ML20042D858
| ML20042D858 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1990 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#290-10204 CLI-90-03, CLI-90-3, LBP-89-32, OL, NUDOCS 9004110069 | |
| Download: ML20042D858 (19) | |
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00LKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VJ kT -6 P 1 :52 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
,;rs,cgor$(carrny BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
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In the Matter of Docket Nos 50-443 - Ob PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 NEW HAMPSHIRE, g a,1..
Off-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2)
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS' l
MEMORAf!DllM 0F LAW REGARDING THIS BOARD'S PRESENT JURISDICTION l
Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney l
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j April 5, 1990 b
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t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1.SS10N BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD in the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-443 OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
Off-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and ?)
)
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW REGARDING THIS BOARD'S PRESENT JURISDICTION On March 29, 1990, the Massachusetts Attorney General (Mass AG),
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League,(SAPL) and New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP)(hereinafterreferredtoas"Intervenors")fileda "Femorandum of Law Regarding This Board's Present Jurisdiction"
(" Memorandum"), as promised by the Mass AG at oral argument on March 27, 1990.
In their Memorandum, Intervenors state that they have filed appeals before the U. S. Court of Appeals challenging the Commission's decision authorizing the Seabrook operating license -- and they argue that the pendency of their Court appeals deprives this Bo6rd of jurisdiction to act t
on their pending, previously filed, intra-agency appeals in any manner which is inconsistent with, or which would interfere with, the Court's jurisdiction over matters they raised (or will raise) before the Court of Appeals.
The NRC Staff files this response in opposition to the Intervenors' Memorandum. For the reasons set forth below, the Staff submits that the Appeal Board continues to have jurisdiction to consider the Intervenors'
i i,
pending appeals, and that the Board should reject Intervenors' various jurisdictional arguments as unfounded, in the absence of any Order by the Court of Appeals directing the Board to stay further consideration of Intervenors' appeals.
DISCUSSION A.
Finality of the Commissinn's Decision.
The Intervenors assert that their currently pending appeals before the Court of Appeals challenge a final, reviewable agency action, which they contend consists of the Licensing Board's authorization of a license in LBP-89-32, "together with the non-adjudicatory executive decision of the Commission [in CLI-90-033 to allow that authorization to become effective" (Memorandum at 2). While the Intervenors recognize that the Court of Appeals dismissed their prior appeal from LBP-89-32, on the grounds that it was not a final agency action, they contend that their filing of subsequent appeals after the Commission's issuance of CLI-90-03 cured this defect (Memorandum at 2-3).
The Intervenors' arguments concerning the finality of LBP-89-32 and CLI-90-03areinerror.1/ Plainly, the Commission's issuance of its imediate effectiveness decision had the effect of authorizing a license, and that decision, in certain respects, may now be reviewable by the Court of Appeals -- although it does not constitute the final agency decision on 1/
Pursuant to NRC regulations, an initial decision au W ri:ing issuance
~
of a license does not become final agency action unt.1145 days after its date of issuance, provided no appeal is filed.
10 C.F.R.
f 2.760(a). The filing of appeals pursuant to 6 2.762, as in the instant proceeding, or the issuance of a Commission directive that the record be certified to it for final decision, tolls the finality of a Licensing Board's decision.
Id.
j l '
these matters. 2/ However, the Licensing Board's prior decisions in this proceeding have not yet been finally adjudicated within the agency and they are, therefore, not yet reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
Section 189(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 2239, provides that:
Any final order entered in any proceeding of the kind specified in subsection a. above [e.g., a proceeding for tne " granting, suspending, revoking, or amending" of an operating license? shall be subject to judicial review in the manner prescribed in the [Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C.
I 2341 et sec.1 and to the provisions of section 10
[sectioT7 M of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended.
The Hobbs Act, in turn, provides that the Court of Appeals has juris-diction to review "all final orders" of the Commission which are "made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42," which jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of a petition for review within 60 days after entry of the final order.
28 U.S.C. si 2342(4), 2344.
In determining whether an agency decision or action constitutes a
" final order" within the meaning of these provisions, the courts have adopted a " pragmatic" test, governed by two relevant factors: (1)whether the process of administrative decision-making has reached the stage that judicial review will involve no possible disruption of the orderly process i
of adjudication, h, whether there is nothing else for the agency to 2/
For instance, the Court may be asked to examine whether the i
Commission acted artitrarily and capriciously in approving the Licensing Board's authorization of a license pending the outcome of Intervenors' various appeals and motions to reopen, or whether the Commission's action was so flagrantly wrong and demonstrably critical as to rcake apparent reversal of the agency's action. See Ohio Citizens for Respondble Energy v. NRC, 803 F.2d 'l5B (6th Cir.
1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).
do, and (2) whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency's action. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970). Accord, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v.
NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1988). The finality provisions of 28 U.S.C. I 2342 have been likened to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 61291, l
which governs appeals from final orders of Federal District Court decisions; and both provisions have been found to reflect the reasoned policy judgment that administrative and judicial processes should proceed with a minimum of interruption. Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc.
Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F. 2d 1338,1351 (D.C. Cir.1988),
cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 866 (1989).
The courts' adherence to this principle is based on a desf re to permit the administrative agency with substantive expertise on the issues to complete its review, as well as considerations of judicial economy of resources and the avoidance of undertaking appellate reviews which may be mooted by ongoing proceedings within the agency.
For instance, in Sierra Club v. NRC, 825 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987), the court declined to disturb a Commission order allowing restart of a reactor, which order was issued prior to receipt and resolution of petitioners' request for a nearing and request for a stay. While the petitioners appealed from the Commission's determination not to issue an immediate decision on their requests, they failed to appeal from the Commission's subsequent order denying their requests for hearing and a stay.
In this posture -- even 1
l though the Commission's order allowing restart of the reactor was " final" l
l l
in the sense that, like the Commission's immediate effectiveness decision in CLI-90-03, it permitted reactor operation -- the court found the petition was " fatally premature" and dismissed it for lack of I
l jurisdiction. The court stated:
l An order is final when the administrative agency has given its 'last word on the matter.'...
" Judicial intervention in uncompleted adminis-trative proceedings, absent a statutory mandate is r
strongly disfavored." We will not entertain a petition where pending administrative proceedings or further agency action might render the case moot and judicial review completely unnecessary.
825 F.2d at 1362 (citations omitted). M Other judicial decisions involving challenges to Commission actions support this outcome.
In Oystershell Alliance v. NRC, 800 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.1986), the court upheld the Commission's authorization of a full power license under its immediate effectiveness rule, despite the pendency of the petitioners' motions to reopen before the Appeal Board.
The court found that the Commission's imediate effectiveness decision 3/
The court in Sierra Club also found that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate "some overarching ' hardship,'" -- despite the effect-iveness of the restart order -- because they "had the opportunity to present their grievances to the Commission and could seek appellate review of that decision." 825 F.2d at 1361.
The court further stated (id. at 1361 n.6):
It must be noted that the petitioners sought adjud-ication of their grievances in an administrative tribunal, the NRC. The NRC has expertise in this highly technical area, the NRC and litigants expended substantial resources in adjudicating the issues, and the petitioner appealed those issues before the NRC had an opportunity to pass on the controversy. Moreover, the time necessary for a final administrative ruling was minimal and the NRC proceedings involved the identical technical issues presented to this court.
1 e,
constituted a non-merits review, and that the Commission's decision to allow the license to issue prior to resolution of petitioners' motions to reopen was entirely without prejudice to any later decision on those motions or other issues raised in the proceeding.
Id. at I?03, 1206.
Upon reviewing the history and purpose of the Commission's imediate effectiveness rule, the court in Oystershe11 Alliance found that it "specifically contemplates Comission approval of a full-power operating license prior to the resolution of appeals or motions associated with ongoing challenges." Id. at 1206. The court upheld, as reasonable, the Commission's determination not to stay the effectiveness of the Licensing Board's decision, based on its review of the record and its conclusion that the plant could be operated safely pending resolution of the petitioners' motions; and it observed that this conclusion was "well within the Commission's discretion." The court concluded as follows:
It is petitioners' implicit position that the regulatory i
scheme enshrined in section 2.764 is inherently flawed because it permits licer: sir.g cecisions to become effective prior to a review on the merits. That position is without support.
Nothing in the AEA makes resolution of all appeals by an Appeal Board mandatory prior to Commission action on a Licensing Board's initial decision. To the contrary, section 191(a) of the AEA, 42 U.S.C. 6 2241(a), vests wide discretion in the Commission to establish 'one or more atomic safety and licensing boards... to conduct such hearings as the Commission may direct and make such intermediate and final decisions as the Commission may authorize.... '
Id.
The Commission is thus well within its discretion in providing in 10 C.F.R. 6 2.764 for immediate effectiveness of Licensing Board initial decisions upon Commission review notwithstanding the pendency of appeals to the Appeal Board, and especially notwithstanding motions to reopen on which the Appeal Board has not yet ruled....
7 While the court in Oystershe11 Alliance did not expressly address the question of whether an immediate effectiveness decision constitutes a
" final decision" under 28 U.S.C. I 2342, the court's analysis indicates that it does not. Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the reasoning of Oystershell Alliance in deciding that no " final decision" occurs until the agency's review is concluded. Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 803 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987). There, the court found that a Commission order denying petitioner's motion to reopen, issued prior to a Commission meeting anc' vote on whether to authorize a full power license, was not a final order. The court stated as follows:
We conclude that, in licensing proceedings before the NRC, a final order is the order granting or denying a license (citations omitted). The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Oystershe11 Alliance v. NRC, 800 F.2d1201(D.C.Cir.1986)(percuriam),stron'gTi supports our conclusion.
In Oystershell Alliance, petitioners argued that their motions to reopen the licensing proceedings should have been decided before the Commission authorized full. power operation. The court disagreed, concluding that the Commission's decision to license after examining all relevant evidence and determining that the plant could be operated safely, was 'well within the Commission's discretion.' At 1206.
The court also affirmed the Commission's decisions denying the motions to reopen.... Implicit in the court's entire discussion is the notion that review of the final licensing decision is the appropriate proceeding in which to consider all objections.
We conclude that the analysis utilized in the decisions discussed above is the appropriate one for use in reviewing licensing decisions of the NRC.
Because review of the final licensing decision may
[
encompass all challenges raised in the proceeding, i
such review is to be withheld until a final decision is issued, i
1 l
~8-803 f.2d at 260-261 (emphasis added). N Other courts have applied similar reasoning in finding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration renders the underlying agency decision "nonfinal" within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.
For example, in United Transportation Union v. ICC, 871 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a petition for review of the ICC's denial of a motion to reopen. There, the agency had issued a decision denying petitioner's motion to reopen and allowing a purchase I
transaction to be consummated. The petitioner then filed, before the Commission, a motion for reconsideration of the denial and for review of an underlying arbitral award involving petitioner's claims; while the motion for reconsideration remained pending within the agency, the petitioner filed for judicial review.
Upon reviewing the procedural posture of the petition, the court held "a pending petition for rehearing must render the underlying agency action nonfinal (and hence unreviewable) 4/
The court's decision in Ohio Citizens employs the same reasoning as
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the Appeal Board utilized in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-349, 4 NRC 235, 244-45 (1976). There, the Appeal Board rejected Applicants' assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider certain pending appeals due to the filing of petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals.
While the Appeal Bnard held that the licensing board's decision was a final order within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it noted that the courts have insisted upon the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to undertaking judicial review on the merits of an agency decision.
It therefore concluded that the pendency of a petition for judicial review did not deprive it of jurisdiction to consider the pending appeals (Id. at 245)-- although it suggested, without deciding, that it might be appropriate for it to seek leave of the court to reconsider matters squarely pending before the court.
Id.
at 245 n.16.
See also Id., ALAB-350, 4 NRC 365, 366 (1976) (finding that abstention might be appropriate as a matter of comity between court and agency); see also Id., CLI-76-24, 4 NRC 522, 523 (1976),
i
r 9
with respect to the filing party." Id. at 1116.
In support of this conclusion, the court cited its prior decision in Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (finding that a motion for rehearing rendered an agency action nonfinal), emphasizing its prior statement that "when the party elects to seek a rehearing there is always a possibility that the order complained of will be modified in a way which renders judicial review unnecessary." Id. at 1117.
The court in United Transportation Union further cited the decision in ICC v. B otherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1988), where I
the Supreme Court held that "a timely petition for administrative reconsideration stay [s] the running of the Hobbs Act's limitation period until the petition ha[s] been acted upon by the Commission," and where it interpreted Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act, despite its literal meaning, as allowing petitions for reconsideration to render agency actions nonfinal. El 871 F.2d at 1117-18, citing I
-S/
Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Sec. 704. Actions Reviewable.
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application...
for any form of reconsideration, or unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
a i
I I
West Penn power Co. v. epa, 860 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1988), and Winter v.
100,851F.2d1056(8thCir.), cert. denied,109S.Ct.308(1988).6/
0 An application of these principles to Intervenors' jurisdictional j
arguments compels the conclusion that Intervenors' currently pending appeals and motions to reopen before the Appeal Board and Commission render the Licensing Board's decisions nonfinal for purposes of judicial f
review. The Intervenors' pending appeals and motions involve the same matters as they raise, or will raise, before the Court of Appeals. Those matters are currently under review within the Commission, the agency having expertise to decide them, and could still result in a decision in Intervenors' favor, thus mooting any judicial appeal. The pendency of these appeals and motions militate against judicial review of the Licensing Board's decisions, and plainly render those decisions nonfinal for purposes of judicial review. Only at such time as the agency's internal appellate reviews are completed will the Licensing Board's decisions become final -- notwithstanding the fact that the Commission has allowed plant operation to commence, on the basis of its immediate effectiveness review.
Intervenors' argument that their filing of petitions for review before the Court of Appeals " deprives" the agency of jurisdiction to consider their pending motions and appeals (Memorandum at 5-6) is unfounded. First, if Intervenors were correct in their assertion, the pivotal determination of what constitutes a " final decision" under the 6/
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 704 of the Adminis-trative Procedure Act vitiates the Intervenors' reliance upon the literal terms of that provision. See Memorandum at ?-3.
11 -
l o
Hobbs Act would be made, not on the basis of established law and regulatory process, but upon a party's unilateral determination to invoke l
judicial review. That unfettered election might be made, for instance, when a party is no longer content with the agency's handling of its concerns and decides that it might do better in sore forum outside the agency - and it would seek judicial review of a licensing board decision l
rather than allow established agency review processes to run their l
prescribed course.
Such a result is clearly untenable, f
Nor do the cases cited by Intervenors warrant a contrary result.
For j
instance,IntervenorsciteGreaterBostonTelevisinnCorp.v.[CC,,
t l
463 F.2d 268, 283 (D.C. Cir.1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972), for thepropositionthat"[o]nceapetitiontoreviewhasbeenfiledincourt, the FCC has no authority to cor. duct further proceedings without the I
i court's approval. The reviewing court must order a remand if there is to be provision for further administrative consideration."
(Memorandum I
at 5 6). That case states generally that a petition for review remotes the agency's authority to conduct further proceedings without the court's approval. However, there, the agency's proceeding had already, concluded i
j and the agency (the FCC) asked the court to recall its mandate affirming a j*
final FCC order in order to permit the agency to consider arguments l
concerning the reopening of the proceeding.
Id. at 272.
In those circumstances, where both the agency's proceedings and the court's review had concluded, the court declined to recall its m6ndate.
Id. at 290-91.
Greater Boston is simply not apposite to the case at bar, i
Moreover, Other statements by the court in Greater Boston support a finding that the Appeal Board continues to have jurisdiction to decide the l
12 -
pending appeals. Thus, the >. urt defined a " final
- administrative order as one 'which is no longer subject to appeal to the court, for which no editinistrative reconsideration is permitted by regulatory statute." Ldt at 282.
Further, the court noted that the agency has undoubted authority to reconsider an order it hes enterec' before it becomes final, in order to correct errors or to hear newiv discovered evidence before an appeal.
Id.
And the court observed that the need for administrative flexibility and the objective of securing the right result in a particular case have relative dominat.ce where judicial review is sought prior to the effective date of a final administrative order.
Id.
h'or is American Fam Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service. 397 U.S.
540(1970), cited by Intervenors (Memorandum at 5), to the contrary.
There, the Court held that the agency did not act improperly in reopening a proceeding to take additiohal evidence, despite the pendency of judicial review and the entry of en order staying operation of the challenged decision. The Court recognized the agency's authority to grant rehearings and to modify or reverse its decisiens, and found that while the operation of the challenged order had been stayed by the District Court, the agency had not been stayed from furtter consideration of the matter. The Court held that, despite the pendency of the petition for judicial review, the agency never lost jurisdiction to pass on petitions for rehearing.1/
Z/
The Court's statement, quoted only in limited part by Intervenors, was as follows:
This power of the Commission to reconsider a prior decision does not necessarily collide with the judicial (Footnote continued on next page) l 4
- 13 B.
The Appeal Board's Authority to Act.
The Supreme Court's decision in American Fam Lines, supra, is instructive in considering the Intervenors' assertion that the Appeal board is proscribed from taking any action that would interfere with the Cnurt's jurisdiction over their pending judicial appeals.
It indicates clearly that the Intervenors' filing of judicial appeals does not deprive the Appeal Board of jurisdiction to consider the pending appeals.
- Indeed, the Appeal Board's own decision in Seabrook, ALAD 349, supra, reaches the sare conclusion.
All that is lef t to decide is whether the Appeal Board is required to seek permission from the Court of Appeals for its review to continue.
In this regaro, it is clear that the intervenors are entitled to seek a stay of any further review of their appeals, either from the Appeal Board or (footnote continued from previous page) power of review.
For while the court properly could provide temporary relief against a Comission order. its issuance does not mean that the Commission loses all jurisdiction to complete the administrative process.
It does mean that thereaf ter the Commission is "without power to act inconsistently with the court's jurisdiction."
Inlana Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 160. When the Commission made the additional findings af ter its first order was stayed by the court, it did not act inconsistently with what the court had done.
It did not interfere in the slightest with the court's protective order....
The Court further concluded that, because the agency had jurisdiction to act, had completed its reconsideration before the administrative record was filed and oral argument was held, and had not been stayed from reconsidering the matter, "it was not necessary for the Commission to seek permission of the court to make those rulings." Id. at 542.
The agency's action was therefore found to be "in full harmony with the court's jurisdiction." Id.
from the Court. Thus, section 705 of the Administrative Procedure 1.ct. 5 U.$.C. I 705, provides:
Sec. 705.
Relief _Pending Review.
When an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone tie effective date of action taken by it, um pending judicial review. On such conditions as may be E
required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court... may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
As the Staff understands the current status of their appeals, Intervenors have not sought to enjoin the agency from further consideration of their appeals.
In our view, until they seek and obtain such relief, no reason exists for the Appeal Board to discontinue or limit its review of the pending appeals. The Court of Appeals currently has before it, at best, Intervenors' appeal from the Commission's immediate effectiveness 0/
decision indeed, the Applicants point out that even that decision is notproperlybeforetheCourt.E/ in these circumstances, the merits of the Licensing Board's decisions are not Squarely before the Court, and the agency properly m6y cor tinue to review Intervenors' various appeals from thcse decisions without interfering with the court's jurisdiction. E 1he cases cited by Intervenors suggesting that certain procedures should
~/
As noted supra, at 3 n.2, review of the Commission's immediate 8
effectiveness decision is properly limited to a determination whether the Commission's action was arbitrary and capricious, or whether it is so flagrantly wrong as to make reversal likely.
9/
" Licensees' Memorandum With Respect to Jurisdiction of This Appeal Board Over Appeals of LBP-89-28," dated /pril 4,1990, at 2-4
~/ Of course, the parties can always bring to the attention of the court 10 any subsequent decisions of the agency, and the court could then stay the effectiveness of any such decision should it choose to do so.
be followed if further agency review is to be undertaken (Memorandum at 5-6) are not applicable here, inasmuch as final agency action on the Licensing Board's decisions has yet occurred.
CONClllSION For the reasons more fully set forth above, the Staff submits that there is no jurisdictional bar to the Appeal Board's continued consideration of Intervenors' pending appeals, Respectfully submitted, bk b
Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 5th day of April,1990 9
s
I'
$bNC UNITED STATES OF AWERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N 90 Am -6 P) :52 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of p 6 tc!: N HCMitJY votM b'd a 'FVil Docket Nos. 50-443 OL I t'la "
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF S0-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, g d.
Off site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and M CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I
hereby certify that copies of *NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS' MERORANDUM OF LAW PEGARDING THIS BOARD'S PRESENT JURISD!CTION" in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 5th day of April 1990:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairman (2)*
Peter Brann Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State House Station 6 Washington, DC 20555 Augusta. ME 04333 Richard F. Cole
- John Traficonte. Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Boston, MA 02108 Kenneth A. McCollom Geoffrey Huntington, Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General 1107 West Knapp Street Office of the Attorney General Stillwater, OK 74075 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
Robert K. Gad, III Esq.
Diane Curran. Esq.
Ropes & Gray Harmon, Curran & Tousley One International Place 2001 S Street, NW Boston, MA 02110-2624 Suite 430 Washington, DC 20009 1
o,
Robert A. Backus, Esq.
Jack Dolan Backus, Meyer & Solomon Federal Emergency Management Agency 116 Lowell Street Region !
Panchester NH 03106 J.W. McCormack Post Office &
Courthouse Building, Room 442 i
Boston, MA 02109 i
H. J. Flynn, Esq.
Judith H. Mizner, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel 79 State Street i'
Federal Emergency Management Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20472 Pobert Carrigg, Chaiman Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esq.
Town Office l
Shaines & McEtchern Atlantic Avenue L
25 Maplewood Avenue North Hampton, NH 03862 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Prs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman i
Board of Selectmen l
George Hahn, Esq.
13-15 Newmarket Road Attorney for the Examiner Durham, NH 03824 Hahn & Hesson 350 5th Ave, Suite 3700 Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey New York, NY 10118 United States Senate i
531 Hart Senate Office Building R. Scott Hill-Khilton, Esq.
Washington, DC 20510 Suzanne P. Egan, Esq.
La9oulis, Hill 4'hilton
& Rotondi Richard R. Donovan 79 State Street Federal Emergency Fanagement Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 Federal Regional Center 130 228th Street S.W.
Allen Lampert Bothell, Washington 98021 9796 Civil Defense Director Town of Brentwood Peter J. Matthews, Mayor 20 Franklin City Hall Exeter, NH 03833 Newburyport, MA 01950 i
William Armstrong Michael Santosuosso, Chaiman Civil Defense Director Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter, NH 03833 South Hampton, NH 03827 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833 Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
Town Counsel for Merrimac Gary W. Holmes Esq.
145 South Main Street Holmes & Ellis P.O. Box 38 47 Winnacunnet Road Bradford, MA 01835 Hampton, NH 03842 Barbara J. Saint Andre. Esq.
Kopelman and Paige, P.C.
4 77 Frankin Street Boston, MA 02110 w
3-Ms. Suzanne Breiseth George Iverson, Director Board of Selectmen NH Office of Emergency Management Town of Hampton Falls State House Office Park South Drinkwater Road 107 Pleasant Street Hartpton Falls, NH 03844 Concord, NH 03301 Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert R. Pierce. Esq.*
Board Panel (1)*
Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Board Panel Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear F<egulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Office of the Secretary (2)*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, DC 20555 Appeal Panel (6)*
Attn:
Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washingten. DC 20555 bd Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney e
-.-