ML20042D183

Requests Commission Approval for NRC Activities W/Iaea

ML20042D183
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/30/1989
From:	Harold Denton NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
To:
References
TASK-PINV, TASK-SE SECY-89-356, NUDOCS 8912060299
Download: ML20042D183 (15)

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POLICY ISSUE November 30, 1989 g

g SECY-89-356 For:

The Commissioners From:

Harold Denton, Director Office of Governmental and Public Affairs

Subject:

HRC'S INVOLVEMENT IN 1AEA ACTIVITIES

Purpose:

To obtain the Consission's approval for NRC's activities with the IAEA Semary:

The NRC and its predecessor agency, the AEC, have j

i maintained close technical relationships with the

- i International-Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna-since it was established in 1957. The U.S. has been in the i

forefront of efforts to establish a strong safeguards 1

regime based on IAEA inspections and has-also supported - -

IAEA's other activities fostering the use of nuclear

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energy throughout the world for civilian purposes.

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provides the key U.S. policy guidance to the IAEA in l

the nuclear safety and radiation protection program areas.

Technical experts from the NRC staff are regularly called upon to provide U.S. expertise in international discussions of all-aspects of Agency programs and issues as they have been addressed in Agency meetings, particularly in the areas of international nuclear.

safety and safeguards.

NRC employees are frequently called upon to serve as aavisors to the. Agency on nuclear safety-related aspects of technical assistance projects. Mest of. these activities ettectively support and complement NRC's statutory responsibilities, regulatory policy interests, and domestic technical i

programs.

With the growth of IAEA safeguards responsibilities, and i

restrictions on the Agency)'s budget.during the 1980's, i

directU.S.(including.t,aC support for this program has taken on growing importance. Also,.since-the Chernobyl accident in 1986, safety issues have dominated international nuclear discussions, particularly at policy level meetings in the IAEA, and the nuclear safety division.of the IAEA has practically doubled in size. Now, over three years later, with staff and program gains consolidated in the operational safety area, attention is being focused on radiation protection

Contact:

Marjorie J. Mahy, GPA/IP k gQ)_k Cy ff

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3 (atthe1988IAEAGeneralConference),-regulationand-safety of-advanced reactors (at the 1989 General Conference), and a variety of waste management issues.

It is in these areas._that we believe the NRC needs to-j

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direct its policy: attention and determine its level off effort in the IAEA.

The staff recommends that the' Commission approve continued participation in IAEA' programs at about the-same level of effort' as in recent year.s. : NRC should '

_ give high priority to support for the safeguards 1

program, reactor safety improvement programs such as Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) missions and' AdvisoryTeam(RAPAT)programssuchasRadiationProtection radiation protection-missions, safety requirements!

of future nuclear = reactors,land IAEA_ responsibilities'.

under the international conventions ~ on; emergency, notification and assistance.

The staff believes _that NRC~should ' continue _to-support

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IAEA programs in which there is a clear benefit to the l

NRC's mission, especially thosezin which the NRC wishes, L

to ensure its views.are heard.on issues being discussed by the internationalinuclear community (such as.

I development of-severity scales and Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) guidelines),-as well as.those where we can i

make a contribution ~to safety decisions ~in other r

countries. The staff,also recommends that NRC continue to support efforts to enhance the technical expertise of:

the IAEA, by the recruitment of.' qualified: technical people from the:U.S. to work oncits staff Because of resource' limitations and the priority of NRC's bilateral activities, staff participation in other IAEA. technical activities would be of lower priority. '

r The= staff notes the need to define more closely NRC's safety cooperation objectives with Eastern Europe, and certain developing countries, sand to develop a strategy i

for determining which-activities to pursue bilaterally.

and which through the IAEA.

Finally, the= staff recommends that GPA/IP continue to-monitor the IAEA program and budget to: assure that'I/fA gives appropriate emphasis to activities of particulw interest and.value to the NRC; give policy guidance to NRC participants in IAEA activities, and require meaningful reporting of the results of such participation; and work to eliminate duplication of effort between IAEA and other organizations.

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i Discussion:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 as an independent intergovernmental' organization within the United Nations system.

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headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and is composed of 113 Member States ~and a Secretariat.

Its annual budget is over $150 million, of which the-United States has i

assumed responsibility for about 25 percent.

Its main objectives,by; Statute,are: ~"To accelerate and enlarge.

the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health,-and-l E

prosperity throughout the world.and to ensure so far as' 4

l it is able that assistance provided by it, or at its i

request, or unoer.its supervision or control, is not i

used in such a way as to further any military purpose."

The IAEA was established largely at U.S.-initiative, and the United. States has consistently worked to develop'and-strengthen the Agency.

President Bush mentioned the j

3 important work it is doing to-limit the proliferation of nuclear explosives in his 1989 budget message to Congress.

The Director General of the IAEA is Dr.'Hans Blix, a l

Swedish national,'who has just been reappointed for-his

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third four-year term.

Blix oversees tne work-of the Secretariat which has approximately 800 professional staff,17 percent of whom are American. _ Policy and _

program direction is provided by a 35-member Board of _

j Governors, which generally meets four times a year. ' The-1)nited States is a permanent member of the Board..- All I AEA members meet.once. a year, in September, at: the General Conference.

For many years, until the mid-1970's, unlike most other international organizations, the-IAEA remained a largely technical forum in which divisive political' debate was generally avoided.. The U.S. continues: to emphasize its.

technical _ policy roots,- but has, on occasion, had.to take dramatic action to turn the organization back from.

.j political divisions over issues such as membership off d

Israel and South Africa. After the membership voted not to accept Israel's credentials in 1982,.the United-States walked out of the General Conference, suspending-its participation in the organization..The Administration.thereupon undertook a general reappraisal of U.S. government participation in the IAEA..The i

government decided at that time-that there was no readily available and effective safeguards and i

non-proliferation alternative to the-IAEA. -The U.S.

therefore resumed its participation in the Agency, j

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determined to work to reduce the injection of political' issues into the Agency's work.. In this it has been largely successful over the last several years.

The U.S. Congress annually appropriates.approximately.

_$40 million towards the-IAEA assessed budget of-just under $160 million.- Since 1981 the U.S. Government hasi insisted that the:IAEA use "zero-real-growth"._as a budget. planning principle, but it is. currently?

considering whether.some increase may be necessary.in; the-Safeguards budget-_in order.to continue adequately to.

inspect the-growing number of, nuclear facilities around the world.

In addition, the U.S. and other Member States provide voluntary contributions to the Technical _

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. Cooperation Department to-use for programs'in' developing countries. The-U.S.- currently makes available some-$22 million to the' Agency and its developing Member States 1

that meet our criteria for. assistance'(e.g.. NPT membership) under this program. The Technical j

Cooperation program,:however, has'not been limited by the strictures of "zero-real-growth" but-has grown at an-i annual rate of about 10 percent for the past several years. Many in the IAEA see this voluntary assistance-as the " price" the developed nuclear states pay:to obtain acquiescence in a tough safeguards policy.

The Department of State relies upon NRC guidance on.

. nuclear safety'and radiation protection in developing 1

policies regarding IAEA. programs'that' result in the wise-1 expenditure of appropriated funds.; NRC also influences the activities which take place at the IAEA through meetings of senior NRC officials with top _IAEA' managers, by participating in' advisory groups; by wor. king.as part of the U.S. delegation.at Board of Governors: meetings,_

by participating.in the~meny-techhical meetings 11n the

' i areas in which NRC has' expertise, Land by commenting _on i

the IAEA budget.

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Safeguards One of the IAEA's key responsibilities is to deter diversion:of nuclear materials' equipment, or technologies from their intended peaceful purposes through the application of safeguards to monitor the use.

l of nuclear _ material in declared peaceful programs.

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effectiveness of IAEA safeguards under the NPT is.

s limited to deterrence through the threat of ear,1y i

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detection.- The IAEA has no. enforcement _ power in its dealings With-its sovereign Member States. Should the IAEA determine'that an agreement has_been breached, it-

-is limited to reporting the incident to its Board of Governors, which then reports _to the Security Council and the _ General Assembly of the-United Nations. _ The Board may suspend all technical aio toithe State and-demand the returniof alll nuclear material,and' equipment supplied under the safeguards agreement. The United:-

Nations Security Council and General.-Assembly may take further sanctions. ThelNon-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 focussed the application of most safeguards under one j

agreement, as parties to the NPT undertook the 4

acceptance of:" full-scope" safeguards on'all.their' peaceful: nuclear activities. :Six countries with significant nuclear programs continue to adhere to a

pre-NPT type safeguards ~ agreements, under which they submit to_IAEA safeguards inspections.only.certain; facilities of their own choosing; thus they also n:ay L

(and do) operate some unsafeguarded facilities. These.

l six countries are Argentina, Brazil, Israel,. South.

Africa, India',. and: Pa kistan. -

i In:recent years, IAEA's' safeguards' inspection activities; nave increased at a faster rate than theLsafeguards, budget.

IAEA currently conducts over two thousand inspections per-year (representing over nine,thousand inspection staff -

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-days), covering:almost one;thousand facilities in 571 countries.

Included'in the scope of this program are.-

L facilities handling-sizeable quantities of enriched-1 uranium (over 30,000 metric tons of LEU and some 13 tons of HEU), and source material.

Although.IAEA's inspection-responsibilities have grown-significantly the past five years, its safeguards budget has-been subject to zero-t real-growth policy, which has.only permitted increases to compensate for inflation.

1 Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of'1978, the 1

l maintenance of effective international safeguards;is a l

fundamental tenet of U.S. nonproliferation policies and_.

L is critical to U.S. national and international security $

interests. The acceptance of IAEA safeguards enables a-non-nuclear-weapons state:to demonstrate its peaceful intentions regarding_ development-of. nuclear technology.

The voluntary-renunciation of ' nuclear weapons by States, and acceptance of international controls lto that-effect, help assure other Member States, including the U.S.,

l that trade in nuclear equipment and fuels will be used L

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i only for peaceful purposes. This' political' commitment is gaining increased importance as the technical r

sophistication of States' nuclear technologies j

increases.

1 To amplify its commitment to IAEA safeguards' the-U.S.

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has voluntarily placed its 247 peaceful nuclear s

facilities on the eligible list for, potential selection to be safeguarded by'IAEA' The U.S. continues to.-

4 provide technical support worth millions of dollars'on a voluntary-basis in addition to its regular budget.

contributions. The U.S; also-supports'lAEA programs with extrabudgetary means through the " Program of TechnicalAssistanceto1 Safeguards"-(P0TAS),managedvia,

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a State' Department' contract with Brookhaven National.

Laboratory which-has an annual budget of approximately-

$7 million.

There funds' are spent largely on. technical.

research and devices to improve, safeguards technology,-

as well. as on U.S. cost free experts (CFEs) who work in J

the Safeguards Department. NRC currently has one CFE on:

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the IAEA safeguards staff at no dollar cost to the NRC (he is supported by POTAS).

An effective international-safeguards program provides much of the basis for:NRC's confidence in licensing nuclear exports.. The confidence the. NRC may place in.

IAEA' assurances is. dependent upon-the IAEA's technical-

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' expertise and the soundness'of its policies. The U.S.

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employs-an interagency' structure of working groups and i

committees, in which the NRC participates, toFhelp-strengthen the.lAEA safeguards program._'This enables.

the NRC to influence the-policies and-priorities of

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Agency safeguards and. ensure that the-. objectives of the-3 program are fulfilled.

In the; face'of IAEA budget

. constraints 'and the increased magnitude ~ and. complexity l

of the job of safeguarding. nuclear. facilities,'as national nuclear programs mature, llRC's continued reliance on Agency safeguards could come under closer:

scrutiny if the U.S. is unable'to continue-to lend' support to IAEA safeguardsiboth voluntarily;and through' 3

the regularly assessed > contributions..the U.S. pays toi the Agency.

5 Nuclear Safety Another key responsibility of the IAEA is to promote' good safety practices worldwide in the peaceful use of:

nuclear energy. Over the years the IAEA's role in this area has grown substantially, and its-influence is felt l

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-1 in the nuclear reactor safety and nuclear materials safety programs of Member States., The NRC has taken a

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particular interest:in_the. safety activities of the IAEA in view of our mission to protect the'U.S. public health i

and safety and our special safety expertise, which can be useful to others.- The-Agency's role in nuclear.

safety increased sharply following the Chernobyl accident in.1986.

Director General Blix and two IAEA officials from the nuclear safety division _-(including-one American) were the first foreign nationals invited by Soviet. authorities to visit the Chernobyl site in the' wake of the accident. At the_end of this visit, the

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Soviet Union agreed to make information regarding the accident available through the IAEA to the international community. This resulted_in.a~ highly successful

" Post-Chernobyl Review" meeting.in August 1986. Prior -

to launching its own bilateral nuclear safety.

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arrangement with the Soviet Union.-the U.S. received its l'

informationLabout the Soviet civilian nuclear program primarily _ through the.IAEA.

East European and Soviet L

nuclear experts take part in most of the:IAEA meetings to which the U.S. sends participants.

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IAEA work in the reactor safety area contributes-to -

operational safety worldwide, including, in particular, on-site advice and assistance to developing-countries which are using U.S. power reactor technology _ exported under NRC license. OSART missions represent a' key element of-IAEA's overall safety assistance effort; they i

are very beneficial-to: countries developing safety.and' regulatory programs, and are helpful.to advanced nuclear.

I powercountriesaswell..Inaddition.inareyiewGPA

'i conducted of NRC and U.S. utility participants on IAEA<

OSARTs, the experts reported substantial benefits to-them professionally and:to their organizations from i

their international exposure on these peer ~ review teams.

t NRC has requested and received;twoiOSART' missions to; power plants inLthe U.S. which the utilities have also L

found-helpful.

a The NRC played a significant role in writing)and-approving the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS documents published in the late 1970's covering the areas of 4

i I NRC provides staff experts to serve on about half of the foreign OSARTs;;

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INPO recomends utility experts to participate on most of the remaining foreign OSARTs.

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Commissioners regulation, siting, design, construction, operation ~and decommissioning of-nuclear power reactors. Although a few of these guioes have been revised since Chernobyl, work on the guides has become-a small part of.the current IAEA safety program.

Also, more recently, NRC officials helped to influence' the safety program at the IAEA at the April 1989 IAEA Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory Group (NUSSAG)-

meeting, where members were briefed on the elements of the Agency's ongoing safety program and invited to comment on future priorities. At the suggestion of the NRC, NUSSAG developed'a set of strategic goals to guide future deliberations. -This strategic plan emphasized four goals, namely:

a) that the Agency should give highest priority. to the safety of operational nuclear power plants,-

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b) that it should help identify the desirable safety characteristics of the next generation of-nuclearL

plants, c) that it should strive to connunicate clearly and:..

effectively with the public on-safety matters, and:

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that it should continue to support Member States embarking on a nuclear power program.

Radiation Protection Several accidents in recent years which resulted in severe injury and death were caused.by the mismanagement -

i of radioisotope sources.-. One such' incident a few years ago resulted in' substantial contamination of products imported into the U.S.

While the worst problems have occurred in developing countries, incidents also occur in the,U.S. as well'as in'other advanced countries.

Devices using radioisotopes are sold on international markets and are imported into the U.S. for industrial and medical purposes. At NRC's urging, a1 seminar on-m safety of radioisotope sources was held in conjunction-l with the IAEA General Conference in 1988 and l

subsequentlyi the IAEA developed, with NRC-support, a l

program to upgrade safety in this area. While the most j

significant-improvements in safety can be achieved in p

developing countries, there are domestic benefits to be 1

obtained through improved device design,' quality assurance and understanding of human factors involved in

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v accidents. NRC participation in the IAEA program offers opportunities to improve safety domestically as well as internationally.

These accidents have demonstrated the importance of helping other countries maintain and strengthen the safety of their nuclear installations and radiation sources worlowide. The IAEA RAPAT program advises developing countries on proper practices. The U.S. has supported this effort in a number of cases, including the Goiania accident in Brazil and the more recent El Salvador radiation incident.

International differences in ap "Below Regulatory Concern (BRC)glying the principle of-to very low level sources is another important issue being' addressed at the IAEA. NRC, in. cooperation with international agencies, held an international conference in 1988 on the application of BRC policy.

BRC policy is being employed in_ some countries for recycle of contaminated materials and the introduction of radioisotopes in.

products which will reach international markets.

NRC participation in the development of international _ guides for the policies on the application of BRC and, probably more importantly, associateo quality assurance measures, is important to assure consistency on the acceptable level of safety for products that reach domestic' markets.

The Agency's ability to communicate effectively with Member States, and to expedite the provision of i

radiological assistance when deemed necessary -- in accord with the Conventions on Emergency Assistance and Early Notification -- should be useful to the the U.S.

Government in the event of another accident. NRC i

continues to contribute staff expert advice to the IAEA's emergency planning program.

The NRC should continue to be involved in internatdonal discussions of severity scales for notifying the general public in various countries of the relative seriousness of nuclear incidents. While we currently do not support the establishment of a universal scale, it is important that NRC have.a voice in the international dialogue regarding the pros and cons of employing such a scale because decisions taken by other countries in this area could ultimately affect us and because we have substantial experience with our system of public O

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notification of incidents that can help guide other countries as they consider adopting such scales.

1, Resources Expended

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r In the way of direct' support to the Safeguards l

Department at IAEA, the NRC is currently funding a i

project at a cost of approximately $560,000 to evaluate l

the utility of-an accounting concept called " Running-Book Inventory." The NRC provides equipment and

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consultative support to the IAEA-safeguards program which involves travel to overseas meetings in some 1

cases. Each year about 6 NRC staff members participate in approximately 15 meetings at the IAEA at NRC expense and 1 or 2 staff members go to Vienna at IAEA expense.

Altogether NRC spends'about $50,000 and 0.8 FTE participating in IAEA safeguards meetings annually.

In addition, NRC currently. helps guide IAEA programs and exchanges technical safety information with other countries through a wide variety of IAEA meetings.-

About 50 NRC staff members participate in meetings at.

i the IAEA each year at NRC expense. Each year about fifteen others go to Vienna at IAEA expense to complete a specific task for the IAEA with other international consultants. NRC spends approximately $150,000 and 2.6 FTEs participating in IAEA safety meetings. NRC also sponsors contractors' travel to Vienna to participate in IAEA activities.

In recent years NRC ras supported one cost-free expert to work on the IAEA nuclear safety-staff ($90,000 per year).

1 Suggested Priorities:

I.

SUPPORT FOR PRIORITY PROGRAMS Since the IAEA is the central focus for a number of important international programs in nuclear safety and e

safeguards; since the U.S. Government has determined that it is in our interest that these programs be continuedt and since the NRC provides the key technical guidance for. developing U.S. policies at the IAEA in some of these programs, the staff recomends that the Commission approve continued support for the following of NRC'y activities as a guide for the future direction priorit s involvement ~1n IAEA activities. These activities, and some other selected IAEA efforts in-which the staff identifies a clear benefit to NRC's mission or in which NRC wishes to ensure its views are t

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heard on issues being discussed by the international nuclear comunity that could affect' us, or where we could contribute to safety in other countries, will constitute the major part of NRC's participation in IAEA. Overall, current levels of effort appear about right for, accomplishing U.S. and NRC goals, and the staff recommends these levels be generally maintained.

SAFEGUARDS The IAEA safeguards program is important to U.S.

national interests.

While it does not require much direct allocation of NRC funds, it deserves continued strong programmatic support for an adequate budget as well as continued participation of key.NRC personnel at meetings which enhance the program.

REACTOR SAFETY ACTIVITIES The NRC should continue to give strong support to the OSART program, both in IAEA budget consultations and by continuing to send U.S. experts on OSART missions.

OSART visits help promote operational and safety excellence in U.S. and foreign plants and, in some-cases, help address safety problems in developing countries which are using U.S. designed and exported reactors. Currently about one OSART a month is conducted.

In addition, NRC should support, where possible, other.

IAEA activities related to operational safety, as well as safety requirements of future nuclear reactors, the development of performance indicators, severe accident and accident management, technical specifications, the use of the ' Incident Reporting System, and the analysis of safety significant events.

RADIATION PROTECTION NRC should help strengthen, and along with representatives of other countries, participate in the IAEA's RAPAT program, and in efforts to offer follow-up assistance in setting up' regulatory structures for control of radiation sources in developing Member States.

RAPAT visits appear to be the most cost-effective way for the U.S. and others to help identify and bring international resources to bear og

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dangerous radiation practices and programs around the world.

It is in the NRC's interest to. assure that the IAEA's i

clearing house functions in emergency response situations are clearly spelled out and that the IAEA maintain.a modest, but effective, emergency response assistance and training program, i

11. ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT NRC should also continue to monitor IAEA performance in the following administrative and technical areas to achieve U.S. and NRC objectives:

a)

Enhanco the technical expertise ofithe IAEA. -NRC should support the goal of increasing the number of U.!.. citizens on the~ staff of the IAEA, refle: ting the U.S. fair share in view of its 25 percent budget contribution.- NRC has sent, and needs to continue to send, well. qualified technical people +.o the IAEA staff to manage-IAEA programs better, j

b)

Continue to. monitor the IAEA's Budget and Program i

of Work to look for programs NRC. wishes to support strongly, and also to-assure'that IAEA is not spending U.S. or NRC funds on programs NRC i

believes are not worthy of its time and money.

GPA currently is focusing staff effort on obtaining a better understanding of IAEA nuclear safety and radiation protection programs and NRC's involvement in them.

NRC must also continue its close observation of the international safeguards program of the Agency, to assure that'it is.

effectively carrying out its mission, so that we can rely on its judgments in making our export -

licensing determinations, c)

Continue to coordinate instructions for NRC participants at 1AEA technical meetings, and require better reporting on issues of interest to the hunission.

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Eliminate duplication of effort with other international organizations such as the NEA.

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has encouraged better cooperation, and progress has been made, for example toward eliminating b

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duplicate meetings on similar topics and having one system for reporting of nuclear incidents rather than two.

However, we still have evidence, such as the work underway in each Agency on comparing national regulatory practices, that the two agencies are still not well enough coordinated.

III.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PRIORITIES Because of' resource limitations and the priority. of certain bilateral activities, NRC's participation in IAEA technical activities, other than those described in I., above, would be of low priority. Some technical assistance support will.be provided to IAEA (for which the travel and subsistence costs of NRC experts'are paid by IAEA or from State Department / AID' funds), but preference will be given to-helping regulatory and safety groups in countries using reactors or other technology and materials exported from the U.S.

In addition, the NRC position in U.S. Government discussions on.the IAEA 2rogram of work should be to emphasize the value of tie Agency's role in achieving technical consensus among Member States.

NRC will help exercise restraint on the IAEA staff in regard to programs where the expertise for productive work, lies in the Member States, or where NRC determines IAEA involvement is not timely or efficient.

NRC should more closely define its nuclear safety cooperation objectives with respect to Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc.), and those developing countries which operate LWRs imported from the U.S.

(Korea, Mexico, Brazil Yugoslavia, and Taiwan) to-develop a strategy for determining which activities to pursue bilaterally and which through the IAEA. NRC can often exchange specific regulatory information most effectively under NRC's bilateral arrangements.

We cannot afford to duplicate these bilateral efforts in international meetings, and neither NRC nor IAEA resources for these purposes are increasing.

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Reconmendations:

That the Comission review and approve NRC's involvement in IAEA activities as outlinec above.

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w-Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Governmental and Public Affairs Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Friday, December 15, 1989.

Conniesion Staf f Office comments, if any, should be submitted; 1

to the Commissioners NLT Friday, December 8, 1989, with an information copy to the office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

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