ML20043E037

FEMA - Final After Action Report for November 6, 2019, Watts Bar Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20043E037
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	01/27/2020
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML20043E037 (56)

Text

i 1 Final After Action Report I Watts Bar Nuclear Plant I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: November 6, 2019 I

I January 27, 2020

I Watts Bar Nuclear Plant I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: November 6, 2019 I I January 27, 2020

Radiological Emetgeh~y Preparedn~ss Program After Action Report **

2019 Watts Baf'Nuclear Plant

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Table of Contents*

Page Table of Contents............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview......................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Exercise Details............................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership............................................................................. 7 1.3 Participating Organizations........................................................................................... 8 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary...........................................................................................-11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design....................................................................................... 11 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives.................................................................. 11 2.3 Exercise Scenario......................................................................................................... 12 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities............................................................................................... 17 3.1 3.2 3.3 Exercise Evaluation and Results.................................................................................. 17 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.................................................................... 17 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation............................................. 18 3.3.1 State of Tennessee........................................................................................... 18 3.3.2 3.3.1.1 3.3.1.2 3.3.1.3 3.3.1.4 3.3.1.5 3.3.1.6 State Emergency Operations Center.............................................. 18 Dose Assessment........................................................................... 20 Radiological Monitoring Control Center....................................... 21 Regional Coordination Center....................................................... 22 Field Teams................................................................................... 23 Waterway Clearance...................................................................... 25 Joint Operations............................................................................................... 26 3.3.2.1 Central Emergency Control Center............................................... 26 3.3.2.2 Joint Information System............................................................... 26 3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions............................................................................................. 28 3.3.3.1 Rhea County, Tennessee................................................................ 28 3.3.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center..................................... 28 3.3.3.2 McMinn County, Tennessee.......................................................... 30 3.3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center..................................... 30 3.3.3.2.2 Emergency Worker Decontamination.......................... 32 3.3.3.3 Meigs County, Tennessee.............................................................. 34 3.3.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center..................................... 34 3.3.4 Host Jurisdictions............................................................................................. 37 3.3.4.1 Cumberland County, Tennessee.................................................... 37 3.3.4.1.1 Reception Center and Congregate Care....................... 37 Section 4: Conclusion................................................................................................................... 39 3

Radiological E:mergep9.Y :Preparedness Program After Action R~port _*.

2019 Watts,Bar Nuclear Plant Appendix A: Exercise Timeline......................,.....................,.......................................... :............. 41 Appendix B: Evaluator Assignments............................................................................................43 Appendix C: _ ~xtent of Play Agreement..... :'... :::::... :..........'... *.....'....... l............... :........................... '.45 i *

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I Radiological Emergency Prepafeaness.Program After Action Report.

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

• Executive Summary On November 6, 2019, the offsite response organizations of the W,atts :Sar.Nucrear Plant.10-mile emergency planning zone participated in a plume exposure 'pathw'ay exercise. FEMA Region N Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated that exercise, which also included out of sequence activities conducted the week of July 8-12, 2019. This report outlines the results from both the exercise and out of sequence activities.

The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and county preparedness in responding to an incident at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. It was conducted in accordance with

' FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and county radiological emergency response plans and procedures.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures, and successfully implemented them during the exercise and out of sequence activities. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA staff did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise or the out of sequence activities.

It was apparent that a great <;leal of planning and training was conducted by the offsite response organizations to successfully demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the public. They provided the necessary support and resources to respond in the event of an incident involving the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and out of sequence activities and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of planning and conduct.

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Radiological EmergencycPreparedness.Program After Action Report,,..

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I Radiological Emergency Preparednes~. Pro grain After Action Report.

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1 Exercise Details 1.2 Exercise Name 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Type of Exercise Full Scale Exercise Exercise Date November 6, 2019 Out of Sequence Dates July 8-12, 2019 Locations See the extent of play agreement in Appendix C for exercise locations.

Program Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Mission

Response

Scenario Type Full Participation Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Planning Team Leadership Mr. Matthew Bradley State of Tennessee Lead FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 Mr. Tim Holden Tech Hazards Branch Administrator TEMA 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 Mrs. Erica Houghton Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site Specialist FEMA Region IV 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 Mr. Kevin Penney TV A Program Manager TEMA 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

• After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1.3 Mr. Kevin Petty Mr. Jackie Reavley Fixed Nuclear Facility Specialist TEMA Emergency Management Director.

Rhea County. '

3041 Sidco Drive

., -r 8860 Back Valley Road *.

Nashville, Tennessee 37204

• . *Evensville, Tennessee 37332 Mr. Tom Trotter Mr. Tony Finnell Emergency Management Director McMinn County Emergency Management Director Meigs>County 1107 South Congress Parkway

, 14816 Highway,58 South Athens, Tennessee 37303, - *,,i

.* Decatur, Tennessee 37322 Mr. John Parshall

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, '*.-., Mr: James Watson EP Program Planning and Implementation. ' : Program Manager EP Fleet Training Tennessee Valley Authority

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• Temressee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street

• ** 1101 Market Street: *.

Chattanooga, TN 37402

. Cliattanooga, TN' 37402

• I Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant exercise.

State of Tennessee Jurisdictions:

Tennessee Department of Military Tennessee Emergency Management Agency.* * * * * * * **

Tennessee Department of Agriculture

• Division of Forestry

• :r::,,,

Tennessee Department of Correction

• Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Division of Radiological Health Tennessee Department of Health Tennessee Department of Human Services Tennessee Department of Safety & Homeland Security Tennessee Department of Transportation.

Tennessee Highway Patrol, * *...

• Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency Risk Jurisdictions:

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Rhea County:

City of Dayton Police Dep~inent': *

• Rhea County Department of Education i. *

• Rhea County Emergency Management Agency

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. Rad,iological Emergen~y Preparedness Program After Action Report,

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Rhea County Emergency Medical Services Rhea County Fire and Rescue Squad Rhea County Health Department Rhea County Road Department Rhea*County Sheriffs Office Spring City Police Department McMinn County,:

Athens Police Department*

Athens Rural Fire Department McMinn County Auxiliary Communication Services*

McMinn County Board of Education McMinn. County,Emergency Management Agency McMinn County. Emergency Medical.Services: '

McMinn County Hazard01.:fs Materials Team McMinn County Health Department McMinn County Road Department McMinn County Rural Fire and Rescue Squad McMinn County Sheriff's Office Meigs County:..,

Decatur Police Department Meigs County Department of Education Meigs County Emergency Management Agency*

Meigs County Emergency Medical Services Meigs County Fire and Rescue Squad

• Meigs County Health Department'.

Meigs County Highway Department

• Meigs County Road Department Meigs County Sheriff's Office Host Jurisdictions:

Cumberland County:

Crossville Fire. Rescue Crossville Hazardous Materials Team Cumberland County Health Departmen~ *.

Private Organizations:

American Red Cross-Chattanooga/Hamilton County Chapter American Red Cross-Southeast Tennessee Chapter American Red Cross-Cleveland/Bradley Chapter Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services*

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Rac;ljological; Emergency Rreparedness Program After Action Report Federal Jurisdictions:.

Federal Emergency Management Agency Tennessee Valley Authority United State~ Nu~lea~.R~gul~tory Conunission

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I Radiological, Emergency: Pr:eparedness,f>ro gram

, After Action Report.

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2.1 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary Exercise Purpose and Design.

FEMA administers the Radfological *Ert1ergerity Pfeparedhess *Prograrn: pbrsuant to the regulations found in Title 44 CFR parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning

• zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the 16 planning standards for the licensee. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities.

During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological incident at a nuclear plant.

The results of the exercise and out of sequence activities, together with reviews of the radiological emergency response plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits, enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This statement verifies that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and procedures are: (1) adequqte to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear plant by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological incident; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The federal approval of the formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant by the State of Tennessee was granted on July 8, 1985, and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on July 25, 1985.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives Core Capabilities-based planning allows the exercise planning team to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, the exercise objectives meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements, and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Tennessee and risk and host counties. The following Core Capabilities were demonstrated during the exercise and out of sequence activities:

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Radiological Em.ergen~y Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts* Bar Nuclear Plant 2.3 Operational ~oordination: Establish an_d maintain a unified and coordinated

.; operational sti:µcture and process that appropriately integrates all critical

... '. '. stakeholders ahci supports the 'execution of core capapilitfos.

• SituationalAssessm_enf:,Pr9.vide aU_ decision make.rs witb q~cision-televant

. information;regan!ing th~ ii~tt1re a11d extent_ ofthe_ hazard,_ any cascading effects,

. ' '-' al?-d th~ S!a~U~ O! th~ response.__ _.

• \\:, fyblic Inf o~mati~n and!:\\Va~11b~g: Delive_r coordinated, prompt, reliable, and

• • * ;actionable ioformation to.the whole community through the.use of clear,

. *cons1stent, accessible, and ;cuituraliy and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay inforinatfop regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate,

the actions oeing taken, andi the assistance beh1g D1ade\\ available.

Environmental Respon~~/Health and Safety:.. Conduct-appropriate measures to ensure the protection or the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as

.. t.he; ~nvi:rpnrp.~µtr, fi;om all,haZ;ai:q,&,in suppqrt gf respQpder operatioQ.s and the

, affect~d commu11~tfes *. :. ;l,,. _:., ;*,, * *,.*,,, :

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,. On~Scene Security,, J>roJ~ction,, a,nd, Law Enforcement:; Ensure a safe and secure en.vii:onine11t _:through law* enforceme.nt and related security and protection

_...,. operations {or people-and comm1;1nities located. withirnaffected.areas and also for response personnel engaged jn Jifosaving and life-sustaining operations.

Mass Care Services: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee

• , -support, reunification,. and distribution of emergency supplies-:

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These Core Capabilities,:when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives.

The objectives for Jhe exercise.and out of sequence activities;were:*

• . __ Ql:Jjective 1: Demonstrate the ability to alert, n()tify, and II_1obilize response personnel and facilities; provide direction and *control,Jnake precautionary and protectlve action decisio'ns and. irtlplement those decision's. *., '...

• .. *.. Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability,to manage radiological field.monitoring teams anc;l petform plume-phase. field measurements and analysis. -

• :,,,, -:0.bJective-3: Pernonsirat~.il:I.<;\\~b.ility,to,activate. tJ;i~,prmnpt alert;md notification system, and provide accurate emergency information and-instructions to the puqlic and n~w~mediain a timely manner.*

Objective 4: Demonstrate the:ability to x~ceiv~, I;llOnitor; decontaminate, register and provide for the temporary care of evacuees Jnd emergen~y workers; *.

Exerci~e S~enarjo

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The follof,ing.is a ~UIIllllary of th~. ~~~nario ~rr.4. ~P;Pr.9~ir1:a~e#~e~1ne develoJ?e~ by the Tenness~e Valley Authorityfo drive.exercise play;:.

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• Radiological Eme.rgency P~13paredness;Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Exercis~ Events.

Time Utility to* Declare

• Time*ORO to be

..Informed Start of Exercise.

.0800,

',,,.,i0800 Notice of Unusual Ev:ent*

.10819,

. ('0834 Alert

.'.0848

.. ' 0903 Site Area Emergency, **

i.i 'f'0952 General Emergency

,, JllO Radiological Release

. :- 1125

. Wind Shift PAR Update Dose Projection PAR Update

:;T.145.,,,I End of Exercise

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This scenario* provided a-significantTelease ofradioactive niatetia1. The' *protective action guides for evacuation were exceeded past 2-miles according to utility and; state dose projections. Winds were froni the rtdrthwest(329 d~gtees )' at *about 5 rrtph with a stability class of D when. the General Emergency emergency.classification level was declared.

Winds later shifted to be fromthe west (277 :de*grees);*teqU:iringthe utility to issue an updated protective action recommendation. 'Wind speed varied*from 55-to 7.6 mph during the release..

The radiological.release was the result of significant cladding damage, a: release of coolant into containment due to safety injection (after loss of all feedwater), and containment verit valve failures. The release was filtered.* The plume.. *, *.

• contained significant amounts of noble gases along with*smaller but still significant amounts of iodines and particulates. Timeline highlights:

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b800 !Exercise begins. Unit 1 is at 100% pbwer. Unit 2 is shut down in'.mode 5.

0804 Seismic.event greater than operating basis earthquake levels occurs. Conditions exist to deolare. a Notification of Unusual Event emergency classification level based on emergency action level HU2 {~ffects both units).

0819 Utility declares'a Notificatiori.bfiUnu*suaI;Event emergertcy*dassification level lby this time.

I *. r 0834 Utility notifies offsite response organizations**of the Notification of Unusual

!Event emergency classification level by this time.

0828 IAn aftershock occurs:.

• 0833 !Damage to both residual heat removal pumps for Unit 2 is reported. Conditions iexist to declare an Alert emergency classification level based on emergency action level CA6..

• os48. rDtility declares an: Alett"~Iiiergericy claSSificatlon' fovel* by this tirtie.

0903 rDtility notifies offsite response ;organizations of the Alert emergency.

K:;lassification level by this time.

0920 IA loss of condenser vacuum occurs on Unit 1 due to a boot tear. Unit 1 is

~ripped. The loose parts monitor alarms shortly thereafter.

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Radiological Hmergehc;y,Preparedness_ Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 0922 : Various feed water pumps fail resulting in loss of,all feed water. Conditions exist

, ~o declare a Site.Area Emergency emergency das;sification level based on emergency action level FS L. :.,.

• 0937. Utility declares 'a Site Area Emergency ~riiefgency cfa.ssification level by this time.

0952 Utility notifi~s off site response. organizations of the' Site-'Area Emergency ertiergency classificaHon Te'.vel by-this time.

1015.*

• Safety injection in\\nitiated. A filtered-containment venting valve fail~ open. A

' ; few minutes later, the pressurize{ielief tank rupture disk.ruptures, allowing

idolant into cont~inment...

1040 Radiation levels idcontainmenHncrease above certain values. Conditions exist to declare a' Gen~dl' Emetgehty 6inergency classificati&rt level based on FG 1.

1055 !Utility declares ;i Geueral Emergency emergency classifieation level by this t~rne.

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1 t'l O... Utility notifies off site re~pc5lls'e' orgaiiizations of the. G~Iieral Emergency

. ' ~mergency classific'ation level-by* this: time. -Exp~ctdctprotecti ve* action tre~bmmendation'froin the utilit§wiil be to evacuate seqtprs A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1;

• . j s~elter C-2, C-4; C-5; C-7, C-8, D-4; monitor and prepar,e all other sectors; and consider issuance ~f potassium'iociide in accordance with the_ state pfan.

1110 A second filtered containnierit venting valve fails open.. Aradiological release is occurring.

1115 Wind shifts to be from 277°, requiring utility to issue an updated protective action recommendation.

1130 Utility notifies offsite response organizations of the updated protective action recommendation. Expected protective action recommendation from the utility will be to evacuate sectors A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1; shelter B~2, C-2, C-4, C-5, C-7, C-8, D-4; monitor and prepare all other sectors; and consider issuance of potassium iodide in accordance with the state plan.

1145 !Utility dose projections show protective action guides exceeded past two miles, irequiring utility to issue an upgraded protective action recommendation.

1200 !Utility notifies offsite response organizations of the upgraded protective action recommendation. Expected protective action recommendation from the utility twill be to evacuate sectors A-1, B-1, C-1, C-2, D-1; shelter B-2, C-4, C-5, C-7, C-8, D-4; monitor and prepare all other sectors; and consider issuance of tpotassium iodide in accordance with the state plan.

1245 !Utility notifies offsite response organizations of upgraded protective action ecommendation based on time since 2-mile evacuation commenced. Expected protective action recommendation from the utility will be to evacuate sectors A-l, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, C-4, C-5, D-1; shelter C-7, C-8, D-4; monitor and prepare all other sectors; and consider issuance of potassium iodide in accordance with the state plan.

1300 Exercise is terminated for the utility.

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Radiological Emergency Pn;paredness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The tables below-show do'Se.projections using the Meteorological Inform-ation and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS; used by the.utility) and Radiol0gical Assessment System for Consequence Analysis (RASCAL; used by,the state) based on release.rates and meteorological c;on~itions. at two different tiip.~s dµ:i;ing the r~lease:,

• ime: 1200 SCAL.

iiiie: 1300 SCAl.

istance

.62 miles

• Child thyroid dose is approximately double the adult thyroid dose.

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Radiological Emergency* Preparedness Program I

After Action: Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant I

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I Radiological Emergen.cy Pr~paredness: Program After Action Report

• 2019 Watts:Bar Nuclear Plant 3.1 3.2 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the evaluation results for all jurisdictions that participated in the November 6, 2019, plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities completed the week of July 8-12, 2019.

Each jurisdiction was evaluated based on the demonstration of Core Capabilities, capability targets, critical tasks, and the underlying Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program criteria as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and demonstration status.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions, and to specific performance standards. Core Capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The Core Capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of the state and risk and host counties' collective denionstta'.ted performance. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

Operational Coordination: The state direction and control officer and county emergency management directors established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders and enabled protective.action decisions to be made without undue delay. The decision to have the public sheltered in place in affected sectors ingest potassium iodide could cause confusion during an actual radiological incident, especially for those whom potassium iodide has not been made readily available. The implementation and potential ramifications of this decision should be further discussed.

Situational Assessment: State dose assessment personnel provided decision makers relevant information regarding radiological and plant conditions. The radiation control officer provided direction to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health team members.

The team gathered information from changing plant and meteorological conditions to assess the radiological release. They performed dose projections and compared their results with utility dose projections and field team readings.

This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, their cascading effects, and to make the appropriate protective action decisions.

Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public occurred via the outdoor warning system (simulated), Emergency Alert System messages 17

Radiological* Emergency Preparedness: Program

• After. Action Report.. **

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 3.3 (simulated); press releases, and press conferences. State and county public information officers and spokespersons developed and distributed timely and coordinated emergency information to the public and media. Some pre-scripted messages and press releases contained inaccurate or outdated information and

. require revision; however those pre,..scripted messages,did not have a negative impact on the exercise'. W;aterway clearance and,route* alerting were successfully

• demonstrated during:the *exercise and.out of sequence activities.

• • ** i,Environmental Response/Health and*Safety: Field teams were consistently

• informed ofplantstatus; chatigidn wind direction, and protective action decisions

, by the radiological monitoring coordination center.* The radiological monitoring coordination center personnel were knowledgeable of administrative exposure and dose limits for field teams. However, limits included in the Pre Job Briefing

• Farin for Field Monitoring and-Sampling Team did not match limits listed in the

• procedure. Overall, there was excellent coordination between all five field teams.

• , On-Scene-Security, Ptotectibn;' and Law *Enforcement: The Tennessee Wildlife Resources 'Agen*cy staff demonstrated the ability to clear the Tennessee River. Emergency workers from Meigs County discussed traffic and access

• . control points and roadblock kYcatiorts, including establishment and staffing. In addition,* law enforcement representatives in *each risk county discussed the

management of traffic and access controJ points, and equipment and staffing.

• Mass Care Services: CumbeilandCortnt'y*demonstrated out of sequence the ability to provide-services arid accomrhodations for evacuees. Tnese activities included evacuee reception, radiological monitoring and decontamination, and shelter registration..

• The capabilities available to provide human services to contaminated pets and individuals with access.,and functional needs were also discussed.

Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluatio~..

3.3.1 State of Tennessee 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Direction and Control Officer and staff demonstrated the ability-to protect public hea1th and safety-in the event of a radiological incident at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Emergency service coordinators repres~nting a variety of agencies and* organizations *were notified* and mobilized to the state emergency operations center; the facility' was' 'staffed *a~d declared' operational 'l!,1 a tirriely manner.

The* state*warnirig point and state emergency operations center had sufficient space, supplies, and backup power to support emergency response operations. Multiple communications means were available and operable. Electronic displays, maps,

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I Radi0logical Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report.

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant monitors, and other-visual aids were used to,provide a common operating picture and situational awareness.

The direction and control officer provided direction and control.in-the.state emergency operations center; and facilitated decision:-mal<lng conference calls with-the emergency management directors from the risk counties.of-Rhea, McMinn; and Myigs. The direction and control officer coordinated with emergency service coordinators from the Tennessee Department of Environment and: Conservation, Bi vision ofRadiological

. Health and Tennesse~. Valley A.utbo,rity; Tllis_coordination. ei;isured appropriate protective action reGommendations were,CQQsid~ed.and dedsions made to protect public health and safety...

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During the e;x.erdse, a protectiye acti~n.d~Gisionwas'smadelo have.publit-.sheltered in place in affected S.ectorsjngest ;potassium i_odide.- J'he intent.of the:decision was to provide maximum. safety: f qr the publi9. pµqhe :decisi<;m ;i.ts.elf was ri.qt c,cr1;nmunicated well to* the risk county emergency maQ.agelllent q.irectors,nor the public.*.

. Following the. ordyr-to ev;;tcuate affected secton;, emergency service co.ordinators from the Tennessee H;igh~ay Patrol,,Tennessee Pepartn;ient :of Transportation, and Tennessee Wildlife Res_oursy A,gencywere.inJerviewed.regarding.their roles in,mari.agement of the evacuation. T.hey wer"e ],a:\\owleclgeable:of.their.roles and responsibilities, *specifically the coordination of traffic and access control_ points and waterway clearance.

/.' ii For this capability the followingrndiqlogical emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.a.1, l.c.1, l.d.l, Le.l, 2.b.2, 3.b.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2

a. Level 1 Finding; None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

,),,,:.

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

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e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

, Public information; officers at the state. emergency operation,s center s.uccessfully de,monstrated the capability to develqp and d_isseminate emergency pµblic.information.

. This effort was led b.y Jhy state:e.qiergency inforn;iation director and cqordinated with the

• risk ~o~nties t),rrollgh,9-eci~igg,,niaj<lng.conferency calls',, TbejoinUntormation system was used until the joint information center was activated. One press release was devel<;>ped, and disseminated at, the.state emerg~ncy operations center prior tq a,cti vation of.the joint information center.

19

• Radiological Emergency Preparedness-Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The* state emergency information director and public information officers used* -

appropriate,development and* approval protocols; monitored radio and television stations, websites,' and social media outlets;. and kept *state 'emergency operations center staff up to

• date on available emergency public infomiation..

'. ' *... ; ~ >.. ;. ; r:. ;.*

The public:was*notified.via the outdoor warning*system and seven Emergency Alert System messages;: both siren sounding :and b.roadcast of the Emergency Alert System messages were simulated. The Emergency Alert System messages were pre-scripted and modified to align with the protective action decisions. All messages contained the four FEMA required elements pf informatiori: ; :,

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

5.a.1, 5.b.l

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

,11_

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: N~n~ *

e. Prior Level 2 Findings-Unresolved: Norte.*

3.3.1.2 Dose Assessment *

~ ~'

Situationn!Assessment Capability Summary:

Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation;: Division of Radiological Health personnel successfully.demonstrated the abilityto *assess radiological and plant conditions, and provide sound recommendations to decision makers in response to a

• radiological-incident at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Personnel worked with utility liaisons to ensure they understood plant conditions and radiological release pathways.

The Division of Radiological:Health1 Radiation Control Officer provided sound technical advice to theTennesseeEmergencyManagemeritAgency andriskcounty emergency management directors regarding the radiological health,hazard; and appropriate protective actions to take to protect the public. Following calculations showing projected thyroid doses exceeded action levels offsite, the radiation control officer promptly consulted with* the state medical officer's designee to recommend potassium iodide be ingested.by emergency workers*; and the public sheltered fo,place in affected sectors.

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• Radiological :Emergency.Prepar.edness. Program After Action Report 2019 Watts-Bar Nuclear Plant The Division of Radiological* Health Technical Advisors demonstrated *proficiency in the dose assessment software,used.by the state.* They performe&numerous.dose projection calculations based cmplant conditions.and on.release rates provided by the.utility, When the utility reported very high iodine and.particulate release'.rates, the technical advisors investigated the assumptions being used by utility personnel and determined that field monitoring team data would be. needed to verify. the.high rates.* As soon as field data was available, they lllOdified the dose projection}tiputs so that results were *closer to* the actual measurements.. *,

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness* criteria. were met:

2.b.1, 2.b.2

• ~ ***.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings-Unresolved:. Nol).e

',. ' :, ~' -

3.3.1.3 Radiological Monitoring Control Center,,,, ***, '

• .. _{.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:,. ;.,.

Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division. of.Radiological Health personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to coordinate field monitoring activities from the radiological monitoring control center in responsetb.a radiological incident at the'Watts..Bar, Nuclear Plant. TheTadiologicalmonitoring,control center was

.co-located.with the.regional coordimition.center. Personnel were prepositioned in the area in accordance: with the extent of play agreement, but described how they would be

.notified during an,actual radiologica}in<.:ident..,

The facility was sufficiently equipped fot,.field;tnon:itoring-team management.

Equipment, maps; and other displays supported emergency operations.. Communications capabilities consisted of radios, landline and cellular telephones, facsimile machines, and internet-connected computers.,

• Radiological monitoring control center personnel provided a briefing,to the field teams prior to deployment. Dosimetry use, potassium.iodide ingestion, plant status, meteorological conditions, and protective clothing requirements were discussed. The field team members were instructed to ingest potassium iodide prior to deployment. The radiological monitoring coordination center personnel were knowledgeable of administrative exposure and dose limits for field teams. However, limits included in the Pre Job Briefing Form for Field Monitoring and Sampling Team did not match limits listed in the procedure.

21

,Radiological Emergency Preparedness 0Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The radiological monitoring coordinator positioned Jive field teams in the possible downwind locations within the lQ,.mile emergency planning-zone.* The radiological monitoring;coordinator,responded appropriately to wind.direction shifts during the exercise:.

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• *, i;

• :,*;**. _-,,,. ;}f ~. *. *i

,,.*.,,;,~,:_,;---. '..*

Three field teams were positioned at the plume edges with two teams outside the plume in case of wind direction shifts. All field teams were instructed to take air samples.

There was,no,columri on, the,Ekvirons}.?.adiological Monitorjng Record to-record air sampleicartridge results., The radiological.monitoring coordinator used the air sample results'._obtained by:the field*teanis*to:calculate particulate andradioiodine.concentrations.

All field data.was transmitted fronithe radiological monitoring coordination center to the state emetgency operations center.*.-,, *~,; L r,;.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparetlness criteria were met:

l.a.l, l.d.l, l.e.l, 2.a.l, 4.a.2

~ '.. :..,.. ' '.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolv~d:. None,.

3.3.1.4 Regional Coordination Center :

• Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Regional coordination center*personnel demonstrated the ability :to,establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure that appropriate! y integrated state

• ageneies and mganizations.,,. ;,, > *.: i '.

' *

.r~... )_'I l! ' '. I\\'... '.***{,

Regional coordination center personnel were prepositioned.in the area in accordance with the extentof'play agreement, but described*how they would be notified during an actual radiological incident.. Notification would he completed by operators in the. state warning

• point and received by staff via cellular telephone, short'message service, and email.

There were more than two communications systems:available; all co~unications systems were operable. The regional coordination center also had enough space, supplies, an<i equipment to-.support.emergency{).pera.Hon,s:-

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I Radiological Emergency. Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts.Bar Nuclear Plant The Regional Coordination Center Director provided direction and control, and ensured state agencies and organizations coordinated response actions;* An electronic incident

. management system w_as used to maintain situational awareness and track resource requests. Decision-making conference.qlls;with the Tennessee,Emergency Management Agency Direction and Control Officer and emergency management directors from the risk counties of Rhea, McMinn, and Meigs were used to inform personnel of changes in plant status.,.

• The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Radiati<lm Officer. conducted a

• radiological briefing foriregional coordinaticmcenter.personnel., The radiological briefing covered the use of dosimetry, exposure:limits, *and distribution.of emergency worker kits. Each emergency worker kit. contained: direct reading and permanent record dosimeters, potassium iodide tablets, and a Temporary Personal Recorr}: of Radiation Received card. Kits were readily available; additional kit were available at the state emergency operations c~nter, if needed..,, ; '...:

1 :

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.a.1, l.d.1, l.e.l, 2.a.1

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.1.5 Field Teams Environmental Response/Health and Safety Cap;ibility Summary:.

.. /

.\\

Two field teams successfully demonstrated they had adequate equipment, knew how to use their equipment to find and obtain samples at the edge of a radiological plume, and monitor their radiological exposure. The teams were each staffed with two individuals from the Tennessee Department of Environmerit and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health:. The teams were staged at the radiological monitoring control center, butwere abl~ to explain the notification *and mobilization.process* that would be

. used during an actual 'radiological incident... : *

• The field teams were supplied with appropriate communications equipment to, include: a vehicle installed radio, portable radio, cellular telephone, and the RadResponder application. The field teams used portable radio as their primary means of communication, and cellular telephone as their backup. Field team kits were kept at each Division of Radiological Health field offices and during an actual radiological incident would be transported to Knoxville, Tennessee when the teams were mobilized.

23

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The field teams inventoried, prepared, and checked equipment, dosimetry, and radiological survey instruments prior to field deployment. Each team was equipped with sufficient supplies and equipment to perform field monitoring and air sampling. The teams we:re briefed on*pfant status;'nieteorological"conditiohs; and assigned a location by the Division of Radiological Health!G0ordinafor:. Each team described and demonstrated proper use of :dosimetry, exposure riionitoring,;recordikeeping, and the use of potassium iodide:** Emergency permanent' record closiineiers were issued to replace occupational dosimetry. Potassium iodide was simulated but available at the radiological monitoring control center:

...J ~ * ' ' I i

• Once deployed; the field teams usedproper'monitoring and ait,sampling techniques to locate plume edges. The field teams were,able to 'determine they *were in the plume by evaluating.radiation survey instrument r,eadings., One teamwas assigned to monitor the northern edge of the pluine 'on* StateRoute;.304, approximately one mile northeast of the plant. The other team monitored the southern edge on County Road 254, approximately eight miles froin the :plant'. Survey data,was serit to the radiological monitoring control center via,the RadResponder. application.*.

The radiological monitoring control center directed field teams to take an air sample when they ;confirmed they were in the plume. Each team followetl procedures in clemonstrating. the collection ofa proper air.isample. * :Samples were counted in a low background area. Appropriate contamination contr6ls were demonstrated during sample handling and*packaging. Samples.were transported to* a sample *collection point in Knoxville,*Tennessee where they were tumed*over to the sample coordinator.

AppropriEitei s:ample chain *of custody 'transfer.was demonstrated. -:

~

For this capability the following ra:diological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I.a.I, l.d.l, Le.I, 3.a.l, 4.a.3

.. a.* Level 1 Finding: None. *. *

b. Le~~l 2 Finding': No~e ' / : : 'i.:,. 3 l

,,,_.\\

,:,**/;

• . c., Not Demonstrated: None

d. Pri9rt,evel 2 Findings-Re~olv~d:. N~~e*..

e. Prior Level 2 Findings-Unresolved: None

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I Radiological Emergency Pr~paredness Program After Action Report

• 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 33.1.6 Waterway Clearance On-Scene Security,Protection, and* Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

'i' i:

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.: The Tennessee Wildlife Resources: f\\gency. staff demonstrated the abihty to clear the Tennessee River and notify theipublic ofaradiological incident at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Personnel explained1their.internal*1to.tification.and,mobilization process, as well as how subsequent shifts would be staffed to supportmultiple,operational.periods.

-.Y '.:: ; i *;: '

: *.-.(

• The officer demonstrating river clearance had a truck, boat, warning siren; airhorn, public address system, electronic river maps and other appropriate equipment and supplies sufficient to support river,clearance. Redundant communications systems,ensured the

.,officer had the ability to communicate,with,agenoy personnel. The primaty..

. communications system was radio;- backup communications.consisted :of c*enular telephone and *a lJ nited States Coast Guard J:adio installed in the boat'..>.,.

• {** ***. '. !

Appropriate dosim~tr,y and*pbtassium.iodide.were issued.to the officer and was properly used. The officer explained the radiation exposure:limits, use of potassium iodide, and demonstrated record keeping for radiation exposure control.

Two boats. woµld be assigned to;clear the :ten miles south of the dam ar.id four boats to clear the ten miles.north of the dam.* The river clearance demonstration*covered the ten-mile area south of the Watts Bar,Nudear Plantdam. As the boat traveled up-river; the officer explained how notification of boaters, and public on docks. and along the river bank of would occ:Ur.. Boaters. and the public would be asked to return to their launch point, get off the river*, and monitor radio, television, or public information sites to obtain additional information or protective actions. For demonstration purposes, the officers

. sounded.the boat siren and airhorn and used the. boat's public address system to broadcast a short message.

The Cottonport Boat Ramp had a sign in the parking area titled, *.'Important Nuclear Emergency Information." This sign contained information.on what wquld happen if a radiological incident occurred at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant: It ex.plained how residents and boaters would be notified of an emergency, and provided directions to the public on actions to take in an emergency. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency officer explained that alike signs were prominently placed at all public boaframps within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.a.l, l.d.1, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.d.1

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

25

Raq,iological. Emergency.Preparedness P.ro gram After Action Report. '

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

e. Prior LeyeiiFJndi11.gs-Un~esolved:. None

1.

3.3.2 Joint Oper,atfons.. ;,..

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Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

T~nnei.~ee, y ~iky: A~thdrHyp~~i9_¥,n6l~t:j~~ ce11tra1 ~mergency' c_oritrC>l center.

coordinat¢d appropriately witl.i s~~t~)~a\\SOilS, to support off site response to a radfological incident: at 'the Watts Bar Nuciear 'Plant:. Th'e Tennessee Emergency Management Agency ~µd T~nnesse,e. ~epart_myn~ of Enyiromp.en~ and CoQ.seryation, Di.vision of Radi 0

olog1cal Health aepl9yed_'liaisoris'to'the c~ritral emergency'control center. The prese~c~ of.these liaisons faci'.lit;ited infopnat.i9n sh#i~g b~,t~e~n ilie Tennessee Valley Authori'ty and state arid cpunty'dedsion makers....

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• 1 The liai~ons worked w_ith Tenriess~e.Y.alley Aqthority p~rsonnel to obtain current plant condition~, and provide that information in a timely nianne~ to personnel in the state emergency operations center. The liaisons also responded to various utility and state requests. For example, obtaining rhe status of roadways and/or imp~diments that could

. potenti~lly im,pact the ev;icuatioq of µon:-essential p~ant p~rs,onriel (simulated), or providing cu,rierit meteorological an'ct' pll:!,rit conditi,qns to bett~r inform protective action de~is~m;i-making.

• For, this' c-apilbility*.the, fol~o~ing i:ad.iolog~cai ~J:ll~rg.enc;:r: 'prepai:~c,lnes~ criterion was met:

2.h.1 *

a. Level 1 Finding: None

~ -.. '.

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not'ben10nstrated: None

I..,*.

"/,....

• d.* Prior Level 2 Findings "-Resolved: None

e. Prior.Level 2 Findings-Unresolved: None 3.3.2.2 Joint Information ~yst~m PubU~ Inf,orm~tion and Warii.h1gC~p~bility,~µµilriary:.',....

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• Public infor~~tl~n' cifficers with t:he Teriri~~~6~ v all~y Au~h~rity, T~nne,ssee Emergency Management Agency, and risk counties of Rhea, McMinn, and Meigs successfully used the joint information center to provide timely and cqordinated emergency information to the public and media., *

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I Radiological Emergency: Preparedness Pro grain After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The public information officers were prepositioned,in the_ area in '.iCCordance with the extent of play agreement, and directed to report to the joint information center following the declaration of a Site Area Emergency emergency classification level. A public information officer from Hamilton County also deployed to the joint' hiformation center to support, as needed. Utility, state, and risk co1mty.p1;1plic informatior.i 9fficers received notifications of the changes in emergency classYi:foation *1ev-els tiotn their respective agencies.

Once activated, the joint information center, served as a central location for utility, state, and risk county public info'rrn~#?.i:t, dffic~r(t~; develqp 1

_1 approve,. and disieIIli~ate press releases, and conduct *press conferences, to provide iAfo~rriatioff to the public and media.

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The joint infor~afron center_h~d ampie'~phc~ a~ci tnultiple inean~ of c~_~unications; no communicatidns failures Were obi;erveci'. The Joint information center director participated in' dedsion:.making"coriferertte calls'with the Teri~essee Emergency Management Agency Direction and Coritroi'Officer, state emergency-information director, and emergency management directors from the risk counties to obtain situational

. I awareness. In addition, equipment, 'maps, displays, and other supplies were sufficient to support em~rgency operatfons.....

\\

J Th~ Tennes~ee Eme~gincy'M~hagemerit'Agehcy ~11d th*e risk cbunty public information

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• I' officers developed press releases that addressed the needs of their respective agencies and I

counties. It was unclear whether or not the county-specific press releases were reviewed prior to dissemination, and to which media outlets they were sent. All.utility and state press releases were coordinated and approved jointly by the Tennessee Emergency Mahagement Agericy a11dTennessee Vailey Authority Joint Information Center Directors prior to dissemination to the media. A pre-established list of media outlets was used to disseminate these press releases.

Prior to each press conference, spokespersons coordinated their messages,.-discussed rumors and trends, and determined the order of speakers to prioritize critical emergency information (e.g., impediments to evacuation routes).: The spokdpersons answered all questions asked by mock media and discussed the prote.ctive 'actions decisions rriade by their respective agencies. An American Sign Language interpreter was_ used during the press conferences.

The citizen information center was collocated with thejoiM inforinaticin 'center and staffed by Tennessee Emergency,.Management Agency.and Tennessee Valley Authority public information officer's: 'The"tfrizeris'itiformiition center was used to respond to citizen inquiries, provide ~urrent information, and identify rumors to be 9isp~lled during

'press conference*s...

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For this capability-the follo.wing* radiol~gical emergency preparedness. criteria were met:

1.a.1, 1.d.l, 1.e.l, 3.d.2, 5.b.l 27

Radioldgical Emergency *Preparedness. Program After Action Report *

a. Level '1 Finding: None I'

b. Levfl 2 Finding: None.

,1,.

c. Not P.emonstrated: None.

d. Pri~r:teye1'2 Findjngs-Res~(ved:*: No~e... '

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e. Prior,l,'evel2,Findings'."""Unresolved: None*

3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.3.1 Rhea County, Tennessee * *.*

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i, I 3.3.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center*. : :. ; * *: *.

Operational Coordination Capability Summary: *

.. '1:J.. :.*.

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The Rhea County Emergency Management Agency Emergency: Management Director and emergency operations center staff successfully demonstrated the ability to monitor, coordinate, and support response*efforts to,protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological incident attlie Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

There were* multiple means of communications available*for use;*including radios, landline and cellular telephones, facsimile machines, internet connected computers, and the Digital National Warning System. The Digital National Warnirig System served as the primary means of communication between the utility, state; and Rhea County. There were connectivity challenges during the entire exercise; not one notification to the emergency management director was received via this system:* Notification from the state waring point was received by cellular phone or through the T.Ynnessee Emergency Management Liaison in the emergency operations center.

Staff were prepositioned in the areaiQ &c:cm:dance.with the, extent of pl~y agreement, but described how they would be notified.during an *actuai radiological incident. The emergency management director established and maintained*a*miified and coordinated operational structure. All critical partners representing law enforcement, emergency medical services, schools, public information; health and medical, mass care~ and public works were integrated and supported the response effort.

Direction and control in the emergency operations:ceiiter was provided by the emergency management director and deputy director: Specifidal1y, the emergency management director was responsible for conducting emergency' operations center briefings and coordinating with the direction and,control officer and directors in the tisk counties of

• McMinn and Meigs. The deputy director was responsible for answering the Digital National Warning System and reviewing notification forms. This "tag team" approach facilitated coordination of respons~ activities and ensured staff remained informed.

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I Radiological Emergency,Preparedness.Pro grain After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The Rhea County Sheriff's Office, Spring City Police Department,, artd Rbea County Road Department representatives discussed the establishment of _appropriate traffic and access control points prior to evacuation. The discussion iricluded'coordination of resources, assignments, issuance of emergency worker kits;.etc., Through interview an impediment on a primary evacuation route was, discussed. A traffic assistance team would be used to respond to accidents, brehl<.cic:H~ris,-or*v~Hicl~s out offuel. *,in addition, the Rhea County Sheriff's Office Chief explained the prqcesshy which watetway warning and clearance would be conducted in coordination with the Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency.

Following the declaration of a General Emergency, the Tennessee Department of.

Environmental Conservation, Division of Radiological Health recommended emergency workers and public sheltered in place in affected:sectors ingest potassiurp.i@dide. A decision-making process to issue appropriate dosimetry from the emergency operations center to emergency workers in, Rhea County, *sectors. was tin.place,.and -included directions for wearing direct reading and permanent record dosimeters, and checking direct reading dosimeters, recording readjngs,_,and monitoring turn back values.

~

The Rhea County Sheriffs Office, Spring City Police Department, Emergency.Medical Services, Rhea County Department of Education, and Rhea County Health Department representatives coordinated to ensure public with access and functional needs were identified and notified by telephone,or door-to,.door contact (simulated).

. For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.a.1, l.c.l, l.d.l, l.e.l, 7.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c~l, 3.c.2, 3;d;l, 3.d.2..

a. Level.I Finding: No~e.

b. Level 2 Finding; None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings ~ Resolved: Npne:' :.. *

i(.*,:, ',**'.\\:

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved:..None

• Public Information and._Warning Capability. Summary:

Public information and warning was successfully demonstrated. However, the Rhea County Public Information:Officer in the emergency operations. center had a limited role

. in the overall developme:nt*c:llld:dissemination of ~mergency public information.

Information learnedin the emernency operations.*center was shared via cellular telephone with the Rhea;County Public. Information Officer in the joint information.center..It was in the joint information center that press releases were developed and disseminated that contained. the status of known.hazards, and appropriate shelter and/or evacuation protective action decisions.

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Radiological.Emergency Preparedness :Program After Action Repcm 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The public information officer in the: emergenc;;y operations *center responded to several public inquiry.Galls; however, most publicinquiry:calls werereceived and answered in the joint information center.

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The.Tepnessee Emergency.Management Agency State *Warning Point Operators had primary responsibility for activation of the outdoor warning system and Emergency Alert System. The Rhea County Emergency Management Agency Communications Center Officers had the ability and*authority t_o *activate both systems, but only if the state warning: point operators were unable to.. activate the systems*.

An interview. was. conducted with th~ communications center officer responsible for sounding the-sirens. The officer explairted*the activation*protocols and how the system reports a, siren failure. The Rhea :Courity*Sheriff' s* Office Chief explained the process by which backup route alerting would,,be conducted if a* siren failure* was reported. The chief would review the backup*rnute*alert,map; identify th,e* failed siren, and dispatch a patrol vehicle to drive the specified routes in the siren coverage area. The deputy would drivetb,e assigned*routes at a,slow speed and*announce an emergency message over the public address system;..

• For this,.capability.the, following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

5.a.1, 5.a.3; 5.b;l

a. Level 1 ;Finding: None b: Level i Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None d.. Prior Level 2 Findings-: Resolved: None e.. Prior Level 2.Findings - Unresolved:

• None 3.3.3.2 McMinn County,. Tennessee.,.*:*:.

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3.3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

( *:

McMinn County Emergency Operations Cenferstaff successfully'demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and integrated all relevant stakeholders.

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I Radiological Emergency, Preparedness *Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Initial notification of a radiological incident at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant was received via the Digital National Warni°'g ~ystem in the emergency operations-center rather than the communications'. center.: (The communications center was staffed 24. hours a day, 7 days a week, unlike the emergency operations center.) The emergency management director still received the notification in a timely manner. Due to prepositioning, alert, notification, and mobilization of emergency,operatidns* center*staffwas explained throughinterview......

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Theemergency operations center had.multipl~imeans:of.communications,including the Digital National Warning System (primary) andilandline and cellular telephones (secondary). Additional means of communications included email, short message

. service, an electronic, incident management.system, facsimile machines, and 800-megahertz radios;;.McMinn County Auxiliary Communication Services, staff maintained real-time tracking and*commuhications*with,emergency workers. The.emergency operations center had:sufficient equipment, maps, displays; dosimetry; potassium iodide, and other supplies to support emergyncy, operations.i,. ~

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1' The emergency management director' provided. direction and control. throughout the incident through regular briefings and status updates; overall direction. and control of the incident was led by the State of Tennessee. Decision-making conference calls with staff from the Tennessee Emergency*ManagementAgency;* Tennessee Valley- :Authority; and risk counties of Rhea and Meigs were used to coordinate protective;actfon decisions.

Recommendations made from the utility, along with dose assessment input, were also used to make protective action decisions for the public and emergency workers.

Protective action decisions made were inclusive of individuals identified as having access and functional needs.

McMinn Emergency Management Agency staff w~re kno~ledg~able o{ appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures to ensure emergency worker safety. The emergency medical services representatives planned appropriately to evacuate those persons identified as having access and functional needs, and the McMinn County Board of Education representatives demonstrated the ability torelocate,school children,*.

teachers, and staff to the assigned relocation area (simulated). Law enforcement representatives provided details on traffic and access control points and clearance of impediments.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

La.1, l.c..1, l.d.l, l.e.l; 2:a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d:l,;3.d.2 t

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None 31

, Radiological-Em~rgency Preparedness: Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None *,.

• Public _Information and Warnin*g Capability Summary:..

• McMinn County Emergency Operations Center Public Information'Officers provided prompt and actionable information to the community. Information regarding the

- radiological incident was relayed and~ as 'appropriate, the actions being taken, and the

. assistance being made.available to the public.!*. *

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The McMinn County Emergency,Managernent Diredorpr.ovided information to the county public information officer at the joint information center for inclusion in press releases.*. Public-inquiry li'nes were staffed by utility and state personnel at the joint information center. MoMinn*CciuntY,:officials within the emergency operations center responded: appropriate! y to *inquiries regarding *county operations:*

The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency State Warning Point Operators had

. priinar'y rnsponsibility for activaticfo**of the prompt notification system, with Rhea County Communications Center Officers tasked to provide backup, ifneeded. Although no siren failures were identified during the exercise, a McMinn County Sheriffs Office Deputy

• explained how backup route alerting would.have been conducted. : If the system identified a siren failure, within the county, a deputy would be directed fo drive specified routes in the siren coverage area while broadcasting a*pre..:scripted.emergency message to advise the public:* :

• Foi1this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness, criteria were met:

5.a.l, 5.b.l

a. Levell ;Finding: None * *

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

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e. Prior Level 2 Findings-Unresolved: None 3.3.3.2.2 Emergency Worker Decontamination

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Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

Monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their vehicles was demonstrated at the McMinn County High School stadium by staff from McMinn County Emergency Management, the Tennessee Department of Health, Athens Rural Fire Department, and the McMinn County Hazardous Materials Team.

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I Radiological Emergency; Pr.eparedness. Program After Action Report.

2019 Watts ~ar Nuclear Plant The facility layout was carefully consideted.and-leveraged both the stadium and adjoining parking lot to facilitate a smooth and steady monitoring and decontamination flow. Signage was located throughoutthe_facility t0 help guide emergency workers through the process. There was appropriate equipment and supplies available to safely support the mission.

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,*" i,* .ii Each facility worker:,was 0issued.a dec~ntamihati0n kit.that provided everything needed to monitor and record radiation exposure, as}Vell as pbtassiumiodide.* Several workers were interviewed about radiation exposure control and were knowledgeable of their administrative,reporting and turnback dos,e limits..

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Facility workers wore latex gkives to prevent-cross contamination. It was recommended that team members performing decontaniinat~on iricreasi:} their personal protective equipment to account for the possibility ;of: being_ sprayed ~ith contan;liriated water.

Adequate quantities of radiological survey meters were available to monitor personnel and vehicles. Each meter was within current,calibratibn.and_ was operationally.checked in accordance with procedures prior-to use>Additional meters'were available from the emergency operations center, if needed. - ' *.,.

Facility workers processed incoming.emergency workers and their vehicles effectively.

They communicated the process well to the emergency workers and documented the entire process in accordance with procedures. The workers knew how to use their radiological survey meters and used sound survey techniques. Contaminated *personnel and vehicles were decontaminated in accordance with procedures. The facility was well managed by the 'McMinn County Radiological Officer and it was evident the facility workers were well trained.

For this capability the following radiological emergency -preparedness criteria were met:

l.e.1, 3.a.l, 6.b.l

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

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c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report.

3.3.3.3 Meigs County, Tennessee 3.3.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability.Summary::

• *.: ~

• 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant The Meigs County Emergerrcy. Management Director attempted to alert emergency operations center staff following notification,of:a seismic eventwithin the county. Staff were requested to report to the emergency operations center. The emergency management directckserif a message *recalling staff through the agency's paging system; however, many staff did-frat :recei ye*the *message... It was only because staff were prepositioned iri the ar~*a in accordanciewith. the extent *of play. agreement that most were notified and mobilized:, The emergency operations *center was declared operational shortly after the message was*sent:. *, -* '**, *

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The emergency operations center had sufficient supplies, maps, and equipment to support emergency operations. There were*niultiple means of communications, including landline and cellular telephones, the Digital National Warning System, the decision-making conference calls, facsimile machines, 800 megahertz radios, VHF and low band radios, satellite phone, an electronic incident managementsysterii, *and an Amateur Radio Club. No interoperability or connectivity issues were observed.,.*.

Upon activation of the emergency operations center, the Bradley County Radiological Safety Officer conducted a radiological briefing._ The conte11t qfeµiergency worker kits was discussed, including the purpose and intended use of each item*., The Meigs County Emergency Operation Center is located within the 10-mile emergency planning zone, as such there were sufficient emergency worker kits and supplies stored within the facility.

There were 80 kits, all of which included a 0~20Rdirect reading, dosimeter, permanent record dosimeter, one course of potassium iodide, and a Temporary Personal Record of Radiation Received card with instructions.

Later, when three fire and law enforcement representatives were identified to assist with traffic and access control points in theJO.amile emergency,planning zone, the radiological officer gave them a more comprehensive briefing. Following the briefing, the emergency workers were interviewed. The emergency workers knew how.to use issued dosimetry and record readings; were knowledgeable of administrative reporting and turnback dose limits; understood when to ingest potassium iodide; and where,toreturnthe emergency worker kits at the end* of their shift.

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Direction and control was demonstrated by the Meigs, County Emergency Management Director. The emergency management director participated in decision-making conference calls with the state and other risk county emergency management directors, and emergency operations center staff. The emergency management director managed situational awareness through frequent emergency operations center briefings.

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I Radiological -Emergency, Pr:epar:edness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Protective action decisions for access and functional needs and.school.relocation were accomplished in accordance with their procedure. Emergency medical services representatives coordinated the relocation of Grace Healthcare };ly ambu\\ance and AmbuBus to Bradley County Healthcare (simulated). Emergency medical services representatives also attempted to contact *22 indivjduals1 who had self.,iderttified access and functional needs. Telephone calls or door to door notifications were made to each (simulated). In addition, Jaw enforcement representatives_ in partnership with the Tennessee Department of Corrections, were* prepared to !teldtate the Meigs County Jail.

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Following the, decision to ev.acuate sectors Cl, C2, C3, C4,.cs interviews were.

conducted with deputies from the Meigs, County* Sheriffs Office, officers from the Decatur Police Dfpartment,-and representatives from,the Meigs County Highway Department. They each explained how impediments to evacuation routes would be identified and removed. They also understood.where to ob,tain an emergency worker kit and were familiar with kit contents and use.

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-* r I For this capability the following radiolbgical emergency preparedness criteria were met

l.a.l, l.c.l, Ld.1; -1.e.1, 2.,Ll, 2.b.2, 2.c;l;3.a.1,.3.b.l,.3.c.1, 3.d.1,:3.d.2 *,.

a.. Level lFinding: :None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

. c. Not Demonstrated*: None *.,,

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d. Prior Levei'~:Finclings-Res()Ived: Norie

e. Prior_Level2 Findings-Unresolved: None Public Informaticm and Warning Capability Summary:

': l Activities associated with public information and warning were completed quickly following concurrence of the protective action decisions by county officials. The emergency management director used the decision-making conference calls to exchange information, andfoform;and*concur.:w.ith deci'siohs. i **

. The Meigs.County Public Information Officer.in the emergency operations center coordinated and communicated with the Meigs County Public Information.Officer in the

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• joint information center., Active engagement with the city and county ma¥ors, emergency management director, and various emergency operations center staff ensu'red,press release information provided to the Meigs County Public Information Officer in the joint information center was accurate;*.,;.

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RadiologicaVEmergency Preparedness Program After, Action Report

• 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant A Meigs County Sheriff's Office Deputy was interviewed about backup route alerting in the event of a siren failure in Meigs County. The deputy produced a siren map with siren locations, as well as a procedure. The deputy identified a failed siren (simulated), and discussed directions to the start of the route, the route itself, and the pre-scripted emergency message that would be read, The.deputy was, farnilianvith radiological safety procedures and knew to report to the closest shelter information point for initial radiological monitoririg,. :Th'e d,epbty also knew to*.report to, art* emergency worker monitoring and decontamination station if found to be contaminated.

For this *capability. the following :radiol0gical emergenctpreparedness criteria were met:

5.a.1;5.a.3;5.b.l*

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a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Lev.~i 2 Fincling: fyone

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c.. Not Demonstrated:: Ncme.. ;,,.i

. d. Prio; Level* 2* Findings..:_ k~s~lv~ci:, None f

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e. Prior:Level 2 Findings - UnresQlved:: None *.,

On-Scene*Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

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Emergency workers from the Meigs County Sheriff's Office, Decatur Police Department, and Meigs,(;ounty,HighwayDepartment discussed traffic and access control points and

.. roadblock locations, including establishment and staffing. Vehtcles were equipped with traffic cones, flares, flashlights, and other supplies. Each *emergency worker was familiar with the emergency worker kit content, including potassium iodide, if directed to ingest.

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For this capability the following radiological emergency prepa:vednes~ *criteria were met:

3.d*.l; 3.d.2.,

-.,.':c.

a. Level 1 Finding: None.,

b. Level 2 Finding; None 1:'

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d.

• Prior ievel 1

2 Findings-Resolved: *None

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e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None;* * *

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 3.3.4 Host Jurisdictions, 3.3.4.1 Cumberland County, Tennessee 3.3.4.1.1 Reception Center. and. Congregate, Care. :

• Environmental Response/Health.and Safety,C,apability Summary:,,* ;' *

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Reception and congregate care was demonstrated out of sequence on July 11, 2019 at the

• Cumberland County High S.cl:iool in Crdssville,,Tenhessee. :Adequate space.and resources and supplies to receive, monitor, and decontaminate the public.were available and used during the demonstration.

Entering evacuee vehicles were quick! y directed into par~pg ar~as and. <j.J?propriate procedures were used to identify and quarantine contaminated vehicles'. 'Evacuees exiting the vehicles were properly monitored for contamination*and-decontaminated,if necessary. Personnel with Crossville Fire Re~cue, the Cr.ossville B;azar;dou~ Materials Team, and Tennessee Department of Health' tobk grea(care to ensure evacuees were free of contamination, while also minimizing,the'potential for cross contamination.

There were signs, flagging-tape;*and barricadesflocated throughout the'.facility to keep evacuees organized. All survey meters had been calibrated and were operationally checked prior to.use. Facility staff knew-how to use their radiological survey meters and used good survey.techniques. One instrument provided faulty-reading's during the operation, it was:quickly identified and taken out of service. A backup survey, meter was then properly put;into. service to replace the faulty one.

• Decontamination teams provided sound instructions to contaminated evacuees and had adequate supplies,to properly decontaminate them. Facility staff were knowledgeable of radiation exposure control and knew their administrative reporting and turnback dose limits. During the demonstration staff were reminded via radio to periodically check their dosimeters and report their readings to the radiological safety officer.*.

Facility staff were well trained and worked together effectivel:/'Th~y c~m~uni~ated well with the evacuees and took steps to minimize the anxiety that may. be caused by the process. The demonstration was used as a training event for county and city staff. A large number of police, fire, and emergency medical services personnel observed the operation and are now better prepared'.tolsupport;,if needed., **

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None 37

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

. After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

c. Not Demonstrated: None, *.

d. Prior_Level.2 Findings-Resolved: None

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e. Priorii,~vel2,F!ncJ.ings - Unresolye4:, None..

Mass Care Services Capability Sum~ary:

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The Curµberland c;ou11ty}Iigh'.Scbp,ol. w~,suc;cessfully,used to provide services and accornrnp:dations for evacuee~: T:l:ie. facility was setup in aGcord~mc;;e with American Red Cross planning guidelines. As part *of the demonstration evacuees were appropriately mo:qitorecl,,a,nd decontamj.pated,prior,to,entering (hc;reception center ctnd congregate care facility.

The reception center and congregate care facility had sufficient staff, equipment, and supplies to support operations. There were plenty of forms and informational pamphlets available at the registration area. Most of the forms were translated and available in Spanish. Evacuees could register in the "safe and well" area by computer, smartphone, or paper form to let friends and family members know their status. The dormitory area issued a cot, pillow, two blankets, and a comfort kit to each evacuee. A cafeteria was available and would be used to prepare and serve two hot meals per day. Breakfast items such as cereal and fruit would be made available each morning. Should an evacuee's health and medical needs change while in the facility, a health services area was available and staffed by American Red Cross and Cumberland County Health Department staff.

The facility would be staffed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. If additional resources were required, resource requests would be made through the American Red Cross-Southeast Tennessee Chapter and then through the state.

Through interview, the Cumberland County Health Department explained that they would oversee the general health needs and radiological monitoring of the evacuees.

Health department staff would also be responsible for the administration of potassium iodide, if directed to ingest.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

1.e.1, 3.b.l, 6.c.l

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings-Unresolved: None 38 I

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I Radiological Emergency:Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Section 4: Conclusion Overall, the exercise was a success. Officiais and r~pr~sentatives from Rhe~;'McMinn, and Meigs counties; the State of Tennessee; the* Tenriess~e Valley Autliority; Jnd ht.unetdus other organizations participated in the exercise and out of sequence activities.

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All offsite response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures.and successfully ddnonstrated the ability: fo:protect the health'a'.rid -s~fety of the public in the event of a radiological incidentinvbiviilg'the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. : '

FEMA wishes to *acknowledge*the efforts ofthe'manyiritlividuals'whd participhted and made this exercise and the out of sequence activities a success.

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After Action Report -

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• 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant I

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After Action Report Emergency Classification Level or E:vent Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Simulated Rad. Release Began Simulated Rad. Release Ended Facility Declared Operational Declaration of Emergency State Local Exercise Terminated Precautionary Actions:

Preposition Buses Relocate Schools Press Release Relocate Nursing Home Time'..

• utility

.Oe.clared 0810 0835 0929 1041 1111 Ongoing 0910 1st Protective Action Decision:

Monitor and Prepare &

Go Inside/Stay Inside: Al, Bl, Cl, C4, CS, C7, C8, C9, ClO, Cll Dl, D4, pt Siren Activation 1st EAS Message 2nd Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate: Al, Bl, Cl, Dl Shelter: C2, C3, C4, CS, C6, C7, C8, C9, ClO, Cl 1, D4 2nd Siren Activation 2nd EAS Message Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Appendix A: Exercise Timeline Time That Notifi~atiori.Was'Receivedor Action Was Taken JIC SEOC DOSE RCC/

RHEA MCMINN MEIGS RMCC COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY 0817 0822 0824 0822 0821 0823 0841 0844 0847 0849 0845 0845 0936 0940 0940 0943 0938 0941 1056 1102 1057 1059 1057 1059

• 1042 1124 1115 1111

• 1122 Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing 0943 0907 0950 0850 0930 0832

• 1016 0943 1304 1404 1403 1354 1351

• 1332 0925 0939 0942 0926 1034 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1008 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015

• 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015

• 1015 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118 1118

• 1122 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120

• 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120

• 1120 41

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

• Eiinerg~rict' Classification Le~~I *of E~ent

"\\ *,Ti'me :c "'

- tJ}ility Deciared *.

J 3rd Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate: Al, Bl, Cl, Dl Shelter: B2, B3, C2, C3, C4, CS, C6,..

C7, C8, C9, ClO, Cl1, D4 3rd Siren Activation 3rd EAS Message 4th KI Ingestion Decision:

Emergency Workers.

Public SIP in Affected Sectors 4th Siren Activation 4th EAS Message 5th Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate: Al, Bl, B2, B3, Cl, C2,'

C3, Dl Shelter: C4, CS, C6, C7, C8, C9, ClO, Cll, D4 5th Siren Activation 5th EAS Message 6th Protective Action-Decision:

Evacuate: Al, Bl,'B2, BJ, Cl, C2, C3, C4, CS, C6, DI Shelter: C7, C8, C9, qo, Cl 1, D4 6th Siren Activation 6th EAS Message SEOC DOSE 1142 1142.,

li50 1150 1157-1158 1157 1158 1210.

1210 1210 1210 1227 1227 1235 1237*

1345' 1345 1350

1352'

/

RCC/

RHEA MCMINN MEIGS RMCC COUNTY COUNTY

. :coUNTY 1142

.1142

--1.142

., ~ '

1144 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 11'50' 1156.

1156 1156.

1154*

'1156 '

1156 *.

1210 1210

.. 1210 1i10:*

1210

)210 *.

.. 1210 1210.

1224 1224

1225.* *:*

1235 1235 1235 1235 1235 12.35 1345 1345 1345 1i44':**

1350.

. i350.

. 1350.*,

1350 135ff

-1350...

. 1350*.

1350.*

• Denotes the tlme in whzch a deczsion was messagedfrdm th'e'joz1Jf znformatlon center....

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• 1152

• 1210

• 1210

• 1235

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I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Appendix B:. Evaluator Assignments**

RAC Chair: Randy Hecht Section Chief: JT Ackermann State Lead: Matt Bradley Site* Sp~c~alist:

• Erica Houghton Exerc.ise Management: Robert Spence, Jqseph Harworth Evaluator Assignments,. Exercise*Wee~,.November 4-8, 2019:

-~*

. -Location/Venue Evaluation

Team Core. Capability(ies).

State of Tennessee

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• Michael Dolder (Nashville, TN I David Ortman Opfrational Coordinatiotj Quintin Ivy puj:>lic Information and Warning Central Time Zone)

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TomHegele Dose Assessment John Fill

~it:uational Assessment CECC Johp_ Pelchat Situational. Assessment RMCC

• • l Jill Leatherman Environmental Response/Health and Safety

( Knoxville, TN)

RCC I

Robert Nash

... Operational Coordination

( Knoxville, TN)

Marcy Campbell Field Teams Brad*McRee (Knoxville, TN)

Bar;t Ray Environmental Response/Health and Safety

.. Kent Tosch Joint Information

~Glenda Bryson I

Public Information and Warning System/Center

.* Bruce Swiren Rhea* County*...

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• Erica Houghton

. Operational Coordination BOC

.:Lorenzo Lewis

Roy Smith Public Information and Warning

McMinn.County

• *Libby Adkins BOC DeShun Lowery.

Operational Coordination

,Russell Bergmann (OJT)

• Public Information and Warning

jim Greer Meigs County I

• Gerald McLemore Operational Coordinatipn BOC George Odom (OJT)

Public Information and W_arning.

Peter Judge * * **

On-S~ene Security, Protection, and Law PJ Nied.

Enforcement

• Denotes Team Lead 43

Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant EvaluatorAssignments, Out of Sequence Week, July 8-12, 2019:

,Location/Ye.nµe :

• Stat~ of T'ennessee

• Waterway Clearance

• Matthew Bradley JT Ack~ittiartri\\\\:! 1:.,i(;!T~,;JJ*\\\\':

EWD Marcy Campbell George Odom{OJ'I')*'.Sdn ',.i J' 1,i Erica Hou htg1;1 C.IT-.*. v,.

Cumberbnid Co:unty

,, i -;;\\ 1 r?,,,.: '. :l'Ma.tth,(}~ l?ra.cJ!~Y5d,.*.,, _:: _:;.*.,, :: : *.

JT Ackermann RCCC

.-,;*: ;** 10;

• Denotes Team Lead

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Environmental Response/Health and Safety M~ss Care' Serv-iees' *

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Radiologic;aL Emergency. Pr~paredness: Pro gram After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Appendix C: Extent:of Play Agreement.

For the 2019. Watts* Bar. Nuclear: Pl~nt Exercise and Out of Sequen_ce,Activities July 8-12, 201~ an_d No!e111ber 6, 2019 I

,**I Watts Bar Nucle'a"r Pl*ant GRADED EVALUATION EXERCISE (Full Scale Plume Phase E,cerd~e,)

EXTENT-OF-PLAYAGREEIVIENT._,

2019 FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

~

All activities will be, demqnstrated fully in accordance with respective plans ~nd procedures as they would be in an actual event. This extent of play agreem'erit is\\vritten* by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in thei p'lans, standard or suggested operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-

• demonstrated if allowed by the RAC Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and mutually agreed to by the TEMA lead controller and FEMA lead evaluator, as designated by the RAC Chair.

The State of Tennessee and TVA have prepared goals addressing respective obligations. Both reflect the necessary interactions between the State and local governments as well as TVA as set forth in the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for the TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

NOTE: All exercise times are Eastern Standard/Daylight Time (EST).

Exercise Date: November 6, 2019 Exercise Start Time: 0800 Exercise Objectives Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize response personnel and facilities; provide direction and control, make precautionary and protective action decisions and implement those decisions. (Operational Coordination; Environmental Response/Health & Safety; On-Scene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement; Critical Transportation)

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to manage radiological field monitoring teams and perform plume-phase field measurements and analysis. (Situational Assessment; Environmental Response/Health & Safety)

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system and provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report*

2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Objecth(e,4: Demon.strate the ability t0 receive, monitor, decontaminate, register and provide for the temporary care of evacuees and emergency wo~kers. (Envirommental Response/Health & Safety; Mass Care)

Exercise* Evaluation Criteria

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Capability: Operational Coordination Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates 911 critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

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This 'cap*abiiity,will be deriKinstr~ted at t~'e'5EOC, '.R'cc, Rhea, McMihn a~dMeigs County EOCs.

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Target: Emergency Operations Management Critical Task: OROs use effective procedl'.J~es ito alert; n*otify; arid mobilize *emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (Criterion 1.a.1).

Participants may be prepositioned in'proximity to their assigned response locations. Participants will not be allowed to enter their a~signed ex'ercise location prior to receiving 'activation/notification in accordance with plans and procedures.

All notifications to adjacent states, Federal government agencies and railroads will be simulated and verbalized tci. evaluators.

Discussion of agency capabilities/ procedures to alert and mobilize staff may be discussed with participants..

C::ritical Task: Key personnel wit_h leadership roles for the Offsite Response-Organizations (ORO) provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion 1.c.1 ).

,. Critical Task:* At least;two.communications. systems are available; at.least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are,managed in support of emergency operations (Criterion 1.d.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, Kl, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1.e.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. State SAVs and TEMA Radiological Shop SAV will be on 05/21/2019. Rhea, Meigs and McMinn County SAVs dates will be July 101h (McMinn and Meigs Counties) and July 11 1h (Rhea County).

Target: Protective Action Decision Making Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, c'onsidering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system,,induping the use of Kl (if appropriate), is in place for EWs including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures. This critical,task will be demonstrated at the SEOC and risk county EOCs (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea).

Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of Kl, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2).

In accordance with plans and procedures at the SEOC and risk counties. At the SEOC, solely from the DACO's perspective.

Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (Criterion 2.c.1 ).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs in accordance with plans and procedures.

Target: Protective Action Implementation Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl; and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures from a management perspective. Issuance of Kl to emergency workers will be explained and completed during the exercise on November 61h, and during the out of 47

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant sequence activities.

Critical Task: Kl and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of Kl is made.

Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.1 ).

If applicable this critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspectiv~ and in accordance with plans and procedures~ The issuance of Kl will be simulated.

Critical Task: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions (Criterion 3.c.1 ).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate. Personal information relative to access and functional needs individuals will not be copied or removed from the EOC by the FEMA evaluation team.

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Criterion 3.d.1 ).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk. county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate.

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654 J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate.

Capability: Situational Assessment Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature ~nd extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.-

This capability will be demonstrated atthe SEOC by Dose Assessment and at the CECC.

Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considerin~ relevant factors and appropriate 48 I

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watt;s Bar Nuclear Plant coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of Kl, is in place for EWs including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a.1}.

In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: Appropriate PARs are based on *av;:iilable. irformation on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions (Criterion 2.b.1 }.

In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: A decision~making process involving c;:onsideration of, appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the g~neral public (including the recommendation for the use of Kl, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2}.

In accordance with plans and procedure Capability: Public Information and Warning Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent; accessible; and culturally and linguistically appropriate 'methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, McMinn, Meigs and Rhea County EOCs, and Joint Information Center.

Target: Emergency Notification and Public Information Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public ate completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional. message to the public must include, at a minimum, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion 5.a.1).

This critical task will be demonstrated during the graded exercise on November 6, 2019. The State 49

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Emergency Information Director or designee will discuss procedures for the formulation, approval, release, receipt, acknowledgmenVvalidation and broadcast of an EAS message. EAS message will not be transmitted or broadcast.

As part of the graded evaluation, the initial activation of the PNS to include EAS will be simulated by the State Emergency Information Director or designee as applicable. Applicable EAS message formulation(s) and approval(s) will be demonstrated. EAS message(s) will not be given to the watch point; participants responsible for the activatio1_1.of the PNS will discuss procedures for activations and demonstrate same up to the point of activation. Sirens will not be activated.

Critical Task: Backup alert notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the pri.ma~ alert and notification system (Criterion 5.a.3).

As part of the graded evaluation, McMinn, and Rhea County participants will discuss backup route alerting with evaluators as applicable. Rhea County with the assistance of TWRA will demonstrate waterway warning and clearance on Thursday, July 11th.

Critical Task: Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion S.b.1).

This critica,I task will be demonstrated at the SEOC, risk County EOCs, and Joint Information Center.

The Joint Information Center (JI() personnel. State/local and TVA, can be pre-positioned in area. Using a virtual joint information system, public information management will be demonstrated and provide the necessary public messaging until the JIC is activated and made operational in accordance with established procedures. Locally available State PIOs may be utilized in the JIC to supplement TEMA PIOs.

Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (Criterion 1.a.1 ).

Participants may be_prepositioned in proximity to their assigned response locations. Participants will not be allowed to enter their assigned exercise location prior to receivin*g activation/notification in accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications 50 I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (Criterion 1.d.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures.

Capability: Environmental Response/Health and'Safety Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural* disasters in support of the respondet operations and the affected communities.

l This capability will be demonstrated at the RMCC, by the radiological field monitoring teams and Rhea, Meigs and McMinn Counties as applicable.

The following task will be demonstrated by DRH RMCC.

Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure (Criterion 4.a.2).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the RMCC in accordance with plans and procedures.

The following tasks will be demonstrated by the State Radiological Field Monitoring teams.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, Kl, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1.e.1).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Ki may be used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings pn the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Ki may be used.

Critical Task: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and 51

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low-background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media (Criterion 4.a.3).

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be availabie for wear in accordance with plans and procedures.

Actual donning/doffing of PPE will be the* state exercise director's decision at the time of the activity.

Field monitoring teams will do their ihventories; backgrounds *and equipment checks with evaluators upon arrival to allow more time for field demonstrations. In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of tbe administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: The facility/ORO had adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (Criteria 6.b.1).

Monitoring of emergency workers and their vehicles will be demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operational checks of radiological monitoring instruments is an evaluative component and will be completed with an evaluator. Decontamination of emergency workers, at least one, will be simulated in accordance with plans and procedures. Simulated contamination will be given by controller inject. Physical decontamination of an emergency worker vehicle will be demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be available for wear in accordance with plans and procedures.

Actual donning/doffing of PPE will be the state exercise director's decision at the time of the activity.

Critical Task: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees (Criterion 6.a.1 ).

Radiological monitoring, decontamination and registration facilities for evacuees will be set up in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operational checks of radiological monitoring instruments is an evaluative component and will be completed with an evaluator. Counties will have one-third of the resources available at the facility for this demonstration as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. The remaining two-thirds of the necessary resources will be demonstrated by the counties providing valid documentation reflecting how/where the equipment and 52 I

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I Radiological Emerg~ncy Prepareqness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts B;µ-Nuclear Plant staff will be procured/stored/respond from.

A minimum of six evacuees, two df which will be contaminated (simulated) will be available for monitoring registration and decontamination as applicable. A minimum of two evacuee vehicles, one of which will be contaminated (simulc!ted) will be c1vailable for monitoring, registration and decontamination as applicable. Simulated contamination will be given by controller inject. Physical decontamination of evacuees and vehicles will.be simulated and in acc;on;lance with plans and procedures. Demonstrated out of sequence at Cumberland County,High School July 11. 2019, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be available for wear.in c1ccordance with plans and procedures.

Actual donning/doffing of PPE will be the state ex~r-cise director's decision at the time of the activity.

The following three tasks will be demonstrated out of sequence by McMinn County on July 9, 2019 McMinn County High School EWD site.

Critical Task: The facility/ORO had adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency wor~ers and their equipment and vehicles (Criteria 6.b.1).

Monitoring of emergency workers and their vehicles will be demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures. Decontaminati,on of emergency workers, at least one, will be simulated and in accordance with plans and procedures. Actual decontamination of an emergency worker vehicle will be demonstrated in.accordance with plans and procedures. Personal Protective Equipm~nt (PPE) will be available for wear in accordance with plans c1nd procedures. Actual donning/doffing of PPE will be the state exercise director's decision at the time of the activity.

Capability: Critical Transportation Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (Criterion 3.c.2).

In accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with applicable representatives of the Rhea, Meigs and McMinn County School Districts during exercise..

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

This core capability will be demonstrated by the Meigs County EMA and Meigs County Sheriff's Office during the Emergency Worker Decontamination evaluation at McMinn Central High School.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, Kl, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operatipns (Criterion 1.e.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (Criterion 3.d.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. Demonstrated by discussion at Meigs County EOC in sequence.

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (Criterion 3.d.2).

In accor.dance with plans and procedures. Demonstrated thru message inject during in sequence.

Capability: Mass Care Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying families.

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'I Ra~iological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Watt Bar Nuclear Plant This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence on July 11, 2019 by the Cumberland County EMA and Cumberland County Health Department at Cumberland County High School. These activities are done in conjunction with the State Health department.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, Kl, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1.e.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task:.Kl and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of Kl is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of Kl for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. Kl will not be distributed but procedures for distribution will be discussed.

Critical Task: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers._ have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities (Criterion 6.c.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. Each shelter is Red Cross certified and a limited demonstration of services will be provided. A valid and current LOA or MOU between the county and American Red Cross will be provided to the evaluation team either prior to the demonstration or at the time of the demonstration.

Demonstrated out of sequence at Cumberland County High School July 11 1h, 2019.

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