ML20043C316
| ML20043C316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1990 |
| From: | Kaufer B NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-AE, TASK-T90-07, TASK-T90-7 AEOD-T90-07, AEOD-T90-7, NUDOCS 9006050049 | |
| Download: ML20043C316 (2) | |
Text
i AEOD TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORT UNIT:
Limerick 2 TR REPORT NO.:
AEOD/T90-07 DOCKET NO.:
50-353 DATE:
May 24, 1990 LICENSEE:
Philadelphia Electric EVALUATOR / CONTACT: B. Kaufer NSSS/AE:
General Electric /Bechtel
SUBJECT:
REVERSED SENSING LINES CONNECTIONS EVENT DATE:
January 5,1990
SUMMARY
I I
This study was initiated to review the safety significance of an event at Limerick Unit 2, LER 90-002, on January 5,1990.
This event involved reversed connections of sensing lines to a containment hydrogen / oxygen analyzer. Nineteen additional events involving this issue were revealed from searches on NUDOCS and SCSS databases. NRC actions regarding this issue include an AEOD engineering evaluation report and Information Notices issuedin1984and1985(Ref.1-5). Most of the events were plant specific.
In conclusion, this review determined that the frequency of 4
occurrences is relatively small and the consequences of the events resulted in limited safety significance. Therefore, no further AEOD action is recommended.
1.
INTRODUCTION On January 5,1990, the Limerick Unit 2 containment Hydrogen /0xygen (H2/02) analyzer was declared inoperable due to a high concentration indication during nitrogen inerting of the containment.
Following troubleshooting, it was determined that the root cause of this event was due to reversed connections of the analyzer sensing lines, due to mislabeling of the analyzer ports.
The analyzers were supplied by Comsip-Delphi (Model K).
Installation of the analyzer was accomplished by connecting the labeled inlet / outlet ports to the desired plant lines.
Because of the reversed connections, the l
normally closed sample point isolation valve was in the line exhausting to containment while the sample point line had only a cap. This resulted in an indeterminate percentage of sample recirculation through the analyzer rather than normal exhaust to the suppression pool or drywell. The licensee determined that the analyzer had been inoperable since its installation in 1989.
Pre-operational testing of the analyzer did not identify the improper configuration of.the system. The three other analyzers in the plant (two on each unit) were verified to be properly labeled and connected.
This review was performed to determine if other events involving reversed sensing lines had occurred and to evaluate consequences of these events as to frequency, safety, and root cause.
L 900605o049 900324 FF;DR ADOCK 05000333 FDC go
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MAY 2 l 1990 i
NOTE FOR:
Distribution
SUBJECT:
REVERSED SENSING LINES CONNECTIONS AEOD/T90-07 ISSUED 5/24/90 Will you please remove the cover sheet of AEOD TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORT AEOD/T90-06 and insert the new cover sheet listing the correct report number as AE0D/T90-07.
Thank you.
Distribution:
PDR Edordan KBlack Centrs1LFilA13. Dross RSavio, ACRS ROAB R/F TNovak MTaylor, EDO DSP R/T LSpessard KRaglin, TTC AEOD R/T SRubin PBaranowsky, NRR BKaufer GZech NSu MWilliams Glanik JRosenthal l
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