR$ position that he was presenting regarding Appendix 8.
WEGNERstated(Exhibit 9)thathehadnointentionofintimidatingHARRISONin any way by his (WEGNER's) questioning in the January 16, 1986, meeting. He advised that he was merely trying to pinpoint the specific level, within the QA l
documentation hierarchy, that NSRS thought was not in compliance.
He stated that it did not appear to him (WEGNER) that HARRISON was convinced that TVA was not in compliance. WEGNER stated that his impression of HARRISON's concern pertained to the timeliness of Corrective Action on nonconfonnances.
HARRISON stated (Exhibit 6, p. 32) that he later heard from WHITT that WEGNER had really agreed with HARRISON's position, but was just trying to test the other attendees at the meeting to see where they stood on the issues, and how they would react.
Wi11 fulness / Intent No evidence was found of.any wi11 fulness or intent on the part of WEGNER to intimidate or harass HARRISON in this January 16, 1986, meeting.
Conclusions The allegation was unsubstantiated.
Group (2) - Suppression of Information Onl.y Allegation No. 3 Alleged Suppression of, by deciding not to publish, an NSR$ Report on a Major Management Review of Corrective Action (C/A).
Joan T. MUECKE, NSRS member, stated to 01 on March 115 1986 (Exhibit 10), that she worked on a review of C/A, starting in May 1985, with NSRS members Art DEBBAGE, Harold BENNETT, and Robert GRIFFIN.
She advised that the field work was completed, and draft report sections were submitted, by all the team members, to the NSRS Project Supervisor, Michael KIDO, around the end of August 1985.. She stated that KIDD was in the process of reviewing the various sections of the report when, due to other circumstances, he had to reassign the Case No.:2-85-031-14
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review responsibilities to MSR$ Supervisor Richard SMITH. MUECKE stated that R. SMITH t:as heavily involved with issues pertaining to welding problems at i
TVA, and, for that reason, did not spend much, if any, time reviewing the C/A Report. MUECKE advised that on February 28, 1986, R. $MITH asked her if she would object if the C/A Report was not issued.
She stated that she told him that she thought it should be issued, and he told her to think about it.- $he stated that she understood that the decision was made the next day not to issue i
the C/A Report. She advised that the findings in the report were quite critical of TVA's C/A System.
MUECKE stated, in a subsequent 01 interview, on October 2,1986 (Exhibit 10),
i much for him to handle. good reviewer of reports, and the C/A Report was tooS that R. SMITH was not a probably took R. SMITH at his word, without even looking at the draft report himself, when R. SMITH told WHITT the report needed a major rewrite.
GRIFFIN was interviewed on March 13 and October 2,1986 (Exhibit 11), and i'
stated that when R. SMITH asked him if he objected to the C/A Report not being issued, he (GRIFFIN) told R. SMITH that he did not object to not issuing the entire report as it existed at the time, because the scope was, in GRIFFIN's opinion,toolarge. GRIFFIN advised, however, that he told R. SMITH that the report could be reworked", or supplemented and updated, and then issued in shorter sections.
GRIFFIN stated that he did discuss with R. SMITH the possibility of doing an entirely new C/A Review.
GRIFFIN stated that he had no indication that there was any connection between the decision on non-issuance of the C/A Report and the fact that TVA was engaged, at that time, in respond-ing to the NRC regarding TVA compliance with Appendix B.
BENNETT stated in his interviews on March 11-12 and October 1, 1986 i
(Exhibit 12), that the NSRS C/A Report had been held up because R. SMITH was too involved in the welding inspection **ogram at Watts Bar, and had put the C/A Report on the back burner. BENNETi.tated that when R. SMITH asked him for his recomendation on the disposition of the report, he (BENNETT) said that, at least, a memorandum should be issued, highlighting the findings that were still applicable af ter the reorganization that had suppostdly rendered the report outdated and not applicable. BENNETT provided a copy of a draft of the referenced C/A Report (Exhibit 13).
DEBBAGE was interviewed on March 20 and September % 1986 (Exhibit 14).
DEBBAGE identified the draft provided by BENNETT as being the final draft of the C/A Report that he (DEBBAGE) turned over to R. SMITH for review in early November 1985. DEBBAGE stated that he thought the reason that R. $MITH did not get around to reviewing the C/A Report was acause there was a " big push" to review all previously issued NSRS Reports, in an effort to identify and list all the unresolved items in those reports.
DEBBAGE advised that WHITT probably never reviewed the draft C/A Report himself, and that he (WHITT) probably only knew what K!DD had told him about it before it was turned over to R. $NITH for review. DEBBAGE advised that when R. SMITH came to him in March 1986 and asked if he (DEBBAGE) had any problem with not issuing the C/A Report, he told R. SMITH that he did not object, but that he fe t that most of the root causes of the problems with TVA's C/A Program were still valid, even in view of TVA's recent reorganization.
DEBBAGE stated that he understood, at that time, that the results of this 1985 C/A review would be used as a basis for an updated C/A L
review which pertained to the new TVA organization.
DEBBAGE stated that when Case No. 2-85-031 15 l
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Nuclear Power, the plans to do the updated C/A review He stated that, in his opinion, 'no one wanted to hear any more bad news."
1 DEBBAGE advised that an updated C/A review might never have been done, but i
iu WITT, I,st prior to his leaving mRG and TVA, wrote a memorandum to WITE on August 1986, asking that the updated C/A review be done, as was committed to j
by W(Exhibit 15), and also a copy of a memorandum, dated Septem ITE and MASON in February 1986.
DE88 AGE provided a copy of_this memoran-dum from WITE to Ronald $ElBERLING, Director, NMRG (Exhibit 16).
In this memorandum to SE!BERLING. WITE directed that MRG do a review of TVA's C/A j
Program.
R. SMITH was interviewed on April 10 and October 9, 1986 (Exhibits 17 and 18).
R. SMITH advised that when the responsibility of reviewing the C/A report was i
passed on to him by KIDD, he (R. SMITH) was heavily involved with the EG4G 1
Welding Program, and any time spent reviewing the C/A Report would be on his weekends or days off. He advised that the C/A Report was going to take a major rewrite because, from the limited review he had been able to do, he had seen a lot of statements in the report that did not appear to have any documented substantiation.
He advised that he was going to have to go back and sit down I
with each one of the reviewers and go over these statements to either solidify the substantiation, or revise or eliminate the statement.
R. SMITH stated that WHITT had asked him about the status of the report a few times, and he (R. $MITH) had told WHITT that it was going to take major revision.
R. SMITH stated that he had never directly recommended to WHITT that the C/A Report not be issued. He advised that it was WHITT that told him, after a i
meeting between WHITT, WHITE, and MASON, that the C/A Report was not going to have to be issued because it needed so much revision, and because it was out of dr.ce with respect to the current TVA Nuclear Power organization.
R. SMITH stated that he got the impression from WHITT that a new C/A review was going to be done, and, on that basis, when he contacted the members of the team that did the C/A review, they had no strong objections to the non-issuance of the report.
R. SMITH stated, emphatically that he had no indication that a reason that the C/A Report was not issued could have been that it showed too many problems with TVA's C/A Program.
WHITT was interviewed on October 15, 1986 (Exhibit 19).
He advised that R. SMITH inherited the responsibility of reviewing the C/A Report from KIDO, and that R. SMITH told him (WHITT) that the report would require a major rewrite before it could be issued. WHITT stated that he told R. SMITH that since the rewrite would be necessary, and since the review was outdated with respect to the recent TVA reorganization in the Office of Nuclear Power, he (WHITT) was going to reconmend to WHITE that the report not be issued. WITT advised that he made this recommendation, to WHITE and MASON, in a regularly scheduled weekly briefing of WHITE, on February 26, 1986. Wt'!TT stated that he made this reconmendation based upon his own intention, and hisaxpressed conenttment to Richard FREEMAN of the TVA Board of Directors, to oO an updated review of C/A in the Spring of 1986 using the 1985 draft report at a basis.
WHITT stated that in his February,1986 briefing of WHITE and PASON, they both agreed not to publish the report of the 1985 C/A review, and that PEON L
requested that WHITT hold off on the updated review "for a few months" until the new Nuclear Power organization had a chance to initiate some of their Case No. 2-85-031 16 L
l-planned improvements. WITT stated that he thought that tas a reasonable.
i request. WITT said that he told R. SMITH that WITE and NASON had accepted his reconnendation not to issue the report. WHITT had R. SMITH contact each of the team members to see if they had objections to not issuing the report, and WITT stated that R. SMITH reported to him that there were no objections, as long as the updated review was to be done.
WHITT advised that in April 1986, MSRS wa reorganized into WRG, relocated to 1
Chattanooga from Knoxville, and reported to the Manager of Nuclear Power, instead of to the TVA Board of Directors. He stated that he was made the Assistant Director of MMRG, under the newly appointed Director, SE!BERLING.
WITT stated that it soon became evident that mRG was going to be doing only reviews that were directed by WITE and his staff. WHITT stated that he did not press the issue of the updated C/A Review with SE!BERLING at first, but when he (WHITT) started getting questions from the TVA Office of Inspector General (0!G) and the Knoxville Journal about why the 1985 C/A Report had not been issued, he started emphasizing the importance of the C/A update review with SE!BERLING, including his (WHITT's) comitment to the Board of Directors.
i WHITT said that SElBERLING replied that the update was an NSR$ comitment, not an NMRG comitment, and that NMRG reported to the Manager of Nuclear Power, not
.the Board. WHITT advised that he was not sure where the source of reluctance to do the update was, but he (WHITT) did not feel that SElBERLING would take it on his own to delay, or eliminate the updated review without some direction, or support from WHITE and his staff.
WHITTstatedthatSE!BERLINGeven'askedforNMRGstaffinbouglasSTE ut regardin4 re' views that they thought should be done.
WHITT advised that W.
I former NSRS and NMRG member, currently Site Procedure Supervisor, Watts Bar, coordinated this input, and that the t,pdated C/A review was one of the high L
priority items on his list, along with a Pre-Operational Start U) review of Sequoyah. WHITT stated that he understood that when STEVENS toot this list to SElBERLING, he (SE!BERLING) scratched C/A and Pre Op Start-Up off the list.
L WHITT stated that he knew that SElBERLING was aware of the majority of the NMRG staff support of the C/A update, because SElBERLING had comented on it in 4 l
staff meeting, but WHITT did not see any indication at all that a C/A review was going to be done. Therefore WHITT advised, he wrote a memorandum directly to WHITE, stressing the importance of the updated review and requesting that it be done.
He stated that he did this just prior to his retirement from TVA.
STEVENS was interviewed on October 22,1986(Exhibit 20).
STEVENS stated that he had, while assigned to NMRG, prioritized and sco>ed some input from the WRG staff regarding future reviews they thouflht should l>e done.
He stated that he presented these 'briefly scoped* suggest< ons for reviews, in order of MMRG staff priority, to SElBERLING. STEVENS advised that he did seem to recall that a C/A review and an Operational Readiness Review of Sequoyah were two of the three or four " heavier weighted" suggestions by the staff, meaninfl that more j
than one or two of the staff members had suggested that these rev< ews be done.
STEVENSadvisedthatSEIBERLINGdidnotremoveanyofthesuggestedreviews free the list, but he (SEIBERLING) definitely tried to ' sell his 'INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations), maintenance-type" reviews to the NMRG staff when they discussed the suggestions. STEVENS recalled that the Sequoyah Operational Readiness Review, and the C/A Review were two of the last of the 1
suggested reviews discussed at that staff meeting. He stated that he noted no i
specific reluctance, on the part of SElBERLING, to do a C/A review, other than Case No. 2-85-031 17 L
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L just his general philosophy of doing the more narrow-scopd, maintenance-ty i
reviews, as cpposed to tw broader-scoped, 'hard hitting, important-issue reviews that N$t$ used to do.
He stated that it was because of this o
" lower-tiered" review philosophy of SE!BERLING that he ($TEVENS) transferrH out of NMRG.
SE18ERLING was interviewed on October g and November 20,1984(Exhibit 21). He stated that he heard about the non-issuance of the NSRS C/A Report about a week after he became Director of IMRG.
He advised that he had not reviewed the draft report, but had heard that it was voluminous, unwieldy, and had gotten beyond a manageable scope.
$E!BERLING stated that WHITT had spoken to him numerous times about doing an updated C impressed him with any sense of urgency /A review, but that WHITT had never or importance about this review.
SElBERLING said that an updated C/A review was not a high priority with him nor, a >parently, with WHITE, because he (SE!BERLING) had a C/A review low on, the NMtG priority list of projects that he had discussed with WHITE, and WHITE had not disagreed with the priorities until WHITT wrote the memorandum to WHITE in August 1986. $ElBERLING stated that after WHITT's memorandum, WHITE directed him (SElBERLING) to do a C/A review and have the report written by December 1986.
SE!BERLING stated that he did recall that when he asked his staff for their input regarding future NMRG projects, a review of C/A was one i
of the " heavier weighted" suggestions.
i He advised, however, that he factored his staff's input into his decision along with input from Senior Nuclear Power Management (MASON), the TVA Employee Concern Program, and his own ideas.
stated that one main reason that a C He was that his staff was not large enou/A review was not a high priority with him 1
gh to do a C/A review of sufficient scope.
C. MASON was interviewed on November 21,1986(Exhibit 22). MASON advised that after WHITE became Manager of Nuclear Power at TVA, he (WHITE) had "gotten wind of" an unpublished NSRS C/A Report.
MASON advised that WHITT made a special i
trip from Knoxville to Chattanooga to discuss this report with WHITE.
MASON advised that WHITT stopped in his office to brief him on the report before l
t talking to WHITE. MASON said that WHITT told him that the report had had no review activity for a number of months, due to NSRS involvement in the Quality Technology Company's (QTC) investigations of employee concerns.
He said that WHITT also told him that the field work for that report had been done in mid 1985, and that the report had no continuity, and would require major revisions before it could be issued.
MASON stated that WHITT left his office, and was in WHITE's office for a few minates before he (MASON) joined them, but it was his (MASON':) impression that WHITE accepted WHITT's recommendation not t
to issue the report, and that WHITE couaitted to WHITT that a new C/A review would be done in three or four months.
MASON edvised that he did not review
-the draft of the unpublished C/A report, and that neither he nor WHITE asked WHITT if there were any significant findings in the report of which they should be aware.
MASON stated that there was never any connection in his mind between the decision not to issue this C/A report, and the ongoing efforts to prepare a response to the NRC regarding TVA compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8.
WHITE was interviewed on July 15, 1987 (Exhibit 28).
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: This interview was incorporated as a portion of an interview of WHITE in 01 Case No. 2-87-002.
Pages90-103 of the transcript of that interview pertain to the decision not to issue the NSRS C/A Report.
These pages are attached as Exhibit 23.
Case No. 2-85-031 18 il
.-..-,.m,,,,,--
I WITE stated that he had never seen the draft of the report on the 1985 N$R$
i Major Management Review of C/A.
He stated that his letter to $[18ERLING, dated i
september 5,1986. accurately reflected his (WITE's) conversation with WHITT in early 1986. He stated that WITT told him that it was a 'Iousy" report, that it contained " bad information," and that some of it was outdated. WHITE advised that WHITT told his he did not want to send the report to him. WHITE manager came to him and told him that 'he' going on at the time, and w advised that he had a lot of other issues to send it to him (WHITE),' he (WHITE) did not attach any special significance to it, he just told WHITT not to issue it. WHITE stated that without having had his memory refreshed by looking at the letters from WITT to him, and from him to $E!BERLING, he (WHITE) was not sure he could have remembered that the subject of the report was C/A.
WITE stated that he did not recall asking WHITT if there were any significant items that should be looked into, even though the report was not going to be issued. WHITE stated that he did not recall any discussion of an updated C/A review to be done a few months after his meeting with WHITT. WHITE stated that, once he got the August 1986 letter from WHITT, he was quick to order that a C/A review be done, because the C/A System was an " essential and important > art of our nuclear recovery program."
WHITE stated that he did not recall SEllERLING ever suggesting to him that a C/A review be done. WHITE reiterated that WHITT had told him that the report of the 1985 review was " incomplete and inaccurate."
1NVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: WHITT stated (Exhibit 19) that he chose his words very carefully in his description of the draft report to WHITE, because he did not want to antagonize the team members that had prepared the draf t.
He advised that he never told WHITE that the report was inaccurate or that it contained errors.
WHITE stated that he did not recall, but that it would not have been out of character for him to have asked WHITT what he (WHITT) intended to do about the situation. WHITE reiterated that he would not have rade any type of comitment to WHITT to do another C/A review.
Wi11 fulness / intent The following evidence indicates a willful, intentional effort, on the part of the Management of NSRS, NMRG, and the Office of Nuclear Power to suppress the publication of information that would show significant deficiencies in TVA's C/A System:
1.
No report, of-any length, scope, or fors, was ever issued on NSRS' 1985 Major Management Review of C/A. This review showed significant deficiencies in TVA's C/A System.
2.
Nr updated C/A review was done, as was discussed among WHITT, WHITE, r.nd MASON in February 1986, until WHITT went over his supervisor's (SElBERLING) head with a memorandum directly to WHITE.
3.
WHITT and STEVENS opired and SE!BERLING: confirmed, that there were no plans, either by NMRG or WHITE, to do an updated C/A review until WHITT wrote his memorandum to WHITE.
i -
Case No. 2-85-031 19
4 Despite the formal and well-comunicated NSR$ position that TVA was 0
not in compliance with Appendix 8 at least in the areas of C/A and Material Traceability. TVA certified compliance to the NRC in Harch
=.
j 1986.
This certification stated that a major reason that TVA was in compliance was because problems were being corrected. The existence, at that particular time, of a recent N$R$ Report that would have documented significant problems with TVA's C/A System would not have
[
been supportive of a certification of compliance.
5.
MASON's statement that neither he nor WHITE inquired of WHITT about any significant adverse findings in the 1985 C/A review, notwith-1 standing their decision not to issue the report.
6.
WHITE's characterization of WHITT's description of the draft report.
with admittedly scant recollection, as being inaccurate, and contain-ing errors; as opposed to WHITT's positive recollection of being very careful with the wording of his description to WHITE, specifically not saying that it was inaccurate or that it contained errors, so as to not offend the team members that drafted the report.
The following evidence indicates that the Management of NSRS, NMRG Office of Nuclear Power did not willfully or intentionally suppress, or the i
information that would show significant deficiencies in TVA's C/A System:
1.
The statement of SMITH that he has never suppressed any substantiated NSRS findings that showed problems with TVA systems, up to, ar.d including the TVA General Manager himself. His statement that he never directly recomended not issuing the report to WHITT, but rather just made WHITT aware of the magnitude of the work required before it could be issued. And, his statement that he had no indication of any connection t tween the decision not to publish the report, and TVA's certification of compliance with Appendix B.
2.
The statement of WHITT that the only reasons he recomended to WHITE not to issue the report were his belief that it would take a major, time-consuming revision befoie it could be issued; and his comitment i
to TVA Board member FREEKAN that an updated review of C/A would be done.
3.
The statement of MASON that there was no connection in his mind l
between the decision not to issue the report, and the TVA efforts in responding to the NRC regarding compliance with Appendix B.
4.
The statement of SE!BERLING that the reasons he did not plan to do a C/A review, until he was directed to do so by WHITE, were that he wanted to do a preventative maintenance review first, to establish NMRG's credibility, and that he did not have sufficient staff to do an adequate C/A review in 1986.
I Conclusion The M.*nagers of both NSRS and the Office of Nuclear Power both willfully-and intentionally suppressed the formal issuance of a report of a 1985 NSRS Major Management Review of C/A.
I Case ho. 2-85 031 20 l
.. ~
A11ecation No. 4 A TVA Policy Comittee, composed of senior TVA Managers, in a March 20, 1984 Black & Yeatch (y severely downplayed the significance of the findings of theB report, allegedl System at Watts Bar. The Director, NSR$ was on this Carnittee and allegedly signed off on.the Policy Cornittee Rexrt after being made aware of the
' toning-down" of the report by the NS LS Staff.
On March 20, 1984, SEASLEY sent the Counittee's report of their BVALUATION OF BLACK AN) VEATCH INDEPENDENT REY: EW, dated March 16,1984(Exhib'try),to J. A. RAJL5 TON, Chief. Mechanica' Engineering Support Branch. The cover page of this report was signed by the members of the Independent Review Folicy Cosnittee, to include CULVER, Director, MSRS.
)
J. SMITH, NSRS member, Technical Analysis and Review Group (TARG), was 1
L interviewed on January 9,1906 (Exhibit 25).
J. SMITH stated that although B&Y l
itemized in excess of 400 findings in their design review of Watts bar's i
Auxiliary Feedwater System, the TVA Policy Committee's response to B&V's report only admitted to the validity of three findings.
J. SMITH advised.that both CULVER and James MURDOCK, the TARG Section Leader at the time, both knew that l
there were " problems" with the Policy Comittee response, but neither CULVER l
nor MURDOCK would stand up to the rest of the senior TVA managers on the Comittee.
John M. MASHBURN,(NSRS TARG member, was interviewed on June 7,1985 January 22, 1986 Exhibit 26). MASHBURN stated that the TVA Policy Comittee l
supervised the activitics of a TVA B&V Task Force.
He savised that the Task Force grouped the 428 indivioual B&V findings into 39 categories of findings.
He stated that in January 1984, MURDOCK directed the TARG to compare the.
individual B&V findings to the proposed TVA Policy Ccanittee response to these i
findings. MASHBURN stated that MURDOCK told the TARG memt>ers that he reeded this comparison so that CULVER could decide whether or not to sign off on the Policy Comittee response. He stated that the TARG was given 10 days to do i
this comparison. MASHBURN advised that some of the other members of the TAkG I
that worked with him on this project were:
Bruce SIEFKEN, J. SMITH, WASHER, Doug HORNSTRA, Dallas HICKS, Jim JONES, and Vencil O' BLOCK. MASHBURN stated that each of these members had some problems with their respective areas of
)
comparison, and reconnended that CULVER not sign off on the Policy Comittee l
l Report as it was drafted at that time. He ady' sed that he thought that CULVER went ahead and signed off on the Report regardless of their recommendations.
3 MASHBURN said that in June 1984 NSRS was still doing some work on that comparison, and at the time of the writing of the final report, MURDOCK wanted it done in a new fonnat. MASHBURN stated that the final NSR$ Report on B&V, which was numbered R-84-19-WBN (Exhibit 27), was written as if MURDOCK had done i
all the work on it himself, and it did not appear to be a team effort.
l WASHER, NSRS TARG member, was interviewed on January 23,1986(Exhibit 28).
WASHER stated that when MURDOCK assigned the TARG to do a review of the B&V findings, he (MURDOCK) divided the findings into three basic disciplines; electrical, civil / structural, and mechanical. WASHER said that he worked on the civil / structural items. WASHER identified the members, and the mission, of the group as identified by KASHBURN, above. WASHER advised that the group did as much as they could in the ten-day period, and then had a meeting with Case No. 2-85-031 21
l MURDOCK. WASHER said that every member of the group thought that the TVA Policy Comittee Report improperly concluded that the B&V findings were either-1 insignificant, not legitimate, or properly dispositioned. WASHER stated that l
the group told this to MURDOCK, and also told MURDOCK that CULVER should not sign the Policy Comittee Report in that fore. WASHER stated that the purpose of the 84Y review was to determine if TVA was meeting its FSAR design cosmit-ments, not to_ determine if a disastrous accident were going to happen. He said that the Policy Comittee Report addressed whether or not the system, and its various components, would perform their safety functions; as opposed to addressing meeting FSAR coenitments. WASHER stated that he personally knew that CULVER had reviewed the TARG findings while they were in draft fore.
1 WASHER stated that when the final NSR$ Report, pertaining to their review of l
the B&V findings, was issued in July 1984 MURDOCK wrote the conclusions, and improperly concluded, from the details of the report, that NSR$ agreed with the 1
Policy Comittee Report.
HlCKS, former NSR$ TARG member, was interviewed on February 19, 1986 (Exhibit 34). HICKS advised that in January 1984, he was involved in the NSRS l
assessment of the B&V review. He stated that he reviewed the findings that i
were associated with electrical and instrumentation / control. He stated that he 1
produced written drafts of his early findings and provided them to MURDOCK.
HlCKS said he saw EURDOCK and CULVER going over his, and the other TARG menber's, drafts together on many occasions.
HICKS stated that MURDOCK
)
disagreed with the rest of the TARG members regcrding the significance of the valid B&V findings.
HICKS said that the TARG members felt that the significant thing was that 86V found so many FSAR design comitments that were not being met by TVA.
HICKS advised that MURDOCK's view was that as long as the deviations found by B&Y would not have caused a component of the safety system i
E not to perform its design fe,nction, even if the deviations had not been detected and/or corrected, they were not significant from the standpoint of whether or not the safety system would operate in an accident condition.
HICKS 1
stated that-the TARG members had some fairly heated arguments with MURDOCK over this point. HICKS advised that he had resigned from NSRS and TVA by the time the final NSRS report of their assessment of B&V was published, but he and the J
rest of the TARG members were very disappointed when CULVER signed off on the Policy Comittee Report, i
MURDOCK, Section Leader. TARG, was interviewed on April 8,1986 (Exhibit 30).
l
'MURDOCK described the scope, objective, and initial time frame of the NSRS review of the B&V findings as was described by SMITH, MASHBURN, and WASHER, above. MURDOCK stated that his main concern was the significance of the deviations from the FSAR as they pertained to plant safety, and whether or not the affected component would have performed its safety function if the deviation had not been detected or corrected (Exhibit 30, pp. 27-28). ElRDOCK statec that his TARG had many concerns about the quality of construction at l
Watts Bar, and the B&V findings seemed to support these concerns, in their minds, but with the exception of WASHER, the members of the TARG did not do a satisfactory job of producing the specific documentation to show that a given l
issue would have prevented the systems from performing their design safety functions. MURDOCK stated that they could not even demonstrate, specifically, that the margins of safety were reduced, based upon the B&V findings of design L
deviations. MURDOCK stated that his comunications with CULVER were verbal up to the point of the final draft of the NSRS Report on their B&V revieu, and l
L Case No. 2-85-031 22
m that he (MURDOCK) expressed no concerns to CULVER about the B&V findings 4
revealing any problems with,the performance of design safety functions.
CULVER (Exhibit 2, p&V review centered on the effect of the B&V deviations
- p.62-120) stated that his conversations with MURDOCK regarding the NSR$ B performance of safety functions and that MURDOCK said that there was nothing to show that the design safety functions would not have performed. CULVER stated that he did have a discussion with MURDOCK about the fact that any deviation would reduce the margin of safety for that particular cosiponent to some degree.
He advised that since the TARG members had not quantified the reductions in margins of safety, that aspect would be inappropriate to address in the Policy Committee Letter. CULVER stated that even when he signed off on the Policy Committee letter, he made BEASLE) aware that his (CULVER's) MSRS staff were still looking at B&V, and if they found any problems, it would be documented in the final report. CULVER advised, he felt comfortable signing off on the letter as long as the statemert about being able to perfom the design safety functions was included. Plus, as he stated, his staff was still assessing the situation, and he made BEASLEY aware that he would document any safety problems if they arose subsequent to his (CULVER's) signing off on the letter. CULVEii stated that, with the exception of WASHER and HICKS, none of the TARG, below I
MURDCCK, ever came to him (CULVER) directly and expressed dissatisfaction with either the Policy Committee Letter, or the fact that he (CULVER) had signed it.
CULVER stated that WASHER had prepared a draft letter for him regarding B&V, and WASHER wanted to say that the Policy Committee Letter was a whitewash" of the B&V Review.
CULVER stated that he tolo WASHER that if he felt it necessary to 9se the word " whitewash", he (WASHER) should specifically itemize the
" hitewashed" areas and point them out to him (CULVER), because he (CULVER) would have to defend the use of that word at some point. CULVER stated that WASHER returned to his (WASHER's) office and did not come back with any i
specifics within the next few days, so he (CULVER) assumed that WASHER decided that he did not really want to use that word to describe the Policy Committee
. Letter. CULVER stated that HICKS did not come to him with any problems until the day before HlCKS was to leave TVA, after having resigned.
He advised that, i
at that time. HlCKS presented him with a thick stack of documents containing issues that HlCKS felt should be investigated at TVA. CULVER stated that he gave this list to MURDOCK and told MURDOCK to look into each one of them.
He advised that MURDOCK told him later that he (NURDOCK) had given this list to J. SMITH to.look at.
CULVER stated that he did not recall getting any results of SMITH's investigation of those issues. CULVER did Stated that the same stack of documentation that had been presented to him by HICKS in June 1984, when HICKS resigned, came to TVA from the NRC in December, after HICKS had written to Congress and the NRC Commissioners, q
INVLSTIGATOR'S NOTE: MURDOCK's interpretation of the significance of the B&V findings is the pivotal point in this particular allegation of suppression. The significant issue to the TARG members is the mere fact that BLY found that TVA had a large number of deviations from FSAR design commitments. The significant issue to MURDOCK, who was in the position to do the communicating with CULVER on this project, was whether or not these deviations would have kept the components from perfonning their design safety functions.
Since the TARG members were not documenting, to MURDOCK's satisfaction, that the design deviations would have prevented the perfonnance of safety functions, MURDOCK expressed no concern about the devi6tions to CULVER, and CULVER signed off on the TVA Policy Case No. 2-85-031 23
o Comittee letter. - From the
'4
' this concurrence by CULVER, point of view of the TARG members, however, and the wording of the Policy Committee letter e
itself, was a suppression of their expressed concerns to MURDOCK regarding
-r r
TVA not meeting its FSAR design commitments.
BEASLEY, at one time the Chairman. TVA Policy Comittee, was interviewed on May1415.1986(Exhibit 31). BEASLEY stated that in February 1982 the Regional Administrator.- Region !!. NRC suggested that TVA have an IDR done on i
the Auxiliary Feedwater System at Watts Bar. BEASLEY advised that B&Y was selected by TVA to do the IDR.
He stated that a TVA Task Force was fonsed from TVA' employees outside of NSR$ to assist B&V in the conduct of the review..
MSR$y JONES supervised the activity of this Task Force.
Henr BEASLEY stated that was heavily involved with this Task Force during the conduct of the IDR.
He advised that both NSRS and the Task Force were ensuring that TVA was properly resolving the B&V findings as the IDR progressed.
He stated that the TVA Policy Comittee published a report in March 1984, regarding this IDR. He stated that CULVER, as Director of NSRS, was on this Cemittee. He stated that-no pressure of any kind was-exerted, by anyone on the Policy Comittee, upon CULVER to sign as concurring with this Policy Committee Report.
BEASLEY stated that he did not recall CULVER having any problems with what was stated in the report. He advised that, as a matter of fact, the wording of the conclusions of the report, on pages 2 and 13, was a result of a combined effort of CULVER and MURDOCK from NSRS.'and Joe ANDERSON and John MCDONALD from the Office of QualityAssurance(0QA).
He advised that MCDONALD was the person who came to i
mind as being the most concerned <nd careful about the wording in the Report.
3 as opposed to CULVER or MURDOCK.
BEASLEY stated that although the transmittal memorandum for the Policy Comittee Report was addressed internally, within-TVA, from him (BEASLEY) to RAULSTON, he (BEASLEY) knew that this was the nonnal path for this report to follow to get to NRR.
BEASLEY advised that, after comparing the Poli:y Comittee Report to MSRS Report No R-84-19-WBN, of. July 1984, entitled Nuclear Safety Review Staff Assessment of the Results of the Black and Veatch Independent Design Review of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Auxiliary Feedwater System, he was still very comfortable with the statements in the. Policy Comittee Report.
_i11 fulness / Intent W
The testimony shows that the TVA Policy Committee and NSRS Management were aware that NRC would be reviewing the actual B&V Report of their IDR. and 4
-therefore NRC would be aware of each of the specific deviations from the TSAR Design commitments. Therefore, since there were no admissions from either NSRS..or TVA Policy Conunittee Management, regard 1hg any attempts to cover-up, or tone-down, these B&V findings,' there is not a preponderance of evidence to show a willful suppression of infonnation regarding these i
findings in the TVA Pc,licy Committee Repvrt on the B&V IDR.
. Conclusion From the viewpoint of the TARG members, the Policy Coanittee Report suppressed, or toned-down, the significance of the findings of the TARG members in their analysis of the B&V findings.
From th6t standpoint, since these member's comments and conclusions were not included in the Policy Comittee Report, the allegation of-suppression is technically substantiated. However, since the evidence shews that these NSRS findings Case No. 2-85-031 24 v
7 g.
were eventuall blished in the NSR$ Report on 88Vband the testimony shows=that NSR nagement looked at the TARG membe s findings from the aspect of actual perfonnance of the system safety functions, the suppression is not significant.
Allegation No. 6 An WSR$ member alleged that the NSRS Director suppressed information, in that the Director did not issue a memorandum to the General Manager of TVA, pertain-1 ing to the requirement to retain QA records on Pipe Support Calculations. The NSR$ member had drafted this memorandum to the General lianager, because Line.
Management had been unresponsive to NSR$' recommendation, in an earlier published report, that these missing Pipe Support Calculations be recreated.
WASHER was interviewed on January 23,1986(Exhibit 28). WASHER stated that NSRS Report No..R-84-07 WBN (Exhibit 32) pertained to the NSRS investigation of the reclassification, from safety significant to non Safety significant of a i
non-conformance report (NCR), regarding the missing Pipe Support Calculations.
WASHER advised that this NSRS Report reconmended that:
(1) Classify the NCR as safety significant, (2) issue a 50.55(e) report to NRC, and (3) recreate and preserve the missing calculations. WASHER stated that the NSRS report was issued about April 6,1984, and PARRIS, the Manager of Power issued a response to the report (Exhibit 33) that created an impasse to the execution of the NSRS recommendations. WASHER advised that, because of this impasse, he drafted a memorandum to the General Manager of TVA, W. F. WILLIS, from CULVER (Exhibit 34), which explained the logic of the reclassification of the NCR, reporting to the NRC, and the requirement to recreate and retain the records.
i WASHERstatedthathisSectionLeader,MURDOCK,toldhim(WASHER)thatCULVER said that the memorandum would not go out. WASHER described a subsequent technical meeting regarding the calculations, but stated that nothing was done by the Line regarding the recommendations in his MSRS Report until the Chattanooga Times did an article on the Report. WASHER stateo that, after this article was published, suddenly a new NCR was issued, classi'fying the earlier NCR as safety significant, and a 50.5S(e) report was issued to NRC.
CULVER (Exhibit 2, r,p. 138-148) stated that his concern was that the pipe supports were prcperly and safely installed and designed. He advised that al7 he wanted was to get enough of a sampling of calculations to assure this proper design and instaliation. He stated that he was also concerned, along with WASHER, that the missing calculations constituted a QA records violation.
CULVER stated that he believed that the NCR would have been reclassified even if the Chattanooga Times had not done an article on it. He advised that the f
NSRS communication with the Lint was not good because WASHER was not willing to compromise at all, and therefore, the response to WASHER's recommendations was slow. CUI.VER advised that he had personally discussed the issue with WILLIS and the Board of Directors, and assured himself that the Boa-d and General Manager were going to put some pressure on the Line to comply with WASHER's reconenendations. After this meeting, a fonnal memorandum to WILLIS regarding this issue was not necessary.
CULVER advised that he did not recall when the issue came out in the newspaper, but that the NRC had become aware of the NSRS Report, and they (NRC)-had been giving some guidance to-the Line Organization regarding the calculations.
Case Ho. 2-85-031 25 l
1
Willfulness / Intent The following evidence shows w111 fulness and intent on the part of CULVER to suppress the recommendations of WASHER as stated in NSRS Report R-84-07-WBN:
1.
CULVER's non-issuance of WASHER's draft memorandum to WILLIS.
2.
CULVER's opinion that WASHER was inflexible and non-communicative with the Line representatives on the issue.
CULVER's mixing of the issue of:
(1) are the 3.
designedandinstalled,withtheissueof.(2)pipesupportsproperly the quality assurance records required for each pipe support, as applied to the question of J
how many calculations needed to be done.
The following evidence shows a lack of willfulness / intent on the part of CULVER regaroing the alleged suppression:
1.
The original NSRS report, R-84-07-WBN, was issued as WASHER wanted.
2, CULVER's stetement that he had verbally requested that the General Manager and the Board put some pressure on the Line to carry out the recomendations in the NSRS Report.
Conclusion The preponderance of evidence developed shows that CULVER suppressed
]
infortnation that WASHER ielt was necessary to formalize in a memorandum to the General Manager.
The allegation is substantiated.
Allegation No. 6 NSRS member J. SMITH alleged that CULVER suppressed information by not publish-ing a report of a review done by him (J. SMITH) and MASHBURN on fire protection, Appendix R.
J. SMITH stated (Exhibit 25) that in 1984, after the Sequoyah Thimble Tube incident (referred to directly in Allegation No. 8 of this report) a new " era" Started for NSRS, in that NSRS reports were being obtained by the Knoxville and Chattanooga newspapers.
J. SMITH stated that in tis new " era" NSRS Management was much more careful about toning-down the wording in the reports.
J. SMITH stated that soon after the Thimble Tube incident, he and MASH 8 URN did an Appendix R, fire protection review.
J. SMITH stated that CULVER decided not to issue the report, and that he (J. Sd!TH) did not know why.
J. SMITH provided a i
copy of the draf t Appendix R report (Exhibii. 35).
l MASHBURN stated (Exhibit 26) that ha and J. SMITH did an Appendix R review in July 1984 He stated that he felt that his findings as stated in the draft report were damaging to TVA, and therefore, his supervisor did not issue the report.
~
CUtVER stated (Exhibit 2, pp,107-112) that he had initially assigned J. SMITH and MASHBURN to do a review of Appendix R because he (CULVER) anticipated that
{
Case fio. 2-85-031 26
1 tit tould be an areal of interest with the TVA Board of Directors, and he wanted
- ' to be able to answer their-questions about TVA's status on fire protection.
CULVER advised that 'the issue went away? before J.-SMITH and MA$H8 URN ever got 5
a-report out_on their review.
CULVER stated that, therefore, he decided not to 4
issue the. report _because:'the issue is all gone." CULVER stated that he never m*_
saw the draft report, but he did order that work be stopped on the final report. He advised that he did not, "believe in writing reports (,just) to put m'
j into the file."
James C. STONE. NRR.- NRC, reviewed the draft Appendix R Report No. R-84 24-NPS, entitled Reviow of TVA's Exoerience in the laclementation of 10 CFR 50.
Accendix R.
En his memorandum report of this review, sated December Iti,1987 (Exhibit 36, p. 5), STONE concluded that' the report "would have been of minimal value to TVA Management.
The decision by NSR$ management not to issue
- the report appears to be reasonable."
Willfulness / Intent The NRC staff conclusion regarding the value of the contents of the draft Appendix R report, plus CULVER's statements that he ordered the report not i
to be issued, without having reviewed it, show evidence of a lack of willfulness / intent to suppress significant safety information.
l Conclusion By the fact that the report was not issued, the allegation of suppression 1
of information is substantiated.
Allegation No. 7 i
NSRS members alleged that the letter of transmittal of an NSRS Report of Investigation into the termination of both a TVA, and a TVA Contract employee, indicated that the terminations were proper, when the report itself showed that the termination of the TVA employee was improper.
i
.This NSRS Report of investigation, No. I-82-19-W6N, entitled, Investication of Alleged Improper Termination-of Services of a Personal Services Contract Employee, along with its letter of transmittal, dated October 25, 1982, is attached to this report as Exhibit 37.
Claude M. KEY, TVA Employee, fonner NSRS member, was interviewed on 1
January 9-10, 1986 (Exhibit 38, pp. 2-3).
KEY stated that he was very unhappy 1
~
- with the cover letter the anssi Report of Investigation of the termination of KEY stated that HARRIS 0N a g JONES were two of the NSR$ invest ga ors o is matter.
KEY advised that M were' terminated because they had written some inspection re, ject @' on notices (IRN's) on some-pipe supports, based upon verbal information from members of _ the craft, rather than based upon actual inspection-of these pipe supports. KEY stated that the N nyes rs wrote a report that concluded that the TVA termination of both KEY advised that TVA's Office of Genera Counse $(was "an improper action.
0GC) got involved with the writing of this report, and wanted to change the report to reverse the -
findings. He stated that the NSRS investigators would only sign the report if
'it went out as they had originally written it. KEY stated that, due to this
' Case No. 2-85-031 27
stance by the investigators, the report tas issued as they trote it, but the~
cover letter, critten by CULVER, said essentially that "TVA management has the i
> prerogative to terminate, and that the termination decision ces proper." KEY stated that the cover letter disagreed entirely with the report findings.
2' INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:- 0 over letter showed that it stated
'the official reason for termination was that they.
falsified inspection documents by wri g IRN's on pipe supports that.had' not beer, physically inspected. The NSR$ investigation showed that that situation was a fact. The. cover letter went on to state that TVA manage--
ment had a right to impose terstnation as a disciplinary action in such a situation. This es another statement of fact. The cover 1 0 er did not make any connent abwt the propriety of these particular terminations, one way or the other. The attached NSR$ Investigation Report showed that the
-)
rejection of the p s
ithout physical inspection, was reason--
1 able in that after ected some of the i-pipe supports, the craft told them that the rest of the supports tha'
, eere going to inspe been nstalled the same way.
L TheReportitu.'goesontoshowhowj (the Contract employee) was-disliked by the craft, due to some ear ier rejections, and was apparently
" set up" by the craft for this termination. The report also concluded that 6 (the TVA employee) was fire rimarily for reasons of "consis -
'tency" after the decision to fire had been made, it is noted,-
_I however, that th tual t did not directly conclude that the L
terwinations of were improper.
Rather, it tried to show this impropriety direct y making statements in'the CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Section, Section 111., A., 4. and 5. (Exhibit 42, p. 6) such as:
"The actions subsequently taken regarding @ m consistent with the _
1 general philosophy at the site that shoppers can be removed for any valid reason or for no reason."
M was considered to be a good inspector but appears to have been caught up in the events surrounding $......
Former NSRS members Gerald G. BRANTLEY (Exhibit 39, interview of 3-13-66, p. 2) and JONES (Exhibit 40, pp. 1-2) stated their concern about the difference in Lthe cover letter and the actual investigation report as was expressed by KEY.
JONES stated that HARRIS 0N told him that he (HARRISON):had nothing to do with-
-the writing of the cover letter, and that CULVER had drafted that letter himself.
HARRISON, in an earlier 01 interview on June 5,1985 (Exhibit 41), which was-
. conducted during the course of O! investigation 2-85-009, plana-tion of the circumstances surrounding the temination of f
basically as described in the INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE, above, statetthat
~
he discussed with CULV R his" gut feeling" about the actual reason that g
, was terminated. HARRIS 0N stated that CULVER understood these " gut feelings", but without factual documentation, such-4 feelings would not support an actual conclusion in the report.
CULVER (Exhibit 2 1-131) stated that during the preparation of the NSRS Report on the nyestigation, he spent a lot of time talking to Case No. 2-85-031 28 j
3 J'
TVA OGC., CULVER advised that he and HARRIS 0N both realized that contract C
=,'
. employees could be terminated at any time, for almost any reason except doiN a good job.. He that they both felt that the circumstances surrounding the; termination of were not a good basi t rid of him." He stated
~that they both rea ited-that, technically, had done something wrong,
.)
but' that the circumstances-did not justify termination. CULVER stated 4
' that, "we had real differences of opinion with 06C."'! CULVER stated that he and HARRISON dealt with William E. MASON,_06C on this matter.1 He advised that this was the first,-and last, NSR$ Report, under his management, that ir.cluded
' legal implications." He advised that, after that report, NSRS just reported on the technical issues, and if the matter needed legal consideration, the final report would be sent to 0GC.
CULVER, stated that he wrote the cover letter himself, and because of 06C's involvement, he " carefully selected" the words the transmittal letter, but the attached report detailed the circum-stances of both terminations.
MASON was interviewed on May 13,1986(Exhibit 42). MSON stated that e nly i
recalleddiscussingd h situation with CULVER.. MASON advised that had filed an interna TVA grievance regarding his termination, and that OGC had not been involved in that edure. MAS tated, additionally, that his i
interface with CULVER on was because had filed a complaint with the l
DOL, and OGC was the inter ace with DOL on ese complaints. MASON stated that, from reviewing his OGC file on the matter, OGC had req an' investigation by NSRS into the safety issues surrounding the situation. MASON stated that one of his objectives in meeting w CULVER was to ensure that there was a unified TVA position taken regarding the termination of @ MASON stated that he persuaded CULVER, and another NSRS representative, whom he could not positively recall id indeed have job-shopper. -MASON advised that he did not see $, that TVA the justification and prerogative to tenninete bdcause was a any disparity or conflict between *he NSRS Report and its cover letter.
STONE, NRR/NRC, (Exhibit 36) concluded from his review that, "The transmittal letter was misleading.... but the report was available for review...
there-fore, there was no suppression of information."
W111 fulness / Intent There is not a preponderance of evidence of wi11 fulness / intent on the part of either CULVER ppress the circumstances surrounding.the terminations of Conclusion
.The allegation of suppression is not substantiated.
A11ecation No. _8 An NSRS member alleged that the Director, NSRS watered-down, or toned-down NSRS reports issued'after the NSRS Report on the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON)
Thimble Tube Ejection event, because the NRC Regional Administrator. Region !!
told the NSR$ Director to stop using " purple words" (inflamatory, excessively descriptive adjectives / adverbs) in the NSRS reports.
"o Case No. 2-85-031 29 g
b
~
j
= BRANTLEYl(Exhibit 34) stated that WHITT told hia (BRANTLEY) that
~
James P. O'REILLY, former NRC Re
. airport.L
- jumped on" hia (WHITT)gional Administrator, Region !!, while at an about the ' purple words that were contained-
_ in the NSR$ Thimble Tube Report..
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: The MSR$ Report of their investigation of.the' circumstances surrounding the ejection of thimble tubes at SQN was highly q
critical of SQN site _ personnel for performing,o criticized t at power, the operation Licensee Event Report TLER) for not describing the severity of the event.
that resulted in the edection. The report a s
The additional significance of this report is that it was the first NSRS report to become available to the news media, and the SQN site management and the NRC Regional Administrator had seen the newspaper accounts of the report.
)
.WHITT was interviewed on April 10,1986(Exhibit 43,pp.86-g1). WHITT stated I
that after the issuance of the Thimble Tube Report and'its letter of trans-mittal, he happened to run into O'REILLY at the airport in Atlanta on his 1
-(WHITT's) way to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. WHITT advised that O'REILLY said that he had seen an article about the Thimble Tube Event, with quotes from the NSRS report and cover letter, in a special edition of Nucleonics Week. WHITT
- stated that O'REILLY asked him if he really felt as strongly about the event as was characterized in the paper.
WHITT stated that he told O'REILLY that,
" Guess we did. We didn't know it was going to get in the paper." He advised that O'REILLY then said, "You need to almost consider that anything you report is _ probably going to get in the paper. ' Good words nothin except purple words can get you in trouble unnecess,arily."g wrong with them
- WHITT stated that he knew what the term " purple words" meant from having worked at NRC with O'REILLY.
WHITT stated that he did not interpret this as any kind of threct, or attempt at suppression of NSRS Reports by O'REILLY.
He advised that the conversation had-no effect on the wording of future NSRS regorts. He stated that he considered the conversation " constructive criticism by O'REILLY.
'l WHITT did state, however, that his awareness of the fact that his reports were
.i J
going to be "in the public domain" in the future made him choose his words more
{
carefully in subsequent NSRS reports and cover letters.
O'REILt.Y was interviewed on May 21, 1906 (Exhibit 44).
O'REILLY stated that he did-not specifically-recall a chance meeting with WHITT at the Atlanta airport in which they discussed the Thimble Tube incident.- He advised, however, that:
this meeting and discussion, could well have taken place, and that if it had, the phrase, purple words" could well have been used by him because he used that expression.
O'REILLY stated that if that phrase was used by himiit would have been used in a constructive manner and that he would never try ta inhibit NSRS' reporting in any way.
O'REILLY defined his meaning of " purple words" as being "the use of descriptions, depth of coments, adjectives, adverbs, and scope of activities that describe a given event more negatively than the facts of the actual event, or situation, dictate."
Willfulness / Intent There is no evidence in the te'stimony of either WHITT or O'REILLY that shcws a willful, intentional act on the part of 0'REILLY to suppress -
infonnation in NSRS Reports.
I:
\\
Case No. 2-85-031 30 o
)
J
}
l a
Conclusion
~
[
The allegation is not substantiated.
C Allegation'No. 9 An NSR$ member alleged that the MSRS Director deleted sections of a memorandum, drafted by the alleger, that addressed significant aspects ~of structural weld problems at TVA. This memorandum was from the Director, MSRS to the Director.
0QA, regarding an NSRS-investigation of the 0QA dispositioning of some QA-type findings th6t NSR$ had turned over to 00A.
7, 1
$1EFKEN, NSRS member, was interviewed by 0! on June 7,1985, and January 17
-1986(Exhibit 45).
SIEFKEN stated that in 1983, MSR$ had developed a list of QA-type findings regarding welding that they (NSRS) had turned over to 0QA for dispositioning. He advised that two months after giving 0QA these findings, NSRS did their first review of OQA to see how well they were dispositioning-
.these items. He stated that he found two areas where, in his opinion. 0QA was improperly closing out NSRS weld findings. He advised that he drafted a memorandum from CULVER to ANDERSON, that specified why these items were being closed out improperly by 00A. SIEFKEN advised that the final memorandum that a
was issued did not contain his (SIEFKEN's) coments on:
(1) weld-
)
configuration, or (2) the conflicts in welding procedures and guidelines.
SIEFKEN stated that this was the only problem that he had with suppression of infomation by NSRS Management.
SIEFKEN provided copies of drafts 0-3 of this memorandum, along with three pages of coments by CULVER and WHITT on draft No.
2, plus a copy of the final Memo as it went to ANDERSON (Exhibit 46).
WHITT stated (Exhibit 43, pp. 75-86) that he remembered being involved with NSRS members HARRISON and JONES more than SIEFKEN in the preparation of this memorandum to ANDERSON. WHITT identified both his and CULVER's handwriting on the three-page sheet of coments that had been provided by SitFKEN, regarding the memorandum. WHITT stated that the reason that all the areas of discussion in the drafts were not included in the final memorandum was because he, HARRISON, and JONES had discussed all the proposed areas at length, and had 1
decided not to include some of the topics because, "... we... didn't have j
enough amunition to deal with them.... some-of them were inadequately stated, l
and some of those items made in comparison were just plain wrong...."
He advised that he knew that the. items that were going to be included in the= final memo to ANDERSON were going to be sensitive, so'NSRS needed to be on very solid
)
ground-on those issues. WHITT stated that when the final memorandum was issued, it precipitated, "one of the mos't serious confrontations that NSRS had...."
He clarified that the NSRS confrontation was with 0QA. WHITT stated that-he knew' that NSRS was going to addres:: the items that were not included in this memorandum at a later time, and that he was not, in any way, suppressing safety information by not including these items in the August 1983 memorandum.
CULVER (Exhibit 2,pp.131-138) stated that the only reason SIEFKEN got involved in the NSRS review of the welding issues that he had turned over to OQA for. dispositioning, was that he (SIEFKEN) was looking at 0QA perfomance in closing.the issues out. CULVER stated that the reason NSRS was writing a J
report on the welding issues, and a separate memorandum on the OQA performance in dispositioning these issues, was that he (CULVER) did not want to "...get that whole issue of welding cluttered up with a review of 0QA." CULVER stated Case No. 2-85-031 31
q lthat he. '*...had 'an awful hard time getting anything _out of Bruce (S!EFKEN) that tas meaningful.'. CULVER stated that his only real recollection about what SIEFKEN wrote was that it was difficult to understand. CULVER stated that he 4 '. -
did not. remember the specifics of what was included, and what was not included..
in that memorandum, well enough to cossnent on it in a meaningful manner.
W111 fulness / Intent i
It appears from the testimony that the deletions from SIEFKEN's early drafts were made because of MSRS anticipation of a confrontation with 0QA i
over the memorandum, and NSRS wanted to make certain that the issues they.
did bring up with OQA were well-docuinented and defensible. The evidence shows that the deletions were made _by NSRS mana because the sections deleted were either wrong,gement (primarily WHITT) c' *nsufficiently based.
Conclusion The allegation of suppression of infonnation is unsubstantiated.
Allegation No. 10 An NSRS member alleged that the NSRS Director was unresponsive to nuclear safety issues presented by the alleger at the time of his resignation.
HICKS (Exhibit 29, pp. 63-68).-stated that NSRS Director CULVER did not take any action on a written list of safety concerns that he (HICKS) presented to CULVER at the time of his (HlCKS) resignation from NSRS and TVA.
CULVER (. Exhibit 2, pp. 90-92) stated that the first time he got any indication of how-concerned HICKS was about the B&V IDR and the problems it identified was when HICKS came in his (CULVER's) office on the day of his (HICKS) resigna-tion from TVA. CULVER stated that he wanted to talk to HICKS about why the TARG was not performing any better than it was, but HICKS dropped a thick stack of papers on his (CULVER's) desk and said, "Here are all the technical problems." CULVER stated that he told HICKS that he would give the stack to MURDOCK for follow-up, but that he (CULVER) did not want to talk about technical problems on hlCKS' last-day. CULVER stated that he really did not get much of anything out of HICKS regarding the perfonnance of the TARG because HICKS only wanted to talk about the technical issues.- CULVER stated that he gave HICKS' technical. issues to MURDOCK, and told MURDOCK that he needed to look at every one of the issues.
CULVER advised that MURDOCK told him that he gave the issues to J.-SMITH for follow-up. CULVER stated that he did not get much of anything in the way of follow-up from J. SMITH. CULVER advised that c
. the naxt time he saw this'" stack" of issues was when the NRC was fo11 ewing'them up after HICKS had sent them to the NRC Connissioners.
Willfulness / Intent i
F d augh there is evidence that CULVER anticipated that J. SMITH would not
&a detailed follow-up of HICKS' technical concerns, there is not a-l preponderance of evidence that shows a willful' intentional effort on the 4
part of CULVER to suppress nr ignore safety concerns.
i l
j,
- e No. 2-85-031 32 L
L I
I
^
Conclusions-a
.The allegation of suppression, or undue delay, in the resolution.of safety 1
'7 J.
concerns is unsubstantiated.-
- ]
~
Group (3) - Both H/l and Suppression'of Information A11ecation Nos.- 11._12, 13. and 14-1 WHITT and KIDD in a continuing manner because of GUITY' gainst by NSRS NSRS member Mansour'GUITY was allegedly discriminated a s insistence on s' l
stringent, non-negotiable approach to investigating and reporting nuclear safety problems.
In each of the four following MSRS investigations, conducted
.by GUITY, this pattern of H/I alleged y continued, and, in association with this alleged discrimination, suppress on of. infonnation by NSRS Managers i
allegedly:took place.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: These H/l issues, both within NSRS and other TVA o
divisions in which GUITY was employed, were investigated by-the Wage and i
Hour Compliance Section, DOL. Their report of investigation is attached as
?
Exhibit-47.
DOL's Investigative Report and Exhibits were reviewed by O!
and found to be thorough, with logical conclusions. DOL substantiated discrimination against GUITY at TVA, both within NSRS, and in other Divisions.
Investigation of the associated suppression of information issues was accomplished by 01 as a supplement to the DOL H/1 investiga-tions.
Allegation No. 11 GUITY alleged that WHITT and HARRISON were not going to permit him (GUlTY) to inclu'e details in a report of his investigation of electrical cable routing at d
- Watts Bar, until he (GUITY) threatened to tell the NRC.
-GUITY was interviewed on June 6, 1985, and January 15, 1986 (Exhibit 48).
I GUITY stated that, in-the writing of his report on the cable routing investiga-tion, he had written four detailed sections which clarified and amplified his findings. He stated that WHITT and HARRISON did not want to include these sections in the report.- He stated:that they wanted to write a sumary report
~
and keep the detailed sections as supplements.
GUITY stated that the detailed sections were necessary to properly explain the findings, and that the report-would be useless without them. GUITY stated that', under pressure from HARRISON, he worked at home and prepared a 20 page condensed report. He advised that when he gave this condensed report to HARRISON, he (GUITV). told HARRISON that if no action was taken by the TVA Line Organization on the cable problems, he (GUITY) would go to the NRC. GUITY stated that the next day he had a meeting with WHITT, HARRISON, and BRANTLEY, who had been assigned to help him-(GUITV) write the condensed report. GUITY advised that he told WHITT that he wanted the report to be published with his original detailed sections.
He stated that WHITT then took the approach of letting him write the report the way he wanted, but would try to modify various sections and set him (GUITY) to agree to the modifications. GUITY stated that the cable routing report finally was issued as,he wanted, but only after he had threatened to go to the NRC.
i L
Case No. 2-85-031 33 L
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7 HARRIS 0N (Exhibit 6, pp. 6144) stated that he was the team leader or. that cable investigation and report. He advised that the cable problems-that were
~
4
. discovered were' incidental to-their investigation of an employee concern, and that the employee concern itself was not substantiated. HARRISON advised that the team had voluminous technical cable infonnation to connunicate, with no good fomat for doing it. He stated that he suggested the report be written in summary fonn ' with four appendices dealing with the technical areas. He stated that he' wrote the suunary and GUITY wrote the appendices. He advised that he (HARRISON) took these appendices with him to e meeting with the Manager of power in Chattanooga. He stated that he gave copies of the appendices to Bob CANTRELL, Manager, Office of Engineering, and that CANTRELL stated that he would respond to those technica issues in draft, and would prepare to initiate
-C/A. HARRISON said that when he told WHITT about the meeting with PARRIS and
'CANTRELL, one of the things he (HARRISON) and WHITT briefly considered was to issue only a sumary report and reference the appendices that had alreadg been provided. HARRISON stated that that idea only lasted "a couple of hours because he, WHITT, KIDD, and GUITY had a meeting and decided that, "We wanted all the information officially transmitted." HARRISON stated that he thought it was KIDD who decided that he did not want to issue the abbreviated report with four appendices, so he (HARRISON) directed that all the infomation be put into the standard NSRS report format.
HARRISON stated that, at one point, GUITY was asked by WHITT or WILLIS, General Manager of TVA, to prepare a sumary of the report for the Board of Directors. HARRISON stated that he l
could-not imagine how GUITY could have confused that task.with being ordered to write a condensed version of the report itself, but it could'have happened.
HARRISON stated that he did not recall GUITY stating that he (GUITY)~ would go to the NRC if the report was not written the way GUITY wanted.
WHITT stated (Exhibit 43, pp. 66-75) that KIDD assigned HARRISON and GUITY to do the investigation of an employee concern regarding cable routing. WHITT l
advised that the next time he had any involvement with this investigation was when, "..they put together what they called a report....
Had very little resemblance to reports we nomally put out...." WHITT advised that it was a short report with six or seven big attachments. He statea that, in that form, it was.a very difficult report to follow.
He advised that he had had no interaction with GUITY regarding the report at that time, and he (WHITT) understood it was HARRISON's idea to put the report together in that fonn with the attachments. WHITT stated he told HARRISON at that time the report would i
have to be written in the standard NSRS format. He advised that HARRISON put GUITY to work rewriting the report, and it was done very quickly. He stated i
that he still had a problem with the report because GUITY was quoting long.
sections of various documents in the body of the report. He stated that he 1
told GUITY that he should take the salient points from the documents and explain them'in the body of_ the report, but if he (GUITY) felt it was important L
that the reader look at the whole document, that document should be made an L
attachment to the report. WHITT stated that GUITY did not argue much about this, but tha?. it was going to mean a lot more work for GUITY on the report, so, after a restless night s sleep on the matter, WHIT' told GUITY anc HARRISON that he (WHITT) was going to make an exception and let the report go out as GUITY had written it, with the long verbatim quotes from the various documents.
l l_
WHITT stated that he just wanted to get the report to the Line Organization quickly so they could get to work on it. WHITT stated that at no time in the j
L evolution of that report did he ever intend to "...take out any of the infonna-tion in the report or to reduce it or anything like that " WHITT stated that J
E l
Case No. 2-85-031 34 g
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.-he 'did not recall GUITY talking to' hia directly ebout going to the CC, but he (WHITT) did recall MARRIS0N mentioning'something.to his that GUITY thought-that
=,
J L
het(WHITT) cight be trying to keep something out of the report..and that GUITY.
. as. thinking ~4 bout going to the NRC. WHITT stated that there was. absolutely no~
V.-:
w
- basis. for'GUITY: to think that he.(WHITT) would be trying to protect TVA Line 9
~
- Managers by toning down the report. He stated that.- to.he contrary, he was anxious to get the report out and that-he had no friends in Design or
="
Construction that he was:trying to protect.
,111 fulness / Intent W
L"
.There is evidence, from WHITT's testimony about his care in wording NSRS
-reports after the Sequoyah Thimble Tube incident in 1984., that WHI"T might?
' have difficulty issuing a report, such as this sensitive cable report, as written by GUITY.-without an effort to soften the wording.
There is also. evidence from the testimony of both HARRISON and WHITT, that G
- GUITY may have been a bit confused about just exactly what he was writing when he was writing what he called a " condensed report.'" This could have:
l been the 'sumary briefing for WILLIS and the Board of Directors.
There is evidence, from the' testimony of CULVER in the Background Section-of this report that there was no-firm NSRS method of handling NSRS findings with the Line Organization.. Therefore, the provhion of the draft detailed sections of the report to CANTRELL-by HARRISON, and the y
resulting assumption that the Line could take action on those sections, with only the necessity of issuing a short, sumary report that referred to these sections, was a realistic assumption in HARRISON's mind, but not in GUITY's.
Conclusions 1
i
= As csncluded by 00L, the actions by NSRS Management wiW regard to the l
reporting of the cable routing investigation were part_ of-a continuing act of discrimination against GUITY'for being uncompromising in fully report-ing-safety concerns.
The fact that the report was issued in the fonn that GUITY' originally desired, plus the testimony of WHITT and HARRISON denying any effort at suppression, with their logical explanation of the-possibility of a i
'sumary report in this case, results in the conclusion that the allegation of suppression of infomation in this case is not substantiated.
j s
'A11ecation No. 12 i
GUITY alleged that,'during his. investigation of an employee concern regarding cable crimping (electrical tenninations), he uncovered an instance of-H/I, ana j
his MSRS Management would not pemit him to pursue that part of the investiga-tion.. GUITY also alleged that BEA'3 LEY attempted to make him (GUITY) tone-down p,
J K
his findings in the report uf this investigation.
4 W
GUITY' stated (Exhibit 48) that during his investigation of a matter involving cable' crimping, he uncovered evidence that TVA harassed and intimidated the individual that had surfaced the crimping problems.
GUITY advised that NSRS Case No. 2-85-031 35 t
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. Management did not' permit him to investigate the N/I aspect of the case. GUITY Y
advised that he did. find out that QTC was investigating this H/1~ aspect while
'l he was doing the technical portion of the investigation.- He stated that when.
t he completed this investigation, he aNst have had seven or.eight meeting's with BEASLEY in which BEASLEY tried to get him;(6UITY) to tone down his report on Lthe cable crimping problem. GUITY stated that he did not get appropriate ;
a support from NSR$ Management'in these meetings with BEASLEY..
' DOL-inhrview of Frederick J. SLA6LE, NSR$ ' member, (Exhibit
)onFebruaryl0,.
1986. Wesulted in' SLAGLE advising as followst He stated thet he worked with GUITY on the cable crimping investigation and that NARRIS0N specifically told' n.
him and GUITY not to~1ook at the H/l aspect of \\the matter. SLAGLE stated that-they started the investigation in April or. May 1985, and finished it in July of i
thatLyear. He advised that-he was assigned to Watts Bar, so GUITY finished up-1 with the writing of the report.
SLAGLE stated that he thought.that there was NSRS Management pressdre to tone down the C/A'that he and GUITY had recomendted in the report.
He stated that the report finally went out with the C/A stated Y
4 as he and GUITY desired.
1 a
DOL interview of WHITT (Exhibit 50) on January 23,1986, resulted in WHITT j
stating that he agreed with 00!TY's findings and recommended C/A in the. cable H
crimping investigation.' WHITT stated that he went--to the Manager of Power, PARR!t with this issues and that the Line people at Sequoyah took care of the.
s problem. WHITT stated that, contrary to trying to tone down the report, he thought it was-a good review.and report, and he (WHITT) agreed:with GUITY and
-took action on it.
Wi11 fulness / intent i
The Cable Crimping report, as testified by GUITY, SLAGLE, and WHITT, was*
issued with the recomended C/A as -GUITY desired.
SLAGLE's testimony about NSRS Mana.gement pressure to tone down the 1
recomended C/A was hearsay and not from direct knowledge.
WHITT stated that he agreed with GUITY in this matter and personally took up the cause with TVA' Line Management.
L Conclusions It is. concluded, in consonance with DOL, that the treatment of GUITY in this matter was.a factor in the overall finding that GUITY was discrim-
- inated against due to his persistence in reporting safety related findings l
p, and requiring proper C/A.
m
- Although BEASLEY was not interviewed regarding.his alleged efforts to tone A
down_the C/A in this. report. even if these al'eged efforts were made,-the fact that the report was issued as GUITY desired refutes the substantiation of the allegation of. suppression of information in this I
instance.
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Y i-T iA11ecation No? 13
\\
N a'>N GUITY alleged that his investigation into en extortion letter involving the-i Authorized Nuclear Inspectors (ANI's), wasiprematurely sespended. and that he was not permitted to pursue an indication of possible collhoton between the-w 3
xAN!'s and some TVA Managers.
i
^
h GUITY kExhibit 48), stated that HARRIS 0N interruptoc' his (GUITY's) wr1Ging of ti S
report of investigation into diesel generators at Sequoyah.to assi Jinvestiflation that had.been requested ty the TVA General Manager. gn him to an y
aN He. advised
\\ that th's matter involved an extortion letter that had been received by TVA' a
pertaining to the AN.I's.. He stated that this,was in late August-1985. He stated that soon thereafter, he develo>ed information that indicated possible collusiorNbetween TVA and the AN!'s.
ie stated that suddenly, his investiga
' tion was suspended as of. November 15, 1985.
GUITY stated that he requestedq in-writing, to be removed from the ANI investigation, because he was constantly being required to brief so nany different people on the case.
GUITY stated i
that he was continually being reminded by his NSRS(Management that the V
42 e
collusion asper,t of this case was not to;be a part of his report.
He stated g-that the case had essentially been at a standstill since November 15, partially s
kh because of a confusion in policy regarding the granting of confidentiality to NS A witnasses in the case.
s
' HARRISON stated..in his-statt. ment to DOL (Exhibit 51h that GUITY was assigned.
l-
,y the XNI investigation because he (GUITY) wasia good investigator. HARRIS 0h 3 stated that GUITY wan finding a lot of. ihfomation in "legallareas,* ar:d was under a lot ofLpressure-regarding the dissemination of that infomation ;He' 1
advised that.both TVA/0GC and the F8L were involved, and that OGC needed >
constant updating r,n GUITY's findings. HARRISON stated that, right at that
- time, GUITY; wgs transferred from his (HARRISON's) supervision to SAVER's, and A
'that KIDD and WHITT also got, involved in the ANI matter. HARRISON stated that they were> not trying to " crush" GVITY, but that the combination of. the sensi--
I tive information being needed to be. disseminated and the additional number of Q
NSRS Management that.got involved in the' case resulted in more pressure than s
GUITY could handle, p
L U K10D stated, in his staterent to ' DOL (Exhibit 52), that GUITY fdlt that N$RS N
should handle:all aspects of the ANI investigation, not just the' technical', s
]
nuclear safety aspects.
KIDO stated that OGC was mandated to handle any J
infomation regarding wrongooing on the part of a TVA emplovee. 3He advised
^
that the problem in the ANI investigation was that NSRS could not get the d
,necessary infornation to OGC because GUITY had granted come witnesses a
" guaranteed confidentiality," as opposed cc the " qualified confidentiality" y
that NSRS was supposed to grant.
The " qualified confidentiality" reent that the witness should be advised that-certain 7egal ramifications may mde it
. impossible to preserve the confidentiality when the matter, is taken to'a final-r s
m L
i,
. resolution. 'KIDD stated that GUITY granted " ironclad"Jconfidentf alityi and the J
1 Tla case remained at a standstill for a period'of time while NSRS and CGC tried toi J\\:
- figure out a solution to the confidenttality problem. KIDD stated that GUITY l
s d
was-frustrated.that hs, as a representative of NSRS, was nott being pemitted to investigate ell aspects of the ANI matter, and he (GUITY) wote a letter of-Q resignation from the casa to WHITT on' November 15, 1985.
ai Case No. 7-85 031 37 i
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W111 fulness / Intent There was not a preponderance of evidence to indicate that NSRS or 0GC Management, willfully or intentionally tried to suppress infonnation of possible collusion between TVA knagement and the ANI's (Hartford Steam BoilerInsurance).
Conclusions 00L concluded that the direction and requirements of GUITY ccsing from so many different NSRS and 06C Managers, plus the appearance of not letting GUITY do his job as an investigator, were part of a pattern of H/I of GUITY by 'iVA knagement, both within and outside NSRS-Of agrees with this conclusion.
The allegation of suppression of information in this case is not substantiated, in that actual confidentiality problems and jurisdictional problems between NSRS and OGC did, in fact, exist and hindered the progress of the investigation.
Allegation No. 14 GUlTY alleged that he was restricted in his ability to conduct interviews, by Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) Nnagement during his investigation of a Diesel Generator problem at Sequoyah.
He also all.eged that his technical findings in the matter were significant enough to require a plant shutdown, and that NSRS Management delayed issuance of these findings until Sequoyah was shut down for other reasons.
GUlTY advised (Exhibit 48) that during the conduct of the Diesel Generator investigation, he wanted to interview some EEB people, confidentially, on site.
He stated that EEB Nnagement refused to permit these interviews.
he advised that he understood that sone type of negotiation between NSRS and EEB Manage-ment tock place, and ca an interim basis, GUITY agreed to possibly interviewing these potential confidentici witnesses off site. He stated that, in actuality-he did the remainder of the investigation without interviewing any EEB people, tnd that because of that, the investigation was only partially done. GUITY advised that his investigation revealed that Sequoyah was required to test their diesel generator batteries, and the testing needed to be done right away but that the Plant, which was on-line and operating at the time, would have to be shut down to test the betteries.
He advised that he made KIDO aware of this situation and that K100 was hesitant to force the battery testing issue with Sequoyah Management, because of the necessity of a plant shut-down.
GU,HY stated that KIDO got lucky, because FARRIS made the decision to shut, down Sequoyah for other reasons, therefore KIDD could require the testing of the battery with na pressure.
KIDD stated to DOL (Exhibit 52, pp. 20-27) that be categorically denied intentionally deleying the reporting o'! the requirement to test the batteries.
He stated that that would have been totally inconsistent with both his own, ar4 HSRS p(licy and procedure. He stated that hn adhered to the N$R$ procedure that required NSR5 to get this type of information to Line knager.ent in a timely manner, so that they can do their review for reportability to NRC.
He CBSe No. 2-85-031 38 1
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y stated that he challenged GUITY to present any real evidence that he (K!DO)'was delaying the reporting of the Diesel Generator situationo
+
Wi11 fulness /!ntent.
+
The' Diesel Generator report was issued with the battery testing require-ment'includad. There was only evidence of a difference of opinion between.
GUITY and KIDD regarding the timeliness of the issuance of the report.
There is not a preponderance of evidence to show willful, intentional-effort on the part of NSRS Management to suppress the information regard.
ing the testing of the batteries.
Conclusions Jo The allegation of suppression of information is not substantiated.
The appearance of NSR$ Management not fully supporting GUITY regarding the-conduct of the interviews of the EEB people was considered by D0L to be a contributing factor in the pattern of H/I of GUITY by TVA Management.
Allegation No. 15 NSRS members J. SMITH and JONES alleged that while they were members of the TARG of NSRS. they uncovered widespread welding problems, and NSRS Management suppressed their information regarding the problems, and also harassed and intimidated them (J. SMITH and JONES) for trying to force C/A by TVA on these problems.
J. SMITH stated in his statement to DOL (Exhibit 53), that when he'first came to TVA from NRC, Region Ill, he started finding problems with structural welding and cabling during a Major Management Review of Watts Bar in 1981.- He stated that he and JONES documented these problems, but they were not properli resolved, in that the findings were turnea over to OCA for dispcsition and many -
were dispositioned based upor, an Office of Design and Construction (OEDC) promise to correct them. The items were not held as open items until they were actually corrected, so they " disappeared,"
J. SMITH stated that he soon realized that'it was not good for his career at TVA to keep bringing up ;the fact that the welding problems had not been resolved. He stated that he saw-L.
his. supervisor bring up these problems directly to the TVA Board of> Directors
. at.a meeting in early' 1983, at which point = the Assistant General Manager
" sprang out of his chair" and said that those problems had been resolved a-long i
time ago. ' J. SMITH stated that his supervisor, who had mentioned' the problems.-
4 "was gone three months later."
J. SMITH stated that he sawtK!DD personally m
" attack" (verbally) JONES ~ over the resolution of the welding issues in a i
1 meeting between MSRS and OQA, wher KIDD was in OQA.
J. SMITH stated that JONES had'already told WHITT that' he (JUNES) did not want anything more to do with welding issues, but' WHITT tock JONES to the_ NSRS/0QA meeting anyway..'J. SMITH 1
t stated that when all the NSRS welding issues were turned over to 0QA, he wrote 4
i" a Differing Professional Opinion memorandum, stating that those issues should remain with NSRS'for sonitoring of disposition. He advised that he had a asb u" i
personal meeting with Charles DEAN, TVA Board Chairman, and FRIEMAN, Board F
Member, during which this memorandum was ' discussed.
J. SMITH stated that he kh also had a discussion with George DILLWORTH, the Assistant General. Manager, h
about,both:this memorandum and a memorandum he-(J. SN'TH) had written that
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Case No.. 2 85-031 39 (h) 4 y
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criticized the Mana
' opinions -and criticgement Appraisal System (MAS). J.-SMITH advised that his:
i
$;s did not prevail. He stated that he formally uithdrew-Lthe memorandum he had written on the MAS.
He stated that DILLidORTH asked him i
c,-
'to go back to his office and withdraw the memorandum on welding, but he advised i
4 that he did'not do it at that time. J.-SMITH advised that both he and J0NES
-l were eventually harassed ~ so much by KIOD, when KIDO had come over to NSR$ from 00A, over these welding issues, that JONES got out of NSR$ and hei p'
3 withdrew his Differing. Professional Opinion on the welding issues.(J. SMITH)
J. SN1TH advised that he again talked to the TVA Board about the welding concerns ~ in April 1985, but that he had seen no results, and that the " Board response was t
self-serving." -J. SMITH stated that QTC was investigating JONES' technical-concerns and his allegations of H/I by KIDO.
J0NES was= interviewed on January 14, 1986 (Exhibit 40)..during the conduct of which ha' supplied a copy of the complaint he had filed with QTC (Exhibit 54 JONES advised that soon after being hired by TVA in September 1981,-he was ).
)
assigned to.do a sini-management review with NSRS at Watts Bar. He advised that one of the first thin through Carbo-Zinc primer.gs he found was that welds were being' inspected
- Na stated that he also found that the weld inspector's qualifications did not meet either the standards that TVA had established, or the applicable AWS standards.
He stated that he also four.d problems with the traceability of both weld filler material and also structural steel..He stated that 0QA was not doing their job, and that KIDD had come from NRC to TVA/00A
-JONES advised that K!DD had gotten very angry and abusive with him (JONES) when he brought up/some of these welding issues in NSRS/0QA
-meetings.
JONES advised that nis pursuance of the welding issues got to be so much of a problem that.he asked WHITT to be removed from the issue altogether.
KIDD was interviewed on May 1, 1986 (Exhibit 55, pp. 45-52).
KIDO stated tha't he!did not try to convince J. SMITH to withdraw his (SMITH's) welding concerns.
He stated'that he did have meetings with J. SMITH in an effort to pt answers to the questions asked in a March 1985 letter from NRC (NOVAK) to TVA _(PARRIS) regarding welding. He stated that he met with W SMITH on three consecutive i.
days in April 1985, during which time he (KIDD). requested J. SMITH to document f' T just exactly what his concerns were, so that the letter from NRC could be answered,. and-also so that the concerns could be quantified'in order to set out a
a coursejof action in dealing with,them.
f KIDD' stated that he-never received
-any documentation or write-up fromiJ. SMITH on his concerns.
KIDD stated that JJ. SMITH's. concerns remained undocumented, general administrative, and
" generalized techni. cal" concerns.
KIDD stated that he prepared an answer to the NRC letter without ever getting any specific, documented concerns from J. $NITH.
KIDD reiterated that there wasino way that J. SMITH could have, or R
' shouldhave,interpretedtheconversationf.inthosemeetingsashim(KIDO requesting or demanding, that he withdraw his memorandum on welding concer)ns.
E KIDD also stated that his conversations with JONES, during OQA meetings with NSRSs when he (KIDD) was:with OQA, were not abusive or intimidating in nature.
He advised that he experienced somes of the same problems of undocumented findings with J0NES as he did with J. SMITH.
KIDD~ advised that he recalled
(' ! :,i that in onc of these meetings, when JONES brought up a finding that had not a
T Ebeeniwritten up-in the NSRS report, he (KIDD) asked where this finding was.
documented, and JONES stated that it had been addressed with= site Management at the exit meeting.
KIDD~ advised that JONES and J. SMITH both talked about a lot of'problesis that they had not precisely defined or documented.
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' Case No. 2-85-031 40 kA; a
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-W111 fulness / Intent J
L ~
"m s.
. There is evidence-th'at both. KIDD'and CULVER had a tendency to totally 1
~
discount any indications cf a problem 1f the problem was not. documented to the meximum degree.: - There is evidence that KIDD became frustrated with
'any engineer that persisted in verba11 ring about problems, and-was unable, w
in KID 0's judgment, to adequately define and document these problems.
1 There is insufficient evidence to indicate that KIDD did, or would,-
suppress information regarding safety-related problems, if it was o'
4 It '
documented to his level of acceptance.
l; Conclusions L
L The e,llegation'of H/I by KIDD is substantiated.
The allegation of willful, intentional suppression of safety-related information on the part of KIDD is not substantiated.
4 There was a tendency, by both OQA and OEDC, to consider a deficiency
.l
. resolved when a planned C/A was expressed, as opposed to keeping the' open until the C/A was completed.
deficiency'no requirement for timeliness appeared to be levied.Or, if the C/A
- followed, Allegation No. 16-JONES, fonner NSRS member, alleged that KIDD harassed and intimidated him during the conduct of a TVA Procurement Review, and that KIDD suppressed l
findings that' JONES had produced with respect to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant by not including these findings in the final NSRS Report.
JONES was-interviewed on January 14, 1986 (Exhibit 40), and also provided a
- copy of a prepared, signed statement of complaint, given by JONES to QTC on.
D
- November 8,1985(Exhibit 54).
l In this prepared statement, JONES stated that during HARRISON's-tenure as his I
l (JONES) supervisor, HARRISON assigned him to do a total TVA Procurement Review.
'l b
JONES ' stated that about this time.- KIDD transferred back into NSRS as an M-7, h
and took over HARRISON's post ion-as his (JONES') superviso. JONES related
['
his perception of favoritism, by KIDD with a
'i J'
female NSRS~ member, MUECKE.
Sa at ECKE had en a favorite of KIDD's when they.were both in 0QA, and now that MUECKE was in NSRS, KIDD j
innediately ssigned her to be' on the Procurement ~ Review Team, under his
. (KIDD's) stre 51sion. JONES related how he tested MUECKE's auditing abilities, surreptitiemly,durin9theconductoftheProcurement' Review, JONES described
'n L.,:
..his perception of KIDO s. harassment:(Exhibit 54, p.'29. 31-40). He= stated that-'
1 he confronted.KIDD about why-KIDO was harassing him, and KIDD related back to L
the welding memorandum JONES-had written when KIDO was in 0QA. JONES assumed that the welding issues were still bothering KIDO, and that was why KIOD was harassing'him. JONES also stated that he left NSRS prior to the' issuance of the final report 'on the procurement review (Exhibit 56) and that KIDD left out some significant safety. findings that JONES would have put in the report if he had been there.
x L
p Case No. 2-85-031 41 b
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'!!NVESTIP'Whhed as Exhibit' 57.o#'$ NOTEU - NRC Report s
s-KIDD stated (Exhibit SS, pp.- 7-41) that JONES made essentially no input to the.
l procurement report because he either could not, or would not, document his findings. KIDD did state that ~ JONES' failure to document was complicated by the fact that he was ill.- KIDD stated that JONES had ex the same ess approximate 1 ear earl also.
KID advised t at NES' recent ut w th the il ness was in pt r-tober 1984, and JONES became ill to the point of having to stay home.
KIDD advised that this was right in the middle of'the NSRS Procurement Review, and that it was one of the reasons that JONES did not have any usable documentation for the report.
KIDD stated i
that the only two issues that JONES provided any usable, detailed write-ups for the report were:
(1) the use, or misuse, of 10 CFR Part 21 in the determina-tion of quality levels, and-(2) the training, or lack of training, of'the-receipt inspectors. KIDD stated that there were a lot of other-areas where JONES said he found problems but that JONES at no time documented or discussed these areas with him (KIDD), the other team members, or at the exit meetings with the site personnel.
KIDD stated that both QTC and the TVA-Inspector General (IG) were. involved with the issue of his (KIDD's) alleged H/I of JONES, and his (KIDD's) alleged suppression of JONES' findings in the Procurement 1
Review. He advised that JONES had given QTC and the IG a set of his (JONES')
notes from exit meetings at Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, Watts _ Sar, and Chattanooga.
-t showing the areas discussed at those exits.
KIDD advised that-he had demonstrated, to both QTC and the IG, by marking up these notes of J0hES, to show how each of these issues was covered in~the final Procurement Report.
KIDD stated.even the undocumented areas of concern of JONES, that KIDD was aware of, were covered in the report.
KIDD stated that there definitely were some bad feelings between he and JONES, but the cause of these feelings was not H
because of.any welding issues.
He advised that he oiscovered that JONES was i
perpetuating, if not originating, a rumor that he M were having an affair. He stated that nothing was further from the truth, and that he was angry at JONES for his (JONES') part in that rumor.
KIDD stated that, because of this rumor situation, his conversations with JONES were not exactly friendly, but that the management direction that he gave to JCNES was :fue to JONES' poor performance, not.because of the rumor. KIDD stated that he.
i perceived that JONES was afraid to confront-site management at exit meetings, and had a habit of not' attending these meetings if he could get away with it.
-W111 fulness / Intent 1
There is evidence that KIDD did willfully and intentionally H/I JONES, partially because of: JONES resurfacing welding issues without, in KIDD's judgment, sufficient documentation, and also bec use of JONES' perpetua-tion of the rumor of the affair There is insufficient evidence to indicate that KIDD willfully and inten-tionally suppressed safety-significant findings of JONES in the Procure-aient Report.
p Case No. 2-85-031 42 h
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Conclusions i
.s
[
-The allegation of H/I'of JONES.by KIDO is' substantiated, but primarily
~
.because of the. instigation of-a personal rumor by JONES,.as opposed to' q
because JONES was trying to raise safety concerns.
The allegation of suppression of infonnation is not substantiated.
Status of'Investication
- This -investigation is CLO$tD.
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Case No.' 2-85-031 43 T
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$UPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 1-g-Thel following is-a list of NSR$ Staff Members that were interviewed by 01, and
- had no allegations of Suppression of Information or H/I:
Fredrick J. $LAGLE John L. CROES Lonnie E.-BROCK Edward J. GARONER James H. KINCAID Mary Anne KOLT0WICH-John J. KNIGHTLY-
- Richard C. CUTSHAW John B. ROLLINS Kirby G. LAWLESS Richard E. McCLURE j
- Vencil O' BLOCK Douglas HORNSTRA 4
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.V' LIST OF EXHIBITS
,h;f,
-Exhibit 1
.h Number Description J
1 TVA Nuclear Program Review, dated May, 1979
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2.-
Transcript of. Interview of CULVER, dated April 8,1986 1
1 7-3, Narrative of Dept. of Labor Report on Jerry D. SMITH, dated
-0ctober 7. 1986 4
Narrative of Dept.-of L' abor Report on WASHER., dated November 21, 1986 5
Narrative of Dept. of Labor Report on SAVER, dated July 16,'
1986
-6 Transcript of Interview with HARRISON. dated April 9,_1986 -
7~
Results-of Interview with COTTLE, dated May 15, 1986 0
Results of Interview with C. MASON, dated May 16, 1986 9
'Results of Interview with WEGNER dated May 15, 1986
- ( '.
10-Results of Interview with MUECKE, dated March 11, 1986 and October 2, 1986 i
11 Results'of Interview with GRIFFIN,1 dated March 13. 1986 and.
-October 2, 1986
-12 Results of Interview with BENNETT, dated March 11', and 12, 1986, and October 1, 1986
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L 13 Draft of NSRS C/A Report, as provided by BENNETT on-L
- March 12, 1966
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.'14 Results of Interview with DEBBAGE, dated March 20, 1986 and p
September 30, 1986
'i J
p 15 Copy of Memorandum, WHITT to WHITE, dated August 64 1986:
16 Copy of Memorandum WHITE to SE!BERLING, dated September' 5, i0 1986' 17 Transcript of Interview with R.. SMITH, dated April 10. 1986L 18-Results of Interview with R. SMITH, dated October 9,1986 u
19 Results of Interview with WHITT, dated October 15, 1986 20.
Results of Interview with STEVENS, dated October 2E - 1986 L
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t 21 Results of Interview with SE!BERLING, dated October 9,1986 et and November 20, 1986
'22 Results of. Interview with C. MASON, 11-21-86' 23 Pages 90103 of Transcript.cf Interview with WHITE, dated.
July 15. 1987 j
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24 TVA Policy Comittee Reart, entitled Evaluation of Black and Veatch Independent iteview, dated March.16.1984
'l
-25 Results of Interview with of J. SMITH, dated January 9 1986 1
26 Results of Interview with MASHBURN, dated June 7,1985 and January 22, 1986 27 MSRS Report No. R-84-19-WBN l
28 Results of Interview with WASHER, dated January 23. 1986 29 Transcript of Interview with HICKS, dated February 19,1986 30 Transcript of Interview with MURDOCK, dated April 8, 1986 31' Results of Interview with BEASLEY, dated May 14 and-15, 1986 32 NSRS Report No. R-84-07-WBN, dated April 6.,1984 p
33 PARRIS Menorandum to CULVER, dated July 25, 1984 34 Copies of draf ts of CULVER Memo to WILLIS, prepared by WASHER, dated August 15, 1984 35' Copy of Draft of NSRS Appendix R Report, provided by J. SMITH 36 J. C. STONE Memorandum to J. Y. VORSE, with enclosure, dated December 10, 1987
-l 37 NSRS Report No. I-82-19-WBN with Cover Letter, dated -
-October 25, 1982-38 Results of Interview with KEY, dated January 9 and 10,1986 39 Results of Interviews with BRANTLEY, dated March 13, 1986 3
and December 17, 1965
- 1
'40 Results of Inter. view with JONES, dated January 14, 1986 E
41 Results of Interview with HARRISON, dated June 5,1965 k
14 2' Results of Interview with W. NASON, dated May 13 1986 1
Case No. 2-05-031 48
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-43 Transcript of Interview with WITT, dated April 10, 1986
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44 Sworn Statement of O'REILLY, dated May 21, 1986
'45 Results of Interviews with $1EFKEN, dated June 7,1985 ano January 17, 1986 46 Drafts. Handwritten cossents, and Final Memorandum, CULVER-to ANDER$0N, dated Au9ust 10, 1983 47 Narrative of DOL Report on GUITY, NSR$ Staff Member 48 Results of Interviews with GUITY, dated June 6,1905 and January 15, 1986 49 DOL Interview Results of SLAGLE, dated February 10, 1986 50 DOL Interview Results of WITT, dated January 23, 1986 51 00L Interview Results of HARRISON, January 23, 1986 52 00L Interview Results of KIDD, dated January 29, 1986 53 DOL Interview Results of J. SMITH, dated November 5,1985 54 Typewritten Statement, prepared by JONES for QTC, dated November 8, 1985 55 Transcript of KIDD, dated May 1, 1966
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56 NSRS Procurement Report,-No. R-84 17-NPS, dated-March 12, 1985 57 Memorandum, STONE to VORSE, with enclosure, regar0ing NRC review of NSRS Procurement Report, dated August 18, 1986 Case No. 2-85-031 49 t.
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