ML20043A349

Licensee Use of Tactical Exercise Results

ML20043A349
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/30/1990
From:	Charles Brown, Sawyer C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
References
NUREG-1404, NUDOCS 9005210234
Download: ML20043A349 (11)

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/ l l NUREG-1404 i e Licensee Use of Tactical Exercise Results

i Manuscript Completed: April 1990 Date Published: April 1990 I

C. Sawyer, C. Iirown l Division of Safeguards and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 i p"'em, I e M + 3

ABSTRACT On November 10, 1988 the Nuclear Regulatory Consission (NRC) amended its physical security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 for fuel facilities possessing fomula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. The amendnents 1 to 10 CFR 73.46(b) require, among other things, that licensets carry out perfor-mance evaluations through tactical response exercises. The stercises are intended to demonstrate the guard force state of readiness and to test the effectiveness of delay mechanisms, alam and connunication systems, response times, deployment of respcase forces, firing skills (simulated), tactical maneuvers, etc. The purpose of this document is to set forth criteria, acceptable to the NRC staff, which will enable a licensee to use the results of an exercise to determine whether additional training or security improvements are needed. iii l l

i i TABLE OF CONTENTS f!21 ABSTRACT iii i 1. INTRODUCTION 1 ?.. GUIDELINES FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1 2.1 Safeguards Vulnerabilities 1 2.2 Safeguards Deficiencies 2 2.3 Safeguards Concerns 4 3. NRC STAFF POSITION 5 l i V l

._w_ 1. INTRODUCTION i On November 10, 1988 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its physical security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 for fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear meterial. The amendments to 10 CFR 73.46(b) require, among other things, that licensees carry out performance evaluations through tactical response exercises. The exercises j are intended to demonstrate the guard force state of readiness and to test the l effectiveness of delay mechanisms, alarm and communication systems, response times, deployment of response forces, firing skills (simulated), tactical maneuvers, etc. The results art to be used as a basis for determining whether additional training or security system improvements are needed. Exercises should be designed so that over the course of several exercises all major components of the physleal security system required by 10 CFR 73.46 will be tested: the security organization, the physical barriers, the access controls, the detection, surveillance, and alarm subsystems and procedures, the communication subsystem, and the contingency and response procedures. The design, conduct, and critique of exercises art discussed in NUREG/CR-5081 Tactical Exercise Planning Handbook. The purro',e of this present guidance is to set forth criteria, acceptable to the NRC caff, which will enable a licensee to use the results of an exercise to determine whether additional 1 training or security improvements are needed. 2. GUIDELINES FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l l l The staff has identified three categor-les of exercise results that mandate l corrective actions. The categories are termed safeguards vulnerabi'lties, safeguards deficiencies, and safeguards concerns. 2.1 Safeguards Vulnerabilities An exercise with any of the following outcomes demonstrates a safeguards l vulnerability: 1 l 1 = r w e e m w-9 w-v --v--rv-- w W v ww w-w-

1 L (a) An adversary initially located outside of the protected area gains access to a fomula quantity of material in easily. portable form without being observed by guards or detected by equipment. (ti) An authorized insider, alone or with-inside or outside assistance, removes or causes the removal, unauthorized and undetected, of a fonnula quantity of material (in a single event or over a period of six months or less) from a material access area. (c) An adversary gains control of a fonnula quantity of material and exits the protected area with it. A safeguards vulnerability warrants innediate attention. It indicates a failure to meet a perfonnance objective in 10 CFR 73.45. In order to comply with regulations, temporary corrective measures must be put into place immediately to protect against loss of control of the vulnerable strategic special nuclear material while pennanent measurrs are designed and put into service. If evaluators cannot pinpoint the cause of a safeguards vulnerability with high f confidence, the exercise should be rerun until the root cause is identified. A slow-motion reenactment of the exercise may be useful. 2.2 Safeguards Deficiencies An exercise with any of the following outcomes demonstrates a safeguards defin ncy: e (a) An adversary gains entrance to the protected area without being detected. (b) An authorized insider, alone or with inside or outside assistance, gains unauthorized access to a material access area containing easily portable strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) without being detected. 2

i i (c) A major component of the security system or the defensive strategy fails to fulfill its intended defensive function. l I (d) An authorized intider, alone or with inside assistance, moves or i i relocates SSNM to an unauthorized location within a material access area without being detected. Compensatory measures and subsequent corrective actions should be implemented i as they would be if the deficiency had been discovered other than during a tactical response exercise. Examples of each of the four kinds of safeguards deficiencies follow. The examples I cited are for illustration only and do not comprise a complete set. An adversary gains entrance to a protected area without being detected s by using existing structures (such as poles, fences, or building i facades) to circumvent the alarm system. by using false credentials. by digging under the alarm in snow or soft earth or by making use of erosion ruts. by stowing away on a vehicle entering the protected area. through collusion with an insider who admits the adversary to the protected area. An authorized insider, alone or with inside or outside assistance, gains unauthorized access to a material access area containing easily portable SSNM without being detected by tailgating. by using an unsafeguarded opening such as a roof portal, a ventilation duct, or a pipe tunnel. by using false credentikis. by some subterfuge, such as a false mission. 3- ,-,.v..,-+ye% w y y, ,,v.+, y --w e-w g. ..qg

i A major e 1ponent of the security system or the defensive strategy fails to fulfill its intended defensive function in situations such as the following: ] l An unauthorized weapon or unauthorized shielding material is taken into a protected area or material access area through an access control point. The entire tactical response team is diverted to a remote corner l of the plant by causing deliberate alarms or other ruse. j The connunication system is rendered meless by deliberate _ radio inter-l ference and the guards and tactical ieponse team are not adequately trained to act effectively in absence of the communication system. The entire tactical response team is tricked into responding to false or unauthorized commands. The security force is unable to locate intruders after a confimed intrusion. A lons individual is able to enter a storage vault. A lone individual is able to deactivate all or part of the alam system without informing (or providing indication at) the other alarm station. An authorized insider is able to disable both normal and backup power i to the alarm system. An authorized insider, alone or with inside assistance, mover or relocates SSNM to an unauthorized location within a material access area without being detected, for example: by substituting false material for SSNM and then moving the true SSNM to the unauthorized location. l 2.3 Safeguards Concerns An exercise with the following outcome demonstrates a safeguards concern: i Any condition that in and of itself is not a safeguards vulnerability { l cr deficiency but that left unchanged could develop into a deficiency or cause a degradation in the effectiveness of the security system or its parta. -4 l

i I Concerns should be evaluated as to their long term impacts or effects on other elements of the security system. They should either be corrected or compensated for by changes in the defensive strategy. Some examples of safeguards concerns follow. Again, the examples cited are for illustration only and do not comprise an exhaustive list. I Adversaries avoid innediate detection because the performance of the closed circuit television system has degraded to a point where low contrast subjects are difficult to distinguish. Adversaries, after first disrupting normal power, disable emergency power sources and take advantage of subsequent security organization confusion frum darkness and security system shutdown. Adversaries made good progress because expected local law enforcement response takes more time to arrive than formally committed to. Shortly before adversary assault, an authorized insider confiscates weapons stored in a locker not alarmed or protected against forced entry. Adversaries use one or more heavy construction vehicles, not secured against unauthorized use, to batter their way toward a storage vault. Security organization losses are heavy because adversaries take advantage of clutter on site for concealment and firing positions. Security organization tactics are compromised when adversaries intercept security transmissions or acquire a security radio. The nighttime light levels at the security organization's firing locations are too low to pennit use of standard sights, and assigned weapons are not fitted with tritium sights or some other enhanced sighting aid. 3. NRC STAFF POSITION l l Safeguards vulnerabilities or deficiencies uncovered by an exercise indicate failure to meet one or more of the perfonnance capabilities required by 10 CFR 73.45. Safeguards concerns uncovered by as exercise may indicate l failure to meet one er more of the performance capabilities of 10 CFR 73.45 and 1 I

should be further evaluated by the licensee. Licensees should correct ssrious safeguards shortcomings uncovered by an exercise, notwithstanding the fact that all comitments in the NRC-approved security plcn may have been carried out during the exercise. Uncovered vulnerabilities, deficiencies, or concerns e may indicate a need to revise the security plan to elimilliN: 3e cause of the shortcomings. l t l l 1 i l

o g .v .. -.,ru 'I.'i # BISUOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET uniwi.oction o=v inivt.in NUREG-1404 e i i te....v.u,6. . 6... 6... Licensee Use of Tactical Exercise Results ...ii.. .,co sitio ao.i-Si.. ..vi o... April 1990 . o.ii..o. . vio Carl Sawyer, Carrie Brown l oo i-i.. April 1990

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,. c, . wici n....o.. ...v n. Division of Safeguards and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards .... o. c.... i. von. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 .. o ... o r... a. i................,, ,. c. ii........... Same as 7. above. Tegn a{,,,,, 9 is.v,....i....oisi is.....ci m On November 10, 1988 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its physical security requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 for fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. The amendments to 10 CFR 73.46(b) require, among other things, that licensees carry out performance evaluations through tactical response exercises. The exercises are intended to demonstrate the guard force state of readiness and to test the effectiveness of delay mechanisms, alarm and communication systems,) response times, deployment of response forces, firing skills (simulated, tactical maneuvers etc. The purpose of this document is to set forth criteria, acceptable,to the NRC staff, which will enable a licensee to use the results of an exercise to determine whether additional training or security improvements are needed.

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