ML20042E487
| ML20042E487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1990 |
| From: | Thompson H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042E477 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-88-192, NUDOCS 9004230220 | |
| Download: ML20042E487 (19) | |
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e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of AkKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Docket Nos.
50-313 and 50-368 Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2 License Nos.
DPR-51 end NTI 3 EA 88-192 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL 110!1ETARY PENALTY
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Arkansas Power & Light Company, Little Rock, Arkansas, is the holder of Operating License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 issued by the Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC/ Commission) on flay 24, 1974 and September 1, 1978. The licenses euthorize the ' licensee to operate Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
11 A special inspection of the licensee's activities was conducted on July 14-18, 1986.
The results of this inspection indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements.
A written Notice af Violatiof, and Pre 1 sed Imposition cif Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated April 24, 1989.
The Notice stated the nature of the violation, the provision of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had violated, cnd the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violation. The licent,ee responded to the Notice by letter dated June 22, 1989.
In its response, AP&L admits that, applying present day perspective, certain documentation deficiencies existed in regard to the environmental qualification of the equip-ment that was the subject of the Notice.
However, AP&L denies that the cited deficiencies constitute violations of 10 CFR 50.49. AP&L states that, even if it is assumed that the specified deficiencies constitute violations of 10 CFR 50.49, escalated enforcement action under the NRC's Modified Enforcement Policy 9004230220 T'OO417 ppg ADOCE 05000313 o
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. Relating to 10 CFR 50.49" (Modified Enforcement Policy) is i_nappropriate.-
The licensee also provided, in a letter dated August 11, 1989, additional inform 6 tion concerning the number of. systems and components -affected by the deficiencies.
III t
After-consideration of the licensee's responses and the statements of fact,-
explanstion, and argument for mitigation contained therein,- the Deputy. Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards-and Operations Suppor_t has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that'the violations occurred as stated, that the violations were appropriately classified as a Category B problem under the Ibdified Enforcement' Policy, and that-the civil penalty imposed for the violations designated 'in the Notice of ~ Violation and-Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty should be Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000).
The civil penalty originally proposed was $75,000.
However, the'NRC recon-sidered and is withdrawing the escalation of. the proposed civil penalty for_
failure to take corrective' action. Fif ty Thousand Dollars is the minimum civil
- 4 penalty for a Category B problem under the Modified Enforcement Policy 'and.
therefore that amount is being imposed.
IV-i In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954L,- as amend d 'Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY i
ORDERED THAT:
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'.i The licensee pay a civil pennity-in th~e amount of-$50,000 within 30~ days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable 1to the,
.f Treasur.
' the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of:
1 Enforcen 9t,
- 3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:/Docunent' Control 3
Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 8
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i The licensee may request a hearing within' 30 days of the.date of this Order.: ?A l
i request for a hearing should be clearly marked as a_ " Request for an Enforcement' Hearing" and should be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement,-U.S..
l Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:. Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.,120555, the Regional, Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,- Region IV, and the NRC _
c Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.
If a hearing is requested, th'e Commission will. issue an Order designating:the time and place of tha hearing.
If the licensee fails to. request aihearing within '30 days of the date of this Order, the. provisions.of this Order shallcbe.
effective without further proceedings.
If payment has not been made by that -
time, the raatter may be referred to the-Attorney General.for collection.
In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to I
be considered at such hearing shall be:
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t (a) whether the licensee was in violation of the Cpunission's requirements as set forth in the f;otice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil.
Penalty referenced in Section II. above and,.
(b) whether, on-the basis.of such violations, this-Order should.be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
ryyig HughL. Thompson /J.
De y Executive D rect r for-Nuclear liaterials f
y, Safeguards, and Operations Support Dated at Rockville, Maryland this/7%ay of April 1990 i
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, APPENDIX l-EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS I
l On April 24, 1989, the NRC' issued a Notice of Violation'and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice)' to Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L) for deficien-cies relating to the environmental qualification (EQ) of electrical equipment-i important to safety. On May<19,1989, AP&L requested; and was grantM, a 30 -
day extension to respond to the Notice..By letter dated June 22 1989,EAP&L.
l responded to the Notice (Response). On August 11, 1989, the licensee-provided L
additional information. requested by'the NRC staff after receipt of the June 22, 1
1989, submittal. The NRC staff's evaluations and conclusions regarding-AP&L's response follow.
RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATION 10 CFR 50.49(f) requires that electric equipment important to safety be j
qualified by certain specified methods of testing identical or.similar equipment under identical or similar postulated accident conditions with analysis.to.show that the equipment to be qualified.is acceptable.
10 CFR 50.49(k) provides that' licensees are not required-to requalify. electric equipment important to. safety in accordanceiwith 10 CFR 50.49.if the Comission has previously required qualification of:the equipment in accordance with~
" Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors," November 1979 (D0R Guidelines).
Such qualifi-1 cation was previously required by Comission Memorandun and Order CLI-80-21 on May 23, 1980.
Paragraph 5.2.2 of the D0R Guidelines. states that a type test should-only be considered valid for equipment identical in design.and material construction to the test specimen unless deviations'are evaluated as part ofetheLqualification documentation.
Paragraph 5.2.6 of the D0R Guidelines states that equipment ~ interfaces should t
be representative of the actual installation for the test to be. considered-conclusive, and as-built inspection in the field to verify-that the cquipment was installed as tested should be performed.
Contrary to the above, as of the date of the inspection, EQ files did not adequately document qualification of~ the. numerous Limitorque motor operators =
(M0s) referenced in NRC Inspection Reports 50-313/86-23 and 50-368/85-24 because (1) the plant equipment was not identical in-design and-material construction.
to the qualification test specimen and deviations were not adequately' evaluated-l as part of the qualification documentation, and.(2) the licensee failed to verify that the equipment was installed as tested. : As a result, 'for the
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Limitorque M0s identified, one or more of the<following discrepancies was-l.
identified:
(1) unqualified Scotch 22/23 tape; slices to motor windingileads, a.subcomponent to the M0, had not been identified;c(2) unqualified terminal boards, a subcomponent to the M0, had not been identified;'and (3) motor T-drains had not been installed as required.
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-h Appendix
SUMMARY
OFLICENSEE'SRESPONSE AP&L admits that, applying present-day perspective, certain documentation -
deficiencies existed in regard-to the environmental qualification of the-equipment that was the subject of the Notice. However, AP&L denies that the i
cited deficiencies constitute violations of 10 CFR 50.49. AP&L-states,that even if it is assumed that the specified deficiencies-constitute. violations of' 10 CFR 50.49, escalated enforcement action under the NRC's " Modified Enforcement.
Policy Relating to 10 CFR 50.49" (Modified Enforcement Policy) is-inappropriate.
AP&L supports its position with the following arguments:
1.
Contrary to its normal Enforcement Policy, the NRC failed to adequately consider the actual safety significance of the alleged violations.
AP&L.
stated that it is inappropriate to equate documentation deficiencies with actual equipment qualification deficiencies.
Based on the lack of. actual safety significance, AP&L= contends, it would be more appropriate for'NRC to have considered these deficiencies as violations not.sufficiently.
significaat to_ warrant consideration of a civil penalty. Furthere the.
licensee-argues that it is inappropriate for the. NRC staff to takela _ civil-penalty action solely based _ on a licensee's misreading of the NRC staff's intent with-respect to equipment walkdowns.
2.
AP&L contends that the NRC improperly classified the deficiencies as a Category B violation. AP&L-contends that these def.iciencies:are more appropriately classified as Severity Level IV or V _ violations. under.the.
NRC's normal Enforcement Policy. ' Alternately, ~AP&L contends, these deficiencies should be considered as no more than a Category C' violation under the Modified Enforcement Policy.
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3.
In regard to the specific deficiencies-in the'Nutice. involving. tape' splices and terminal blocks, AP&L contends'that the " clearly should have known" 1
threshold has not been reached. AP&L asserts _that the:NRC had given tacit approval to industry practices prior to the November 30, 1985 deadline with respect to inspection of the internals of Limitorque motor-operators.
4 In regard to the specific deficiency _in the Notice involving T-drains, AP&L.
denies that this constitutes a violation of 10 CFR'50.490 AP&L statesLthat it analyzed this condition (motor operators without T-drains) and concluded.
in 1984, prior to the deadline for qualifying equipment,'that T-drain installation was-not necessary to satisfy 10, CFR 50.49 with respect to the?
d valve motor operators in question.
If the NRC concludes that the absence-of T-drains was a violation of 10 CFR 50.49, AP&L argues that the " clearly i
should have known" threshold was not reached..
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5.
AP&L argues that, even if violations are assumed to have. occurred, full mitigation of the_ proposed civil penalty is warranted based on a fair' application of the factors specified in the NRC's Modified Enforcement.
Policy.
AP&L contends that the NRC failed, in its proposed civil: penalty,
_ t - & :'te consideration to' AP&L's efforts to comply with 10- CFR-
/ yw '- the November 30, 1985 deadline, and. failed to g'ive adequate' Ms o AP&L's' corrective actions. -In addition, AP&L argues that
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R Appendix H the three cited deficiencies represent isolated violations affecting a limited number of components. Accordingly AP&L argues, NRC should miti,
gate the proposed penalty in its entirety in conformance with its-Modified Enforcement. Policy.
6.
Finally, AP&L argues that NRC's proposed action is inconsistent with NRC's handling of similar issues at other licensed facilities.
NRC EVALUATION OF LICENSEE'S-RESPONSE The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's arguments follows.
The licensee's arguments are addressed in the same order as discussed above.
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1.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE l
.The licensee states that the NRC has an obligation to categorize violations by severity levels based on safety significance and that this~ obligation was recognized by the Commission in promulgating the General Enfercement-Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C). AP&L believes that this premise also applies equally to-the Modified-Enforcement Policy of GL 88-07. -The-
' licensee states that it is inappropriate to simply equate documentation-deficiencies with actual qualification deficiencies and-to apply; a severity--
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-i test limited to the " number of: systems" affected.
The licensee continues =
-i by contending that safety significance must.be considered.under GL 88-07.
After considering GL 88-07, AP&L argues that these deficiencies should be treated as file discrepancies only.
The Commission, in promulgating 10 CFR 50.49, determined that-a licensee's.
failure to demonstrate the environmental qualification of electrica1 equip-ment important-to safety was a significant safety matter.
A~ licensee's failure to qualify-such equipment showed the licensee's lack-ofc knowledge concerning-the qualification of the equipment and, accordingly, showed J
that the licensee could not demonstrate the correctness of its bases.for-assessing plant safety.
In the area of environmental qualification, a-licensee's lack of knowledge of whether. equipment important to safety capable of operating in a harsh environment indicates.that the licenseis e-cannot predict whether such equipment would operate in the event of an r
accident in,<inich it is called upon to perform its intended safety function.
Accordingly, a licensee who. lacks such knowledge cannot assure protection :
of the public health and shfety in the event of an accident.-
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The environmental qualification regulations require licensees to, qualify:
j each item of electrical equipment important-to safety. The regulations:
require.each licensee to list each item of electrical equipment important I
to safety on a master list. All such listed items, by definition,_ perform important safety functions. Thus, safety significance is inherent with q
respect to each item on the list. As described above, the licensee's knowledge of whether such equipment is qualified is.significant'for pro-tecting public health and safety. Accordingly, the Commission, as -a matter of policy, decided to treat each unqualified item as equally significant
Appendix
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to safety. As explained in the Modified Enforcement Policy, the Commission has aggregated individual violations of 10 CFR 50.49 to determine the pervasiveness of the-qualification probleu represented by those individual violations in order to assess civil penalties. The Comission developed.
Categories A, B, and C based on the pervasiveness of the. violations which a
reflect the relative significance of-the collective violations.
Isolated individual violations are based.upon the fact;that a licensee could not t
assure the operation during an accident of a limited number of systems affected by the isolated individual violations.
Because a small number of safety systems. or components could fail during an accident as a.. result,.the Commission classified such violations.as Category C.
If the violations affect a moderate number of systems,. the. violations would be more signifi-cant than those in Category C because the licensee would not know whether a correspondingly greater number. of systems would operate. in the event.of-an accident. Accordingly, the probability. that an accident could endanger-public health an safety would be.increasec. The Commission classified such s
violations in Category B.. Finally, pervasive; problems would_ be the most-significant because the licensee's-lack of~ knowledge of equipment qualityg would extend'to many systems and result in the licensee being unable to-assure that these systems would perform their intended functions in an accident. These would be classified as Category A violations.
This.
method, therefore; does provide a measure of'the safety significance of-r environmental qua'ification violations.
The licensee states that the Notice cited only documentation discrepancies for unqualified Scotch 22/33 tape 1 splices.to motor winding leads, unquali-fied terminal blocks, and T-drains.missin Limitorque motor operated valves ~(H0Vs).(g from the motor housing _on items 1 identified by AP&L during.
its Limitorque upgrade program)..It should be noted that the licensee claims that each of these examples are only~ subcoraponents of the' qualified MOVs. The Notice addresses not'only the documentation deficiencies, but also the fact that the MOVs were installed in a. configuration'not qualified by a test report. This is a hardware problem.not just'a documentation i
problem.
1 1
The Modified Enforcement Policy-does provide for cat'egorizing. certain violations.at Severity Level IV or V.
The intent'of this' provision was to prevent calling EQ violations significant if information which demon-strated the equipment to be qualified was readily available or accessible.
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Minor file deficiencies, which are resolved.by addingLreferences 'or the insertion of-pertinent documents in the file, or deficiencies involving equipment known by the NRC staff to be qualified, are intended to be-Severity Level'IV or Y violations, regard.less of who found them.
On the -
other hand, vielations involving greater effort to prove qualification,.
such as significant analysis, testing, or extended efforts to; produce or find the necessary information, may be? considered significant violations and therefore considered forLa possible civil' penalty. The NRC staff considered this when evaluating the significance of-the proposed' viola-tions.
In summary, the NRC staff views the EQ deficiencies at ANO to be significant.
In making that determination, it is irrelevant that the licensee muy have misread the NRC staff's intent with respect-to the i
single issue of walkdown as asserted by AP&L.
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Appenoix 2.
CATEGORIZATION OF THE VIOLATIONS The licensee's genera 1' argument concerning classification of the violations based on safety significance is discussed above. Additional discussion of the merits of elements of the violations is provided in Paragraphs 3 and 4.
The revised number of items and systems involved, as indicated in the licensee's-August 11, 198911etter, does not alter the NRC staff's conclusion that the categorization of: the' violations-should be Category B.a The violations, by the licensee's own tabulation,- affected six systems and -
approximately three dozen components, which represent more than: an ~ isolated.
problem. Review of.other actions taken by the NRC staff under the Modified Enforcement Policy finds the categorization of. this action'is_ consistent with that of other actions involving similar' issues and;similar numbers of-systems and components.
3.
TAPE SPLICES AND TERMINAL BLOCKS A.
. Tape Splices The NRC staff's Notice incorrectly cited the licensee for the use of' Scotch 22/23 tapes in electrichi splices instead of the types-of tape:
actually employed which were Scotch 22/33. ^ Based on -its response, the licensee.apparently recognized this as an inadvertent error which did not change the, Notice in a substantive manner.' However, in order to correct that error, it should be recognized that, whereLScoten 23 tape is specifically identified, Scotch 33 tape'is the material of concern.
Furthermore. general references to tape used in. electrical splices found in the Notice.its cover letter and thisiAppendix, are-intended to describe Scotch 22/33 types of tape,'both.of.which:the_NRC maintains were unqualified in the installed configurations.
The tape splices are interfacing components between'the vendor-supplied motor operators and the system in which theyfare'_ installed.
The. tape splices were-not'the responsibility of the equipment vendor, but of the licensee, as they were put in'after installation'of the' motor operators in the plant.
As either the licensee or its~contrac--
tor had to have subsequently installed these' splices,- they couldinot rely on earlier vendor documentation to demonstrate qualification.
Further, the installation of these connections should have been made-in accordance with approved procedures and in qualified configurations..
Such activities were required to be documented and,such documentation.
would have provided the licensee a record of inspection and assurance of qualification. Absent documentation supporting the qualification of the licensee's own splices, the licensee clearly-should have ques-tioned how interfaces between vendor-supplied equipment and the planti electrical system had been made. The raising of-such questions:would then have led to verification of proper documentation or verification of the installed ccrfiguration. Therefore.with or without specific' notice from the NRC staff, the~ licensee-should have done internal; splice inspections, absent detailed qualification documentation.
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9 Appendix
-'6 The licensee's arguments lthat the tape. splices were qualified are-without merit. The tape splices.are quite dissimilar to'the molded plastic and metal wire caps for.which.the licensee attenots_a similarity-based qualification argument. Qualification:cannot be based on the unsupported logic that the' tape splices provide superior mechanical protection ecmpared with the wire caps, and that-no' moisture barrier is necessary because the wire caps appear to provide.
Additionally, the configuration of t.he wire caps cannot be >
none.
established; therefore, the assumption that no moisture intrusion protection was present cannot be substantiated.: Post-discovery <
unsupported engineering judgment of this sort by the licensee:and a consultant does not_ satisfy 10 CFR 50.49 rcquirements that the licensee have documentation available to support equipment qualification.
The NRC staff notes that the Thomas-and Betts wire caps. referred to in this regard were subsequently tested by Wyle Laboratories for another licensee. A plant-specific qualified life of only about 3
eight years for a BWR LOCA with no, chemical spray. was reported in Information Notice 88-81 and such a qualification finding clearly is s.-
not acceptable at ANO with its PWR LOCA profile and its;use.of chemical spray. Th_is finding underscores'one of the reasons that unsupported engineering judgments are-not acceptable as a basis-for.
E qualH ; cation.
Detailed plant-specific documentation is. required.
d Testing of the. tape splices after their discovery is n' t sufficient 4
o to avoid escalated enforcement.
Documentation for the qualificatian-of the tape splices;did not exist.on November 30; 1985..InLfact, the/
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qualification status =of these tape splices was' uncertain-'and required-
,a additional testing, inspections, and analysis'in an attempt.to qualifye~
the tape splices. Because 10 CFR 50.49 required splicesito'be on the I,
master list and qualification to' be demonstrated lby testing.and 1
necessary similarity analysis, the_. licensee _ clearly was in violation -
1 of 10 CFR 50.49(d), (f),. and (j) at the time of the find.ing.1 Notwith-l standing the statements made'by a representative of Wylet Laboratories, the NRC staff concludes that classification of this itemias signifi-j cant is warranted. The conclusions' reached by _the Wyle representative' O
were based on an " informal eximination"=of,the splices which does not 1
constitute the testing and analysis required by 10 CFR 50.49'to--
I demonstrate qualification.
Further,;the: examination was' performed' i
after the EQ deadline and the NRCLinspection. ~ Additionally, the representative's opinion that, based on previous' testing, "the splices were capable of. passing a qualification test for the relevant function application" was unsupported in that, similarity between the, tested splices and installed. splices.was not established.
Finally though-not specifIcally stated by the licensee or the Wyle represen,tative,-
9 the test m relied upon, to form the above opinion,-was aiso apparently performed after the EQ deadline.- Therefore, even putting.
aside the NRC staff's other concerns, the testing could not befused-j to demonstrate splice qualification as of November 30, 1985.
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Appendix 8.
Terminal Blocks-The licensee made a number of specific arguments to support its position that the " clearly should nave known"- test was not met as to the unqualified terminal blocks inside of:Limitor.lue motor operators.
With regard to the necessity for the performance of internal.-inspec-tion of the motor operators, the licensee argued,_in part, that'it could not have known the NRC staff required such activities because the NRC staff did'not even require such a-level _of. inspect 4n by it own inspectors as evidenced by the inspection guidance conuined-in TI-2515/76 dated March 27, 1986. The NRC staff agrees that TI 2515/76 did not explicitlyf require such inspections.
The inspection guidance-was not written to be all encompassing.
Rather, it was written to:
address what at the time were thought to'be the likely problem areas in meeting the 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.. As it. turns out;'verifica-tion of: internal components for: motor operators was a more significant s
issue than antici problem was more pated by the guidance.- Neither the. fact that t_he-significant than anticipated nor the' fact it was not:
1 specifically ' referenced in,the inspection guidance demonstrate that.
l the NRC staff _' accepted prior.to November 30, 1985 that this. issue.did 4
not have to be addressed by. licensees.. In fact',. Franklin Research!
Center (FRC) Technical Evaluation Report (TER) " Implementation Guidance for New and Corrective Equipment invironmental Qualification" dated April 23, 1983, which is referenced by TI-2515/76'and FRC 4
Report No. 5896-005-2. dated b y 1985, which was also relied upon by the NRC staff in preparing for 10 CFR _50.49 inspections. both.
recognize that internal-inspections may be necessary to verify the j
overall qualification of. components such as' motor operators.-
~j AP&L also argued that_NRC generic correspondence such-as IN 83-7c and IN 86-03 did not provide sufficient information to conclude _that
,~j AP&L or any other licensee clearly should have know;of' unqualified-
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terminal blocks and tape splices in Limitorque motor operators.
J With regard to the applicabili*y c:
g.ieric correspondence in-determining that= AP&L clearly shoulo.. e -known of the unqualified components in the Limitorque motor.opwators, the:NRC staff concludes that the licensee has, in part, misunderstood the NRCJstaff's position.
The NRC staff, as discussed in.the Notice, based its " clearly should..
have known" finding on the necessity to perform walkdowns absent adequate documentation of qualification.as: discussed above and.in NRC j
generic correspondence such as the~ DOR Guidelines!and;IN!83-72.
IN-j 86-03 had no part in the NRC staf f's " clearly should have. known" j
' decision because it was issued after the deadline. 'The discussion J
of IN 86-03'is 1.icluded in the cover letter of the Notice in the-context of corrective actions taken by AP&L which are discussed ini l
Paragraph 6 of this Appendix.
With respect to the licensee's arguments regarding.when walkdowns j
should include individual component disassembly, the'NRC staff's position in this regard has not changed.. It has a.lways been required that the installed configuration must represent the tested configu-
.i ration.
NRC'Information Notice 83-72 provides examples where
1 Appendix ~ components (terminal 1, locks, wiring, etc.) internal to a Limitorque; valve operator were found to be' unqualified.for-the anticipated-'
service condition'. The.NRC staff agrees with AP&L that_it has never been required that a licensee perform' inspections of every component.
in every vendor-supplied assembly.
However, the NRC staff.did expect that a certain number of assemblies would be inspected as part of the EQ walkdowns.
The scope of such _ inspections would be determined by the quality of the qualification 1 record available.
Clearly in this j
case, the qualification record for motor operators was not outstanding-1 or complete enough to warrant total reliance upon it without field verification.-
Had such inspections been_ properly performed and had.the. information in the NRC's generic issuances, such as IN 83-72, been properly utilized to determine the' types of componentsLof particular concern; tre licensee would have clearly found these unqualified components..
ine position the licensee-has taken relative-to' the information that-was provided in IN 83-72 is overly-narrow. The-important issue raised by the IN was the general one of unqualified comoonents being
found in equipment previously thought-to be -qualified.
With respect to 'the ' licensee's argument 'that 'it responded responsibly, to IN 83-72, based on previous actions it took.in identifying unquali-i fied or unidentified terminal blocks, the NRC staff ;is.not-persuaded.
First, the licensee discusses.only:in general; terms the actionsJit took in response to various communications _with Limitorque priormto the issuance of IN 83.72.
Such generalcstatements do not provide-the
- t NRC sta#f with enough information to judge the reasonableness ofLAP&L.
actions. Second, -and more importantly,,the licensee'.s actions, e
however extensive, were in response to issues raised:by Limitorque, the motor operator vendor.
Clearly, IN 83-72 alerted licensees to.
the fact that. vendor documentation alone did'not provide reasonable
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assurance of qualification..Therefore, failing to take.furth_er action regarding IN 83-72 based-solely on: communications with the vendor is.
not a reasonable position.
The NRC staff has reviewed the letter Limitorque Corporation issued-.
in response to IN 83-72 relied ~upon;,in part, by the licensee and found that the conclusion reached by Limitorque_in the_last paragraph-
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of the letter, that licensees need take no action with. respect to'IN 83-72, is not_ supported by the body 'of the letter.
The NRC staff rejects the. letter as the basis for a-licensee not pursuing the issues raised in the IN and. finds that the letter iniitsstotality is-consistent with the NRC staff's " clearly should have known" finding.
Consistent with that point, the NRC found'that a number'of licensees had acted upon the IN after reviewing the timitorque letter.
The NRC staff was concerned that the Limitorque -letter started out.
describing an isolated problem with terminal. blocks at the Midland site and then abruptly went'into discussing the generic use of Buchanan 0824. terminal blocks in Westinghouse supplied equipment.
j The discussion of the Buchanan terminal blocks in Westinghouse equipment is, in the raff's view, significant for both plants with 1
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Appendix-9-
such equipment and those without it. Most importantly, the-Midltnd-facility did not have Westinghouse supplied equipment, yet Limitorque
~ hose to discuss this issue-among a number of seemingly Midland c
specific. issues.
It is clear that the Buchanan terminal block information along with other discussion supplied in the letter about-the Midland specific problemssshould.have alerted liceasees to the a
potential for environmental / qualification deficiencies as the~ result-
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of work performed not only by the vendor (Limitorque) butlthat per. -
formed by the nuclear steam supply system provider or the architect
. engineer..~ Therefore, it is clear. that assurances from the vendor-may not provide a" sufficient basis for? concluding that no' problem existed with motor operators because changes to the motor operators may have been required or made by other: organizations.
The' letter then shif_ts back to problems characterized as Midland specific-including-a discussion of unidentifiable' terminal blocks.
That discussion in the Limitorque letter'(#9 of'the numbered items) does not provide-adequate information to allow a knowledgeable reader i
to fully understand the situation' including whether it was truly;only a Midland problem.
First, given tb t the Limitorque qualification 1
tests for motor operators used only certain types of terminal blocks,.
the letter did not provide a basis for assuring l customers that these or other types of unidentifiable terminal blocks did not exist in
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motor operators at other plants.
Second, the' letter states that the unidentifiable'. terminal blocks were used in' low; voltage control' circults and were identified and found " suitable" for-their applica-tion. The letter does not answer-such questions-e.s'whether the'.
terminal blocks were ultimately identified to be of the types that l
had previously been used ;in testing, whether they were'" suitable" in all possible control circuit applications at Midland as well as'at -
other plants,'and if not of a type previously tested,'.how the: suit-;
ability discussed in the letter equated to the' record of qualification j
l required by 10 CFR 50.49.-
4 The licensee acknowledges in its Response (See page:8 of the licensee's i
10 CFR-2.201 response) that the. terminal blocks were'likely installed l-by someone other than Limitorque.
However, it.is.AP&L's position.
l-that such a conclusion could not have' been' reasonably reached based on information available_ prior the EQ deadline. The NRCnstaff does not agree with the licensee's conclusion.
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee. clearly should have'known of.the terminal block deficiencies prior to November 30, 1985. Had the licensee critically' reviewed IN i
83-72 and Limitorque's letter responding to'it, the licensee should have discovered the deficiencies at-issue prior to the November.30,-
0 1985 deadline, d
-The licensee claims that only four terminal blocks were unidentifMd at the time of the EQ inspections, and therefore, there was no san >y -
significance.
The licensee cites additiona' testing that was perf ormed to show that' the. terminal blocks were quahtied.
The NRC staff a.
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Appendix
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concludes that,' as discussed above regarding the-tape splices and in Paragraph 1 for the weral case, this is a significant-deficiency.
The licensee, at the time of the inspection, did not have documentation-in its EQ files which would support the qualification of the terminal blocks and had to correct more than a minor file deficiency in an attempt to demonstrate' qualification. Therefore, the vblation is-significant and stands as stated.
4.
T-DRAINS FOR LIMITORQUE MOVs.
AP&L denies that the' cited missing T-drains-constitute a violation of i
The-licensee claims that an analysis was performed and the conclusion reached in 1984 was:that the installation of'T-drains was not an issue. The licensee cites Limitorque test reports for inside contain-t ment that. qualified actuators without T-drains. AP&L argues that it further confirmed this position through contacts with an EQ consultant.-
5 The licensee also claims'that it relied;on engineering judgment to conclude-that T-drains were not required. AP&L-contends.that missing-T-drain; is-thus_not a qualification ~ issue.
Although the licensee claims to have documented' prior'to' November 30, 1985, a 1984 conclusion that T-drains are not required for'in-containment-
-qualification of Limitorque operators, the NRC inspectors informed the licensee during the July 1986 inspection that the documentation to sup] ort this conclusion was'not adequate and that T-drains were required.
Boti l
the environmental-conditions and the motors differed significantly between the Limitorque motor operators _ tested without T-drains and-those installed 5
at ANO, and no evaluation of those differences has been documented.: For.
example, motor configuration and insulation material _ differences ^were noti addressed. nor was the lack of a post-LOCA-cooldown~and condensation-period in one of the tests relied upon by the licensee.
Thus, the licensee failed a
to_ document an acceptable analysis to supplement the. test reports in order-to use them to demonstrate qualification-of the motor _' operators in the l
applications found at ANO.
Statements of qualification made by Limitorque were without an adequate t
technical basis, and do not provide. acceptable, documentation of qualifi-cation.
Further, based on a statement made on page 10 of the licensee's 10 CFR 2.201 Response, it appears that Limitorque's statement of qualif.1-cation was not as unqualified as stated by the licensee. The phrase "if-a conditions are bounded by tests without"them-(T-drains)" is important and.
1 as discussed above it is the NRC staff's position;that tests without T-drains do not bound-the conditions at ANO.
The NRC staff has reviewed the April 3, 1985 letter the. licensee received' from Schneider Consulting Engineers (SCE) concerning motor operator'quali-fication.without T-drains, as well as the memoranda attached to that letter.
The letter itself provides no technical. basis-to support the conclusions-reached.' Both the licensee and its-contractor clearly should _ have.
-recognized that statements not supported by testing and the necessary analysis do not constitute the qualification record' required by 10 CFR 50.49. The consultant's submittal fails to prov_ide any basis.to support-the similarity between the motor operators in use at AND to those-' tested J
4
y Appendix without T-drains.
Further, the consultant fails to analyze differences between the environments used during: testing of the motor operators without T-drains and the postulated accident environment of the'ANO containment in order to establish the similarity of environments.
The memoranda attached to the SCE letter also fails to provide any.
.information that could be used to demonstrai.e qualification.- In fact,.
the memorandum documenting a conversation with a Mr. Drab of Limitorque Corporation provides what could be considered a caution about making qualification determinations based on existing Limitorque test results.-
- L Mr. Drab apparently did not accept the SCE position and, while he also
.apparently did not reject it, he did make it clear that conclusions concerning the acceptability of using motor, operators without.T-drains were solely the user's responsibility. The memorandum documenting the conver -
sation with Mr. N. B. Le of the NRC staff cannot be read to give his, let alone the NRC staff's, unqualified approval.of the SCE position.
The memorandum states that the author told.Mr. Le that testing of actuators with pipe plugs (without T-drains) and with T-drains both had successful /
acceptable results and that he considered either arrangement qualified.
Mr. Ln's-scesequent agreement with the author's conclusion clearly assumed the c.; curacy of the author's assertion' of qualification. Mr. Le's recol-lection of the documented' conversation is consistent-with the above position. - He recalls that he; agreed:with the author that,'if SCE: had.a-basis to qualify the motor operators without T-drains then, the issue: at 1
Zion was solely one.of procedural compliance and not motor operator qualification. The NRC staff views any-assumption on th.e author's part 1
that Mr. Le accepted his qualification argument based ontthe telephone call as unreasonable bccause neither Mr. Le nor any member of the NRC staff had an opportunity to review the documentation supporting such an argument.
.i With respect to the licensee's argument that it' relied on engineering judgment, the NRC staff has in the past and continues to' find. it a'ccept-i i
able when used as part of a documented engineering analysis.' In this case, the licensee did not document the engineering judgments made or the bases for those judgments. A record of qualification sho6 d be suffi-ciently detailed such that an individual knowledgeable in equipment qualification issues would be able to review and understand the basis for the determination that a component is qualified. The record need not contain the answers to every conceivable question.
Rather, the record i
should contain clear and logical information which demonstrates.qualifi-i cation. The adequacy of information contained in the qualification file l
can only be determined on a case-by-Lase basis. Undocumented engineering-judgment does not provide a complete auditable record.nor-can it be
(
independently scrutinized.
Undocumented engineering judgment creates a i
void in that a licensee will not know the basis upon which a component was i
determined to be qualified. Such an approach can lead to significant problems over the life of a plant. The basis and details of the judgment j'
could be redefined by each individual who may attempt to reconstruct the rationale concerning qualification.
Consequently, undocumented engineering judgment has been and continues to be of no signifi M t value for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with the EQ rule.
l
w 4
9 Appendix
- The NRC staff continues to be of the view that the missing T-drains at issue constitute a violation of 10 CFR 50.49.
The' licensee's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Additionally, the NRC staff's-position that items such as missing T-drains are safety significant has 1
been discussed earlier in this Appendix, i
With respect to the licensee's arguments that the'" clearly should have known" test was not met, Limitorque report B0058 requires T-drains.for in-containment qualification, and the:1984 Limitorquel letter addressing IN 83-72 states that " Qualified Limitorque RH motors require > the-installation-of motor "T" drains in the two lowest drain plug locations." The instal-lation position of the valve / actuator assembly is nci known at the time the actuator is shipped from Limitorque.- Consequentiy. the motor "T" drains are placed.in the limit switch compartment with installation' instructions at the-time of actuator _ shipment.
Since the. licensee has-4 admitted knowledge of the T-drain concern prior to~ November 30,-1985, and since there was indeed some1 written material from Limitorque (including instructions shipped inside theLoperators)-indicating that: T-drains could be required _for_ qualification, a more thorough evaluation was appropriate.-
Examination of.available'. test reports clearly would have shown no adequate qualification test for an operator with class RH motorjinsulation and no T-drains.
Because of this information, plant-specific analyses to-determine the applicability of existirg-reports to the licensee's plants-should have been initiated.
This was not done. Rather,.the licensee-chose to rely on unaccumented engineering judgment and a. consultant's m
opinion of uncertain bases. These circumstances satisfy the " clearly;
)]
should have known" test.
5.
MITIGATION OF-THE CIVIL PENALTY i
{
i With respect to the licensee's best efforts, the,NRC, staff maintains that, l
while overall best efforts were made by the licensee, significant defi-1 ciencies affecting six systems and three dozen components in a' single.
category of components justify.the application of only: partial mitigation 1
under i.his factor.
Comparison of the application of this factor'in this case with its-application.in previous enforcement actions,under the-Modified Enforcement Policy finds this ~ application consistent with the
.O past actions.
Full mitigation under this. factor'has>only been applied-in-other Category B actions in which a single qualification l problem affecting a moderate number of components was'found.
In this-case, three separate 1
qualification problems were discovered (splices, terminal _ blocks 7and T-drains) indicating more than an isolated error in accounting for environmental qualification of' equipment.
j After reconsidering the licensee's. corrective actions in this case, the NRC staff concludes that escalation of the civil. penalty under this factor was not warranted. However, the NRC staff does.not anree with the licensee-that mitigation under this factor ~is warranted. The licensee should have j
more promptly identified-the deficiencies cited in the' Notice by acting more quickly with' respect to IN 86-03 which necessitated, even by the
}
licensee's admission, inspecting the motor operator' internals. ~Had'the-J l
i
.m
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Q
.6 Appendix' licensee acted in January 1986 'rather than delaying u'ntil July 1986 to assess the qualification status of the motor operators in ANO Unit 1, which was at rower, mitigation under this. factor would have been considered.
in summary, the NRC staff rejects the licensee's arguments with respect to best-efforts but concludes that neither escalation-nor mitigationL for corrective actions is appropriate.__
d 6..
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED ENFORCEMENT POLICY-The hnC staff has reviewed the enforcement actions which the' licensee
. contends support its position that the Modified Enforcement Policy has been inconsistently applied and.that classification of this action as a Category B is ' unwarranted.
The NRC staff acknowledges that in some cases v.iolations-involving T-drains and terminal blocks have.resulted in different levels of enforcement-action being taken. The NRC staff maintains these cases:are consistent with the Modified Enforcement Policy.-
In deciding what action to take under the Modified Enforcement Policy, the NRC-staff considers the facts on.a case-by-case basis. Factors that are evaluated include, but d e not limited to, the' applicability of available _ test repor5, the qui'ty of 1
any required similarity analyses, and the application in which a particular 1
component was employed.- Each type of-deficiency is evaluated en its own merits.. For example,' deficiencies where sufficient d ea exists air % ugh not in the. qualification fil., or where sufficient daia is developed.during
~
I the inspection to support qualification,.are not considered to arrive at j
i
- the categorization under the Modified' Policy. _ Only those items judged significant on their own are aggregated to determine the proper category.
If an item is-judged to be a minor deficiency, a separate = Sever _ity Level IV i
or V violation is issued.
Of the cases cited by the licensee, for which some enforcement' action was.
taken, the licensee has failed. to articulate, beyond indicating that -
similar components were *nyched, how the NRC staff erred U its determina-tions of severity level or appropriate category.
In the River. Bend'_ case, a Severity Level IV violation was issued because the terminal blocks involved were outside containment and used in a control ap In the case-of Diablo Canyon, the tape splices involved were_ plication.
previously accepted as qualified by the NRC staff under the D0R Guidelines but the licensee failed to later provide documentation to meet the 10 CFR 50.49 qualification standard.
In3 both cases, categorization of thr. <hlation as a Severity Level IV was appropriate.
For the cases in which, according to the licensee, action had not been taken the NRC staff prcvides the following: At Oyster-Creek, action has i
subsequently been taken; at Haddam Neck, enforcement action was-determined to be inappropriate because the motor operators involved were replacements that had never been installed in the plant; at Salem, a Severity Level IV violation should have been issued; and at St. Lucie, some enforcement action under the Modified Enforcement-Policy 'should probably have been taken.
)
The isolated failures to take action do not by themselves render this action regarding AND as an inconsistent application of the Modified Enforcement-Policy.
- _ _ - - _ =
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' Appendix --
In summary, as discussed above, the NRC staff finds no basis to change categorization of this action based on the previous applications of the-Modified Enforcement Policy.
CONCLUSION After considering the information and' arguments provided by the licensee, the NP,C staff finds that the licensee clearly should have known of the. Jeficiencies
-cited in the Notice, that the deficiencies were significant and constituted more than an isolated problem _ under the Modified Enforcement Policy, and that the licensee failed to demonstrate that the NRC staff's previous applications of the Modified Enforcement Policy show that the policy was incorrectly applied in.this case. :Further, the NRC staff finds that neither escalation nor mitigation of the base civil penalty.for-the licensee's corrective actions 1s-appropriate in this case. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that_the cited violations x
constitute a Category B violation that. warrants the minimum civil penalty for a Category B violation under the Modified Enforcement Policy which is $50,000, r
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Arkansas Power & Light Company i
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