ML20043C284
| ML20043C284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109181 |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1990 |
| From: | Temus C PACIFIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INC. |
| To: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9006050004 | |
| Download: ML20043C284 (3) | |
Text
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- ttn, May 31, 1990 Mr. Charles E. MacDonald, Chief Transportation Branch Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Reference:
Docket 71-9181, Letter from C. MacDonald to C. Temus, dated March 2, 1990
Dear Mr. MacDonald:
In response to your letter of March 2, 1990, Nuclear Packaging is submitting revised pages in the form of Revision 2
to our consolidated application of February 1985. These pages clarify the adequacy of the package with or without the optional secondary containment vessel. Enclosed are ten copies of the revision pages for the PAS-2 Safety Analysis Report.
Theses specific pages are considered non-proprietary and should be placed in both the proprietary and non-proprietary versions. Please remove page 2-29 and replace with pages 2-29 and 2-29a of Revision 2.
The affidavit for the proprietary version is still valid and is not affected by this revision.
Please call me if there are questions regarding this submittal.
f Sincerely,-
NUCLEAR PACKAGING, INC.
Charles J. Temus Technical Director 9006050004 900531 PDR ADOCK 07109181 C
PDC PacInc Nuclear Packaging. Inc. 1010 South 336th Street Federsi Way, Washington 98003 (206)B74 2235 FAX (206)874-2401 7/%/
j
4 uPac PAS 2 Systec C$ns@lidated SAR Rev.
2, 14 a y 1990 N
4 2.7.6 summary of Demane j
.6 i
Trom the above analyses and. t eit s, it can be seen that there. will be no significant damage to-any of the NuPac PAS *2 containment systems or radle.
- )
. tlen shletds.from the hypothetical accident event sequence set out in 10 CFR-i
.71.
Damage would, in fact, be limited to the inner and outer overpacks, and I
there would be no reason to require any rework or remanufacture of any other i
part of the packaging systems after such an event, should it actually occur.
i By careful review of the package design and the results presented.within this safety Analysle-Report, it may be concluded that the _ presence of the f
optional secondary containment vesset, or lack thereof, has little influence on the survivability of the package's other containment bounderles per the I
requirements of 10 CFR 71.
These conclusions are the same as presented in 5
the initial license application and approval.
In ' review, the PAS *2 package consists of a sample viet (primary contain*
ment), enclosed within a sample shield (secondary containment), enciesed within an optional secondary containment vesset, enclosed within a 001 17H,,
55 gation drum, enclosed within an overpack.
i i
the overpack is fabricated of 20 gauge (0.036 inch - thick) steel (outer shell) a nd.1/8. I nc h th!ck fiberglass (inner shell), with t ti r e e pound per cubic foot density foam between.
The 007.17H, 55 gallon drum is fabricated of 18-g auge (0.0478 Inch thick) steet.
The sample shletd and optional secondary containment vesset are fabricated of 3/16 and 3/8 inch thick steet,.respectively, the former backed by four to six inches of solid, cast
' lead.- The sample shield, being fabricated of cast lead, forms an extremely elgid, thickawetted mass with little tendency to deform.
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~
f 2 29
NuPac PAS 2 System Consolidated SAR bev. 2, May 1990 y
s 9
in relative terms, the sample shletd and optional secondary containment vesset are significantly more rigid than the overpack and 55+gatton drum.
Thus, essentially all the kinetic energy of impact from thw 30 foot drop is absorbed in the relatively " soft" overpack.
This was vertfled by testing as shown on Pages 2 22 through 2 25 where it was demonstrated that the vast majority of drop damage was sustained by the overpack (significant deforma-tion of the outer sheLL and foam, and minor cracking and tearing of the fiberglass shell), and the remainder in the DDT 17H, 55 galton drum (onty slight butging and flattening of the rolling hoops).
In no case was damage or permanent deformation detected in cither the sample viel, sample shletd, or optional secondary containment vessel.
The sample shleid provides two functions,- containment and shielding.
The seats are located at the Internal boundary of the sample shield.
The shielding is conservative for normal conditions and can be reduced significantly for the accident conditions.
If the package was dropped without the secondary containment as described above, it would not be damaged.
However, because of its configuration and function, it could sustatn significant damage prior to compromising its ability to meet the requirements.of 10CFR71.
Therefore, since the sample shletd provides the majority. of the system rigidity, and essentially all the kinetic energy of drop is absorbed by the overpack, removat of the optional secondary containment vessel would not significantly alter the drop results or the package's ability-to meet all the requirements of 10CFR71.
2.8 soecial Form
.Not applicable, since no speclat form is claimed.
2.9 Fuel Rods Not applicable, since no fuel rods would be packaged in the NuPac PAS 2.
1 2 29a
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